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Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) 2011 Presented By: Gavin Grant

Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

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Abstract OSN Vulnerabilities Socialbot Network The Attack Findings FIS effectiveness

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Page 1: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Authors:Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu

University of British ColumbiaAnnual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) 2011

Presented By:Gavin Grant

Page 2: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAPTCHA

http://developers.facebook.com/docs/reference/api/

Page 3: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

AbstractOSN VulnerabilitiesSocialbot NetworkThe AttackFindingsFIS effectiveness

Page 4: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Social Networks have millions of users

Illustrate that Online Social Networks (OSN) are vulnerable to infiltrations by socialbotsIn particular Facebook80% success rate

Socialbots – computer programs that control OSN accounts and mimic real users

Page 5: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Ineffective CAPTCHAsHiring cheap labor ($1 per 1,000 broken)Reusing session IDs of known CAPTCHAs

Fake User Accounts and ProfilesEmail and profile

Crawlable Social GraphsTraversing linked profiles

Exploitable Platforms and APIsUse APIs to automate the execution of

activities

Page 6: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Set of socialbots owned and maintained by human controller called the botherder

Made up of socialbots, botmaster, and command and control channel

Socialbot controls a profileData collected called botcargoCapable of executing commands

Botmaster is software botherder uses to send commands through C & C channel

C & C facilitates transfer of botcargo and commands

Page 7: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Page 8: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Read, write, connect, disconnect

Set of commands used to mimic a real userNative commands

Master commands

Page 9: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Botworker builds and maintains profilesBotupdater pushes new software updatesC & C engine maintains a repository of

master commandsMaster commands needed

ClusterRand_connect(k)DeclusterCrawl_extneighborhoodMutual_connectHarvest-data

Page 10: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Communication model

Works with socialbot-OSN ChannelOnly OSN-specific API calls and HTTP traffic

Helps in non detection

Page 11: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Socialbot has to hide its real identity

Botmaster should be able to perform large-scale infiltration

C & C channel traffic has to look benign

Page 12: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Facebook Immune System (FIS)8 week processExploited Facebook’s Graph API to carry out social-interaction operationsUsed HTTP request to send friendship requestIheartquotes.com, decaptcher.com, hotornot.com, mail.ru

Page 13: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Page 14: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

102 socialbots created and 1 botmasterUsers were created manually49 males53 females5053 valid profile IDs25 request per day per socialbotHarvested data

Page 15: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

First 2 weeks2 days t send 5043 request (2,391 male , 2.662

female)976 accepted (381 M, 595 F)

Next 6 weeks3,517 more users added2,079 infiltrated successfully Generated 250 GB inbound and 3 GB outbound

trafficAcceptance rate increase to 80% as mutual

friends increased

Page 16: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

News feedsProfile infoWall messages3,055 direct neighborhoods1,085,785 extended neighborhoods

Page 17: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Real time learning system used to protect its users

Only 20 bots were flagged by system

Doesn’t consider fake accounts a real threat

Page 18: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

OSN vulnerability to a large-scale socialbot network infiltration

Defense social networks have against social bots that mimic human behavior

Prayed on common user behavior

Page 19: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Only Facebook was attacked

Didn’t provide any prevention techniques

Page 20: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

Try on other social networking sites

Not create socialbots manually

Page 21: Authors: Yazan Boshmaf, Lldar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu University of British Columbia Annual Computer Security Applications Conference