Bacharach (1998) Organizational Theories - Some Criteria for Evaluation-5b

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Organizational Theories: Some Criteria for EvaluationAuthor(s): Samuel B. BacharachSource: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp. 496-515

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c Academy of Management Review, 1989, Vol. 14, No. 4, 496-515

rganizational Theor ies

o m e r i t e r i a o r valuation

SAMUEL B. BACHARACHCornell University

A set of ground rules and vocabulary to facilitate focused discussion

about the structure of organization and management theories areproposed. The many previous efforts at defining and evaluating the-ory help establish criteria for theory construction and evaluation. Inthe establishment of these criteria, description is distinguished fromtheory, and a matrix of criteria for evaluating the variables, con-structs, and relationships that together compose a theory is devel-oped. The proposed matrix may be useful both for defining the nec-essary components of good theory and for evaluating and/or com-paring the quality of alternative theories. Finally, a discussion of theway theories fit together to give a somewhat broader picture of em-pirical reality reveals the lines of tension between the two main cri-teria for evaluating theory.

In order to talk about the nature of the universeand to discuss questions of whether it has a be-ginning or an end, you have to be clear aboutwhat a scientific theory is. (Hawking, 1988, p. 9)

A theory is a statement of relations amongconcepts within a set of boundary assumptionsand constraints. It is no more than a linguisticdevice used to organize a complex empiricalworld. As Hall and Lindzey (1957, p. 9) pointedout, the function of a theory is that of preventingthe observer from being dazzled by the full-blown complexity of natural or concrete events.Therefore, the purpose of theoretical statementsis twofold: to organize (parsimoniously) and tocommunicate (clearly).

Many current theories in organizational be-havior fail to accomplish this purpose, primarilybecause they ignore certain generally acceptedrules about theoretical statements. Just as a col-lection of words does not make a sentence, acollection of constructs and variables does notnecessarily make a theory.

Students of theory construction have tried todevelop a set of rules for the examination of theconstructs and variables which are the units oftheoretical statements (cf. Dubin, 1969; Chron-bach & Meehl, 1955; Blalock, 1968; Schwab,1980). They also have attempted to develop a setof rules for the examination of the relationshipsamong these units (cf. Blalock, 1969; Cohen,1980; Nagel, 1961; Hempel, 1965; Stinchcombe,1968; Popper, 1959; Dubin, 1976; Gibbs, 1972).Nevertheless, the diversity of these perspectivessuggests the need for a more specific examina-tion of their rules as applied to organizationalstudies.

What Theory Is Not:Data, Typologies, and Metaphors

Description, the features or qualities of indi-vidual things, acts, or events (Werkmeister,1959, p. 484) must be distinguished from theory.As Hempel (1965) pointed out, the vocabulary ofscience has two basic functions: (a) to ade-

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quately describe the objects and events beinginvestigated and (b) to establish theories by

which events and objects can be explained andpredicted. While descriptions may be the sourcematerial of theories, they are not themselvestheoretical statements. In the organization andmanagement literature, the two are often con-fused. Specifically, three modes of descriptionmust be distinguished from theory: categoriza-tion of raw data, typologies, and metaphors.

While some forms of descriptive analysis are

often confused with theory, all researchersagree that categorization of data-whetherqualitative or quantitative-is not theory. In thiscontext, much of the work in organizational andmanagement science should not be thought ofas theory. Categorization characterizes much ofthe work in these fields, particularly in therealms of business policy/strategy and humanresource strategy. One theme in the former

case, for example, has been the search for em-pirical categorizations, or gestalts, of organiza-tional environments and characteristics (e.g.,Miller, 1986; Miller & Friesen, 1977). One char-acteristic in the latter case has been the searchfor a goodness of fit between empirically derivedcategorizations of business strategy and humanresource strategy (e.g., Schuler & Jackson, 1987;Wils & Dyer, 1984). Some of these studies, bothquantitative and qualitative, are often particu-larly rich and thus useful as grounds (Glaser &Strauss, 1967) for theory building (e.g., Dyer &Holder, 1989; Miller, 1987; Miller & Friesen,1984). In and of themselves, however, theyclearly fall in Hempel's (1965) realm of descrip-tion, not theory.

Other descriptions-specifically, those basedupon typologies-have been more abstract inorganizing observations (e.g., Blau & Scott,1962; Etzioni, 1975; Gouldner, 1954). Typologistshave implicitly emulated Weber's ideal con-struct, in that most typologies meet his classicdefinition of an ideal type . . . a mental con-struct formed by the synthesis of many diffuse. . . individual phenomena which are ar-ranged, according to certain one-sidedly accen-

tuated points of view, into a unified analyticalconstruct (Shils & Finch, 1949, p. 90).

Yet even these abstractions should not beviewed as theory. The one-sided accentuation ofwhich Weber spoke is found in most typologies.For example, in creating a typology of organi-zations, Blau and Scott (1962) emphasized thebeneficiaries; Gouldner (1954), leadership style;and Etzioni (1975), compliance structure. Whilethis one-sided accentuation achieves one of thegoals of theory (i.e., eliminating some of the

complexity of the real world), and while typolo-gies are more abstract than a categorical de-scription of raw data, such typologies are limitedto addressing the primary question asked by de-scriptive researchers -the question of what,rather than the more theoretical how, why, andwhen.

In recent years, metaphors have become pop-ular in organizational studies. Broadly speak-ing, a metaphor is a statement that maintainsthat two phenomena are isomorphic (i.e., theyhave certain properties in common) (Brodbeck,1959). Unlike the case of categorical analysis ofraw data (What are the phenomena?), or thecase of typology (What is the most important as-pect of the phenomenon?), the metaphor is usedto ask how the phenomenon is similar to another(often unrelated) phenomenon. Some of themost well-known metaphors include the notionsof organizations as loosely coupled systems(Weick, 1976) and as garbage cans (Cohen,March, & Olsen, 1972).

Metaphors are powerful literary tools. RobertBums' comparison of his love to a red rose evokesstrong emotional imagery. It does not need toevoke a series of analytical questions about love;the description itself suffices. To be of use in thedevelopment of theory in organizational behavior,a metaphor must go beyond description and be auseful heuristic device. That is, the imagery con-tained in the metaphor must assist the theorist inderiving specific propositions and/or hypothesesabout the phenomenon being studied. In thiscontext, metaphors are not theories but maywell serve as precursors to theories, and should

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be judged on that basis. For example, if onechooses to view organizations as noncon-

flictual zeppelins, it's his or her prerogative todo so. What must be evaluated is not whetherorganizations are in fact nonconflictualzeppelins, but rather the propositions and hy-potheses derived from the imagery. If one's im-age of organizations as nonconflictual zep-pelins is to thrive, then it is because the qualityof propositions and hypotheses generated bythis image is better than the quality of those gen-

erated by other alternative images such as gar-bage can models or loosely coupled systems.

What Theory Is

Building on the works of previous students oftheory construction (e.g., Dubin, 1969; Nagel,1961; Cohen, 1980), researchers can define atheory as a statement of relationships betweenunits observed or approximated in the empiricalworld. Approximated units mean constructs,which by their very nature cannot be observeddirectly (e.g., centralization, satisfaction, or cul-ture). Observed units mean variables, whichare operationalized empirically by measure-ment. The primary goal of a theory is to answerthe questions of how, when, and why, unlike thegoal of description, which is to answer the ques-tion of what.

In more detailed terms, a theory may beviewed as a system of constructs and variablesin which the constructs are related to each otherby propositions and the variables are related toeach other by hypotheses. The whole system isbounded by the theorist's assumptions, as indi-cated by Figure 1.

Boundaries of Theories

The notion of boundaries based on assump-tions is critical because it sets the limitations inapplying the theory. As Dubin (1969) main-tained, all theories are constrained by their spe-cific critical bounding assumptions. These as-sumptions include the implicit values of the the-orist and the often explicit restrictions regardingspace and time.

Values are the implicit assumptions by whicha theory is bounded. Theories cannot be com-

pared on the basis of their underlying values,because these tend to be the idiosyncratic prod-uct of the theorist's creative imagination andideological orientation or life experience. Thismay explain why perpetual debates such asthose between Marxists and Structural Function-alists have made so little progress over theyears. As Weber pointed out, the value-ladennature of assumptions can never be eliminated.

Yet if a theory is to be properly used or tested,the theorist's implicit assumptions which formthe boundaries of the theory must be under-stood. Unfortunately, theorists rarely state theirassumptions. Thus, while Mintzman's (1970) ex-tensive and fascinating discussion of the influ-ence of Weber's personal reality on his theoret-ical product does not serve to expand or changeWeber's theory, it does assist in explicating theimplicit values which bound his theory.

An example of how a theorist's values may bemanifest in a theoretical debate may be found ina classic debate over the concept of power. Par-sons maintained that power is essentially themobilization of resources and thus is not a zero-sum game. On the other hand, C. Wright Mills(1956) maintained that power is the control ofresources, and thus is a zero-sum game. An ar-gument may be made that this differential ori-entation toward power is based on these theo-rists' different values. Parsons, viewing societyand organizations as functional and consensualsystems, ignored the possibility of finite re-sources as a potential source of conflict. Rather,he saw resources as being capable of perpetualexpansion. Mills, on the other hand, seeing so-ciety and organizations as stratified and conflict-ual entities, ignored the expansive nature of re-sources and instead emphasized finite resourcesand a zero-sum notion of power. The interactionbetween these two theorists is thus implicitly acollision of values.

The current debate over the application of theconcept of culture to the organizational contextalso may be viewed as an example of the im-

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BOUNDARY ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT VALUES, TIME, AND SPACE

GENE |/|PROPOSMTONSll

R | / | CONSTRUCTS CONSTRUCTSA

LAAI

A |B HYPOTHESES

VARIABLES 4 VARIABLES

ITy

Figure 1. Components of a theory.

plicit debate over values if not ideology. Duringthe early resurrection (by organizational theo-rists) of the concept of culture (Schein, 1985; Deal& Kennedy, 1982), most theorists chose to view itas an integrative normative device. In doing sothey implicitly drew on the values that underliefunctionalist theorizing by scholars such as Rad-cliffe-Brown (1949), Malinowski (1962), andDurkheim (1933). Therefore, their implicit func-tional orientation (placing emphasis on sustain-ing the organization as a whole) may makethem vulnerable to criticism that they serve theinterests of management. In more recent workfrom the conflict theory perspective, culture isviewed as an organizational mechanism for thenormative coercion of the individual worker. Forexample, Kunda (in press), in studying a com-

pany that is often held up as a shining model ofthe positive normative impact of culture, un-veiled a story of oppression where others told atale of productivity. While these two orientationstoward culture are not inherently inconsistent,they do show the effects of different valueson the construction of theories about organiza-tions.

While values often canonly be revealed bypsychoanalytic, historical, and ideological stud-

ies of the theorist (e.g., Gay's work on Freud,1988; Mintzman's work on Weber, 1970), spatialand temporal assumptions are often relativelyapparent. Spatial boundaries are conditions re-stricting the use of the theory to specific units ofanalysis (e.g., specific types of organizations).Temporal contingencies specify the historical

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applicability of a theoretical system. Taken to-gether, spatial and temporal boundaries restrict

the empirical generalizability of the theory.While most theories are limited by spatial and

temporal restrictions, some are more boundedby one than the other. For example, some theo-ries may be unbounded in time, but bounded inspace. That is, these theories are only applica-ble to specific types of organizations, but can beapplied over different historical periods. Othertheories are unbounded in space (that is, they

may be applicable to many types of organiza-tions), but very much bounded in a specific tem-poral context. Finally, theories may be relativelyunbounded in both space and time. Such theo-ries have a higher level of generalizability thanthose bounded in either or both space and time,ceteris paribus. Of course, this generalizabilityrequires a higher level of abstraction, whichmeans that the theory sacrifices the level of de-

tail needed to fit a specific situation. This leads tothe paradox that some of the most detailed theo-ries and elaborate studies about organizationsare not generalizable enough to build a cumu-lative body of research on (e.g., Goffman's the-ory of total institutions). On the other hand, someof the most abstract and broad perspectives onorganizations, while not necessarily rich in de-tail, have provided a critical basis for cumula-tive research (e.g., Hannan and Freeman's,1977, population ecology, and Kimberly andMiles', 1980, life-cycle theory).

Implied in the notion of generalizability aredifferent levels on which one can theorize. Thisimplicit continuum stretches from empirical gen-eralizations (rich in detail but strictly bounded inspace and/or time) to grand theoretical state-ments (abstract, lacking in observational detail,but relatively unbounded in space and/or time).

Variables, Constructs, and Relationships

Within these boundaries lies the stuff of the-ory. On a more abstract level, propositions statethe relations among constructs, and on the moreconcrete level, hypotheses (derived from the

propositions) specify the relations among vari-ables. In this context, theorists must be specific

in how they use the notions of constructs andvariables. Theorists should not use these termssynonymously. Constructs may be defined as

terms which, though not observational eitherdirectly or indirectly, may be applied or evendefined on the basis of the observables (Kap-lan, 1964, p. 55). A variable may be defined asan observable entity which is capable of assum-ing two or more values (Schwab, 1980). Thus, a

construct may be viewed as a broad mental con-figuration of a given phenomenon, while a vari-able may be viewed as an operational configu-ration derived from a construct. Schwab listed anumber of examples of such constructs and theirrelated variables (e.g., performance: sales or re-turn on investment; cohesion: rate of interper-sonal interaction or member voting patterns;leader consideration: member perceptions of

specific supervisory behavior).Created within the context of specified bound-

aries and built from abstract constructs or theirmore concrete manifestations (variables), theo-retical systems take the form of propositions andproposition-derived hypotheses. While bothpropositions and hypotheses are merely state-ments of relationships, propositions are themore abstract and all-encompassing of the two,and therefore relate the more abstract constructsto each other. Hypotheses are the more concreteand operational statements of these broad rela-tionships and are therefore built from specificvariables.

Generation of Criteriafor the Evaluation of Theories

No evaluation of a theory is possible unlessresearchers first establish those broad criteriaby which it is to be evaluated. Based on pre-vious work (e.g., Popper, 1959; Nagel, 1961;Hempel, 1965), the two primary criteria uponwhich any theory may be evaluated are (a) fal-sifiability and (b) utility.

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Falsifiability

Falsifiability determines whether a theory isconstructed such that empirical refutation is pos-sible. While the idealistic goal of science is thepursuit of universal truth, most philosophers ofscience would agree that theories can never beproven, only disproven (cf. Nagel, 1961; Popper,1959). As Popper (1959, p. 41) maintains, Itmustbe possible for an empirical scientific system tobe refuted by experience.

Theories are thus like the accused in an Amer-ican courtroom-innocent until proven guilty.The problem with organizational studies is thattheories are often stated in such a vague waythat the theorists can rebut any discrediting ev-idence. Just as no person can be above the law,no theory ought to be constructed in such a waythat it is forever exempt from empirical refuta-tion. If researchers are to avoid wading throughever deeper piles of irrefutable statements dis-guised as theories, they must be able to discardsuch false theories. To be able to do this, theymust try to construct theories that are coherentenough to be refuted.

Utility

Utility refers to the usefulness of theoreticalsystems. As Bierstedt (1959) pointed out, utilitymay be viewed as the bridge that connects the-ory and research (p. 125). At the core of thisconnection are explanation and prediction. Thatis, a theory is useful if it can both explain andpredict. An explanation establishes the substan-tive meaning of constructs, variables, and theirlinkages, while a prediction tests that substan-tive meaning by comparing it to empirical evi-dence.

One problem of incomplete theoretical sys-tems is that they are often used to make predic-tions, yet they do not provide explanations. Inthis context, Kaplan (1964) spoke of the ancientastronomers, who were able to make superbpredictions but were incapable of providing ad-equate explanations of observed phenomena.Thus, in organizational behavior, when re-

searchers accept predictive statements as the-ory (e.g., the proposition: the greater the orga-

nizational size,the

greaterthe horizontal

differ-entiation; or its derived hypothesis: the greaterthe number of employees, the greater the num-ber of departments), they sound a bit like theancient astronomers. Only when theory showshow and why larger organizations have moredepartments will it be able to explain as well aspredict.

The Falsifiability of Variables,Constructs, and Relationships

With an understanding of the components oftheory at different levels of abstraction (vari-ables, constructs, and the relationships that con-nect them) and the two main types of criteria(falsifiability and utility), researchers can beginto understand the way these criteria can be ap-

plied to theory. Because constructs and vari-ables are the building blocks of hypotheses andpropositions, theorists must first evaluate thembefore analyzing the relational properties oftheories. If they are working with inappropriateconstructs and variables, how these constructsand variables are assembled into hypothesesand propositions is irrelevant. All parts of abridge may fit together perfectly, but if this

bridge is constructed of silly-putty, it is not agood idea to drive over it.

By beginning the analysis with variables andconstructs, researchers are not excluding thepossibility that theory building or evaluation is aprocess which begins with the examination ofthe relationships in hypotheses and proposi-tions, or what Kaplan refers to as the paradox ofconceptualization. As Kaplan (1964) noted, Theproper concepts are needed to formulate a goodtheory, but we need a good theory to arrive atthe proper concepts (p. 53).

The Falsifiability of Variables:Measurement Issues

Although constructs contained in propositionsmay be defined in terms of other constructs, con-

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that these theoretical statements may not besubject to falsification.

Yet having noncontinuous variablesis

notenough. Many scholars in organizational andmanagement theory have taken the criterion ofreliability far too lightly. For example, in a re-cent evaluation of the technological innovationliterature, Shenhav, Haberfeld, and Cohen (inpress) showed that across numerous studies,measures of innovation and scientific productiv-ity achieve an acceptable level of reliability (i.e.,

alpha = .70 or greater) only in specific contexts.These researchers argued that such relativelyunstable measures have often been used inap-propriately to test theories. Their instability isattributed to the fact that most innovation andproductivity measures are based on sociallyconstructed notions which take on differentmeanings in different contexts.

The Falsifiability of Constructs:Construct Validity

It may be useful to define constructs in terms ofother established and well-understood con-structs. If the purpose of a proposition is to com-municate the relationship between two or moreconstructs, then (unlike for variables) the onlyoperational criteria which these constructs mustmeet is that they have good clarity and parsi-mony. However, constructs which are explicitlyoperationalized must have their variables un-dergo the previously mentioned tests for vari-able falsifiability as a first step in the test forconstruct validity.

When combined, the indicators of constructand variable falsifiability are no less than thecriteria for construct validity itself. In this context,in order to provide evidence of falsifiability, in-dividual constructs contained in propositionsmust meet minimum standards of construct va-lidity, while individual variables, derived fromconstructs and contained in proposition-derivedhypotheses, must meet the measurement modelcriteria.

To achieve construct validity, at the very leastthe responses from alternative measurements of

the same construct must share variance (i.e.,convergent validity) (Schwab, 1980), while the

identified objects of analysis must not share at-tributes and must be empirically distinguishablefrom one another (discriminant validity).

In determining convergent validity the theoristmust confirm that evidence from differentsources gathered in different ways all indicatethe same or similar meaning of the construct(Kerlinger, 1973, p. 463). In determining discrim-inant validity, the theorist must confirm that one

can empirically differentiate the construct fromother constructs that may be similar, and thatone can point out what is unrelated to theconstruct (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 463). If two inde-pendent variables have high collinearity, it isimpossible to talk of their independent effects.

The formulation of propositions incorporatingvalid constructs is a responsibility not alwaystaken seriously by scholars of organizational

and management theory. Examples regardingproblems with both convergent and discrimi-nant validity may be found. Pelz and Andrews(1966) examined the convergence of their self-reported, nonjudgmental measures of the con-struct scientific productivity. They found a rela-tively low magnitude of correlation among thevarious indicators (e.g., application outcomes,lab reports). In spite of the low magnitudes ofconvergence, the validity, and hence, falsifi-ability, of the construct was confirmed by theseresearchers on the grounds that low magnitudecorrelations could be expected given that eachmeasure was designed to tap a different aspectof scientific productivity. Rejecting this argu-ment, Shenhav and Haberfeld (in press) arguedthat Pelz and Andrews' findings should be takenas an indication of low construct validity, sincedifferent measures of the same construct shouldbe highly correlated. That is, Shenhav and Hab-erfeld suggested that Pelz and Andrews did nottake the issue of construct validity seriouslyenough.

Regarding discriminant validity, Young (1988)was critical of Freeman and Hannan (1983) who,in examining the relative impact of variability in

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sales and seasonality on the viability of resorttowns, measured seasonality on a quarterly ba-sis. For some resort towns

(e.g.,South

LakeTahoe), sales and seasonality measures (i.e.,variables) are nearly perfectly confounded, thusraising the possibility of limited discriminant va-lidity.

Similarly, Locke, Saari, Shaw, and Latham(1981, p. 145) are critical of researchers examin-ing the impact of goal difficulty on the goal-taskperformance relationship. There is often no em-

pirical difference between an easy-goal condi-tion and a moderate-goal condition, for a com-mon problem with easy-goal subjects is thattheir goals are so easy that once they are re-vealed, they set new higher goals to have some-thing to do, which means that they are no longergenuine easy-goal subjects (Locke et al., 1981,p. 142). Furthermore, in attempting to explainthe inconsistent findings regarding the impact of

individual differences on the goal setting-taskperformance relationship, Locke et al. found in-adequate reliability and validity of personalitymeasures to be a primary source of these incon-sistent findings. This situation reminds research-ers that embedded in the construct validity cri-teria is the assumption that the variables werecorrectly measured.

The key to meeting the falsifiability criterionfor constructs thus lies in showing that variableswhich should be derived from the constructs areindeed correlated with the construct, regardlessof the procedure used to test correlation, andthose variables which should be unrelated tothe construct are indeed uncorrelated. In adopt-ing such a definition of convergent validity,Schwab (1980) maintained that Campbell andFiske's (1959) multitrait-multimethod matrixmethodology, while the most popular methodfor assessing construct validity, may provideonly limited evidence, because correlation coef-ficients are likely to be strongly influenced bysample size, and convergence is likely to reflecthard-to-avoid common-method variance.

For this reason the explication of construct va-lidity as an evaluative indicator began with the

phrase at the very least.... In determiningthe falsifiability of constructs, convergent anddiscriminant validity tests should not be used inisolation. Thus, a well-grounded assessment ofthe falsifiability of a construct should most likelygo beyond assessments of convergent and dis-criminant validity. Other supplementary testsinclude factor analysis and tests of concurrentand predictive validity. Van de Ven and Chu(1987), for example, subjected their innovationeffectiveness construct to rigorous analysis, in-

cluding multimethod convergent and discrimi-nant validity tests at two points in time, factoranalysis, and tests of concurrent and predictivevalidity. While construct validity (like a theory)can only be rejected, never confirmed, Van deVen and Chu's tests provide stronger evidencethat their construct is indeed falsifiable.

The importance of this falsifiability criterioncannot be overstated. Unless evidence is pre-

sented of the falsifiability of constructs and vari-ables, construct validity-critical to the buildingof theory-can never be achieved. Schwab(1980) maintained that because organizationaland management theorists and researchersplace such emphasis on the examination of re-lations between independent and dependentphenomena, without examining the character-istics of these phenomena, knowledge of the re-lationships among phenomena is not as greatas is believed, and (more speculatively) not asgreat as would be true if the idea of constructvalidity received greater attention (p. 4).

With this in mind, Anderson and Gerbing(1988) proposed that in undertaking LISREL-based theory testing, researchers should first as-sess validity for the building blocks of the theory(i.e., confirm the falsifiability of the constructsand variables embedded in propositions andhypotheses) by separate estimation and, wherenecessary, respecification of the measurementmodel, and only afterwards simultaneously es-timate the measurement and structural submod-els. When a theory is evaluated, the boundarybetween theory construction and theory testingoften becomes blurred. As such, theorists have

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the responsibility to ensure that their hypothesesand propositions contain constructs and vari-ables which can be researched (i.e., are capa-ble of disconfirmation).

The Falsifiability of Relationships:Logical and Empirical Adequacy

A number of criteria with which to evaluateconstructs and variables have been empha-sized. Now the adequacy of the relational ele-ments of a theoretical system (i.e., the linkagesestablished among the component constructsand variables) must be evaluated. Going backto the analogy of the bridge, now that indicatorscan determine that the bridge is not made out of

silly-putty, it should be established that thelinkages among the component elements aresound.

When evaluating the falsifiability of the rela-tional properties of theoretical systems, theoristsmust examine both the logical adequacy of thepropositions and hypotheses (and their interre-lationships) as well as their empirical adequacy(the capacity of the relationships implied inpropositions and hypotheses to be operational-ized).

Logical Adequacy

Logical adequacy may be defined as the im-plicit or explicit logic embedded in the hypothe-ses and propositions which ensures that the hy-potheses and propositions are capable of beingdisconfirmed. In this context, individual propo-sitions and hypotheses must satisfy the followingtwo criteria: (a) They must be nontautological,and (b) The nature of the relationship betweenantecedent and consequent must be specified.

Criterion A. For a proposition or hypothesis tobe falsifiable, the antecedent and the conse-quent may not be epiphenomenal. That is, thesheer existence of the antecedent may not auto-matically imply the existence of the consequent.A proposition such as the greater the work loadof an individual, the greater the level of felt roleconflict would clearly be tautological if the ex-

istence of role conflict automatically implied theexistence of high work load or role overload, orif role conflict was measured by an index includ-ing work load or role overload (Newton &Keenan, 1987).

However, note that such contamination at thevariable level (in this example, if role conflictwas measured by an index including work loador role overload) does not mean that the hypoth-esis itself is tautological. It may simply be nec-essary to operationalize it with differently de-

fined (i.e., noncontaminated) variables. Simi-larly, the presence of a tautological hypothesisdoes not necessarily imply a tautological prop-osition. Clearly, this issue is related to the issueof discriminant validity and the question of howconstructs are defined.

In a recent critique of the population ecologymodel, Young (1988) maintained that she founda tautology in the logic underlying Hannan and

Freeman's (1984) theory of structural inertia(with inertia, in this case, defined as a low rateof change). She claimed the tautology emergedwhen these theorists defined organizational re-producibility in terms of having nearly thesame structure today as it had yesterday (p.154), and then posited that organizational repro-ducibility generates strong inertial pressures.

There are similar examples in micro-organ-izational behavior theory. Vecchio (1987), in ex-amining Hersey and Blanchard's SituationalLeadership Theory (SLT), pointed out anotherexample of tautology in theory. SLT proposesthat, in order to account for leader effectiveness,theorists must consider the appropriateness ofleader style, operationalized in terms of task ori-entation and relationship orientation, in a givensituation, operationalized in terms of individualor group level maturity. Tautological reasoningis used by these theorists when they define

effectiveness (the dependent variable) interms of appropriateness of leader style (a keycomponent of their independent variable).

In these two examples, a tautological propo-sition or hypothesis is self-verifying and, there-fore, not subject to disconfirmation.

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Criterion B. The theorist must incorporate inpropositions and hypotheses an explicit state-ment of whether the antecedent is a necessary,sufficient, or necessary and sufficient conditionfor the consequent. This specification deter-mines the nature of the data required to ade-quately test the theory. For example, if theoristsclaim that job dissatisfaction is a necessary con-dition for physical stress symptomology, theymust search for physical stress symptoms notpreceded by job dissatisfaction in order to reject

the hypothesis. On the other hand, if job dissat-isfaction is considered sufficient for physicalstress symptoms (Kemery, Bedeian, Mossholder,& Touliatos, 1985; Kemery, Mossholder, & Be-deian, 1987), they must search for a case inwhich individuals experience job dissatisfactionwithout reporting physical stress symptoms inorder to reject the hypothesis.

By failing to explicitly specify the nature of

these logical links, organizational theoristsmake it impossible for their theories to ever bedisproved. Each critique of a theory inevitablyleads to a response that the criticism was basedon a misunderstanding of the author's originallogic. The responsibility for the specification ofthese linkages must be taken seriously if theo-rists are ever to move beyond the deluge of crit-icism and countercriticism. If charismatic

leadership is sufficient to bring about organiza-tional change, then that should be clearlystated. On the other hand, if charismaticleadership is only necessary to bring about or-ganizational change, then that should be explic-itly stated. If theorists are so self-confident as toposit that a particular antecedent is both neces-sary and sufficient for a particular consequence,then by all means, let them run it up the flag-pole.

Empirical Adequacy

Empirical adequacy is the second criterion forevaluating the falsifiability of the relationshipsembedded in a theory. An empirically adequatetheory is one in which the propositions and hy-potheses may be operationalized in such a man-

ner as to render the theory subject to disconfir-mation. If a theory is operationalized in such away as to preclude disconfirmation, then it isclearly not falsifiable. Specifically, propositionsand hypotheses should satisfy the following cri-terion:

There either must be more than one object ofanalysis or that object of analysis must exist atmore than one point in time.

In order for a theory to be subject to disconfir-mation, some variation in the object of analysis

must be observable. For example, a theory ofinterorganizational relations in a specific indus-try necessarily deals with just a single object ofanalysis-a multinational interorganizationalnetwork (Aldrich, 1980). Because the theory per-tains to only one network (i.e., it is spatiallybound), the theory must be proposed in such away as to permit longitudinal analysis. On theother hand, a theory examining a number of

individual organizations within that networkmay be tested at a single point in time, since it isnot spatially bound.

In addition, empirical adequacy at the rela-tional level cannot be achieved if the variabledoes not meet standards of a good measure-ment model. If the variables included in a hy-pothesis under evaluation are inherently un-measurable or unstable, the satisfaction of thepresent criterion becomes impossible.

Utility of Constructs, Variables,and Relationships

Not only do theorists have the responsibilityfor evaluating the falsifiability of these vari-ables, constructs, and relationships, but theyalso have the responsibility for evaluating theutility of these

variables, constructs, and rela-tionships.

The Utility of Variables andConstructs: Scope

For adequate scope, the variables included inthe theoretical system must sufficiently, al-though parsimoniously, tap the domain of theconstructs in question, while the constructs

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must, in turn, sufficiently, although parsimoni-ously, tap the domain of the phenomenon in

question. This is because constructs and vari-ables with broader scope allow hypotheses andpropositions to have greater overall explanatorypower.

A construct or variable which is content defi-cient (Schwab, 1980) limits the generality of thetheory encompassing the construct or variable.For example, as Bamberger (in press) main-tains, in the case of technological innovation, a

useful measure should, at the very least, tap thatconstruct's quantitative (i.e., the number of in-novations initiated or adopted) and qualitativeelements (i.e., the innovation's utility, depth,originality/radicalness). Furthermore, to recog-nize that not all technological innovationsemerge out of an R&D subunit, measures of or-ganizational innovativeness which are broad inscope, and thus higher in overall utility, should

be able to tap all innovations, regardless ofwhere they originate within the organization.However, as often is the case with organizationand management theory, the scholars con-cerned with innovation theory have sacrificedbroad scope for the sharper focus that they be-lieve enhances accuracy and parsimony.

Unfortunately, this process has led to theorieswhich are no more than compilations of isolated

variables and constructs, often trapping theo-rists on the level of empirical generalization andvariable-driven analysis, and making impossi-ble a truly parsimonious theoretical system. Thegoal must therefore be the achievement of a bal-ance between scope and parsimony.

Utility of Relationships:Explanatory Potential andPredictive Adequacy

When evaluating the utility of the relation-ships embedded in theoretical systems, theoristsmust examine both the substantive as well asprobabilistic elements of propositions and hy-potheses (and their interrelationships). In Figure2, these two indicators of utility are referred to as

(a) explanatory potential and (b) predictive ad-equacy.

The explanatory potential of theories can becompared on the basis of (a) the specificity oftheir assumptions regarding objects of analysis,(b) the specificity of their assumptions regardingdeterminative relations between antecedentand consequent, and (c) the scope and parsi-mony of their propositions.

(a) The Specificity of the Assumptions Aboutthe Objects of Analysis. As noted in the previous

discussion of boundaries, theories cannot becompared on the basis of the content of theirassumptions. However, a theory in which theseassumptions are explicit is clearly preferable toone in which they are not. For example, a con-tinuing underlying tension in macro-organ-izational theory is the usually implicit assump-tion of independence between units of anorganization versus the assumption of an inter-

dependence between those units. Theorists sup-porting the environmental-determinism per-spective, particularly those adopting selectionas a key concept (i.e., population ecology the-ory), have consistently assumed that the unitsunder study (i. e., members of a species) are freeactors, independent of, and not part of any otherhigher level organization (Young, 1988).

On the other hand, theorists supporting thestrategic-choice perspective have implicitlystressed the interdependence of units within andacross organizational species and, in particular,the political implications of such interdepen-dence (Thompson, 1967; Lawrence & Lorsch,1967; Child, 1972; Van de Ven, 1979; Bacharach& Lawler, 1980; Perrow, 1986). It should be ob-vious that the elaboration or synthesis of orga-nizational theories cannot proceed without spec-ifying this sort of assumption. Some attempts atsuch elaboration and synthesis have been pro-vided by Tolbert (1985) and Hrebiniak and Joyce(1985).

(b) The Specificity of the Substantive Nature ofthe Relationship Between the Antecedent andConsequent. Although the specification of nec-essary or sufficient conditions is essential to the

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testability of the theory, the application of a the-ory in explanation requires additional assump-tions about the substance of the linkages (i.e.,the sense in which the antecedent is necessaryor sufficient for the consequent). For example,one of the primary critiques made by supportersof the environmental determinism perspective(e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979)against the strategic choice perspective is thatsupporters of the latter fail to recognize the en-vironmental constraints acting upon the pro-

posed linkage between managerial decisionmaking and organizational adaptation andchange. In his critique of Child's (1972) defenseof the strategic choice perspective, Aldrich(1979, p. 160) made that argument most suc-cinctly: Environmental selection processes setthe limits within which rational selection amongalternatives takes place. Prior limits and con-straints on available options leave little room for

maneuvering by most organizations....' Al-drich did not argue that strategic choice is irrel-evant as a tool by which organizational changemay be explained. Rather, he argued that thestrategic choice theory is lacking in explanatorypotential because (a) the potential for organiza-tional decision makers to cause change withinthe organization is severely limited by environ-mental pressures (Van de Ven, 1979) and (b) the

theory does not clearly specify those conditionsnecessary for the hypothesized determinativerelations existing between the variables to bevalid.

Another way in which the substantive natureof the relationship between antecedent and con-sequence can be blurred is if the nature of cau-sal linkages is dictated by methodological con-venience. Both Bailey (1970), and Hage andMeeker (1987) have pointed out that theoristshave been prone to concern themselves almostexclusively with recursive causal linkages to thepoint of nearly ignoring other possible types,such as the teleological (i.e., the notion that acause is the end state toward which an event isleading), dialectical, or reciprocal (e.g., feed-back mechanisms). The clearest example of this

is the proliferating misuse of path analysis (andmost recently, LISREL analysis) to determine thecausal ordering of a set of variables.

Although path and structural equation (e.g.,LISREL) models provide a systematic format forexpressing the assumed relationships amongvariables and estimating the strength of theserelationships, the actual ordering of the vari-ables and the nature of their relationship (e.g.,causal, simultaneous) can only take place onthe assumptive level. For example, by empiri-

cally confirming the existence of a reciprocal(rather than recursive) linkage between job sat-isfaction and physical stress symptomology,Kemery, Mossholder, & Bedeian (1987) provideda clear illustration of how the recursive causallogic implicit in path analysis can have a dam-aging effect on stress-related theory develop-ment.

Furthermore, while the explanatory power of

a theory is influenced by the specification of thesubstantive nature of the relationship among thevariables (e.g., is it causal, teleological), ex-planatory power is also contingent upon the ex-tent to which the actual empirical form of therelationship (e.g., linear, J-curve) is stated. Eventhough this is an empirical question, it must beanswered if the hypotheses are to be useful inexplaining the phenomena in question. For ex-ample, while Hage and Aiken (1969) hypothe-sized and confirmed the existence of an inverselinear relationship between routinization andjob satisfaction, there may be instead a curvilin-ear relationship between these two variables.However, in neither case was a curvilinear re-lationship hypothesized. For the most part, rela-tionships between antecedents and conse-quences in organizational behavior are oftenassumed to be linear. Such assumptions of lin-earity may be viewed as expeditious in terms oflimited theory-testing techniques, but naive inthe context of theorists' qualitative understand-ing of people in organizations.

As Hage and Meeker (1987) pointed out, qual-itative field research, exemplified by such clas-sic studies as Lipset, Trow, and Coleman's (1956)

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Union Democracy, and Whyte's (1955) StreetCorner Society, may go much further in enhanc-ing the explanatory adequacy of a theory thanquantitative research. Such techniques areideal when the theory constructionist is seekingto find and explain causal relations, while quan-titative methods are better when the researcherwishes to test these relations on the basis of con-firmed or disconfirmed predictions.

(c) Scope and Parsimony. Scope is defined asthe range of phenomena encompassed by the

theory, and parsimony as the ratio of hypothe-ses to propositions. A theory which can accom-modate a wide range of objects of analysis (fromsmall groups of individuals to entire organiza-tional types or more general processes) is clearlypreferable to one only applicable to a single ob-ject. For example, all-encompassing theories ofmotivation (e.g., drive, instinct, and condition-ing) are preferable to more limited theories

which do not presume to explain all motiva-tional phenomena (e.g., goal setting) (Locke etal., 1981).

Given the range of phenomena encompassedby the theory, one with a higher ratio of hypoth-eses to propositions is preferable to one with alower ratio. That is, a theory where each prop-osition covers five hypotheses is preferable toone where each proposition only covers two hy-

potheses. Although some theorists may viewthis as merely an aesthetic criterion, the role oftheory in science is the integration and simplifi-cation of experience. A theory which can bestapproximate this ideal (i.e., a parsimonious the-ory) is preferable to one that does less to reducethe complexity of the empirical world. For exam-ple, in her critique of Hannan and Freeman's(1984) theory of structural inertia and organiza-tional change, Young (1988) argued that thesetheorists used more theoretical statements thanwere absolutely necessary and that this lack ofparsimony, as a result, leaves the theory un-necessarily vulnerable (presumably to critiqueand empirical disconfirmation).

Of course, the primary risk in theoretical par-simony is the underspecification of the model.

An example of this may be found in Kemery etal.'s (1987) LISREL-based comparative analysisof stress theory. In this study, the most parsimo-nious theories, such as those of Beehr and New-man (1978) and Locke (1976), were found to beless plausible than the least parsimoniousmodel, that of Schuler (1982), across a number ofmodel fit ndices.

The second basis for evaluating the utility ofthe relationships embedded in a theory is thepredictive adequacy of that theory. Does one

have to have a predictive theory in order for atheory to be acceptable? According to Kaplan(1964), and Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), theanswer is yes. A theoretical system can meet allthe criteria discussed previously but will be un-acceptable if it is incapable of predicting or isinferior in its predictive adequacy. From hypoth-eses and propositions some order in the other-wise complex empirical world must be deduced.

The degree to which hypotheses and proposi-tions approximate this reality is predictive ade-quacy-the final determinant of a good theory.

However, in discussing predictive adequacy,it is important to differentiate between two typesof prediction: probabilistic and theory-based.Probabilistic predictions are based on universallaws of probability. If one tosses a coin in the airoften enough, he can predict that the coin will

land heads up fifty percent of the time. Theory-based predictions are grounded in propositionsand deduced hypotheses. Unlike probabilisticpredictions, they must be made within a delin-eated period of time or number of cases. On theother hand, probabilistic predictions are notbased on the explanatory power of propositionsand derived hypotheses, but rather on the as-sumption that given enough time or enoughcases, all outcomes may be probabilisticallypredicted. Theory-based predictions are contin-gent upon hypotheses and propositions (Kap-lan, 1964). That is, a theory-based prediction isbased on the specification of a relationship be-tween particular antecedents and conse-quences.

In social science, the distinction between

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erally superior to the alternative theoriesagainst which it has been compared.

Evaluating the Conceptual Coherenceof a Theory:

The FitPreviously, the need for organizational theo-

rists to be in a position to discard some previoustheories if the field is to avoid sinking under itsown weight was mentioned. The other side ofthat coin is the need for a cumulative body ofmore-or-less universally accepted theories of or-ganizations as a basis for further theory con-struction. If theorists are to begin that monumen-tal task, how will they decide which theories toinclude?

To answer this question, theorists need a clearunderstanding of how a given theory fits in withthe other preexisting and apparently related

theories. Two qualitative dimensions to this fitcan be described: connective and transforma-tional. Connectivity refers to the ability of a newtheory to bridge the gap between two or moredifferent theories, thus explaining something be-tween the domains of previous theories. In thisway, new knowledge is created, and a morenearly continuous mapping of the empirical uni-verse is achieved. As an example, institutional

theories of bargaining (Chamberlain & Kuhn,1965) were connected to economic theories ofbargaining (Pen, 1952) by the more recent so-cial-psychological work by Axelrod (1980) andBacharach and Lawler (1980). The social-psychological approach does not subsume thetwo, but instead incorporates selected elementsfrom each. Tactics and coalitions are adoptedfrom the institutionalists, while the motivational

elements (e.g., ends maximization) are adoptedfrom the economists.

The theory is said to be transformational if itcauses preexisting theories to be reevaluatedin a new light. Some theories even have thepotential to change the older, established theo-ries that they were built upon, just as the place-ment of a bridge has a profound effect upon the

economic development of the communitiesalong the two shores connected. As Kaplan(1964) said, A new theory requires its ownterms and generates its own laws: the old con-cepts are not merely reorganized, but reconsti-tuted, the old laws not just connected, but givena new meaning (p. 297).

How does this happen? Theories are collec-tions of constructs which are related to eachother by propositions. Thus, the boundary span-ners between theories are the constructs embed-ded in and shared by them. Yet this notion ofboundary spanners is still problematic, becauseconstructs are still theoretical terms which arenot directly observable. In the empirical world,these constructs are operationalized as vari-ables and related to each other by hypotheses.Kaplan pointed out that a hypothesis may be asmuch confirmed by fitting it into other theories asby fitting it to the facts, because the theory then

enjoys the conceptual coherence and supportprovided by evidence for all other related theo-ries. Just as the superstructure of a bridge reliesupon each supporting piece of metal and eachindividual rivet and weld connecting them, theconstructs and propositions of a theory rely uponthe many hypotheses and variables generatedfrom them.

This systemic quality is what makes the con-

struct validation process so problematic; estab-lishing the content of a construct in a variable(inevitably reducing scope) ends up interferingwith the necessity of that construct being used toconnect the new theory with other theories(which requires broad scope). This is further re-vealed when theorists try to find a list of qualitieswhich make a conceptually coherent theory.Systemic openness, dynamic openness, flexibil-ity, and vagueness are cited as being good forcreativity. Thus, they give theories utility in thatthey have the scope to be put to work in thebroader intellectual world of the social sciences.On the other hand, qualities such as closure,precision, accuracy, and the exactness of mean-ing of terms are cited as being necessary if atheory is to be capable of disconfirmation. In

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other words, the latter list of qualities is essentialfor a theory's falsifiability.

A quick look at Figure 2 reveals that this ten-sion breaks along the line between the criteria offalsifiability and utility. Interestingly enough, itseems to break in all three boxes (variables, con-structs, and relationships). No matter how de-tailed the analysis, the same issue comes back.However, an increasing sensitivity to the prob-lem should cause theorists to be more rigorousin attempting to think through all the issues

when findingthe balance between the compet-

ing forces of focus.

Conclusion

It would be foolish to assume that on the basisof any set of criteria, one could determine thatthe insights of Marx are more or less profoundthan those of Weber. However, as the reading of

any organizational journal will testify, most of usdo not theorize on the level of Marx or Weber. Toa large degree today's students of organiza-tional behavior are craftspersons working in thecontext of the middle range (Merton, 1957). Assuch, the goal is to ensure that theoretical sys-tems and statements can be empirically tested,and provide some source of explanation andprediction.

The use of the criteria should improve theorybuilding and evaluation by

1. Ensuring the delineation of theoreticalboundaries, while at the same time ensur-ing the explication of assumptions (values,scope, and time) which bound the theory.

2. Ensuring a common language of constructsand variables across levels.

3. Specifying the distinctions between propo-sitions and hypotheses, and the relation-ships implied in them.

4. Improving the parsimony of our theories.

Organization and management studies arenot the only delinquents in regard to strict eval-uation of theory. Indeed, this has been a com-

mon symptom throughout the social sciences.Maybe it is more apparent because this disci-pline is so diverse and the methodologies are sodivergent. It also may be that the spate of pub-licity surrounding such popular books as InSearch of Excellence, although on the one handstrengthening the field, has resulted in a rash ofbroad descriptions and sometimes irrefutabletheories.

If theorists don't take the rules of theory seri-ously, individually they will continue to cling totheories in almost cultist fashion. Getting be-yond this clinging behavior, which tends todrive theorists from fad to foible, demands a pre-cise discourse, one which allows theorists to fo-cus on the specific strengths and weaknesses ofparticular theories. If nothing else, the list of cri-teria presented here may enhance the accuracyof discourse.

Finally, the use of criteria for the evaluation of

theory also may assist in demystifying certainfalse dichotomies. Although these criteria couldbe dismissed as just another rhetorical call formore organized empiricism, nothing about theappropriateness of various modes of data collec-tion is implied. Too often, a false distinction isdrawn between those who manipulate largedata sets and those who rely on more interpre-tive methodologies such as ethnographic or

case studies. To the degree that both are dealingwith the empirical world, the principles hereinare equally applicable to quantitative data andethnographic or case studies. No matter how thedata are collected, researchers have the obliga-tion to present them in a way that allows otherscholars a fair chance at using and or disprov-ing the data.

The second false dichotomy is between theoryconstruction and theory testing. The message tothe theorist should be clear. If it is not testable,no matter how profound or aesthetically pleas-ing it may be, it is not a theory.

The third false dichotomy is between thosewho view themselves as theoreticians and re-searchers and those who view themselves as

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consultants and practitioners. The role of con-sultants is to assist their clients in both diminish-ing the complexity of their empirical world andexplaining and predicting events. The goal oftheory is to diminish the complexity of the em-pirical world on the basis of explanations andpredictions. Thus, both practitioners and theore-ticians need a clearer understanding of the rulesof theory construction.

Nevertheless, this article should end on a cau-tionary note. To dangle criteria above the head ofa theorist like the Sword of Damocles may stiflecreativity. In most of our work, flaws in theoreticallogic can be found. However, during the earlystages of theory building, there may be a fine linebetween satisfying the criteria of the internallogic of theory and achieving a creative contri-bution. A good theorist walks this line carefully.

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I thank Peter Bamberger and Bryan Mundell, whosepatience, research, and insights made this paper pos-sible; Andy Van de Ven, who proved to be an excep-tional colleague by making many insightful com-ments throughout this paper; Joe Francis, WilliamSonnenstuhl, and Lawrence Williams, whose sugges-tions have been incorporated throughout this paper;and Lee Meiser, who is truly a team player. Finally, Ithank Anna Mundell.

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Bacharach (1998) Organizational Theories - Some Criteria for Evaluation-5b