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AUTHORITY THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIEDSUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (W) SEE DISTRIBUTION "I

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Page 1: AUTHORITY THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIEDSUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (W) SEE DISTRIBUTION "I

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBERAD509538

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release, distributionunlimited

FROM:

Controlling DoD Organization. AssistantChief of Staff for Force Development[Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITYAGO D/A ltr, 3 Feb 1976; AGO D/A ltr, 3Feb 1976

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

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ITNC LAS)I FIE [)

AD.. £0 5

CLASSIFICATION CHANGEDTO: UNCLASSIFIEDFROM: COtV F Fle T1 a, LAUTHORITY. e Gc oz 4

UNCLASSIFIED

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/

Best Available CopyUNCLASSIFIED, o-.'A -

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOFFICK OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310

IN RKPI.V REFER TO

ACDA (M) (8 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 701254 12 June 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I1th ArmoredCavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (W)

SEE DISTRIBUTION "

I. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordanctwith paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as aresult of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriatebenefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations ar.dmay be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

I IncA OETE

as Colonel, C

1)STRIBUT1ON: Acting The Adjutant General

Commanding Generals

US Continental Army CommandUS Army Combat Developments Command

US Army Materiel CommandCommandants

US Army War CollegeUS Army Command and General Staff CollegeUS Army Armor SchoolUS Army Aviation SchoolUS Army Chemical SchoolUS Army Combat Surveillance SchoolUS Army Electronic Warfare School

Army Engineer School Regraded unclassified when separatedUS Army Field Artillery SchoolUS Army Infantry School from classified inclosure.US Army Institute for Military AssistanceUS Army Ordnance School

UNCLASSIFIED,

c2OO0503/50 9

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UNCLASSIFIED,

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:Office. Chief of Staff, US ArmyDeputy Chiefs of StaffChief of Research and DevelopmentAssistant Chiefs of Staff

Chief of EngineersThe Surgeon GeneralThe Provost Marshal GeneralCormmanding General, III Corps, ATTN: Project MASSTERCommandant of the Marine CorpsDefense Documentation CenterUSAF Project RANDCommanding Officers

US Army Limited War LaboratoryUS Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness AgencyUS Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Centerl1th Armored Cavalry Regiment

2

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Page 5: AUTHORITY THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIEDSUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (W) SEE DISTRIBUTION "I

UNCLASSIFIED,

DEPARTIIT OF ThE ARMYHEADQUARTERS, 11Th ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC.WE 18 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for PeriodEhding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. (C) INTRODUCTICN: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers theperiod 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970. During the past quarter the11th Azuored Cavalry Regiment continued in its participation of OperationKentucky Cougar under the operational control (OPCON) of the 1st Ca-alry Divi-nion (AM).

The provinces of Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Tay ?anh were the focus of Regi-mental action during the period. In Binh Long Province the populated areasof Loc Ninh and An Loc were at the core of Regimental operations while inPhuoc Long Province it was the critical Bu'Dop/to Duc area.

The role of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the past quarter has beenmainly one of re-positioning of forces to interdict the NVA lines of communi-cation (LOC) originating in Cambodia and combating local force units. Duringthe month of November, elements of the Blackhorse Regiment embarked on Opers-tion Long Reach I (7-9 Nov) and Operation Texas Traveler (24-28 Nov). LongReach I was initially designed to relieve the pressure from the Bu Dop/Bo Ducarea by providing ,n axis by which the critical area could be reinforced andby interdicting the enemy supply lines. While Long Reach I took the 2nd Squad-ron to the northeast, Texas Traveler brought the 3rd Squadron into easternWas Zone C. Texas Traveler, which essentially was a long range reconnaissanceoperation, was designed to screen enemy units attempting to infiltrpte fromCambodia as well aS to block enemy routes cf withdrawal, and to relieve FSB'sJackie, Jamie, or Vickie in the event of enemy attack..

In the early morning hours of 26 November, the 3rd Squadron made hea.vy contnctwith infiltrating enemy forces, thereby accomplishing the role of the recon-naissance operation. The Commanding General, 1st Air Cavalry Division, orderedthe withdrawal of the 3rd Squadron. The Squadron, having fulfilled its mission,returned to FSB Jake where it secured the southern and southwestern AO boundarrF og 6"T L-) T

7 DOWNGRADDLAT 3 TIAN INItIVALS;Inclosure 'I DCASSM AVTI12 TE1S

M .o 5 .0010

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UNCLASSIFIED,'~

AVIC..Wl 18 February 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regi'ent for Period

&ding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOP-65 (RI)

while conducting limited reconnaisisance operations. 'loward the end of thequarter, when 11 FFV Artillery moved ino FSB Jake, t he 3rd Squadron thellmoved to establish FSB Jan nearby. From this location the 3rd Squadronsecured FSB's Jan, Thunder Ill and Thunder IV.

Although Operation Long Reach I wasn't a total success, it did set the stagk-for an extremely unique and unusual operation-Long Reach II . Long Keii 1i IImarked the first time that the 11th Armored Cavalry RegitnevIt has used Hold,,?

Plows in an extensive land clearing operation. As a result of thi'. opk-r.tiod1,the treac-herous Highway QL 14A was opened, providing a lanid access route toBu Dop. The land clearing operation severed enemy infiltration and supply,routes along the Serges Jungle Highway (a maze of trails running south andsoutheast from Cambodia) and alleviated the pressure on the Bu bop/ho 1lucarea.

While the 2nd Squadron was conducting the Rome Plow operat ion to the northe~ast,the let Squadron C? was located at AB Muleg, In the Loo NInh District. Byconducting reomaloaeao operations around 4c WinJh, the let Souadron wascapable of reinforcing the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons, if the need arose, end block-ing infiltrating WJA forces from the north and northwest. I'lhaa NVA unitsattempted to infiltrate from Cambodia late in January and found that theSerges Jungle Highway was severed by the reopening of QL 14A, the pre-Tothighpoint va" pre-empted. The Battle of the Crescent (20 Jan) and the Battleof the Cross Roads (21 Jun), as well as the border clashes of 24 and 27,Dcber when Air Cavalry Troop (11th ACE) participated in massive air/groundbattles, were very effective in that they greatly hampered the infiltrationof oemy forces and su~pplies into Binh Long Province.

As the quarter closed, the lot Squadron departed its AO for Tay Ninh, OPCONto the lat Brigade, let Cavalry Divi1sion AM). 2nd S~ndron, having accom-.plished its primary mission in the Bu flop/Do Due area, moved southwest to thelee lftnh area to fill the AO vacated by the lot Squadron.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE SUKMARY:

A. General: During the quarter the 11th Armored Cavalry Regimentoperated primarily in Binh Long Province; however, limited reconnaissanceoperations were also conducted in eastern War Zone C and northwestern PhuccLong Province. I

7broughout Ill Corps Tactica Zone, snomr offensive activity was genorAllylight and scattered during the reporting period. Since the death of Ho Chi)6.nh, COSYI's divisionial forces have been oriented largely toward the pro-tectlon of logistical supply routes and the disruption of the Vietnamilationand pacification programs. To accomplish their mission, *I units have

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UNCLASSIFIED,

AVTC..WE 18 Februr.ry 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavrlry Regiment for Poriodhding 31 Janunry 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (Ri)

apparently changed their basic military tact ics--in tead of (onlu( I inbattallon-sized ground attacks and being willing to engage Allied for( es inLarge scale contact, the enemy now emphasizes economy of for, e measures sic h a,.sapper probes, attacks by fire, and heavy mining of the lines ot rotmwiicfIat Ion.Tlhe ther this noticeable change in tactics was brought about by thw Ic iplem.tIta-tion of a Lao Dong (Communist party of NortLh Vietnam) resolut ton In Aprl I .il99or the practical real it Les of heavy losses and few replaceemect S or a col.inu,ct ionof the two, is not knownl.

"COSVN Resolution 9-, as it/known to the Allied intelligence (OrT1,ucity, ,ts

forth the means by which the VC and NVA in South Vietna cope to achievetotal victory. Resolution 9 states that VC/NVA forces are to strive for thewithdrawal of all American troops, to liberate the rural areas, to destroythe RVN pacification teams, and to upgrade and develop the Viet Cong revolu-tionary government (PRG). With these purposes in mind, Resolution 9 furtherstates that an all-out attack strategy prevails. Engineer troops, sapper andarmed reconnaissance troops, and secret guerillas are to be used extensivelyIn tactical operations. The recent relocation of three main force regimentsfrom III CTZ to IV CTZ underlines the enemy's interest in the Delta region.The present attempts at training sub-region forces in sapper tactics and theemphasis of reoupplying these forces lend credence to the belief that COSYNResolution 9 iA being implemented.

Due to this change in enemy activity, the Allied intelligence collectioneffort had to be redirected scuewhat. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, forexnmple, has boen virtually deprived of one of its beat sources of hard in-telligonce-,, the prisoner of war. During the previous quarter, 29 prisonerswere captuaed; only two prisoners were captured in this reporting period.For this reason, the S.-21 collection agencies have not been -Lble to produceexploitable intelligence as rapidly as before. This and other problems to bediscussed below do not i* dcate, however, a relaxation in the intelligenceefforts of the 11th ACR. r&ereas main force enemy units used to operntewithin the 11th ACR TAOR, this quarter has seen elements of the 7th NVA and9th VC Divisions relocat to War Zone C and Phuoo Long Province respectively,and generally avoid cont4 t in our =ea. The dearth of hard intelligenceproduced during the qu rir is largely t-tributed to this relocation of enemyforces,

In November 1969, main force enemy units avoided encounter with the 11thArmored Cavalry Regiment. The slack was taken up by local force units whosemain tictics are mining of LOC's, attacks by fire, and small scale groundprobes against RF/PF outposts. The high level of mining incidents continuedthroughout December; however, near the end of the month, elements of the 7thNVA Division .were contacted as they relocated from northwestern Phuoc LongProvince into their traditional base areas north and west of toc Ninh. All

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC-,WE 18 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Raport of 1 ith Armored C-tvclry Rngirient for Periodbut 1 jkdiflg 31 Jonuary 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

but o okhesignificant engagements during December 1969 Wn January 19170were initiated by or resulted from the daily reconnaissance missions of theAir Caviay Troop, 11th ACR. During January 1970, th~e 141st and 209th NVARegimentsil, 7th NVA Division, maintained a presence along the northern periph-ery of Bii~h Long and Phuoc Long Provinces a:d participated in the Corpa-widehigh Poi I t of 20-21 January.

With theladvent of the dry season "nd significont decrease in rlinfnall afterOctober 1%9, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's cipabilities hive beengreatly enhancod. Neithor terrain nor weather have seriousl't harMered our

I' operation's during the reporting period as evidenced by. the operation of3/11th ACR In War Zone ".. a r4ghtna~re for armored vehicles during the rainyeon bjcqu*se of its lowor elevation.

In general, as far as intelligence activities are concerned, the quarter h-sbeen a very fluid one. In response to the enemy's redirection of effort andadoption of sma- unit and economy of force tactics, the 11th Armored CivalryRegiment's intelligence effort has been forced to gear itself to the ta-rgetingof local! forces and guerilla activities-- whereas main force units had pre-viously boon our primary target. Due to the proximity, of Cambodi-a to the11th ACR TAOR, a man force threat can and sometires does exist to the popu-lation centers of Binh Long Province; however, when COSVN 's divisional forcesrennin in Cambodia avoiding contact, the 11th ACR intelligence collectioneffort is forced to redirect itself.

One of the problems encountered is the development of a means of identif~yingand neutralizing the individuals or groups responsible for mining of IflC's,harassing attacks by fire, intimidation, and proselyting of the loca~l popu-lace. All this had to be accomplished in conjunction with the Viotnarisntionprogrl. In short, the 11th ACR's intelligence effort during this quprterhas operatedil simulttneously en two levels: targeting of main force units,where traditional intelligence techniques are still effective; and targetingof localiforce and guerilla units, where new techniques had to be developed.

Orer ofBtte During the months of November 1969 throughJanuary 17, the three regiments of the 7th NVA Division were the only mainforce en&y units operating in the 11th ACR TAOR, and then only intermittent-ly. Other identifications produced by US as well as Allied forces confirnedthe presence of the Binh Imig Provincial Force (D)368 Local Force Batthlion,Hon Quai' cnd Icc Ninh Armed Forces, and the administrative areas of An toeDistrict). Lz ciddition, several specialized units were identified- theZ25 Eigineer Battalion, CCSVN; the 1)170 Independent Battalion, a part ofthe JCOSV border security regiment; elements of the 50th and 70th Rear Ser-vice Grolas rxd a rear service element of the 69th Artillery Commnand.

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC.WE 18 February 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period

biding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFORP65 (Ri)

o. Intellience Sources: Although there were few signifient changesin the number and type of intelligence sources utilized by the 11th ACR duringthe quartor, some sources were relied upon more than in the previous periodfor the simple reason that the best sources were usually unavellable. TheRegiment's overall intelligence producing cnpabiliti, bowevor, was not ser-iously impaired by this readjustment.

(1) Visual Reconnaissance. Visual reconnaissance missions, flownon a daily basis by the Air Cavalry Troop of the 11th ACR, provide the bulkof the information used for the planning of B-52 strikes, TAC Air, preplannedstrikes, armored ground reconnaissance operations, and ARP and LRRP inser-tions. he Air Cavalry Troop has also been Iastrumental in locating enemyunite in the Jungled areas as well as providing seoond'try evidence of enemyaovement, fortifications, and general location. Visual reconnaissance mis-sions have been uned to confirm or disclaim the infonmation obtained fromSLAR, %ilffor, Red Hase, and usually reliable agent reports.

(2) Enemy Docuents: Captured enemy documents establish enemyunit identification and provide 11th ACR intelligence personnel with "niceto know" information concerning the p-st activities of various eneer, units.Captured documents also give insight into the particularly political aspectof the enem's military activitiec. Documents usually provide infornitionfrcu which general trends can be drawn rather than provide information thatis immediatoly oxploitable.

(3) P W/Ralliers: Prisoners of war and Hoi Chanhs, which wouldotherwise provide the 11th ACR Conmander with his beat source of intelligence,were of insignificant value during the quarter as only two PW's and two HoiChanhs were captured or received. 1e prisoners and ralliers were of lowintelligence and knowledgeability; therefore, even rapid and accurate inter-rogation of these enemy soldiers did not result in any significant infor-mation.

(4) Agent Reprts Agent reports, especially those producedby Team 3ACX under the guidance of the 3rd Battalion, 525 MI Group, arepassed to the 11th ACR on a daily basis. A ent reports were also produced bythe Seoial Forces and National Police Office in An Ioc, but in a les pro-lific manner than Tem 3ACX. The latter two agencies have occasionally pro-duced reports which are fairly reliable and have provided the 11th ACR withlow level intelligence on the activities of local guerillas and VCI. Tem3ACX's reports, on the other hand, have been of very little value to the11th ACR collection effort. Thetr reports are often exaggerated, usuallyuntimely, and of doubtful validity.

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0

CONFIDENTIALAVICT-E 18 February 1970SUDJECT: Operational Repcrt of 11th Armored (;avalry Regiment for PeriodPding 31 January 1 Om RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

(5) ICAP's: The information gleaned from ICAP reports since lateNovember 1969, have proved useful in the establishment of more accurate black-lists and the targeting of the Viet C(mg Tnfraetrcture. ICAP's have alsobeen useful in reporting enemy activity which. is often not reported, such assmall VC bands entering villages for food and supplies and light ground probesor mortar attacks on RF/PF outposts. The ICAP is also an excellent means forthe dissemination and collection of information resulting from the VoluntarfInformant Program, which has not been employed extensively by the Regi-entin the previous quarters. ICAP's and the VIP are potential sources of lowintelligence information; however, their effect and worth can only be accurate-ly gauged after more extensive use.

(6) FAC's: Daily missions flown by the Air Force Forrd AirControllers are an occasional source of intelligence and have proved helpfulin the accurate mapping of enemy lines of comunication.

(7) Technical Detectors: Technical detectors include SLAR, RedHase, &iffer, ground radar and ground sensors. As a general rule, thesedevices are only useful as intelligence indicators. The usual renctAon to adetector activation is the firing of artillery arid/or a visual reconneiss-nce.Technical detectors, especially ground sensors, have a limited value in theplotting of eneny movbaents at night or in heavily jungled areas, but theirlimitations must always be kept in mind. For example, fires in the AO negatereadings by Red Hase and Sniffers.

d. Fne=v Personnel and Material Losses.

NOV DEC JAN

VC/MVA KIA (BC) 32 167 102

VC/NVik N 2 0r 0

Hoi anh 2 0 0

Individual Weapons 22 4 14

Crew Served Weapons 2 0 _ 19

Tons of R1ice Captured .2 0 0

Tons of Rice Destroyed .03 .5 0

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WE 18 February 1970SUBJECT: Operational Rnport of 11th Armored Cavalrf Regiment for Period

bhding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (Ri)

3. (C) COMBAT OPERTIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analvjs and Ealuation oL Opjratiman:

(1) Bu Dop/Bo Duc: In late October and early November, enemyactivity was greatly increased in this area. On 4 November, NVA forces lrunch-ad widespread rocket and mortar attacks and FSB Ellen, southeast of Bu Dop,was the object of a fierce ground assault. On 5 November, CIDG forcen nearBu Dop encountered and had skirmishes with what was believed to be the C-18Anti-Aircraft Company, which is part of the 165th WA Regiment. On 8 November,an NVA soldier was captured. He was a member of the C-20 Phgineer Compniny,141st Regiment, and stated that the mission of his unit was to build e roadfrom FSB Ellen to semewhere around FSB Jerri. This was thought to be eithera route back to Base Area 350 or an avenue to stage an attack against FSBJerri. It appeared that at least two battalions of the 165th Regiment werenorth and west of Bu Dop, while the 141st NVA Regiment had two battalions tothe south.

From the Cambodian border leading south and southoast, the NVA had developedan infiltration route for troops and supplies. This intricate mrze of trailsend pathways, which passes very close to the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area, has beennamed Serges Jungle Highway. Also, to the west of the Bu Dop/Ba Duc rea andcontiguous to Cambodia is the enemy Base Area 350; and, to the northeast isBase Area 351. Here the NVA have built many base camps and bunker complexesto store supplies and allow men to rest while infiltrating along the SergesHighway. Because this logistical artery is so vital to enomy, operations, ithas bsen defiantly protected. This defense has been so effective that QL 14A,the main highway that cuts through Serges Jungle Highway, has been closed fornearly two years.

The Bu Dop/Bo Duc area and FSB Jerri were faced with a large enemy force whichcould be quickly reinforced *eabch larger proportions with elements in nearbyC-imbodia. Special Forces advisor and CIDG forces were located at Bu Dop, whileelements of the 1st Cavalry T)ivision (AM) were at FSB Jerri. The 3rd MobileStrike Force and the 36th Ranger Battalion were situated at Bo Duc. So, itwas not surprising when elements of the 11th ACR embarked on Operitions LongReach I and II.

(a) long Reach I: Initially, elements of the 11th ACR wereto move into the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area by air and Inter by rond to open HighwnyQL 14A, interdict enemy supply lines, and relieve some of the pressure on BuDop. There were many variables to be considered in deciding how the Regimentcould best fulfill this mission. Airlifting forces of the 7nd Squadron to theBu Dop airstrip was one concideration. This feat had been accomplished a monthearlier by A/1/11th ACR wit. vary effective results. Within in the month,

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WE .1 8Febru-'rr 1970SUBJECT: Oporationcil Report of 11th xrmrrW Cavalr--! Rcg-iz~nt for Fcriod

Elding 31 Janua-y 1970 RCSS CS707%-65 (Rl)

howovcr, the condition of the alirfleld Ax Bu Dop had be(., 'llcnvud to~dotoriorate quite noticvcbly. It wa.s now auestionablo if thu l-rgc,four-cneinod C-130's, loadod with such Qxtroely he-.vv ccrgo could l.-ndthere, ixnother important considerntiori w is thu fact thi't the W." h -dompiacd .51 caliber machine guns -xound tho vill-go of Bui Dop, rndtheir fire wa-s proving quito dc:dly to~ Urcr-Tt ini the '-ro-. The alter-nato choice wa-s Q)L14A. This highw'.y had been heavily mined b- theonemy and had not boon +mraod for p .cticidl-r two :7o-,rs. ?.h. hiphv'-;-was flanjkcd by soft ground th ~t would not supprt the weight of a trackedvehicle. This greund was covered b-, iunglo so densa '.nd close to thehighway that any arao, along the wo"- was a likel-r ambush site. Thisdazgerous cul-de-sac was fina'lly chosen .os the zd~s cf cdvancc for themajority of tho ground fores while one ==iorcd cavalr troop vcas tobe airlifted to Bu Dop.

LAe in the norning on 7 November, 0 Trcoop depoxted frcr. Firc. 'pportBase iacrge (CP of Second Squadron, 11th ',CR), northea-st of 7'irc Sup-.port B7-Ac Deb. Prior to G Troop's departure, E Troop h,-.d swept theroad to rSB Deb ad then had returned to the west, where the troop stab-lishod an iVDF. Throughout the day, F Troop remaained at the Lee Ninhairstrip nd waitced Xor the expected nir lift to Bu Dcp. During theafternoon, H C~pany escorted throe 1 55r Howitzers to FSB Deb to supp'r-tthe G Troop rovnnt. Headquartars, 2/11th ACR, remained at FSB '!:rgeith the retaining Howitmors fron their batter-.

By 0700 hours on 8 'Liovenber, E Troop h,-? st.arted en its norring sueep ofthe roads and G Troop was ru.bling along COLU.IA toward Bu Der -xM Bo Due..It 0900 hours, Headquarters, 2/11th iACR was moving on its way fror~ FSBiaLrge to PSB Deb. Here they wore t:) set lup a new cci-:rcd post fro,: whichthey would conL'ol tho road r.arch Of' 0 Troop -.nd the air, lift of F -Troop-to Bu Dop. G Troop undo fairly slow progress thrr'ughcut the day-,ho1Vever, to insure this progress, the job of sweering the rc.,d :Lnd detectingthe enezy n-ines had to be done, and it was slew end exhausting work. 'noon, G Troop radioed that the mine sweeping toa2 .s were verv tired "~dthe troop requested that th ey be given additional teacs and nine detectors.This was dane,, and during the afternoon, G Troop -:oved still farther upthe road,

By evening, G Troop had progressed to a point aproxir-itely two kilo-neoters north of FSB Deb, and was ordered to establish a fire surportbase in thA~ oxea to surport FSB Jerri. by fire. Frev this new bnse,which later would be naced Joel, the naior portion of QL1A would becovered by artillery.

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC.WE 18 February 1970SUBJECT: Coerational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period

1ding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

On the morning of the 9th of November, G Troop was sweepitr4 t Ibrtion of theroad back in the direction of FSB Deb, to the site where P= .el would beestablished. During this move two additional mines had beft tiscovered onthe sce ground which had been swept on the previous day; but, a third de-stroyed a Sheridan and wounded one individual.

Wile G Troop was estnblishing FSB Joel, F Troop was being airlifted from LocNinh to the Bu Dop airstrip. The air lift operation was running smoothlyuntil the first C-130 attempted to land. Ve C-130's engine vs hit by .51calicer fire and the engine was in flames. The C-130 was unable to l V'. atDu Dop and had to return to 14c irnh. The second C-130 bounced too hard uponlanding and had to take off again because the pilot feared a broken landinggear. Fortunately, by the end of the day the rest of the planes landed snfelywith F Troop's tracks, minus Sheridans.

During the following week, the 2nd Squadron had worked to develop FSB Joel andconducted reconnaissance operations in the area. QL 14A fron FSB Deb to FSBJoel had been kept open. The Hovitrers, which were now in place at FSB Joel,would have the capability to support FSB Jerri.

Although the 2nd Squadr made only limited contact with the enemy forces inthe area, the purpose of this demonstration of force bad been a success. Byairlifting F Troop to Ed Dop, establishing FSB Joel to aid FS3 Jerri and theBu Dop/Bo Duc area, and by conducting reconnaissance over a large ares con-tiguoun with Q1 14A, the enemy pressure and dominance in the area h:d beengreatly lessened.

(b) rong Peach II: Cn 3 December 1969, the wheels of prog-ress started chu ng once more and the long awaited Rome Plow - Land ClearingOperation began. Although heavy resistance was expected as the 2nd Souadronplowed its way to Bu Dop, the enem refrained from mounting arW significtntassaults. Tho number of mining incidents were not unusually surprising. Asthe Regiment expected, the 2nd Souadron encountered a heavily mined QL 14A,although a portion bad been olenred during Tong Reach I.

Mien the operation started, engineer elements, reinforced with ACAV's, ledthe column clearing QL 14A of mines and obstacles. The 984th land ClearingCompa, which was DS to the 2nd Squadron, was secured by ACAV's as the RomePloys cleared each flank of the highway to a distance of 200 meters. TheRome Plow were further secured on each flank by Infantry elements of thelot Cavalry Division (AM), which were OPCON to 2nd SquiAron. The 2nd Souad-on's Zippo seo*ion, which was secured by a reconnaissnoce platoon, folled

the Hm Flows burning the debris. ragineer construction teems made essentialfield expedient repairs to bridges and culverts, and conducted road serviceas necessary to permit rapid and easy passage of combat vehicles.

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC,,WE 13 Febru'.ry 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for PeriodEnding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

In this manner the operation proceeded, smashing, plowing, cutting, and burn-ing for approximately 50 days. There were no impressive lists of enemy

killed or captured; howover, the mission of clearing a vast swath of immd

had been accomplished. As a result of Long Reach II, the Serges Jungle High-

way had been sovered. But more important than this, an axis by which FSB

Jrri, &Li Dop and Bo Due could be reinforced had been established. Thus,

eneWy pressure in the area had been relieved.

(2) Eastern War Zone C: There are two routes by which enarry per-

sonnel and supplies can be infiltrated into this zone: the Saigon - Michelin

Corridor -long the river basin and a system of trails -nd caches running

diagonally from the "Dog's Neck" to the Saigon River (southeast to XT4553).

Traditionally, War Zone C has been an inviolable arma from which the enemy

has provided manpower and materials to the battlefield. High level hendquar-

tars, rear service installations, training centers, and hospitals ore locatedin this area. Base Areas 352 and 353, straddling the Cambodian border into

Zone C not only contain the Headquarters of Central Office South VietnAM(COSVN), but also provide rest areas for main force enemy units. Main force

units also infiltrate and initiate the prepartory phases of offensive oper.-

tims from these base areas.

(a) The Threat: From mid-September until early November,

enemy initiated activity was chnracterised by scattered attacks by fire, light

ground probes, ground to air firings and logistical operations. However,

during the early morning hours of 4 November, FSB Ike and FSB Jamie received

ground probes, while FSB ST. Barbara and FSE Vickie received attacks by fire.

Although the X2 Battalion of the 271st Regiment was identified as p,.rticip,%ting

in the attack on FSB Ike, no other unit identification was made. On 20

Novembers the future intentions of the 9th VC Division were unknown; how-

ever, it was believed that the 4 November attacks, as well as others through-

out III Corps, signaled the beginning of the first phase of the Winter - SpringOffensive.

According to documents captured in III Corps, the initial phase of the c-rn-

paign would be from 3 to 25 November. In War Zone C the 9th VC Division

was believed to be located in the northwestern qunrter of the area of opern.

tions, with the mission of attacking FSB's Carolyn and Ike. The 271st VC

Begiment was believed to be in the central portion of the area of oper'tions

and prepared to attack fire support bases in the central and eastern areis.

Although its exact intentions were unknown, the 272nd VC Regiment. was ten-

tatively placed in southwestern War Zone C and it was believed to be destined

for Base Area 355. Attacks in War Zone C would be supported by tho' 9th VC

Division's organic artillery and sapper units, and possibly the N-16 Armor

Office, COSVN. Resupply activity continued rind was expected to increase.

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CONFIDENTIAL

!VIC-WE 18 Fobru-.r'., 1970SUBJECT: etational Report of 11th Arr.orca Cavalry Rogiriint for Paricd

nding 31 January 1'70 RCS CSFOR.65 (Ri)

(b) Toxas Traveler (24-28 Nova,'ber 1969): On the br-sisof the above Inforrw:tion, the 11th Arrorod Cavalry Regir ont was directedby the 1st Cavalry Division (U-4) to conduct xoa recoin-issnnce in theeastern sector vf War Zone C. This sector was designated AO Dallas. Theoperation callod for the reinforced Third Squadron, 11th _C1, to conducta Lultiplo routg, cross country penotrntion through AO Dll-. ilong theaxis of Routo 246, oxocuting oombat assaults along Rrute 246 to clo-r itof obstacles. Mho First Squadron, 11th !.CR, would be preporod to rein-force by tovin into the aroa and conducting orerations.

Texas Travoler began on 24 Ncvember, with the tracks of the WorkhorseSqu=dron ruzbling into the area of opration as plermod. As they rrm '-grossed, it boaewa ovidont that the terrain would lunit their speedconsiderably. As they pushed even deeper, they encountered incrensingsigns of the ensi 's presence: finally, a few rinor contacts woreinitiated. On 25 November, progress hid been greatly decressed ardthe 7hird Squadron's sweeps to the north in pursuit of srll groups ofeneiy forces took therz further away fron their primary axis of narch.

At 0342 hours on tho horning of 26 Noverber, sne"- RPG's struck sevoralkey vehicles in the Canand Post NDP. Fire and secondary explosionsdestroyed a number of vehicles and cuused numerous casuztlties. By 0550hours, it was qstinated that there were four US killed and thirty-fourwounded. One M557, two H551's, two 1fl09's, four 11548's, five 1+-tontrailers, and two 1-ton antnmtion trailers were lost. Four NVA werekilled. For the renainder of the day the Third Squadron worked, tr/ingto recover frc the pro-dawn attack.

On 27 Novenber, the hird Squadron was directed to move ecast with thegoal of leaving AO Dllas by 28 Novernbor. On 28 Neverber, the elerentsof the 1hird Squadron returned across the river toward FSB Joke =nd

eration Texas Travoler ended.

(3) Pro-Tet Highroint: During the riddle of Janutry, ene.yforces started infiltrating frcL: secure arecs in or along Conbodia intoPhue Long cnd Binh ong Provinces. Slowly, varied reports ind incid-ents were pieced together and a ricture of a large force oryosing theBlackhorse forces in the area was visualized.

(a) Battle of the Crescent (20 January 1970)" During theearly ;iorning hours on 20 Jnuary,FSB Ruth, OP for 2/11th ACR, was the object

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC-WE 18 Februarv 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Ax~ored Cavalry Regiment for Period

aiding 31 January 1970 RICS CSFOR.-65 (Ri)

of sporulic mortar attacks. During each occurrence, the mortars were counter'-ed by artillery and Pink Teams. It wasn't till late morning, when LTC Brook-shirels (GO, 2/11 iCR) command aind control ship received .51 caliber mnchinegun fire, that the ena~"e position wan fixed. Fortunately, LTC Br'ookshire'sship had not received vnq hits. Soon after this, a Pink Te-.m from Air CavnlryTroop waa flying over the area trying to discover the enemy situ!,tion. A shorttime later, it was reported that the white element (LGI) w-as shot down. W'hileAir Cavalry T roop's Cobras and Blue Max acrwablecl into the aren, LTC fkookshirewas repositioning his ground forces.* H Compnny wns to cone in C rcn the northwhile P and G Troops moved up from the south. Wile the ground elements weremaneuvering, a Cobra piloted by CPT Qa-ri Marshall, landIed despite - heavy vol-uso of fire and rescued the lone LOH survivor.

Artillery, TAC Air, ACT Cobrasn and Blue Max pounded the -re, PAs F -and G Troopswere comrg on line. The only tia the artillery wasn liftod warn when co~montsof the 33rd QChaica.l Dotachment wero flown over the trgot area and drondCS &1 58 Musters. The CS'clusters routed the anany for cesn from th ,ir securebunkers-- pvnnic stricken. A few moments later artillery resuned pounding theareca whilo gunships and TAC Air poured it on.

Ground forces continued to maneouver nd the maj or fighting continued until161,0 hours. The intire contact had ended by 1836 hours. It wan difficult todetermine the enemy's actual strength boc-%se, after the contact, the troopswere only able to sweep a portion of the area. Elements of tho 2nd Squ-idrondid not re-enter the contact area until two days later because of a require-maent to reinforce 1st Squadron when the enemy carried the b- ttla to the dis-trict of Loc Ninh the next day. By the time elements of 2/11 &CR were able tosweep the cresceint, the area had been wail "policed". Ikifortizately, no, doc-waents or prisoners were captured to accurately reveal the ese of the enemyor the extent of his los ses. Because there were anti-airernft elements, heavymortars and probeibly infantry, it was estimated that the enemy strength prob-.ably consisted of two battal~ions and had boen rositioned in a 012 asic airnobileambush.

(b) Battle of the Cross Roads (21 January 1970): On thebasis of special agent reports, it was decided that B and C Troops would con-duct ground reconnaissance north of FSB Dennis on 21 January. The Troopswould follow the northern road and then turn off at the cross road to sweepthe ridges'that protruded north to one of the suspected enemy locations.

That morain C Troop led the way. Shortly alter they turned from the roid ctdheaded for the ridge li.ne, the lead element received recoilless rifle, 330and w=11 arms fire from the northeast. C Troop reacted quickly and seon theywere on line, slowily advancing up the hill towArd the snmx- anplacs'ents.

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CONFIDENTIALAVlC.WE 18 February 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period

bdng 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

In the meantime, B Troop proceeded along the road And finally turned off,heading for a small bridge over a stream running northenst to southwest. Assoon as B Troop had crossed the bridge, the lend element came under fire.Rapidly B Troop was on line advancing to the southwest tow-rv! C Troop, butthen reversed direction toward the enemV positions. The Troops had chnngoddirections severda times, ever pursuing the anevy, before they wore fin-llyable to link up. They proceeded slowly, ndv-tncing toward the enmy positions,always aintaining fire superiority.

While the ground troops wore skillfully maneuvering, artillery, TAC Air, andgunships wcro pounding the target areas as well as likely routes of withdr.wei1l.It had become evident that the NVA were well equipped when severnl . 51 calibermachine guns started to deliver a heavy volume of fire. It wns now 'Kisoapparent that the ener forces had RPG's, 57m recoilless rifles, mortars -ndAL47's.

The contact continued throughout the day and, although B Pad C Troops werereacting very effectively, two M551 Sheridans and two ACAV's hd been liter-ally blown -way by a ccmbination of MP and recoilless rifle fire. C Troophad lost one trooper while nine were wounded. B Troop had suffered sixwounded.

F and G Troops had been called early during the contact. As they moved fronBu Dop, G Troop r-Tortod sodlnp evidence of an estimated ener comp-ny movingsouth. G Troop continued as quickly as possible to the let Scuadron contarctsite. G Troop made brief contact with the enemy but continued to push on toC Troop's location. 'When G Troop arrived in the C Troop contact -rea, the,started sweep and found two bundles of docunenta. Meanwhile, F Troop pushednorth to the area of a suspected eneq base camp. B, C, and G Troops con-tinued to sweep the area and pursued trails in an effort to m-intain contactwith the fleeing enem.

'When the contact had finally ended and the area had been sept, it vafound that the 11 and 12 Battalions of the 141st WVA Regiment, w well asthe C2 Transportation CcmpeM, had been encountered. Forty-one NVA sol-diers lay dead. The enemy, who ves well armed and who had a superior numberof forces, had been beaten. 1he enemy had chosen the battle site nnd wns wellprepared, but the NVA had not anticipated the expertise which wu zuUlifiedby the men of B and C Troope.

(4) Northern Binh long Province: Duing the reporting period,Air Cavalry Troop staged two significant border clashes in northern Binh toneProvince which were unrelated to the above mentioned operations. The AirCavalry Troop had been conducting visual reconnaissAnce along the border in anattempt to interdict infiltrating enemy forces, and on 24 December its efforts

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CONFIDENTIALVIG.WE 18 Februrpry 1970

IUJBJECT: Cpercational Report of 11th Armored Ccnvlry Regiment for PeriodEniding 31 January 1970 RCS CS-FUR.65 (R1)

proved successful. A LIM, fl~ying west of Lee Nfinh (11570056). received auto-antic weapons fire -vnd in the ensuing battle, gunships, nrtiller-y, n.nd TACAir all converged and pounded tho enany positions. Although no unit Identi-ficatioti w:as obtnined, 30 NVA had been killed.

The Tecond clash took place north of Loc Udnh, about one ind -. herf miles fromthe (Cmbodian border. The contnact ren hnd been under closo ohserv-tion since16 Novmber, when Air Ca' alry Troop gu-nhhips spotted and destrov'cd what wasbelieved to hrve beeni a stone crushing device. It w-ts thought t.-t possiblya stoe quarry was being operated in the -xrea.

* On 27 Deceber, while a Pink Team was conducting n YR in the nxeat, tue WAwere spotted in a lightly wooded are'. Seconds la-ter the white elporent MLOH)received automatic weapons fire. Wehile the red bird (CobraL) and LOH returnedfire, it beox~io apparent that there wns a large NVA force in the Prea. fnutoelater Air Cavalry Troop scrmblod gunships. Blue !hx znr! TOC -,r were'calledon station and artillery' pounded the target area. As this m.-ssive day longair/growrg battle continued, tho lot Squadron alerted A Troop and D'Co~ipWn,which were conducting a conbined operation with the 196th RP Company. Byr lateafternoon, cround elements were appro-tching the hill on which the WVA h.-A beenplanted. The RI company dismounted nnd began sweeping the area. Soon theyencountered a heavy volume of fire. In this brief period four were wounded.A Troop and D Cospny' imediately came on line and began surpressing t)'e fireof the fleeing enm. Whe~n the contact area was swept, captured doctumentsidentified elements of the 141st WVA Regiment. These elemients included the21st Sapper Conpvzy, 19th higineer Company, C-24th Convaleseont Comrany, C-2VrdTransportation Ccspany and a finance Section.

VI~n darkness cme end the WVA had been routed bnck tow-ird Cmbodia, AirCavalry troop had been credited with 29 of the 8 NVA killed.

b. Done Tian (Go2 Forard Together) rogra:

(1) Combined Oparations: Wile the 11th A~nored Cavalry Regimenthas worked tirelessly to secure Binh Iong Province w4d the Bu Dop/Bo Dhac areadurinG this peast quarter, the effort toward the Vietnomization progr-M has nottattred. In fact, combined operations have become n commn occurrence inthe Blackhorse AO. During the past three months, the Regiment has conductedseat and search, reconnaissance, road security, and ICAP operations with ARVN/RF/PF/CIDG forces. The regiment has also secured landing zones during air-mobile operations with the RVNAF.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and OPCON units have conducted the followingnumber of combined operations in which a US company/troop has worked withan RVN/RF/PF/CIDG unit during a 24-hour period. Represented below are combinedoperations from I November 1969 to 31 January 1970.

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CONFIDENTIAL

MGMC.W 18 Febmw7 1970

SJCT Oratinl Hoport of 11th htaOmd C4valry; Rgiit for Poriod

flidine 31 Juury 1970 RCS CSFOR.-5 (

W Y20 2 15 I.

MIG 9 3 5 0

AM 40 6 .6 0

I T: L dsfgr otos ro.-A security operritiofl ,uiong QL 134

2. Ter vro o;O eght irnoi1O prtiofl oductd ith 11th CR ssis-

once uring the qwUotr: -AWN-1P CID-1 it.? FY.

(2) fr~inilgi Ovaer tho past reportin period, the 110.~ ACE bhts

conducted fornal trinin6 in Vorioue fieldsi nchv3ics6, mnr crew rro-*

ficieicy, c'xor trauining, drivers training, refiludoXe irrt

trtSiin. 1he joint ICAP'Ci are also signifiomt,, for they ore pvrt Of -in UJT

irmTh for WRN and proviiz. 2eiw per&eel Th a~t below indi'-.tOs

the naber or formal1 cir.sos given during the quirtert

BY/Pr 6 03

AM? 0 0 29

~CAPto 79 30 6

1. Da.ring the part quartarp the Rglxntal S..5 h-o conducted 45 Joint ICAPts.

(1)fiplgcut training Vas acaimpJlished throughout the qurtA!

to prepCX5 repkegmet fr~ the "Ite they oust fill as Blackhorse tr"OPOTS.

MM"3~ atten&OOe y40 as f ollows I

D3BCZK 523

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//

CONFIDENTIALAVIC.WE 18 February 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Crvalry Regiment for Period

Thling 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOP-65 (R1)

(2) Specialised Tzrining:

(a) Armor School: One individutl from the 919th Engineeraattended a four/ d7 course at Phuoc Vinh.

(b) Artillery School: Four Bltckhorse troopers attended aone week fire direction center course. The course v-s given by the 5/42nd Artyat log Binh.

(c) LM Transition: One individual from .dr Cav.:Irv Troopattended WlH Trrnsition at Vung Thu.

(d) Cobra IP School: One individunl from !ir C-valry Troopattended Cobr'.. IP School at Vung Tau.

(e) Cobra Qu.2ification: Three individuals fron Air CavlrfTroop attended Cobra qu lification clas~os- a Vung Tau.

() Cobra Armament: Three individu-,Is from Air CavalrtTroop attended Cobra arnament classes at Vung Tau.

(g) PLL School: During this qu-rter 15 Blrckhorse troopersattended PLL School. The course was given by the 185th Minten-nce B.tt-lionat Long Binh.

(h) brternal Airlift Procedures: Ten Individuals from theRegimnt attonded classes at Quan loi on C-47 -irlift procedures. The cl-sseswere given by the 12th Combat Avintion Group.

(i) Generator School: Twenty individu'ls attended generatorschcol -it ong Dinh. The classes were given by the 185th *inten'Ince Bat-tlcm.

.- () Field Sanitation Training: The Rcgimental Surgeon con-ducted field sanitation classes at Quan Loi during the p-.st qu-.rter. Thirty-nine attended from the Regiment.

n) iper School: Eleven troopers completed the let TeamActew's two week sniper course at Bien Hon. Six individuals also -.ttendedrefresher trnhing at Ist Team Academy during the reporting period.

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC.WE 18 Februcxy 1970SUBJECT: Operatonnal Report of 11th Armored Cav iry 1gi,8ent for Period

&iding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

4, (C) CO .AT SUPPORT:

(1) General: The 33rd Chemical Detachment continuer' to providedirect chemical support and technical ndvice to the 11th Armored Cr.valryRegiment.

(2) Personnel Detection: During the period 173 Sniffer missionswere flown. A number of Sniffer sensings were confirmed by independent -!e ns.Intelligence readings such as SLIP, ,'. VR'o were obtained in the vicinity ofour readinjs on a number of occasions. For exrmple, - FAC observing artiller-ybeing fired in one of our Sniffer readings observed n secondairv explosion re-sulting in two bunkers destroyed and two more bunkers orM three . 51 caliberpositions uncovered.

In cooprntion with the S-5, the detrchment has continued to drop le-fletsduring our Sniffer misilons. This procedure snves "blr de time" and the lowlevel flying -t wich the Sniffer missions are run allows pinpoint deliveryof leaflets on trails, bunker complexes '.nd other areas used by the VC/NV!.

() CS Drops: There were three persistent CS drum drops in theRegizont.a.l AO. They were coordinated by the detachment nnd supported by thelot CavalAy Zivislonts Cmioal Section.

There were ton drops of El 58R2 Canister Clusters during the quarter. Arrox-imately half were on intelligence targets, the remainder being dropped duringactual conta.ct. The effectiveness of this ccmbat technique was dvjonstr.tedon 20 January 1970, when an Air Cavalry Troop WH received ground fire nearthe Cnmbodian border east of Bo Due. The NWA were in bunkers and, despiteheavy irtiller" shelling, their casualties were light. A load of CS Ca-/isterClusters was dropped on the enerq positions. The NVA left the safetv oftheir bunkers and fled across an open field. Cobra gunships rolled in andtactical airstrikes followed taking a heavy toll in enemy lives.

The detachmont continued to manke bunker bombs filled with rersistat CS. Thebombs arO employod to prohibit the re-use of discovered bunkers b, the enemy.

b. S : Strong ccmrnd emphasis was plnced on the net controlstation suporvision of correct operating procedure. This has zesulted in anoverl improvement in the qu,.lity of traffic on nets and significantly dimin-ished misuse of net air time. The new SOI published in Jcnu-.ry 1970, reducedthe amount of st!..tions in the corr-and net, thereby increasing the efficiencyof the not.

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC.WE 18 February 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period

Jhding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (Ri)

The Regimental Relay Station, which had been operating on Gia Ray Mountainever since the Regiment moved into Blackhoree Base Camp in October 1967,proved to be inadequate for the Regiment's new area of operations. The bessite in this area is ?&i Ba Den Mountain near Tay Ninh City. Its 986 meterelevation provides line-of-sight comunication potential to include the Regi-ment's present positions. Due to the lack of physical space on the -ountain,the move has been postponed until the let Infantry Division withdraws fromits site and space becomes available.

The procurement of secure voice circuits continued to be a problem area due toa shortage of K 38/RC 12 interconnect cables, and pending modifications onARr.54 Radio Sets for the installation of the KY-28 Speech Secure Machine. Atthe end of this reporting period, modificat Ions on ARC-54 Radios were begin'ning to be applied but the shortage of intrconnect cnbles persisted. Speechsecure equipment increases network capabilities by effectively denying infor-

nation to VC/NVA radio intercept teams; furthermore, fewer security viol-tinswould be committed.

c. AkXtille: During the quarter, the 11th ACR operated in a varietyof fire support missions. The 1st Souadron operated primarily in the north-west portion of Binh Long Province out of FSB Marge. Due to the rrnge of the155M Howitzer, not all of the AO could be covered$ even 175mm from A/6-27 inQian Loi could not cover the extreme northwest portions. Consequently, on iseveral occasions a platoon of 155mn Howitzers was sent to a FOB to conducteither an artillery raid or to support troop maneuvers in areas previouslynot covered by artillery support. On 27 December, during a contact near theCambodian border, a platoon was sent north qf loc Ninh to support the contact.Also in December, two platoons were sent to FSB Duffy to conduct an artilleryraid on an old French fort in AO Shortstop. On 17 January, let Howitzer Bat-tery moved from FSB Marge to FSB Dennis which permitted greater covernge of'the northwest portion of Binh Long Province. On 29 January, the 1st Squndronmoved to FSB Christine, north of TVy Ninh.1

Second Squadron spent much of this period Involved in Rome Plow operationsalong QL 14A This operation consumed large amounts of ammunition in the wayof suppressive fires in order to hold down the mining of the highw'y. The 1operation was successful and the mining incidents decreased is the plows movedup the road to Bu Dop. Second Howitzer Battery also used platoon displlcenentto cover either logistical convoys or mmneuver elements of the 2nd Squadron!.During the contact of 20 Jaauary, they sup.3orted with over 650 rounds of HE.On 30 January, they moved into FSB Wade, Just north of An Loc.

Third Squadron has been conducting operations primarily in eastern War Zone Csince aid-November. They have been located at FSB Jake during the period exceptfor a brief move to the center of War Zone C. The battery has fired mainly

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CONFIDENTIAL

LVIC-IdESUBJECT: Orational

18 February 1970Report of 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period

Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (Ri)

in support of maneuver elements. They have had a larger number of contactfire missions and counter-morter missions than the other two batteries. Atthe end of November, 1st and 3rd Howitzer Batteries combined at FSB Jake toconduct a 707 on a base camp in War Zone C.

In the middle of December, the 8" guns from A/6-27 moved from Qu-in Loi to FSBMerge to support operations in northern Binh Long Province until st Scuadronmoved FSB Dennis. Cn 12 January, C/6-27 moved their 175mm guns from Phuoc Vinhand their 8" guns from FSB Thunder III to FSB Jake. Other support has comefrom C/2-13 at FSB Thunder IV and C/2-12 at Quan Loi. The FSCC and clerLrenceof fires has been provided by 6-27 Arty. An MTOE change has been approved byUSARV authorizing the 11th ACR additional personnel and enuip,ient to establisha fire support element organic to the Regimont.

MISSIONS FIRED

HE ILL FC

CONFIRMED 5,160 87 589 15

ACQUIRED 55,124 604 76 168

COUNTER BATTEY 1,087 9 32 16

PREPARATIONS 1,869 140 0 0

SPECIAL PURPOSE 2,023 309 1,186 4

TOTAL 65,563 1,149 1,883 203

d. Ehainer:

(1) GOneral: During the reporting period, elements of the 919thEngineer Compnny (Armored) porticipated in operations Kentucky Cougar, TexasTraveler, and Long Reach I and II, while providing direct combat engineersupport to elements of the 11th Armored C-valry Regiment. In e~kch of theseoperations, the separate platoons of the 919th Engineers were OPCON to in-dividual troops or teams of the 11th ACR on a mission-by-mission basis toinsure maximum utilization and speed of mission execution. Engineers werecapable of demolition work, ford and AVLB construction, reconnrissnnce,NDP construction, tunnel exploration, security, mine detection and combat isan armor element.

(2) COerations: During the quarter, the 919th ngineer Co~mny

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC-WE 18 February 1970SUTECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cav'Kiry Regiment for Poriod

Ending 31 January 1970 RCT CSFOR.65 (Ri)

(Armored) was employed in many diversified missions which took the menbersof the Comp.any into every corner of the IIICTZ. In supporting - unit as mobileas the 11th ACR, the individual plntoons usually found thomselvos working a-sseparate wits. To do justice to each platoon and their nccomplishments, theevents of the last three months will be reported by platoon.

(a) During the first eleven days of the reporting period,the let Platoon was loc-.ted at FSB Gywn, engaged in a mrdntenince stond downduring which they also provided security for convoys to FSB !'rge. On 12November, the Platoon w.-Ls again engaged in engineer proiects with the rein-forcement of a Bailey Bridge on QL 13 (XT722973). Ch the night of 15 November,while temporarily based at the 501st NDP (X'2999), the Ploatoon wts ambushedby an enemy force of unknown size. Fire was returned in the brief contactin which no friendly casi-Ities were sustained. The Platoon moved to Quentel on 19 November for a two week m-intenance stand down.

On 3 December, cafter departing Quan toi Base Camp, the 1st Pl-toon w-'s -imbushedwhile sweeping the road betieen FSB Deb and FSB Joel. During this enga-gment,one man iwas killed in action and one was wounded. The following day the Pla-toon returncd to the ambush site to recover an ACAV that had been d'magedduring the cgagement.

After spending several days at FSB Joel, the 1st Platoon moved to FSB baniceand there provided security for Rome Plows operating in the area. The unitwas regulnrly engaged in improving fields of fire around the fire sup-ortbase and conducting mine sweeps from Eunice to Joel. While at FSB Eunice,the Platoon had removed more than 250 trees, destroyed old nmunition, mr-n-tained their vehicles, and pulled security at the base. Before depnrtingFSB Eunice for FSB Ruth, the engineers destroyed the base.

hile at FSB Ruth, the Platoon was assigned the project of improving b'sedefenses. On 11 January, a triple standard concertina fence was l.aid aroundthe perimeter. That some day, the engineers reconned a culvert site north ofB. Eu Dop on QL 14A, classified a Y4T6 fixed sp'n bridge in the srme area, in-stalled a gate in the concertina surrounding FSB Ruth and destroyed threeM-15 AT mines. On 14 January, the platoon departed FSB Rbth for Ouean Loiand a maintonance stand down.

The.rem ninder of the month was spent at Quan Loi. The Platoon was engagedin daily mine sweep operations and culvert reprir and construction alongQL 13.

(b) During the first two weeks of November, the 2nd Platoonwas engaged in cutting trees in preparation for the construction of a corduro,,rbridge and also undertook the construction of an NDP at XT823842. On 14November, while on a reconnaissance mission, the platoon discovered nine

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CONFIDENTIAL.VIC.WE 18 Februr.ry 1970SUBJECT: Operation.il Roport of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period

1nding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

abandoned bunkers alung the tree line at X=824835 and mode plans to destroythe positions at a later date. The engineers were engaged in regular minesweeping oper.tions until 18 November, and during this time they discoveredseven 231b Qnicom pressure type mines. All were blown in place.

Cc 27 November, the Platoon was engaged in repairing a ford site -t XT625809and during this operation two engineers wore WIA. The remainder of Novemberwas spent conducting daily mine sweeps in the An loc/Loc Ninh re,.

The first part of December was spent reconning for bridge and ford sites andconducting d.ily mine sweep operations. Ck 13 and 17 December, the Platoonspread a total of 50 gallons of permia-.prine on a landinf sone at XU738062.During this period, the engineers served as security for vrious miesions--water point security, modical evacu-.tion security, and security for MI de-tVchnents engsged in interrogating villagers.

Ch January first, the 2nd Platoon constructed a radar control emplacementfor II Field Force Artillery Units at Xt738063. From 6 through 8 January,the engineers were engaged in t a construction of a class 60 tinber trestlebridge at 1'7,2106. Following copletion of the bridge, the Plotoon moved toFSB Dennis and continued corstruction and enlargement of th-t base. On 28January, the Platoon departed FSB Dennis for Toy Ninh and arrived there withthe 1st Squzdron on 31 January.

(c) Ch 30 October, tho 3rd Platoon conducted r reconn-issncemission in the vicinity of XT624815, surveying possible ford sites nd chock-ing the serviceability of an already existing B-iley Bridge. On 9 Novemberthe Platoon was attached to M Compny and conducted reconnaissance operationsfor ford sites in the vicinity of X76483. From 11 to 15 November, the engi-neers constructed a crossing site at XZ37828. For the rem.inder of Novaber,the Platoon provided mine sweep opercaions in the An Loc area.

From 16 to 19 December, the 3rd Platoon constructed a Class 60 timber trestlebridge at Xf682901. OC 27 December, they moved to FSB J nke to make improve-menta on that position. Uhile at FSB Jake, the engineers pulled security andplaced a barrier across the strc.m to protect the newly constructed bridgefrom ch-rges floating down the stream.

During the month of Jonuary, the Platoon was involved in the reinforcementof the wire entanglement around FSB Joke, using 66 rolls of concertin . wire.They lso cut trees around the base to iprove fields of fire. Oa 25 Jan-uary, the engineers constructed ford sites along the Prek Trou River.

(d) During the month of November, the 4th Platoon w!s OPCONto the 2nd Squadron and was involved in d.ily mine sweep operations. Fro-i29 December to 14 January, the Platoon w-s loeted at Quan loi, %se Cnnp for a

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC.WE 18 Febru-try 1970SUBJECM Cerational Report of 11th Armored Cavnlry Reamont for Period

Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

maintenance stand down. While there, they participated in a variety of pro.Jecte to improve the base canp area. On 14 January, the Platon deptrtedQunn Ifi and was reloc-ted at FSB &rth. From 15 Janunry to the end of thereporting period, the engineers were engaged in daily mine swe.ps along QL 14Ato Be Due. No mines were found during this tine.

C 21 Jqnux7, the 4th Platoon wag involved in a major engngement as part of2nd ftuvdrp. Jhe engineers discovered -md destroyed ten 61 x 8' emy bunkers.Though the fighting vs heavy, the engineers suffered no cmaualtles.

On R9 Juc uy, the 4th Platoon moved to FSB W-de where they remained throughthe end-of the reporting period.

(3) Base Camp Development: During the qu-xter, the 919th ftineorCo=mcn (Armored) was engaged in several projects designed to improve the de-fenses zf Qunai Base Camp. Much of this work was concentrated in the Redand Blue Sectors of Bose Defense and consisted of utiliing th6 equiyment,organic to the engineer unit for the construction and improvement of bunkersand enplacoments.

In addition to conaidorations of defense, the 919th Engineers were respen-sible for the adminstration of the Regimentrl S-4 yard from which were issueda multdtude of materinls. Initially, it was the practice of the unit to londrequested materi,-I using equipzent as reqir l by the size and weight of theitem. Since the first of the year, howevar, the demands of the elements inthe field prohibit the continuance of such an operation. This alteraticn innormal procedure resulted in no appreciable degeneration of S-4 yard procedures.

5, (C) CalBAT SERVICE SUPCRT:

(1) Generals During the reporting period, combat service sup-pert shoved signifiennt improvement in almost all ares. Since the beginningof the quarter, there has been a complete rotation of logistics personnel.This his resulted in an influx of nev ideas rnd techniques with emphvisplaced on identifying problem areas and establishing a usable systen to copeith these deficiencies.

Te results of this effort, both in maintenance and supply, hs produced amere effective systa for the management of the Regiment's resources. Actualdetails as to where these improvements were made ilU be discussed in the

emainder of this section.

(2) Supply W and inten-mee:

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC..WE 18 Februiry 1970SUBJECT: Oporational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Reginent for Period

Biding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR.65 (RI)

(a) Class I - Food: During the reporting period the Clnss Iresupply was accomplished in much the some way as during the previous period.All food stuffs wore through-put from Long Binh to the 1 5th S&S Bnttnlionin Qan Loi by means of a daily convoy. Units then drew their raw rationsas well as their "C's" and prepared them here at Quan Loi for shipment tocombat trains locations in the field. This procedure was extremely suit-bloto the needs of the Regiment rnd no major problem areas were encountered.

Suggested -are.s of improvement: It was felt by many units th't the dispos-able food containers should be reintroduced into the supply system. Itsparticular effectiveness becomes apparent when nnother unit becomes OPCONto the Regimcnt. Wth a short'ge of the mernite metal enns, it is not nlwr-yspossible to supply another unit fro. our own resources. This p-rticul-rlytrue of an infantry c,,pany. The disposable mernite can offers two ver'practical solutions in that it serves as a container in which to keep foodhot, and it eliminates the need for backhiuling the empty moti'l heruite c-ns.

(b) Class II and VII - Clothing and 116'or Did Items: Nomajor problems were encountered in the area of Class II supp.lies. A new policywas established for the replacement of clothing within USARV in thtt -11types of clothing become obtain-ble only on a direct exch'nge bnsis. Thisproduced some difficulties for units at firstj however, the policy is nowaccepted .vnd scams to bo working satiaf-ctorily.

In the ClMass VII category there are still some difficulties with regnrd tovehicle replncement. The following vehicles are still short within to Reg-iment and, although we hwvo received some relief on several of the itens, westill -ze not stisfiod with the fill we are getting:

Carrier Cargo 6-ton M548

Truck Cargo 5-ton M54A2

Truck, Utility $-tton M151Al

Flamethrower Service Unit 5E (Note: This item isno longer baing shipped to RVN units.)

The problems encountered with the Self-propellod Howitzor M09 has been e,sedsomowh-it and replacement vehicles are now available within depot stock. Unitsare nov ch-'nging over from the M106 46rtnr Carrier to the M125 'rtar Cirrior.Second Squadron, 11th ACR, has been completely outfitted with the new weipon.The 1st Squadron hns ilre-.dy drawn their 81= mortars rand ere now awaitingVe carriers.

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC.WE 18 Februnry 1970SUBJECT: Opor-tional Report of 11th Armored C-valry Rgimcnt for Perlod

Biding 31 JThnuary 1970 RCS CSFOR165

(c) Class III - POL: Problems were encounterud with the15th S&S &T.ttalion in th-.t they wore un-,ble to meet the needn of tf- Regiaontfor certain critical items of POL- OF-30, OHC, nd LSA. In ordrr to solvethis problem och squadron was aiskcd to provide a listing of -. ll POL productsused and their weekly expenditures. This informition w-9 then eonsolid-tedand a copy w's forwarded to the 3rd FSSE as a required stock- ge level for the11th Armored Cavalry Rogiraent. Since this nction, no problers hovo beenencountered.

(d) Class IV - Construction -tnd Barrier 'Iqteri-l: Construc-tion %nd b,-rrier material, although in limited sunply, his not been ft problemduring the post three months. All comm-.nd controlled items, such as concer-tin,% wire, chain link fence, nnd engineer stokes, hlve been controlled zt Reg.imental level and, generally, all needs have been net. Recentli, the Regi-.entwas given an allocation for all i: '11 size lumber and plywood. Reauests forthese itams come through the Regimental S-4 rnd are screened for vrlidity.Requests are then sent to the NEE in Bien He- for processing -nd ship'ent.This syster is functioning well and so far all reouests h-we ba-in filled pro-pt-

(e) Class V - Ammunition: The short,ge of cert'dn ".mmuni-tion It ts pftsented a significant problem during the rerorting period. Oneitem, G900, Incendiary Grenade, was critically short. Asistnnce w-'s re-quested frcx II Field Force and additional quantities were M-'de avnil-ble,Another item, green bag propellant charges for the 155mm Howitzer proiectile,were in continual short supply nt Qu-n Loi. This resulted in several in-st-inces of stringent control on artillery fires. Continuous monitoring of thestockige levels at the ASP enabled us to anticipate these problems and requestassistance before they impaired our capabilities. Additionatl co-. nr.d emph-sison ASR controls enabled the Regiment to operate within its .SR on nost itemswithout major difficulty.

(f). Aerial Resupply: The primar meerns of resupply con-tinued to be by 'ir. Fixed wing resupply wns utilived to its m-hinum c p'bil-ity into ill prim.r.y log ports, -nd then moved from the port by hook (CH-L7)or by overl.'nd convoy.

Blaide time continued to be a problem with the Regiment consistentl'r orer fly-ing its rillottod time of 15 hours. In order to -llei-'te this problem, a newcontrol systam wns initiated. Essentially, each unit is given -. block ofhours for each day, instead of a number of sorties. The burden is then plncedon the unit to ncrke the mnximum utili.ation of the aircraft in the tine allot-ted. So fa r, this progran has worked well nd the problem seems to hrve beensolved.

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/

CONFIDENTIALAVTC.WE 18 Febru-ry 1970SUBJECT: Opcrtional Rport of 11th Armorfd CiiIrv Reginent for Pvrio

Ring 31 .J-.nuary 1970 RCS CSFOR.65 (Ri)

(g) Maintenanco: During the nurter, increased cormndemphusis r,;sultod in significant improvements in the effoctivencss of theRegiment's irJIntcn-nco program. An iugmentation to the S-4 section of inadditionil cr.ptain to handle the daily administrntion of the m-intnrnceofficor hin allowod the maintenance officer to devote his tine %nd efforttoward the inprovenont of the maintonnnce program. During J'.nu--7, an ex-tensive revicw of the system wns conpleted. The problem areas identifiedwere: lack of spocific, form-i mnintenance stnndrrds; the squ-dron's PLL'sare too lrgc nnd do not appear to be responsive to requirements; -nd, theTAERS systeri is not being utilized. Specific solutions -re being develor edand will be implcnentod during the next reporting period.

Repair parts supply has becomo increasingly more critical during this period.This shortage has included most rnajor assemblies and direct exchange itu.is.A list of the most critical rep!ir itns w-s developed by e-ch of the seu-d-rons nd consolidated at Rogimntal level. This list is presently beingchecked against .l). PLL's to identify those items th't -re critical trough-out the Roginent ind to insure thit they are on vnlid requisition.

b. Yedical:

(1) Significant diseases diagnosed during the qu.nrter are -sfollows:

AD'IIN RATE PR-EVIOUSDISEASE PER/1000/fEM QUARTER

Infectious Hepatitis 1.82 2.71

M-a.nri a 130.62 84.74

Dicrrhon 9.06 35.34

Venereal 150.22 157.47

Derntologica. 17.23 23.62

(2) The most significant problen encountered during the ouirterwas the increase in the number of cases of malaria within the 11th AC, par-ticularly the relatively high percentage of Z. y c-ses as compared to thetotal number of mrlaria cases. Admissions to USRV hospitals alone were largerthan any other reportable ctegory, including those hospitAlized as a resultof battle action.

The following rre 4alaria statistics for the reportable period:

25CONFIDENTIAL

Ill i~i II • U II I I I II I

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CONFIDENTIAL

"VIC.WE 18 February 1970

SUBJECTs Operational Report of 11th Ariiored Cav-ary Regiment for the Periodbiding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFO%.,65 (R1)

TOTAL C;.SES F. vivu % P. vivax

November 55 17 31

December 49 17 35

Jnnuar 41 24 59

(3) At the request of the Commanding Officer, "llth.'.CR, . survey

was in-da of the evacuation capacity of the medica.pl.toons of e-ch srudron,It was found that the tank conpiny of each souadron did not have an evacuation

track (.-113) for its company aidmen to conduct medical oper-tions. The lick

of a K-113 evacuation track often forced the company nidmen to ride inside or

on the outside of a tank during comb'at operations. In addition, there is no

way for the aidnen to adequately protect casualties from further in urv from

small arms fire, except to load the patient into an adjacent tank, often ere..

ating further complications. This problem wns solved by obt-Aning a M.-113

evacuation track for the tank company on a 180 day tempora-, loan, which was

based on the "health of the sick and injured troops" who were exposed to the

elevients of hostile fire. The addition of this 14-113 evacuation tr-'ck to e-ch

of the tan! companies has received extrenely favorable coments. It is recon-

mended that an ade.itional 14-113 be added to the medical platoon, arrored cav-

alry squadron, for the tank company of that element in any future TOE chnnges.

(4) Bvacuation of ths injured b- helicopter has not recentl,7 bcen

a problem in the 11th ACR due to the excellent coverage provided by the Air

Ambulance Plc.toon, 15th Medical Battalion, 1st Cavalrj Division (Y). However,it was noted that when units were placed outside the operrting area of the

15th Medical Battalion, there have been instances of considerable del- in

evacuating patients from air ambulance units that operated strictly on a basis

of geographical area coverage rather than assigned to cover specific units.

With the projected withdrawal of troop units, the 11th ACR will prob-blv

operate independently of division units that have org-nic air rnbul-nce support.

To meet this situation, an air ambulance detachment should be considired as

an Augentation or integral part of the TOE of the 37th Medic-i Comr-ni-, 11th

Armored Cvalry Regiment.

6. (FOUO) pERSOYANL AND .DMINISTRAITION:

a. Stegt: The Regiment's overall strength picture is very good.

Our current aggregate strength is 4470, putting us at 99.8V of our authorized

strength. The Regiment is at 110% on officer strength. The following are

strength figures by month:

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC-VE 18 February 1970SUBJECTs OperationUL Rcport of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period

%d1ing 31 January 1970 RCS CSPOR-65 (Mi)

NOV 4 0244(7 23

DEC 4384 4403 21

JAN 4.74 44.20 28

Casualties:z

WHA I4HA "a~ NBW

xx12 149 0 4 18

9 82 0 0 7

JAN 6 64 0 1 20

b. k~~gan.

I!0S AU D PERCETAGE

12 B Engineer 120 112 93 .3

13 B Artillery 72 4461.1

31 GComo ia df 22, 17 77.2

31 B Radio Hoch 38 28 77.7

c. Renlagwrents: The over-fl quality of the Regiment'sa replacomiefltsIs- good. They seem to be more attentive and more eiger to lerVrn. The en-viroxment probably has a lot to do vith this fttti'tude.

d. -Awgrd, and Decorations:

(1) Statistical Swnnry of US Aw'~ds:

"WARD APPROVED PiMNING

Modal of Honor 1 2

Distinguished Service Cross 1 3

Legion of Krit 41

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC.W3 18 February 1970SUBECT Ope.rationaxl Paport of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Poriod

biding 31 Janua~ry 1970 RCS CSMR-65 (RI)

Silver Star 52 17

Distinguished Flying Cross 10 6

Soldiers Modal 3 1

Bronze. Star, Service 233 112

Air Mdal 135 109

Arty~ Comendt'tion, Service 733 208

Bronze Star, Valor 186 76

Air Medal, Valor 15 7

Army Co=.endation, Valor 137 31

(2) Statistical Stmnxay or Vietnamlese Awards:

AMA APOMMMN

Natiounal Order of 2 1RVN, 5th Class

Army Dist'd Service 2 0Order, 2nd Class

Staff Service 1Mdal, lot Clans

Gallantry Cross 1 0vith Pl

Galatry Cross a 0VihGold Stor

Gallantry Croesa 65 7with Si.lm Star

Gallantry Cros 83 5vith Bronze Star

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CONFIDENTIAL18 F bruorv 1970

SUBJECT: operatioI' Report of 11 t rmored Cavalry Reginent for Period

Rding 31 Jnuary 1 70 RCS CSFCP-65 (RI)

A-WM OED NqMNG

Arned Forces Honor 27 19

d l. , 1st Class

Arnee. Forces Honor 9 15

Vedalp 2id 1;11.sP

Civle Act. nz Honor 1

.. od da 18t Class

Civic Acti. i'f 0 2

Modal, 2nd '. a-

Aror Badg:: 13 4

(1) Courts.,.f"til. Statust FNDNC ONTICTy ONS pEDIqG

General 0 0 0

Special 21 18 0

&= -ry 0 0

(2) Offenfes:

lICK ATCLE No. NO. UTIJ CHAGED NO T cTIfON!S

86 1 Q

89 0 290 291 3

90

1080109 1

113 1 1121 2 1

134 6 5

S. (FOUO) pSYCHLOGICA. 0PEJrAI0S:** : The pot three no~h5 hnve seen - continu-ll*" efettiveCme ~~~ 7nd pat thehonhnav Of ion l

pSIOP's program conducted by tha Rogiment. Orer two and a h-1 nilion le, -

lets have boon dropped and 135 hours of aerial broadener missions flovn.

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC.Ia 18 Febru-,ry 19/?0SUBJECT: Operational Deport of 11th Arnored Cnvalry Raigjnt for Period

Wing 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

decline in leaflet drops and aerial nissions Is noted by the lack of enemyactivii within the T I.

b. &N ers: The Qdeu Hoi Program received the largest anount ofaerial loudapecker tine with leaflet gnd loudspeaker missions being flownduring and fter every contact. A ground tactical mission was conducted inWar Zone C during Operation Texas Traveler in late November. This was doneto deternino the effectiveness of conducting Qtieu Hoi broadcn.sts from nightdefensive positions. Pdditionally, Qieu Hoi missions were flown on r11intelligence missions.

During the reporting period, the Regiment received three ralliors. This fig-

ure is low because most ralliers h:%ve a fear of rallying to US units. It iswell to nto that during this s-me period, Binh Long Province is creeited withover 200 ralliers. A great many of these have stated thnt loudepeikur mis-siens and leaflots had a large impct on their decision to rally.

€. ) lnin Incidents- An extensive effort was r-de to combat miningincidents on QL 13 in November and December with specinal lez M-lets and tapesprovided to stop the minings. This effort helped reduce the number of civ-ilians injured and killed on the highway. Tis proved extremely vlu-bleand resulted in one mcmber of the VC Mining Tem rallying to the ,?egi-"nt.

An attitude of cooperation has boon noted among the popul:Ation within the tO.The eontinuod input of information :s to enem units vnd locations of minesand booby traps, ns well as the acceptance of GVN programs, reflects theirwillingness to cooperate.

S. (FGUO) CIVIC ACTI'h:

a. General: Civic action activities during the quarter were co..tin-

ued at the increased rate reached during October. Through the joi..l effortof the Regimental S-5, 37th Medical Company and 541st Military IntelligenceDetachment, the Integrated Civic Action Program (ICAP) was expanded. Over

15,000 civilians received medical treatment and significant intelligence wasgained. The program was carried out in the An Loc and Loc Ninh Districts of

Binh Long Province, and the Bo Duc District of Phuoc Long Province.

The Regiment was engaged in the Joint project of construction of a d-y roomfor the Binh long Provincial Hospital. The day room was ccnpleted in erlyDecember. Othor civic action proects consisted of bridge and road rerair,distribution of foodstuffs, and the construction of playground equipment -ndthe iwrov=mt of schools.

b. Camodities Distributed:

Food 1,400 lbs.

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC.W P. 16 Februury 1970SUBJECT: Orationcl Report of 11th Armored Cavelry Regiment for Period

Wins 31 Januxy 1970 RCS CSFO.65 (Rl)

CUI0ITIES IISMhIBUTED*

clothing 325 lbs.

Health Itmas 375 lbs.

Cment 1050 lbs.

Tin 75 sheets

lbr 2000 bd. ft.

Paint 25 gal.

Send 400 lbs.

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

1. (C) LESSONS IEMAf~ :

a. Personnel: None.

b. Oberr~ons:

(1) OBSEVATION: There is a need for ' new rnti-mining device.

LPWUATION: Over the years weather conditions have c'usedmines to soop into the ground along infrequently used tils and rords. Thedepth of the mines makes them undetectable to present day mine sweepingdevices. Becwaus of the depth and ago of the mines, it is not uncommon forseveral vehicles to pass over them before they finally detonate.

R3CG!NDATION: Recommend that a new anti-mining devicebe considered for doveloptnont to counter the present problem.

(2) 03MAT : Constant pressure must be maintained duringengagements with VC/NVA forces.

EVALU2.TION: 'hile being supported by another troop during Ccont-Lct, a troop ocmmtnder disengaged his entire troop to medivac his wounded.This practioe can cause supporting units to becoe extramely vulnerrable.

REMMENDATION: Do not disengnge an entire troop to medivicwounded.

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVICWE 18 February 19708URD Tt O"ratonal Report of 11th Azored Cavalry Regi,-.ent for Period

&iding 31 January 1970 RCS CSFO65 (RI)

(3) MW_A.ON: Recently, because of a late sweeping oper'tion,a unit established a hasty NDP during the hours of total darkness. No triptlaes or Cl.ymes were set out.

EVALUATI: This practice can cause MP's to becore ex-traeely vulnerable to enem sapper attacks.

R C* MEDAI : Units must assixe a solid defensive posturewhenever establishing NDP's.

(4) OBSERVATION: Because sufficient time for nxintennnce to beconducted was not given prior to a squadron.size road march, eleven vehiclesdeveloped nechanical difficulties.

NrALUATIO-. If prior harning Md been given, a concentrrtedmaintenance effort could have been lucted.

RECO NDATIONs ' ,ned, where tactically feasible, th.t72 hours of conoentrated n-%intenance ue the prereuisite for e-cessivelV longsquadrorp-ie road marches.

(5) MSEWATION: Basic skills are not used but nre still thekey to success.

EUALUATION: In armored cavalry units the basic skills demon-strated by the individual are still essential to achieve success.

RWCCRAZM: Recocnend that basic skills be stressedduring all phases of training.

(6) OQBSERVATICU: Aggressive and constnnt patrolling keeps theenemy off guard. I

:1 Aggressiveness during patrollintg keeps the eneL7from establishing positions and often pre-eapts his planned attacks.

MOI-MMATION: Recommend to continue aggressive and con-stant patrolling.

(7) MERMUON: AP's are net effective if noise .n lightdisciplie ore not maintained.

IVAL9T : During the past quarter, the effectiveness ofarbush patrols has suffored from the lack of proper noise and light discipline.

RE3G42NDATM: Reommsnd that the basic principles of ra-

bush patrols be stressed in training.

32

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC-.WE 18 Fabrurry 1970SUBJECT: COrational Report of 11th Armored Cnv-JIry Rogfient for Period

baiding 31 J.-muory 19c70 RCS CSFM-65 (RI)

(8) 0BSERVATIO : Regional Forces in demrmd.

EVATXATION: Because of the progress of the RF inf-ntry comn.-p'inioa, sqturon commannjders now request more combined operations.

(9) OBSfltVATICK: Armored vehicles suffer from r: ndo mining.

EV.'LATICi: It has become quit* orr.on for tr-cka to belost while busting jungle. Since it is not practic-. to mine sweep whilebusting junele, the VC/NVA random mining tactics ha-ve been costly.

'COkt]DATION: There is n need for the developrent of a.track mountod mine detector,

(10) CBEVAIN On 20 January 1970, aLOH wets shot down ne!'.ra rge, open lcninxg zone.

EVAWATION: The normal procedure when -%.*-idrcr-.ft is shotdown is to scramble the Aero Rifle Platoon (ARP)*. If the 10lH pilot ha-d notbeen rescued heroically by n Cobra pilot, the Arp would hfav.e sprung an NVAcrmbush. The geographical setting in this instance should h-%ve mnde cowlaxiderssuspicious.

c. Trrinig: None.

d. Inelrne

(1) OBSERVATI N: Increased eniny mining.

WiAIDATICKI: Enemay mining incidents h-ive sharply incrensedduring the quarter, and at times mining was the only snow~ initit.ted activit-directed at the Regiment. Approximately one out of every three mining in.cidents results in either casualties or damage to Allied equipment. Theindividuals or groups responsible for the mine laying, except in ra.re insta.nces,are um identified and imnlocr.ted.

RCO*rODAMIN :phasis should be platced on more of'ectiveand frequent mine sweeping of roads, as well nos the Volunteer Inform-tnt Pro-gram in order to identify where the mines are and who is 1l-ing them. Moredismounted ambush patrols should be used since tanks and ACAV's are too noisyfor AP's.

(2) OBW-M Increased use of sappers.

EVAIAJATON: In recent months, saprer atta-cks have been on

33CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIALAVIC.E I8 Fabrunry 1970SUBJECT: Opurtional Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regisent for Period

1hding 31 January 1970 RCs CSFM-65 (Ri)

the inroeaso in III CTZ. In mary cres, the enemy has been successful inpenetrating defensive perimeters. Prisoner interrogations r id dociriont rend-Outs indicato that the onmy is making a concerted effort to trnAn al, or itleast - portion, of its units in sapper and specinl action techninuos.

RECO.MND:.TION: Comprehensive training progrms should beinitiated to troin personnel in the effective methods of countering the sapper.More effort should also be expended in fcr ifying semi-perzirment fire supportbases.

(3) OBSERVATION: Decrease in the number of prisoners .nd docu-meats captured.

EVAMUATION: As engagements with the enemy decrease, so dothe number of prisoners and documents captured. Since these are -- primtrysource of immodiately exploitable infom-.tion, this void must be filled.

REC MDTION: More emphneis should be placed on psycho-logical operations, especially those oriented toward loctl guerillas.

(4) OESERVATION: Problems of visualizing now irens of operation.

EVALUATION: A picture is worth a thousand rvps.

RPCCHC DTION: Continue the use of hand held aerinl photo-graphy by tr-ined ima-gory interpretitionporsonnel of the 5A1st MD to pro-vide cormn.andors with more realistic viewo of terrain, roads, and vill ,ges.

(5) OBSEV4TION: &emy freodom of movement in border -.re-s.

EVALUATION: AO Shortstop hns rarely stopped or even curtailedthe movement of enemy forces along border -re's in Binh long Province.

P!CQWDATICN: Devices tht restrict or might tone to re-strict a novA~ent also restrict llied movement elon? the border. AOShortstop hes beeo proven not to be effective in limiting enetw movxr'ent. In-stead, it heA brought the border closer to the populated areas of Binh longProvince.

e. A: OBSERVATION: There is insufficient ho-vy e,uii.ent* transporter cap.bility .vailable to support the Regiment.

EVALUATION: Throughout the reporting period, exten-sive del?s were encountered in delivery of replicement vehicles -.nd of cor'b-.tloss and ra-Jntennnce avacuition vehicles due to a lack of tr-narorters. Thiz

34

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC.WE 18 February 1970SUBJECT: orational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period

hiding 31 Januory 1970 RCS CSFOL65 (RI)

problem resulted in Increasod down time on de'dlined vehicles roquiring DSa-dntenance at Long RIM and nenvailbility of replacement vehicles to com-bat units. Although all support units have cooperated to the mnximum extentpossible, it appears that sufficient assets are Just not av'iltable. 7hisproblem has been presented to II Field Force, Vietnam.

RVCKMDATO : That this problem be evaluatod at let logis-tical Cozmnmd level to determine if the most effective utill-m-tion is beingmade of existing assets and if additional trmizporters are required.

f. g : None.

g. ,lnl,, None.

h. BAe Ca=, Doveloment: None.

I. MsCF/Mic Action:

(1) 0B§MJT'Nt PS0P in suprort of contacts are continuouslyineffective because the speaker aircraft are forced to work in and aroundartillery, gunships, and TAC Air.

WAM&TI : This creates an atmosphere of confusion andenemy soldiors cannot hear the full content of the essage being broadc-st.

"MCOMATIC: Mat when the tactical situation permtits,the PSYCP effort be allowed a period of time in which to broadcast theie sage.

(2) !MSWATION: Increased accurate intelligence is gatheredfr ICAP's.

EAI : local populace gains the feeling of helpful-ness hdu giving inforation and feels more Involved in GO.

PMCK=ATIO: ICAP's should be conducted daily of ascheduled bsis. Rr, PF or ARVN zdedical personnel should be used *ere pos-sible for the treatment of civilians. 3.-the-Job training san be given byacconpaiying US nedical pmftonnel.

35

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC WE 18 February 1,970SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period

Pading 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

FOR THE COWANDER:

4s DOMINIC R. BCKGIORII (was1LTACIncl 2 wd HQ. DA iLT, AGC

hasist~at Adjutant

DISTRIBUTIcOf:I OC2 CINC USARPAC3 CO, USARV1 CH, USARV; CG, II FFV3 CG, 1st CAV DIV (AM)1 USAIS1 USAARMSI USAAR1M1 Azmy War College1 USACGSC1 CO, 11th ACR1 XO, 11th ACR1 Staff$ 11th ACRI CO, lt Sqdn, 11th ACR1 CO, 2nd Sqdn, 11th ACRI CO, 3rd Sqdn, 11th ACRI CO, Air Cay TMrp, 11th ACR6 28th NHD, 11th ACR

36

CONFIDENTIAL

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AVDAM7-DT (18 Feb 70) lot IndSUBJLCTs Operational Report of 11th Amored Cavalry 'Leint for I-eriod

Ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSF(I-65 (RI)

DA, lit Cavalry Division (Atiiobile), ATrN, ACoS, G3, APO San Francisco96490 = Mar 70

TOt Commanding General, II Field Force, ATTHN AVFBC-RE-H, APO San1Pa-cisoo 96266

This headquarters has reviewed anl oonc~tre with the Operational Report -Lessons Learned for the quarterly period endine 31 January 1970 from thc11th Amorfd Cavalry Reciment.

FOR TH CC1.2hMDER:

Asst AG

CF:DA ACSFOR

37

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AVYB-Fi (18 rob 70) 2nd IndSUBJECTs Orational Report of 11th Armred Cavalry Regiment for Period

Iding 31 Janary 1970, RCS CSFCR-65 (R2)

DA, HQ II FFGCIV, APO San Francisco 96266, 20 Mar 1970

THRU Cmmnding Gseral, US ArM Vietnam, ATTNs AVHC(DST), APO 96375

Comnder-in-Chief, US Azr Pacific, ATTN GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TOs Asaistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArm, Wuhingt=n, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewwd and concurs vith the Operational Report -

Ienone Lared of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regizeint for the period ending31 January 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W .BARTEL JR$CPT, AGCAzat AG

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CO;--NFIDENTILAL -

AVHEC-DST (18 Feb 70) 3d IndSUBJECTs 'Operational Report of Ith Axwred Cavalry Regiment for Period

Eding 31 January 1970 RCS CZFOR-65 (R1)

Headquarters, United States Amy, Vietnam, APO San Prancisco 96375 0 9 APR 1970

T0s Commander in Chief, United States ArMy, Pacific, ATTI11 GPOP-DT,AMO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learnedfor the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 11thArmored Cavalry Regiment and concurs with the comments of indorsingheadquarters.

2. Comments follows

a. (u) Reference item concerning "Class VII Category", page 23,

par-agraph 5a(2) (b) s

(I) Reference Carrier Cargo 6 Ton M548 and 5 Ton Series Truck, page 23,paragraph 5a(2)(b)t nonconcur. Assets are available; however, this unit hasno requisitions on the above items. Unit has been so advised.

(2) Reference Truck, Utility, i Ton M151: concur. This headquartershas been advised future availability of truck, ton M151 series vehicle iscontingent upon AMC testing of the new MI51A2 model.

b. ,(U) Reference item conccrning "Inzufficient Maintenance Time", page32, paragra;h lb(4)i concur. Sufficient maintenance time should be givenprior to a squadron-size road march. Hovever, there is no substitute for asound spr~anization maintenance program in order to maintain a high state ofcombat readiness during the unpredictable situations encountered in RI.No action by USARPAC or DA recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Increased Use of Sappers", page 33,paragraph ld(2)i concur. "COSVN Resolution 9" includes the statement thatsapper activity is to be used extensively in tactical operations. Programto train personnel in the effective methods of countering the sapper shouldbe encouraged. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion inthe next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA orUSARPAC is recommended.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Problems of Visualizing New Areas ofOperation", page 34, parmgraph ld(4)s concur. The use of hand-heldphotography can be a valuable aid to the coamander. The primary advantageof this pronram is the rapid reaction that can be provided to the commanders'request. It must be remembered, however, that image interpreters do notreceive formal training in the operation of hand-held cameras. Therefore,if image interpreters are selected to perform this function, some OJT naybe required, Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion inthe next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or-USARPAC is reco"mended, DOMOU1 AT 3 YB MIMS;

CONFIDENTIAL M

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C€ONFIDEN TIAL

Ar-rDS (18 Fa~b 70) 3d IndSM a Opert!oni1 ReDport of tith Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period

Nading )I January 1970 RCS CSMO-65 (RI)

e. (U) Befermwce item concerning "Insufficient Heavy Equipment

Transporter Capability", page 34, paragraph ei concur. There is a current

shortage of 50 Ton Eemitrailer transporters. This shortage is expected to

continue until Sep 70. Smaller capacity transporter trailers are not generally

in critical sup y; howver, no additional comment can be made since this

report does noL are sptclfic types. Unit has been so advieed.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Increased Accurate Intelligence is

Gathered From ICAP's", page 35, paragraph 1(2): nonconcur. A policy of

conducting ICAF's d ily on a scheduled basis would be a violation of CPS2C.

It would be an open invitation to enemy units within the area to coincide

a ground/a.rtillery attack on an area where the populace would congregate.Unlee. the ICAP team trvels by air, the danger of enemy ambueh is very

real. The enemy can &lso threatan the populace to stay away. In verysecure aream, little danger exints from regularly scheduled daily visits.In remote or semi-secure aiva.2, however, it is recommended that the notifi-

cation of an IC.-U viit be disseninated by an aircraft with loudspeakers,approximately one hour befo.* the rriva. of the team. No action by DA or

USARPAC is reczar.-It

PM2 TIM C0VAnTU7Ts

QyfrC CPT,

11th AC~~ It nt Adj,;=tztCee''

IQ, C, i/ To

.. A CONFIDENTIAL

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GPOP-DT (18 Feb 70) 4th Ind (U)SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Ilth Armored Cavalry Regiment for

Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (Ri)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Stoff for Force Development, Department of the

Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COWANDER IN CHIEF:

I CPT, 'AGAsat AG

41

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-- ----------

CONFIDENTIALAnneax A

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

11 th 2=1--, rv Reznn

Headquarters and Headquarters Trooi,Air Cavalry Troop919th' Engineer Cocmpany (Armored)

*1LOth Maintenance Battal.ion*506th Supply and Service Company

1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Ydlitary Police Battalion5th Field Tam Gdtpany B, 6th PSYOP Battalion7th Arsv' Postal UnV;17 th Public Information Detachm~ent28th Mlitary History Detachment33rd Cheinica-. Deta,-hmaent124th Composite Support Maintenance Detachment202nd Mlitary Intelligence Deta~chment398th Transportation Detachment409th Radio Research Unit541st Military Intelligence Detachment

Headquatrters and Headquarters TroopA TroopB TroopC TroopD CompanyHowitzer Battery

Headquarters an!i Headquartes TroopE TroopF TroorG TroopH ConpanyHowitzer Battery

Headquarters and Headcnurtaers TroopI D:OopK TroopL TroopM CanaryrHowitzer Battery

*Attached support unit

Incl I9

CONHFID ENI AL

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CONFIDENTIAL

Annex C TASK ORGANIZATICN

1. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was O(CON to the lst Cavalry Division(AM) during the entire quarter.

2. Heudquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regimnet:

a. During the reporting period the following major units were OPCON to' the11th ACR for the periods indicated:

UNIT PFRIOD

1/11 ACR 1 Nov - 30 Jan2/11 ACR 1 Nov - 31 Jan3/11 ACR 1 Nov- 31 JanC/2-7 Cav 24-28 NovD/2-7 Cav 24-28 Nov1st Co, 1/9 ARVN Regt 4-5 Jan2nd Cc, 1/9 ARVN Regt 4-5 JanD/1- 5 Caw 7-17 JanHQ, 14th Cc, 4/9 ARVN Regt 8-9 JanC/1-5 Caw 17-29 Jan

b. During the reporting period the following units were GS to the 11th ACRfor the period indicated:

UNIT PUIOD

A/6-27 Arty 1 Nov - presentC/2-12 Arty 1 Nov - presentD/2-12 Arty 1 Nov - presentC/2-13 rty 1 Nov - present0/6-27 Arty 2 Jan - presentA/1,21 Arty 27-29 Jan

c. During the reporting peeiod the 964th &gineer Comnany was DS to the11th ACR from 3 December 1969 to 25 January 1970.

3. HQ, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment"

a. F/2/11 ACR was OPCCN to 1/11 ACE from 8-9 November 1969.

b. The 1/11 ACR was not CPCCN to the 11th ACR from 30 January to the endof the reporting period. During this time 1/11 ACR was 0PCON to the 1st Bde,lot Cavalry Division (AM) at Tay Ninh.

c The following organic troop/company site units of 1/11 ACR were notunder its operational control during the period indicated-

1/3Inl 13 CONFIDENTIAL

I,=

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IMU 2 L-N TO

C/1/11 ACR 4-6 Iov 31i ACRB/1/11 ACR 9-24 Nov 2/11 S AC/1/11 ACR 12-13 Nov 371 ACRB/1/11 ACR 21 ov - 20 Dec 3rd Bde, lst Cay Div ()C/i/11 ACR 19.30 Dec 3rd Bde) 1st Car Div (A:1)D/1/11 ACR 5-31 Jan 199th Lt Inf Bde

d. Task Force ABE: Task Force ABE was a special task organization underthe operational control of the 1st Bde, lst Cavalry Division (A) A/i/11 ACRand Ccamnnd Group comprised Task Force ABE to secure the 501st Ii'nd ClenringCompany from 13 to 30 Jcnuary.

4. HQ,% 2nd Squadron, 1ith Arnored Cavalry Reginent:

a. During the indicated period the following troop/corpan, size unitswere (DS) OPCON to the 2/11 ACR:

UNIT PERIOD

B/1/11 AC 9-24 NovB/1-12 Cav 4-20 DecD/1-12 Cav 4-27 DecIst Co, 1/9 ARVN Regt 4-5 Jan2nd Go, 1/9 ARVN Regt 4-5 JanD/1 -5 Cay 7-i7 Jan984th Ihgr Co (DS) 3 Dec - 25 JanC/1-5 17 Jan -29 Jan

b. The following troop/company size units were not under the operationalcontrol of 2/11 ACR during the periods indict.ted:

PEI0 CIPCON TO

F/2/11 ACR 8-9 Nov 1/1i ACEF/2/11 ACR 9 Nov - 19 Dec 3rd Bde, ISt Cay Div (UM)G/2/li ACR 20-26 Dec 3rd Be, Ist Cay Div (A")B/2/11 AC 26Dec-7 Jan 3rd Bde, lot CavDiv ()

5. HQ, 3rd Squ-dron, 11th Arnored Cavalry Rcginent:

a. The following units were OPCfJ to 3/11 ACR dining the periodsindicated:

C/i/li ACR 4-6 NovC//11 ACR 12-13 NovC/2.-7 CVay 24-28 NovD/2-7 Cav 24-28 NovHQ, 14th Co, 4/9 ARVII Regt 8-9 Jonp r

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b. The following organic troops /comrinnes were not undor ti-e operational

control of 3/11 ACR during the periods indicated:

UNI T PERIOD Opr ON TO

1/3/li1 ACPL 30 ct - 12 Nov 2nd Bdc, 1st Cay Div (A*:)Z/ /11 ACR 19-22 Nov 3rd Bde, let Cc-, Div(1

il/1 ACR 15 Dec - 3 Jan Div Arty, 1nt Cav Div (.VM)1/311 ACR 22 Jan - present "rd Bde, 1st Ca'r Div(.)

NOTE: Task Force Bradin (27 Nov - 19 Dec 1969) was a gpecin-l task orgrrnizntioncomposed of B/1/li ACR, F/2/11 ACH and a cona.nd group from Reginental Hend-quarters. It w'.s under the operational control of the 3rd Bde, 1st Caval,rDivision (24M) while conducting operations in the Bu Dop/Bo Duc earen.

4,5

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-fftA~j%.-& VAA i I

Annex D

ARM~Y AVIATION STATIL'ICAL SUWKARY

1. Sorties Flown:

ZMQSSION 2j OF..6A UH 1 H AH-1 G

Cor.nd and Control 3556 0 3533 1

Tfroop Lif t 1 0 545 0

Cargo 29 0 25 0

Casualty Bracuation 13 0 10 0

Administration 2067 146 1626 0

Reconnaissance 465 701 611 231

An-.ed Helicopter 0 801 0 736

2. Ntmber Passengers:

AIRCRAFT PASSENGERS

aI.-6A 5189

Ofi-6AA 117

ftUH-1H 15205

.3. Tons Cargo:*

AIRCRAFT TONS CARGO

OH.6A 1

CH-.6AA 0

IJH- 1H 4

3/, 4. Hours Flown by Aircraf t:

V AIRCRAFT HOURS FLOW4N

OH-.6A 2184

AH-IG 1257

CH-6MA 1954

UH.-1H 3963

*Estimated.-iOBM koInci 4

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5. Results of Fire:

NO D2C aN ML

VC/NVA KBA (BC) 0 0 216 216

Structures Destroyed 0 27

Structures Damaged I 0 20 20

6. Ammntion Expended:

7.62 117,885

2.75 7,414

40=m 5,263

7. Aircraft Availability (% Operational Ready):

NOV DEC JAN

CH-6A 89 91 89

U1H-1H 90 88 84

AH..1G 86 89 89

8. Aircraft Non-Operational Ready (Supply):

AIOUNOV DEC JAN

OH6A 0.9 1.8 6

UH.I1E 0.2 0.6 4

AH-1G 2.5 3.4 3

1 Percent of hours downtine due to supply.

n'/7

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9.- Aircr aft Non-Operational Ready (Mintenaince):2

AIRCRf NOV DE A

OML-A 7.6 5.4 5

UH-1H 7.5 9.7 12

AH-iG 9.2 6.4 8

2 Percent of hours downtime due to maintenance.

UNCLASSIFED,

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UNCLASSIFIED,I 'N 1 , V ,.

DOCUMENT CONTROL DA R & DitS c l~ IF ¢ l.~ml *1moa at Hfi.e &..4F aD a&.D,.cl an *n,

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CONFIDENTIAL-ItQ. OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 C N.IDNA

a goey VIL. 4 -__ _-- _ --

Operational Report - Lessuns Learned, HQ, lth Armored Cavalry Regiment

a anSica,- . V a . V fa a t i At P"e f d mot-$- doft.)

Exp-r.,.-rces of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, l1th Armored Cavalry Regiment

3 s.401. Oa. a 70. roYA. No or PAGE i'b No of qs

18 February 1970 51 Ia.€ o,,.'rac '5 0M G a,,'*0 ,o. (3MIG;,ONaOS MEPl[OIaI shf N M III m

CONRAT N , "O 701254

N/A

* 0 T~~~roAIEr MPONM OM (AfW 0lA., -6-,D9 thaD -a .1 .

o S~~mU O ST TiC.C.?

S I.PPLEWf* Ia RV NOT ES I SPONSORING MILITARV ACTIVITY

N/A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

UNCLASSIFIED,

49

D D 17 UNCLASSIFIED

sat cunitV C184*.06, stin"