B-Series Temporal Order in Dogen's Theory of Time

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B-Series Temporal Order in Dgen's Theory of TimeAuthor(s): Dirck Vorenkamp

Reviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 387-408Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399395.Accessed: 09/08/2012 16:33

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B-SERIESTEMPORAL ORDER INDOGEN'S THEORY OF TIME

DirckVorenkamp

J.M.E.McTaggart'sontroversialargumentagainst he realityof time haspromptedmanycounterargumentsince it was firstpublished in 1908.RichardGale saysthatthe responses o McTaggartre in agreementwitheither the so-called A, B, or Either/or heories of time.1 Eachofthese theories is based on the idea that time is either dynamic orstatic (and only dynamic or static). If this is true, then as a groupthey exhaust all possible ways to conceive of time, and any theoryoftime must include elements of one or more of the three responsestoMcTaggart.Given the argumentsabove, and the fact that Dogen also wroteabout the natureof time,one is led to the question, Do Dogen'sviewsof time fall anywherewithin the A-theory, B-theory, or Either/or-theory responsesto McTaggart ? ecause the questionis too broad,asstated,fora work of this length,Iproposeto examineD6gen'steachingsin lightof the B-theory esponseto McTaggart.This essay will show that Dogen's views on time do contain ele-ments of each of the four maintenets of the B-theory.Furthermore,npointingout these aspects of his thought,we will find thatthe assump-tion of consistency that has characterizedmodern interpretations fDogen's view of time requiresreevaluation.Inorderto show why thisis true,we will brieflyexamineMcTaggart'sriginalargument,and thensummarize each of the four main tenets of the B-theorywhile askingwhether or not Dogen's theoryof time reflectssimilar deas.The term B-theory s defined accordingto the synopsisof the B-theorist'spositionsprovidedby RichardGale.2 The details of thatdefini-tion will follow shortly.As forthe phrase Dogen'stheoryof time, it isdefined as those teachingsfound in the Sh6obgenzothatdeal with theconcepts of uji, hoi, and/or nikon.Eachof these three terms will in turnbe definedbeforetheyare used to supporta conclusion.3McTaggart's rgumentIn order to understand he B-theory, t is necessaryto summarizeMcTaggart'sriginalargument.First ublished n1908, McTaggart's orkarguesthat time is unreal.4Theargument tartsby establishingwo basicaspects of time. The first aspect is associated with the dynamic fluxcalled time'spassage,and with ourtensedways of bothconceivingandspeakingof time.According o this way of viewingtime, thingsare saidto exist in the future, hen become present,andfinallyenterthe past. Itisthis mode of time whereinthe futureand pastare said to differontolog-ically.McTaggartalls thisaspectof timethe A-series.5

Lecturern theHistoryDepartmentat the University fWisconsin-Milwaukee

PhilosophyEast& WestVolume45, Number3July1995387-408? 1995by University fHawai'iPress

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Yet,timealso seems to havea staticorderorstructure.Even feventsdo passfrom uture o present o past, theydo so with an order hatneverseems to change. That order is the relationshipbetween earlier hanand later han. 6The earlier han/laterhan relationships tenseless,for the statement hatan event is earlierthan another is not dependentupon the particularemporalframe of referencefrom which it issues.Here,the emphasisis on time as a set of relativerelationships.Such re-lations, if they could be viewed from a position outside time, wouldpresenta patternof thingsand times laid out likea mosaic. EventhoughGrunbaumholds that such a patterndoes not necessarilyconstitute hehypostatization f time, it is nevertheless ixed as regards he temporalrelationships etweenthe individualcomponents.7McTaggartalledthisthe B-series.8The issue at the heartof McTaggart's ork is how these two ways ofconceiving of time can be related o one another.McTaggartirststatesthat events cannot undergo changes in their B-relations.Dbgen's birthis earlierthan mine, and that is a tenseless fact that will not change.Accordingly, he only changes that an event can undergoare A-serieschanges inwhich the event changesfromfuture o present o past.9McTaggarthen arguesforthe unrealityof the A-series based uponthe notion that, assumingthere are no first or last events in the series,then every event mustsimultaneously hare the mutually ncompatibleattributes f future,present,and past.10Forexample, in the year 1980,the year 1981 was the present-future. uch a state is contradictory nd,therefore,according o McTaggart, nreal.Toclaim, however,thatanyevent hasonly one of these attributes ta given time and successively, that is, that an event X was future, ispresent, and will be past, invokes an infinite regress.AccordingtoMcTaggart, uch a statement means that at a past time, event X wasfuture,and at a future ime it will be past.11It is true that the firstcon-tradiction has been explained away, but only by creating a second-level temporalorder withinwhich the firstorder must exist. The state-ments that event X is, was, or will be some particularense itself reliesupon a tense for comprehension.Assuming hat the goal is to preventincompatibletense overlaps,then the second order itself must be re-lated to a higher -level rderjustas the first s related o the second. Atno pointare we freedfromthisnecessity,and so the regress s infinite.12McTaggartherefore oncludes thatthe tensesare logically incompatibleandthat the A-series s unreal.Since McTaggart olds that realtime needs both the A-seriesandB-series o exist,he concludesthat real ime must be nonexistent.Thisconclusion restsuponthe notion thatA-relations re more basic than B-relationsbecause (1) all B-relations an be reduced to A-seriesrelations

Philosophyast&West with no loss of meaning,and (2) the same is not true in reverse. Once

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McTaggarthas demonstrated hat the A-series is unreal,then it followsthat the B-series s unreal,and so, too, realtime itself.13As previouslystated, philosophershave taken three approachestoanswerMcTaggart.The so-called B-theory s one such answer.RichardGale states that there are four basic tenetsthat constitute he B-theory.14Theyare:(1) The A-series s reducible o the B-serieswith no loss of meaning.(2) The passage of time, or temporalbecoming is psychologicalsince it necessarily nvolves a B-relation o a perceivingsubject.(3) All events areequallyreal;hence the B-series s objective.(4) Changeis understandablen termsof B-relations lone.While analyzing these statementsaccordingto the summarythatGale has provided,we can askwhetherthese tenets,or partsof of them,arefound anywherein D6gen'sview of time.The FirstTenet of B-theoryand Dogen'sView of LanguageConcerningthe firsttenet, B-theoristsclaim that the tenses past,present,and future do not refer to ontological times, but are actuallyrelative o eventsand/oreventexpressions or theirmeaning.15Thetermsis past, is present, and is future are actually tenselesstwo-placepredicates that take as their groundsome event or expression.16Forexample, the phrase is past -as in 1980 is past -actually means1980 is past at some other time. It is correct,then, for me to say in1988 that 1980 is past, but the samesentence is false in 1978. Hence,argueB-theorists,he futurity,presentness,or pastnessof an event is notan ontologicalfact,butonly an expressionof that event'srelationshipoanotherevent or expression.Thattwo-place relationship s a tenselesstruth hat holdsfor all times and framesof reference romwhich it mightbe uttered.Regardless, or example, of the year in which I make thestatement, t is, and alwayswill be true that1980 is pastat 1988. Inlightof this, B-theoristssay that B-statements re morefundamental han A-statementsand that all A-statements an be reduced without loss ofmeaningto B-statements.According o Gale, B-theorists se two primarymethodsof reducingA-statements o B-statements.The first s the so-called psychologicalre-duction,and this will be consideredshortly.Thesecond is the linguisticreduction.7The linguisticreductionclaims that statementsassertingan event'stense are relative o the speakersince they necessarily ndicateand relyupon the speaker'stemporalrelationship o the reportedevent.18Suchstatementsaresaid to be token-reflexive ecausethe statement 1980is past actuallymeans 1980 is pastrelative o this utterance token).An importantpointto notice in the modified(i.e., reduced ) tatementis that it makes no mention of the currenttemporalstatusof the token- DirckVorenkamp

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reflexive. That is why B-theorists claim that the reduced statement istimelessly, or tenselessly, true and freely repeatable.19 B-theorists whouse this method claim that the sole purpose of A-series statements is toexpress a B-series relation between the expressed event and the utter-ance (token).20Does Dogen ever utilize a similar reduction?

Certainly Dbgen never spoke of reduced A-series relations. But,did he reduce events to linguistic expressions in order to recognizelanguage itself as a reflexive vehicle referring to uji?21 When weexamine Dogen's statements about the nature of language and words, atype of implicit token-reflexive argument is apparent.First,on the nature of words, Dogen had this to say:

Ifthe Buddha's peech is shallow,turning he flower must also be shallow. Ifthe Buddha'sspeech is only lettersand sounds, that is not the words oflearning he BuddhaDharma.Although t is knownthatspeech is lettersandsounds,it is not known that to the Buddha t is notjustlettersand sounds.22... if it [enlightenment]s not speech, you cannot realize the Buddha'sprogress.... Therefore,when speech is manifested,hat itself is the Buddha'sprogress.23The Dharma-naturepoken of by Baso is the Dharma-naturepeakingtheDharma-nature.24

and also:Thecapability o suggest hatbeingswho do not leavethe Dharma-naturerenot the Dharma-naturemay even accomplishsomething.It is threeor fournew levels of Dharma-nature.Speaking,answering,using,andactingas if it isnot the Dharma-nature ustbe the Dharma-nature.25

What we see in all these quotations is that Dogen does not justconceive of language as merely a verbal representation of some otherfeature of reality. Language is not purely symbolic of what we think andperceive and hence has some separate existence from these thoughtsand perceptions. ForDogen, language has another level of meaning.At the secondary level, words are nothing except what they express.As Dogen said, even the nature of things spoken of by Baso is the na-ture of things spoken of by the nature of things. Dogen emphasizes theimportance of speech and words because he understands them as theBuddha-nature itself.26 Accordingly, the dualism that characterizes ourgeneral notions of the relationship between expression events and theexpressed event is absent in his view-as he states above, there are nomere words with the Buddha. If it is appropriateto apply this expandeddefinition to the term reduction, then Dogen can be said to claim thatall reality is token-reflexive.Note, though, that this claim does not entail the assertion that Dogen

PhilosophyEast&West is giving special status to linguistic expressions. Infact, quite the contrary

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is true.The point is that linguisticexpressionsare no morenor less priv-ilegedthananyotheraspectof being-time.27Given the interrelationshipsbetween dharma-positionss elements of being-time whichwill be dis-cussed shortly),D6gen's insistence on including languageas a formofexpressionof the Buddha-natures in fact an affirmation f the token-reflexivenatureof thatBuddha-nature.Furthermore,ince Dogen's concept of ujiclearly intertwinesbeingand time, we can conclude thatthis type of token-reflexivitymeansnot justthatthe past and futureas concepts are relativeto a particularstatement,but that tensed and nontensed locutions are token-reflexive,because the phrase tselfmust,in a sense, be the times to which it refers.In other words, the expressionevent's expressionof past or future isexactly where these tenses (i.e., past and future)are found. The state-ment 1980 is past exists at the momentit is uttered,and in that state-mentmust iethe referenced vent(i.e., 1980 ),notmerelyas a referent,but as a factual(i.e., actuallyexistingnow) componentof the event.Of course this soundsfantasticalo anyone acquaintedwith modernWesternlanguagetheory.ButD6gen's thoughtis groundedin the con-cept of sunyataand specificallyin the Hua-yenschool's elaborationofit.28Since linguisticexpressionsare neithermore norless importanthanotherphenomena,thereis, then,an interdependent elationship etweenwords and what they signifypreciselybecause both are expressionsofthe Buddha-nature.If,in Dogen'sview, wordsare in factwhatthey signify,then we cancertainly say that not only are A-seriesstatementsreducible to B-seriesstatementswith no loss of meaning,but the act of the reductionitselfaddsmeaning o the token because the token itself is then also seen asthe symbolized.

The Second Tenetof B-theoryand Dogen'sView of TemporalBecomingThe second element of B-theory s that temporalbecoming is sub-jective. According o Gale, B-theoristsuse one of two differentmethodsto argueforan a priorisubjectivepresentin the A-series.The first s thetoken-reflexiveargument,which we have just covered. The secondmethod is the egocentric-particularnalysis,which attempts o show themind-dependenceof A-determinations.29Accordingto B-theorists,he tenses are relative o the perceptionofsome subject in much the same way that they are token-reflexive.Indefiningor understandingwhat is past,present,or future,we must drawa referenceto a mental event. Forexample, in explainingwhat is past,we will typicallyrefer o a memory; or the present,a sense datum; orthe future,an expectationor anticipation. neach case the tense, or thatobject which supposedlyis tensed, is relativeto a mental event. Itfol-lows, say B-theorists,hatbecause the tenses are psychological,then so, DirckVorenkamp

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too, is temporal becoming.30 Is there anything similar to this in Dogen'sthought?

Inspeakingof passage,to think heplace [ofpassage] soutsidethe mind,andthat the dharmas hat can pass, pass to the east past a hundredthousandworldsover a hundred housandeons, that is notdevotingyourselfonlyto thestudyof the BuddhaWay.31The three heads and eightarms[i.e., the stateof unenlightenment] assas mybeing-time.Although tseems to be there, t is Now (nikon).32... everybeingin the whole world,while beinglinedup, isan individual ime.Becausetheyarebeing-time, heyare my being-time.33One muststudythat if there is not now the passageof my utmostexertion,thenthere is not the manifestation r passageof one dharmaor one thing.34

Ineach of the quotations above, Dogen is clearly making a statementconcerning the relativityof time and passage to the individual subject. Inthe case of B-theorists, their contention is clear: in stating that temporalbecoming is subjective, B-theorists mean that it is relative to, a productof, the individual mind and is not an objective feature of the cosmos.Although we see that similar statements can be found in the Shobo-genzd, the matter is not that simple. In many places Dogen speaks oftime's passage without making reference to a subject. Forexample:

You should learn hatpassageoccurs withoutanything xternal.Forexample,spring'spassageis necessarily hatwhich passes through pring.35Ujihas the virtueof passage.Itpassesfrom odayto tomorrow,tpassesfromtodayto yesterday, t passesfromyesterday o today.36

On the face of it, these passages indicate that Dogen also sees tem-poral becoming as an objective feature of reality unrelated to the subject.But is this the whole story? Two interrelated questions need to beanswered before we can decide whether or not subjective temporalbecoming exists in his thought. First,what does subjective mean? Andsecondly, what is the nature of the temporal interaction between subjectand object? To answer these questions, it is firstnecessary to know whatDogen meant by dharma-positions.

Dharma-positions designate the spatial and temporal characteristicsof a particular, discrete aspect of uji.37 Uji itself is a four-dimensionalmatrix of the three spatial dimensions and time. Each particular phe-nomenon is a four-dimensional point of space-time and constitutesa unique thing-time distinct from all other thing-times (i.e., dharma-positions). For example, a partial description of the dharma-positionthat is a rock in the garden might include the fact that it is round, aboutthe size of a baseball, gray, located next to the fence, and that it is all

PhilosophyEast&West these things at a particulartime. The time of the rock is not defined by

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the movement of the hands of a clock, but by the spatial characteris-tics that describe it. Dogen calls these particularized, discrete partsof uji,dharma-positions.Now, if dharma-positions are four-dimensional, and if, as D6gen in-dicates, they do move relative to one another, then their movement musttake place within a second-level temporal order. As J.J.C.Smart has in-dicated, by definition, space-time entities (i.e., four-dimensional phe-nomena) must merely exist en bloc as a thing defined as having suchand such characteristics at such and such a time.38 These are, by defini-tion, tenseless statements, and the concept of change is not a factor. Butthe definition of movement involves change (or at least the perception of

change) in both position and time. In the case of four-dimensional phe-nomena such as Dogen's dharma-positions, since the definition of anyparticularthing's position already includes time, then movement must bedefined as something occupies spacetime-1 at ?-1, and spacetime-2 at?-2. The question mark indicates that some other temporal order is re-quired to account for change.Now we are in a position to answer our two earlier questions by sim-ply asking, Is there such a second level temporal order in Dogen's views,and ifso, how does that affect the interactionbetween dharma-positions?

You should not understand hattimeonlyfliespast.You should not learn hatflying past is time's only ability.If time were [only]given to flyingpast, itwould have to havegaps.39Dogen states that to conceive of time as only a progression of dis-crete instants is erroneous. He demonstrates this by pointing out that alinear progression of radically discrete temporal instants is experientiallyinconsistent.40 The problem is that if time passes us by, then when doesthe future become the present and then the past? In other words, whendoes the present moment suddenly cease to be that moment and becomea past moment?Central to this issue is a present now. Everyone intuitively knowswhat time is, but according to D6gen no one can adequately explain it

according to a progression of radically discrete temporal instants. At-tempting to do so leaves us with a time that flies by, and which has

gaps that cannot be experientially verified. For Dbgen, the view thattime only flies by is deficient because it fails to recognize the rela-tionship of the past and present to the nikon.

The now (konji)under considerationis everyone's [each person's] Now #B1(nikon).Even f Imakemyself hinkof tens of thousandsof pasts,futures,and Tffipresents, hey are now (konji),hey are the Now (nikon).Everyone'sdestinynecessarilyexists now (konji).41For Dogen, the nikon is that aspect of uji that is ever present and DirckVorenkamp

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mediatingbetween the other tenses. Infact, as he has stated,the futureand pastexist within the matrixof the nikon. Forexample,the notion oftimeas a linearontologicalcontinuumwould hold thatDogen himself sin the past,while the year 2000 is entirelyunconnected and in the fu-ture.Butas we have seen above, the nikon is used to createa two-placerelationship hat makes it appropriateo say that Dogen's existence iswhat-Now-is-no-longer,while the year 2000 is what-Now-is-not-yet.The concepts of pastand future aketheirmeaningfrom the relativere-lationship o that Now (nikon).Consequently, he futureactuallyexists,mediatedby the nikon, as the Now-not-yet;the present exists as theNow-present;and the past exists as the Now-no-longer.42Thiscan beclearly seen in the passage below, where Dogen discusses the inter-relationship f the tenses.

It ssaid, hepast ife hasalready erished,he future as notyetcome,andthe presentdoes notstay.Thepastis notnecessarily lreadyperished,hefutures notnecessarily ot-yet-come,hepresents notnecessarily ot-stay-ing.Ifyoulearn hequalities ot-staying,ot-yet-come,ndalready erishedas past, uture, ndpresent, oumust ertainly rasphe reason henot-yet-come ispast,present,ndfuture.43

First,with regard o the present,Dogen saysthat it is not necessarilynot-staying. The present s notjusta fleetinginstant oreverpassingusby andalways gone as we tryto catchit. Similarly,he futureandpastare not just the not-yet-come and alreadyperished. Instead,allthese tenses have furtherdimensionsof meaningderived from the func-tion of the nikon as the Now common to each. Accordingly,tensedevents (i.e., dharma-positions)an be viewed as always existingin two-place relationshipshat take the Now (nikon)as the relative emporalframeof reference romwhich a B-series, earlier han/laterhan struc-ture is generated.The only differencewiththe token-reflexive rgumentdiscussedabove is that these statementseach take the nikon as one oftheir two parts.But isn'tthisjustanotherway of expressinga contradictionn terms?Doesn't this in essence only say that the past, for example, is thepresentpast, and,as McTaggarttated,isn'tthe presentpast contra-dictory?InDogen's case, I thinkthe only correctanswer is yes and no.To understandwhy, and determinewhethertemporalpassage is sub-jective, we have to take a look at where Dogen locates the nikon.There is a clue in the quotationabove: The now under considera-tion is each person's nikon. In another section of Uji, Dogen re-inforces his notion:

If ime s not heaspectofcoming ndgoing, then]hetimeof the mountaintop is being-time'sikon. ftimemaintainsheaspectof comingandgoing,Philosophyast&West [then] eing-time'sikons in the self.44

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Two points in this passage are particularly mportanthere. Dogensays: (1) if time is not dynamic,then any given time is the nikonof uji,and (2) if time is dynamic,then nikon is in the self. Here the nikon isperforming twofold functionthat allows D6gen to speak of both two-place temporalrelations and time's passage. In the firstcase, Dogenstatesthatwhere passage is not present, hen time is all nikon(i.e., uji'snikon).Ujican then be thoughtof as a four-dimensionalmosaicinwhichthe temporal relationshipsbetween the individualdharma-positionsreearlier han and later han (i.e., B-seriesrelations). nthissense, be-cause the cosmos is given en bloc as right-Now,as nikon,change is nota factor,and McTaggart'sbjectionabouttense overlapsdoes notapply.But,as Dogen states,there is also a sense in which time is dynamic,and in that case, the nikon is in the self. We can recall two otherpassagesfrom Uji thatstate:

Inspeakingof passage,to think he place [ofpassage] soutside the mind,andthat the dharmas hat can pass, pass to the east, past a hundredthousandworldsover a hundred housandeons, thatis notdevotingyourselfonlyto thestudyof the BuddhaWay.45

and also:Thethree heads and eight armspass as my being-time.Although t seems tobe there, t is the nikon.46

When passage is the featureof uji evident to the subject (i.e., anyparticulardharma-position),hen the nikonseats itselfin, and is specificto, thatparticulardharma-position.nperforminghis role, nikon can beunderstood as the requiredsecond-level temporal order needed forpassage, given thatdharma-positionsre in themselvesfour-dimensionalspace-timepoints.When the nikon is performinghis second role, Dogen is present-ing a view of temporalbecoming that in one sense is similar to theB-theorists.Time'spassageis subjective preciselybecause it is relativeto the nikon seated in all dharma-positions.Of course, here, subjectmeansonly an arbitrarilyhosen frameof reference, hatis, any dharma-position then acting as the subjectiveseat of the nikon.This helpsexplain the apparentincongruencebetween those sections that speakof passage as relative to an individualand those, like the one aboutspringtime's assage,wherethere is no mentionof an individual. nbothcases, however, we might say that a subject is present since anydharma-positionan seat the nikon.Thissecond role of the nikon,however,also createsproblems ntheform of an infiniteregress.Ifthe objective dharma-positionsonstitutefour-dimensionalphenomenapassing throughthe subjectiveseat ofthe nikon,then that subjectiveseat must be a five-dimensionalphe- DirckVorenkamp

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nomenon. Thatfive-dimensionaldharma-positionan then in turnonlypass relative o a six-dimensionaldharma-position.At no pointdoes theregressend, and McTaggart's bjectionwould seem to apply.Inspite of this problem,however,we can conclude that while pas-sage is not purely psychological in the sense of the B-theorists,heSh6obgenz6does contain evidence to supportthe idea that it is sub-jective (i.e., relative o any given dharma-positionctingas the seat ofthe nikon).And in the case of either a static or dynamicrelationshipbe-tween events(i.e., dharma-positions),6gendoes speakof thegeneratedtemporalrelationship s the two-place earlier han and later han.The ThirdTenet of B-theory nd D6gen's Dynamic UjiThe thirdtenet of B-theorystates that all events are equally real,hence the B-series s objective. Gale states that the objectivenatureofthe B-series s a logical entailmentof the subjectivenatureof temporalbecoming(i.e., B-theorist enet number ).47 Of course,the implicationis that if temporalbecoming is only subjective,then the real orobjective temporalrelationshipmust be only the B-series.As we have seen, there are places in the Sh6obgenz6where Dogenspeaksof the passageof dharma-positionss occurring n my nikon,and in my uji. But the notion of passage also occurs in situationsnotable for their lack of a sentient subject (e.g., springtimepassesthroughspringtime ).Hence, the subjective natureof becoming forDogen is not a statementabout the merely psychological natureofpassage, but an affirmationof the dynamic natureof all reality. ForDogen, since the nikoncan and does seat itself in any and all dharma-positions,it is in the dynamicinteraction f these dharma-positionshatsubject and object come to define one another. And so, it is preciselythe subjective natureof becoming as relativeto the nikon that con-stitutesa kind of objective,two-place,temporalrelationship.But, the logical entailmentof this conclusion is that Dbgen hasaffirmedboth an A-series(thechange of events in respectto tense, i.e.,temporalbecoming)and a B-series.As we will see below, it is correct owonder about the logical compatibility f these two ideas.The FourthTenet of B-theoryand Dogen's DiscreteDharma-positionsThe fourth enet of B-theory tatesthatchange is understandablentermsof B-relations lone. According o Gale, thismeansaccountingfortwo typesof change.48The firstconcernschanges in time.As Gale states, Whatwe meanby the changeof a thingintime is asequence of successive events all regardedas states of one thing. 49When reality s viewed as a four-dimensionalmosaic, we note thatthesame substancehas differentqualitiesat differentimes. Dogen seems toPhilosophyast&West speakof this idea in the followingpassage.

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Firewoodbecomes ashes,and ashes cannotreturn o firewood.However,youshould not understand hat ashes are afterand that firewoodis before. Youshould know that firewood dwells in the dharma-positionf firewood,andhas before and after.Although irewood has before andafter,before and afterare disconnected. Ash is in the dharma-positionf ash, and has before andafter.50Dogen starts by saying that there is a temporal progression fromfirewood to ashes. Obviously the concept of dharma-positions includesdifferentqualitative states of things that we believe are one and the same

object. Because these causally related dharma-positions present us witha temporally seamless picture of change in time, we commonly sayfirewood becomes ashes. Of course, this should not be construed tomean that D6gen is affirmingthe idea of changes in an enduring sub-stance. His point is simply that spatiotemporally proximate, yet discretedharma-positions provide a continuity to experience. In this limitedsense, D6gen does affirmchanges in time.The second type of change is called changes of time. Changesof time are changes in an event's status as future, present, and past.This type of change is found in D6gen's writings, where he speaks oftime as if it were constituted of a progression of discrete dharma-posi-tions. The firewood-to-ashes section above is a good example-andsome others include:

Prior hought,succeeding thought, houghtsdo not wait for each other. Priordharma, ucceedingdharma,dharmasdo notoppose each other.51To tell the mainpoint,every being in the whole world,while being linedup,is an individual ime.52

and the section seen earlier,Ujihas the virtueof passage.Itpassesfromtodayto tomorrow, tpassesfromtodayto yesterday, tpassesfromyesterday o today.53Sections like these suggest a recurrent temporal passage. There is asense in which dharma-positions are unrelated; they do not wait foreach other. When one time is here, the time before is no longer here,the time after is not yet here, and in combination they can be thoughtof as being lined up like a series. In any case, the idea is of discrete

temporal moments succeeding one another in a linear fashion as theyflow from the future, through the present, and into the past. In this sense,we can say that change is nothing but a change of an event's temporalstatus as it proceeds through the three times.A problem that arises here, though, is how one reconciles the idea ofchanges of time with the notion of two-place relations between dis-connected dharma-positions. The difference between ash and firewoodis obvious. But, just for the sake of argument, what about the difference DirckVorenkamp

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PhilosophyEast& West

betweenburningirewoodat time-1andburningirewoodat time-2?Thedifferencebetween time-1 and time-2can be as small a temporal panaswe care to make it. To be consistentwith Dogen, we have to say thateach of these two times is also an independent dharma-positionwithbefore and after. But these correlated dharma-positionswill not inthemselves account for the experiencedsense of continuityin the pas-sageof time. When and how does time-1stop beingthe timepresentandtime-2 become the timepresent? t is true,as D6gen stated,that we donot experience gaps n time'spassage.Of course,one mightreasonablyobjectto thisby sayingthat if therewere gapsbetween dharma-positions, e could never know it.Insuch acase (assumingan Abhidharmic-typeuccessionof instantswhose flash-ingsare all preciselycoordinatedwithsimultaneousflashingsof instantsof consciousness), heirexistence is notmerelyunknown,butcompletelyunknowable,and we, as Dogen has pointedout, experience only con-tinuityin time's passage.Yet the originalproblemstill remainsbecauseDogen has, in fact, differentiatedbetween different,discrete dharma-positions. In other words, he has said we do know that the variousdharma-positionsre different.So, again, we have to ask how the ex-perienceof continuity s related o discrete, wo-place dharma-positions?SeveralDogen interpreters ave suggestedthat the nikonplays animportant ole in this regard.54At firstthought,and in lightof what wehave said above, this seems a plausibleanswer. When discussingthesecond tenet of B-theory,we saw how B-theorists ttempt o reduce thenotionof passageto a bipartite elationship ependent upona token. Wealso saw how D6gen's nikoncan be interpreted s performinghe func-tion of such a token. Depending upon its placement,the nikonboth(1) mediates between the tenses as uji's nikon and (2) allows for thepassageof dharma-positionshrough my Now. But,even thoughthenikon is common to bothviews, we mustnot confusethe two. As soonas the notion of nikon as a temporalreferent or the pastand the futurewas introduced,we stopped speakingof passage and startedspeakingonly intermsof two-placerelations.But,when Dogen spokeof the nikonof the self, that nikonperformsan entirelydifferent unction.Byseatingitselfin any particulardharma-positioni.e., the subject ), t allows fora passage through that dharma-position's xperiential Now. This ischange in respectto tense (i.e., an A-seriespassage).Thefact that thesetypesof A-seriesnotions notonly exist in Dogen'sthoughtbut arefrequentlyoundalongsideB-theory iews is problematicin light of the fact that Western philosophersconsider the two viewslogically incompatible.55 ince Dogen clearlyconsidersA-seriespassageas essential to his view of time, the A-theoryphrases(andthe use of therandomlyseated nikon)would seem to mitigate against the B-theoryviews we have also found. But is this the case?

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Firstwe should note thatdescriptivelypointingout these apparentlycontradictorypositions is not equivalentto assigningpriority o either.Nor does the fact of uncovering an apparentcontradiction weakenthe validityof the descriptiveevidence for the existence of the prob-lem. Nevertheless,this obviously does not answer the question, andwe are still leftwonderingabout the consistencyof Dogen's theoryoftime.The fact that the two very different ypes of assertionsoften occurin close proximity o one another(e.g., the firewood-to-ashespassage)suggests hatDogen had some sort of congruentwhole in mind when heuttered hem.This is certainly he positionof mostinterpretersf Dogen.If we makethe reasonableassumptionshatDogen'sstatementson timeare consistent with one another,and probablyreflectthe influence ofhis own intellectual radition, hen severaloptions are available in ourattempt o explainthe problem.

The firstoption would involvethe claim thatthese apparentlycon-tradictory tatementssimplyreflect an applicationof Nagarjuna'swell-known tetralemma.Advocatesof this view could assert that since thecontradictionsare a skillfulapplicationof conventional-level ruths, heproblemis apparentonly. Unfortunatelyhis option suffers rom textualand philosophicalproblems hat render t untenable.First, t is not obvious that D6gen had such a hermeneutic(i.e., afourfoldnegativedialectic)in mindin the specificcase of his discussionson time. Forexample,while it is certainly ruethatDogen utilizedsuch adialectic in his discussion of k6ans,reading he Uji ascicle as a wholein lightof an assumedtetralemmatructure oes notgive readyevidencethat it reflectsa consistent,widespreaduse of such a device. Infact,theonly clear-cut case of the presenceof the tetralemma n the Uji fas-cicle occurs in one k6an cited towardthe end of the piece. But eventhere,Dogen'sexplanationof the k6an does not reflectan applicationofthe tetralemma.56Secondly, even if we still insist on hermeneuticallyapplyingthetetralemma,he conclusionof inconsistencystill follows-but fordiffer-ent reasons.Itwould take us too far afield to discuss them in detailhere,but suffice it to say that Nagarjuna'suse of the tetralemma s ultimatelygroundedin an inherentlynormative,a priori wo-truths tructure.Thatfact alone renders assertions based on it contradictoryaccording tononnormative riteriaof validity.57Anotherpossibleoption is to explain away the passagescontainingtemporaldiscretenessby relyingon otherpassagesthatexpressHua-yennotionsof interpenetration. arlier t was statedthat Dogen's thought isgrounded n Hua-yen hought.Ifthat is true,then it is reasonable o viewthese statements n a similarlight.To do so would entail asserting hatthe passageof discretedharma-positionsnd the idea of two-placerela- DirckVorenkamp

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tions are relatedin a mannersimilar o Hua-yenteachingson the inter-f_ ? relationship f li and shih. Butthisoption,too, is ultimatelyuntenable.The pertinentquestion in this case is not whetherDogen's discus-sions of time are based on Hua-yennotions-we have alreadyassumedthatthey are (see note28 below), instead,it concernswhetheran appli-cation of Hua-yen notions of interpenetrationan logically resolve theincongruenciesbetween A-theoryand B-theoryphrases.The answer, inshort,is no.Withoutstraying oo far from the topic at hand, the reason is thatHua-yen explanationsof temporal nterpenetrationtrugglewith the ex-periential act of temporalasymmetry.58Any assertionof a relativeandinterdependent elationshipbetween A- and B-theoryviews in a Hua-yen context would have to be predicatedupon firstestablishinga bi-directional, ymmetrical elationship etween anterior ndposteriorem-poralevents. Because of temporalasymmetryi.e., time always flowstoward the future), t is the effect-to-causeaspect of that bidirectionalrelationshiphat causes the problems. Fa-tsang trugglesunsuccessfullywith this very issue in sections of his Wu-chiaochang.59The Hua-yenfailureon this count means thatultimatelyt cannotadequatelyreconcilethe A- and B-theory iews.A thirdpossible optionwould involveexplainingawaythe passagesexpressingnotions of two-place relationsby means of the passage ofdiscretedharma-positionsi.e., negating Hua-yennotions of mutualin-terpenetrationnd nonobstruction).60o do this one mustassign greatersignificanceto the sections on discrete dharma-positionsather han tothose on two-place relations. But this option suffersfrom at least twoproblems.First, here is not only no evidence suggesting Dogen had such apositionin mind,butinfactplentyof evidence indicatinghat he was nottrying o subordinate itherview (i.e., A- or B-theory)o the other. Sec-ondly, this option has the added disadvantageof raisingseriousques-tions about the largerissue of the internalconsistency of the wholeSh6bogenzo(see note 28 forfurtherdiscussion).Inlightof the problemswith each of the three alternatives bove, wemust be open to a fourthoption:the real problemon this issue maysimply lie with our assumptionof consistency. Simply put, Westernphilosophicalviews concerningthe incompatibilityof the A- and B-theoriesmay be correcteven within the contextof traditionalBuddhistphilosophy,and Dbgen is thereforeofferingus an inconsistentphiloso-phyof time.Inanycase, whatmaybe mostsignificanthere is the existence of theproblemitself.In this fact, Dogen sharesthe problemwith B-theorists.Many A-theorists have accused B-theoristsof positing a theory thatPhilosophyast&West cannot adequatelyaccount for the differencesbetween B-seriesrelated

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temporal phenomena and the manner in which we experience time'spassage.61ConclusionWe haveseen thatthereare elements of B-theoryhought n Dbgen'sviews about time: he viewed Realityas token-reflexive, ime'spassageas subjective(i.e., relative o dharma-positions),nd events as existinginobjectivelyreal,two-place relationshipswith one another.62Finally,heanalyzed change as relating o qualitativelydifferent tatesof a thing.But there are also importantareas of divergence between the B-theoristsand Dogen. Inclaimingthat the tenses of expressedevents arerelative to the expression, Dogen does not conclude that the past andfuturearesimplylinguisticconventions.Infact,quitethe contrarys true:because they are linguisticconventions,they cannotsimplybe symbolsbut must be the symbolized itself. In addition,the idea that temporalbecomingis subjective does not mean thatDogen dismissed tas onlypsychological. Instead, hrough he mediationof the nikon,temporalbecoming is a notion that stands side by side with the idea of two-placerelationsbetween dharma-positions.Inoutliningsome of the B-theory lements in Dbgen's philosophyoftime, we also discovered a fundamentalincongruencythat calls intoquestionthe consistencyof his views. The problemconcerns the rela-tionshipof dharma-positionss discretespace-timephenomenaand theexperienceof passageas a smooth and continuous flow. Dogen's no-tion of nikonallows for dynamic interactionbetween dharma-positionsbut not without entailing the apparentlyinconsistent notion of tenseoverlaps.Inaddition,although he nikonhas a functionwithin(1)time asa set of two-placerelations,and(2)time as the passagefrom he future othe past, it does not reconcile the two. Since it is clear that two-placetemporalrelationsholdbetween four-dimensionalphenomena,temporalbecomingcontinues to be an issue without an adequateanswer.

NOTES

This article is dedicated to AlfonsoVerdu.1 - RichardM. Gale, ed., The Philosophyof Time: A Collection ofEssays GardenCity,New York:AnchorBooks, 1967), pp. 70-77.The explanationof McTaggart's osition and the summaryof B-theoryare both based on, and drawheavilyfrom,Gale's explana-tion.2 - Ibid. DirckVorenkamp

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3 - Ido not claim that these are the only definitionsof these terms.Thedefinitionsarestipulativeand functiononly to establishsome work-ing parametersor the study. The intent in formulating ategoriesthrough he use of stipulativedefinitionsbeforethe startof the studyis to create a questionthat is verifiableor falsifiableaccordingtoavailable historicalrecords.As RobertBairdhas shown, this pro-vides the basic framework or a nonnormative nswer to a histori-cal question. See Robert D. Baird,CategoryFormationand theHistoryof Religions(The Hague, Netherlands:Mouton and Co.,1971). Iam gratefulo RobertN. Minor,Professor f Religionat theUniversityof Kansas,for his suggestionson ways to use Baird'smethod.

4-J.M.E. McTaggart, The Unreality of Time, in PhilosophicalStudies,ed. S. V. Keeling London:EdwardArnoldand Co., 1934),pp.110-131.5 - Ibid.,pp. 110-111, and also Gale, Philosophyof Time,p. 67.6 - Ibid.7 - Adolf Grunbaum, The Status of Temporal Becoming, in Gale,Philosophyof Time,p. 322.8 - McTaggart, Unrealityof Time, p. 111; also Gale, PhilosophyofTime,p. 67.9 - McTaggart, Unrealityof Time, pp. 113-116, and Gale, Philoso-phy of Time,p. 67.

10 - McTaggart, Unrealityof Time, pp. 123-126, and Gale, Philoso-phy of Time,p. 68.11 - Ibid.12 - Ibid.13 - McTaggart, Unrealityof Time, p. 126, and Gale, PhilosophyofTime,p. 67.14 - Gale, Philosophyof Time,pp. 70-77.15 -Ibid., pp. 70-71.16- Ibid.17- Ibid.18- Ibid., pp. 72-73.19- Ibid.20 - Ibid.

Philosophyast&West 21 - Hee-JinKim, The Reasonof Wordsand Letters:Dogen and Koan

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Language, n Dogen Studies,ed. William R. LaFleurHonolulu:Kuroda nstitute/Universityf HawaiiPress, 1985), pp. 54-82.22 - Dogen, Shobogenz6, Mitsugo. This is mytranslation romNihonshis6 taikei,vols. 12 and 13, ed. TeradaT6ru and MizunoYaoko

(Tokyo: wanami,1972);hereafter Dogen. Mitsugo s fromvol.12, p. 57.23 - Dogen, Bukkojoji, ol. 12, pp. 300-301.24 - D6gen, Hossho, vol. 13, p. 84.25 - Ibid., p. 85.26 - Kim, orexample, has pointedout thatDogen uses the term d6tokuto signify he importanceof words themselves.See Kim, ReasonofWords and Letters, p. 67. See also Hee-JinKim,D6gen Kigen-Mystical Realist (Tucson, Arizona: Universityof Arizona Press,

1975), esp. chap. 3.27 - Kim has argued that Dogen is careful not to exclude linguisticexpressions romexpressionsof the Buddha-nature.Note that thereis no fundamentaldisagreement n our positions.My claim here isnot that linguisticexpressionsare privilegedin any way, only thatDogen views them, just as any otherphenomenon, as expressionsof the Buddha-nature. ee Kim,D6gen Kigen, chap. 3, esp. pp.103 ff.28 - Note also thatCandrakTrtiefines sarhvrtihreeways in chapter24,verse 8, of his Prasannapada.Accordingto Nagao, the third defi-nition refers to conventionalterminology,mannerof speaking,name. See GadjinM. Nagao, Madhyamikaand Yogacara,rans.LeslieS. Kawamura(Albany:SUNYPress, 1991), pp. 14-15.HereIam,of course,assuming hatD6gen'sthought sgroundedin Hua-yenthought.Thisposition has been questioned,however,based on the fact that Dogen does not quote the Hua-yen chingdirectly,does not refer o the school itself in his discussionsof timeand being, criticizes the Hua-yenmasterTsung-mi,and makes ex-tensive use of other, non-Hua-yentexts. But, setting aside theseobjectionsforthe moment, he claim thathisthought sgrounded nHua-yen thought is much less problematic han the alternative-namely,that it isn'tgrounded n Hua-yenthought.Butwhy?Assumingfor the moment (1) that the reasonable(and histor-ically verifiable/falsifiable)ssumptionthat Dogen's thoughtowesan intellectualdebt to past Buddhistthought, (2) that some ac-knowledgmentof that influence is necessaryin orderto be able tomake sense out of otherwiseincongruent ssertions,and(3)thatthetwo options(i.e., Hua-yenor not Hua-yen)are mutuallyexclusive, DirckVorenkamp

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then Inote thatassertinga grounding n Hua-yenBuddhismallowsfor a consistencyof thought n the Shobogenz6on issues(includingtime-other problemsmentionedaside)thatcannotbe found ifweutilize the other claim. The alternativeposition(i.e., not groundedin Hua-yen thought) s not able to make such a claim, given thenature of many of the seemingly contradictory tatementsin theSh6bogenzo.Since an assumptionof consistencyunderliesbothpossible in-terpretations,he importantquestion is, which of the alternativesyields a more consistentcoherence to the text?The Hua-yen as-sumptionhas the benefitof beingable to explainthose itemswhichwould otherwise be irreconcilable e.g., Sarvastivada-typeotionsof spatialand temporaldiscretenesswith Hua-yen-likenotions ofspatial/temporalnterpenetration),hile the otheroption(includingthe attempt o read a Nagarjunianetralemma nto D6gen'sdiscus-sions of time)will not be as successfulin this regard.This is partic-ularly rue for the Uji fascicle,which is difficult f not impossibleto interpret onsistentlywithoutassumingthe Hua-yenview. Thisprobably explains why many interpreters,myself included, readDogen in thatlight.To takeany other view requires he interpreterto explain how such glaringinconsistenciesare reasonable.If wemake the reasonableassumption hat D6gen wasn'tofferingus acompletelychaotic and incongruent iew, then the alternative iewbecomes verydifficult o maintain.Thenextquestion,then, is, does anyof the evidence inthe textnecessitateagainst his interpretation.he answer is no-even thatevidence pointedout above. The objectionsabove are predicatedupon the assumptionthat Dogen (1) would have made morereferenceto the Hua-yen ching and the Hua-yenschool if in facthis thought was grounded in that school's doctrine, and (2) hewould not have made reference o the texts/doctrines hat he did-perhapseven in the manner hat he did-if his thought s groundedin Hua-yen.Clearly, hough,neitherassumptions necessarilyvalidand bothdo not therefore onstitutenecessaryor sufficientgroundsforrejectinghe Hua-yenreading.Theycertainlymay give us pausein the historical ense-but, upon reevaluation,as above, there aregood reasons o rejectthe alternative.There s, however,anotherpossibility hat mustbe addressed.Areviewerof thisarticle has notedthat the issuemaynotbe either/orin nature,but simply a questionof extent. The reviewersuggeststhatthe consistencyof the Uji fascicle, for example, is not de-pendent on whetheror not it utilizes Hua-yen views, but ratherwhere and how it utilizes them. This is certainlyreasonableandrequires urther nvestigation.But,while the exact details of how

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and where these views apply exceed the scope of this essay, weshouldnotethatacceptingthis view does notchangethe validityofthe assumption regardingHua-yen as a basis for understandingDogen'sviews.29 - Gale, Philosophyof Time,pp. 73-74.30 - Ibid. For the purposes of this essay, I take the term temporalbecoming as synonymouswith the notion of time's passage,change, flow, etc.31 - Dogen, Uji ,vol. 12, p. 260.32 - Ibid., p. 258.33 - Ibid.34 - Ibid., pp. 259-260.35 - Ibid., p. 260.36 - Ibid., p. 258.37 - See, forexample,the Uji and Genjok6an hapters.38 -J.J.C. Smart, SpatializingTime, in Gale, Philososphyof Time,p. 164.39 - Dbgen, Uji, vol. 12, p. 258. Other scholars(e.g., Abe and Kim)have interpretedhe term'gap'inthe sense of a separationbetweenthe event and the 'self'. There is no fundamentaldisagreement,though, between my readinghere and their interpretation.Givenagreementon the idea thatDogen's dharma-positionsefer o par-ticularized segments of being-time (ontological/spatialand tem-poral in nature), hen it is not a matterof one view being correctwhile the other is incorrect.Theyare not mutuallyexclusive.40 - The experiential issue being referredto here is our consciousexperienceof the passageof time as a smooth,seamlesscontinuumwithoutfragmentedbreaks,or gaps. Forexample,see the next sen-tence (notcited)of the passagementionedabove.41 - Dogen, Daigo, vol. 12, p. 123.42 - I am deeply indebted to AlfonsoVerdu,Professor f Philosophyatthe Universityof Kansas, or his many insightsand discussions ontime and Zen Buddhism.He graciouslylet me have a copy of hisunpublishedarticle, Zen and Time. While neither he articlenorourdiscussionswere specificallyconcernedwith B-theoryviews oftime, they did suggest to me the possibilityof a study using thisapproach.The terms now-not-yet, now-present, nd now-no-longer are developed by Verduin the Zen and Time article.I DirckVorenkamp

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have utilized the terminology here as proper to Dogen's views ontime and the B-theory elements in his teachings.Note that the point made in this section of the essay does notlead to the conclusion that D6gen was a determinist. Within thecontext of Dogen's thought, stating that a B-series future is what isnow-not-yet entails nothing furtherthan the conclusion that whatwill be (no determinism implied or intended) stands in a two-place

temporal relation to the present Now. Nevertheless, as we will see,this issue is an important one for another reason. B-theorists havebeen accused of statizing time in a way that is experientially in-consistent. Dogen certainly does not statize time, but, as shown,those passages which do speak of time's flow do so in an A-theory manner. While those A-theory-type passages do not chal-lenge the descriptive conclusion that B-theory views also exist inthe Shobogenzo, they do raise the issue of whether or not Dogen'sviews are internallyconsistent.

43 - Dogen, Juki, vol. 12, p. 273.44 - Dogen, Uji, vol. 12, pp. 257-258.45 - Ibid., p. 260.46 - Ibid., p. 258.47 - Gale, Philosophy of Time, p. 74.48 - Ibid., pp. 74-75.49 - Ibid., p. 75.50 - Dogen, Genjokoan, vol. 12, p. 36.51 - Dogen, Kaiinsammai, vol. 12, p. 141.52 - Dogen, Uji, vol. 12, p. 258.53 - Ibid.54 - For example, see Francis Cook, Hee-Jin Kim, Steven Heine, andJoan Stambaugh. Also, compare the following passages: (items inbrackets are my additions):

Theprocessivenatureof realization onsistsin the fact thatthe at-one-nessor immediateexperience must be repeatedover and over as each newevent occurs.... However, according to him, the actual realization istimeless each time it occurs. (F.Cook, Enlightenmentn Dogen'sZen,IABS6 [1]:25)Whether t be firewood or ash, birthor death,the winteror the spring-each has its own dharma-positionwhich is absolutelydiscreteand dis-continuous.Each has its before and after, but is cut off from those

PhilosophyEast& West dharma-situationspreceding and following [B-seriesrelationsin an

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A-seriesprogressionromfuture o past].(Hee-jinKim, Existence/Time sthe Way of Ascesis, EasternBuddhist11 [2]: 54-55)There areotherexamplesas well, and I do not mean to implyherethat the two scholarsabove have misinterpretedDogen. Infact,theopposite is probably he case. The problemlies with Dogen'sviewof time itself.55 - Gale, Philosophyof Time,p. 69.

56 - See Dogen, pp. 261-262. Iquicklywant to add, though,that this isnot to claim thatDogen was not awareof, or did not employ, thetetralemma-only that it is not evident in the discussionsof timeused as a basisfor the inquiry.One possibleobjectionto thisobservation,notedbya reviewer,is thatDogen may have used a form of tetralemmailteredthroughthe k6antradition f ChineseCh'anBuddhism.As mentionedabove,there is no disagreementon the point that there are koan in theShdobgenz6that obviously reflectthe tretralemma.The point indisputeherewould be the notionthat,somehow,the othersectionsof the text also utilize it-only in a modifiedform that is differentfrom the one used by Nagarjuna. do not want to take issue withthe notionthatideas can changeovertime, butwe have to be verycarefulabout assertions uch as these, which can amountto claim-ing that Dogen used Nagarjuna'sretralemma,but it really is notNagarjuna'setralemma.The processof modifyingsuch assertionscan render hem nonfalsifiable.

57 - The reason is that the use of such a tetralemmaultimatelymustinvolve the assertionof a proposition omethinglike: Dogen can-not be said to hold eitherextremeas his position.... But this isproblematicbecausethe assertion tself s subject o some criteriaofvalidity.This is preciselythe point made by Nagarjuna's pponentin the VigrahavyavartanTi.e., that in orderto assert hat he had noposition, Nagarjunahad to assertsomethingand hence immedi-atelycontradictedhimself).Prasanghikas ave attempted o defendhim and themselvesby invokingboth the notion of nonpresuppo-sitionalnegationand an a priori wo-truths tructure.Those fami-liarwith modernscholarshipon Nagarjunawill know that there isan ongoing debate concerningwhetheror not Nagarjunaand thePrasanghikas' nswer is valid. I have argued in detail elsewherethat it is in fact inherentlynormativeand hence cannot meet non-normative, erifiable/falsifiableriteria f validity.To defendNagar-juna's approachon this point would involve one in attemptingadefense of the inherentlynormative wo-truths laim.A furtherobjectionoften raisedby defendersof the validityofthis method is that it is not appropriateo criticize Buddhists or DirckVorenkamp

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their use of this device, because they had a decidedly religiouspurpose n mind. While this lastpointcertainlynecessitatesa pausein order o ensure that ourconclusionsare historicallyvalid,philo-sophicallyspeakingit is a red herringand has no impacton thisessay'sconclusions.TograntNagarjunaandDogen inthisspecificcase) a kind of intellectual immunity on these points becausethey may have had a religiouspurposein mind is to abrogateourright o ask of them, is this reasonable, and expect thatin answerwe will, inthe secularacademyat least,not rely upon unfalsifiable/normative riteriaof validity.The issue,then, becomes whether heNagarjunianetralemmameets thiscriterion.As mentionedabove, Ithinkthe only answer is no.

58 - See, for example, Fa-tsang'sWu-chiaochang, T. 45, pp. 486a,490a-b, 504b, 505c, etc.59 - Ibid.60 - Thisamounts o assertinghatDbgenholdsthatthe A-series s morefundamental han the B-series.But note that the firstchoice men-tioned (i.e., using Hua-yen notions of interpenetration)oes notcorrespond o the alternativeof asserting hat the B-series s morefundamental.61 - Forexample,see C. D. Broad's OstensibleTemporality, n Gale,Philosophyof Time,pp. 117-142.62 - The conclusion here is not intended as a criticism,but simplyacomparison.I have no interestin forcing Dbgen to fit into thecategoriesof McTaggartnd Gale.Whetheror not Dogen'sagendawas different rom that of the two men whose thought has beenused as a basis for the comparisonwill not necessarilyaffect thedescriptiveresults of askingthe question Arethere any similar-ities? Itcertainlywould, however,have to figureintoany discus-sion of why they are different or the same-but these mattersexceed the scope of thisessay.

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B-Series Temporal Order in Dogen's Theory of Time