Bullshit, politics, and the democratic power of satire

Paul Babbitt

Southern Arkansas University Magnolia, AR

Paper prepared for presentation at the 2013 American Political Science Association Annual

Meeting, Chicago, IL

Draft: Do not cite or circulate without author’s permission

For all the attention it receives, outright lying is relatively rare in democratic

politics. And when it does happen, politicians may pay heavy price because they are often

caught. Bullshit, however, is all too common, produced not just by politicians, but pundits,

and dare I say it, academics who study politics.1 One could argue political theory has done

more to create bullshit than to expose it. Furthermore, bullshit is more likely to be

rewarded than lying. In part, this is because categorizing a statement as a lie is relatively

objective compared to calling something bullshit. Though detecting bullshit is easy enough,

exposing it and recognizing its harm is rather more difficult. It seems to be simply part of

doing business. “There he goes again,” we say with a shrug. It is tolerated, even celebrated.

Spin, propaganda, posturing, and other similar terms describe manipulative and misleading

political communication. Even when “the other side” is doing it, few seem eager to call

others out on their bullshit, perhaps because everyone does it, and to call others out on it

would be hypocritical, judged a worse vice than bullshit.

1 Indeed, I cannot promise this paper will be completely free of bullshit itself.

2

In 1986, Harry Frankfurt wrote an essay entitled On Bullshit, where he sought to

develop a theory of bullshit. At its core, Frankfurt argues that while lying is a

misrepresentation of the truth, bullshit is a misrepresentation of the self, and an

indifference to truth, which in his mind is worse than lying. His work received a flurry of

attention from academics and the general public when it was republished as a very short

book in 2005. Absent from this discussion were political scientists. Their absence is strange

given the growing pervasiveness of bullshit in politics. The exponential increase in modes

of communication has made the piles higher. While the number of working journalists

continues to decline, the number of public relations flacks continues to increase. Given that

much of political theory is dedicated to specifying and clarifying terms used in political

discourse it seems strange that some at least would not find Frankfurt’s work useful.

Bullshit does not attract near the same level of outrage as lying: “We make seek to

distance ourselves from bullshit, but we are more likely to turn away from it with an

impatient or irritated shrug than with the sense of outrage or violation that lies often

inspire” (Frankfurt 2005). In politics, bullshit is the normal manner of speaking. George

Orwell, as we shall see below, demonstrated this point in much of his writing. One purpose

of this paper is to argue that we should not be so tolerant of it. Bullshit not only is

deceptive, it contributes to decay in public discourse. At the very least, its emptiness, its

meaninglessness crowds out substantive discourse. It directs attention to the trivial as

much as the false. More seriously, it may result in a decline of public intelligence. The other

consequence of bullshit is the way it infects thinking. Unlike the lie, bullshit’s effectiveness

is often found in the way it says nothing while appearing to say something profound. But in

fact, the bullshitter is not really saying anything at all: “[T]elling lies does not tend to unfit a

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person for telling the truth in the same way that bullshitting tends to. Through excessive

indulgence in the latter activity, which involves making assertions without paying attention

to anything except what it suits one to say, a person’s normal habit of attending to the way

things are may become attenuated or lost” (Frankfurt 2005). The more it is used, the more

difficult it becomes to identify. It is especially dangerous for democracy because it reduces

the ability of the people to evaluate the vices and virtues of their elected officials.

The problem goes beyond public officials. The decrease of political reporting and

the rise of commentary has resulted in an incredible growth in the amount of bullshit in

democratic discourse. Pundits are among the most prolific bullshitters in public life.

Whether on television, in print, or on the internet, legions of people are making a good

living talking about things they know nothing about. Even if they wanted to call out

politicians for their bullshit, they lack the knowledge to do so. Furthermore, the increasing

amount of “commentary” seems to reflect an insatiable appetite for bullshit among the

public. At the very least, there is no doubt that bullshit is easier and cheaper to create than

reporting information and providing insightful analysis. Some academics have entered the

fray in the attempt to raise the level of political discourse. On the other hand, the

temptation to cash in by becoming a public intellectual seems too great for most.

As Frankfurt points out, bullshit is a misrepresentation of a subjective state of mind.

But there may be more to it than that. Frankfurt’s theory of bullshit is a useful starting

point, particularly in articulating the distinction between lying and bullshit as forms of

dishonesty. In Frankfurt’s eyes, what makes bullshit especially objectionable is that it is

indifferent to truth. However, with an eye towards the political function of bullshit,

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Frankfurt’s theory requires expansion. Bullshit is not just an attempt to deceive the

audience about the nature of the speaker. It is also an attempt to manipulate the beliefs of

others. In Plato’s terms, bullshit makes the weaker argument defeat the stronger. He may

also be trying to manipulate others without directly lying. Bullshit is more like an illusion

than a lie.

The most important contribution of Frankfurt’s essay is the distinction between

bullshit and lying. The bullshitter:

cannot be regarded as lying, for she does not presume that she knows the truth, and

therefore cannot be deliberately promulgating a proposition that she presumes to

be false: Her statement is grounded in neither a belief that is true nor, as a lie must

be, in a belief that is not true. It is just this lack of connection to a concern with

truth—this indifference to how things really are—that I regard as of the essence of

bullshit. (Frankfurt 2005)

The “indifference to how things really are” is why bullshit is so dangerous. Once such

indifference is established, propaganda and lies become more difficult to counter. The

ability to even articulate a thought, much less an argument against bullshit becomes more

difficult. Truth matters to the liar in a way it does not to the bullshitter.

Lying in political theory has defenders from Machiavelli to Michael Walzer. (Walzer

1973) The idea that political virtues are different from ordinary virtues is common. Lying

may not be desirable, but sometimes it is necessary or prudent. It is also common to

withhold information. Most political theory is anti-perfectionist in this regard and carves

out room for necessary, benevolent, or even noble lies. The analysis presented here

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assumes that bullshit by definition must be bad or harmful to democratic politics. That is, if

there is a convincing justification for the deception, then it should not be considered

bullshit. Though such an account does result in lending a degree of subjectivity to the

description, it helps to distinguish bullshit from forms of deception that have potential

benefits. Such a distinction is especially necessary when we consider things like metaphors

and, as we will see below, satire.

The underlying premise here is that while lying in some circumstances may have a

defense, a distinguishing feature of bullshit is that it is always fraudulent. There is no such

thing at paternalistic bullshit in the sense that it has benefits for the receiver of bullshit that

outweigh the costs. Bullshit is a product of the symbiosis of the news media and the

political system. Satire might do little to eliminate the foul product, but it can identify it.

Exposure of bullshit is an important political duty. A most effective means for this is humor,

especially satire. Bullshit seems to be resistant to conventional modes of argumentation

and dispute, but at its best, satire exposes the pretentions of the powerful. Though some

accounts of democracy seem troubled by irreverence; irreverence or at least the tension

between reverence and irreverence is essential to democracy. Reverence inspires an

adherence to authority that is undemocratic at its core. Thus, in challenging authority,

humor performs a critical democratic duty.

What is bullshit?

Frankfurt’s account is a useful starting point. However, in order to understand its

effects on democracy and potential ways to counter it, a more detailed description might be

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useful. In each of the categories of bullshit below, note the way in which the emphasis is not

on the content of the claim but rather on what the act conveys about the bullshitter. The

power of bullshit resides in its acceptability. The bullshitter does not seek to shock us, quite

the opposite. The bullshitter flatters us and reinforces our prejudices. Sometimes, she does

this to get us to think a certain way, perhaps, at worst, to get us excuse or even endorse

some evil, make evil acts even admirable. Often, the bullshitter merely wants us to like her,

and does so by presenting a false person who we find appealing.

Language is constitutive of politics. If there is no language, there can be no politics.

Political acts are speech acts. Legislation is made of words. Persuasion need not be

language—force can be used. But even here, speech acts have great significance. War, civil

conflict, riots, and so forth all involved physical force, but the meaning of such is conveyed

through language. And of course, the cessation of conflict typically involves surrender or a

treaty. Normal politics occurs almost wholly on a linguistic terrain. Even threats are a

language. Thus, as both Plato and Orwell recognized, in very different ways, the willful

manipulation of language for the purpose of politics poses a serious problem.

The idea that an utterance of bullshit is neither true nor false brings to mind the

idea of J.L. Austin’s idea of a “performative sentence.” (Austin 1975) Since bullshit is more

about deception of intention rather than deception about facts, to bullshit using words is a

speech act. Bullshit is not a quality of the claim itself. Bullshit need not always fit Austin’s

description of a performative, especially because bullshit can be true or false, as well as

neither, for the concept to have some usefulness. There is potential bullshit in many speech

acts: The insincere apology, the false promise, and negotiating in bad faith are all examples

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of bullshit. Furthermore, certain acts can be bullshit even if they are not spoken or written

language. Thus, because an act of bullshit may not always be judged true or false (a key

element in a speech act) bullshit can be subjective. Motivation is an important element is

recognizing bullshit. The challenge to the liar is “is it true?” while the challenge to the

bullshitter is “do you really mean that?”

Rhetoric

The introduction of rhetoric into my account of the taxonomy of bullshit

demonstrates the difficulty in its identification. Bullshit is not the same as rhetoric, though

Plato came close to arguing they were the same thing. Rhetoric obviously can be bullshit,

but not all rhetoric fits the description. A speaker who truly believes his rhetoric is not the

same as one who uses words simply because she thinks will persuade her audience. Unlike

bullshit, there is a great deal of discussion of rhetoric in political theory and defense of

rhetoric can be persuasive. However, these discussions rarely address the problems

raised by Frankfurt’s account of bullshit. An important exception, discussed below, is Plato.

There are, however some important exceptions In Gorgias, Plato warns us of the danger of

rhetoric, and what he describes comes close, bullshit. On the other hand, he also argued

that in certain respects lies could be noble. In a different context, George Orwell made

important observations about the way abuse of language harms political discourse. The

kind of abuses Orwell details fit nicely under the designation “bullshit”.

Hypocrisy

Bierce defined the hypocrite as: “One who, professing virtues he does not respect,

secures the advantage of seeming to be what he despises” (Bierce 1993). The hypocrite fits

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Frankfurt’s description of bullshitter quite well. Runciman describes her as one who

creates a “false impression” about herself. (Runciman 2008) Much of Runciman’s

discussion of hypocrisy emphasizes the way in which it involves the creation of a “persona”

and is akin to Frankfurt’s account of bullshit. However, not all hypocrisy does exactly this.

Hypocrisy commonly involves issues of morality and religion. The issue at hand is not the

validity of the criticism of the morals or behavior of another. The hypocrite’s condemnation

may be reasonable and appropriate. The hypocrite is not necessarily a liar. However, the

hypocrite very much misrepresents herself. Do as I say, not as I do may be entirely honest.

(And what parent has not at least thought it?) But the core of hypocrisy is misdirection.

Focusing on politics, the purpose of political hypocrisy can be to appeal to views held by

voters. Another possibility is to misdirect people—the hypocrite may be attempting to hide

her own moral short comings.

In today’s politics, hypocrisy is perhaps the most recognizable form of bullshit and

one most likely to be condemned. Like lying, it can be difficult for a politician to remain a

hypocrite for very long, and the discovery of hypocrisy may end a political career.2

Furthermore, the media are quite happy to expose hypocrites, and the public delights in the

exposure. People enjoy finding out that the moralist is not as pure as she claimed to be.

Thus, though hypocrisy is common enough in today’s politics, its threat to democratic

politics is not as severe as other species of bullshit. Though bullshit and hypocrisy have

much in common, they are not the same, as I hope the pages below demonstrate.

2 Why some discoveries of hypocrisy are more damaging to political careers than others is a fascinating subject that as far as I know has received little scholarly attention.

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Crocodile Tears

Crocodile tears are the result of the exposure of hypocrisy. The public figure who

gets caught and subsequently begs for forgiveness deserves at the very least suspicion for

being a bullshitter. Rarely do we find such a person confessing before getting caught. Thus,

it seems likely that the regret is not over the act itself, but getting caught. The apology is not

exactly phony, but it is about getting caught rather than the act itself.

Propaganda

Good propaganda is rooted in fact, if not truth. At the same time, nothing probably

fits the description of bullshit more than the label propaganda. The key to propaganda is

not whether it is true or false, but rather that like bullshit, its truth or falsity is irrelevant.

Propaganda is perhaps the paradigmatic example of political bullshit. It was one of Orwell’s

central concerns, and will be explored in more detail below.

Intellectual dishonesty

Intellectual dishonesty is making an argument that while possibly persuasive, is

believed by the propagator of the dishonesty to be invalid, incorrect, or irrelevant. To be

intellectually dishonest then is not only to lie, but to misrepresent the self. If Frankfurt is

presenting a paradigm of bullshit, then intellectual dishonesty is a paradigmatic example.

In politics, intellectual dishonesty is rampant. Politicians, pundits, lobbyists and their ilk

(probably including at least some political scientists) grab any evidence or research

convenient so long as it supports their agenda.

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Politeness, etiquette, and civility

Politeness can be defined as: “The most acceptable hypocrisy” (Bierce 1993). To

include politeness or civility indicates the difficulty of really defining or theorizing about

bullshit. It also demonstrates the appeal of bullshit. A world without civility, even insincere

civility would be an unpleasant place. Rudeness often masquerades as truth telling.

Whether or not politeness qualifies as bullshit depends the context and the intent of the

speaker. For example, showing respect can be sincere or insincere. A sincere

demonstration of respect is not bullshit, but displays of obsequiousness are. In addition,

few people are more obnoxious than those who willfully flaunt basic standards of

politeness, even though there is nothing inherently right regarding specific standards of

civility or etiquette.

On the other hand, politeness often is a way of masking conflict, and denying voice

to those with legitimate grievances. That certain things are not spoken of in polite

conversation can be a way of silencing those who lack power, and reinforcing the status

quo. For Rousseau, amour propre, a concern with propriety could be construed as an attack

on etiquette or politeness. Thus, politeness is bullshit when it results, or even requires an

insincere presentation of the self. Its political function is to mask conflict and make certain

expressions of grievances illegitimate.

Common sense, conventional wisdom

If anything reveals a lack of concern for truth, it would be the repetition of whatever

happens to be passing for common sense or conventional wisdom. Like all prejudice, the

critical issue is not that conventional wisdom and so forth are false, it is that the claims

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have not undergone critical investigation. The expression of such claims has more to do

with demonstrating conformity to accepted opinion and the fact that such claims generally

require little support or justification is testimony to their harmfulness in democratic

discourse. One way to understand the purpose of philosophy is to see it as a challenge to

common sense. The idea that common sense can be bullshit suggests that one reason

people do not object to bullshit in the same way that they object lying is because the

bullshitter does not pose a challenge to our conventional ways of thinking. The liar insults

us, but the bullshitter flatters us.

Symbolic Votes

Not all symbolic votes are bullshit. Symbolic and protest votes can be important

devices to make a point, even if they have no hope of achieving an immediate result. In the

US House of Representatives, there have been 40 votes to repeal the Affordable Health Care

Act. Everyone knows that repeal has no chance in the Senate, and even if it did, President

Obama would certainly veto it. The purpose of at least some repeal attempts seem to be to

give freshmen members the opportunity to say they voted against Obamacare. Whether or

not such claims themselves amount to bullshit is subjective. Perhaps the bullshit started

with the 20th or 25th vote to repeal. There is nothing per se wrong with symbolic and

protest votes, or proposing legislation that “has no chance”. The distinction rests on the

sincerity of the motivation. A sincere protest is one thing, acting merely to score political

points is another matter.

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Platitudes and Valence Issues

Certain concepts in politics are slippery, and thus lend themselves quite easily to

abuse. In everyday political discourse, terms like freedom, equality, rights, and democracy

have such broad meanings that they can be used to serve ends quite at odds with one

another. A juxtaposition such as “rights of the majority” is from the perspective of a

political theorist nonsense or at least an oxymoron. Yet, the use of both terms may actually

seem stronger if one does not pay attention to the normal meaning of the term “rights”. A

majority right may seem more compelling than an individual right. Indeed, it seems one

area where political theorists can actually matter is in establishing more rigorous

conceptual grounding to such terms.

This list, while lengthy, is incomplete. The examples serves to elaborate on

Frankfurt’s description with particular concern to its political function. A theoretical

account then such as Frankfurt’s is helpful both in recognizing bullshit as well as

understanding why it is harmful. Though recognizing bullshit is important, it is more

important to know what it does. Finally, many items in the list above present some ideas

why we do not object much to bullshit. Bullshit may be more comforting than the truth. The

bullshitter tells us what we want to hear. It may not be good for us, but it satisfies our

appetites.

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Orwell and the danger of bullshit to liberty

Orwell was not an especially strong advocate of democracy, though he considered

himself to be a social democrat. He also noted that the term democracy had become

meaningless, used to refer to any government people approved. Orwell believed that

democracy required hypocrisy to function. (Runciman 2008) Despite these reservations,

his arguments about the abuse of language have particular resonance for democracy, if

democracy is to be compatible with individual liberty. In any event, Orwell recognized that

the relationship between government and the people would be realized through language.

Language could corrupt thinking, and a corrupt population would not be fit for liberal

democracy.

There is little that can be called theoretical in Orwell’s non-fiction. He is at bottom a

reporter, albeit one who freely offers comments on what he sees. Though committed to

truth, he does not pretend to be able to get beyond his own subjectivity. There is also little

to tease out in reading Orwell—in the main, he presents a straightforward account of his

argument. Even 1984, a work of fiction, is an obvious exploration and criticism of

totalitarianism. Its most important contribution is to expose the difference between mere

authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Thus, Orwell does not really present much in the way

of interpretive puzzles though questions of his own hypocrisy and the complexity of his

attitude toward hypocrisy remain. (Runciman 2008)

George Orwell was especially concerned with the political uses of language, and the

way in which language did or did not function in democracy. The famous quote in “Politics

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and the English Language” was directed at all political language, but seems especially apt in

democracy:

If you simplify your English, you are freed from the very worst follies of orthodoxy.

You cannot speak any of the necessary dialects, and when you make a stupid

remark, its stupidity will be obvious, even to you. Political language—and with

variations this is true of all political parties from Conservatives to Anarchists—is

designed to makes lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an

appearance of solidity to pure wind. (Orwell, Politics and the English Language

2008)

At the same time, he argued that governments needed to use propaganda, and they should

do it effectively. Propagandists needed to try to make sure they followed the conventions of

spoken rather than written English not just when making speeches, but also with written

communication.3 (Orwell, Propaganda and Demotic Speech 2008) This is because a true

democratic government would need not just to tell people what is happening, but

communicate it to them in a way that resonates: “But some day we may have a genuinely

democratic government, a government which will want to tell the people what is

happening, and what must be done next, and what sacrifices are necessary and why. It will

need the mechanisms for doing so, of which the first are the right words, the right tone of

voice” (Orwell, Propaganda and Demotic Speech 2008).

3 This might explain why Winston Smith used a “speakwrite” at his job altering back issues of news articles rather than a typewriter.

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Three themes on the relation between language and politics that run through much

of Orwell’s work are relevant here. First, he claimed that “all art is propaganda”. In essence,

Orwell argued every work of art (and not just “high” art, but art intended for mass

consumption) made an argument, made certain commitments. The artist in the twentieth

century could not avoid politics, could not avoid taking sides: “No one, now, could devote

himself to literature as single-mindedly as Joyce or Henry James. But unfortunately, to

accept political responsibility now means yielding oneself over to orthodoxies and ‘party

lines,’ with all the timidity and dishonesty that implies” (Orwell, Writers and Leviathan

2008). Thus, the artist faced a dilemma between the party line and artistic integrity. There

is no solution to this dilemma but it needs to be faced. Orwell managed to find his own

solutions: I see that it is invariably where I lacked a political purpose that I wrote lifeless

books and was betrayed into purple passages, sentences without meaning, decorative

adjectives and humbug generally” (Orwell, Why I write 2005).

The second point follows from this—that literature is only possible in a free society.

The artist must be free to articulate his fundamental values, or else he will not be able to

create literature. Orwell protested against especially left-wing apologists (despite his

commitment democratic socialist) who denied the reality of communist totalitarian

atrocity. Truth however was not just the objective condition of the world, it also internal to

the artist. (Cain 2007) Orwell was deeply committed to the idea of truth itself. 1984

demonstrated the dependency between inner and outer truth. The interrogation scenes

require that Winston Smith deny both objective reality and the subjective self.

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It is curious here how these two positions work together. The implication is that

people matter. The political system exists for the sake of the people, not the other way

around. Their lived experience is what matters. But this does not make politics

unimportant or less important. The Party holds onto power because its lies, even though

easily contradicted by memory and experience, are constant. There are only lies. And thus

everyone is rendered insane. (Frankfurt, On Truth 2006) Indeed, like Plato, Orwell can be

understood as a writer concerned with political education. Obviously, Animal Farm is more

than a children’s book, but it is accessible by children, and it is a useful introduction to the

ways of politicians and the operations of power. Similarly, 1984 is a teaching novel.

Orwell’s book reviews were often concerned with what they taught and how effectively

they did it.

The third concern is the way in which political language works. The attention to

prose style, the invention of double speak, and the satire of political discourse found

throughout Animal Farm were all explorations of this topic. Much of Orwell’s writing on the

politics of language focuses on the way in which overly complex language and Latinized

English provide opportunities for bullshit. But oversimplified language is also susceptible

to this kind of manipulation. After all, what could be simpler than “WAR IS PEACE”?

Unopposed, bullshit enslaves us in a world where it is impossible to distinguish

between reality and fantasy. Where there is nothing but bullshit, there is totalitarianism.

Over and over again in 1984 Smith doubts the reality of his own mind because there is no

evidence other than his own memories and senses that corresponds to it. Everything

around him is a fabrication, and it makes no difference that the fabrication is fragile and

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ever changing, because that is all there is. War is peace, freedom is slavery, ignorance is

strength are nonsense phrases that eliminate the meaning of the concepts war, peace,

freedom, slavery, ignorance and strength. The purpose of Newspeak was to make even the

formation of subversive thought impossible. Beyond Frankfurt’s concerns, bullshit also

infects thinking. As Syme puts it: “Don’t you see the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow

the range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because

there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed will be

expressed by exactly one word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary

meanings rubbed out and forgotten” (Orwell, 1984 1992).

Some of the ideas presented in 1984 were presented in an essay “The Prevention of

Literature.” Orwell witnessed the strategies used by the Party: “Freedom of the intellect

means the freedom to report what one has seen, heard, and felt, and not to be obliged to

fabricate imaginary facts and feelings. The familiar tirades against ‘escapism,’

‘individualism,’ ‘romanticism’ and so forth, are merely a forensic device, the aim of which is

to make the perversion of history seem respectable” (Orwell, The Prevention of Literature

2008). This essay also articulates a connection between sincerity and freedom as opposed

to bullshit and totalitarianism: “The journalist is unfree, and is conscious of unfreedom,

when he is forced to write lies or suppress what seems to him important news: the

imaginative writer is unfree when he has to falsify his subjective feelings, which from his

point of view are facts. He may distort and caricature reality in order to make his meaning

clearer, but he cannot misrepresent the scenery of his own mind” (Orwell, The Prevention

of Literature 2008). The importance of artistic freedom is not just that it allows for self-

expression but that the artist has a duty to truth itself. Truth is both internal and external, it

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is the way things are. And it is likely, if not inevitable, that truth will conflict with political

orthodoxy. Orwell’s career and Orwell’s value was preserving the importance of truth.

Gorgias and the response of philosophy

Orwell compels us to take the problem of bullshit seriously. But he was hardly the

first to do so. One aspect of the purpose of philosophy has been the elimination of bullshit.

Its quest of clarifying thinking and its attempt to eliminate modes of expression it deems

muddled or meaningless is aimed at making it impossible to express oneself in a way that

could be seen as bullshit. Some of the ideas above in the taxonomy of bullshit are inspired

by various accounts of the purpose of philosophy. Plato’s philosophy was no different. The

Socratic Method is designed to force the interlocutor to clarify her position. Socrates argues

that we want what the bullshitter offers and this would provide a simple explanation as the

pervasiveness of bullshit in political discourse. As is the case with much of Plato’s work,

there is an anti-democratic thrust in much of Gorgias. As Gorgias says: “Since it is perfectly

ture that by virtue of this power you will have at your beck and call the physician and the

trainer, that businessman of yours will turn out to be making money for somebody else!

Not for himself will he make it, but for you who have the power to speak and persuade the

vast majority” (Plato 1989). Rhetoric is taken to work among the masses, that is, the

ignorant. Among those who truly know, as Socrates and Gorgias agree, it is ineffective. The

problem is that the truths of philosophy were for Plato not easily apprehended. That is,

having received an education, it was not clear that the philosopher would be able to

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function among the uneducated, who would still not only be susceptible to bullshit, but

would demand it.

Central to Plato’s moral epistemology is that such knowledge is available only to

those who have devoted themselves to investigating truth and justice. It is a profoundly

undemocratic enterprise. Thus, in The Republic, Plato asserts that philosophers should be

kings. It is a characteristic perhaps shared by all accounts of justice. There is a tension

between democracy and political philosophy in general. Even if we were willing to be

governed by philosopher kings, the attempt of philosophy to purify public discourse of

bullshit has failed. If anything, there is more bullshit now than ever. And, within philosophy

itself, the denial of the existence of truth is widespread. (Frankfurt, On Truth 2006)

In Gorgias, Plato presents an account of rhetoric that bears remarkable similarity to

Frankfurt’s account of bullshit. If there is any significant distinction, it is that Frankfurt’s

account of bullshit emphasizes the way in which the bullshitter is concerned with creating

a false impression about herself, while the rhetorician is seeking to persuade, rather than

instruct. It may be the case that Plato offers a more apt account, particularly as it concerns

politics. Even so, one key trope throughout the dialog is Gorgias’ repeated claims that the

rhetorician is more persuasive than the expert. A rhetorician is more persuasive about any

craft than the craftsman. “There is no need for rhetoric to know the facts at all, for it has hit

upon a means of persuasion that enables it to appear, in the eyes of the ignorant, to know

more than those who really know” (Plato 1989). This fits Frankfurt’s description of bullshit

rather well.

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Another important characteristic of rhetoric is that it does not offer any substance.

It does not inform or instruct, it merely persuades: “The rhetorician, then, is not a teacher

of law courts and other public gatherings as to what is right or wrong, but merely a creator

of beliefs; for evidently he could never instruct so large a gathering on such weighty

matters in a short time” (Plato 1989). This is fair enough for rhetoric as bullshit. In creating

beliefs, it does not seem to matter whether or not the beliefs are true. In Socrates’ terms,

the creation of beliefs is not an art, but a knack.

The problem with rhetoric is that corrupts the city as well as the orator. The

corruption seems to be inevitable for any successful democratic politician: “Whoever, then,

may render you most like them will also make you the politician and the orator you desire

to be. Everyone, of course, is pleased with speeches that accord with their own way of

looking at things and annoyed with a foreign point of view” (Plato 1989). Of course, the

orator must in the end live among the corrupt people, and therefore pays a price for his

sophistry. Extending this a bit, we can infer that one problem with the poet is that he is

likely to pursue the approval of the demos, while the philosopher seeks truth. Thus, the

poet in the end will also become like the people, by giving the people what they want.

Neither can give the people what they need.

At the same time, Socrates has to answer the charge that philosophy is useless. It

does not benefit the practitioner: “If a man, however well endowed, goes on philosophizing

throughout life, he will never come to taste the experiences which a man must have if he’s

going to be a gentleman and have the world look up to him” (Plato 1989). Furthermore,

Callicles also argues that Socrates’ speech is as empty as rhetoric. Socrates is merely

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engaging in word play, but it is word play that provides no advantage to the philosopher in

the same way working with words at least benefits the rhetorician and might in fact result

in benefits to the city. It turns out that philosophy lacks the persuasive ability to improve

the city or the people in it. From the perspective of practical politics, it fails. Plato blames

democracy for its failure, but it does not seem that philosophy works in any system of

government. Plato may not have been utopian, but it seems that Orwell’s anti-utopianism

and his willingness to live within the ambiguities Plato abhors apprehends the problem

better.

Plato may have done a disservice to rhetoric. The argument of this paper is that he

has done a disservice to the poets, at least some of them. Not all rhetoric is necessarily

bullshit. The concern here though is not a defense of rhetoric but a fuller understanding of

bullshit and its effects. For Plato, it is corrupting. It is significant that among Plato’s more

infamous ideas was the “noble lie” which was intended to create unity among the Guardian

class in The Republic. In the same sense, rhetoric may serve to persuade people to noble

ends. The problem with rhetoric from Socrates’ perspective is that it is a tool that can be

used for good or bad ends. It is not inherently good in itself.

From the time of Plato, the elimination of bullshit has been an occasional project for

philosophy. Plato spends his days going looking for people who claim to be wise and

showing them and others they are not. He is in this respect subversive. However, it appears

that the attempt to counter bullshit using philosophical methods has been a dead end.

Logical positivism was an attempt to eliminate nonsense from language, but had it

succeeded it would have eliminated much else along the way in its attempt to “eliminate

22

metaphysics” (Ayer 1971). The problem is in seeing bullshit as a problem of language, or

words, and to try to counter it with facts or logic. But the curious nature of bullshit is such

that it eludes such counters. The bullshitter does not play fair. It is to Socrates’ credit that

he manages to over and over again to call out those who claim to be wise. On the other, his

efforts result in death and do not arrest the decay of Athens.

Ultimately, the other problem with philosophy is it seems impossible. If we go back

to the ideas Plato expresses in his The Apology, where he acknowledges that no one truly

knows such things, then any attempt to make such claims are in the end bullshit. The

implication is that the assertion of moral authority by political philosophy is itself an act of

bullshit, no different from the way in which ideologues assert knowledge of truths that

make it possible to ignore reality.

23

Satire: The Democratic Response4

If the opposite of bullshit is sincerity, then it may seem odd to offer satire as

counter-measures. The mechanisms of exposing bullshit come close to bullshit itself. Satire

is, after all, insincere. Stephen Colbert of the Colbert Report is a transparent persona that

seems to have little to do with the actual person Stephen Colbert. Because it is transparent,

though, it would be unfair to accuse Colbert of practicing bullshit in the same way that

Callicles does. We may distinguish easily between the obvious and transparent

performance of Stephen Colbert and the dissembling of a politician. We know Colbert

doesn’t believe what he is saying, but we do not know if Bill Clinton believes what he’s

saying when he says “it depends on what the meaning of ‘is’ is” (Noah 1998). Colbert is

insincere, but there is no attempt to deceive. The puritanical and Platonic objections to the

performative aspect of Colbert miss the mark. As long as Colbert believes in what he is

doing (and I have no idea whether he does or not) then the performance is not deceptive.

There may be reasons to object to Colbert—he may not be entirely fair with his targets and 4 There are several academic discussions of political humor that use a “case study” approach. That is, they consider a particular humorist and discuss how that humorist engages in politics. The problem is that it is impossible to make any inferences from this research, though I do cite some of it in the paper. The best examples of political humor—for example, Mark Twain, Ambrose Bierce, HL Mencken, Lenny Bruce, John Stewart, and Stephen Colbert—are unique. They cannot be successfully imitated. Like the history of political thought, there is a real bias towards emphasizing the truly first rate. And even most first rate political comedy becomes dated rather quickly. Topical humor from even a decade ago will have little resonance today. When was the last time anyone laughed at a Nixon joke? Furthermore, in writing about contemporary culture, there is a risk that few in the audience will be familiar with all the examples I might want to use. As such, I offer the examples I do as a way for readers of this paper to consider some illustration of the points I raise here. It is my hope that the argument I present here does not depend much on the appropriateness of what I cite. Furthermore, I do not wish to present myself as an expert in political satire. There are many examples that may be more appropriate than the ones I cite that I’ve missed.

24

there is no doubt his performance serves an ideological agenda. He does not limit himself to

a television show—he has instigated political stunts including starting his own PAC and

testifying in character in Congress on immigration reform. (Jones 2012) The satirist

however has no choice but to take sides, and in this regard, Colbert really is no different

from earlier humorists like Ambrose Bierce and HL Mencken. The distinction between the

satirist and the politician is central to understanding the effectiveness of satire. In essence,

the satirist is presenting bullshit and asking “how can anyone take this nonsense

seriously?” The fact that he points out the unseriousness of much “mainstream” political

debate is possibly one reason why his stunts seem to enrage not just his political

opponents, but many so-called serious journalists as well. (Jones 2012)

Plato’s criticism of the poets was mistaken in part. Of course, comedy in particular,

and the arts generally may often endorse viewpoints or actions others find offensive or

objectionable. Humor may be mean spirited and cruel. However, to object to comedy

because it is irreverent, because it challenges authority is to deny its most important

power. It is precisely those modes that have the best chance of exposing bullshit to the

ridicule it deserves. Socrates was subject to ridicule at the hands of Aristophanes, though

Aristophanes did not really engage the substance of Socrates’ argument. The Socrates who

appears in The Clouds bears little resemblance to the Plato’s Socrates. However, even Plato

himself seems to have some appreciation for this. Socrates’s performance in The Apology

seems to fit the kind of public performance that comes close to satire. Socrates was accused

of irreverence, and the charges have merit as even The Apology shows. From this

perspective, the enmity between the poet and the philosopher may be exaggerated and

misconstrued. Philosophy and comedy share an adversarial relationship with authority.

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Indeed, it may be the case that Aristophanes’ charges against Socrates stick precisely

because it is Socrates who is irreverent toward the traditions of the city. (Blanchard 2000)

From the perspective of the philosopher, the poet has no binding commitment to

truth. Aristophanes’ account of Socrates has nothing to do with what Socrates said, but by

the time of its trial, it was too late—people seemed to believe that Socrates really did walk

on air and teach how to make the weaker argument defeat the stronger. Athenians believed

in the parody of Socrates more than they believed the man himself. Or at least that is the

story we have. We do not really know what happened. If Aristophanes is lying, if his

account of Socrates is bullshit, motivated by a personal vendetta, then we see how comedy

may very pose a danger. The poet is following different rules than the philosopher, and it

appears that in democratic discourse, the poet has significant advantages. It is no mere

coincidence then that Plato was hostile to both poets and democracy and championed

philosophy and philosopher kings. Plato was well aware of the conflict between philosophy

and democracy. This may reflect a fundamental flaw in democracy—many of its critics

surely see it as a flaw. Alas, the flaws of alternatives to democracy are considerably greater,

and in any event, authoritarian regimes certain produce a substantial amount of bullshit all

their own.

If Gorgias itself is read as parody, though, a different line of attack against bullshit

opens. Certainly, Socrates is not above holding many of his interlocutors up to ridicule. Of

course, they tend to deserve what they get. Their arrogance generally makes them

unsympathetic. Indeed, there may be intentional humor in many of Plato’s texts—it is not

just at the expense of some of Socrates’ interlocutors, but at readers. (Saxonhouse 1978) It

26

may be that humor the inevitable result of trying to apply philosophy to politics. Socrates’

argument in the Gorgias depends on identifying oratory with sophistry. (Blanchard 2000)

In doing so, he offers what amounts to a parody of oratory. It turns out Socrates is not

wholly unsympathetic with his audience. He intends to correct them, to teach them. But

there is still a strategy that in part involves ridicule. Moreover, it seems possible that Plato

intends to present many of the characters in the dialog as satirical figures, doing to them

what Aristophanes did to Socrates.

There are good reasons to use such a strategy, and they can help us understand the

purpose of satire in our own political environment. The fact that the satirist may pay with

her life is perhaps the best evidence we have of its subversive quality. Satire sometimes

provokes feelings of violation and violent reactions. Satire is irreverent, and they may

target things you or I hold sacred. Even in democracies, satire can be dangerous, as the

experiences of Salman Rushdie and cartoonists who depicted the prophet Muhammad can

attest. Interestingly, despite many expressions of sympathy, most American and British

newspapers did not reprint the Muslim cartoons that drew such offense. Even an academic

book from Yale University Press about the cartoon controversy did not reprint them.

(Freedman 2012) Lenny Bruce was tried and convicted. In a different mode, H.L. Mencken

often offends me, even if I find him funny. Satire can push our toleration to its limits. And it

is no surprise that authoritarian regimes and often even democracies censor satirists, even

if the censorship is not at the hands of government but rather corporations that fear

offending anyone lest they lose customers. If Plato is right about the appetites of the people

in a democracy, it may be that the commercial desires to appeal to a mass audience and

27

avoid offense at all costs are effective limits to the power of satire in a democracy. On the

other hand, if Plato is right, then there would not be so much to get offended about.

The only rule the bullshitter follows is to say anything so long as it works. As long as

the bullshitter refuses to abide by standards of transparency and honest exchange of ideas

then there is no choice but to engage the bullshitter on different ground. The satirist does

not follow the same rules as the serious journalist or pundit. In the main, political humor is

cast as critical, even destructive precisely because the humorist does not play by the same

rules as “respectable” journalists. The rule breaking characteristic of the satirist is an

important element in satire’s subversive character. It is not just that the satirist is targeting

important powers of the system, it is that the satirist does not follow the rules either. A

powerful recent example of this is the Russian punk rock feminist collective Pussy Riot,

who found they had to shock and offend in order to get the attention of a largely indifferent

Russian public as they called out the hypocrisy of the Putin administration. They paid an

enormous personal price. (Pozdorovkin 2013) The difference between the satirist and the

bullshitter is the satirist is not pretending to follow the rules. Rule breaking need not be

confined to entertainment media, but can include “stunts” and other public acts that also

serve to call attention to bullshit. It serves to undercut ways in which politicians misuse

language and rhetoric in ways that infect democratic discourse.

The democratic potential of satire and parody is found in its subversion. There are

humorists from all over the political and philosophical spectrum, with all manner of

intellectual and personal commitments. But there cannot be is a reverent humorist. It is a

tribute to puritanism that comedy is not always accorded its due. It seems that because the

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most effective comedy is enjoyable, it deserves less respect than tragedy or drama. Much

academic writing on political humor emphasizes its relationship to authority and finds

political humor as democratic. In general, democratic political need not be subversive—

often it is rather gentle. (Paletz 1990) These analyses seem to focus on the personalities

and roles of the players involved in the comedy. Much American political humor focuses on

political actors rather than the United States or the political system itself. (Boskin 1990)

These academic accounts are flawed because they cannot possibly survey the entire comic

universe, not even that of the United States. For instance, Boskin makes the claim that

humor that pokes fun at corporations is rare, but he has only anecdotes, not data to support

his claim. Current examples of popular comedy that takes on the corporate world would

include popular television programs such as The Office and 30 Rock. To be fair, it is

possible that the comic environment of the 80s was more reverent than that of today and it

would hardly be surprising that many people saw corporations as more benevolent at the

end of the 80s than in 2013. Regardless, this does support Plato’s contention that the poets

thrive by feeding people’s appetites.

Less examined is the way that political humor contributes to enriching political

discourse. Unlike philosophy and “serious” political discussion, comedy is democratic—the

empirical literature suggests that political comedy engages otherwise disinterested

members of the public. (Parkin 2010) Comedy has reach that conventional political

discourse lacks. Comedy has the potential to call out bullshit to a wide audience.

Furthermore, it may be the case that comedians are more trusted by a skeptical audience

than the more “insider” politicians and reporters. (Jones 2012) Philosophy by contrast

lacks the same access to the popular consciousness. Just as significant though is that in at

29

least some modes, philosophy is hostile to democracy. It seems almost silly to point out

that comedy is more popular than philosophy. But comedy is more democratic not just

because people enjoy it more. It is democratic because so much comedy takes the side of

the common person and the underdog. Comedy has a leveling tendency. A story where a

common person puts one over on his social or even intellectual superiors is funny, a story

where elites take advantage of the lowly is cruel. However, satirist need never spare the

foibles of ordinary people. If they are to highlight shortcomings of democracy, they cannot

spare the people. (Freedman 2012)

More than that, comedy works because it is grounded in a shared experience.

Political satire highlights the difference between the words used by politicians and the

lived experiences of ordinary people. The causes and principles that seem so important in

politics, the rhetoric that makes up much political speech is almost a foreign language to

most people. Liberal and conservative have almost nothing to do with day to day life

outside the political arena. For most people the political world is intrusive. Confronted by

the strangeness of the political world, political comedy serves to remind people that their

lives are normal and the political world is the anomaly. Thus, the citizen need not be

intimidated by the strange world.

Satire hostile to democracy still serves democratic ends by reminding everyone that

the masses are just as prone to error and foolishness as anyone else. Given its adversarial

role with authority, it should not be surprising that in democracy, some political humor

attacks the people themselves. Mencken’s quips about democracy come to mind, and there

are many examples of humorists gleefully pointing out the foibles of ordinary people. And

30

in at least one regard, despite the democratic characteristics of comedy, satire does create a

kind of hierarchy—people who are in on the joke, people who get it over those who don’t.

Yet such work still serves democratic purposes. Recall the list above and note how much

bullshit presents serious hazards to democracy:

A candidate for office, even the highest, must either adopt the current manias en

bloc, or convince it hypocritically that it has done so, while cherishing reservations

in petto. The result is only two sorts of men stand any chance whatever in getting

into actual control of affairs—first, glorified mob men who genuinely believe what

the mob believes, and secondly, shrewd fellows who are willing to make any

sacrifice of conviction and self-respect in order to hold their jobs. (Mencken 1958)

This is not exactly funny, but it does in some respect resemble Colbert. It encourages a kind

of self-correcting mechanism that is one of democracy’s strengths. Throughout the essay,

Mencken makes mockery of American democracy. There is nothing constructive in an of it,

but all rulers need to be reminded of their shortcomings and Mencken’s humor does so

quite effectively. This is not to say that there is some secret sympathy with democracy in

Mencken. Rather he has decided to live in one, and find delights in its absurdity. In this

regard, he shares some similarities with Orwell, who also was not always enthusiastic

about democracy but ended up serving it anyway.

To be sure, political comedy may serve other, sometimes even nefarious purposes. I

can mock the victims of tyranny or make fun of an unpopular minority. A set of general

criteria that could distinguish propaganda from noble political comedy will be elusive.

However, it seems a useful rule of thumb that salubrious political comedy will typically

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target the powerful, the domineering, and perhaps the foolish. Furthermore, it will, even in

its satirical or parodic mode, serve truth. These standards are nebulous and perhaps not all

that useful. Indeed, there is likely to be a degree of subjectivity. But they serve the purpose

here which is to describe how parody and satire serves to expose bullshit, and at its best,

blunt its effect.

There is of course an ugly side to this—a mass, largely uninformed audience may

not be able to distinguish between exposing bullshit and mocking serious and sophisticated

arguments—pomposity is to an extent a subjective evaluation of others. Comedy is

indiscriminate in its targets. It not only poses questions, but it subjects its targets to

ridicule. In its leveling, it erases distinctions and hierarchies that in fact are important

elements in any human society. (McWilliams 1995) The informed and concerned public

servant is as likely to be ridiculed as the most foolish politician. Comedy can and does

expose the tendency of the public to follow the lowest common denominator. Furthermore,

the kind of comedy most citizens will see, hear, or read has entertainment as its primary

purpose. It does not escape the commercial imperative. One should suspect that if there is a

choice between making money and performing a civic duty, money making will win out.

Ambiguity can be an issue for literary expressions of principles, political or

otherwise. Compared to a philosophic text, literary texts may obscure principles,

demonstrating the limitations of guiding a life by abstract principles. Heroes pay a price for

their virtue; villains are compelling personalities or may have persuasive justifications for

their actions. Work that lacks these ambiguities risk taking on cartoonish features, that

make them less compelling works of literature and perhaps even risks becoming

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propaganda itself. Satire is not immune from ambiguity. In countering bullshit, though, this

may be one of its strengths. If democracy depends on a widespread apprehension of the

way the world is, then adherence to abstract principles is a real danger. Satire may not be

able to say much about the way the world is, they are quite effective at illustrating the way

the world is not.

The idea that bullshit is especially dangerous to democracy and that parody and

satire are necessary correctives has important implications for democratic theory. The kind

of democracy I have in mind here is best described as skeptical democracy. Rather than

assert that specific democratic procedures are designed to discover something like a

general will, the notion of democracy here is one where truths, such as they are, are

contingent. Democracy requires an “open society” to work.

Even though satire can have a particular ideological bias, it is a critical mode of

political expression. Therefore, it undercuts rather than sustains any given ideology. The

bias is generally found not in the point of view it expresses, but in the position it attacks.

Political ideology can either serve as a theoretical underpinning to guide political action, or

it can serve as a cover for the pursuit of naked self-interest. Of course, the two categories

are not mutually exclusive: The theory of bullshit presented here however gives people at

least some response to ideologues: “Do you really believe that?” A party line may be

sincerely believed, or it may be used to gain political advantage. All too often, though,

ideology serves as a mechanism for the selection of certain facts over others, and to deny

some the validity of their lived experience. Like art, life is full of ambiguities. The world

rarely matches our theoretical reconstructions of it. As Mencken and other anti-democratic

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humorists point show, in order to remain democratic, democracy must subject itself to the

same kinds of criticism and ridicule it would impose on others. Democracy in the broadest

sense is not really an ideology—it is a method for governance.

Orwell was especially sensitive to the way modern politics seemed to demand

allegiance to a party line over a commitment to artistic truth. It is unclear if the true

believer, the one who actually accepts the party line in total is better or worse than the

bullshitter, the one who parrots the party line in service to the cause of the party. The

problem though is not just that totalitarianism results in bullshit, but that ideological

writing: “Political writing in our time consists almost entirely of prefabricated phrases

bolted together like the pieces of a child’s Meccano set. It is the unavoidable result of self-

censorship. To write in plain, vigorous language one has to think fearlessly, and if one

thinks fearlessly one cannot be politically orthodox” (Orwell, The Prevention of Literature

2008).

For comedy though, there seems to be an aesthetic of commitment to comedy over

ideology. That is not to say that political comedians are not subject to their own political

biases. In choosing targets for satire, it is likely that one party or another will come in for

more than its share of ridicule. On the other hand, regardless of political affiliation, it is

difficult to imagine any political comedian resisting the urge to make fun of Anthony

Weiner.5 It is probably the case that much comedy is directed at the self-important and the

pretentious, which is why comedy so often seems democratic. This holds even if the self-

important consists of the mass of the people.

5 Though I suppose a comedian may decide making fun of Weiner is too easy.

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Orwell insisted that the artist must take a side in modern times. But that side need

not be couched in a particular party or even ideological preference. There is something in

nature of comedy, perhaps more than all the other arts, where regardless of the biases of

the artist, there must be some commitment to truth. If comedy works by highlighting

absurdities, then its mode and function is critical. As such, it cannot endorse. Ultimately, it

is subversive. A comedian may have ideological commitments, but they cannot continue to

be funny and be true believers.

Ideology can come rather close to utopia. It is impossible to imagine utopian satire

or even a utopian comedy. Saxonhouse’s interpretation of The Republic as a comedy results

in reading it as anti-utopian. Orwell was a deeply committed to anti-utopian. This points to

another democratic function of satire—it prevents citizens from demanding too much from

each other. Again, by highlighting the way in which lived experience falls short of any ideal,

satire makes it easier to live with our imperfections.

Conclusion

Lying is no doubt a political problem, and exposing liars in politics is a public

service. However, merely accounting for the degree that a claim deviates from fact is only

part of the of the challenge to democracy. More attention to bullshit—the statement may or

may not be true, but its rhetorical intent was to accomplish a particular political goal, and

had little to do with transmitting information. This creates a challenge—the extent to

which a claim is a lie is relatively straightforward. But judging a claim to be bullshit

35

requires some discernment of the intent, what is going on in the perpetrator’s mind when

the statement is uttered.

The three thinkers examined here share a concern with bullshit, even if only one

uses the word. Orwell was quite fond of the word “humbug,” a word that Frankfurt allows

is similar to bullshit. Indeed, what is striking about the very different men, writing in

different times and for different purposes, is how much they share. For all three, the issue

is at bottom an ethical one. A commitment to clear thinking and clear expression of

thoughts is a universal virtue. And, the arguments of all three demonstrate that clear

thinking depends on clear expression. Bullshit makes it easy to wish away unpleasant or

inconvenient truths.

Perhaps one reason why bullshit seems to pass with little objection in politics is the

fear that if we purge politics of bullshit, there will be nothing left. An insistence on sincerity,

not just in politics but in everyday life would quickly grow rather tiresome. The fear of

course is misplaced, as there is no danger of ever eliminating bullshit from politics. Satire is

an effective weapon against bullshit, but in the end it works in part by turning bullshit

against itself. It does not eliminate it, it uses it an exposes it. Satire replaces one form of

insincerity with another. The difference is that the sincerity of satire is open. Satire will not

eliminate bullshit, but it may prevent us from being seduced by it. Our own, as well as

others.

36

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