AW AGID article on 'sustainable mining

8/7/2019 AW AGID article on 'sustainable mining'

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The emperor’s new clothes: sustainable mining?

ANDY WHITMORE

Mines and Community Network, 41 Thornhill Square, London N1 1BE, UK

(e-mail: [email protected])

Abstract: Over the last few years, the idea of ‘sustainable mining’ has, thanks to industrysponsorship, been working its way into the agenda of many international processes. There isnow a push in many countries to invite in multinational mining companies with the idea thatthere is a ‘new, sustainable mining’ that is different from the old, bad practices of the past.Yet what has actually changed in the industry to match this shift in rhetoric? From the per-spective of mine-affected communities, nothing seems to have changed. Their land is stillbeing taken from them without giving their free, prior and informed consent, and they aresuffering the same ill effects on their ways of life, health and environment. This paper

will illustrate, using case studies from the Philippines and West Papua, how under this rheto-ric, the mining industry ‘emperor’ has the same old naked ambitions. This paper intends tolook at how ‘sustainable mining’ is perceived from the viewpoint of mines-affected commu-nities and their supporters. Ideally a representative of such a community should be writingthis, but as this was not possible, I am writing this as a member of the editorial board of Mines and Communities (MAC). (MAC is a network of organizations across the worldseeking to empower mining-affected communities in their struggles against damaging pro-posals and projects. More information on Mines and Communities, including the membersof its editorial board, can be viewed at http://www.minesandcommunities.org.) Many of thecommunities MAC works with are made up of indigenous (or first, aboriginal) peoples, whohave been unfairly disadvantaged by mineral development on or near their land. Thepaper will therefore concentrate to some extent on the issues of indigenous communities.

Industry initiatives

Over the last few years, the idea of ‘sustainablemining’ has, thanks to mining industry sponsor-ship, been working its way onto the agenda of many international processes. The idea waseffectively born under the banner of the GlobalMining Initiative (GMI) in 1998, leading up tothe questionable insertion of the term ‘sustain-able mining’ into the post-Johannesburg plan of action at the World Summit on SustainableDevelopment (WSSD) in 2002. The industry’spreparation for, and indeed integration with the

processes of, the WSSD was partly a wake-upcall from its relative exclusion at the 1992 prede-cessor, the Earth Summit (MMSD 2002; Moody2002).

The GMI was initiated in a meeting of industryleaders and was based in London at Rio Tinto’shead office in St James Square. The founders of GMI included Rio Tinto, Anglo American,BHPBilliton, Freeport McMoRan, Newmontand WMC. These are among the largest compa-nies in the industry, and each has been frequentlycriticized over their own problematic environ-mental and social records (Moody 2002).

The GMI established the two-year researchand dialogue initiative entitled the Mines Min-erals and Sustainable Development (MMSD)project. This was followed by a global confer-ence and the formation of the InternationalCouncil of Mining and Metals (ICMM) –which is also based in London and featuresmany of the same companies – to better rep-resent the industry to its critics (MMSD 2002).

Despite an engagement with some, particu-larly Northern-based, NGOs, MMSD predictablywas widely criticized and boycotted by indigen-

ous peoples’ organizations, NGOs with expertiseon the issue and mine-affected communities, ascan be seen in the joint letter by the MineralPolicy Centre and others dated 2 August 2000(Nettleton et al. 2004). This is because, while itprojected itself as being consultative and inclus-ive, its framework, objectives and structure wereall unilaterally predetermined by the corporatesector. Even the members of the nominally inde-pendent Assurance Board (established to monitorrather than manage the process) were originallychosen unilaterally by industry, without thebroad consultations and self-selection processes

From: MARKER, B. R., PETTERSON, M. G., MCEVOY , F. & STEPHENSON, M. H. (eds) 2005. Sustainable MineralsOperations in the Developing World . Geological Society, London, Special Publications, 250, 233–242.0305-8719/05/$15.00 # The Geological Society of London 2005.



associated with a more credible multistakeholderprocess (Moody 2002).

The aims and outcomes of MMSD were there-fore tailored to the industry’s priority agenda of

linking mining to sustainable development, andaccording to critics did not reflect those of com-munities. This meant that, as argued by Moody(2002) in his paper ‘Sustainable DevelopmentUnsustained’, MMSD did not gain broad accep-tance or credibility as an independent body, andas a result the project failed to generate anymeaningful dialogue between those mostaffected by mining and those most responsible.MMSD, in its own conclusions, noted lack of trust as an important qualifier in its own historyand for future dialogue in the industry. Thisfailure stunted its capacity in terms of its statedgoals of engaging with critics (MMSD 2002;

Moody 2002).Even some within the industry, such as Philip

Crowson in a letter published in the MiningJournal, 12 April 2002, called MMSD the‘flawed outcome of a flawed process’. He findsits introductory pages ‘. . . no more than a recyclingof currently fashionable ideas and phrases, pre-ceded by an alarmist sketch of the world todayand laced with some crudely misleading economichistory.’ Crowson cannot stand the idea that theMMSD team has now ‘dignified’ NGOs as ‘civilsociety’. He deplores the ‘working assumption’that miners would need a ‘license to operate’through ‘multistakeholder engagement’ beforethey can lift a sod of other peoples soil, (Moody2002).

However, none of this has stopped the industryengaging with some large, Northern-basedNGOs, such as Conservation International andCARE International, much to the frustration of mines-affected communities, as these organiz-ations have no grassroots consent on which toenter into dialogues that will affect those com-munities (Moody 2001b; Choudry 2003). As aslight aside it is worth looking at MarcChapin’s examination of the tension betweenindigenous peoples and large conservation

organizations in an excellent article thatexposes just how environmental organizationsfrequently fall into the same arrogant traps asmultinational companies in dealing with theexpectations of local communities (Chapin2004). Nor has the MMSD project preventedsubsequent ‘dialogue’ processes (including thatbetween ICMM and IUCN concerning thefuture of mining exploration within ProtectedAreas) from repeating the same exclusion of the indigenous peoples whose lands were underdiscussion (ICMM/IUCN 2002). It has also notstopped the industry, aided by the World Bank,

promoting ‘sustainable mining’ within the liber-alization of various country mining codes, suchas the National Minerals Policy in the Philippines(Corpuz 2003).

London Declaration complaints

It is partly owing to the above industry initiat-ives that MAC was born. There was a meetingof community activists and their supporters inLondon in May 2001. London was chosenbecause it is increasingly seen as the centre of mining companies, mining financing (note therapid growth of mining stocks on London’sAIM market), and most importantly to theindustry-sponsored initiatives mentioned above.

A joint declaration came out of that meeting,

called the ‘London Declaration’, which formsthe basis for the following critiques of ‘sustain-able mining’ (MAC 2001).

The Declaration makes various demands uponthe mining industry and civil society, but fromthe point of view of this paper its most relevantsection is in how industry-sponsored initiativespromote at least four half-truths or myths.These are:

(1) the supposed need for more and moreminerals from ever more mines;

(2) the claim that miningcatalysesdevelopment;(3) the belief that technical fixes can solve

almost all problems; and(4) the inference that those opposed to mining

mainly comprise ignorant and ‘anti-development’ communities and NGOs.

I intend to look at each in turn to see how itexposes the fallacy of sustainable mining.

The supposed need for more and more

minerals from ever more mines

This is perhaps the key question; how can the

naked laws of supply and demand, in a growingworld of consumption, result in a sustainableextractive industry? In 1999 some 9.6 billiontons of marketable materials were dug out of the earth, nearly double the amount for 1970.This only accounts for minerals that reachmarkets, and not the unused and/or waste pro-ducts, or overburden. If you add this in, thenthe amounts removed are staggering. In 2000,mines around the world extracted some 900million tons of metal – and left behind some 6billion tons of waste ore (not including overbur-den). The Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea

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generated 200 000 tons of waste a day onaverage – more than all the cities in Japan,Australia and Canada combined (MMSD 2002,p. 243; Sampat 2003, p. 112).

It can be argued that at least part of theincrease in production is not just pure globaleconomic demand, but is a result of subsidiesprovided by government policies and the pro-motion of mining via International Finance Insti-tutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank. Thesubsidies that mining firms enjoy can come inthe form of pro-mining laws, which chargevery little in taxes or royalties, for example, the1872 U.S. mining law, or any of a number of newly introduced codes in developing countries.Taxpayers, who pick up the bills for cleaning upcostly mistakes, such as through the U.S. ‘super-fund’, can also subsidize mining. IFIs have

actively promoted mining in developingcountries through loans, investment guarantees,insurance covers and pressure on law making.Between 1995 and 1999 the World Bank spent close to US$6 billion to fund miningprojects around the world (Sampat 2003,pp. 123–124).

Based on figures from the late 1990s, on thenegative side mining consumed close to 10% of world energy, is responsible for 13% of sulphurdioxide emissions and, it is estimated, threatensnearly 40% of the world’s undeveloped tractsof forest. Yet it directly accounts for only 0.5%of employment and 0.9% of ‘gross worldproduct’. When considered as a ‘completebalance sheet’, it just does not look sustainable(Sampat 2003, p. 111).

Given these figures, there is definitely a logicand market for increased production of recycledmaterials (or even the use of current stockpiles –there is after all enough gold stockpiled to meetdemand for 17 years). About half of theworld’s lead comes from recycled sources, asdoes a third of aluminium, steel and gold.Energy savings of up to 70% are availablethrough recycling, not to mention the benefitsfrom reduced toxic emissions, as well as to occu-

pational health and safety.Yet, partly thanks to subsidies, companiessearch for new greenfield sites when so muchuseful metal lies in landfills (although somepilots on mining landfills are happening in theUnited States). These subsidies can also behidden ones, because it is very difficult to quan-tify any costs to air or water quality, the con-sumption of ‘free natural resources’ and theloss of alternative livelihoods. In the same waythat the heavily subsidized arms industry isbeing asked to transfer skills towards morepeaceful industries, so the corporate mining

industry should be looking towards switchingits skills and knowledge towards investing inrecycling (Sampat 2003, pp. 123–124; LehmanBrothers Inc. 2000).

The claim that mining catalyses

development

It is interesting that even in the 18th century,Adam Smith had already noted how capriciousthe benefits of mining were, when he said, ‘of all those expensive and uncertain projectswhich bring bankruptcy upon the greater partof the people that engage in them, there is nonemore ruinous than the search for new silver andgold mines. It is perhaps the most disadvanta-geous lottery in the world’ (Smith 1776).

There is now a well-published argument uponthe issue of mining’s contribution to developingcountries; a proper exploration of which wouldrequire an article many times the length of this one. Aside from the ‘boomtown’ effectcaused by short-term projects, often referred toaround a set of symptoms known as ‘Dutchdisease’, there are also the problems associatedwith extractive industries called the ‘miningcurse’. Mineral development, it is argued, hasparadoxically been shown to have a negativeeffect on economic growth in minerals-depen-dent developing countries, or at the very leastnot to benefit the poor in that country. Accord-ing to the United Nations, the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day in min-erals-exporting countries rose from 61% in1981 to 82% in 1999 (OXFAM 2003). Astudy from Britain’s Lancaster University con-cluded that mineral-driven, resource-richcountries were among the poorest economicperformers in a study from 1960 to 1993(Auty 1998).

Many economists consider it ‘intuitivelyobvious’ that mining is the vehicle to drive sus-tained economic growth to lift countries out of poverty. A recent World Bank report makes

this familiar case; ‘. . .

natural resources-basedactivities can lead growth for long periods of time. This is patently evident in the developmenthistory of natural resource-rich developedcountries, such as Australia, Finland, Sweden,and the United States. Mining was the maindriver of growth and industrialization in Austra-lia and the United States over more than a cen-tury. . .’ (Power 2002, pp. 4–7).

However, a recent publication from OXFAMAmerica, ‘Digging for Development’, debunksmany of these standard myths. The author,Thomas Michael Power (2002) shows how the

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idea that mining was an engine for growth incountries such as Canada, the United States andAustralia, and therefore can be so for othercountries, is simply not true. He shows how rela-

tively unimportant mining was for thosecountries, how their large geographical size andinternal markets assisted a diversified mineralsector and how they were effectively alreadymiddle income countries anyway. ProfessorPower stresses how these positive factors justdo not hold for most mineral-rich developingcountries, with most lucky to have even one of these characteristics. More importantly he noteshow in the last 20 years – with increased globa-lization leading to cheaper transportation pricesand more volatile markets – mineral-dependentcountries are faring even worse (Power 2002).

Although there has been an ongoing argument

between Professor Power and the World Bank over the figures used and the conclusions drawn,it is obvious to many that even if a country canbe seen to benefit, communities who are close tothe operation seldom seem to in comparison tothe costs that are imposed upon them. Researchhas shown that many of the poorest regionswithin countries are those associated withmining, from Bihar in India to the Appalachiancoal mine areas of the United States. An excellentexample is in Peru, where aside from a generalproof of theabove statementthereis oneprovince,Cajamarca, the site of Latin America’s largestgold mine, Yanacocha, which has, after over tenyears of mining, dropped from being the fourthpoorest province in the 1980s to the secondpoorest. Also, certain previously disadvantagedgroups, such as women or indigenous peoples,suffer the greatest negative effects, as confirmedby the extensive research undertaken for theWorld Bank’s Extractive Industries Review(Moody & Flood 1997; Salim 2003; Glennie2004, p. 11–12).

It is, of course, arguable why this should be,when claims are constantly made of the benefitsof jobs and infrastructure that mining can bringto local communities. Although there is some

obvious circumstantial evidence that miningtends to take place in already remote and oftenmountainous areas, there is an argument thatnotes the potential damage to the environmentand loss of land that leads to the loss of liveli-hoods. Also, the point that taxes paid to somenational governments for community benefitsimply does not make it back to the communitynot only holds up to as much empirical inspec-tion as the subject of corruption can, but alsostresses the role that corruption, as well as con-flict, seems to play in the ‘resource curse’(Jaques 2003; Nettleton et al. 2004).

The belief that technical fixes can solve

almost all problems

The corporate mining industry is exceedinglyquick to herald beneficial improvements intechnology, which are promoted as the productsof, or associated with, large multinational com-panies. However, history has shown us thateven if beneficial, these technologies are notalways necessarily used, as costs can sometimesbe prohibitive. For example, in the case of Ok Tedi, when confronted with problems of buildinga tailings dam in a high rainfall and geologicallyunstable area, BHPBilliton opted to dump wastestraight into the local river system, which hasbeen the source of ongoing legal action since.It seems that at no point when a reasonable tech-nical solution could not be found did the simple

solution not to mine in such an area occur tothe company (Kirsch 2000).There are still arguments over so-called new

solutions. A good example is submarine tailingsdisposal, which in the developing world startedin Papua New Guinea and at the urging of indus-try is spreading to other Asia-Pacific countries,despite serious civil society opposition. This isa relatively untested technology, and alreadyobjections and problems have been noted in theLihir, Misima and Buyut Bay mines. In thecase of the latter, the company responsible,Newmont, is at the time of writing the subjectof civil and criminal proceedings, and had five

executives detained in jail for questioning, forthe alleged poisoning of residents of the epon-ymous bay via submarine tailings disposal(Moody 2001a).

If you look back over the period when sustain-able mining has been on the agenda, the two out-standing technological developments have beenthe extraction of minerals from lower-gradeores and heap leaching. Lower-grade ore, openpit mining produces less ore for energy con-sumed and waste produced, compared to under-ground mining. It also employs fewer peopleand obviously is less attractive to communities,

who stand to lose more of their otherwise pro-ductive land, and run a greater risk of airbornepollution (Sampat 2003). It is difficult to seehow this has encouraged ‘sustainability’.

Heap leaching, heap leach SX-EW and HighPressure Acid Leaching (HPAL) benefit indus-try, but not necessarily the environment or localcommunities. In fact it could be argued thatsome of these processes have opened up newregions for mining where it has not been pre-viously practical. The MMSD report commendsHPAL, as an example, for its lower capital andoperating costs and superior metal recovery,

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which ‘may have a significant effect on thelocation and nature of nickel mining in thefuture’ (although in hindsight constant problemsat mine sites have left the whole initial HPAL

hype somewhat tarnished). There is absolutelyno recognition that by opening up new areas of laterite (as dramatized via the Crew Mindoroproject in the Philippines) this ‘new location’factor may sound the death knell for traditionalfarming or fishing communities (MMSD 2002,p. 29).

It is difficult to see how these types of technol-ogy are really helping sustainable development.If technical fixes are the answer to everything,then we should have seen reductions in thenumber of tailings dam problems in the periodthat ‘sustainable mining’ has been in discussion.Recent research by Indigenous Peoples Links on

tailings dams in the Philippines, and by theWorld Information Service on Energy in Australiaon uranium mines, seems to suggest that this hasnot happened (Nettleton et al. 2004; Wise 2005).

As a good example of where even the largestand best-equipped companies have technical pro-blems, the Kelian gold mine in Indonesia, whichlasted for less than a decade, is closing before itsscheduled decommissioning, and has left RioTinto with an enormous problem of rehabilita-tion (including not being able to return its minesite to productive agricultural use as undertakenin the EIA) (McDonald & Ross 2003).

Finally,if technology is really improvingsafety,then surely companies should be putting theirdollars where the their company reports are, andagreeing to the ‘polluter pays’ and ‘precautionary’principle. However, companies have been invest-ing much time and energy lobbying against thisprinciple, despite civil society worries that somefees for polluting can be so low as to actuallymake it affordable for the polluter to just ‘payand go’ (Corpuz 2003; REHN 2003).

The inference that those opposed to

mining mainly comprise ignorant and

‘anti-development’ communitiesand NGOs

It is important to stress that many of the groupsthat MAC works with are not ‘anti-mining’ perse, and many work with, or are, miners them-selves (notably small-scale or artisanal miners).However, their dealings with the corporatemining industry to date have often made thosesame groups suspicious or hostile of the inten-tions of the industry.

As previously alluded to, there is a perceptionthat the mining industry is using bodies of

engagement, such as the MMSD, to seek outnorthern – often environmental – NGOs, withwhich it feels it can work. This tactic is fre-quently used to isolate those who are critical of

larger scale mining, but the worst part of thesituation is that those organizations seeking toengage are then taken to represent ‘civilsociety’ positions on mining and therefore tospeak on behalf of communities who havenever endorsed such a position. Understandingand dealing with the different groups within‘civil society’, and as a result dealing directlywith affected communities, is essential to creat-ing real trust (Moody 2001b).

The key question is who has the right to makethe decision over the future of communities:companies, governments, NGOs or the commu-nities themselves? In any decision-making

process there must be the concept of free, priorand information consent (FPIC). With indigen-ous peoples this must take account of collectivedecision making. Respect for FPIC, alongside ahuman rights-based view of development, wasstrongly recommended in the authoritativeExtractive Industries Review (Salim 2003,pp. 21–24, 52–53, 61–64).

It is crucial that corporate mining representa-tives understand what this means. It means iden-tifying and dealing fairly with all the affectedcommunities from the very conception of aproject. It also means accepting a ‘no’ to aproject, if after fully and transparently explainingthe costs and the benefits, that is what the com-munity wishes.

Yet, so far there has been a history of the abuseof communities’ right to consent in order topromote projects. In order to explore this furtherit is worth concentrating on two specific areas:the first is a study of the types of abuse of suchconsent, focussing on examples across thePhilippines. The second case study is lookingspecifically at the Freeport mine in West Papua/Irian Jaya.

The abuse of FPIC in the Philippines

The Philippines is a good example to concentrateon with regard to the abuse of FPIC, especiallywith regard to indigenous peoples, for a numberof reasons. Mining, mainly for gold, copper,chromite and nickel, is widespread in thecountry. It has, however, a negative legacy –including the famous 1996 Marcopper tailingsdam disaster – which has led to widespreadcommunity opposition to ongoing or proposedmining projects. The country also has around10 million indigenous peoples (approximately15% of the population) who retain a close link




with their land and traditions, and many of whomlive in the more remote areas where mining is totake place (Nettleton et al. 2004).

This potential clash between mining and the

wishes of indigenous peoples is played out inthe field of law. First, there are pro-mininglaws that have been enacted by the PhilippineGovernment in order to encourage overseasinvestment, such as the 1995 Mining Act, 2003National Minerals Policy and 2004 MineralAction Plan. However, the Philippines also hasarguably the most advanced law with regard tothe rights of indigenous peoples. The 1997 Indi-genous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) is modelledon the provisions of the UN Draft Declarationof Indigenous Peoples Rights, and states thatbefore exploration or extraction rights aregranted, the whole community must be informed

and agree to the decision (Corpuz 2003;Nettleton et al. 2004).

The two laws are often diametrically opposed,even to the point of having separate land uses,under both Acts, covering the same piece of ground. The courts, and subsequent legislation,are now trying to unravel the inconsistenciesof the situation. At present the cash-strappedPhilippine Government’s stated priority isapplying pressure in favour of mining, to thepoint where the operating regulations of IPRAare being re-written with a mind to ‘fast-track’mineral operations.

However, it is not just in legal terms, but prac-tically on the ground, that indigenous peoples arelosing out despite the theoretical rights they holdunder IPRA. There are numerous examples of breaches of good faith or duplicity, where theconsent is either not freely given, not informed,not done prior to commencement or in somecases consent is not given at all (Nettletonet al. 2004). The following are just a smallnumber of illustrations of such behaviour.

Western Mining Corporation (WMC) alleg-edly tried to persuade leaders of the B’laanpeople to endorse its Tampakan mine inMindanao by giving them gifts, building tribal

halls, employing relatives and taking them ontrips where they received lavish entertainment.Despite this, some community elders refused toagree to the mine, with one leader withdrawinghis consent after visiting an existing mine andseeing its environmental impact. On oneoccasion, as part of its negotiations with theB’laan, a joint team from WMC and the govern-ment presented a 75-page Memorandum of Agreement to the community in English. TheGovernment lawyer described the content of the agreement to community leaders in roughoral translation and advised them to sign. The

whole negotiation was completed in a one-daysession (Muntz 2001).

On the subject of bribery, Councillor PeterDuyapat of Didipio, Nueva Vizcaya, is among

several indigenous leaders who make claimsof attempted bribery. In exchange for stoppinghis vocal opposition to the entry of the miningcompany Climax Arimco, he says he was‘offered by the company a 20-hectare farm inBayombong, in Nueva Vizcaya, a sum of money that I could not spend in my lifetime,a house and lot, and a Pajero land cruiser’(Colchester 2003).

In Pagadian, on Zamboanga del Sur, British-based mining company Rio Tinto called ameeting to talk about its mining applications inthe region. The consultation took place in theprovincial capital, far from indigenous commu-

nities, and less than one week’s notice wasgiven. However, assisted by civil societygroups, more than 300 Subanon did attend to reg-ister their strong and unanimous opposition to theplans. Despite this hostile response, the local RioTinto manager told the Philippine Governmentthat the company had fulfilled its obligationto consult, and that the meeting had been ‘verysuccessful’ (Nettleton et al. 2004).

Finally, another tactic is to undermine the indi-genous leaders who oppose mining. In Mindoro,the Norwegian company Mindex – now part of UK-based Crew Development Corporation –cooperated with regional NCIP (the governmentbody charged with indigenous rights) officials toestablish a new indigenous organization, Kabilo-gan, within their claim area. There were,however, already two other indigenous organiz-ations who held prior, officially registered,ancestral domain claims to the land covered bythe concession claim of Mindex. Despite strongand repeated protest from local organizationsand elected officials, the NCIP chose to recog-nize and deal only with the newly formed Kabi-logan. The project was endorsed as havinggained consensual free prior informed consent,and a licence was granted. At least in this case

the licence was later revoked following an unpre-cedented level of local protest (Gariguez 1999).

The Grasberg mine in West Papua

Moving south across the Asia-Pacific region, thehuge Freeport-McMoRan Grasberg mine wascarved out of the sacred Graberg mountain inWest Papua (otherwise known as the Indonesian-occupied province of Irian Jaya). Several featuresmark it out as worth concentrating on from thepoint of view of community resistance to pro-jects. The first is its size, as by the turn of the

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century it was set to become the world’s biggestsingle mine. Secondly, it produces more minewaste than any other mine on the planet – aver-aging over 200 000 tonnes a day deposited

straight into the local river system (Evans et al.2001; Moody 2005).However, from the perspective of community

rights, it is the extreme repression meted out byarmed forces against the local indigenouspeoples around the mine site – on whose landit was constructed – that is most shocking.When the American company Freeport arrivedin the late 1960s, the Amungme and Komoropeople were living subsistence lifestyles in alandscape full of spiritual significance. Asidefrom the impact of the pit, waste and technology,the mine has brought mass migration andIndonesian soldiers and police, provisioned and

paid for by the company with a mandate toprotect it. There was no ‘good neighbour’scheme adopted, no attempt at consultation. Free-port simply arrived, reinforced by Indonesianmilitary power, and imposed itself upon theoccupied people nearby without their consent.

Since that time, the human rights abuses havebeen widespread and well documented. Peacefulprotest gave way to resistance, which provoked‘counter insurgency’ operations and an escalatingconflict. The mine has become a lightning rod forthe armed Free Papua Movement (OPM), andindependence struggles of the West Papuanpeoples. Yet the main people who suffer as aresult are the unarmed, local community aroundthe mine (Evans et al. 2001; Moody 2005).

It is interesting to note that the first contract of work signed between Indonesia and Freeport –to mine the associated Ertsberg copper deposit –took place two years before the United Nationsrecognized Indonesian sovereignty over WestPapua. The contract was the first to be signedby a multinational corporation with the SuhartoNew Order Government, and was to set apattern of American support for the regime, inprotection of its business interests, despite thehuman rights violations and corruption of the

Suharto dictatorship.There were belated attempts to engage withthe local communities. Seven years after theirarrival, the company was forced into a three-way meeting with the Amungme communityand the provincial government. This led to the1974 January Agreement, wherein Freeportpledged to construct facilities, includinga school and health clinic, if indigenous land-owners gave their approval for the mine (Evanset al. 2001).

However, despite the agreement, for the next20 years the land grabbing without consent, and

forced resettlement, continued and expanded. Itwas in 1995 that community members under-stood for the first time that they had, accordingto government records, ceded all their ancestral

rights in the Timika area (nearly one millionhectares) to the government for transmigrationsettlers (migrants from Java) associated withthe mining.

The local landowners have been strugglingsince that first agreement to have their concernsfor compensation and an end to the environ-mental and human rights abuses effectivelyaddressed. They have appealed to the IndonesianGovernment, the United States Government andcourts, the United Nations and directly to themanagers and shareholders of Freeport, and itspartner Rio Tinto.

The company’s response has been to increase

the amount of money offered to local commu-nities – namely through a ‘one per cent fund’for local development. Although apparently agenerous offer, it does not address the concernsof the people over their rights and the destructionbeing wrought – and therefore is generally seenas a belated bribe. Inevitably, the decision overwhether to accept the offer, and even how itshould be distributed, created more divisions inthe community, leading to the deaths of 18people in an inter-ethnic conflict over how themoney would be distributed.

Eventually, for that reason, a local leader withsome credibility, Tom Beanal, with huge reluc-tance decided to sit on PT Freeport’s board of commissioners in June 1999 to attempt to mitigatethe damage the money was doing in his commu-nity. What he says of this bitter decision sumsup the feeling of powerlessness in so many com-munities faced with huge company pressure:‘What Freeport has done to me is to present mewith a limited choice, prepared by the company,so that I was not able to choose freely, but wasalways obliged to choose what was desired byFreeport. People see me as working with Freeportnow’ (Evans et al. 2001, p. 88).

Statement from John Rumbiak

Given the history of the Grasberg mine, and thefact I am not a direct community representative,it would be useful to quote at some length JohnRumbiak of ELSHAM, a human rights groupbased in West Papua. It is important to notewhat he has to say of the Grasberg mine, andits effect on the local Amungme people, butalso his conclusions on the ‘right to say no’.

In its 1967 contract of work, [Freeport] was thefirst foreign investor to enter into a [newly




defined business] agreement with Suharto’s NewOrder regime [in Indonesia]. The company gaveitself broad powers to resettle local indigenouspopulations whose traditional lands thecompany seized free of charge for its operations.

It also gave itself, in writing its own contract of work with the Indonesian government, thepower to take, free of charge, whatever naturalresources it required for its operations.

In the three decades that Freeport has operatedin Papua, the company has single-handedly suc-ceeded in establishing its own fiefdom. With theassistance of the Indonesian armed forces, paidby Freeport to safeguard its operations, thecompany decides who can enter the area sur-rounding its mine and who cannot. Althoughthere are commercial flights in and out of Timika, the main town near the mine, visitorshave been deported and blacklisted for attemptingto be in the area without Freeport’s permission.

In September 1995, Indonesia’s National Com-mission on Human Rights concluded that clearand identifiable human rights violations hadoccurred in and around Freeport’s project area,including indiscriminate killings, torture, andinhuman or degrading treatment, unlawful arrestand arbitrary detention, disappearance, excessivesurveillance, and destruction of property. Thecommission noted that these violations ‘aredirectly connected to [the Indonesian army]acting as protection for the mining business of PT Freeport Indonesia’.

To put an end to these dynamics of destructionand violence, the international community –particularly international investors – must, first

and foremost, recognize indigenous commu-nities’ basic rights to chart their own developmentpaths, to manage their own resources, to pursuetheir traditional livelihoods and cultures, and tosay NO to multinational operations on theirlands. The failure to respect communities’ basicright to “just say no” exists at the heart of thenexus of human rights violations, environmentaldegradation and conflict (Rumbiak 2003).

Conclusion

The truth is that sustainability implies somethingquite different depending on which side of the

bulldozer you are on. Attempts by the industryto green-wash itself as a new, improved, sustain-able industry simply will not wash, as even somecorporate mining cheerleaders, such as PhilipCrowson as mentioned earlier, have pointedout. Those at the other side of the bulldozer caneasily see that the emperor is naked, and themore he insists it is not so, the further away isan honest dialogue.

To emphasize this point, it is worth finishingwith a quote from an Indian colleague who wasrecently questioning the use of the term ‘stake-holder’. ‘The meaning of “stakeholder” got

ruined the day it got coined by Rio Tinto, amajor mining multinational corporation, to giveitself legitimacy and pose its demands of some-body else’s land as reasonable. . . The stake-

holder engagement process is purported to bean exchange of information and views betweenall parties concerned by one project. In fact, a“stakeholder engagement process” stands forcommunities being continually told of compa-nies’ plans and invited to modify them. Butit does not mean that these communitiesare permitted to reject the projects per se. Itdoes not mean that they are empowered topresent their own development plans’ (pers.comm. 2003).

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Documents

AW AGID article on 'sustainable mining