AvR Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness Routledge Encyc

8/7/2019 AvR Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness Routledge Encyc

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MOMENTARINESS, BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF

possessed by the blind are identical to thosepossessed by the sighted.)W. (1765) New Essays on Human Under-standing, trans. and ed: P. Remnant and 1. Bennett,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. (Acommentary on Locke's Essay, unpublished inLeibniz's lifetime, which contains an excellenttreatment of the Molyneux problem on pages136-8).

1. (1688) 'Essai philosophique concernantl'Entendement ou l'on montre quelle est l'etenduedes connaissances certaines, et la maniere dontno us y parvenons', Bibliotheque Universelle etHistorique, January-March: 49-142, Amsterdam,ed. 1. Le Clerc. (Locke's first major publication inthe journal of his Swiss friend Jean Le Clerc, whomhe met in The Netherlands. It is a substantialof his as yet unpublished Essayconcerning Human Understanding and often re. ferred to witli the term Abiege, because it was laterrepublished separately and translated into Englishin 1692 as an extract of a book entitled APhilosophical Essay upon Human Understanding.)

- (1689) Essay concerning Human Understanding,ed. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.(Locke's magnum opus, breathtaking in its scopeand depth, still worth consulting on every topic itdiscusses. The second edition appeared in 1694.)W. (1688) Letter to Locke of 7 July 1688,in E.S. de Beer (ed.) The Correspondence of JohnLocke,'Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, vol. 3, 482,letter no. 1064.- (1692) Dioptrica Nova, London: BenjaminTooke. (A treatise in the tradition of similar worksby Kepler and Descartes, which is mainly devoted'to the physical aspects of optics, containing alsoseveral remarks on the psychology of vision.)The Correspondence of John Locke,vol. 5, ed. E.S. de Beer, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1974. (Letter 1984 (pages 494-6) fromMolyneux to Locke, quotes in full the interestingletter by Synge -later Archbishop ofTuam - whichanticipates several later objections to Locke's reply.)

MENNO LlEVERS

DOCTRINE OFof the Buddhist dOctrine ofmomenlariness is

the nature of time. but existence within time. RatheriziJlg tilne into nlOmenls, it atomizes phenom-temporally by dissecting them into II succession of

discrete momentary entities. Its fundamental proposition is that everything passes out ofexistence as soon asit has originated and in this sense is momentary. As.anentity vanishes. it gives rise to a new entity ofalmost thesame nature which originates immediately afterwards.Thus, there is an uninterrupted flow of causallyconnected momentary entities of nearly the samenature. the so-called continuum (santana). Theseentities succeed each other so fast that the processcannot be discerned by ordinary perception. Becauseearlier and later entities within one continuum arealmost exactly alike. we come to conceive, ofsomethingas a temporally extended entity even though the factthat 'it is in truth nothing but a series of causallyconnected momentary entities. According to this doctrine. the world (including the sentient beings inhabitingit) is at every moment distinct from the world in theprevious or next' moment. It is, however, linked to thepast ,and future by the law of.causalit)J in so far as aphenomenon usually engenders a phenomenon of itskind when it perishes, so that the world originating inthe next moment reflects the world in the precedingmoment.

At the root ofBuddhism lies the (never questioned)conviction that everything that has originated is boundto perish and is therefore, with the exception offactorsconducive to enlightenment, ultimately a source offrustration. There is no surviving textual material thatdocuments how this law of impe.rmanence came to beradicalized in terms ofmomentariness. It seems that bythe fourth century the doctrine of momentariness hadalready assumed its flnal form. Characteristically, thedebate became more and more dominated by epistemological questions, while the metaphysical aspect fadedinto the backgroundI Exposition2 Relevance3 Development4 Doctrinal background5 Proofs

ExpositionThe doctrine of momentariness entails that entitiesare too shortlived to undergo change. Thus, if anentity has always engendered a new entity of exactlythe same kind and with exactly the same properties,the worlds arising at every moment anew would beidentical, so that there could be no evolution. ThiS,however, is not the case because the process ofreproduction of a ,given entity may be manipulatedby outside factors in such a way that the newly c r e a t ~ d entity differs qualitatively from the preceding entity, Ifexposed to fire, for instance, it wood entity does not

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give rise to an identical wood entity when it perishes,but to a wood entity which bears the mark ofimpairment by lire and so is slightly charred.(According to later parlance, the wood as the maincause forms, together with the fire as a subsidiarycause, a causal complex which produces the slightlycharred wood entity.) Thus, change is not constitutedby the transmutation of persisting entities, but by thequalitative difference between earlier and later entitieswithin a series.

Not only the transformation of series but also theircessation (that is, what is ordinarily conceived of asthe utter annihilation of temporally extended objects),is caused _by an external agent, which affects theprocess of reproduction of the object exposed to it insuch a way that this process comes to a completestandstill. Hence, in the case ofmu(der, the victim diesbecause the murderer affects the fmal moment of the--- breath of life (prara), that IS, the vital principleaccounting for the body's animation, in such a waythat i t fails to reproduce itself. Since the final moment(like ail preceding ones) passes out of existenceautomatically, murder is, microscopically speaking,

not destruction but the interception of the process ofreproduction. In this way the teaching that all entitiespass out of existence spontaneously without aepend- -ing for this upon any external cause is recOnciled withthe observation on a macroscopic level that wood isburut byfrre, or that one dies when knifed by amurderer. .Independently of the doctrine of momentariness,the Buddhists, like many other Indian schools, alsodissected everything spatially into atoms (see MAT-TER, INDIAN CONCEPTIONS OF). Thus, in the finalanalysis, the world is made up of momentary atoms;. which by their spatial arrangement and by their'concatenation with earlier and later atoms of thesame kind, give rise to the illusion of persistingcompact things. This analysis of existence can beillustrated by referring, anachronistically, to cinematography. Just as the rapid projection of distinctpictures evokes the illusion of continuous action onthe screen, so the fast succession of distinct momentary entities gives rise to the erroneous impressionthat the world around us (and we ourselves) existcontinuously without undergoing destruction andbeing recreated every moment. Similarly, as thechange of events on the screen is caused by thequalitative difference between earlier and later pictures on the IiIm reel, so the change in the world isbrought about by the qualitative difference betweenearlier and later entities. Moreover, as people vanishfrom the screen because they are not featured in thesubsequent frame, so things cease to exist becausethey stop reproducing themselves_ Finally, just as each470

projected picture only consists of differently shadedpoints, which by their specific arrangement give riseto the perception of composite shapes, so the worldaround us consists of nothing but distinct atomswhich are arranged in such a way that they convey theimpression of compact bodies.2 RelevanceThe Buddhist doctrine of momentariness does notchallenge our experiences of macroscopic events assuch, but only our interpretation of: these events on amicroscopic level. The claim that macroscopic objectsare constituted by a succession of distinct momentaryunits only affects the intuitive conception of theseobjects as self-identical units (think of the notion ofan uninterrupted line in contrast to one made up ofdistinct but contiguous points), but it does not affectthe question of how these macroscopic objects behave,/ whatever. their analysis on a microscopic level.The doctrine ofmomentariness was not viewed as apurely metaphysicaf theory without practical .. relevance. On the contrary, the contemplation of theconstant rise and fall of phenomena was employed toinduce a particularly poignant experience of theirimpermanence, thus revealing the unsatisfactorynature of all existence. Moreover, in a Mahayanacontext this contemplation served as a tool forundermining (but no t negating) the substantialexistence of phenomena. However, since only ad-vanced yogins seem to have been able to pet,ceivemomentariness directly, the soteriological significanceof this doctrine remains very limited. This e'Xplainswhy it only played a marginal role in the wider contextof Buddhist spirituality.3 DevelopmentThe doctrine of momentariness is postcanonic andmay have originated in the first century. It is for thefirst time presupposed in the Vibhti,a (both in theChinese translation by Xuanzang (Hsiian-tsang) andby Buddhavarman) of the Sarvastivadins, one of themajor Hlnayana schools of Buddhism. In t ~ i s scholastic compendium, the better part of WhIChwas probably compiled in the second century, the-momentariness of all phenomena is not treated as atopic in its own right, but is frequently taken forgranted when dealing with other issues.Doxographical reports and other evidence confirmthe impression that it was in the milieu of . theSarvastivadins that all phenomena, more preCIselyall conditioned entities (saI!lskrta, salJ1skiira), c ~ m e tobe looked upon as momentary_ (The Sarvastlvadimtreated space and two forms of suppression of certalll


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, factors as unconditioned entities (asGf!lskrta) whichhave never been created and, hence, are not subject tothe law of impermanence, hence the specification atthis point that momentariness only applies to conditioned entities and not to all phenomena.) Althoughthe Sarvastivadins reduced the duration of allphenomena to a moment, they still conceived of theirexistence much in the same way as they had donebefore the introduction oCthe doctrine, insisting thateven within one moment they first originate, thenpersist and decay and finally perish. This treatmentviolated the common conception of the moment( k ~ a l ) a ) as the shortest conceivable unit of time andconsequently was rejected by the D a r ~ t a n t i k a s andSautrantikas, who are closely related to the Sarvas-, tivadins and may have evolved from them. These twoschools argued that contradictory events cannot takeplace within one moment. From this they concludedthat all things perish as soon as they have originated.Since destruction was conceived of as the spontaneous cessation of existence and not as a timeconsuming process, the existence of entities wasreduced to mere acts of. origination, flashes intoexistence. ' """ . , ': . ' . .

With this radicalization of the instantaneousnatli're o f . e x i s t e n ~ thedoctrlne of momentarinessassumed its firialform:Such a form was adopted bythe Yogacaras, one of the tWo main Indian schools ofMahayana Buddhism, and came to be known byother Buddhists and non-Buddhists. .The Yogacaraswith a Mahayana orientation, however, only aCJ


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that everything changes all the time and thus undergoes origination and destruction at every moment.This argument rests on the presupposition that anyform of transformation implies the substitution of oneentity for another. This proof from change reflects thepresumable doctrinal background underlying theformation of the doctrine of momentariness. Third,it is argued that everything has to perish as soon as ithas originated because, otherwise it would persisteternally. This would be at odds with the law ofimpermanence. The argument rests on the presupposition that destruction cannot be brought about fromwithout and that it is impossible for an entity toperish on its own account after it has persisted as thiswould require a change of nature. The latterpresupposition reflects the view that self-identicalentities cannot change.VASUBANDHU (fourth-fifth century) marks thegradual transition between the earlier phase when .the debate was still confined to Buddhism and theJater phase when it was carried out between Buddhistsand non-Buddhists. Vasubandhu. only adopted thethird type of proof, deducing momentariness from thespontaneity of destruction. He developed this ideafurther with the argument that destruction cannot becaused since, as mere nonexistence, it does not qualifyas an effect. Up to the time of DHARMAKIRTI(c.600-60) andto a lesser extent thereafter, this proofof momentariness, the so-called inference fromperishability (vini'iSitviinumiina), dominated the controversy.

With Dharmakirti, the doctrine entered a newphase. He developed a new type of proof, the socalled inference from existence (sattviinumiina), thatderives the momentariness of all entities (withoutpresupposing their impermanence) directly from thefact that they exist. On the basis of the premise thatexistence entails causal efficiency, Dharmakirti demonstrates that all existing things have to bemomentary as it is impossible for nonmomentaryentities to function as efficient causes. This impossibility derives from the idea that, if the entities alreadyproduce their effect in the first moment, they alsohave to produce it again and again at all subsequentof their existence (a situation which is clearly absurd), becausefrom their nature in the first momentthey be different entities). Nor is it possible for the entities to d i s c h a r ~ they were not able to }produce their effect completely from the beginning,neither should they be able to do so later as this wouldentail a change of nature. This argument is also basedon the premise that one and the same entity cannotchange its properties.The inference from existence became more prominent than the inference from perishability, although it

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*Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to proofread the finaldraft. Hence my correction here of a mistake which must have occurredin the editorial process. (AvR)

never superseded it completely. Its prominence can beexplained partly by the logical peculiarity Of thisproof which gave rise to an epistemological debateabout the correct form of a valid syllogism. Sincemomentariness is to be proved for everything, allentities are the subject of inference (pak.a). Thus, theinference from existence fails to fulfil two of the threeclassical conditions (/rairiipya) for a valid syllogism,namely a positive and negative exemplification of thelogical nexus (vyiipll) between the reason (to beexistent) and the argued property (to be momentary)outside the subject (see INFERBNCE, INDIAN THE-ORIES OF).Among other responses, this problem led to themodification of the conditions of a syllogism in suSh away that those vyiip/is also became accepted as validwhere the logical relation between reason and arguedproperty is not induced from. other cases.. This

solution was already developed by Dharmakirtihimself, however, it was ne/pected until the time ?fRatnakarasanti (eTeventh century). He argued that Inthose syllogisms where the proving property isintrinsic to the subject (svabhiivahe/u), the logicalnexus is to be established by demonstrating that theproving property cannot inhere in a: locus that islacking the argued property.Frequently, ,as a corollary of these proofs' ofmomentariness, the Brahmanical. arguments againstthis doctrine are refuted. The most prominentargument - that the recognition of phenomenadisproves their contended momentariness - is invalidated by the contention that recognition is a mixtureof perception and memory and does no t thereforequalify as a valid means of knowledge (pramiilJa). Therelated argument, that the mind cannot be a merestream of momentary mental entities because memoryand the discernment of causal relationships presuppose an enduring subject, is rejected. It is so on thegrounds that the knowledge of the past is, py theprinciple of causal concatenation, passed on from onemental entity to the next. Thus, it is transmitted downto the present moment in a way which we maycompare to the transmission of historic data fromgeneration to generation.

Over the centuries the debate on the doctrine ofmomentariness developed to such an extent thatRatnaklrti (eleventh century) felt the need to deal withthe inference from perishability, the inference fr?mexistence and the refutation of the proof of duratIOneach in a separate treatise.See also: BUDlliiISM, ABHIDHARMIKA SCHOOLS OF;BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY, INDIAN; MUJO;POTENTIALITY, INDIAN THEORIES OF

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References and further readingThe pertinent textual material has to be accessed inthe following studies where it is presen ted in reliabletranslations (in English, French, or Gennan) whichcan also be consulted by readers without Indologicaltraining.Mimaki, K. (1976) La Refutation bouddhique de laPermanence des Choses (sthirasiddhidii_alJa) et laPreuve de la Momentaneile des choses( k ~ a l J a / j g a s i d d h i ) (The Buddhist Refutation of thePermanence of Things and the Proof of theMomentariness of Things), Paris: Publications deI'institut de civilisation indienne, fasc. 41. (Dealswith later proofs of the doctrine of momentariness.)Oetke, C. (1993) 'Bemerkungen rur buddhistischenDoktrin der Momentanheit des Seienden. DhannakIrtis Sattvanumana' (Remarks on the BuddhistDoctrine of Momentariness. Dhannakirti's Sattvanumana (Inference from Existence, Wiener 8tudien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 29,Vienna: Arbeitskreis rur. Tibetsich und Buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien. (Employs contemporary analytical logic for the analysis of theS a t t ~ l ! n u m a n a . ) Rospatt, A. von (1995) 'The Buddhist Doctrine ofMomentariness: A Survey of the Origins and EarlyPhase of this Doctrine up to Vasubandhu', Alt- undNeu-indische Studien 47, Stuttgart: Steiner. (Dealswith the early phase of the doctrine of momentariness and analyses it doctrinal background on thebasis of earlier proofs of momentariness; presentsthe most complete collection ofprimary sources (alltranslated into English) available on the subjectmailer.)Steinkellner, E. (1968/9) 'Die Entwicklung desK ~ a l } i k a t v a n u m a n a bei Dhannakirti' (The Development of the K ~ a l } i k a t v a n u m i i n a (proof bf Momentariness) by Dhannakirti), Wiener Zeitschrijifur die Kunde Siidasiens 12-13: 361-77. (Traces thedevelopment of the Sattvanumana by Dhannakirti.)

ALEXANDER VON ROSPA TT".

MONBODDQ, LORD (JAMESBURNETT) (1714-99)In speculating that orang-utans' vocal organs must havebeen designed for speech, M onboddo was convinced that, these creatures were primitive humans who had not yetemer:d ,SOciety, His chief contribution to the history of! t ~ ! f U I S I l C S and alllhropo!ogy lurns upon two propoS/llOns: that language is not nalllra! 10 man, and Ihat

cMONBODDO, LORD (JAMES BURNETT)

close physical resemblance between species is evidenceof biological relation.By training as a jurist and through his writings as alinguist and anthropologist, Monboddo was one ofthe most learned figures in eighteenth-centuryScotland. Appointed a law lord or judge on theScottish Court of Session' in 1767 (from which his titlederives), he drew lifelong inspiration from theclassicism of Thomas Blackwell, whose writings onHomer and Augustus had helped to convince him ofthe decline of modern man and the decadence ofmodern fonns of speech by contrast with the heroismof the ancient Greeks and Romans and the poeticresonance of their languages. More hostile to theempiricist tendencies of contemporary British philo- .sophy than any other predominantly secular writer of 'the Scottish Enlightenment, he sought to rescue theglorious achievements of ancient science, ethics andrhetoric in refonnulating an essentially Aristotelianinterpretation of the human faculties, published in sixvOlumes from 1779 to 1799, entitled Antient Methaphysics (see ENLIGHTENMENT, SCOT,TISH);'A similar enthusiasm for c1assicisJj}'overIiiodernity ,is manifest in Monboddo's more iriflueiiIialwork ofroughly the same peri()d, OJ the Origin diz4 Progressof Language, also published i n ~ i x ; ' \ r 9 1 } l l l i e s between1773 and 1792. In, addition toconinienting on thesplendours of ancieritLatin" andtJreek," this textdiscusses the nomenclature ofavariety of exoticlanguages, hicludirigFIuron,Qarib;;Eskimo andTahitian, which Monboddo ,had/learned "throughdictionaries and travellers' r e p o i t s ? H i ~ attempt totrace the natural history oflanguagesasal1 expressionof both the universal ,capacities of the human mindand the specific genealogies of diverse cultures drewMonboddo in the direction of the nascent sciences of'etymology and historical linguistics' along Ilnesdeveloped by Sir William Jones (1746-89), withwhom he corresponded. But he was even more drawnto the anthropological linguistics sketched in theDiscours sur !'inegalite (Discourse on the Origin ofInequality) (1755) of Jean-Jacques ROUSSEAU, fromwhich Monboddo adopted and developed two mainpropositions: first, that language must be cultivatedand mastered in society and hence is not natural toman; and, second, that the 'orang-utan' (in theEnlightenment a generic term for all the great apes)is human, since the inarticulacy of this creature sosimilar to a human being is attributable to its not yethaving had the opportunity to enter society andthereinto exercise its larynx, pharynx and otherorgans of speech. Monboddo imagined that analo- /, gous physical traits characteristically signify

h O , ~ O : , / logous functIOns, so that unless Nature had been so , ', .

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AvR Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness Routledge Encyc