(b). Smit, Houston (2011). the Moral Significance of Gratitude. SJP

8/11/2019 (b). Smit, Houston (2011). the Moral Significance of Gratitude. SJP.

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2011 Nancy D. Simco Lecture

THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GRATITUDEIN KANTS ETHICS

H S MT

: In this essay, we examine the grounds, nature and content, status, acqui-sition and role, and justification of gratitude in Kants ethical system, making use ofstudent notes from Kants lectures on ethics. We are especially interested in questionsabout the significance of gratitude in Kants ethics. We examine Kants claim thatgratitude is a sacred duty, because it cannot be discharged, and explain how this claim

is consistent with his insistence that ought implies can. We argue that for Kant aproper understanding of self-esteem is importantly related to, if not necessary for,possession of the virtue of gratitude.

In his 1797 The Metaphysics of Morals (Part II, The Doctrine of Virtue), Kantplaces gratitude among the main positive duties of love to others, along

with beneficence and sympathetic feeling. Kants discussions of the

various duties and corresponding virtues and vices featured inThe Doctrineof Virtueare fairly brief. In the Akademie edition of his works, his discussionof gratitude, in the section Von der Pflicht der Dankbarkeit (On

the Duty of Gratitude), occupies roughly two full pages of text (MS, 6:45456), while his discussion of ingratitude is given a mere paragraph

Houston Smitis Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He specializesin the history of medieval and early modern philosophy and is currently writing a book with theworking title Kants Theory of Cognition.Mark Timmonsis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He has publishedwidely on topics in metaethics, normative ethics, and Kants ethics. He is editor ofOxford Studiesin Normative Ethics (2011) and is currently working on a book with Terry Horgan tentativelyentitled Illuminating Reasons: An Essay in Moral Phenomenology. Smit and Timmons arealso co-authors of Kants Grounding Project in the Doctrine of Virtue forthcoming in KantsTheory of Practical Justification, ed. M. Timmons and S. Baiasu (Oxford University Press).

The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 49, Issue 4

December 2011

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 49, Issue 4 (2011), 295320.

ISSN 0038-4283, online ISSN 2041-6962. DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00077.x

295


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(6: 459).1 As we shall see, Kants remarks about gratitude and ingratitude

are quite rich, but his laconic treatment of them leaves much that is un-

developed, unexplained, and unexamined. In particular, his remarks raise

questions about the grounds, nature and content, status, acquisition androle, and justification of gratitude in his ethical system.2 Here is a list of

questions worth addressing in coming to an adequate understanding of

Kants conceptions of gratitude and ingratitude:

Grounds: What grounds the duty of gratitude? That is, which considerationsfigure in making gratitude an appropriate response and, moreover, a

response that a beneficiary in some senseowesto her benefactor, without itbeing strictly morally required of her?

Nature and Content: Kant characterizes particular acts of gratitude ashonoringones benefactor, and he makes general remarks about considerations

governing the content of ones duty of gratitude. In addition to questions

about these matters, there are particularly interesting questions about the

place of affect in Kants conception of gratitude. Fully sincere acts of

gratitude would seem to require that one perform them out of a grateful

heart that is manifested in having certain positive feelings such as gladness.

But how, if at all, do such feelings figure in Kantian gratitude?

Status: Kant claims that gratitude has a certain statusit is what he calls asacred duty, to be contrasted with ordinary duties. What makes it

sacred is that a beneficiary cannot completely discharge this duty. But why

is this? And what is its significance in Kants ethical theory?

Acquisition and Role: For Kant, acquiring the virtue of gratitude requiresovercoming a natural tendency toward ingratitude, rooted in a perceived

tension between being a beneficiary and maintaining ones proper self-

esteem. What, exactly, is this tension, and what can Kants treatment of

this tension teach us about the role that he assigns gratitude in his account

of the virtuous agent?

Justification: Nowhere in his writings (that we know of) does Kant offer ajustification in the form of a derivation of the duty of gratitude. This is an

especially peculiar feature of his discussion in The Doctrine of Virtue, since

1 Citations from The Metaphysics of Morals (abbreviated MS) and from Groundwork of theMetaphysics of Morals (abbreviated G) are from Gregor 1996.

2 There is also a question about an alleged paradox involved in the very idea of there beinga debt of gratitude. Of course, Kant does take gratitude to be a duty, and he refers to abeneficiary being indebted to ones benefactor (see, e.g., MS, 6: 459). However, partly forreasons of space and partly because the alleged paradox concerns the very idea of a debt ofgratitude and thus is not a special problem for Kants ethics, we will not be discussing it in thispaper. For more on the alleged paradox, see Lyons 1969, Weiss 1985, and Wellman 1999.

296 HOUSTON SMIT AND MARK TIMMONS


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Kants primary aim in that book seems to be to show how basic duties to

oneself and to others can be derived from the categorical imperative. Is

there a need for such a derivation? If so, how does it go?

These questions indicate some of the complexity of gratitudeboth as a

response on some occasion (occurrent) and as a virtue. One aim of this essay

is to address these questions and, thereby, to elaborate what we take to be a

Kantian (if not Kants own) conception of gratitude. In doing so, we will make

use of student notes from Kants lectures on ethics.3 Moreover, as indicated

by our title, we are especially interested in questions about the role or

significance of gratitude in Kants ethics. We argue that for Kant a proper

understanding of self-esteem is importantly related to, if not necessary for,

possession of the virtue of gratitude. In this way at least, the virtues ofself-esteem and gratitude are importantly related. But before defending this

claim, we begin by presenting an interpretation of Kants views of the

grounds, nature and content, and special status of gratitude. In the final main

section of the paper (preceding our conclusion), we briefly consider the topic

of justification.

1. GROUNDS

As a start, it is useful to distinguish objective from subjective grounds. Theobjective grounds of gratitude are those conditions the obtaining of which

figure in making acts of gratitudeobjectivelyappropriate or owedappropriateor owed from an ideal spectator point of view. It may thus be subjectivelyappropriate for the recipient of a gift to feel or express gratitude toward

someone in cases where he or she believes, or perhaps reasonably believes,

that the objectively appropriate grounds of gratitude obtain, even if in fact

they do not (all) obtain. Understood in this way, the concept of an objective

ground is prior to its subjectivist cousin. In what immediately follows, we

focus on the objective grounds of gratitude in Kant, which have to do with hisconception of duties of love to others in general and the duty of beneficence

in particular.

InThe Doctrine of Virtue, Kant divides ethical duties to others into duties of(practical) love and duties of respect.4 The basis of this distinction concerns

whether the performance of an action that fulfills an ethical duty to others

3 We make use of the Collins notes taken in 178485 (cited in the text as Col.) and the laterVigilantius notes (cited as Vig.) begun in 1793. Both sets of notes are included in Heath andSchneewind 1997.

4 Kant distinguishes pathological love from practical love. The former refers to love as anaffect-laden emotion, while the latter refers to a maxim ofbenevolence (MS, 6: 449)roughly,the maxim of genuine altruistic concern for the welfare of others, as we are about to explain.

GRATITUDE IN KANTS ETHICS 297


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thereby imposes an obligation on select others. If so, then the duty is one of

love; if not, then it is a duty of respect. The idea is that in performing an action

that fulfills a duty of love, ones action is not strictly owed to the recipient;

rather, it is a kindnesssomething meritoriousand as such calls for aresponse on the part of the recipient. The fundamental duty of love in Kants

system is beneficence and the response called forthe response that is due or

owedis gratitude. So the ground of gratitude is beneficence. More precisely,

what grounds this kind of response are acts of benefitting (or attempting to

benefit) another that constitute what we may call genuine beneficence. InKants writings, one finds three constraints that jointly contribute to an acts

being one of genuine beneficence and thus grounding a response of gratitude.

These constraints concern (i) the intentions and motives of the benefactor; (ii)

the acts relation to strict or perfect duty, including its being meritorious; and(iii) the happiness-related ends of the beneficiary. We take these up in order.

(i) Although Kant is not entirely explicit about the matter, we may

presume that in order for an action to count as one of genuine beneficence,

it must be done voluntarily and with the intention of promoting someone

elses happiness. A coerced act typically will not generate a debt of gratitude.

Nor will doing something that by luck or happenstance benefits someone

elsesuch acts are not ones of genuine beneficence. Motive, too, is impor-

tant. In The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant writes that To be beneficent, that is to

promote according to ones means the happiness of others in need, withouthoping for something in return, is everyones duty (MS, 6: 453; emphasis added).5

In being genuinely beneficent, one cannot be motivated merely by self-

interest. Indeed, according to Kant, if ones motive in helping someone is to

put him under obligation, one does not provide him a true benefit. He thus

warns that a benefactor must also carefully avoid any appearance of

intending to bind the other [by bestowing a benefit]; for if he showed that

he wanted to put the other under an obligation (which always humbles the

other in his own eyes), it would not be a true benefit that he rendered him(6: 453; emphasis added).6 Of course, providing someone in need with a

benefit and doing so from, say, malice, where the aim is to humiliate the

recipient, does not count as conferring a genuine benefit either.7 These

casesof self-interest, imposing obligation, and malicerepresent only

5 This claim about acting without hope of return can also be found at MS, 6: 393.6 See also Col., 27: 443.7 In the first of these three casesacting from self-interestthe motive is presumably

permissible; however, acting out of malice involves a violation of the duty of respect strictlyowed to others. It is perhaps not clear what to say (without more detail) about cases in whichsomeone acts in order to impose a debt of gratitude on his recipient. Motives of all three sorts(with a qualification presented in the next footnote) are at least prima facie incompatible withgenuine beneficence.



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some of the types of discounting motives. But the main point is clear: having

and acting on the virtue of beneficence requires seeing the happiness-related

ends of others as providing one with moral reasons to help those in need.

Genuine or true beneficence, for Kant, is helping others for their sakesandthus is altruistically motivated.8

(ii) However, that an agent intentionally and voluntarily benefits (or

intends to benefit) others and does so for their sake is not sufficient for that act

to be one of genuine beneficence. A further condition, already mentioned, is

that the act not be strictly required: in performing an act of genuine benefi-

cence, one cannot be fulfilling a perfect duty, that is, a duty the omission of

which would violate the beneficiarys moral or legal rights.9 One may volun-

tarily and intentionally do something that one solemnly promised to do for

someone else, and may even do it for that persons sake. But, at least in Kantsview, in making a solemn promise, one puts oneself under a strict obligation

to the promisee, compliance with which is a perfect duty. So in keeping ones

promise, one simply avoids wrong-doing. By contrast, acts of genuine benefi-

cence are not required in this strict manner;10 moreover, performing them is

consequently morally meritorious, deserving of what Kant calls positive

honor (Vig., 27: 665). The merit is earned in such cases because the agent

is altruistically motivated.11

Here are three further points about the duty associated with the virtue of

beneficence that bear on the grounds of gratitude. All concern the fact that anaction must be morally permissible in order to be meritorious. First, as Kant

makes clear in various places (MS, 6: 388, 450), acts of helping others inresponse to which gratitude is owed must promote (or be intended to

promote) the morally permissible ends of those others. Helping a gangster

achieve his nefarious ends does not merit gratitude, regardless of what either

party may believe. Second and relatedly, violating the rights of some indi-

vidual as a means to, or in the process of, benefitting someone else is generally

8 Of course, the issue of motivation is complicated by cases of motivational overdetermina-tion, where one acts partly from self-interest and partly from altruism, a topic we will not takeup here. Note also that altruistic motivation is not incompatible with a benefactors realizingthat in acting on her maxim of beneficence, her beneficiary thereby comes to owe her a debt ofgratitude, and it is not incompatible with her thinking (in concert with recent work in positivepsychology) that beneficence promotes ones own happiness.

9 The perfectimperfect distinction in Kant is multifaceted; here we focus on just one of thefacets.

10 While particular acts of beneficence are not strictly required, adopting the maxim ofbeneficence is. As Kant notes, The law [requiring beneficence] holds only for maxims, not fordeterminate actions (MS, 6: 393).

11 Of course, in order for an act of beneficence to be meritorious, the benefactor must confera genuine benefit on the recipient (or have intended to do so). However, we take this to be anenabling condition in relation to moral merit and not part of what makesthe act meritorious.



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wrong, and thus is not an action that calls for gratitude.12 Third, it is perhaps

not clear what Kant might say about an altruistically motivated action that,

suppose, greatly benefits some needy person but at a significant expense to

the benefactor, so significant that he himself would finally come to needthe beneficence of others (6: 454). Details seem to matter here. For instance,

assuming the case has to do with financial matters, did the benefactor and/or

the beneficiary foresee, or should either of them have foreseen, this unwel-

come outcome? What about someone altruistically sacrificing his or her life to

save others?13 We leave these and other questions of casuistry to the side.

(iii) The third general consideration that bears on the grounds of gratitude

concerns what we have referred to as the happiness-related ends of the

recipient. We have already noted Kants claim that genuine beneficence

involves making others ends my own (provided only that these are notimmoral) (MS, 6: 450). Such ends include those, the satisfaction or obtainingof which, the beneficiaryconsidersas constituting (or contributing to) her or hishappiness. The perspective of the beneficiary partially determines what

counts as a genuine benefit and, thus, whether a deed counts as an act of

genuine beneficence: I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with myconcepts of happiness (except to young children and the insane), thinking to

benefit him by forcing a gift upon him; rather, I can benefit him only in

accordance with his conception of happiness (6: 454). Conferring genuine

benefits, Kant is here saying, involves taking into consideration the recipientsown ends. Forcing or trying to force some gift on another (competent)

person that the other person does not welcome presumably represents a

morally problematic form of paternalism in which the would-be benefactor

fails to respect the authority of the recipient to choose her or his own life plan.

Now there are many complications to sort out with respect to this general

condition concerning the recipients perspective. For instance, to (objectively)

merit gratitude, must the gift in fact be of benefit to the recipient in lightof her (the recipients) happiness-related ends? Or rather is it enough that

the benefactor believes, or reasonably believes, that her gift is of benefit to

the recipient in light of the recipients ends? Again, for reasons of space, we

12 We say generally because one can well imagine exceptions. I violate your propertyrights if I break into your house to use your phone to make a life-saving call on behalf of anotherinjured party. In the Casuistical Questions appended to his discussion of beneficence in The

Doctrine of Virtue (MS, 6: 454), Kant himself raises the question of whether the merit of someacts of beneficence might be great enough to outweigh the rights of a beneficiary. His exampleis of an estate serf who willingly consents to putting his welfare entirely in the hands ofhis master, counting on the masters beneficence. The idea is that in so doing, the serf is ineffect waiving certain natural rights he has as a person, which (typically) violates perfect dutiesto self.

13 Kant briefly raises this issue in his casuistical remarks on suicide (MS, 6: 42324).



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set aside this question and others.14 The most central point about respecting

the perspective of the beneficiary has been made.

A concluding point is in order: the conditions that groundhavinga debt of

gratitude need to be distinguished from conditions that affect whatand howmuchis owed in fulfilling a debt of gratitude. We have been focusing exclu-sively on the former. In discussing gratitude, Kant mentions the degree to

which a gift benefits the recipient and the degree of self-sacrifice on the part

of the benefactor in providing the benefit.15Arguably, these factors bear most

directly on the content of some particular duty of gratitudewhat and how

much a recipient owes to her or his benefactorrather than on the question

ofwhethersome debt of gratitude is owed. We take up the issue of content inthe next section.

2. NATURE AND CONTENT

Talk of gratitude in Kant refers to particular actions that one owes to her or

his benefactor as well as to an associated character trait that one has a duty

to cultivate and maintain. Issues arise concerning the general nature both of

such actions and of the associated character trait. In this section, we set forth

the main elements of Kants conception of gratitude, with an eye on the

question whether feelings of gratefulness are required to fulfill a duty of

gratitude.Kant begins his discussion of gratitude in The Doctrine of Virtue with the

claim that Gratitudeconsists inhonoringa person because of a benefit he hasrendered us, adding that respect for the benefactor is the feeling connected

with this judgment (MS, 6: 454). As we interpret these remarks, Kants viewis that conscious experiences and corresponding expressions of genuine grati-

tude constitute a certain distinctive complex attitudehonoringa proper

understanding of which involves reference to various psychological compo-

nents that help make the honoring in question an instance of genuine grati-

tude. Expanding on Kants remarks, there would seem to be five elements

that combine to make an act one of genuine gratitude, each of which deserves

a brief comment.

First, for a conscious experience and associated act of gratitude to occur in

response to a genuine act of beneficence, a beneficiary mustrecognizethat she

14 Fully explicating the grounds of gratitude would require saying much more about theperspective of the recipient. For further discussion, see McConnell 1993, 3041.

15 These considerations reflect the degree of merit associated with an act of beneficence that,for Kant, depends on (i) how costly the action is to the agent, (ii) the agents relation to therecipient, and (iii) the extent to which the recipient is benefitted. Kants own example of a gooddeed with a high degree of merit is where at considerable self-sacrifice I rescue a completestranger from great distress (MS, 6: 228).



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is the recipient of a benefit conferred voluntarily and intentionally by another

person. Second, the beneficiary must interpret the benefactors act as one ofgenuine beneficence and thus as a morally meritorious action. Third, against

the background of this joint recognition and interpretation, the honoring thatconstitutes gratitude consists inacknowledging, whether privately to oneself orin a public act (perhaps verbally, perhaps nonverbally, or perhaps in both

ways), both the significance of the benefit received and the benefactors merit

as deserving of ones recognition and acknowledgment.

Fourth, a beneficiarys response to beneficence would not count as grati-

tude if ones motivating reason for honoring were other than (or at least did

not include as a main element) the thought that the benefactor had rendered

a genuine benefit deserving of the sort of acknowledgment just described. For

instance, giving something in return solely for the purpose of encouragingones benefactor to give even more, and thus as a matter of mere self-interest,

may be understood as officially repaying a debt of gratitude in a very narrow

sense (where the focus is entirely on the outward gift or the service that the

beneficiary offers as repayment for a benefit). But if so, then it is important to

distinguishgenuinegratitude from a mere outward act of repayment, wherethe former is understood as requiring that ones principal reason for express-

ing gratitude is that one has benefitted from the benefactors act of genuine

beneficence.

Fifth, although Kant indicates that there is a feeling of respect connectedwith genuine expressions of gratitude, he does not say that having this or any

other feeling is required for complying with the duty of gratitude. Here it is

worth noting that in connection with the negative duties of respect to others,

Kant explains that the respect in question refers not to a mere feeling but

rather to the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in

another person, and so as respect in the practical sense (MS, 6: 449). Acts ofgratitude are, of course, acts of commission, not mere omission, and so the

maxim just mentioned does not quite fit them. But given the nature of the

honoring (lately noted) that constitutes gratitude, talk of positive respect in

this context should be understood as the maxim of acknowledging the sig-

nificance of the benefit conferred and of the meritorious nature of the act of

beneficence. And adopting (and acting on) this maxim is something that can

be required. (We will return to the issue of gratitude and feelings in a

moment.)

The five components just described figure in Kants conception of the

general nature of acts of gratitude. With regard to more specific matters

concerning the content of this duty, Kant briefly addresses questions regard-ing what he refers to as extent and intensity. Extent concerns the issue of

to whomindividuals owe a debt of gratitude (in addition to their immediate



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benefactors). He claims that gratitude is owed not just to ones contemporar-

ies but also to ones predecessors, even to those one cannot identify with

certainty (MS, 6: 455). And he indicates that in cases where it is not possible

to show gratitude toward ones benefactor (perhaps because she has died),then one ought to express ones gratitude by conferring benefits on worthy

others.16 Regarding the intensity of gratitudehow much a beneficiaryought to do for his benefactorKants suggested guideline is that one should

consider how useful the favor was to the one put under obligation and

how unselfishly it was bestowed on him (6: 456).17 In this paper, we will not

further explore questions that these particular matters of detail raise. Rather,

having remarked on the general nature and content of acts of gratitude, we

now wish to address our question about the role that feelings of gratefulness

play in Kants account of gratitude, both as an act and as a character trait.Feelings of gratefulness or thankfulness are often described by those who

have them as involving positive feelings of gladness and joy, and they are

taken to be an important feature of ordinary experiences of gratitude.18 Call

experiences of heartfelt gratitude that are accompanied by such feelings

(whether publicly expressed or not) instances of gratefulness.19 Such

instances are to be distinguished from the sort of mere acknowledgment

16 Kant also mentions gratitude as an appropriate response to the service of animals. It isworth noting that some philosophers argue that the extent of gratitude is much broader thanKant seems to recognize. See Fitzgerald 1998 and Walker 198081.

17 See also Col., 27: 441. Regarding how much one is to do for a benefactor, Kant writesthat The least degree is to renderequalservices to the benefactor if he can receive them (if heis still living) or, if he cannot, to render them to others (MS, 6: 456). What Kant means by talkof equal services is not clear. It could be taken to mean that one is to do for the benefactor thesame sort of thing he or she received from the benefactor. For a general critique and consequentrejection of the claim that properly expressed gratitude requires that one is to repay a debt ofgratitude by performing services equal in kind, see McConnell 1993, 4851. Alternatively, talkof equality in the context of gratitude may be understood as the idea that one is to perform (ifpossible) services of equal significance, rather than of the same sort. It is worth noting that recentexperimental evidence gathered by social psychologists studying gratitude shows that peoplesfeelings of gratitude vary in response to their perceptions regarding: (i) whether the benefit wasconferred intentionally, (ii) how costly it was to the benefactor, (iii) how beneficial the benefit wasto the beneficiary, and (iv) the antecedent closeness of the relationship between the benefactorand the beneficiary (see, e.g., McCullough et al. 2001). There is perhaps no better source inWestern philosophy for such details than Senecas De Beneficiis, a manual of proper andimproper ways to give, receive, and return favors. See esp. chs. 14.

18 Walker 198081 distinguishes gratefulness from acts of gratitude. The psychologicalattitudes and feelings associated with positive experiences of gratitude are the subject of muchrecent psychological research on gratitude. See, e.g., Emmons 2007, Fredrickson 2004, andWatkins 2004.

19 At MS, 6: 455, Kant refers to what Gregor translates as a grateful disposition, whichKant claims is appropriate if not owed to those who, regardless of conferring a benefit, arebenevolently disposed toward oneself. He calls this disposition appreciativeness. However, weare inclined to interpret Kants duty of appreciativeness as one ofacknowledgingthe good will ofothers and not as involving sensible affect.



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constitutive of the honor involved in gratitude that we have been describing.

Our question, then, is whether for Kant fulfilling the duty of gratitude, in

addition to honoring ones benefactor, also requires that one have genuine

feelings of gratefulness toward ones benefactor. Putting this question aboutKants view to the side for a moment, one might argue that the duty of

gratitude requires that an outward expression of gratitude be sincere, that

sincerity requires being truly grateful, and that being truly grateful requires

having the sorts of feelings that count as gratefulness. After all, there is

something missing in someone who deeply begrudges or resents his bene-

factor but is able to (and does) manage to truthfully express (mere) acknowl-

edgment of the benefactors beneficence in response to receiving a benefit.

The same may be said of a beneficiary who simply lacks any feeling of

gratefulness despite honestly acknowledging a benefit. If this argument iscogent, then unless Kants view can accommodate such feelings as part of

what is owed to ones benefactor, his view is (in this particular regard)

implausible.

In answer to our question about Kant, it is reasonably clear that Kants

duty of gratitude does notindeed, cannotinclude having sensible feelings

as a necessary component. Consider this passage from the Collins notes in

which Kant makes it clear that having a grateful heart (and thus having

feelings of gratefulness) is not required in fulfilling the duty of gratitude:

Gratitude is of two kinds: from duty, and from inclination. It comes from duty, when

we remain unmoved by the others kindness, but see that it behooves us to be

grateful; in that we have, not a grateful heart, but principles of gratitude. We are

grateful from inclination, insofar as we feel love in return. (Col., 27: 441)

Of course, these cool-hearted rather stern remarks of Kants are not sur-

prising in light of various claims in his own writings to the effect that feel-

ings (using this term to cover all kinds of sensible affects and passions) are

not under ones direct voluntary control and, thus, unlike actions, cannot

figure in what one is required to do on some occasion. Given the

ought-implies-can doctrine that Kant accepts, the ought involved in

the duty of gratitude cannot include the requirement to have feelings at

will. In response to the sincerity argument presented in the previous para-

graph, Kant (and many others) would likely make the simple reply that

sincerity in expressing (and having) gratitude does not morally require

having feelings at will.

Nevertheless, one can go on to ask how, if at all, feelings of gratefulness can

figure in Kants conception of gratitude. We think an answer can be inferredfrom what Kant says about the duty of sympathetic feeling that, along with

beneficence and gratitude, is a positive duty (of love) toward others. The



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feelings in question, most generally speaking, are those of joy and sadness,

which are sensible feelings of pleasure or displeasure (MS, 6: 456) directedat anothers situation. The main point Kant makes in The Doctrine of Virtue

about the duty of sympathetic feeling is the following:

But while it is not in itself a duty to share the sufferings (as well the joys) of others,

it is a duty to sympathize actively in their fate; and to this end it is therefore an

indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to

make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the

feeling appropriate to them. (MS, 6: 457)

An active sympathetic response involves use of ones free will, and the

idea here (as we understand this passage) is that one has a duty to adopt a

maxim of beneficence (as previously explained). And it is helping others inneed based on this disposition that one has a primary duty to adopt and

cultivate. This is beneficence grounded in obligation; something that can be

commanded. But given ones natural compassionate endowment, one has an

indirect (instrumental) duty to cultivate the kinds of sensible feelings that,

guided properly by ones understanding of the duty of beneficence, can lead

one to perform acts of beneficence that the representation of duty alone

might not accomplish (MS, 6: 457). The instrumental value of sympatheticfeelings being stressed here might be taken to imply that coming to have a

developed disposition to have such feelings (based ultimately on consider-ations of moral obligation) is not itself a moral virtue. But in the Collins notes,

we find the following passage:

Well-wishing from love cannot be commanded, though well-wishing from obligation

can. If, however, we do well by someone from duty, we get used to this, so that we

can subsequently do it from love and inclination as well. If we speak well of someone,

simply because we see that he deserves it, we get used to this, so that afterwards we

intone his merits in everything. Thuseven love from inclination is a moral virtue, and might

be commanded to this extent, that one should first practise well-doing as a duty, and

later, through habituation, out of inclination as well. (Col., 27: 417; emphasisadded)20

20 See also MS, 6: 402. Kant distinguishes well-wishing love from well-liking love. Well-wishing love consists in the wish and inclination to promote the happiness of others. The lovethat likes well is the pleasure we take in showing approval of anothers perfections (Col., 27:417). In the Vigilantius notes, where the well-wishingwell-liking distinction is drawn in con-nection with friendship, we find this remark: For well-wishing to others is a universal duty oflove, which we owe to every man, since we must absolutely make it our maxim to promotegoodness in others (27: 675). In this same passage, Kant goes on to say that well-liking cannever be commanded as a duty at least as a duty we have toward all others since it is based onthe esteem the other has acquired through his characteristics, which, of course, will vary fromperson to person.



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If, as this passage says, well-wishing from love, when properly cultivated, can

be a moral virtue, the same should hold for the complex attitude of heartfelt

gratefulness, whose manifestation involves feelings of gladness and perhaps

joy in exercising ones grateful disposition toward ones benefactor. Suchfeelings can apparently be cultivated and appropriately channeled. So if such

feelings are subject to ones indirect control, then they can figure in a complex

character trait for which one is responsible.21 Given that one ought (if pos-

sible) to cultivate such feelings, it is reasonable to suppose that the virtue of

gratitude is most fully developedwhen these feelings are in fact cultivated. Wewill have more to say about the virtue of gratitude when we discuss its role in

section 4.

3. STATUS

In addition to the various elements that figure in expressing gratitude and (if

relevant) engaging in acts of reciprocation, Kant also claims that gratitude,

compared to other duties, has a special status.

But gratitude must also be considered, in particular, asacredduty, that is, a duty the

violation of which (as a scandalous example) can destroy the moral incentive to

beneficence in its very principle. For, a moral object is sacred if the obligation with

regard to it cannot be discharged completely by any act in keeping with it (so that

one who is under obligation always remains under obligation). Any other duty is an

ordinaryduty.But one cannot, by any repayment of a kindness received, ridoneself

of the obligation for it, since the recipient can never win away from the benefactor

hispriority of merit, namely having been the first in benevolence. (MS, 6: 455)

This passage advances what we will call Kants nondischargeable thesis,

namely, the thesis that one cannot fully discharge ones debt of gratitude.

Kants reason for adopting this thesis seems to be the following. Consider a

case where, before some particular time, neither of two parties has provided

a genuine benefit to the other (a benefit that would partly fulfill the duty ofbeneficence and thus count as meritorious). At the particular time in question,

one of the two parties performs an action of genuine beneficence for the other

party who (at the time) is in dire need of help and does so at some personal

cost. The benefactors action is thus meritoriousan act of kindness that

was not strictly owed, was temporally prior to any act by the recipient, and

was done in order to benefit her benefactor. With respect to the moral

relation between these two parties, one of them is said to have a priority of

21 At least one can be held responsible for striving to fully realize the virtue of gratitude asinvolving a disposition to have grateful feelings. For a helpful discussion of the role of feelings ingratitude, including issues about responsibility for having them, see McConnell 1993, ch. 3.



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merit that, as Kant says, the recipient can never win away, owing to the

temporal priority. This fact about temporal priority (again, assuming that the

act in question constitutes a case of genuine altruistic kindness that is not

owed) seems to be the reason why one cannot completely discharge ones debtof gratitude. We find this same idea put even more forcefully in a passage

from Collins.

For beneficence creates a debt that can never be repaid. Even if I return to my

benefactor fifty times more than he gave me, I am still not yet quits with him, for he

did me a good turn that he did not owe me, and was the first in doing so. Even if I

return it to him fifty times over, I still do it merely to repay the benefit and discharge

the debt. Here I can no longer get ahead of him; for he remains always the one who

was first to show me a kindness. (Col., 27: 44243)22

But why think that a benefactor being first in benevolence yields the

result that the beneficiary cannot fully discharge the obligation associated

with gratitude?23 Even if in some sense ones debt of gratitude cannot be fully

discharged, does the so-called priority of merit on the part of the benefactor

nevertheless require some sort of special response on the part of the benefi-

ciary? In any case, does the very idea of an obligation that one cannot

fully discharge violate the ought-implies-can doctrine that Kant himself

embraces? Let us take these three questions in order.

With regard to the moral significance of being first to act, our conjectureis that for Kant there is a special value that attaches to an initial act of

beneficence that cannot be matched by subsequent acts of gratitude. After all,

in pure cases of genuine beneficence, the benefactor is not acting under a

perfect obligation; she is not under a strict requirement to offer help, particu-

larly in cases where help is costly to the benefactor. Whatever moral merit

accrues to the agent for her act of genuine beneficence is apparently some-

thing that cannot be equaled; as Kant says in the second of the two quotes, in

outwardly repaying ones debt of gratitude, no matter how much one does in

return, one still does it merely to repay the benefit and discharge the debt.This remark about motivation perhaps cannot cover all cases of genuine

gratitude, but one can see what Kant is suggesting. Acting out of gratitude

22 See also Vig., 27: 696.23 Throughout this discussion, it helps to think of cases in which a benefactor provides a very

significant service to someone in dire need of help. In the Collins notes, there is a trifolddistinction among types of helping actions: To assist someone in distress is an act of charity; tohelp him in regard to other needs is an act of kindness; and to aid him in matters of amenity isan act of courtesy (27: 441). The paragraph immediately following, he cautions againstaccepting benefits unless it be under the following two conditions: first, out of dire necessity,and then with complete confidence in our benefactor (27: 442). Kants claim that one cannotfully discharge a debt of gratitude has (we think) the most intuitive grip in cases where thebeneficiary is in dire need.



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signifies that ones doing so involves a sense of debt to a particular person (or

group), so (at least intuitively) one can see that the moral quality of ones

motive is not (cannot be?) on a moral par with the benefactors presumed

motive of pure altruism. As we say, this is a conjecture that we think isaccurate as far as it goes but needs far more elaboration and defense than is

possible here. But, assuming it is roughly correct, we pass on to our second,

related question about the practical implications of nondischargeability.

Our second question is whether there is something one ought to do that

does not count as fully discharging the duty of gratitude but, nevertheless, is

somehow reflective of this particular aspect of the duty. In addressing this

question, it is helpful to note that acts of gratitude, like acts of repaying a sum

of borrowed money or keeping a contract, are indeed forms of reciprocity.

With respect to repaying borrowed money, presumably the lenderborrowerrelationship is such that it is possible (and expected) that the borrower can and

will fully discharge the obligation of repayment, once she has repaid in full

according to the terms of the loan. In fully discharging this obligation, she has,

going forward, completely extinguished it. In such cases, it is plausible to

claim that in repaying ones debt to the debtor, one is thereby quits with

him. At least part of the point of Kants sacredness thesis, we suggest, is to

put in relief the difference in moral significance between benefactor

beneficiary relations on the one hand and lenderborrower relations on the

other. Indeed, this is suggested by the remark, We . . . are thankful notmerely for the good we have received, but also for the fact that the other is

well disposed toward us (Col., 27: 441).

These reflections help answer our second question. In being well disposed

toward a beneficiary and, indeed, performing an action that a beneficiary

recognizes is of moral merit, the benefactors act and associated disposition

arguably calls not only for being disposed to return the favor if the opportunity

arises but also for coming to have an ongoing appreciation, in the form of moral

esteem, for the benefactors act of kindness. (Remember, we are focusing on

cases where the benefit is significant.) So in addition to being disposed to benefit

ones benefactor if the occasion arises, one is to have an ongoing esteem for the

benefactor, owing presumably to the benefactors priority of merit. And if this

is right, then obviously there is a sense in which what one owes to ones

benefactor is something that cannot be fully discharged in the sense of being

extinguishedin effect ending any morally significant relationship between

benefactor and beneficiary. In short, because part of what one owes is anongoingesteem for ones benefactor, the obligation in question cannot be fully dis-

charged, in the sense of being extinguished. Having performed a service orgiven something to ones benefactor in response to an act of beneficence, I am

still not yet quits with him. This is not because one needs to keep heaping on



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the benefits without end, but because an important element of the duty of

gratitude is ones ongoing esteem for the benefactor.

Finally, our third question: if a duty of gratitude is not fully dischargeable,

then does this run afoul of Kants commitment to the ought-implies-candoctrine? If it is not possible to perform some action or series of actions that

would fully discharge a duty, then it would seem that ought does not imply

can. But given what we have just been saying, the tension here is merely

apparent. It is important to distinguish the notion of fully discharging a duty

from that of fully complying with (or fulfilling) a duty. We have glossed the

former as being able to do something that not only complies with the duty but

serves to extinguish the obligation. And our prime example has been of a

fiduciary obligation that can be fully discharged, so that once one has paid

what one owes, there is no lingering moral residue. To fully comply with aduty, as we propose to understand this notion, simply involves not being in

violation of the duty. So if in response to a genuine act of beneficence, one not

only outwardly does something to benefit ones benefactor (on some appro-

priate occasion) but also comes to have an ongoing esteem for her in light of

her meritorious deed, then the beneficiary is in full compliance with the duty:

one is doing all that one can and ought to do. In short, the duty of gratitude

does not require that one fully discharge, in the sense of extinguish, ones

obligation of gratitude; thus, there is no tension between the duty and the

ought-implies-can doctrine.This section and the ones preceding it have focused on duties of

gratitudetheir grounds, nature and content, and status. But Kants discus-

sion of the duty of gratitude is embedded in a book on virtue. And as we are

about to explain, perhaps the most interesting aspect of Kants treatment of

gratitude concerns its acquisition and roletopics to which we now turn.

4. ACQUISITION AND ROLE

In The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant has little to say about the acquisition and roleof gratitude. But in his lectures, he has much to say about natural impedi-

ments to gratitude: what makes gratitude difficult for us to acquire and

maintain. This reflects how, for Kant as for Aristotle, virtue is an achieve-

ment that we admire and, thus, has to do with what is difficult for us. Of

particular interest is what Kant has to say about the relationship between

the vice of ingratitude and ones sense of self-esteem. Acquiring the virtue of

gratitude requires overcoming our natural tendency toward ingratitude. Any

full story of acquisition would have to include more than the overcoming ofnatural countervailing tendencies, but Kant says little by way of providing

such a full story. In what follows, we will focus almost entirely on his account



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of our natural tendency toward ingratitude and the role that proper self-

esteem plays in overcoming this tendency. As we mentioned at the outset,

we want to defend the thesis that having a proper understanding of self-

esteem is importantly related to, if not necessary for, possession of the virtueof gratitude.

4.1 Ingratitude and Self-Esteem

The natural tendency toward ingratitude that must be overcome to achieve

and maintain the virtue of gratitude is rooted in an apparent tension between

being a beneficiary and maintaining proper self-esteem. According to Kant,

this tension cannot be resolved simply by determining never to be a benefi-

ciary, because most all human agents from time to time are going to need the

help of others who offer to help out of genuine beneficence, and agents in

serious need ought to be willing to (selectively) accept such offers. Agents are

confronted with this tension when they consider expressing gratitude or

performing acts of gratitude, for these expressions and acts involve an admis-

sion of dependence on others and thus of a kind of inequality, an admission

that would seem to be in conflict with their need (and obligation) to preserve

a sense of their own true self-esteem. Given the importance we place on

maintaining self-esteem, this psychological tension naturally leads to the vice

of ingratitude.In a nutshell, Kant holds that the perceived underlying tension between

gratitude and self-esteem is not genuine but, rather, is one that results from a

mistaken, if natural, conception of what grounds ones moral self-esteem. The

key to resolving the psychological tension in question, and avoiding the vice

of ingratitude, is achieving an understanding of the grounds of proper self-

esteem and recognizing that maintaining self-esteem is compatible with being

a beneficiary. In our view, then, Kantian gratitude and a proper sense of

self-esteem (what Kant sometimes calls real self-esteem; MS, 6: 459) are

importantly related. To explain further, let us first consider the grounds ofKantian moral self-esteem and then turn to the psychological sources of

ingratitude.

4.1.1 The Grounds of Two Forms of Moral Self-Esteem

Kant recognizes two kinds of moral self-esteem individuated by their distinct

grounds. Every (normal) person, in Kants view, has a capacity for freely

setting her own ends and, in particular, a capacity for acting out of regard for

moral requirements. Acting in ways that realize this capacity by acting

morally whereby one engages in internal lawgiving represents the highest

exercise of freedom, or what Kant often refers to as ones autonomy. This



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capacity is the ground of a persons inalienable dignitya characteristic

one has by nature that makes all persons moral equals.

But from our capacity for internal lawgiving and from the (natural) human beings

feeling himself compelled to revere the (moral) human being within his own person,

at the same time there comesexaltation of the highest self-esteem, the feeling of his

inner worth (valor), in terms of which he is above any price (pretium) and possesses an

inalienable dignity (dignitas interna), which instills in him respect for himself (reverentia).

(MS, 6: 436)

Call the kind of esteem that represents a proper response to a persons

autonomy recognition esteem. The idea (roughly) is that all human agents

have a moral standing or status that grounds moral requirement to self and

others, and that ought to be recognized as such. Recognition self -esteemthen is the esteem one ought to have for oneself in light of ones inalienabledignity grounded in ones autonomy. In coming to understand ones dignity

as an autonomous agent, one can measure himself with every other being of

this kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them (MS, 6: 435).But notice that even if one can compare oneself with others in this regard,

ones possession of this inalienable dignity does not depend on any relation to

others; it is grounded in something one possesses as an individual.

Kant also recognizes a second sort of standing or status: one earned

through meritorious conduct. The proper response to this sort of moral statusmay be called appraisal esteem.24 In the Vigilantius notes, we find a dis-

cussion of true moral honor in which Kant distinguishes negative from

positive honor-worthiness. Negative honor-worthiness has to do with know-

ingly complying with strict moral requirements, such that one is honor-

worthy in that the agent merely refrains from acting contrary to his

humanity and its worth (Vig., 27: 665). By contrast, positive honor-

worthiness results from the agents performing actions that involve merit

more than what is required of him (ibid.). By performing actions that are

honor-worthy, one is to some extent realizing ones rational nature by actingmorally.25 While all persons are equally deserving of recognition esteem

regardless of their conduct and formed character, they often differ in whether

they deserve appraisal esteem and how much esteem their actions deserve.

24 Our use of the terms recognition and appraisal for two types of self-esteem is borrowedfrom Darwall 1977.

25 Sensen (2010) argues that Kants concept of dignity involves the Stoic idea of dignity aselevation. Additionally, he argues that dignity for Kant involves two dimensions: the idea ofbeing elevated in relation to nonhuman terrestrial creatures as a result of having autonomy, andthe idea of the kind of moral elevation that results from fully realizing ones autonomy throughacting morally. Some support for this reading comes from Kants remark that morality [fullyrealizing ones autonomy], and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality [autonomy itself],is that which alone has dignity (G, 4: 435).



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For instance, with respect to performing meritorious actions, Kant remarks

that We can thus acquire merit in relation to others (27: 622). In this

important regard, the grounds of the two kinds of esteem differ. However, in

a crucial respect, they are similar. Neither form of esteem, including self-esteem, is properly grounded in comparison with others. To explain further,

let us consider Kants account of the psychology of ingratitude.

4.1.2 The Psychological Sources of Ingratitude

This vice, according to Kant, has its primary source in a recipients false sense

of self-esteem and a consequent misunderstanding of the benefactor

beneficiary relationship. In the Vigilantius notes, where we find some detail

about the source of ingratitude, the emphasis is on appraisal self-esteem, while

inThe Doctrine of Virtue, the emphasis is on recognition self-esteem. As we havejust been saying, we read these texts as supporting the claim that proper

self-esteem is important (if not absolutely necessary) for acquiring and main-

taining the virtue of gratitude.

Ingratitude involves a displeasure or discontent at the obligation the other

has laid on us, through the kindness he has shown towards us (Vig., 27:

69495). The basic pattern involved in the benefactorbeneficiary relation-

ship producing such displeasure or discontent includes the following three

elements.Inequalities: The benefactorbeneficiary relationship involves certain kindsof comparative inequality. Using the metaphor of relative heights, the

beneficiary stands, as Kant says, a step lower than his benefactor who, by

comparison, is thereby elevated.26 The sources of inequality include those

bearing on: (a) the superior position (at least temporarily) of ones bene-

factor in relation to some aspect of ones welfare, (b) the dependence of the

beneficiary on the benefactor for help, (c) the benefactors moral merit in

acting from genuine beneficence, and (d) the beneficiarys consequent

indebtedness in accepting the help, which creates a kind of asymmetry inones relations with the benefactor.

Comparison-Evaluation: One or more of these recognized inequalities formthe basis of a comparison with ones benefactor that triggers in the bene-

ficiary a felt threat to his standing as a personto his moral self-esteem.

Other-directed hostility: As a result, the beneficiary comes to have hostilefeelings toward his benefactor that constitutes ingratitude.

26 Such remarks occur at MS, 6: 456 and 458.



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We find this pattern in bothThe Doctrine of Virtueand Vigilantius discussions ofingratitude. We begin with the former.

In Kants brief treatment of this vice in The Doctrine of Virtue, the

perceived threat to ones self-esteem as a beneficiary is said to rest on amisunderstanding.

What makes such a vice possible is misunderstanding ones duty to oneself, the duty

of not needing and asking for others beneficence, since this puts one under an

obligation to them, but rather preferring to bear the hardships of life oneself than to

burden others with them and so incur indebtedness (obligation); for we fear that by

showing gratitude we take the inferior position of a dependent in relation to his

protector, which is contrary to real self-esteem (pride in the dignity of humanity in

ones own person). (MS, 6: 459)

For our purposes, the crucial remark in this passage follows the semi-colon.27

The claim (as we interpret it) is that one who is reluctant to show gratitude (or

who actively expresses ingratitude) toward ones benefactor misunderstands

the significance of showing gratitude and, we should add, of just being grateful.

The misunderstanding results from thinking that gratitude expresses a kind of

inferiority that conflicts with ones real self-esteem. In this particular passage,

the parenthetical remark at the end strongly suggests that the focus here is on

recognition self-esteem. Since, as earlier explained, all persons possess the kind of

inalienable dignity that grounds proper recognition esteem, being a beneficiaryis not something that can alter ones fundamental moral equality with others.

The misunderstanding Kant claims one is liable to is, it seems, to suppose that

in accepting the role as a beneficiary, one thereby comes to accept a kind of

27 This passage is revealing but also invites a particular misreading. The misreading wouldbe to suppose that according to Kant one has a duty to refrain alwaysfrom asking others forfavors (asking for others beneficence) or from otherwise accepting a freely given service ormaterial benefit from someone (one takes to be) benevolently motivated. Such an interpretationcannot be correct in light of the fact that specific acts of beneficence are generally morallyoptional and indeed meritorious. Such acts could not have either status if it were true thataccepting a benefit is always a violation of duty on the part of the recipient. Kant does counselindividuals to strive for self-sufficiency and thus nondependence on others, and we find refer-ence to a duty to frugality in the Vigilantius discussion of ingratitude (27: 696). See The Lectureson Ethicswhere the importance of self-sufficiency is discussed at some length (esp. Of the Dutiesto Oneself in Regard to Outer Circumstances; Col. 27: 39398 and Vig. 27: 65258). Hence,as the above passage (properly understood) indicates, one does have a duty to try to ensure thatone does not need anothers beneficence. However, To be able to rid oneself of all needs, onewould have to be a higher being. . . ; [but human beings], in respect of their physical nature, arenot capable of total self-sufficiency. . . (Vig., 27: 653). Therefore, one is almost certainly goingto encounter circumstances in which one must rely on others beneficence to meet genuineneeds as well as to pursue worthy goals. Finally, we have already cited a passage (see note 23)in the Collins notes (27: 442) that warns against indiscriminatelyaccepting benefits and cites direneed as a legitimate reason to accept a benefit. So the sentence in the above passage up to thesemi-colon is properly understood as warning that a major source of ingratitude results frombeing too willing to depend on others.



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inequality as of a dependent needing a protectora role that will strike thebeneficiary as being one of servility. Of course, being in the position of a

beneficiary does involve the various kinds of inequalities lately mentioned.

Kants point (again, as we interpret it) is that one misunderstands thebenefactorbeneficiary relationship if one views the various inequalities

involved in that relationship as placing one in the position of amoralinferior.And this misunderstanding is itself rooted in a failure to understand the basis of

real (recognition) self-esteem. These related misunderstandings are liable to

lead one to have the sort of hostile feelings of resentment and envy toward ones

benefactor that are characteristic of ingratitude.

While Kants remarks in The Doctrine of Virtueabout ingratitude are verybrief, we find much more in the way of a psychological explanation of this

vice in Vigilantius, where the discussion focuses primarily on perceivedthreats to a beneficiarys appraisal self-esteem. Let us take a closer look.

In these lecture notes, Kant explains that the so-called devilish vices of

envy, ingratitude, and malice (Shadenfreude) take the ground of their originfrom a property of human nature native to man . . . namely, the instinct of

antagonism or rivalry (Vig., 27: 692). And the inclination or impulse that

is associated with the instinct of rivalry is what is referred to in a number of

places as emulation (Aemulation), which prompts the activity of makingoneself equal to the other in every respect (27: 695).28 The way in which this

instinct of rivalry manifests itself in human psychology is by persons compar-ing themselves to others either with regard to their moral standing or with

regard to their prudential well-being (understood broadly), or both. Making

such comparisons often leads to a feeling of discontent with oneself: one sees

another person as having or doing better with regard to whatever it is that

is the basis of comparison. In light of ones discontent, the inclination in

question can motivate an individual in one of two directions: toward self-

improvement within the bounds of morality or toward some form of vicious

attitude, if not behavior. So we can draw a distinction between good and bad

forms of emulation. Both forms of this impulse are routes one might take in

hopes of making oneself equal to ones rival. Let us consider these two

routes in a bit more detail.

The impulse involved in good emulation must absolutely be cultivated;

and it serves merely to extend our animal nature and make it adequate to

humanity, or the intellectual being within us, and to its laws (Vig., 27: 695).

In other words, emulation is a natural impulse that (employed properly)

serves to prompt one to strive to perfect ones natural being and ones moral

28 See also Vig., 27: 67880 and 693.



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beingKants fundamental positive duty to oneself.29 When interpersonal

comparison yields the judgment that one is lacking with regard to one or

another merit, then, when put to good use, this impulse spurs one toward

self-improvement. Comparison with others in determining our own worthcan thus be aimed only at self-instruction concerning our value (Vig., 6:

70304). But the crucial idea here is that one is to use such comparisons with

others as a prompt to compare ones own behavior with the moral law.

Personal self-assessment, or the determination of ones own moral worth, thejustum

sui ipsius aestimium [just estimate of oneself], rests on a comparison of ones action

with the law, and to that extent thehumilitas comparationis[humble mode of compari-

son], i.e., the maxim of determining ones worth by comparison with others, and of

requiring in the process to accord oneself a lesser value, but a higher one to others,

is quite contrary to duty. . . . (Vig., 27: 703)30

The remark about the duty not to judge ones worth through comparison

with others refers to the bad form of emulation, which Kant identifies as the

primary source of the devilish vices. So while interpersonal comparisons of

moral worth have their instrumental value in relation to self-perfection when

properly understood, such comparisons can lead one to hostility toward

others. As Kant remarks:

[T]his is where the error lies. That method [of comparison involving positive

emulation] would establish true love of honour [love of honor-worthiness that is a

basis of true appraisal self-esteem] in us. But in judging himself and his inner worth,

man founds and measures it instead on a merely comparative estimate of his person

and condition against the worth and condition of other men. Hence arises love of

honour in a bad sense; if he finds himself lowered by comparison with the other, that

arouses in him dislike of the others person. . . . (Vig., 27: 695)

So it is the error involved in this bad use of interpersonal comparison that

leads to envy, ingratitude, and malice.31, 32 Concerning ingratitude, here is

the relevant but difficult passage in Vigilantius:

29 In Vigilantius, it is noted that emulation can lead to envy, owing to a side of humannature that has become malignant, despite the fact that the purpose of emulation really lay ininciting men to constant cultivation of greater perfection in themselves by comparison withothers (27: 67879).

30 At Vig., 27: 704, Kant notes that the good that we can discern in [others] actions isthat now their actions become motives to prod us to enter into the practice of virtue, in that wethereby become assured that in comparison with the law, and the fulfillment of it achieved byothers, our practical virtue is still weak, or in some degree may surpass others.

31 Envy has its immediate ground in emulation (Vig., 27: 693) of the bad sort.32 We are here interested in moral merit that accrues to an agent from genuine acts of

beneficence and, thus, with envy and ingratitude having specifically to do with ones moralstanding. Of course, as Kant recognizes, ones envy can be and often is directed toward another



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The fact that the other has done more for us than he was required to do, arouses

ingratitude; for all hismeritain regard to our person, or fortunes, bring it about that

we are thereby obliged to him on that account; but in that he has had an influence

on our well-being, he has an advantage over us, whereby he is elevated above our

worth, and we, on the contrary, have becomeinferioresin his regard;for assuming that

the estimation of our self rests on a comparative judgement with the others worth [emphasis

added] this degradation displeases us; we are tortured by the obligation he has laid

upon us, and so envyhinders our participation and interest in his welfare. (27: 696)

Here again, Kant is referring to the various sources of inequality that are

characteristic of the benefactorbeneficiary relationship, including inequality

in merit, fortunes (welfare), and indebtedness. He claims that the beneficia-

ries, as a result of such inequalities, have become inferiors. As he notes a

few sentences after this particular passage, [Gratitude] seems to be contraryto our self-esteem, since it can almost never appear without the benefactors

worth being coupled with a demeaning of the value of the other party (Vig.,

27: 696). Further, as the italicized clause in the passage above indicates,

dwelling on these comparative inequalities and using them for purposes of

judging ones own worth is a primary source (if not thesource) of hostilitiesdirected toward ones benefactor that is characteristic of ingratitude, which

likely also includes envy. The preventive measure Kant is pressing is true

love of honour (a proper understanding of the ground of appraisal self-

esteem): a beneficiary must firmly understand the true grounds of his moralequality if he is to avoid feeling his appraisal self-esteem threatened by the

various inequalities brought about by the benefactorbeneficiary relation-

ship. The proper source of any humility and consequent downgrading of

ones person one might feel with respect to appraisal self-esteem is comparing

oneself with the moral law. True humility follows unavoidably from our

sincere and exact comparison of ourselves with the moral law (MS, 6: 436).Returning for a moment to the basic pattern characteristic of ingratitude,

the source of this vice according to Kant is in the comparisonevaluation

phase of the process leading to this vice. The faulty evaluation undergirdingingratitude rests on a failure to properly appreciate and respond to the

grounds of real self-esteemwhether the esteem one ought to have for

oneself concerns ones standing as an autonomous agent and thus a moral

equal in this regard (recognition self-esteem), or the esteem that is appropriate

in comparing oneself with the moral law (appraisal self-esteem). This reading

persons material possessions, talents, and fortunate circumstances. Thus envy extends, notonly to all praiseworthy features necessary to man, but also to talents and fortunate circum-stances of every kind (Vig., 27: 694). The paragraph immediately following this remarkdiscusses envy with respect to ones moral standing, distinguishing mere mislikingorinvidia in

genere (translated envy without ill will) from envy that becomes invidia qualificata, i.e., livor(translated malicious envy or spite).



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of Kant supports our main interpretive claim that the virtue of proper self-

esteem (which Kant discusses in his treatment of servility inThe Doctrine of Virtue) is importantly related to (if not necessary for) avoiding ingratitude and

cultivating and preserving the virtue of gratitude.33, 34

Howone is to proceed in cultivating and preserving not only a dispositionof gratitude but a grateful disposition (understood as a disposition for relevant

feelings) is not an issue Kant discusses. He does claim that among the various

duties of self-perfection the primary duty is one of moral self-scrutiny. As for

a regimen that would help one cultivate, develop, and preserve a grateful

disposition, Kant refers to a duty of frugality (see note 27), and in his discus-

sion of servility inThe Doctrine of Virtue, he points to various types of action,including accepting favors one can do without, that are important to avoid for

purposes of preserving the self-esteem one has as an autonomous agent.

4.2 The Positive Role of Gratitude

We turn finally and briefly to the positive role of gratitude in the life of an

individual and of society. As for individuals, Kant advises that one should take

the occasion for gratitude as a moral kindness, that is, as an opportunity given one

to unite the virtue of gratitude with love of man, to combine the cordiality of a

benevolent disposition with sensitivity to benevolence (attentiveness to the smallest

degree of this disposition in ones thought of duty), and so to cultivate ones love ofhuman beings. (MS, 6: 456)

The remarks here seem to be addressed to one who is at least somewhat

benevolently disposed in general. They suggest that one should view occasions

of communicating gratitude as an opportunity to further cultivate and

33 We have not attempted to argue that the virtue of self-esteem is necessary for acquiringand maintaining the virtue of gratitude, hence our more cautious claim about the former virtuebeing importantly related to the virtue of gratitude. A number of questions naturally ariseabout the relation between gratitude and proper self-esteem. Is proper self-esteem partiallyconstitutive of the virtue of gratitude? Is each required to achieve and maintain the other? Onemight think that gratitude helps one achieve and maintain a proper sense of self-esteem. Forexample, the virtue of gratitude might help one become and stay focused, in a disinterested way,on moral merit, and thus keep from falling into bad comparison of oneself with others (even withrespect to moral merit). It is also possible that the vice of ingratitude is not only produced by amisunderstanding of what sort of equality is important, but also helps perpetuate, or ingrain,that misunderstanding. We hope elsewhere to address these questions.

34 In addition to ingratitude, there is also nongratitudethe failure to be appropriatelyresponsive to anothers beneficenceas well as misplaced gratitude that would need to beconsidered in a full treatment of Kants account of vices associated with ingratitude. Thepsychological sources of the former would seem to be various, while an overly servile attitude(and thus a lack of proper self-esteem) would seem to be a common contributing factor to thelatter.



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strengthen ones practical, if not affective, love for humankind. This idea

of uniting the virtues suggests what is perhaps best viewed as a form of the

reciprocity of the virtues to the effect that possession (or perhaps full possession)

of a particular virtue by a human being requires the cultivation of many othervirtues. Unfortunately, we are not able to pursue this theme further here.

With respect to the role of gratitude in society, Kant warns that ingratitude

is a social harm because of its likely deterrent effect on beneficence generally.

By contrast, having a grateful disposition that is manifested in acts of sincere

gratitude tends to encourage further acts of beneficence on the part of the

benefactor (and perhaps others) toward oneself and others. In this way, the

virtue helps to promote the general welfare (happiness) of society. But just as

importantly, because gratitude involves a respect for others that is expressed

in honoring them, gratitude as a virtue also promotes a society held togetherby bonds of mutual respect. One might think of the duty of beneficencethe

duty to promote the welfare of othersas part of a more general duty of

sociability that includes a duty to promote relations of mutual respect,

distinct from and in addition to a duty to promote the welfare of others.35

Given the role of gratitude in promoting both welfare and mutual respect,

one can thus view this virtue (and corresponding acts) as being instrumental

in fulfilling the duty of sociability.

5. JUSTIFICATION

Kant does not offer a justification for the claim that gratitude is a duty that

would constitute a derivation. That is, he does not provide an argument

featuring the categorical imperative as a premise, which, perhaps together

with other premises, not only leads to the conclusion that gratitude is a duty

but also serves to explain why it is a duty. As we noted at the outset, this isespecially odd in the context ofThe Doctrine of Virtue, where a main part of theproject of that work is to derive a system of duties from the categorical

imperative.36 Perhaps Kant did not think a derivation is necessary since his

very conception of duties of love to others (really beneficence),37 when con-

trasted with duties of respect to others, involves the idea that fulfilling the

former, but not the latter, imposes corresponding obligations on others.38

Such an answer might explain why Kant did not bother to provide a deri-

35 Berger (1975) emphasizes the role of gratitude in promoting and maintaining suchreciprocal relations of recognition and respect.

36 For a discussion of Kants derivations in The Doctrine of Virtue, see Smit and Timmons,forthcoming.

37 The notion that carrying out a duty of love imposes an obligation on others is true onlyof the duty of beneficence, in contrast to gratitude and sympathetic feeling.

38 Gregor (1963, 196) offers this as a reason for the lack of derivation.



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vation, but one can still ask why an act of genuine beneficence calls forgratitude on the part of the beneficiary, why gratitude is owedto the benefac-tor.39 Space does not permit a thorough treatment of this issue. So instead we

will make two very brief observations before concluding.First, with regard to Kants formula of humanity requiring that all (finite)

rational agents treat persons as ends in themselves and thus with respect,

perhaps Kants thought was that ingratitude as well as culpable nongratitude

are failures to treat benefactors as ends in themselves. From this it would

follow that gratitude is owed. Clearly, what Kant calls ingratitude proper

(active ingratitude), involving intentions to harm ones benefactor, is a

failure to treat humanity as an end. And perhaps the same could be said of

nongratitude, where a beneficiary simply fails to have or express gratitude.40

Based on these two claims, one could then provide a justifying argumenthaving as premises the formula of humanity as well as claims to the effect that

to fail to have and express gratitude (as a result of ingratitude or nongratitude)

is to fail to treat ones benefactor as an end, leading to the conclusion that

gratitude is a duty. If, as we are inclined to think, the formula of humanity

provides the proper basis in Kants ethics for explanatory justifications of

duties, then the argument just hinted at would count as the kind of justifica-

tion sought for the duty of gratitude.

Our second observation is simply that claims about the negative and

positive roles of gratitude described in the previous section serve to provide arole-based justification of the virtue of gratitude, and perhaps on this basis one

can provide a justification of the claim that acts of gratitude are owed to ones

benefactor. This would constitute a virtue-based approach to the duty of

gratitude.

6. CONCLUSION

Our aim has been to bring into focus some of the main elements that figure

in Kants views about the grounds, nature and content, status, acquisition and

role, and justification of gratitude, both as a duty to select others and as a

virtue in moral life. In exploring these topics, we have in most instances tried

to develop what we take to be a Kantian view, if not Kants own. Some of the

most intriguing aspects of Kants view of gratitude concern the psychological

sources of ingratitude that we find in the student lecture notes that connect

39 This question is also raised by Guyer (1993, 38688) in his brief but insightful remarksabout Kant on gratitude. And, of course, it is at the heart of the so-called paradox of gratitudementioned above in note 2.

40 Kants notion of unappreciativeness (Unterkenntlichkeit) can perhaps be understood asincluding nongratitude within its scope. See MS, 6: 459.



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this vice with matters of proper self-esteem and their relation to the virtue of

gratitude. But by no means have we provided a thorough treatment of any of

these elements of gratitude in Kants moral philosophy.41

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41 This is a thoroughly collaborative paper; order of authorship is alphabetical. A version ofthis paper was given as the inaugural Nancy D. Simco Lecture, delivered at the Universityof Memphis, April 6, 2011. It was also delivered at the University of Geneva, May 13, 2011. Wewish to thanks audiences at both universities for very helpful discussions. Thanks also toSuzanne Dovi and Betsy Timmons for ongoing discussion as this paper was being developed.


Documents

(b). Smit, Houston (2011). the Moral Significance of Gratitude. SJP