1. P stopped at D’s repair shop to help D repair an automobile fuel tank. In order to allow the car to move without the tank attached, P poured gasoline into the carburetor and, signaled D to turn the ignition key. The car backfired, causing an explosion that resulted in severe burns to P’s upper body. P sued D, and after the close of the evidence, requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that handling a dangerous substance such as gasoline required a particularly high duty of care. The trial court refused the instruction.

Was the trial court’s ruling correct?

A. No, because the danger that gasoline poses is so severe that the law requires a higher standard of care than just the reasonable prudent person.

B. Yes, because P was contributorily negligent.

C. No, because D, as a mechanic, should have known better.

D. Yes, because the standard of care is always RPP. What may change is the burden of taking additional precautions in light of the circumstances.

2. P was driving on North Broadway when a woman pushing a stroller jaywalked into his path. Although P skidded a bit, he was able to stop his car without colliding with the woman or the stroller. D, however, ran into the rear of P’s car, causing personal injury and property damage. At trial, D admits following P too closely and says that he never saw the woman with the stroller. The trial court gave the jury the standard emergency instruction, telling the jury to evaluate the situation according to what the reasonable prudent person in D’s position would have done. The jury returned a verdict for D. P appeals.

Should the appellate court affirm or reverse?

A. It should affirm on different grounds, because the RPP standard does not apply in emergencies.

B. It should reverse, because the emergency doctrine does not apply where D has created the emergency.

C. It should affirm because D acted reasonably in the emergency of the woman jaywalking.

D. It should reverse unless the record shows that P was well aware that D was following too closely before the accident.

3. P was pregnant. She and her husband did not want to have more children after the birth of the child with whom she was pregnant. P needed to have a C-section to deliver the child, and her OBGYN advised her that she could perform a tubal ligation (which ordinarily prevents further pregnancies) at the same time. P consented. A year later, P felt a sharp pain in her abdomen. It turned out that the ligation had not worked perfectly, which occurs about 2% of the time. P had developed a tubal pregnancy, which is quite dangerous to the mother and always fatal to the embryo. P had to undergo additional surgery to resolve the pregnancy. P now brings an action against the OBGYN for failing to inform her of the risk.

Is the OBGYN liable for negligence?

A. Yes, if a 2% chance of developing a tubal pregnancy is a material risk.

B. No, unless in addition to it being a material risk, P proves that she would not have consented to the tubal ligation had she known of the risk.

C. Yes, provided that the reasonable prudent person would have refused the ligation in such circumstances.

D. No, if the OBGYN had performed many such procedures over a ten-year period with no complications.

4. A New York statute makes it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle in violation of any driver’s license restriction. D’s car collided with P’s car at a Queens intersection. D’s license required him to drive with corrective lenses, which D was not wearing at the time. There was testimony at trial from which the jury could have concluded that that P failed to keep a proper lookout when he stopped for the stop sign and from which the jury could have concluded that D’s failure to wear glasses was a proximate cause of the accident. P requested the trial court to charge the jury on negligence per se, but the court refused. The jury returned a verdict for D.

P appeals. Was P entitled to the negligence per se instruction?

A. No, because the jury could reasonably have found P contributorily negligent.

B. Yes, because New York is a comparative negligence jurisdiction.

C. No, because P may have been negligent per se.

D. Yes, because the statute is a safety statute; P is a member of the protected class, and collisions are the kind of events against which the statute protects.

5. The marines were conducting bombing practice on a government practice bombing range on a frigid January day. P’s decedent, a fisherman, was fishing in waters six miles from the bombing range. A falling object penetrated the roof of the boat’s cabin and the hull below. The vessel sank within a minute, and decedent died shortly thereafter from hypothermia. P sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act. At the trial, P presented testimony from the range’s ordnance control officer that marine planes were approaching the bombing range from the direction of decedent’s vessel and that the damage to the vessel was consistent with the type of projectiles used in the practice. P also introduced evidence that there was no other apparent cause for the sinking.

Was P entitled to a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction?

A. No, because there is no proof that decedent’s vessel was not already sinking when struck.

B. Yes, because the government has far better access to evidence about the practice and far more resources to employ in its defense.

C. No, it is P’s burden to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence.

D. Yes, there is enough evidence to support findings of exclusive marine control and decedent’s non-contribution to the accident. The highly unusual nature of the incident permits a reasonable inference that a negligently dropped projectile sank decedent’s boat.