1China alt energy increasing now, but is zero sum with America—Key to maintain CCP stability and their economy McMahon, 13 (Tamsin, Diploma in European Journalism from the Hogeschool van Utrecht, B.A. from Ryerson University, reporter for the National Post, “How China is going to save the world”, MacLean’s, January 27, 2013 http://www2.macleans.ca/2013/01/27/business/, JKahn)

Last week the U.S. Embassy in Beijing upgraded its official reading of the city’s air quality on Twitter from “hazardous” to merely “very unhealthy.” But that was scant comfort to the millions of Chinese workers who don masks for their daily commute through thick smog into “Greyjing.” Recent news that air pollution had reached its highest levels since the American government began monitoring it—roughly 44 times worse than the World Health Organization’s recommended daily levels—had ground the city’s construction industry to a halt, forced schools to cancel outdoor sports activities and even sparked several rare, critical editorials in the state-owned press. “What do we want, breathtaking growth or taking a breath amid choking air?” asked China’s state-run news agency Xinhua. It prompted two Chinese environmental activists to pay for an ad in the New York Times urging new

Communist party chief Xi Jinping to pledge his commitment to the environment. China’s ongoing struggles with pollution have been a blight on the country’s international reputation. The world’s image of China is that of an industrial behemoth fuelled by the dirtiest of energies, coal. On the surface, the reputation is well deserved. No country pumps out as much CO2 as China (not even the U.S. comes close). But behind the smog, China’s environmental woes have become an unexpected boon to the global renewable

energy industry. Last week’s air quality emergency sent Chinese green energy stocks soaring on the hope that the political

fallout will prompt the Communist party to offer up more public money for the country’s burgeoning environmental protection sector. Investors are counting on it . Even as it remains the scourge of environmentalists for being the largest

emitter on the planet, China is also emerging as the world’s biggest spender on green energy. Globally, green energy investment fell 11 per cent last year, according to a recent Bloomberg New Energy Finance report. Indebted European countries slashed subsidies, India cut its spending by more than 40 per cent and the U.S. witnessed a string of solar power manufacturer bankruptcies.

China’s investment in renewable energy , meanwhile, was a bright spot. It rose 20 per cent to nearly $68 billion, or a full quarter of the $269 billion global total. From having virtually no green energy infrastructure as recently as 2008, China has built 133 gigawatts of renewable energy—mainly wind turbines—enough to power as many as 53 million homes, or every household in Canada four times over. The International Energy Agency predicted that China would overtake Europe as the world’s top renewable energy growth market. It’s a market expected to be worth more than $470 billion by 2015, according to state-owned China Merchants Securities, or

almost double what it was in 2009 and equal to about eight per cent of the country’s GDP. That investment has caught the eye of clean-tech companies in Europe and North America, who are flocking to China in hopes of selling their technologies after seeing demand stagnate or collapse in their home markets. “ All the key players are going to China these days,” says Changhua Wu, Greater China director of the Climate Group, a London-based agency that promotes green energy investment. “Everyone is trying to figure out what the potential for opportunity is, partly because everyone recognizes that

China could potentially be the largest market for clean tech in the world.” As China takes the lead, everyone will benefit from the technology that is developed and exported. China is saving itself, but might also be saving the world in the process. While the Middle Kingdom’s smog problems have earned plenty of headlines, it has also been quietly attracting a host of very unlikely supporters, including praise from the Pew Charitable Trust and the World Wildlife Foundation, which gave its “climate solver” award this year to several Chinese companies that manufacture technology to capture and recycle wasted heat, water and chemical emissions to power everything from factories to refrigerators. Greenpeace predicted the country would be on track to install 400 gigawatts of wind energy by 2030 and could become the largest solar market in the world. The argument that China is the world’s environmental bad guy “is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to make given China’s recent policies,”

wrote the authors of an October report for the Climate Institute, an Australian think tank. The country has closed more coal-fired power plants since 2006 than the entire capacity of Australia’s electrical grid, and exported more than $ 35-billion worth of renewable energy technology —equal to the total value of shoes exported from China that year. This year, China is rolling out pilot projects that could eventually lead to the world’s largest carbon trading system. “The broad scheme of things is that China believes it wants to become a resource-conserving, environmentally friendly society and that’s the way they describe it, in those exact words,” says Arthur Hanson, one of Canada’s leading experts on sustainable development. The former founding director of Dalhousie University’s School for Resource and Environmental Studies, Hanson is in Beijing this week in his role as international chief adviser to the China Council for International Co-operation on Environment and

Development. Granted, China has little choice but to invest in renewables as it seeks out more sources of energy to help power its rapidly developing economy , with GDP growth expected just shy of

eight per cent this year and an urban population rising by an estimated 2.3 per cent a year. Green energy is also seen as a political tool for the Chinese government that can quell rising environmental protests and appease political dissent . “The leadership in China is really recognizing that in order to manage and govern the country

better you need to find a universal underlying theme to make sure everyone is with you,” says Wu. “ Green growth or sustainable development happens to be the only one . ” But beyond the obvious political and economic advantages of green energy, China is also pinning its hopes on the belief that global demand for clean technology will enable the country to transform both its domestic economy and its exports. Until now, China’s green energy sector has largely done what the country does best: import technology developed elsewhere,

reproduce it for less money and then export it back to the West. That’s changing as China pours billions into research and development

and advanced education in hopes that clean tech can help shift China from being merely the low-cost factory of the world to being a global leader in developing innovative technology. China’s current five-year plan,

which runs through 2015, includes an economic development blueprint that will see more than $1.5 trillion invested in seven industries, all of them related in some way to environmental protection and renewable energy technology.

Stalled Chinese growth causes CCP lashout Shirk, ‘07. director of the University of California system-wide Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and Ho Miu Lam professor of China and Pacific Relations at IR/PS and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs (Susan, Fragile China, pg 3).

As China’s leaders well know, the greatest political risk lying ahead of them is the possibility of an economic crash that throws millions of workers out of their jobs or sends millions of depositors to withdraw their savings from the shaky banking system. A massive environmental or public health disaster could also trigger regime collapse, especially if people’s lives are endangered by a media cover-up imposed by Party authorities. Nationwide rebellion becomes a real possibility when large numbers of people are upset about the same issue at the same time. Another dangerous scenario is a domestic or international crisis in which the CCP leaders feel compelled to lash out against Japan, Taiwan, or the United States because from their point of view not lashing out might endanger Party rule.”

That causes nuclear and bio warfare Renxing, ‘05 (San, The Epoch Times "The CCP's Last-ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War. Hundreds of millions of deaths proposed", 8/5, http://en.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-5/30931.html)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological , chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life . The CCP , which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches.

Bioweapons cause extinctionParson, ‘06 – Ed, University of Michigan, “The Big One: A Review of Richard Posner’s Catastrophe: Risk and Response,” http://www-personal.umich.edu/~parson/website/pdf/parson-jel-45-posner-catastrophe-review.pdf.

For his fourth risk, in case you are not scared enough, Posner turns to bioterrorism. Biological weapons produced for terrorist purposes could be far more devastating than either chemical or

nuclear weapons , or natural pathogens. A bacterium or virus with ideal killing properties – a high mortality rate , a long infectious incubation period, and efficient airborne transmission – and for which there was no effective vaccine or treatment, could potentially kill most or all people on Earth. While naturally occurring organisms are unlikely to grow this lethal – if you are a bacterium, it is not advantageous to kill your entire host population – genetic manipulation of existing disease organisms (e.g., smallpox or other pox viruses, or the hemorrhagic viruses Marburg and Ebola) could in principle produce new bugs this bad.

CCP instability triggers a nuclear civil war and regional conflicts that escalateYee, politics and international relations professor and Hong Kong Baptist University, and Storey, Defense professor at Deakin University, 2002 (Herbert and Ian, April 11th, 2002, Routledge publisher, “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality”, pg 5, InformaWorld)

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability . Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario - nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords .'2 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

2Apocalyptic framing of warming causes denial and despair, undermining the political will to actFoust et al. ’08—Associate professor of Communication Studies at the University of Denver (Christina., William O. Murphy, Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver, and Chelsea Stow, Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver "Global Warming and Apocalyptic Rhetoric: A Critical Frame Analysis of U.S. Popular and Elite Press Coverage from 1997-2007" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the NCA 94th Annual Convention, TBA, San Diego, CA, Nov 20, 2008, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p260125_index.html) JOElements of an apocalyptic frame could be said to exist in most of the articles we read, though all elements were not present in each article. Nonetheless,

apocalyptic framing should give us pause, for it threatens to hinder progress in forming a political will to change the carbon- based energy economy (and thus mitigate the consequences of global warming). To announce the coming of the apocalypse creates despair as people feel they cannot stop such an event, but can only hope that they are among the chosen few to be saved (if they believe in the immanence of the end). Apocalyptic framing also creates denial, as when people fail to exit the movie theater because they have hear d fire yelled once too often . There may also be a sense of denial in terms of the effectiveness of solutions: Why make changes to our lifestyle, if the world is going to end quickly and our actions don't make a difference anyway ? If the end is, indeed, the total destruction of earth, won't our efforts to make change now be in vain? As Brummett suggests of pre-millennial apocalyptic rhetoric (which assumes that the world will be destroyed after a judgment day), the cosmically mandated telos of

catastrophe overshadows any efforts to change the trajectory of the narrative. The only place for human agency within such rhetoric is the capacity to agree with prophesies , against the polarized opposition of non-believers. By agreeing with the prophesies, "believers" feel a sense of control over the situation because they are "right ," not necessarily because they are taking collective and personal steps to resolve the issue. Granted,

one's worldview may spur action , as when a "conservative Christian" outlook motivates someone to learn more about how better to be

a "steward of the Earth." But when that worldview is structured in apocalyptic terms, it seems more likely to resign us to a telos which lacks human agency . The apocalyptic frame of climate change may offer "believers" a sense of control over events like Hurricane Katrina and the Indonesian tsunami, or the elections of anti- or non-environmental officials. But it also assuages "believers" of responsibility to make active changes in the here-and-now. While we await the flooded coastlines and mass extinctions; the famines, plagues, and rivers red with the blood of non-believers; we do nothing to preventtheir arrival or impact—save trying to get others to see the world as we do. The apocalyptic frame promotes people who are "right" about the forthcoming environmental and climatological collapse, rather than people who are actively preventing it.

Apocalyptic rhetoric justifies military buildup to protect from the impacts to climatechange—that causes arms races, magnifies climate induced conflicts, and kills solvencyBrzoska ’08— Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, University of Hamburg (Brzoska, Michael. "Securitization of Climate Change and the Power of Conceptions of Security" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p253887_index.html) JOIn the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘ exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms , force and violence – will gain in

importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’ . A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate . An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers , thus leading to arms races. This kind of reaction to climate change would be counterproductive in various ways. Firstly, since more border protection , as well as more soldiers and arms, is expensive , the financial means to compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing greenhouse gas emission and adapting to climate change will be reduced . Global military expenditure is again at the level of the height of the Cold War in real terms, reaching more than US $1,200 billion in 2006 or 3.5 percent of global income. While any estimate of the costs of mitigation (e.g. of restricting global warming to 2 ° C by 2050) and adaptation are speculative at the moment, 1 they are likely to be substantial. While there is no necessary link between higher military expenditures and a lower willingness to spend on preventing and preparing for climate change, both policy areas are in competition for scarce resources. 1 One example of the difficulties is the discussion of the cost calculations in the Stern Review, see e.g. Nordhaus 2007 and Tol 2006. Secondly, the acceptance of the security consequences of climate change as an intractable problem could well reduce efforts to find peaceful solutions to the conflicts that will inevitably come with climate change. Climate change will have major consequences, particularly in countries where living conditions are already precarious (IPCC 2007. WBGU 2007). The consequences of climate change on some basic foundations of life, such as fresh water supplies, arable land and agricultural productivity in various parts of the world can already be roughly estimated for various global-warming scenarios. There are also more or less well founded predictions of the consequences of reduced availability of natural resources such as arable land and water on hunger and disease, even though such consequences are highly dependent on counter-measures and adaptation efforts in affected regions. There is no inevitability about these consequences.

Causes serial policy failure - The metaphorical gesture of the 1AC - is a form of hyper-optimism that accelerates the speed of the product’s output, but marginalizes the complexities of said technology - this guarantees tech failure and means you should be suspicious of all their solvency claimsCarper and Schmid 11 (Ross, is a writer at the U.S. Department of Energy's Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, where his work focuses on science, technology, and policy aimed at addressing energy and environmental challenges. He holds an MFA in creative writing from Eastern Washington University, and has also published fiction, poetry, and journalism and Sonja, s an assistant professor in Science and Technology Studies at Virginia Tech, http://www.issues.org/27.4/carper.html, The Little Reactor That Could?)Historically, nuclear energy has been entangled in one of the most polarizing debates in this country. Promoters and adversaries of nuclear power alike have accused the other side of oversimplification and exaggeration. For today’s industry, reassuring a wary public and nervous government regulators that small reactors are completely safe might not be the most promising strategy. People may not remember much history, but they usually do remember who let them down before. It would make more sense to admit that nuclear power is an inherently risky technology, with enormous benefits that might

justify taking these risks. So i nstead of framing small reactors as qualitatively different and “passively safe,” why not address the risks involved head-on? This would require that the industry not only invite the public to ask questions, but also that they respond, even—or perhaps especially—when these questions cross preestablished boundaries. Relevant historical experience with small compact reactors in military submarines, for example, should not be off limits, just because information about them has traditionally been classified. The examples we discussed show that metaphors always simplify the complex technical calculations underlying nuclear technologies. Vivid illustrations often obscure as much as they clarify. Small reactors are not yet a reality, and the images chosen to represent them are often more advertisement than explanation. What information do we need to navigate among the images we are presented with? Clearly, some comparisons are based more on wishful thinking than on experience. A retrievable underground battery and a relationship with a child, for example, invoke quite different degrees of complexity. Carefully scrutinized, the selection of metaphors often reveals the values that go into the design of these new reactors: why one approach is safer than another, which level of risk is acceptable, and whom we should trust. Ultimately, the images offered by our interviewees are based on projections. Although it may make intuitive sense that smaller plants will be easier to manage, nuclear power involves non-nuclear, and even nontechnical, complexities that will not disappear with smaller size, increased automation, or factory-assembled nuclear components. For instance, nuclear reactors , and by extension nuclear power plants, need reliable organizations to train experts, provide everyday operation and maintenance , address problems competently when they arise, and interact effectively with the public in case of an emergency. This is not a trivial list even for high-tech nations like the U nited S tates, and it presents an even larger challenge for prospective importers of small modular reactors, particularly the developing countries with no domestic nuclear infrastructure that are clearly a major target of Hyperion’s efforts. The same goes for the projected cost of small reactors. If there are any numbers publicized at this point at all, they tend to increase monthly, not least because of the recent events in Japan. The nuclear industry may need to rethink nuclear safety issues, revisiting problems it had considered long resolved. Small modular reactors do not offer easy solutions to multiple point failure. In fact, the modular arrangement of multiple cores at one site might increase this particular risk. These questions remain, regardless of whether a new reactor follows an evolutionary or a revolutionary track. Whether the “nuclear battery” or the “just another light-water reactor” message appeals to us, we would be well advised to keep in mind the connotations of familiarity and controllability they offer in the face of unpredictable novelty . That should make us suspicious . Is what we are being sold as advantageous in fact the biggest vulnerability of these small designs? Easy transportability may look less like an asset when considered from the standpoint of proliferation. Multiple small cores might not necessarily turn out to be safer than one large one. We may remember that taking apart a machine, looking inside, and trying to figure out what is wrong ourselves can be more appealing than a machine that, like an iPod, needs to be shipped back to the factory for repair. Distributed generation sounds like a good idea when we talk about solar roof panels, but may not be as attractive when it requires highly trained expertise and accumulates radioactive waste. We don’t know all the answers yet, but we should avoid being drawn in too quickly by these metaphors , even those that are more muted than Hyperion’s. Yuri’s realization that reactors are like children, an image based on profound experience and devoid of any marketing bias, presents a different and competing picture. Rather than simplifying, Yuri’s image goes in the opposite direction. Thinking of small reactors as more like children offers a lesson in humility in the face of complexities, both technical and nontechnical. Reactors, like children, may come with their own complicated personality; they can be quite unpredictable, but they also hold the promise of a better future. Today’s small-reactor narrative isn’t a children’s story but an immensely complex novel, rife with layers of context, relationships, and flawed characters. But even children’s literature can temper itself against its own oversimplifications, as we are urging the nuclear industry to do. In 1974, Shel Silverstein published his reaction to The Little Engine That Could, flipping the empowerment narrative to a cautionary tale. The last stanza of his poem “The Little Blue Engine” warns against allowing confidence and optimism to become hubris: He was almost there, when — CRASH! SMASH! BASH! He slid down and mashed into engine hashOn the rocks below … which goes to show If the track is tough and the hill is rough, THINKING you can just ain’t enough! For the small-reactor movement to truly come of age, the metaphors we use to describe it must also mature. Convenient images, save-the-day narratives, and a we-think-we-can reliance on a purely technical fix must be balanced by a broader examination of a full range of metaphors, the complexities they capture or ignore , and the social, political, and organizational contexts in which these machines will ultimately be used.

The alternative is to do the aff without the apocalyptic framing of climate change to emphasize alternative frames that emphasize human agency and responsibility.Foust et al ’08 —Associate professor of Communication Studies at the University of Denver (Christina., William O. Murphy, Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver, and Chelsea Stow, Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver "Global Warming and Apocalyptic Rhetoric: A Critical Frame Analysis of U.S. Popular and Elite Press Coverage from 1997-2007" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the NCA 94th Annual Convention, TBA, San Diego, CA, Nov 20, 2008, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p260125_index.html) JOIn conclusion, we hope to inspire more scholarship in the spirit of Moser and Dilling’s (2007) call for a greater inter-disciplinary conversation on climate change. The methodological tool of frame analysis can help foster common ground between humanities scholars , social scientists, and climate scientists , concerned about global warming. Frame analysis can also be a valuable tool in identify ing the troubling aspects of how a discourse evolves and is communicated—and in so doing, it can lead to more effective communication . Deconstructing the harmful effects of an apocalyptic frame, we feel some responsibility to try to offer alternative frames which might balance the need to communicate the urgency of climate change, without moving people to denial and despair. We would like to see the press inspire more of a public dialogue on how we can mitigate climate change, rather than encouraging readers to continue to be resigned to the catastrophic telos. This does not mean that we should ignore the potentially devastating consequences of global warming (now and in the future); but it does mean that we must begin a conversation about how to change our daily routines to make things better . We believe that the press could promote greater human agency in the issue of climate change, so that people do not become resigned to the telos of global warming. This includes encouraging more personal and civic responsibility , rather than suggesting that experts will take care of it (or that we can do nothing to mitigate the impacts of climate change). Journalists could acknowledge the expertise of scientists, balanced with an acknowledgement of the power of common sense and morality— such a move may help avoid casting scientists as prophets. Through a less tragic, more productive framing of the issues of climate change, we may expand the common ground needed to build a political will for dealing with climate change.

3Text: The United State federal government should substantially increase Peridotite carbon sequestration efforts Peridotite sequestration solves warmingUlion and Kelemen 9

Billions of tons of carbon dioxide could be captured by rocks in a natural chemical reaction that humans can speed up, say researchers from Columbia University. Peridotite, a rock found in the Earth’s mantle, is exposed at the surface in many places on the planet. In the Middle East sultanate of Oman, this mineral is naturally converting an estimated 100,000 tons of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide into rock each year . That's enough to soak up the CO2 emissions from burning more than 10 million gallons of gasoline. The potential for peridotite is reported in a recent study, “In situ carbonation of peridotite for CO2 storage,” published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The Columbia researchers measured the rate of natural carbon capture in the rocks found in Oman and also assessed the prospects of increasing the rate of reaction. Drilling, the artificial input of the greenhouse gas and an increase of temperature in the rock can accelerate the process and create a “significant sink for atmospheric CO2,” stated researchers Peter Kelemen and Jurg Matter in the published study. Lead researcher Peter Kelemen, a professor of earth and environmental sciences at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University, discusses the future of this technology. What are the next steps for putting the peridotite discovery to use? We need to do a pilot experiment in natural peridotite over smaller scales of at least tens to hundreds of meters before expanding to volumes of cubic kilometers that could be possible. This is needed to evaluate whether the reaction can reach a "self-cracking" regime in which the volume change due to carbonation creates new pore space and exposes fresh minerals for reaction.

4Interpretation- The plan must be exclusively under US controlPossessive pronouns show ownershipUsing Engish 13 , http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership. EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

Violation-Cooperation requires sharing ownership of the programCarrillo 13 Susana Carrillo & Napoleão Dequech Neto, Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean Boosting Vocational Training and Skills Development January 2013

http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37888185

The Triangular Cooperation agreement among Brazil, Germany, and Peru to support vocational

training and skills development shows that Triangular Cooperation succeeds when the institutions involved share ownership and the same strategic interests, and perceive mutual benefits as a result of the partnership. The positive institutional relationship among SENAI, SENATI, and GIZ has provided a strong base for the implementation of the Triangular Cooperation agreement and establishment of the CTA. The three parties worked in close collaboration to establish the Center with the goal of building a trained skill base to serve the needs of industries on issues related to environmental protection and clean production. SENATI will assume full responsibility for the management of the Center at the end of the triangular project, at which point the parties involved will be able to evaluate results and impact. This initiative is clearly grounded in a solid partnership in strategic areas of interest for all partners and with benefits for the industrial sector. For these reasons, the CTA could become a center of excellence in its field and a knowledge hub in the region.

The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate, limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash. The affirmative unlimts by permitting the private sector to do the plan. We could never be ready for all the possibilities.T is voter because it's necessary for good, well-prepared debating.

WarmingNo runaway warming—neg feedbacks check - even high co2 levels not catastrophic

- plant growth checks

- water vapor checks

- negative feedbacks => one degree warming

- their authors exaggerate

Meyer 12 (Warren, “Understanding the Global Warming Debate,” Forbes, 2/9/12, http://www.forbes.com/sites/warrenmeyer/2012/02/09/understanding-the-global-warming-debate/4/, CMR)

So what’s the problem? Why the debate? Isn’t this admission a “game over” for the skeptics? Actually, no. To understand this, let us

do a bit of extrapolation. Current CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere today are around 390ppm, or about 0.039%. But even if we were to hit a relatively pessimistic level of 800ppm by the end of the century, this would , by the numbers

above, imply a warming of about one degree . While potentially undesirable, a degree of warming is hardly catastrophic. The catastrophe comes from the second chained theory. The Positive Climate Feedback Theory As the Earth warms, we expect there to be changes that may further accelerate or decelerate the warming. These are called feedbacks. Take one example — as the Earth warms, there will likely be less snow and ice coverage of the Earth. Snow and ice tend to reflect heat back into space more than does bare land or water, so that this loss could add additional warming above and beyond the initial

warming from CO2. On the opposite end of the scale, many plants grow faster with warmer air and more airborne CO2 , and such growth could in turn reduce atmospheric carbon and slow expected warming . It turns out the critical feedback involves water vapor. While CO2 is indeed a greenhouse gas, it is a weak one when compared to water vapor. Rising temperatures may increase evaporation and therefore the amount of water vapor in the air, thus adding powerful

greenhouse gasses to the atmosphere and accelerating warming. On the other hand, water evaporated by rising temperatures may form more clouds that shade the Earth and help to reduce temperatures . Whether future man-made global warming is catastrophic depends a lot on the balance of these effects. The IPCC assumed that strong positive feedbacks dominated , and thus arrived at numbers that implied that feedbacks added an additional 2-4 degrees to the 1 degree from CO2 directly. So in the IPCC numbers, at least two thirds of the future warming comes not from the basic greenhouse gas effect but a second independent theory that the Earth’s climate is dominated by strong positive feedbacks. Other more alarmist scientists have come up with feedback numbers even higher. When Al Gore says that we will see a tipping point where temperatures will run away, he is positing that feedbacks will be nearly

infinite (a phenomenon we can hear with loud feedback screeches from a microphone). But the science of this positive

climate feedback theory is far from settled . Just as skeptics are probably wrong to question the basic greenhouse gas

effect of CO2, catastrophic global warming advocates are wrong to over-estimate our understanding of these feedbacks. Not only may the feedback number not be high, but it might be negative , as implied by some

recent research, which would actually reduce the warming we would see from a doubling of CO2 to less than one degree Celsius. After all, most long-term stable natural systems (and that would certainly describe climate) are dominated by negative rather than positive feedbacks . Nice Theory, But What Do We Actually See Happening? At some point, theorizing becomes stale unless the theories are supported by observations. And the most important single observation relative to catastrophic man-made global warming theory is that the world has indeed warmed over the last century, by perhaps 0.7C, coincident with the period mankind has burned a lot of fossil fuels. Some skeptics have tried, relatively futilely I think,

to deny that the world is warming at all. Certainly skeptics have a lot of evidence that this measured warming may be exaggerated — there are some serious flaws in our surface temperature measurement system today and almost certainly much worse flaws in the numbers from, say, 1900 to which we are comparing current readings. But radically new technologies, such as satellites, that are not susceptible to these same flaws and coverage gaps have still measured an upward drift in temperatures over the last 30 years.

or magnitude of harmful global warming, then it must be because somehow action by the United States now will increase the probability that China, India, and similar industrializing countries will in the future find it in their interest to take costly action to reduce their own greenhouse gas emissions.

Consensus of experts agree no impact to warmingHsu ‘10 Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts , who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end- of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution

to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and

renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But

Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon

dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said.

Warming is slow and we’ll have time to adaptMendelsohn, Professor of Environmental Studies at Yale University, 9(Robert O., “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf) These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves

attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next

few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no

or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the

more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

No impact—IPCC models predict mild warming. Their scenarios rely on unrealistic population growth and a tenfold increase in coal usage. -Even if status quo natural gas and alt energy doesn’t solve, it’s still sufficient to avoid their impacts

Ridley, writer at the Financial Post, 14 [Matt, 6/19/14, The Financial Post, “Junk Science Week: IPCC commissioned models to see if global warming would reach dangerous levels this century. Consensus is ‘no’,” http://business.financialpost.com/2014/06/19/ipcc-climate-change-warming/, accessed 7/1/14, TYBG]The debate over climate change is horribly polarized. From the way it is conducted, you would think that only two positions are possible: that the whole thing is a hoax or that catastrophe is inevitable. In fact there is room for lots of intermediate positions,

including the view I hold, which is that man-made climate change is real but not likely to do much harm, let

alone prove to be the greatest crisis facing humankind this century. After more than 25 years reporting and commenting on this topic for various media organizations, and having started out alarmed, that’s where I have ended up. But it is not just I that hold this view. I share it with a very large international organization, sponsored by the United Nations and supported

by virtually all the world’s governments: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) itself. The IPCC commissioned four different models of what might happen to the world economy, society and technology in the 21st century and what each would mean for the climate, given a certain assumption about the atmosphere’s “sensitivity” to carbon dioxide. Three of the models show a moderate, slow and mild warming , the hottest of which leaves the planet just 2 degrees Centigrade warmer than today in 2081-2100. The coolest comes out just 0.8 degrees warmer. Now two degrees is the threshold at which warming starts to turn dangerous, according to the scientific consensus. That is to say, in three of the four scenarios considered by the IPCC, by the time my children’s children are elderly, the earth will still not have

experienced any harmful warming, let alone catastrophe. But what about the fourth scenario ? This is known as RCP8.5, and it produces 3.5 degrees of warming in 2081-2100. Curious to know what assumptions lay behind this model, I decided

to look up the original papers describing the creation of this scenario. Frankly, I was gobsmacked. It is a world that is very , very implausible . For a start, this is a world of “ continuously increasing global population ” so that there are 12 billion on the planet. This is more than a billion more than the United Nations expects, and flies in the face of the fact that the world population growth rate has been falling for 50 years and is on course to reach zero – i.e., stable population – in around 2070. More people mean more emissions. Second, the world is assumed in the RCP8.5 scenario to be burning an astonishing 10 times as much coal as today , producing 50% of its primary energy from coal, compared with about 30% today . Indeed, because oil is assumed to have become scarce, a lot of liquid fuel would then be derived from coal. Nuclear and renewa ble technologies contribute little, because of a “slow pace of innovation” and hence “fossil fuel technologies continue to dominate the primary energy portfolio over the entire time horizon of the RCP8.5 scenario.”

Energy efficiency has improved very little. These are highly unlikely assumptions. With abundant natural gas displacing coal on a huge scale in the United States today, with the price of solar power plummeting , with nuclear power experiencing a revival , with gigantic methane-hydrate gas resources being discovered on the seabed, with energy efficiency rocketing upwards, and with population growth rates continuing to fall fast in virtually every country in the world, the one thing we can say about RCP8.5 is that it is very , very implausible . Notice, however, that even so, it is not a world of catastrophic pain. The per capita income of the average human being in 2100 is three times what it is now. Poverty would

be history. So it’s hardly Armageddon. But there’s an even more startling fact. We now have many different studies of climate sensitivity based on observational data and they all converge on the conclusion that it is much lower than assumed by the IPCC in these models. It has to be, otherwise global temperatures would have

risen much faster than they have over the past 50 years. As Ross McKitrick noted on this page earlier this week, temperatures have not risen at all now for more than 17 years. With these much more realistic estimates of sensitivity (known as

“transient climate response”), even RCP8.5 cannot produce dangerous warming. It manages just 2.1C of warming

by 2081-2100. That is to say, even if you pile crazy assumption upon crazy assumption till you have an edifice of vanishingly small probability , you cannot even manage to make climate change cause minor damage in the time of our grandchildren, let alone catastrophe. That’s not me saying this – it’s the IPCC itself.

No biodiversity impactBrook 13 Barry Brook, Professor at the University of Adelaide, leading environmental scientist, holding the Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and is also Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide’s Environment Institute, author of 3 books and over 250 scholarly articles, Corey Bradshaw is an Associate Professor at the University of Adelaide and a joint appointee at the South

Australian Research and Development Institute, Brave New Climate, March 4, 2013, "Worrying about global tipping points distracts from real planetary threats", http://bravenewclimate.com/2013/03/04/ecological-tipping-points/

Barry Brook We argue that at the global-scale, ecological “tipping points ” and threshold-like “planetary boundaries” are improbable . Instead, shifts in the Earth’s biosphere follow a gradual, smooth pattern. This means that it might be impossible to define scientifically specific, critical levels of biodiversity loss or land-use change. This has important consequences for both science and policy. Humans are causing changes in ecosystems across Earth to such a degree that there is now broad agreement that we live in an epoch of our own making: the Anthropocene. But the question of just how these changes will play out — and especially whether we might be approaching a planetary tipping point with abrupt, global-scale consequences — has remained unsettled. A tipping point occurs when an ecosystem attribute, such as species abundance or carbon sequestration, responds abruptly and possibly irreversibly to a human pressure, such as land-use or climate

change. Many local- and regional-level ecosystems, such as lakes,forests and grasslands, behave this way. Recently however, there have been several efforts to define ecological tipping points at the global scale. At a local scale, there are definitely warning signs that an ecosystem is about to “tip”. For the terrestrial biosphere, tipping points might be expected if ecosystems across Earth respond in similar ways to human pressures and these pressures are uniform,

or if there are strong connections between continents that allow for rapid diffusion of impacts across the planet. These criteria are, however, unlikely to be met in the real world. First, ecosystems on different continents are not strongly connected . Organisms are limited in their movement by oceans and mountain ranges , as well as by climatic factors, and while ecosystem change in one region can affect the global circulation of, for

example, greenhouse gases, this signal is likely to be weak in comparison with inputs from fossil fuel combustion and deforestation. Second, the responses of ecosystems to human pressures like climate change or land-use change depend on local circumstances and will therefore differ between locations. From a planetary perspective, this diversity in ecosystem responses creates an essentially gradual pattern of change , without any identifiable tipping points. This puts into question attempts to define critical levels of land-use change or biodiversity loss scientifically. Why does this matter? Well, one

concern we have is that an undue focus on planetary tipping points may distract from the vast ecological transformations that have already occurred. After all, as much as four-fifths of the biosphere is today characterised by ecosystems that locally, over the span of centuries and millennia, have undergone human-driven regime shifts of one or more kinds. Recognising this reality and seeking appropriate conservation efforts at local and regional levels might be a more fruitful way forward for ecology and global change science. Corey Bradshaw (see also notes published here on ConservationBytes.com) Let’s not get too distracted by the title of the this article – Does the terrestrial biosphere have planetary tipping points? – or the potential for a false controversy. It’s important to be clear that the planet is indeed ill, and it’s largely due to us. Species are going extinct faster than they would have otherwise. The planet’s climate system is being severely disrupted; so is the carbon cycle. Ecosystem services are on the decline. But – and it’s a big “but” – we have to be wary of claiming the end of the world as we know it, or people will shut down and continue blindly with their growth and consumption obsession. We as scientists also have to be extremely careful not to pull concepts and numbers out of thin air without empirical support. Specifically, I’m referring to

the latest “craze ” in environmental science writing – the idea of “ planetary tipping points” and the related “planetary boundaries”. It’s really the stuff of Hollywood disaster blockbusters – the world suddenly shifts into a new “state” where some major aspect of how the world functions does an immediate about-face. Don’t get me wrong: there are plenty of localised examples of such tipping points, often characterised by something we call “hysteresis”. Brook defines hysterisis as: a situation where the current state of an ecosystem is dependent not only on its environment but also on its history, with the return path to the original state being very different from the original development that led to the altered state. Also, at some range of the driver, there can exist two or more alternative states and “tipping point” as: the critical point at which strong nonlinearities appear in the relationship between ecosystem attributes and drivers; once a tipping point threshold is crossed, the change to a new state is typically rapid and might be irreversible or exhibit hysteresis. Some of these examples include state shifts that have happened (or mostly likely will) to the cryosphere, ocean thermohaline circulation, atmospheric circulation, and marine ecosystems, and there are many other fine-scale examples of ecological systems shifting to new (apparently) stable states.

However, claiming that we are approaching a major planetary boundary for our ecosystems (including human society), where we witness such transitions simultaneously across the globe, is simply not upheld by evidence . Regional tipping points are unlikely to translate into planet-wide state shifts . The main reason is that our ecosystems aren’t that connected at global scales . The paper provides a framework against which one can test the existence or probability of a planetary tipping point for any particular ecosystem function or state. To date, the application of the idea has floundered because of a lack of specified criteria that would

allow the terrestrial biosphere to “tip”. From a more sociological viewpoint, the claim of imminent shift to some worse state also risks alienating people from addressing the real problems (foxes), or as Brook and colleagues summarise: framing global change in the dichotomous terms implied by the notion of a global tipping point could lead to complacency on the “safe” side of the point and fatalism about catastrophic or irrevocable effects on the other. In other words, let’s be empirical about these sorts of politically charged statements instead of crying “Wolf!” while the hordes of foxes steal most of the flock.

No WarNuclear war is still possible. It’ll escalate and lead to extinction —leading climatologists agree. Ozone destruction, famine, ice age, and meltdownsStarr 14 [Steven, Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility (www.psr.org) and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 5, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear War has No Winner,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-lethality-of-nuclear-weapons-nuclear-war-has-no-winner/5385611/AKG]

Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers,

UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war , including baseline scenarios fought with

merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals . They concluded that the

consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate[i]

and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer[ii]. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. [iii] These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race .[iv]

In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could

produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the

findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke , which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer

would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing

the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight , thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices[viii], including those in commercial

nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown ; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable . Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation”

are unrealistic . [ix] In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it

essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military –

emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,[xi] which can be launched with only a few minutes warning . [xii] Both the US and Russian

Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase”, which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds.

SolvencySMRs don’t solve warming Makhijani & Boyd 10 *Arjun, electrical and nuclear engineer who is President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research **Michele, former director of the Safe Energy Program at Physicians for, Staff Scientist at the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research

(“Small Modular Reactors No Solution for the Cost, Safety, and Waste Problems of Nuclear Power” http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/small-modular-reactors2010.pdf)

Efficiency and most renewable technologies are already cheaper than new large reactors. The long

time—a decade or more—that it will take to certify SMRs will do little or nothing to help with the global warming problem and will actually complicate current efforts underway . For example, the current schedule for commercializing the above-ground sodium cooled reactor in Japan extends to 2050, making it irrelevant to addressing the climate problem. Relying on assurances that SMRs will be cheap is contrary to the experience about economies of scale and is likely to waste time and money , while creating new safety and proliferation risks, as well as new waste disposal problems.

Can’t solve fast enough—no infrastructure and doesn’t reduce emissions -even if we triple output by 2050 only reduces growth of emissions by 20%

-solving requires building 1400 large scale reactors—replacement rates means construction emissions outweigh reductions

Smith 11

(Gar,Editor Emeritus of Earth Island Journal, a former editor of Common Ground magazine, a

Project Censored Award-winning journalist, and co-founder of Environmentalists Against War, NUCLEAR ROULETT: THE CASE AGAINST A“NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE” pg 18)

More than 200 new reactors have been proposed around the world but not enough reactors can be built fast enough to replace the world’s vanishing fossil fuel resources.2 Even if nuclear output could be tripled by 2050 (which seems unlikely in light of the industry’s record to date), this would only lower greenhouse emissions by 25 to 40 billion annual tons—12.5 to 20 percent of the reductions needed to stabilize the climate .3 The International Energy Agency estimates that renewables and efficiency measures could produce ten times these savings by 2050. The IEA estimates that cutting CO2 emissions in half by mid-century would require building 1,400 new 1,000-MW reactors —32 new reactors every year. But since it usually takes about 10 years from groundbreaking to atom-smashing, these reactors could not be constructed fast enough to prevent a n irreversible “ tipping” of world climate .This hardly seems feasible since the industry has only managed to bring 30 new reactors on-line over the past ten years. Of the 35 reactors the IEA listed as “under construction” in mid-2008, a third of these had been “under construction” for 20 years or longer. Some may never be completed. By contrast, a 1.5 MW wind turbine can be installed in a single day and can be operational in two weeks.4 Still, the pace of nuclear construction has picked up lately. In 2010, the number of reactor projects underway had ballooned to 66—with most located in China (27) and Russia (11). And it’s not just a matter of designing and building new reactors.The construction of 1,400 new nuclear reactors also would require building 15 new uranium enrichment plants, 50 new reprocessing plants and 14 new waste storage sites—a deal-breaker since the sole proposed U.S. storage site at Yucca Mountain is apparently dead.The cost of this additional nuclear infrastructure has been estimated at $3 trillion.5 Moreover, since the operating lifetime of these new

reactors would still be a mere 40 years, even if new construction was practical, quick and affordable, it would only “solve” the global-warming problem for another 40 years, at which point the plants would need to be decommissioned.

Won’t solve Squassoni 9

Sharon, Carnegie Endowment, Who's Right?: Climate Change Experts Debate Nuclear Energy, 12/10/9, http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/12/10/who-s-right-climate-change-experts-debate-nuclear-energy/1lii

First, Squassoni questions the practicality of switching to nuclear energy. Building sufficient nuclear capacity would take many years , while the need to reduce greenhouse gasses is immediate, she says. She argues the key to reducing energy consumption lies not just in replacing fuel but in improving energy efficiency. Switching to nuclear power would not immediately address emissions from other sources, such as cars, homes, businesses and industries. While she agrees that a sense of panic won’t speed the process of replacing fossil fuels with nuclear power, Squassoni believes the climate change issue is urgent enough to require faster solutions — the leaders of the G8 countries have set 2015 as the year when carbon dioxide emissions cannot rise any higher. She also argues that private financial investors have shown little interest in funding the high cost of nuclear plants and are more focused on smaller renewable projects that offer a faster return. In addition, the hazards of nuclear waste and the possible proliferation of nuclear fuel for weapons are major concerns. Efficiency, she says, is the fastest and safest way to reduce emissions.