Back into Plato’s Cave

Michael Banton*University of Bristol

In his Gellner lecture Rogers Brubaker referred to the distinction between catego-ries of practice and categories of analysis that he introduced in an essay written in2000 with Frederick Cooper (Brubaker 2004:31–32). A distinction of this kindmay well have a long background in philosophical writing, but, for presentpurposes, it may be sufficient to start from a 1979 essay of mine contrastinganalytical and folk concepts of race and ethnicity (Banton 1979). This distinctionwas endorsed by Wacquant (1997), though he failed to notice that I had changedmy position, and had come to regard ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ as folk rather thananalytical concepts. Brubaker noted Wacquant’s argument, but remarked that hedid not wish to draw so sharp a distinction. Since then I have reiterated myconclusion that a sharp distinction is needed, and that it is best expressed by thecontrast between emic and etic constructs drawn by American anthropologists(Lett 1996).

More recently, Brubaker has published an article in which, as an example of acategory of practice, he cites the category ‘Muslim’ as a word ‘used to identifyoneself and to identify others’ (Brubaker 2013:2). He also writes:

My argument is not about what categories we should use; it is about how weshould use them. We may have no good alternative to using analyticalcategories that are heavily loaded and deeply contested categories of prac-tice; but as scholars we can and should adopt a critical and self-reflexivestance towards our categories.

(Ibid.:6)

For me, language and religion are emic constructs that need to be refined if they areto be used for the purposes of analysis. Brubaker thinks otherwise; in his Gellnerlecture he aims to identify the ways in which language and religion are intertwinedwith ethnicity and nationhood, using four categories of practice as categories ofanalysis. Brubaker sets aside questions of methodology because his interestsare, he says, substantive. Methodological issues are nevertheless central to hisenterprise.

Brubaker appeals to Durkheim as an authority, but Durkheim presented hisstudy of variations in suicide rates as a demonstration that the distinctiveness ofsociological knowledge lay in its ability to discover something new. As Durkheim

* Michael Banton was Professor of Sociology in the University of Bristol 1965–92.

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(1952 [1897]:310) wrote, ‘If there is such a science as sociology, it can only be thestudy of a world hitherto unknown’, i.e., knowledge of a world of culture-freeconstructs distinct from those of popular consciousness. Likewise, Popper(1972:191) has maintained that the world of theoretical knowledge grows by aprocess of conjecture and refutation: ‘scientific explanation, whenever it is adiscovery, will be the explanation of the known by the unknown’.

Brubaker claims, in effect, that ordinary language suffices for sociologicalanalyses, a line of argument that can draw support from the philosophy ofWittgenstein and which Gellner opposed. Gellner famously assailed the ‘Linguis-tic Philosophy’ that prevailed in Oxford in the 1950s as trying to create a world safefrom new knowledge and, particularly, from scientific knowledge. According to itsexponents, he wrote: ‘The philosophical job is to persuade us of the adequacy ofordinary conceptualizations. It is the story of Plato over again – only this time it isthe philosopher’s job to lead us back into the cave’ (Gellner 1968 [1959]:117).

It is particular languages and particular religions that are intertwined withparticular ethnic and national identifications. They interrelate in ways that chal-lenge the social scientist’s curiosity. For example, in ordinary language usage, theacquisition of full nationhood is thought to be signalled by the internationalrecognition of a state and of its flag. In international institutions, like the EuropeanParliament, the new state may expect recognition of its national language evenwhen this is not necessary. So the Irish language was added to the EuropeanParliament’s list although it is not the first language of most of the state’spopulation. Languages like Serbo-Croat and Czechoslovak may be divided inorder to satisfy the pride of two newly separate nations. Language recognition mayentail significant costs for the interpretation of speeches and the translation ofdocuments. How much other states are willing to pay for such services is a politicalissue that merits examination. Changes in attitudes towards language are ofacademic interest if they cast light upon changes in the nature of social bonds.

Research by David Laitin has illuminated processes of language change inseveral countries, including Catalonia in both the seventeenth century and morerecent times (Green et al. 2009). Moreover, instead of a bilateral bond betweenstate and language, there is now a triangle introducing interstate relations. Inter-national UN-sponsored human rights treaties are agreed in five languages(Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish) and are equally authentic in allfive. The use of major languages, for convenience, affects conceptions of nation-hood. International bonds sometimes take priority over national ones.

A comparable argument can be advanced with respect to Brubaker’s other maintopic. In the world of practice, what counts as religion – or as ‘a’ religion – isusually decided by religious professionals: popes, ayatollahs, archbishops, rabbis,synods, and so on. Governments and courts defer to their pronouncements. Behindmany decisions is the notion of ‘world religions’: Buddhism, Christianity, Hindu-ism, Islam, Judaism, etc. Believers do not necessarily see their faith in these terms(see Searle-Chatterjee 2000). What individuals actually believe and do is sodifferent from professional declarations that it merits a distinctive name. ‘Faith’ isdifferent from ‘religion’. Because of increased contact between peoples, the actualbeliefs and practices of individuals have been changing in ways that should

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provoke curiosity. One sociologically important consideration – as Laitin has againdemonstrated – is that a perception of shared faith facilitates the coordination ofsocial action. It can promote reciprocity.

As categories of practice, both language and religion pose problems that shouldbe treated as explananda – things to be explained. In proposing these ordinarylanguage constructs as explanantia – terms in an explanation – Brubaker stayswithin the world of practice and of emic understandings. He tries to lead hisreaders back into Plato’s cave.

References

Banton, Michael. 1979. ‘Analytical and Folk Concepts of Race and Ethnicity’. Ethnic andRacial Studies 2 (2): 127–38.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. Ethnicity without Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2013. ‘Categories of Analysis and Categories of Practice: A Note on theStudy of Muslims in European Countries of Immigration’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(1): 1–8.

Durkheim, Emile. 1952 [1897]. Suicide:A Study in Sociology. Trans. John A. Spaulding andGeorge Simpson. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Gellner, Ernest. 1968 [1959]. Words and Things. Harmondsworth: Penguin.Green, Elliott D., Michael Banton, Monserrat Guibernau, and David Laitin. 2009. ‘Fifth

Nations and Nationalism Debate on David Laitin’s Nations, States, and Violence’.Nations and Nationalism 15 (4): 557–74.

Lett, James W. 1996. ‘Emic/Etic Distinctions’. In Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology,ed. David Levinson and Melvin Ember. Vol. 2. New York: Henry Holt.

Popper, Karl R. 1972. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford:Clarendon.

Searle-Chatterjee, Mary. 2000. ‘ “World Religions” and “Ethnic Groups”: Do These Para-digms Lend Themselves to the Cause of Hindu Nationalism?’ Ethnic and Racial Studies23 (3): 497–515.

Wacquant, Loïc J.D. 1997. ‘For an Analytic of Racial Domination’. Political Power andSocial Theory 11: 221–34.

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