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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 03 NOV1969. Other requests shall be referred toOffice of the Adjutant General [Army],Washington, DC 20310.

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310

AGDA (M) (9 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 694039 13 February 1970

SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, leadquarters, Ist Cavalry

Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

"11!t'} ~~1F [Irt'"* TO'" -v e

SEE DISTRIBUTION i-. - }V _

"%1-:

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in a:cordance

with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrp.ctive actions sbhuldbe reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 daysof receipt of covering letter,,

2. Information contained in this repovt is provided t.: insure appropriate

benefits in the future from lessons learned during curtpnt operations and

may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDFR OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G.* WICKCHAM WI Incl Major General, USA • .as The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:Zomuanding Generals - l

US Continental Army CommandUS Army Combat De.velopments Command kUS Army Materiel Command

CommandantsUS Army War CollegeUS Army Command and General Staff College

US Army Air Defense SchoolUS Army Armor SchoolUS Army Aviation SchoolUS Army Combat Surveillance SchoolUS Army Electronic Warfare SchoolUS Army Engineer SchoolUS Army Field Artillery SchoolUS Army Infantry SchoolUS Army Institute for Military Assistance Regrae unclassif!ie when separatl

from classiflid Inclosure.CONFIDENTIAL

ICONFIDENTIALIDEPARTM'1ENT OF THE AP14Y

HEDQUARTERS1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY (AIRMOBILE)

APO 96490

AVDAAR-T 3 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period F.ding31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

SEE DISTlBUTION

Section 1 (C) Significant Organization of Unit Activities

1. (U) General

a. This report covers the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October1969. During this period the Division Artillery supported maneuver forcesin 1st CAV DIV (AM) Operation Kentucky Cougar. The operation continuesin effect at the end of the reporting period.

(1) Mission. The 1st CAV DIV ARTY and suporting fire unitsprovide fire support to 1st CAV DIV (AM) maneuver forces within thedivision's assigned TAOI and takce necessary action to enhance the GVNpacification effort, and to improve the effectiveness of all RVHIAF elements.

(2) Special Mission: the Ist CAV DIV ARTY (AM) continues to act

as the maneuver headquarters for AO Chief and control the defenses of thelot CAV DIV (AM) base camp at Phouc Vinh, RVN.

b. Task Organization (see Inclosuro 1).Ia. Artillery moves (see Inclosure 2).

d. Commanders and Principle Staff (see Inclosure 3).

2. (C) Intelligence

a. Area of Operations

n (1) War Zone "C". Eneny activity in War Zone "C" during Jul.yand up until the 12 August high point decreased sharply over the previousreporting period. The enemy was weakened duo to succes3ful interdictionof his supply routes and the destruction of his cache areas by Arc Lightsand artillery.

During August and early September, the 95C Regiment, istNVA Division, with its sapper elements, attempted to inflict casualitieson F.trat Team forces occupying FSBs throughout War Zone "C". On 11 August,FSB Bc-ckiu recieved a mortar attack followed by a company sized attack.FoR or OF- -WWUA AT 3 4W UINAS;169qo9 CONFIDENTIAL wCLASSM AAFM E12 .UInclosure 1 mom u.w

W A

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDILR-T 3 Nlovumbor 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons LArned for the Priod BndiU6,

31 October 1969

from the west ,nd northwest. The enemy lost 17 KI:h in this attack. Thefollowin3 night th : enemy launched an indirect rocket and mortar -t ;aok,f"" .l by a two company Zroud ,.ttack from the wcst and northwcest.Fifty-four (54) en;my wor(. KIA in this attack. On 15 fugusto the c, emy hadnov .cast and attackod FSB Jatmbio, losing 12 KIA. 5 September fovuid theenomy back in the wustern portion of War Zone "C", %-.Uain launchini, an un-successful ,%ttack on FSB Ike, followed by another attack on 14 &ptunbor,oufforinr 34 KIA and 1 PW.

Shortly after the 14 Scptcmbur attack, the enemy withdrwnorth towird the Cambodian border, leaving Wr Zonu "C" void of rrnyunomy tuits. The onemy app(.,xs to bu sitting and waiting, oboerrvin-Y r.-<;rcss on the Paris Peace Talks anO the anti-war mvemcnt in th( U3. Itis felt some enery resupply activity continu,,; in W.r Zone "C", indicating'a *osoibl,. high point in early Novembcr. Should it u t. 'i)1.isc, 'he I~izhpoint will prob.ably consist of periodic attacks by fire a groud probes.

(2) Binh Long Province. On 29 July, a Hoi Chanh from th:e 272ndR,.inunt, 9th VC Division ralli,.d to ARVN elcn,;nts. The Hoi Ch-nh ri.v.l-dpl.%ns for an attack against In Loc and Loc Ninh, which wore to be m,,untcdby elements of the 9th VC, 7th NVA, a~nd 1st NVIA Divisions. Th, attackswere to occur bctween 5 and 15 August. This information was su'stn.tintcOby verifying heavy enemy activity in the "Fish Hook" arca by sensorsvisual reconnaissance.

In reaction to this intelligence, a series of ixc Iishts,followed by light fire team md ground unit insertions, resultd in 72enemy KIA, 9 PWs, ,.nd 3 Hoi Chanho, con:irming the 9th VC Divisions pre-sence in Binh Long (P).

On 12 August, the cnemy Ir.unchud thv first phasc of his fc.lloffensive. In the early morning hours, he struck several n:aJor friendlyinstcal.tions. Quan Loi Base Camp was attacked by olmnnts of the 272ndRegiment, 9th VC Division, in conjunction with the 4th Bno N16 i-mor OfficeCOSVN. Thc onomy suffered 55 KIA in this action. Simultaneously, the271st f loimont, 9th VC Division launchod attacks. on F5Bs Sidowinder andAspen. Sufforing 110 KIAs and. one PW. In other action on 12 AUgust, ele-mcnts of the 11th ACR engaged onomy elements two kilometers east of FSBSidewindur, accounting for 85 enemy KIA.

The onemy had taken hec:.vy casualties and was attonptin. towithdraw into Cambodia. On 13 August, the 11th ACR mado contact ith ele-meonts of the 209th Regiment, 7th IM, Division west of FSB Kelly, accountingfor 77 IA KIA. The enemy sustained a total of 460 KIA during the 12-13August highpoints.

On 6 Soptombor in the northwest portion of Binh Long Pro-vince, olemonts of the 209th Lginont woro contacted to the ;;ou'thwost

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 3 November 1969SUBfJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

of Loc Ninh, resulting in 40 neny KIA and 4 PWs. PWs and documents cap-tured on 10 September identified the 165th Regiment in the general areaof the 6 September contact with the 209th Regiment.

During the remainder of September, enemy activity was insign-ifican!, Captured documents indictcd the displacement of the 101D Reg-iment Lud the 272nd Rogimont to War Zone "C". The remainder of forces inBinh Long Provinec have withdrawn to the Cambodian border and appear tobo in a stand-down posture. First Team operations have eliminated theopportunity for the enority to lauach a second phase of his fall of7ensive.

(3) Phuoc Long Province. Enemy activity in Phuoc Long Provincehed been at a low level until mid-July when a Hoi Chanh identified his

as the 5th Din, 95th Regiment, 5th VC Division. On 8 August, %notherW ir identifiod his unit as the 3rd Be, 275th Roeifient, 5th VC Divi.;ion..%ddcd that all three reg.ments of the 5th VC Division (95A, 275th, 174th)

,cre :t that tib-e loc, ted in Phuoc Long Province.

The First Team quickly reacted, roloc ting the 2nd -nd 3rdDrigades into the area, successfully interdicting the Serges Junglc High-way and the Adams Ro-'d Complex with strategically located FSBs and a dcl-iberate ground and air roconnaissanco.

On 12 August, elements of the 275th attacked friendlyunits at Dic Phong and FSB Caldttll, resultina in 21 onomf XIA.

On 3 September, elements of the 3rd MSF mde contact withelemonts of? the 5th Be, 95A Rugiment, and 24th AA Bn, 5th VC Division.The encray suffered 21 KIA in this contact. Hoi Chanh reports indic-tethat t.ugust Are Lights cut decply into the resources of the 5th VCDivision, destroying the Division hospital and inflicting heavy c,'sialtieson the 174th and 275th Regiment.

In early September the 5th VC Division assumed a stond-downposture, ,nd Hoi Ch nh reports indicate Arc Lights are taking a hezvytoll of the enemy. It is believed the 5th VC Division has withdrawn to-ward the Cambodian border and is not fully combat effective.

It is expected that the 5th VC Division will begin to refit,resupply, and retrain in late October in an attempt to regain an offensivecapability. Another possibility is that the Division will move to LongKhan Province to bolster enemy strength in that area.

(4) AO Ohiof. During the reporting period, enemy reconn:aissanccelements were active. On 8 August, Ranger Team 32 contacted 5 individunis9 kilometers SSE of Camp Gcrvad, resulting in 2 NVA KIA. Captured doe-umonts indicated a 12 Ma.y perimeter probe of Camp Gorvt.d. On the nightof 11 and 12 May, movement was noted on the perimeter of Camp Gorv-d,starting approximately 2350 hours. Positive sightings followed andthe perimeter wire was cut in covoral locations by ennv sappers.

3

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;VDA.R-T Oprtnl CONFIDENTIAL 3 November 1969SUBJECT- prt~a Report - Lasons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

A vigorous series of counter attacks from the perinoer followed, cuplo.dwith various fire support assesta rappliod at points onl the perimreter 'andlocations just south of Camp Gorvad, resulting inn a o' f3 fOYKIA and numerous enemy weapons captured.* Effectivo deploymont of platoonsized elements at key points throvehout AO Chiuf, by the base defensebattalion, precluded offensive oporati'na by the onozry in the AO.

Despite the sharp increase Ai oeny activity in the romainderof the First Tonmn AO during Iuvust, activity in AO Chiuf was higthiiChtod onlyby a sta~ndoff attack against Camp Gorvad on 15 August, probably by theK33 Artillery Battalion, using 1221xi rocktts for the first tin,;.

In late AWgust, 6 PWs cr~pturcod by the 1st Infantry )I v i si o :SW of A.O Chief, indicated that enomy moralo was low amnd sup,Jlivs werecritical. Thi3 can be attributed to allied sucess in interdictin,,, oneraysupp.1y routes in the area.

As PW captured by the Chon Thanh Subseetor on 5 Septomber, iden-tified the 7th Bn, N16 Armor Office, and stated an attack on Phouc Vinhw,-s a. future mission of the Battalion. Radar detected a sharp inercnce Iin neymovement in A.O Chief durinq the f irst week in Soptonb,., , -nd S.15 September, Camp Gorvad roceivod 4 volleys of mixed 1 O7mn.r and 1 2amlrockets.

On 11 Septemaber an ostimztd platoon of sip)c-75 attemptod tojxnutroite the SE porinotor near Bunker 44. Four NVA wore KIA' in the action.Oni 14 September, rmu G.'.ao District captured an individual in the ar'ea Ofthe attempted probe who identified the 5th Rn, N16 Anior Officoi Hestated 25 :xn were involvod in tne attack, confrini tlip estimate madefollowing -the attack.

On 18 September CapGorvad received three 02mm rounds ondon 23 Soptember 12-107txi rounds.

Despite being greatly hamp'u'ed by friendly oporati,_ns, theoneiny still maintains the capabi2 Lty to initiftirtc l r-z'quont harrrssingattacks.* Ho can still be o'-.prctcd to launch small Crtuwv iml'ebcs againstCamnp Corv'ad and continue hin stan daff rocket and mortar attacks.Intelligence re ports indicate a coming high ?oint of enemy activity,oriented strongly on F'huoc Vinh and Camp Gorvad, between 1 and 5 November.

b. Survey. The First Tear Division Artillery Survey Section continUedto provide fourth-oraer surve.y dat:. to firinZ elements within the DivisjiAO, Survey control was brought to five new fire support bases and .nwiorousFSBs hA survey data updated during the reporting; period. In addition,the Div ' Arty Survey Section calibreted nine firing batteries and providedan "on cal1" crater annlysis/shell rep toam, %Mr.h responded quickly to

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4b

CONFIDENTIAL

3 November-1969SUBJECT: Operational Report -Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

incoming attacks.* This resulted in the placing of timely and accurateurtillery fire on known and suspected enoW. lauching sites.

c. Re.dar

(1) HH'B, Div Arty and each of the three DS Artillery & ttalonsoperated an AN/I4PQ-4A Counter-Mortar Radar.* In addition to it-- counter-mortoar rl, the Q-4 proved to be a ecoromical and tie-saving meansof corducting artillory registrations.

(2) Div Arty's two AUT/TPS-25 Ground Survoilli.eaice Radars showedthe~iselve3 to be valuable target acquisition devices. The two radarsaeqv,,ircd a- total of 372 hostile targots during the reporting period.Their use in conjunction with Nighthawk, IR, SLL.R, and uensor devicesproved to be not only a moans of rapid and accurate target dctoct..on, butwas a reliable method of~ verifying intolli~onco information.

(3) Div -1irty w,)s also responsible for the management end controlof the Division's 17 k"235Ground Sturvci22.ance RNtdaxos. fbRdaro we .re

pik 'fn from i 2.rc: supp~rlc W~cL as r,-pfot' or -a-ta-tion wcro nee~dod.%h :oie oon' to 147',h NM1:'-toro.ne, f er rot. and new oets neitl

re'Oane d to the F3SBa. Yliieions wore flou-, on 'r24 hour basis, ofteridiiring hours of darkness, providing the First Team's FSBs continualra dar coverage.

3. (0) Oprations

a. Plans: Daring the period 1 AuCut 196. throe 31 October 1969,c' 1 st CAV DIV (Aui) participated in Oporation Kcntbucl-y Couo,%r.

b. Operation Kentucky Cougar: 181930 June 69 to prescnt.

(1) Concept of OPerati-ons: Direct support arxtillery was provideadon a maneuver battalion - artillery battery basis, with batteries changingOPOON from their parent battalions as the brigade task organization changed.11Cdi%"- artillery orgcnic to the division was used in a General SupportReir-forcing role to werigh critical areas and influcea the battle.* Aeri alRocket Airtillery wan given a Modified Goneral Support Reinforcing missionwhich allowed the reinforced artillery batt-alion to diroct the employ-ment of up to two sections of APIA Cobrcs under specific conditions.Heavy artillory support was requested from supporting fire units of the23rd Arty Op and 11 FFV. Artillery and automatic wow~ona wore used forconvoy and firo support base/base camp security. Artillery support wasprovided to USSP camps nnd V140 elements.

(2) Execution:

Organization for Combat:

2nd En,. 19th Arty: DS 1st Bde, 1ACD

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CONFIDENTIAL

AVDA-T 3 Nov aWbo'r 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

lst Bn, 77th Arty: DS 2nd Bde, IACD

lst Bn, 21st Arty: DS 3rd Dde, IACD

lst Ben, 30th Arty: GS 1st Cav Div Arty

Sep How batteries, 11th ACR: DS 11th ACR uder OPCCM'6th Ben, 27th Arty

(3) All three brigades o' the lit ACD and the 11th ACR continuedto opweatc in same areas in which they were reported lat period. Internalboundary adjustments were made to allow for maneuver of ARVN forces ofbattalion and regimental size. The 1st de AO is generally north andnortheast of Tay Ninh extending to the Cambodian border. 2nd Bde AOextends generally north to Cambodia and south to Dong Xoai from Song Be,which is center of mass. The 3rd Bde AO extends from the Cambodian bordersouth to Chi Linh along the Song Be River and includes Quan Loi. The11th ACB area of operations extends south from the Cambodian border tovicinity of Chon Than along Highway QL13 and includes Loc Ninh end An Loc.It is bordered on the west by Cambodia down to the tip of the Fish Hookarea. DIV ARTY conducts ground operations in AO Chief which is an areavarying in radium of 10 to 20 km centered around Phouc Vinh.

c. Activity throughout the lst CAV DIV area of operations was mod-crate to heavy during August and lighter during September and October.In August, the enemy's offensive efforts focused on Binh Long Province andthe population centers of Loc Ninh, An-Loc, and Quan Loi, each of whichis also a major military installation. Coordinated attacks were earriedout against other locations but the principle effort was against TJS/ARVNinstallations in Binh LonL Province. Division Artillery units supportedUS/ARVN forces as they successfully countered all enemy attacks, handingtho enemy a tremendous defvat in the Binh Long Province. Enemy activityduring September and Octobur consisted primarily of standoff attacks.1st Cavalry Division forces conducted extensive ground reconaissanceto find and destroy the enesy, his base camps, and logistical supportareas. Division Artillery .a extensive use, during the reported period,of all intelligence sources to develop targets for attack.

d. lIt Cavalry Division Artillcry units supported the GVN Pacificationand Development Plan at every opportunity. Friendly villages wore supportedwith artillery fire and oncall targets wore planned and fired aroundallied settelments to insure their defense when under attack. Artilleryassistance programs wore conducted by DIV ARTY units which m ateriallyimproved the RVNAF artillery unit's capability to support their own forces.

6CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDAA-T 3 Noveber 1,9SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

e. Ammunition Expenditures (1 Aug-31 Oct) RE ONLY

I|IT CALIBER AMOUNT TO' ',-GE

2rd Bn, 19th Arty 105MK 72,042 2,017.2

1st Bn, 77th Arty 105K,,; 78,667 2,202.6

lit Bn, 21st Arty 105MW! 68,337 1 ,9 1 3.4

TOTAL (lo5): 219,046

1st Bn, 30th Arty 155MM 35,581 1,956.9

2nd Bn, 20th Arty 2.75 FFAR 77,756

2nd Bn, 20th Arty 7.621H 1,238,962

2nd Bn, 20th Arty 40;,A 52,244

f. Artillery Moves (l Aug-31 Oct 69)

AUG 69 SEP 69 OCT 69 RPT PERIOD

2nd Bn, 19th Arty 4 2 12 18*

t Bagn, 77th Arty 8 5 3 16*

l Bst n,21st Arty 7 8 2 17

1st Bn, 30th Arty 6 2

TOTAL: 25 17 22 64

g. 2nd Bn, 20th Arty ( m) Employment Statistics 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69

Hours Flown 6664

Sections on ARA Fire Missions 862

Sections on ;UV, GA~s 945

Sections as Gunships 464

Sections on Mortar Patrol 265

Aircraft on Hunter/Killer 325

*10 moves credited to 2/19 were made by A-2/19 while under OPCON to1/30 Arty.**NOTE: 1/77 Bn Hqd/HHB also reloc: ted two times during this period.

7

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CONFIDENTIAL

.'.. D:.-T 3 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

4. (U) Training

a. General. Formal instruction over and above normal recurringtraining proscribed by lot CAV DIV Cir 350-1 consists primarily of threeprogress a Forward Observer School, Counter-Zapper Traimi .ixl Do.ton-strationas .. presented to the entire division, and artillery assistnceand tralning to ARVN artillery units .. through the DONG TIEN (ForwardTogethr ) Plan .. in support of the ARVN upgrading mission of the D~visien.In addtition, Div Arty units liaison officers and forward observers conductinformal ;-rtillery training for the US and ARVN infantry units that theysupport, on a continuous basis.

b. Forward Observer School. 1st Cay Div Arty conducts formal for-ward observer training to newly arrived or assigned personnel who willbe members of a forward observer team. The purpose of the instructionis to familiarize officers and enlisted men with the techniques of artilleryadjustment in Vietnam. Two days ofr classroom instruction and one day of Iactual artillery and Aeri.l Rocket Artillery (iRA) adjustment are conducted.Seen classes were conductoc. during the period 1 Au& 69 - 31 Oct 69, grad-uating 56 students.

c. Counter-Sapper Training/Demonstrations. 1st Cay Div Arty is res-ponsiblo for presenting formal counter-sapper training and sapper demon-strations to all tho fire support bases end base camps within the 1stCay TLOI. This is accomplished on a recurring basis in an attempt to reachas many I:crsonzel as possible. Each POI consists of opening remarks (10n ns) giving the background of two former sappers assigned to Div Arty asKit Carson Scouts, that give the dbmonstration portion; a 15 minute classon the cnamy sapper .. his background, training, and methods/techniques ofattack; and a 15 minute demonstration, highlighted by the two former sappersnoGotating the perimeter wire and anti-entrusion devices. This POI is alsopresented to each Combat Leaders Course conducted by the 1st Cav Div's FirstTeem Acdemy. Following the class, the two Kit Carson Scouts are made avail-ablo for questioning and to analyze the perimeter defense, as commanders maydesire.

d. Artillery Acsistance/Training. Division Artillery units continuodan aggressive assistance program throughout the reporting period. Art;llorybattalions instructed supported infantry units in proper adjustment of rtillery fires including ARA. The ARVN artillery forward observers and the USadvisors of ARVN units received instruction in the employment of ARA from the2nd Bn (AM), 19th Artillery in the lit Bde AO. Division Artillery unitsin the 2nd and 3rd Bde AD's trained ARVN artillery units' in airmobile tech-niques and oonductod formal gunnery training for the fire direction centers ofseveral ARVN firing units.

5. (U) Logistics

Duing the reported period the S-4 section implemented a vigoroussupervision program which took representatives to tho forward fire basesand base camps to evaluate and monitor, primarily, CMass I, IV, and V

a CONFIDENTIAL

k ' CONFIDENTIALAVDAAB.-T b or 1969

ilitie adoprtin to inhure unformity throughout the Div Arty units.

Nea th an oftheperiod c, ooimand maintenance visit wasu initintod intotheproromwhch ,-.csthe Div Arty Wintananno -officer to tho ffru W~aus

ad bascuips throughout tho lot r^e-v TAOI on a recuring~1 lulim.

E

F

I

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CONFIDENTIAL-AVD11-T 3 Novombor 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Liding

31 October 1969

6. (C) Organisation

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strength as of the end of thereporUng period were as follows:

(1) AUTHORIZE:

*H"B 24/2 3 135/15 162/17

**E/82 20/1 17/1 91/25 128/27

1/21 43 2 391 436

1/77 43 2 .391 436

2/19 43 2 391 436

**2/20 53/3 52/3 313/156 418/162

1/30 37 6 555 598

(2) ASSIGED: *H'B 31/2 17/1 89/25 116/27

*,3q/s 20/1 17/1 89/25 116/27

1/21 39 1 353 393

1/77 42 1 348 391

2/19 38 1 354 393

**2/20 56/3 44/2 303/112 403/117

1/3 36 5 518 559

'OTE: *Figures below diagonal aro the attached 273rd and 268th RadarTeams (TPS-25).

**Figures below diagonal are the KD Team attached (Aircraft kHin.tenanoe Teams).

b. Casualties(AUGUST) (SEMeM) (OCTOBE)

UNIT KIA WIA HMU KIA WIA MIA KA WIA MA

2/19 1 13 1 15 1 2 (Due to lackof identity1/77 3 15 6 at end ofperiod°.)

1/21 4 3 14 1 1

1/30 11 40 2 18I0

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AVDAA-T 3 November 1969SUB3JECT t Operational Rleport -Lessons Lezarned for tho Period Ending

31 October 1969

b. Gasualitios(AUGUST) (SEPT~E MER) (OCTOBER)

U11IT I WI IA IA WIA MIA KIA WIA IKIAI2/20 1 6 2 6IDIB 2

E/821

co Awards & Decorations for the period 1 Aug -31 Oct 69:

UN1IT DFC SS LM4 SM BSIVI BS"A" BS"S"t AM"V"' AM ACM"'Vi

HHB 1 1 11 38 1

2/19 1 46 47 63 53

1/77 2 25 63 2 47 17

1/21 3 21 89 1 114 24

1/30 4 19 50 1 25 22

2/20 6 4 48 -9 106 9

E/24 1 6 1

UIT ACM"A" AQCttS" PH

HR 2 27 1

2/19 16 38

1/77 47 16

1/21 65 21

1/30 124 71

2/20 58 9

E/82 11 1

7. (M OTHER:

a. E Battery, 82nd Artillery (liviation)

(1) Aircraft St&"u

(a) During the reporting period there was a arge turnover

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDAAR-T 3 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

of aircraft. F Btry turnod in three (3) O-6As and one (I) UH-1H.The replacement aircraft gained were two (2) OH-6As and two (2) additionalUH-s. These additions brought the total of UH-ls to five (5) .nd OU-6Asto fifteen (15)

(b) Fixed wing capability was increased with the additionof three (3) U-6As and one (1) O-ID. The U-6As increased Div Arty capa-bilitioes and missions to include courier service, passenger service, andPSYOPS missions. The additional O-IG further increased the capabilitiesto perform better visual recomaissanco and rogistration duties.

(c) Aviation Safety Summwary for reporting period;

Major Accidents 1

Minor Accidents 0

Incidents 5

Precautionary Landings 2

(2) Opcri,tior.s

(a) During the reporting period tho unit gained two ...ditional missions: Night Hawk and Aerial Reconnaissance Toam. TheNight Kiwk enabled the battery to acquire the fifth UH-1H aircraft (onorder of the Commanding General) which has greatly reduced the possibilityo' ground attacks at Camp Gorvad. The Aerial Reconnaissance Team con-Sisting of a LOH from E Btry and a Cobra (UH-iG) from B 2/20, has provedits usefulness ma'ay times in locating enemy activities in AO Chief.

(b) Each Arty Bn of Div Arty still retains two LOHs inDirect Support. This program has gone well with the exception of or-genizational maintonaAco which results in bringing the aircraft backto the B Btry location more often than doeiroable.

(c) The unit has attempted, in this reported period, totra-nsition all rotary wing pilots to the LOH-6A, and the fixed wingpilots to the U-6A" This program has been very successful and will con-tinue in the future.

(3) Sumunar of Aircraft Utilization

(a) The battery flow a total of 5,525 hours during the re-ported period.

(b) The breakdown by the type of missions are as follows:

ADMINISTRATVE (Including radar mans) 3700 hrs

LOGISTICS 360 hroCONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL3 November 1969

SUBJECT: Vi'ational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending3Vbctber 1969

ARTILLERY ADJUSTM3T 50 hre

COtOAND AND CONTROL 165 brs

VISUAL RECON 850 hra

MAINTENANCE 300 hrs

TRAINING 100 hra

(o) During this reported period the unit flew a total of7350 sorties averaging 45 minutes per sortie.

(4) S=umarY of A/C Maintenance for Reporting Period

Percentage OR - 82%

Percentage MR - 76%

b. Chaplain.

(I) During the reported period, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69, the DivisionArtillery Chaplain Section comprised of one Chaplain and one Chaplain'sAssistant, functioned as follows:

(a) Coordinated and conducted religious coverage of allunite assigned or attached to Headquarters, Division Artillery, includ-ine denominational coverage, providing a program of pastoral care andcounseling. This is made possible by constant liaison with artillerycounanders down to battery level and with various infantry battalionchaplains.

(b) Conducted 115 Protestant Worship Services with atotal attendance of 3,218. Some of these services were area coverageservices including infantry battalions operating in AO Chief.

(c) Daily visits were odo, to artillery units located atCamp Gorvad, and portions of six days a week were utilised visiting theforward firo bases.

(d) Evening counseling opportunities were provided on anarea oovorage basis. A Wednesday evening discussion group was initiatedin the early portion of the reported period and a Thursday evening groupin the later portion of the same period. In mid September a ohapol choirprogrcam was started, with Friday evening rehersale. Each progra hasbeen enthusiastically accepted by men of D Arty units in the Camp (orvodBoseo Camp.

13

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDAAR-T 3 Novomber 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report - Iassons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

(e) A total of six visits wore made to hospitalized menof Div Arty units.

c. Signal: 1st Cav Division Artillery uses the following means ofcommunications: telephone (local and long distance), radio (FM and AM),and messenger (ground and air). The communications portion of the ORLLreport is divided into three parts; trtillery Communications, Base Def-ense communications, and Air Warning Control Center (AWCC) Communica-tions.

(1) Artillery Communications:

(a) Telephone

_j_ Local Telephone, local common-user service: localservice is provided by the individual units through the use of organicfield switchboards, telephones, and wire. In mny instances localservice is augmented by base camp dial or manual switchboard service,offered by elements of the 1st Signal Brigade. In these cases the basecamp cable distribution system is also operated by the lot Signal Brigadeelements and cable pairs are usually made available to interconnect tac-tical switchboards within the confines of the base camp.

2 Long Distance Telephone Service: long distncoservice is provided by tactical switchboard trunk circuits which arerouted via radio relay and tropospheric scatter facilities operated byelements of the 1st Signal Brigade. Long distance service is augmentedby the Army Area Telephone System, also supported by the ist Signal Bri-gade elements. On occasion long distance artillery telephone services arGprovided by radio relay facilities organic to the Division Signal Batt-alion.

(b) Radio

_L Radio Communications (FM). The following nets pro-vide DIV ARTY with radio communication to higher headquarters and subor-dinato units: DIVARTY Command Fire Net (non-secure); DIVARTY Corn-xndFire '!et (secure); and Division Intelligence Net (secure). Artillerybattalions enter DIVARTY's fire not. The battalions have their ownCommand Fire Net and fire nets in which they communicate with theirfiring batteries, liaison officers, and forward observers.

... Radio Communications (AM): DIVARTY operates asthe Net Control Station of the DIVARTY RTT Net using an AN/GRC-142,while tWe supported battalions use AN/VSC-2s. This not is oper-ational 24 hours a day. DIV ARTY also enters the II Fiold ForceArtillcry RTT Not when requested to do so.

CONFIDENTIAL14

CONFIDENTIALAVDILAR-T 3 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Endine

31 October 1969

(c) Messenger

1 Ground Vessongcr: A driver and ton truck are onhand 24 hours daily to deliver messages within the base camp boundaries.

2 Air messenger: DIVARTY has in its assets r courier- plane which makes scheduled flights to each of the forward support batt-

aliens.

(2) Base Defense Communications:

(a) Telephones: The Command Post for base camp defense,located in the Div Arty TOO, has direct lines to each of its Sector Csto insure prompt communication in the case of impending danger to thesafety of the base camp. Each Sector OP has wire line to bunker andtower locations.

(b) Radios: The Base Defense Coruiand Post has FM radiocoLnmunic tion with each of thu Sector CPs.

(3) Air Warning Control Center (AWCC):

(a) Each AWCC has a sole-user voice circuit to the Ccntroland Reporting Center (CRC) located at Tan Son Nhut. Additional3y, eachAWCC has access to the common-user telephone system.

(b) Radio Communications: each AWCC has a mininun ofone FM radio for use in broadcasting artillery warning information toaircraft. This radio is also used to reciove artillery firing data fromartillery units in the area. Each AWCC also uses a VHF air/ground AMradio sot for broadcasting warning data to aircraft.

d. Medical.

(i) The overall health, sanitation, and imunization of theDivision Artillery personnel during the quarter ending 31 October wasgood. There arc three problom areas that demand attention: Malaria ,Diarrhea, and Rat Bites.

(a) Malaria: A special emphasis program is under way.The program is aimed at personal protection against malaria by the useof repellant, protective clothing, mosquito netting, and supervised dis-tribution and intake of two anti-malaria pills.

(b) Diarroa: This problem is being attacked by education,as to the cause, common sources, and methods of prevention. Also cloan-linoss of all moss facilities and personnel is rigidly supervised.

(a) Rat Bites: A program to eliminato food sourcos andeffective use of rat exterminating devices is in offect.

'CONFIDENTIAL15

- ].5

CONFIDENTIAL• +:¢ A -T3, Noe mb r 1969

SUBJECT: OpRretionpl Report Leusons Lornod for tho Period Eoidi.g31 October 1969

(2) Other activities carried out this month include ten MEDCAPmissions, in which 252 persons were troated and =edi0al treatment givento on unknown number of nntion-Ais employed in and arourd the aid stati(,ns.

(3) Sanitation inspections were carried out i. 15 batteriesthroughout the AO. The primary dnf i a ori,,a wore inadcc uate 1t'uofaci:itics and improper disposal of waste.

(4) The medical facilities are well staffed. There are twoMedical Officer positions vacant. There are three MOS 91A10 positionsand one 91B position vacant. However, area miediccl coverage is '.vrll-able.

(5) Planned Activities: A more intiioified MEDCAP progren toPhuoc Vinh and the close by comunitics is planned. The purposo of theprogram is to make available proper medical treatment with Cood follow-up care& The aim is specifically at the control of the vnoreal disea.serate.

SECTION 2 (C) Lessons Learned: Communder's Obserwtions, Evaluations

and Rccommendctions

1. (U) Personnel. None

2. (C) Operations.

a. 105mm Howitzer Parapet Construction

Observation: The fIquont moves of direct support artilleryand the iinediate need to provide overhead cover for personnel and immunitlon,once a new position is occupied, makes it necessary to design a standardhowitzer section area.

B al"ation: The parapet is designed to p.nerit the sectionpersonnel to perform all roquircd duties during an one, attack whileproviding maximum protcetion for themselves, sGction equipmontj and am,-unition. The parapet is constructed primarily with dirt filled ammunitionboxes :nd with sandbags placed on the outside of the parapet slopingfrom top to bottom. The parapet is appjroximtoly 31 feet high (4 =noboxes) and will permit direct fire ty the howitzer. Ammunition bunkersare constructed 6n each side of the parapet and consist of two (2)pieces of 60" culvert, pIeced on two (k) ammo boxes filled with dirt.This structure providob storage for 80 rounds of 105 howitzer ammition.Seven (7) ammo bunkers will house all required ammunition. Three (3)layers of se;'Abags are placed on the culvert and sandbags are also stackedbetween tho e Ovurt to provide protection from fragments and blast. BElatwalls aro constructed in front of the ammunition bunkers and the openinginto the porsonnal bunkers. Four Uors of dirt filnhd n.vmo b=0oo will

CONFIDENTIAL16

tB

CONFIDENTIALAVD A R-T 3 Novembcr 1969SUR ECT: Operational Report - Lossons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

provide blast and fragmentation protection for the personnel, oquiplmont,and ammunition. Personnel bunkers arc placed to the rear of the parapetand toward the battery center, allowing maximum clearance for directfire 3600 around the outside of all battery positions. The bunkers areconstructed with aone boxes, 72 " culvert, and sandbags. The culvertis placed on 2 dirt filled anlo boxes, and arranged to form a "T". Thoouter ends are protected by using filled amo boxes and sandbags.Three (3).layers of sandbags are placed on the culvert to provide over-head protection. The opening in the center of the throe (3) bunkers canbo coverod by using excess timber or matting (PSP) from the Fire BaseKit, covered with throe (3) layers of sandba s. This will provide con-plete cover for the section personnel during an enemy attack. Approx-iratly 20 meters from the howitzer a collimator bunker is constructedusing suvso boxes, one (I) piece of 60" culvert, and sandbags. This willprotect the collimator from both fragments and weather. The parapetdesign on page 17 has boon used by A Battery, ist Battalion, 21st Art-illory sinco 24 May 69. During both stand-off and ground attacks it hasproven very effective.

Recomimendation: That this parapet design bo ado ,ted for use byDivision irtillory Direct Support units.

b. High Burst Registration:

Observation: Too great a reliance is made by the artillery inthe 1st Cavalry Division on precision registration.

Evaluation: When precision registration is rmado without propersurvey,the registration points are difficult to identifyand subjectto map inaccuracy. High burst registrations arc particularly usefulunder such conditions. High torrain features or towers on adjacent Fire

Support Bases provide adoqu ate ends of a high burst base.

Recommendations: Greater emphasis should be placed on the use of

Iiigh burst registrations.

c. Check Fire of Artillery:

Observation: On many occasions, a chock fire is requested by AirWarning Control Certcrs because aircraft are in a given area on intoll-igence and reconnaissance missions.

Evaluation: Aircraft that are flying intlligence and reoonn-aissance missions request a cease fire of cartillery while the mission isboing flown. There are periods of check fire that extend for 60 r.nuteas.The aircraft is then to notify the Air Warning Control Center of theirflight pattern and then leave the LWCC frequency. At the prasent time acontact mission is the only authority to request the r.ircroft to lwavutho vicinity of the fire mission.

N7

CONFIDERTIL

CONFIDENTIALlOMau How, Pocition

3' Chain Link Fen".

$DAIBS.~(~ Po der Pit

Blast 1fa2.l- . I/ I9 'i

34.r M . Peronnel

2W*

p~~ ]it -- ,'.,. -I

Inaendztary ."..

Gri ,~e , ,,.i

collizator Bunker

III

"W ' t asc V 1,bon I

ID~CONFIDENTIAL

~CONFIDENTIALCONFIDNTIAL3 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operatio~al Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending31 October 1969

Rocom ndations: Aircraft flying Intelligenco and/or roconn-aissance missions must monitor the fire control note of the controllingartillery tire direction center or the AWCC wlhilo assignod missions arebeing flown. Whon possiblo, circre.ft should fly in such n patto'n as toavoid interfering with fire missions.

j d. Mrking FSB Forimetcrs.

Obsorvation. Diwi3i; night onomy attacks on FSs, illuminationof tho pcrimoter is usually accomplished by flroes. There is no standardway uiod to define the perimeter whon viewed from the ,Jg at night. Flares

over FSBs can becomo a hazard to aircraft in the vicinity of the s=c;ospecially these ar-d aircraft providing fire support.

Evaluation: At this timo it is difficult to locate the oxo.ctporimeter of a FSB from the air during the hours of darkness. By usingr sy ;t'm of marking lights Around the perimeter the exact loc.tion .nd

physical boundarios would be very plainly displayed when vicwod fromtho air.

Roctrnondations: That a standard system be established for mrrkingof FSB porimetors and that it be nccomplishod with battcry ;:,o,:er-'c, lightscUialCed fron diroct ground vivuin,. Different De cou34 3 used todisplay certain sectors of tho FB.

o. Combined ARVN/US Operations.

Observation: Combined ARVN/US operations which involvo the tacticalcontrol of a US firing battery by an ARVN artillery hoadquarters ond/ortactical--control of an ARVN firIng battery by a US artillery headquartrsaxe facilitated by cl.ee cooporantion W certain tochniquos.

Mauation: Combinod oporations of this nature prowent unusulproblcm of control, liaison# and firi direction. It has boon found thattho 'ollowing techniques havo boon useful:

(a) Establishmont of a joint FDC oases communications prob-loms considerably. Enchange of information is simple ,-d gunnery pro-codures can be st,%ndrdisod.

(b) Exchange of small liaison pexties and use of bi-lingualmescge formte circumvents the Thnguage problem. For oxample, a form wasdevised with air advisory data in b3oth English nd Vietnnmeso. The ARVNporsonnol simply fill in blv:r/ spaces and give the form to a US RTO, whotransmits the data.

Beciaedations: That the above techniques be considered whencombinod US/ARVN operations are contemplated.

CONFIDENTIAL

_ _ _ __

____ _______ _________________________

CONFIDENTIAL November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

f. Blast Walls for 155mm Howitzer Powder Bunkers

Qbpervation: 155mm Howitzer powder bunkers without blast wallsare e::trmmely vulnerable to RPG, mortar, and rocket fire.

Ali;tipn: During a recent mortar and rocket st,.ndoff attackon a fire support base, a powder bunker took a direct hit with an RPG ormortar fire and exploded; causing casualties and damage to crcw membersand howitzer. Construction of a blast wall 2 feet high in front of thebunker, with matting or PSP for siding (supported by engineer stakes)and filled with sandbags or dirt filled 105mm ammo boxes, 6ould greatlyroduce this occurrance. The PSP sorves not only as a burster plate fordiroct hits but also provides rigid support for tho bags or boxes dur-ing high-charge firing of the 155mm howitzer.

.ocomo-.]aticns: That blast walls, as described above, be made

a matter of SOP for all 155 howitzer units.

g. Standard 155mm Howitzer Firing Pit

Observation: Recent standoff attacks on FSBs in the 1st CavalryDivision hin vo shown that the smaller the firing pit for a 155 howitzor,the less likely the chances are of having rocket and mortar roundsl?.nd inside these pits.

Evaluation: When a 455 howitzer section firing pit is constructed,the first stop is to push up a berm approximately 5 feet high, utilizinga bulldozer. The second stop is to bring in fill dirt to raise the levelinside tho borm (approximately 2 feet of fill) for adequate drainago.

Sufficiont space must be provided inside the parapet, between the trailspados and the outer wall, to allow for tho separation, storage, and pro-toction of all 155 howitzer projoctilos, powder, and fues. Between theavmo lpkomlocatod against the inside wall of the parapet, there arelocated 3 two-man fighting positions for the defense against groyd attackof the howitzer position. The trail spade arc for the 155 howitzer mina-suros 15 foot from pit center to the trail logs. If the inside diameterof the parapet is 50 feet across, all interior pit requirements can bemt, and the minimum space required to shift trails for the howitzerwould be provided. The opening in the parapet wall for moving the how-itzer in and out (and for aone resupply) need only be 15 f;ot wide.when not in use, a simple removable barrier, of dirt filled 105 howitzerammo boxes, could be orectod to compluto the 6400 mil proteotion of thefiring pit.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

proja awzkor

Pow~der &mri wv/ maiot WIL11/

//25'-.

/ri Spd/it(os

Scale: 1" =10'

I l55nmm How Firing P.t

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDAAR-T 3 November 1969SUBJECT: Operatinal Report - I^- u "i Luar.aed for the Period Ending

31 Octobex 1969

Recownindti.n! - That the above described 155mm howitzer firingpit be ap'oved as tand-za and thet the enirer support elements beadvised of th, reoaiqtircnts for 'cho construction of the parapet wallsprior to the 155 howior itnit occ pation.

3. (U) Training. Fo'ward Observer Training

0bservat~ipi: Forward olon.rers must be thoroughly fami.liar withthe proper utilization and ce ploe.ment of Aerial Rocket Artillery (AUk).

Tvaluation: FO's normally spend a day or two at battclion head-quarters prior to being attached to an infantry company, This tii~uprovides an excellent opportunity for the FO -L receive added instructionin the use of ARA. A 4 hour class, for all new FO's, has been developedoy Div Arty units in conjunction with ARA batteries fromo 2nd Blttalion,20th Artillery. The purpose of the class is 1"o advise the IFO's ),n theproper utilization of ARf. and the manner in wlaich ARA c, * beet be employedin support of the Infantry. The block of ins L-uction includes a briefingby an ARA battery commander or operations of1'.cer, and a orientationflight. The orientation flight include., Ihe expenditure of oronanceon suitable targets when the situation ,ermits. This program has pro-duced excellent results.

Pecon iondation. It is reccwamended that Direct Support ArtilleryBattalions coordinate with their General Support ARI. Battery to establishan iRA orientation for all newly assigned FO's.

4. (C) Intelligence

a. Concealment of /IPQ-4A Radar Antenna

Observations: The enemy can observe the direction the radar ispointed and use this information in the selection of positions fkx whichto launch a mortar attack.

1luntion.: Better utilization can be made of the NF" Warif the enemy is unable to determine the direction of the antenna.

RecommeLnd4atiop: Conceal the radar screen with a parachute eleyatedon all sides to avoid interference with traverse, thus ppeventing theenemy from deteniing the direction of search.

b. Forward Observers

Observation; Forward observers are not being used to their fullcc-.abilities.

CONFIDENTIAL

I

j CONFIDENTIALAVDAAR-T 3 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Report - L,30son Loarnod xor the P(,riod Ending

31 October 1969I.E luatJo,.: Forward cbservor:a uro not calling back spot r-

ports and are not roporting all intellionce info'mation. The observersare a vital source of intelligence 1nfornati.on and their spot reports area basis for fire planning. In the past observerb have been ceiling,primarily, for fire missions. VWry little surveillance was boinq providedaftrr fire P1isson3 and no effo-t was made to keepn the b-,t'Lalion firedirection cente-s informeod on the typo of terrain in which the observerwas operatir,,. Tho 1st C.iv JIv Arty units hnve re-initiatOd a vigorousprogram of inteic.icc athrlng thccugh the foroard observer cha'nols.

Recomiondation: Liaison officers must requiro the forward obser-vers to provide npot reports on a continuouz bacis. In aMditi on, muchuseful infor.m.tion ,nd greater rapport is est.blished k, debriefing ofthe forward observers by the Battalion S-3, .- 2, nud/o- thoir asistant3.

5. (U) Organization: ilone

6. (:)Communications.

a. Fiuld P-pdient Antennas

C'"v-,vti on: Antenna assonbly RC-292 is particularly vulnerableto ,annao ,.el vI'struction by inccming rounds ab forward fire supportbase. Avoilability of replacemonts for combat loss antennas is linitodand time conouning. 9

Eoraluatica: It has been found that field expedient F4 radioantonn,.s nan be constructed very easily with materials alrody on handat the firo support base. Several of these expedient antennas can beproparod as backup for existing RC-292s. Battalions within Div Artyhave constructed over 15 of these expedient antonnas. The specific typefound to be mo , efficient is a vertically polnrised, center-fed, half-wave antenna. Solid copper wire of approximately 6 gauge is used asthe bas, ic antenna, although field wire is satiofactory. Insulators canb. maae of wood or fiberboard sections from inside an unserviceable GA-3W/P.OC-25 batter,. Field wire or RP cable may be used as the Trans-mWsion Line, bat both must be fitted with - coaxial fitting to matchthe antenna receptacle on t'he radio. This can be done by adapting aUG-255 coaxia] fitting with alligator clips or any method to match onestraad of the field .iro to the ground load, and the other st:,.ad to theRF load. Units have made use of these oxpedients by using them as mainantennas in rear aroas, as backup at the battalion operati:-no location,and as emergency backup on FSBs. They hive also served as a primaryantenna during split battery operations,

Reco:racndatlon: That field expodient FM antennas be used to re-place RC-292 in fixed- or semi-fixed locations and as reserve systems inall fonlard locations#

A3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDAAM?-T 3 November 1969SUJICT: Operational Report - Lossons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

-b. Communiations During Split Comiit.on As

,j2tion: During V::etic:.l opor tions whore firing batterieswore apli for extended period& fA time, the communications ccitmentwas ocesentially 4oublod.

Thation: For short ororations of a split firing battery,the additiol' onaunioations equ.pmrnt necessary is available from theorganic battery. However, when batteries are split for extended periodsand occupy Aprata fire support bases the following inimum configurationis required foi a battery:

(a) 2 ea RC-292 or equivalent field expedient antennas

(b) 1 ea AN/VRC.46 FM Radio

(c) 1 ea AN/PRO-25 FM Radio

(d) 1 ea 1.5 KW 28 volt DC generator,

(a) 4 ea TA-312 field telephones

(f) 2 ea 12 volt DC storage batteries

In addition, if the liaison section associated with the battory is ii-la'ly split the following minimu configuration is required for eachlocation:

(a) 2 ea RC-292 or oquivalent field expedient antennas

(b) 1 ea AN/VRC-46 FM Radio

(o) 1 ea AN/RC-25 FM Radio

(Iore it is assumed that power will be provided by theIr~ctry.)

The TOE of the 105 howitzer battery provides the organic equipment tocarry on sustained -operations in a split configuration, with the exceptionof the communiotions portion of the mission, however. Reserve or backupouipment must be put in service and maintenance becomes critical. TheTs Of the liaison section does not provide backup equipment for a splitcapability. Consequently the liaison sections must depend upon the alreydepleted reserve equipment of the firing battery.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

18 AVDAT 3 November 1969SUBECT Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969

Rocommendations; That communications contingency plans be off-ected to fully utilise the organic equipment available at battalion levelshould one or more of the firing batteries be required to operate forsustained periods in a split configuration. Also, kits of anticipatedcommuniations supplies should be maintained at battalion level to rapidlysupply the displacing battery with essential supplies. Such kits shouldinclude antenna parts, DR-8 wire reel@, TL wire cutters, assorted powerand eleotcal cable, DC storage batteries with clamps, electrical tape,BA-30s, BA-286/fRC-25, a few spare handsets, and the necessary additionalSOI items and operational codes.

3 mdSL.as LTC, Fie llery

Incl 2 wd HQ, DA Commading

DISTRIUTON:

CG, let Cay Div (WM)ATTN: G-3 DIT 25

CO, 2/19 Arty 10COO 2/20 Arty 10c0, 1/10 A 10

CO. 177 Arty10CO 3/82 Arty 2

I.s

ICONFIDENTIAL

AvuAar-DT (3Noveober 1969) 1st irdSUBET: Operaticnal Report of'the 1et Cavalry Division Artillery (AM)

for the Period Endingj 31 October i*9, RCS CsFa-65 (R2)

DA# HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), APO San Francisco 96490, 14 Nov 69

TOt o .

1. This Headquarters Is received the Operational Report-Lessons'Learnedfor the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969 from Hdadq,.rters, IstCavalry Division Artillery and concurs with the report.

2. Report is forwarded in compliance with UBARV Reg. 52-5-16.

FOR TME COMNDER

TEN1TH R. SWAIM 13CP1r, AGCAst AG

Mg

IN

'ii

AVIDOU.- (3 Now 69) 2nd IndiMJMTs Operatowal Report - Lameous Lseasd for the Period boi1.og

31 October 1969 (Ce cs (Aa-65) (R2)

DA NQ I FM'CWJ, APO In Fraoioo 96266 13 DEC I+".q

TRIl.' Cmndn OwmmI, US Army Vietwal ATTNi AViC (D$T),, APO 96375

Co.nder-I-Chief, . Arm Ptoiflo, ATTN OPP-O p APO 96558

M'0s Assistant Chief of Staff for Fores Derelopmntp Departamsnt of the.arW, Whingtog, D.C. 20310

This heldqrtersw has reviewed and conours with the OpasiOnam l Report -mseoae mared of th, lot Cavalr7 Division Artillery (AM) for the period

n; 1- October 1969.

Mast AG

V

CONFIDENTIAL

AV3C-DST (3 Nov 69) 3d IndS, ICTt Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending

31 October 1969, ROS CSF-65 (R2)(U)

HI*dDQUARTU, UNITED STATES ARE, VIMAM, PO San Francisco 96375 2 0 J,.

TOs Couzander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,AP0 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - LessonsLearned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters,lot Cavalry Division Artillery (AN) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follows

a. (U) Reference item concerning 0105mm Howitzer Parapet Construction',{ page 15, paragraph 2a; concur. Recommend this item be forwarded to the US

Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma for evaluation. This itemwill be considered for inclusion in USARV's publication 'Battlefield Report -Tips for Consanders'.

b. (U) Reference it concerning 'Marking FSB Perimeters', page 18,paragraph 2d; concur. The distress light marker (FSN 6230-067-5209) is abattery powered device which is authorized by current TOE and can be usedfor this purpose. Additionally, a flash guard w/blue filter (FSN 6230-917-6692) will shield it from direct ground viewing. Standard issue flashlightsare also suitable. No action by USARPAC or DA is required.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Standard 155mm Howitzer Firing Pit',page 19, paragraph 2g; concur. Recommend this item be forwarded to the USArmy Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma for evaluation.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Concealment of AN/MPQ-4A RadarAntenna', page 20, paragraph 4a; concur. Nylon parachute canopy, standardArmy issue camouflage netting or canvas may be used to camouflage the direc-tion of scan of the counter-mortar radar antenna. However, an accumulationof dirt or debris on the camuflage material may attenuate the radar returnsand, thereby, reduce the sensitivity of the set. BCO( Laboratories at FortMonmouth are presently conducting a test of this technique.

FOR THE COG4ANDU

I. D. I..;J; ,eI ( P, /

lot Cay Div Arty (AM)

I OWN M AT 3 IAN IIALS;! , WAssM AFa,. 1 VIAKsnoi0 S200.10

I CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (3 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Airmobile)

for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 6 JAN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy t Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE CCGIANDER IN CHIEF:

..L. oCPT, AGCAmi AG

t

I

I

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDAAR-T 3 November 1969SUBJECT: Operational Roport - hejon Loarnt.J for the Period EndingF31 October 1969

Fildganizaition 1' Cmb as of 31 October 1969:

1 Ist Cavalry Division Artil2;,,

2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery (105): DS lot Bde

B 2/19

C 2/19

A 1/77 OPCON

Ist Battalion, 77th Artillery (105): DS 2nd Bde

A 1/21 OPCON

C 1/77

lot Battalion, 21st Artillery (105): DS 3rd Bde

B 1/21

C 1/21

B 1/77 OPCON

lst Battalion, 30th Artillery (155): 0S Ist Cav Div Arty cnd controlthe fire of the DS ArtilleryBattery in Div Arty's AO Chief

A 1/30: GSR 2nd Bn, 19th Arty

B 1/30: GSR lot Bn, 77th Arty

C 1/30: GSR lot Bn, 21st Arty

A 2/19: OPCON

2nd Battalion, 20th Artillery (ARA): GS 1st Cay Div Arty

A 2/20: GSR (Modified) 2nd Bn, 19th Arty

B 2/29; GSR (Modified) lit Bn,- 77th Arty

C 2/20: GSR (Modified) 1st Bn, 21st Arty

Incl III SA3E AT $ YER h vi AILS;

NCuu Aurn 12 YWS

3D wNn

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAVDA*PT 3 11ovember 1969SUBJECTs Operational Report - Lessons leaaraed for the Puriod Ending

31 Octobor 1969

batter. B., 82nd Artil~ory (i.ion): GS 1st Cav Div Arty

Attachmonts:

3rd Pit , Btry C, 4th Bn, 60th Arty (AW) (SP): G8 lat cav DivArty

StrZ, Sth S, 6th At (4.2" Mortar) I lot v Div Arty

2. Sfporti14 Artillery

II M? Artillery

6th Battaliono 27th Artillery (8"/175)i GS I1 FF and controlthe fires of US Arti-llery of the 11th ACR

lot Howitzer Battery, 11th ACR (155 SP): OPCON

2nd Howitzer Battery, 11th ACR (155 SP): 0PCO

3rd Howitzer Battery, 11th ACR (155 SP-): OPCON

Btry C, 2nd En, 12th Arty (155): GSR 1st Cay Div Arty

Btry 0, 2nd Bn, 13th Arty (105): GSR 1st Cav Div Arty

Btry F, 16th FA Arty BE (155): GS II I-V

Btry A, 2nd Battalion, 32nd'Artillery (8"/175m): GS II FFV

I

~CONFIDENTIAL

St

CONFIDENTIAL

G, OMMANDERS ',ND PRINCIPLE ST,,s.P, 1 SI CAV DIV ANTY AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1969

1:,,DQU:ATERS DIVISION LP.T.ILERY:

CO: LTC Morris L. Brady

XO: LTC Hol rd P. Gun.''cy

FSCC: 1,TC L'aight L. Wilson

S-i: MAJ James S. Willifams

S-2: CPT Gerald W. Shcarpo

S-3: LTC Thomas J. P. Jones

S-4; MIJ David B. Smith

S-5: CPT Fred P. Swiss

CO, MIB: OPT Charles W. Stewart

2ND D141, 1 %2H :'TY (105):

LTC Leo J. Fitzgerald

XO: MAJ Robert E. Blake

S-I: CPT Ronald R. Goodell

S-2: CPT Robert P. Williais

S-3: MJ Fredrick J. McConville

+-4: iLT John L. Keith

1:0, HHB: CPT Joseph A. Krupansky

CO, ", BTRY: CPT Theodore A. Monette

0O, B BTRY: CPT Mac K. Honnigan

CO, C BTRY: OPT John P. Purcel.

Incl 3

DOWUSJiDS AT 3 ;'PAl lIUIVALS;

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL1 '-T TrN, 77TH ARM!Y (0O)

GO; LTC Williamn J. flarrison

XO: 14A3 Robei4 ~ Cai:-rj

S-i: ~LT Hohor-C Ib~& r

S-2: OPT Roger U1. i !iui~icar

.5-3: M&J Stophn I., Glick

S-4: OPT George D. Shannon

CO, HUB: OPT Genu, A. Williams

COO, A YTRY.; OPT Roy S. Carlson

GO, B IITRY: OFT Edward J. Dewey

C\~0 JTAP-': OPT William G. O'Dell

'MT BD)i 21IST I. 'Y ('105):

C0: LTC Mac D. Sandnrs

XO: MfAJ James H. Ramsden

S-i.:CPT Richard H4. Swain

S-2: .PT 49#us G. Aiwnan

KUJ Charles W. Jarvis

S--4: OPT John Patterson

GO, 'IHB: OPT Raymond E. Whittney

00, A DTRY: OPT Kenneth R. Coarlson

0O, 13 BTR Y: OPT John M. Harnisch

00, 0 BTRY.: OPTRoger L. Segier

33

CONFIDENTIAL

I

CONFIDENTIAL- I ,', 3Gc' -F:". (1W):

LTO Jnxc.- 0. (0Cl:Ltawcy

:IJ Gerald Chnpmzn, Jr.

S-i: OPT John R. ' enry

S-2: OPT Terry L. Maris

S-3: MAJ Jack T. Gcrven

S-4: CPT Raymond G. Beck

0O, MuB: OPT Rom..d 0. Pruitt

CO, SVC BTRY: CPT Willi~m L. Noard

60, BTRY: CPT Jmncs Camona

0O, B BTRY: OPT Urey W. Alexcnder

CO, C BTRY: CPT Josuo Robles, Jr.

2ND BN, 20TH A.TY (ARA):

CO: IT Jerry M. Bunynrd

I XO: , Fdin K. R-binson

CPT John G. Christie

-..Z: CPT Gary --- Epporson

j S-3: MJ August !. Cianciolo

S-4: CPT George Cortez

0O, M}B: CPT Jan C. Polliard

CO, i BTRY: MJ Walter J. Wosicki

j 10, B BTRY: MKA4J Donald C. Wilson

" C BTRY: J Domtld E. Wilson

3YCONFIDENTIAL

{I

CONFIDENTIAL

00:. MAJ joopl S. i)lvi

Xo: C "T F., d). S. t3unck

op.,8 OIFT: OPT David M. Snydor

3RD CTT 0 !'.TRY Co, 4TH Bfl, 60,-ti ,,PTY (AW) (s');

L). -T CQ. OPT lMic~aul L. Mulharn

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFI EDsbecity ClasmifacticiDOCUMENT CONTROL OATA - & D(Srt es e Mll a'" o" of " f$@ b" * of abtrc mew --'looln --m."e(0 m" he .0.101. h." th " " "' ...... . ......

1 O6 IN TI NG AC IVI TY (Cl-O1/po .is fAt ) ., 6e4CIsO I S CU41 I h (I A 0,1# 1( A 111

10 CONFIDENTIA.M

HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 \< i.TOu. ..J 4a. UapOnT TITLA

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery

4 OISCRIPYIVS NOTES (T~po .5 t.1 and inelve|do.e g.)

Experiences of unit en a ed in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.S. AU ?NOISI (Pivo w. mdHe sesI. oem)

CO, Ist Cavalry Division Artillery

a, MCPOMY U.AI 9 i. rOYAL NO. Of' PAGSS I", NO. OF "try

3 November 1969 38So. CONTRACY OR GRANT NO. k. nRIINATORS RI POIII NUM0RISI

,. PROJ1CT No 694039N/A

€. SI. OTI4R REPORT NOISI (AnO edhtneamber Mhot "av he we.Ipnodthi. report)

.

10 OISTPHOUIION STAVEMENT7

. SUPPL..N.IY FNTE ems SPONSORING MILIIARY ACTIVI ry

N/A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

1I2- AUpsysACT

I

I 36

iDD ,.160'.1473 UNCLASSIFIEDI