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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 1970.Other requests shall be referred toAssistant Chief of Staff for ForceDevelopment [Army], Washington, DC 20310.Noforn.

AUTHORITYAGO D/A ltr, 12 Apr 1976; AGO D/A ltr, 12Apr 1976

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REPORT'A SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING THE.EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF,

PART 1IARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OdiflETNAM [ARVNJ,

VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS IVNMC)YIETNAMESE NAVY [YNN).

,1ST QTR) CY'105x,/ SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT

RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALSBY AUTHORITY OF COMUSMACV

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94~~ /UCLASSIFIED,

MAC.3-05iSUBJECT: US1ALV SEER Report, Part 1, st Qtr CY 70-

.Vl WHIT! SECTIONDISTRIBUTFION : 1o UFF 37.G7110, -

5 - OSD 2 - SA, Arty Adv Gpl'" t.-

Div TWCATION ....... 145 - JCS 9 - SA, ist Div1 - CofsU US Army 6 - SA, 2d Div ........................ ........

1 - DSOPS 6 - SA, 22d Div Gp ........ ...........1 - CO 6 - SA, 23d Div MHUTiAk1t1LM (".n1 - CofS, USAF 6 - SA, 5th Div1 - Comdt, USNIC . . ...... . -6 - SA, 18th Div - _ F... Iw- i -ar is- ar~

6 - CINCPAC 6 - SA, 25th Div1 - CINCPAC AF 6 - SA, Rth Div A1 -,CINCUSARPAC 6 - SA, 9-th Div

1 DDC 6 - SA, 21st Div G1 -Air University Library 2 - SA, Abn Div Adv Det

2 - US Embassy 2 - SA, Marine Adv GpI - CONNAITORV 1 - SA, 0D

1 - CG, 7th AF 1 - SA, 51st Regt1 - OSD/ARPA-REDFU-V 1 - SA, 42d Regt4 - CG, USARV I - SA, Ranger Command Adv Det2 Chief, USAF Adv Gp 1 - SA, ist Ranger Gp HQ2 - Chief, NAG 1 - SA, 2d Ranger Gp1 - ,%tACJ01 1 - SA, 3d Ranger Gp2 - MACJ03 1 - SA, 4th Ranger Gp1- MACJI 1 - SA, 4th Ranger Gp7- MACJ2 1 - SA, 6th Ranger GP

30 - MAC J3 I - SA, Armor Command Adv Gp2- AC4 1 - SA, 24th srz2 - MAGIJ5 1 - SA, 44th STZ1 ,t CJ6 I1 SA, Quang Da S5TZ

10 , 't.NC11*..,KD' 1 -CG, 1st Air Cav Div3 - Nt 01A 2 - CG, 4th Inf Div

1 - ,NCAG 2 - CG, 2Sth Inf Div2 - \LCIG 2 - CG, 23d Inf Div1 - *,ACOI 2 - CG, 101st Abn Div (Air Mobile)1 -MACSA 2 - CG, 1st Mar Div7 - CT (includes NrC's) I - CG, 173 Abn BdeI .- AtCSOG .1 -CO, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)1 -ROID I - CO, llth Armored,-Cavalry Regiment, ,.I -'NACCSD r

5'- SA, I CTZ/CG WXIV Corps5 - SA, II C FZ/CG I FFV5 - SA, III CrZ/CG II FIN5 - SA, IV CTZ/CG Mi-.AC

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MAGJ 3-051

SUBJECT: USMACV SEER Report, Part I, 1st Qtr CY 70

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. This report is prepared quarterly to provide COMIJSMACV, MACV staffagencies and advisors with an evaluation of the combat. effectivenessof the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RXN.,W);

2. The content of the USMRL\C SEER Report is derived from operationalstatistics and responses to quarterly questionnaires submitted by senioradvisors as a part of the MACV System for Evaluatingo the Effectivenessof RkNAF (SEER). This part of the report contains VIN~/ VVC and INNevaluations. The Vietnamese Air Force (NVNAF) portion of this report ispublished w~der separate cover as Part IH.

FOR fl0 lIE INANDER:

1 IncI WNALD A. IL'\LLIJSIACV SEER Report, Part I, CPT, USA1st Qtr CY 70 Asst AG

STAT"Y.77T J'2 CL .SZIFIED

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PART I: ARVN/VMI C AND VNN FORCES

CONTENTS

PARA SUBJECT PAGE

"1. INTRODTIO 1

a. Coverage .................................................. 1

b. Data and Information Sources..........................1c. Factors Influencing Performance .......................... 1

2 ........... StIARY -OF PERFORMANCE. .-.... ........ 2

a. Effectiveness .......................2

b. Problem Areas ....................................... 3

3. ARMY AND MARINE FORCES EVALUATION ........................... S

a. Environm entl Aspects ................... ............

Charts: 1 - I CTZ ....................................... 6- II CTZ . ..................................... B

3 - III CTZ ..................................... 104 - IV CTZ ...................................... 12

b. Enemy Initiated Incidents ................................ 14

Charts: 5 - Enemy Initiated Incidents Country-wide ...... 14

6 - Enemy Initiated Incidents I, II, III,and IV Corps ................................. 16

c. Contacts ................................................. 16

Chart: 7 - Enemy Contacts by ARVN Infantry Battalions.. 16

d. Effort ............................................ 17

(1) Percent Time on Missions Country-wide ............... 17

2) Percent Time Spent on Missions Within Each Corps.... 17

t3) Comparison of Time Spent on Missions by Division

or Regiment ......................................... 19

Charts: 8 - Country-wide Allocation Effort .............. 18

9 - Percent of Time Spent on Missions Within

Each Corps .................................. 1810 - Combined and Unilateral Operations Percent

of Effort ................................... 20

Table: I - Comparison of Time Spent on Missions byDivision or Regiment ........................ 19

i . -

I

11 - Combined and Undiateral Operations KIAper Rn Day ............................. 20

12 - Combined and Unilateral Operations KillRatio • 20

e. Combined and Unilateral Combat Operations ................ 21

f. Results .......................................... 23

(1) Enemy Eliminated, Weapons Captured and Ratios ....... 23

(2) Weapons Captured .................................. 23

(3) US and GVN Regular Forces ........................... 23

(4) Caches ........................................ 25

(5) Ambushes . 27

Charts: 13-14-ARVN/VVIC Average Bn ResultsCountry-wide..' 22

15-KIA Ratios US and CNN Regular Forces......2316-ARVN/VNMC Enemy KIA Per Battalion ........ 24

17-18-Caches-Weapons Found, Food andAmmunition Found ....................... 25

19-Ambushes - KIA Trends .................. 2620-Ambushes - Enemy KIA ................... 26

g. Combat Support ..................................... 28

Chart : 21 - Combat Support Provided ARVN/VNMC(Per Bn) ................................... 29

22 - Combat Support Provided ARM Infantry(Per Bn) I, II, III, IV Corps .............. 30,

h. Operational Effectiveness Assessment ............ 31

Charts: 23 - Average Operational Effectiveness ofARVN/VMIC .................................. 31

24 - ARVN/VNM4C Operational Effectiveness 32Assessment .................................

i. Division and Regimental Staff Element Evaluations ........ 33

Charts: 25 Evaluation of Command and Staff Functions-Div/Regts ................................. 34

26 - Evaluation of Command and Staff Functions-Inf Bns ............................... 35

ii

;,41

j.Summvary of ARVN Infantry Effectiveness Indicators ....

Chart:. 27,- ARVN Infantry Effectiveness Indicators..37

k.Aayis of Infantry Divisions/Separate Regiments-.....36

Charts:, 28 - 1st Division..................... 3829 - 2d Division ............................. 403C - 51st Regiment ........................... 4231 -22d Division...............4432 23d Division ............................ 4633- 42d Regiment............ ................. 48

_7 34 ->5-'th Division.._..,..............O35 -t18th Division ......... .............. ...5 2.36 - 25th Division......................... 5S437 - 7th Division ............................. S638 - 9th Division ........................... 5839 ...t iiso .......................... 6040 - Airborne Division.......... ...6241-- Enemy Kills by Airborn Batalon......642 - Enemy Kills by Armored Cavalry Squadrons.. 6543 - Armored Cavalry Squadrons ................. 6644 -. Marine Division ......................... 6845 - Enemy Kilis by Marine Battalion ........... 7046 - Enemy Kills by Ranger Battalion ........... 7147 - Raaiger Battalions ......................... 72

4. AVN NC PRJBBAREAS................................... 74

a. General-i................................ ........... 74b. Maneuver Battalion Strength ........................ 74

Charts: 48 - Personnel Assigned ARVX/VIC .............. 7449 -Assigned Strength ARVN Maneuver Bns ....... 75

.c Casualties Duie to Mines and Booby Traps ................. 75

Charts: 50 -Number of ARVN/XNMC Deaths Caused byMines and !ooby Traps.................... 75

51 Percent Friendly KIA from Mines andBooby Traps ............................ 76

d. Battalion Problem Areas ............ .................. 77

-~-- ~ - ~Chart: 52 - Battalion Pr-oblem- Areas-i PartI 7Battalion Problem Areas, Part 11 .... 79

e. Staff Problem Areas....... ........... ........ ...... 81

Chart: 53 -Staff Problem Areas, Part I............82Staff Problem Areas, Part 11 ....... ...... 83

Pb4,If IAL

f. Training Assessrent .................................. 84

Charts: 54 - Advisors' Assessment of TrainingEffectiveness........................... 85

55 - Ad viso' 1Assessment of Training fuality 8756 - Tie ent on Training by infantry Bns. 8857 Refires er Training ....... ................ 89

g. Action on First Oua er Problem Areas................... 90

h. Current Problem Are s Reported by Senior Advisors ....... 96

S. VIETNAESE NAVAL FORCES EVALUATIN...................... 99

a. Introduction ................................... * 99

b. Summ~ary of Perfo ce...................... I.......... 99

c. Improvement and Mod rnization.......................... 100

__Charts: 58 - USN C aft Turned over to VNN ............. 10159 - VINN P rsonnel Assigned................... 10360 - VNN T aining ................... 10761 - Logis ics Lift Craft Results.:::.......... 11062 -Craft Availability ............... 6....... Ill63 - Vietri ese Naval Craft Thiploymient ........ 11364 - Vietn~nese Naval Craft Employment ........ 114

Tables: 2 - Actual and Planned VNN Craft Inventories 1023 - PersoAnel Manning Levels................. 1044 - Training ................................ 1055 - Supply Effectiveness .................... 108

d. Operdtional Performance........................... 6... 112

Charts: 65 - Markef Time Surveillance Stations 1stOtrC'0'70 .............................. 116

66 - Market Time Surveillance Stations ........ 117

Table: 6 - Performance Indicators ................... 115

-e. Area of Operational! Responsibility ............ ........ 118

f. Operational Results .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. . . . . . . . 118

Charts: 67 -Combied and US% Barrier Operations ....... 11968 - Xietnbmese Navy'Results .... ;....120

69- VNN-U N Results Comparison............. 121

Glossay of Arony....................................12

iv

ANNEXDES:

A. Enhiy Contacts and Results Per Battalimn

B. Enemy Initiated Incidents and Results

C. Effort, Results and Caches Discovered

D. Advisors' Assessments Tables

E. Combat Sujpport Received

V

CONFIDENTIAL1. (U-RiMJO) INTRMJUCTION,

a. Cover This report addresses the operational effectiveness ofthe ArrCy o tie Republic of Vietnam ( A.N), the Vietnamese arine CorpsVNMIC), the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and the Vietnamese Navy (VNN)

during 1st Qtr CY 70. ",Thc Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) portion of thereport is published as Part II. The status and performance of Regionaland Popular Forces (RF/PF) are covered in separate reports, the mostcomprehensive of which 'is the M1ACCORDS Territorial Forces EvaluationSystem (TFES) Monthly Evaluation Stumary Report.

b. Data and Information Sources.

... . .. .i eneal pertional statistics are derived--from the .EPMonthly Operational Statistics Reports submitted to MACV by US advisotsassigned to AMRVN/NIC units. Significant problem areas are renortedquarterly by corps senior advisors. Assessments of operational effec-tiveness, leadership, training, staff functions and problem, areas ofARVN and MIC units are derived from advisors' responses to the SEERquarterly questionnaire; Enemy force strength data is obtained fromMACJ2. Friendly force strength data is received from MCJ3 and the . . . .Territorial Forces Evaluation System. Input for the naval forces portionof this report is received from the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam,and the Senior Naval Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, in the form ofmnthly and quarterly reports.

(2) Revised MACV SEER flestionnaire. This questionnaire wascompletely revised in late 1969 and provides a greater range of infor-ation for evaluating important areas of command interest in ARVN/VNCeffectiveness. In addition, the new questionnaire now has specificquestions answered by advisors at all basic command levels (infantry andartillery battalion, regiment, brigade, division and corps). During thedevelopmental stages, various field organizations were contacted forassistance amd their recommendations incorporated into the final question-na ire. The new questionnaire was iiplemented on a test basis during thefourth quarter 1969 reporti ng period, providing an overlan of old and newdata bases, and allowing the old and Pew results to be directly compared.The new questionnaire provides a more precise easuremcnt of many attributesof ARVN/WN% units covered by the old questionnaire, as wel as exnandedcoverage into areas previously not considered. Ience, the raluationsderived from the two questionnaires are not identical, and nose trendlines displayed in this report which cover several quarters hav ha'e a dis-continuity in the fourth quarter. Likewise, the fourth quar :r evaluationw;shown on charts derived from the questionnaire are not thos i disnlayed in.4th Qtr( 69 MC SER Report, but have been derived from he ne

questionnaire. ----

c. Factors [nfluencing Performance. Many factors, such as differencesin terrain, size of"areas, enem,/Frin _ly den.qity, level of activity, weather,and tactics employed by opposing forces affect the results as shown in thisreport.

1 GROUP 4Downgraded at 3 yearintervals; declassifiedCONFID NTIAL after 12 yearsCONFiDENTIAL

rCCNFIDENTIAL

2. (C-NOFORN) SUNt\RY OF PERFORNICE.

a. Effectiveness.

(1) Allocation of Effort. The level of effort devoted to combatoperations increased to 61 percent, an all-time high for the past two years.

Time spent on security remained about the same as the previous quarter, at21 percent. Effort devoted to pacification has steadily decreased as aresilt of .JCS's emphasis on turning this mission over to territorial forces.There was a two percent decrease in time spent on reserve, training andrehabilitation, however.

(2) Contacts and Enemy Initiated Incidents. Country-wide enemycontacts by ARVN infantry battalions increased from 1,843 in the 4th QtrCY 69 to 1,979 during the first quarter.. The number of contacts. withenemy units of platoon size and smaller increased ten percent, whilebattalion size contacts dropped sharply from the previous period. Themajor decrease occured in II Corps, which reported no battalion size con-tacts during the quarter. There was a decrease in the number of enemyinitiated incidents against ARVN/kNVMC units during the quarter; as hasbeen the trend over the past five quarters. Night time incidents continueto constitute the major percentage of all incidents.

(3) )perational Results. Results during the first quarter in termsof enemy eliminate increased and was the best achieved since 2d Qtr CY 69,while the number of friendly KIA, declined. I Corps organizations achievedthe greatest number of enemy KIA per standard battalion among the corps andthe 2d Division was highest in-country in this category. Ranger bpttalionsshowed the greatest impiovement in enemy KIA during the quarter. The numberof weapons captured per battalion increased, and the weapons ratio morethan doubled from the previous quarter, as the number of weapons lostby friendly forces decreased by 50 percent. The ARIN maneuver battalionkill ratio reached a new high at 5.4:1. Cache finds of weapons increasedfive percent, while the amount of food and ammunition increased 50 percent;the largest amount since 2d Qtr CY 69. The Airborne Division accountedfor 29 percent of the total cache finds.

(4) Effectiveness. US Advisors' assessment ofARVN/VNMIC operationaleffectiveness increased from the previous quarter, with III Corps units showingthe largest overall gain. I Corps organizations have been rated high for the

.. past five quarters, as have- some special units (Airborne and Marines)_ .

(5) 'Iraining. The total time spent on training by APYN battalionsdecreased slightly fom the fourth quarter and remains low. The quality oftraining showed improvement during the first quarter with almost all categoriesreceiving a smaller percentage of "por" ratings from advisors than in thefourth quarter. An accelerated program to provide refresher training isplanned, but twenty percent of the ARVN infantry attalions will be overduefor this training by the end of the year.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(6) Unit Performance. Highlighted during the quarter as top

performance units were the 25th, 9th, Ist and 2d Divisions, and the Airborne,and Marine special units.

b. Problem Areas.

(1) Leadership. The quality of leadership has generally improvedduring the quarter, but continues to be weak among lower ranking officersand noncommissioned officers. Specialized leadership courses at divisiontraining centers and increased numbers of small unit operations are servingto correct this deficiency. This problem reveals itself in many ways, themost serious of which is the lack of aggressiveness demonstrated by manyorganizations. During the first quarter, 12 percent of the battalion advisorsreported that their units were not aggressive when in contact with the enemy.The overall ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalion leadership assessment has improvedslightly during the first quarter. The leadership problem continues to bereported as greater in ARVN infantry battaliont- than in special units.

(2) Maneuver Battalion Strength. The ARVN and VNMC expandedslightly during the first quarter, but maneuver battalions continued to beunderstrength. The assigned strength of ARVN infantry battalions increasedby 2,500 during the first quarter, but lagged behind authorized levels,which also increased by 4,100 on 1 January 1970. The shortage in maneuverunits amounts to a deficit of approximately 2Z infantry battalions. Thecountry-wide desertion rate of ARVN/NvC major combat elements, whichincreased in the fourth quarter, decreased slightly in the first quarterto 30 per 1,000 assigned-strength. Although the overall RVNAF desertionrate is much lower, the high rate in combat units continues to present asignificant problem.

(3) Casualties due to Mines and Booby Traps. In the first quarterdeaths from mines and booby traps increased, and since total friendly KIAdecreased, the percent of total casualties due to mines and booby transincreased to 36 percent, which was the highest percentage in the last fivequarters.

(4) Logistics. The ARVN supply system, especially the portiondealing with the requistioning and distributing of supplies and repair parts,remains a critical problem. Failure to properly exercise the supply systemhas led to shortages of parts for mission essential items at the using unitlevel, while an adequate supply of these parts is reported to be available in-country. The quality and quantity of dependent housing continues to be amajor problem, although some progress has been-made: Some items ,such as . .

SS0~g sahneoms rea e pauoghes .a bee tn an o tukreaniM60 machine guns, grenade launchers,. 3/4 ton and 1 ton trucks, remain inshort supply. Experience gained in the recent turnover of bases to AIWNunits has indicated the need for substantial improvement of ARVN basemaintenance support.

3

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r

COHFIDNTIAL(S) Training. Extra attention is still needed on all aspects of

training so that maximum qualitative improvement in ARYN/VNMC forces canbe realized. Advisors report that the analysis of the training situationby division, regimental and battalion G3/S3 sections and the training pro-grams they develop and implement have shown substantial improvement thisquarter, but still remain major problems. Some gradual improvement isindicated in the quality of in-place training, but the amount of suchtraining has decreased since the fourth quarter. The overall training effec-tiveness evaluation has slightly improved this quarter.

(6) Inadequacies within Division, Regimental and Battalion Staffs.A substantial number of advisors report G2/S2, G3/S3 and G4/S4 functions tobe inadequate, with considerable improvement being reported in division/regimental G3/S3 staff sections. A greater percentage Of advisors reportinadequacies within battalion staffs than in regimental and division staffs.

(7) Intelligence. ARN battalions have displayed more effectiveefforts in collecting intelligence information this quarter, but the intelli-gence they received from higher headquarters was untimely much of the time.The intelligence functions at all staff levels are reported as a major staffproblem.

(8) Unit Performance. The 42d Regiment and the 23d Division dis-played relatively low performance during the quarter. The 42d Regimentcontinued to be hampered by poor employment and obtained minimal results.

4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL3. (C-NOFORN) ARMY AND MARINE FORCES EVALUATION.

a. Environmental Aspects. On the following pages are environmentalconditions and characteristics for each corps. These conditions are con-sidered important in analyzing results and performance of ARVN/VNMC units.Charts i, 2, 3, and 4 show the average numbers of enemy and friendlymaneuver battalions present in the DTYA during the first quarter, relativestrengths of enemy and friendly maneuver elements, and enemy and friendlydensity in each D[A. I/ Friendly strengths are subdivided to show FWAF,ARVN, and RF/PF-CIDG. -]nemy strengths are subdivided to show. NVA/VCinfantry and guerrilla elements and are computed to include all enemymaneuver elements less headquarters. Arrows indicate previous quarterstrengths.

l/ Maneuver battalions include ARVN armored cavalry squadrons.

5

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CONFIDENTIAL II CORPS ENVINENT

CONDITIONS CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain The Chaine Annamitique Mountains dominate the area. Rainforests covering the mountains offer refuge to the enemy.In the west, the Chaine Annamitique grades into rolling up-land plains, with altitudes between 1,500 and 3,000 feetabove sea level. In the east, the mountains drop off sharplyto narrow coastal plains.

Weather Throughout the quarter, the northermost corps area was dominatedby poor to marginal weather more than 50% of the time.Ceilings below 2,000 feet and.visibilities restricted by fogand light rain or drizzle were commonly observed. However,breakdowns in the northeast monsoon did produce periods ofup to a week of good flying weather during the first two months.The beginning of the transition to the southwest monsoonduring the latter half of March also brought about somewhatimproved conditions over the corps..

Population The majority of the population of about 3,062,100 (17.3%of the national total) is settled along the coast. Da Nangand Hue are the only major cities in the area.

GVN Control Relatively secare: Hamlets 84.5%; Population 88.3%.

Enemy TYPE OF AVG NO. CHANGE IN AVG NO. OFForces UNIT OF BNS BNS FROM LAST QrR

NVA 61 -2

VCMF 7 0

VGLF 7 0

Sappers 19 -2

94 -4

The total enemy strength decreased about 11 percent fromlast quarter. The lth UrA has the highest enemy-density -- ..in-country.

Friendly The total friendly strength remained about the sae asForces 4th Qtr CY 69. CIDG strength of 3,611 has been included in

the RF/PF totals this quarter. FWMAF decreased by sevenbattalions since last quarter reflecting the redeploymentof US Marine forces. RF/PF and CIDG forces increased by1,389 and ARVN/VNMC forces increased by 1,171.

7

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALII CORPS ENVIRONMENT

CO)NDITIONS a-LARACTERISTICS

Terrain The largest of the corps areas; II Corps, is characterized

by diverse terrain features con:isting of coastal plains, high-land plateaus, mountains and dense jungles. The, area is, forthe most part, sparsely populated and underdeveloped.

Weather During January, coastal II Corps experienced a wer her pat-tern similar to I Corps and the highlands were un(r generallygood conditions. February produced somewhat improved conditionsalong the coast while the highlands experienced good flyingweather 27 days during the month.. During March, the coastalstretches were under partly cloudy skies except for occasionalperiods of rain shower activity. Light, widely scattered showersalso appeared in the highlands for the first time this year.

Population The majority of the population of about 3,141,900 (17.7% of'the national total) is settled along the coast. Qui Nhon andNha Trang are the major cities of the coastal area. Thepopulation inland is largely Montagnard.

GVN Control Relatively secure: Hamlets 76.3%; Population 88.1%.

Enemy TYPE OF AVG NO. CHANGE IN AVG NO. OFForces UNIT OF BNS _BNS FROM LAST QTR

NVA 24" +2

VC4F 4

VCLF 12 0

Sappers 10 +1

50 +3

Although there was an increase of three enemy battalions,the total enemy strength decreased about 23 percent from lastquarter. The 23d DrA continues to have the lowest enemytroop density of all the DTrAs and SrZs.

Friendly The 23d DTA also has the lowest-friendly troop density ofForces all DTAs and SrZs. There was an increase in the total

friendly strength during the quarter. CIDG strength of 9,767has been included in the RF/PF totals this quarter. Thereduction in FNAF strength reflects the redeployment ofUS forces. RF/PF increased by 3,663 and ARVN/VNMC forcesdecreased by 854, and remained lowest of all corps.

9

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CONFIDENTIALIII COr-S ENVIRONMENT

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OJNDITIONS CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain The III Corps area is one of transition. The sourthernportion consists of rich, flat lands which flood duringthe rainy season. In the eastern regions, there aremangrove swamps, dense forests, and rubber plantations.In the northwestern areas the terrain becomes mountainouswith elevations up to 1,500 feet.

Weather A basically good weather pattern persisted across the corpsduring the first quarter of 1970. Fog and haze caused briefperiods of poor conditions during the early mornings butthe afternoons generally provided good flying weather.Near the end of March, a slight increase in rain showerswas noted in the area.

Population III Corps has the second largest population of about5,571,400 (31.4% of the national total) and the nationalcapital (Saigon) with a population of about 2,192,500.

GVN Control Relatively secure: Hamlets 92.7%; Population 96.8%.

Enemy TYPE OF AVG NO. CHANGE IN AVG NO. OFForces UNIT OF BNS BNS FROM LAST TR

NVA 32 -5

VCMF 34 +1

VCLF 6 0

Sappers 16 +2

88 -2

the total enemy strength decreased about 27 percent fromlast quarter although the total 4aumber of battalions onlydecreased by two.

Friendly The total friendly strength remained about the same asForces 4th Qtr CY 69. CIDG strength of 5,924 is included in the

RF/PF totals this quarter. FSMAIF battalions decreasedby 11 reflecting the redeployment of US forces. RP/PFand CIDG forces increased by 773 and APRN/INVC forcesincreased by 2,585.

I I

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CONFIDENTIAL

IV CORPS EVI)MVENT

OWNDITIONS CHARACTERISTICS

Terrain IV CTZ includes the Delta of the Bassac and Mekong Rivers.The area is covered almost entirely with swamps, marshesand rice fields. The shoreline is marked by long stretchesof mangrove swamps, beyond which mud flats stretch for some,distance at low tide. Nearly all of the Delta is less than10 feet above sea level and the rise and fall of the tide isnoticeable in the rivers and canals throughout the area. Theunimproved areas of swamps, mangrove forest and jungle affordsanctuary to the enemy.

Weather Southern IV Corps experienced the same general weather patternas III Corps. A good weather pattern persisted across thecorps. In the early mornings and afternoons fog and haze

'caused brief periods of poor conditions but flying conditionswere generally good.

Population IV Corps has the largest population area with about 5,948,200(33.6% of the national total). The de.ta s the major farmingarea and producer of rice.*

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GVN Control Relatively secure: Hamlets 76.6%; Population 84.7%.

Enemy TYPE OF AVG NO. CHANGE IN AVG NO. OFForces UNIT OF BNS .BNS FROMA LAST (QR

NVA 8 +5

VorF 18 -2

VCLF 18 +2

Sappers 9 " +4

53 +9

Although enemy battalions increased by nine, there was a 14percent decrease in total enemy strength diqring the quarter.There was an increase in infiltration by NW\! forces.

Friendly The Tien Giang DTA (7th Division) continues to have theForces highest friendly troop density of all DTA's and STZ's. The

total friendly strength increased by less than one percentfrom the last quarter. CIDG strength of 5,750 is included inthe RF/PF total this quarter. One additional ARVN Marinebattalion was deployed during the quarter. RF/PF and CIDGforces increased by 1,322 and ARN strength increased by395.

13

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CONFIDENTIAL

b. Enemy Initiated Incidents.

(1) There was a decrease in the number of enemy initiated incidentsagainst ARVN/VNWC units during the quarter; as has been the trend over thepast five quarters (Chart 5).

(2) Chart 6 illustrates the number and type of incidents directedagainst ARVN infantry units, by corps, during the last four quarters. Night-time incidents continue to constitute the major percentage of all incidents.Corps assessments are as follows:

(a) I C2s. I Corps experienced the least number of enemyinitiated incidents among-the four corps. Most of these incidents occurredduring daylight hours. Incidents were about equally distributed between thetwo divisions and one separate regiment.

(b) II Corps. Although other types of incidents declined, assaultsand ambushes remained at t e same level as the previous quarter. The totalnumber of incidents were highest among the four corps. Incidents in the 23dDrA accounted for 50 percent of the corps total and consisted mostly of attacksby fire. Night attacks comprised the majority of these incidents.

(c) III Corps. The total number of enemy initiated incidentsdecreased by more than67 percent. Activity in the 31st and 32d DTA accountedfor all of these incidents, most of which took place at night.

(d) IV Corps. The corps w~s second highest in the total numberof enemy initiated incidents, which were equally distributed among the threedivisions. The majority of incidents took plate at night.

(3) Annex B contains a detailed tabulation of enemy initiated inci-dents.

d,.,t 5

[EN MY INITIATED INCIDENTSAGAINST ARVN/VNMC

-- _____ __ - -h'500 -

Si -

ISTS

625 _ _

I i1961 1970

14

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 6

m 004~ cm4

W'221 w a

cn. (n4

040

a ax

a. w.

0 a nr crtc

z n 0 4n C

o ui

z t

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a0*W 0 v 0 w Nl 0 . Lj

tz a ) 2

F. (n

0M0 a910

_ _ _I-_-- -q U

0

02 (d4 IC4n

C',Y

L a

N N

CDD~ 0 (D N 0D

CONFIDENTIAL

r

CONFIDENTIALc. Contacts.

(1) Country-wide enemy contacts by ARVN infantry battalions increasedfrom 1,843 in the 4th Qtr CY 69 to 1,979 during the first quarter (Chart 7).II Corps experienced the least number of contacts among the CTZs.

(2) The number of contacts with enemy units of platoon size andsmaller increased ten percent from the last quarter. This denotes the enemy'sincreased reliance on the employment of small unit tactics throughout thebattle area, as opposed to massing his forces into battalion-size operations,which increases their vulnerability to detection and annihilation by friendlyforces.

.(3)- In contrast to the increase in platoon-size contacts country-wide, battalion-size contacts dropped sharply from the last quarter. Themajor decrease occurred in II Corps, which reported no battalion-size contactsduring the quarter. In I Corps, an equal number of battalion-size contactswere reported by the st and 2d Divisions (eight' each), while in III- Corpsonly three such contacts were reported; all by the 18th Division. IV Corpsreported 25 battalion-size contacts, 16 of which took place in the 42d DTA,-.in Choung Thien and An Xuyen Provinces.

(4) Annex A contains a detailed tabulation of enemy contacts andresults.

Chart 7

ENEMY CONTACTS BY ARVN INF BNS

5 100 100(000)

86%

•4 SO 80

3 60 60

• 25

- PREVIOUS QTRI16CONFIDENTIAL

J N NB ICzr L

CONFIDENTIAL

d. Effort.

(1) Percent of Time Spent on Missions Country-wide. Chart 8 showsthe average battalion effort on missions country-wide for ARVN/VNMC organi-zations, and trends since 1969. Effort devoted to combat operations increasedto 61 percent, an all-time high for the two year period. Time spent onsecurity remained about the same as the last quarter, at 21 percent. Effortdevoted to pacification has steadily decreased as a result of JGS's emphasison turning this mission over to territorial forces. II Corps continued todevote one-third of its time to pacification, although there was a decreasefrom the previous quarter. There was a two percent decrease in time spenton reserve, training and rehabilitation.

(2) Percent of Time Spent on Missions Within Each Corps. Chart 9shows a comparison of time spent on each mission, with an indication of thechange since last quarter.

(a) I Corps. Time spent on combat operations increased,although bad weather continued to restrict operations in the llth UTA duringthe early part of the quarter. The 51st Regiment almost doubled its efforton combat operations but continued to devote 49 percent of its effort tosecurity operations--second highest in-country. Very little time wasdevoted to pacification, as is prevalent with I Corps units. Time spenton reserve, training and rehabilitation increased slightly. The 2d Divisioncontinued to devote an above average amount of effort to training (ninepercent) while the 1st Division and 51st Regiment were both below averagein the amount of effort 'expended on this mission.

(b) II Corps. A large percentage of II Corps' effort wasstill devoted to static pacification and security (43 percent during thequarter), while time spent on combat operations decreased. JGS has directedthe withdrawal of units of the 22d and 23d Divisions from pacificationeffort by the end of 2d Qtr CY 70; and efforts are being made by theseorganizations to meet this goal. The 42d Regiment continued to placeemphasis on training during the quarter, devoting 11 percent of its time tothis effort--highest in-country.

(c) III Corps. Time spent on combat operations increasedfor the sixth consecutive quarter and was highest in-country at 67 percent.The 5th Division recorded, for the second consecutive quarter, the most timeon combat operations (79 percent) of all major organizations. As combatoperations increased effort devoted to pacification declined. Time spenton reserve, training and rehabilitation decreased to eight percent, however,.six percent, was devoted to training.

(d) IV Corps. Time spent on combat operations increased to63 percent, while there wa a corresponding decrease in security and paci-fication efforts. The 19 percent of time devoted to reserve training andrehabilitation was highest among the four corps. Seven percent of thistime was devoted to training.

17

CONFIDENTIAL

r

CONFIDENTIALChart 8

ARVN/VNMC PERCENT TIME SPENTI ON MISSIONS

100

0

20

30 2 24 22 4 3

1919 1 5

T 10- 6

30 2242 0 10

CTZ 1 12 m iz I l U ifi 1 13 U if rI U

COMBT OP ECURITY PAC ACTIVE PAC STATIC TR AINI.rRE".4A

ll-EWO;5 QRjT~EpR

18

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) Comparison of Time Spnt on Missions by Major Organizations.The table below shows the major AR.N organizations with the most or leasttime spent on each mission. Complete data indicating time spent on eachmission is contained in Annex C.

TABLE 1

MISSION MDST TIME LEAST TIME

Combat Operations 5th Div (79%) 22d Div (7%)

Security 42d Regt (51%) 9thDiv (1%)

Pacification-Active 25th Div (36%) .5th Div 51st Regt (0%)

Pacification-Static 22d Div (39%) st, 2d, 5th,' 18th-. ,-,Div. , 51st, 42d Regt (0%)

Reserve 2d Div (10%) 42d Regt, 25th Div (0%)

Training 42d Regt (11%) 2d Div (5%)

Rehabilitation 9th Div (14%) 51st & 42d Regt (0%)

19

CONFIDENTIAL

r CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 10

.1 CMBIND AD UNILATERAL OPERATIONS

loo PERCENT OF EFFORT

75

50-

20130140110 2QoQ4 10 2Q130140110 2013QI01 0I CORPS IIOPS III CORPS IV CORPS

%'COMBINED OPNSUNILATZRAL OPNS

KIAPER BIN DAY 150KILL RATIO

10.0- p

' I %.p$pp

3.0p pp

200

CONFIDENTIA

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Combined and Unilateral Combat Operations.

(1) Effort (Chart 10).

(a) The proportion of timne spent on combined (US and ARVN)comibat operations decreased from the last quarter primarily due tothe reduction of combined efforts in III Corps, which was caused by theredeployment of US units. However, the III Corps commander continuesto emphasize the DONG TIF. (Progress Together) program in the 5th and 25thDivisions, and has gained considerable success.

(b) In I Corps approximately the same proportion of timewas spent on combined and unilateral operations as in the previous quarter.The 51st Regiment spent almost 20 percent of its time on combined operationswith US Marine Corps units.

(c) All combined operations conducted in II Corps during thequarter were recorded by the 23d Division elements working with US forcesof Task Force South.

(d) Combined operations will continue to show a decrease inthe future due to US force redeployments and the increasing desire of ARVNcommanders to assume responsibility for their own areas of operation, withonly US combat support provided.

(2) Results (Charts 11 and 12).

(a) In I Corps, the number of enemy KIA per battalion perday was higher on combined operations than the number achieved on unilateraloperations. The kill ratio, however, was low. The 51st Regiment obtained70 percent of its kills while on combined operations with US Marine Corpsunits.

(b) II Corps units produced negligible results on combinedoperations.

(c) In III Corps, results achieved were better per battalionday of effort than those achieved on unilateral operations. The 5thand 25th Divisions achieved excellent results in the number of enemy KIAper battalion day and kill ratio.

(d) Although the kill results from combined operations arenot always impressive, advisors continue to report that many benefits arederived from these operations in terms of improving leadership, combat - . .effectiveness and employment of combat support. Combined operationsprovide a vehicle for moving ARVN combat forces away from populated areasand into remote, high threat areas to operate against enemy main forceunits. The forward deployment of ARVN units helps in eventual redeploy-ment of US forces.

21

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Chart 13

AR V N /VN MCAV~EABN RESULTS-0JINTRY-WIDI

KILL - ENEMY ELIMINATED

RATI 4.61 4.31 4.01 4.51 5.4:1 ___ _

60 41.2 45' 940-

20- 10.9 1L1__10 2Q 30 40 1 20 30 4

1969 1970IMENEMY CAPTURED/SURRENDEREDIIIIIIII ENEMY KIA QWFRIENDLY KIA

Chart 14

WEEAPONSRATIO 15.9:1 5.3:1 20.1:1 7.0:1 185:1 __

100 *

60-

40-

20-2. 17.3 11.6 9.6 14.6

IQ 20 30Q 4 IQ 120 130 401969 1970

=ENEMY CAPTURED FRIENDLY LUST

22

CONFIDENTIAL

f. Results.

(1) ,/Enemy Eliminated. Chart 13 shows the country-wide averagebattalion results achieved by ARVN/VNMC in terms of enemy eliminated(killed, captured and surrendered). In addition, friendly KIA is indicated;and the ratios of enemy to friendly'KIA are also shown. The number of*enemy eliminated increased and was the highest since 2d Qtr CY 69, whilethe number of friendly KIA declined. The kill ratio reached a new highat 5.4:1. The 2d, 9th and 25th Divisions had the largest number of enenreliminated during the quarter. Chart 16 shows the enemy KIA figure perbattalion for the corps and major organizations.

(2) Weapons Captured (Chart 14). The number of weapons captured-(excluding caches) per battalion increased, and the weapons ratio morethan doubled from the previous quarter, as the number of weapons lost by . ..friendly forces decreased by 50 percent. The weapons ratio of 18.3:1 wasthe best achieved since 3d Qtr CY 69. The 2d and 9th Divisions capturedthe most weapons.

(3) US and GVN Regular Forces Kill Ratio. A comparison of US andGVN regular forces (ARVN/V[, VNAF and VNN) kill ratios, based oncountry-wide statistics (Measurement of Progress Data) is shown on Chart15. Both US and GVN ratios decreased during the quarter, with the USratio showing the greatest decline.

Chrt iS

I I KIA RATIOI[ I IUS AND GVN REGULAR FORCES

-,.,? io.,, I.,,- 10 1 0 . ,1

- 6I

'4,, -s.4I

lop 40 4

0 12Q0 30 1401 IQ 1 2.. 3. 401969 1970

US --m--- GVN

23

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENJIALChart 16

ARVN/VNMC ENEMY KIA PER BATTALION

UNIT i0 1020 30 40 50 7P 80 9

ICORPS AVG 48.4

I st Div 34.8 1 -

2d Div 72.7__________'

512dRegt 63.5

1ICORPS AVG 340

22dh Div 24.61

25th Div 48.8

M CORPS AVG 34

7 th Div 35.2-

9 th DIv 58.2.

INFANTRY AVG 135.4 ~ ________

RANGER 557

ARMD CAy 49.8

AIRBORNE 63.7

MARINES 63.1 t -_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _

ARVN/VNMC AVG 141.9 ~'

wV PREVIOUS QTR

24

CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Caches.

(a) Chart 17 indicates caches of wcapons found by ARVN/VNMCorganizaticns country-wide since 1st Qtr CY 69. Cache finds of weaponsincreased ive percent during the quarter. The largest find of weaponswas in III Corps by the Airborne Division.

(b) The food and ammunition found in caches is indicatedby .Chart 1L The amount of food and ammunition discovered increased by50 percent- the largest amount since 2d Qtr CY 69. The 5th Division found16 percent of all the ammunition while the Airborne Division found 28percent of all the food. The Airborne Division continued to do very wellin both calegories by finding 29 percent of the total.

Chart 17

CACHES

_NUMBER OF WEAPONS FOUND310002600

2,0001115 902 956' 956

02 Q 4Q 10 2Q 3Q 4Q

1969 1970

Chart 18

TONS OF FOOD AND AMMUNITION400 376 312

200 200 216200" -

100

4, o 2Q 30 40 t 20 3C 40S1969 1970 -

2S

CONFIDENTIAL

mi

\ / r

CONFIDENTIALCurt 19

UHES- KIA/STD BN

25

20

10 W o ZCORPS

0 o EmrCORPSm' ORPS 1

S /11"CORPS

10 1 20 4

1969 1970

ARVN INF AVG

Chart 20

AMBUSHES

-I----, 1330 13393

tS I!1 I I4

2-

_IS 2 D JI 4 2212 1 5TH ISTHI2T 7THIST I

I CORPS I :CORPS I CORPS I CORPS

MAMBUSHES OIN1OOS)STo N .- ARVN INFAVG(KIA/S3D ON)iENEW KIA/STo ON ......... ARVN INF AVG(AMSUSHES/STD ON)

26

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Ambushes.

(a) Chart 19 shows a comparison of corps results of friendlyambushes, in terms of enemy KIA per standard battalion, during CY 69 and1st Qtr CY 70. Results increased in all four corps. I Corps obtained thegreatest number of enemy KIA per standard battalion, for the fifth consecu-tive quarter. II. Corps' results increased for the first time since 2d QtrCY 69, due to the efforts of the 22d Division, but remained lowest amongcorps for the quarter. III Corps' results increased steadily throughoutthe 15 month period, and remained ARVN's second highest in the first quarter.

..... .... . -The 25th-Division was III Corps' best performer, accounting _for_ 61 percent ofthe corps total kills by ambush. Results in IV Corps increased to 7.8KIA per standard battalion. Although results achieved were below the ARVNaverage, they were the best attained by the corps during the 15 monthperiod.

(b) Chart 20 depicts the number of ambushes conducted byorganizations within each corps during the first quarter and results achieved .in termsof enemy KIA per standard battalion.

1 I CTZ. The 2d Division achieved 316 kills by ambushduring the quarter. Thi-s-as the largest number of kills attained by anyARVN organization and represented 39 percent of the division's total killsfor the period. The 1st Division conducted an above average number ofambushes but achieved below average results, while the number of ambushesconducted by the 51st Regiment were below average and the results achievedwere about average.

2 II CTZ. The 22d Division conducted the 2d highestnumber of ambushes-in-country and accounted for 76 percent of the corps119 total kills; but its results, although the best in II Corps, were belowthe ARVN average. The 23d Division conducted almost 700 ambushes perstandard battalion and achieved only 25 kills, while the 42d Regiment was.lowest in-country in both the number of ambushes conducted and enemy kills.

3 III CTZ. The 25th Division conducted the-largestnumber of ambushes-in-country and achieved he second highest results. Thirty-four percent of the 5th Division's total k' ls for the quarter were by ambushes.The division conducted the third highest n er of ambushes in-country butits results were below the ARVN average. e 18th Division was lowest amongIII Corps organizations both in the number f ambushes conducted and enemyKIA per standard battalion.

4 IV CTZ. IV Corps las lowest among corns in thenumber of ambushes-conducte d-during the quarter. The 7th Division withrelatively few ambushes achieved ARVN's third highest number of enemy killsper standard. battalion (13.4). The 9th and 21st Divisions were below averagein both the number of ambushes conducted and enemy kills.

27

CONFiDENTiAL

. .. .. . ,,, i ii iii i i i| .. ... i i i iiii . . . . ii . . . . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . . . .

~ljp

r

CONFIDENTIALg. Combat Support.

(1) Country-wide. Chart 21 depicts combat support provided tothe ARVN/VNN battalions from 2d Qtr CY 69 through 1st Qtr CY 70, asreported by US advisors to ARN battalions. There was a substantialincrease in the amount of combat support provided ARVN/VNMC battalionsin each category. Tactical air/gunship and helicopter/fixed wing liftsboth increased 39 percent from the previous quarter. Artillery supportalso increased and was the greatest amount provided in over a year. Therewas a proportionate increase in the amount of support provided by RVNAFresources, with artillery support reaching a new high at 85 percent.-Among ARVN/VNMC organizations, the Airborne Division was the greatestuser of combat support during the quarter. The amount of tactical air/gunship and artillery support provided the airborne battalions wasmore than double that provided any other organization. The airbornebattalions also used the greatest number of helicopter/fixed wing liftsand aerial resupply sorties. Among the ARVN infantry organizations,however, IV Corps battalions were provided the greatest amount of combat

........support during the period. Annex E provides complete combat support . " .data for major organizations and a per battalion share for each organi-zation.

(2) Chart 22 shows the combat support provided to the ARVN ineach corps.

(a) I Corps. Combat support employed by I Corps battalionsincreased in each category, as shown by the chart. The percentage of artil-lery support provided by RVNAF decreased to 77 percent compared to 89percent in the previous quarter. RVNAF provided 43 percent of the tacticalair support, a substantial increase from the last quarter, and eight percentof the MEDEVAC. The 1st Division received the greatest amount of artillerysupport in I Corps and was the second highest user among ARVN infantryorganizations. The 2d Division received th- most helicopter lift support,and the 51st Regiment received the greatest amount of tactical air support;but utilized less artillery support than the other organizations.

(b) II Corps. There was a decrease in support provided IICorps battalions, which was the lowest of all corps in each category.RVNAF resources provided 90 percent of the artillery and 33 percent of thetactical air support, both of which represent a substantial increase fromthe previous quarter. RVNAF provided 14 percent of the helicopter liftsorties (a slight decrease) but did not fly any MEDEVAC missions. The 42dRegiment received the most helicopter lift and artillery support while the-.23d Division utilized the greatest amount of tactical air. support...

(c) III Corps. Combat support employed by III Corps battalionsincreased in each category except artillery support which decreased. The5th Division employed the most artillery and was the greatest user of tacticalair support. The 25th Division employed ARVN's second largest number of

28

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALhelicopter lift sorties, while the 18th Division was the lowest of the corpsorganizations in the use of all combat support, except artillery. RVNAFresources provided 76 percent of the artillery (a 15 percent increase), and22 percent of the tactical air support. The percentage of artillery supportprovided by RVNAF remained lowest among the corps for the second consecutivequarter. Only one percent of the helicopter lift and four percent of theWEDEVAP support was provided by RVNAF.

(d) IV Corps. Combat support provided IV Corps battalionsshowed a substantial increase in all categories. The amount of artillery,helicopter lift and MEDEVAC support provided was the greatest of all corps.RVNAF resources continued to provide 100 percent of the artillery support,while providing 65 percent of the tactical air and 35' percent of thehelicopter lift support. Three percent of the MEDEVAC support was providedby RVNAF. The 9th Division was highest among ARVN infantry organizationsin the use of helicopter lift, MEDEVAC and artillery support, while the 21stDivision employed ARVN's second highest amount of tactical air support....

Chart 21

COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED~ARVN/VNMC (PER BN)

SORTIES TACTICAL AIR PLUS HEL/FXWG L;FTS ROUNDS ARTILLERY400 HEL/FXWG GUNSHIP MEDEVAC AIR SUPPLY 3000 -

2500300

200 2000

1500

100 I 1000

%BYRVNA1t 6 I 1 '3 '4 9 9 1 I) 78 75 82 8T

-- .-- RVNAF . . US .-- 41969i ---- 1970

29

CONFIDENTIAL

r

CONFIDENTIALChart 22

COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED ARVN INF (E

r CORPS ZCORPS~p23 F0fC4 ,Eg~ TL/Fx SOTE T 2.s . 7 S ?47AL 4122L2 P OLIU p LIF S RP0O JNTL0K

- 400 Dt - 3000 - -403000

0003200 1 20000o

000 200030-oo% 000

200 1900 I 200 5001

00I I 0

0 0l o o.l001,00340 22 002 8 9721S4~3 6 2 6 3 7 4 72030401203 4 0 40 00 04 02 3040 0 20F 410~S~.U g 69 '470 = us0* 1969 -970

m CORPS N CORPS3an0"S 744 TX PLUS 2EL/FX LIF OO.S jiTIL SOTES.o TCA 1(4 PLUS1 20/FW LIT IOa*0 S MY

0Sp PEEW spl 3000 U0 IF 3000

Soo000 300 20

0000 2I000000 200 I

40000000 5- 00

l478m 70: loo4 2 3 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

I0 2 130 1401 0~ 00 3040 4 0 f. 30 4 40 Q IQ 0 0

=ns us 1349 U70 o1o4o 1s70

30

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

h. Operational Effectiveness Assessments.

(1) The country-wide average of advisors' assessment of operationaleffectiveness rose for the fifth consecutive quarter. Chart 23 shows thetrend in the ARIN/VNMC average since the first quarter 1969. The discon-tinuity in the fourth quarter was caused by a change in evaluations given sameARVN units by advisors in the revised SEER Quarterly Questionnaire.

(2) Significant factors in the first quarter increase were theimproved assessments awarded to the Sth, 18th and 21st Divisions, and the42d and 51st Regiments as shown by Chart 24. The percent of increase inthe 42d Regiment's assessment was highest in country, but the organ;zationstill ranked lowest in ARVN. Several units showed regression during thequarter, among which %ere the 2d, 9th and 23d Divisions. The 9th continuedto rank among ARVN's top divisions, but the 2d Divisicn, one of ARVN's topdivisions in the fourth quarter, dropped tc below average due to a changein the advisors' assessment of the 6th Regiment. Among ARVN special organi-zations, the ranger units showed a significant increase, while the airborneand Marine units dropped off. Advisors' assessment of Marine units, however,remained highest in-country.

(3) Annex D contains detailed assessment tables derived fromthe questionnaire.

Chart 23

AVERAGE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESSOF ARVN/VNMC

spa 83.7

s0 76769 . ........ 79.7

60"

40

20

t0 20 30 20 30 1 4Q1969 1970

4 REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIREIMPLEMENTED 4TH QUARTER.

31

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDEN TIALChart 24

ARVN/VNMC OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESSASSESSMENTS

UNiT V - 1021 p p O~?,O9O

I CORP:S AVG 84.7I st DIVj 88.3

2d Divj 78,6 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

51St Regt 187.7 _____

3ICORPS AVG 8.22d Div 82.6

42d Regt 76.7_______

M~ CORPS AVG_ 82.5

7th Divi 78.0,9th Divi 85.0__

21 st Divi 84.6 V

INFANTRY AVG_183.4RANGER 8491ARMD CAV 79.1AIRBORNE 87.7MARINES 193.5____________

A RV N/VN MC AVG 83.7'W PREVIOUS QUARTERNOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONAIRE

EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69

32

CONFIDENTIAL

- ClNWIU IIALi. Division, Regiment and Battalion Staff Element Evaluations.

(1) Chart 25 compares the effectiveness of division and regimentalstaff functions among the four corps on a percentage scale and Chart26 contains the same information for infantry battalion staffs. Responsesto specific staff questions were grouped by functions (command and control,G1/SI, G2/$2, G3/$3, G4/$4) and ratings computed. The command and staffaverage column shows the combined ratings. A staff element such as GI/SI canbe compared between corps because advisors answered the same set of questions.Different staff elements cannot be directly compared because the ratingsare based upon different sets of questions. The battalions have experiencedgreater difficulty in staff operations than divisions and regiments andare therefore portrayed separately. Staff element problem areas are analyzedby specific function in paragraph 4e.

(2) Regiments/Divisions (Chart 25). In the first quarter, I Corpsstaffs again received the highest overall rating, with no change from theprevious quarter average. II Corps staffs were rated below average in eacharea but exhibited a substantial gain in the GI/S1 staff function from theprevious quarter. III Corps staffs showed an increase in each category, andwere below average in only the G2/S2 and 64/S4 staff functions. IV Corps wasbelow average in each staff area except G4/S4, and showed an overall declinefrom the previous quarter.

(3) Infantry Battalions (Chart 26). I Corps battalion staffs showeda decline in each area from the previous quarter and their overall ratingfell below average. II' Corps staffs were highest in each category, withevery function showing an increase from the fourth quarter. III Corps alsoincreased in each area from the previous quarter, but was below average inthe overall rating. IV Corps battalion staffs declined in each categoryeycept S4, and were below average for all staff areas.

33

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFID NTIAL('ha it 2S

EVAUATONOF COMM4JD STAFF FUNCTIONS:I REGIMENTSI'DIVIIONSJ

100CIV CTONTROLY6

90

4034

CONRDPTSA

Chart '26

EVALATIO OFCOMMAND STAFF FUNCTIONS i~IEV INANTRY BATTALIONS I

100 -- CONTROL SI S2 S 3 S 4 ST__IAV

40-

30-

20-

I0-

3035

CONIDETIA

CONFIDENTIALj. Summary of ARVN Infantry Effectiveness Indicators.

(1) ARVN's ten divisions and two separate regiments are depictedon Chart 27. The comparative standing of the orgalizations according tosix selected indicators is shown. Organic reconnaissance companies andcavalry squadron results are included in totals. The chart does not consider allthe ramifications involved in a total evaluation. The organization areconsidered in three groups (top/pniddle/bottom) in discussing their relation-ship on the chart.

(2) ARVN's four divisions in the top group during the 1st Qtr CY 70were the 25th, 9th,,lst and 2d. The 25th has the highest enemy kill ratioand is above average in the five other effectiveness indicators. The 9thDivision is above average-in-five -of -the six -indicators and has the greatest---number of enemy KIA per standard battalion in-country. The 1st Division wasalso above average in five of the six indicators, and had the highestassessment of operational effectiveness, as well as the highest weaponscaptured ratio per enemy eliminated; a distinction that it shared with tiieSth Division. The 2d Division was above average in four of the six indi-cators, and was highest among ARMN organizations in weapons captured perstandard battalion.-

(3) ARVN's two organizations in the bottom group were the 42dRegiment and the 23d Division. The 42d Regiment was below average inall ARVN effectiveness indicators during the 1st quarter, and was in thebottom position in three of the six. The 23d Division was below averagein five of the six indicators, achieving an above aw , status in onlythe ratio of weapons captured to enemy eliminated. The division waslowest in-country in enemy kill ratio.

(4) The other six ARVN organizations, the Sth, 7th, 18th, 21stand 22d Divisions and the 51st Regiment were in the middle group.

k. Evaluation of Operational Effectiveness of Infantry Divisions, Sepa-rate Regiments and Special Organizations.

(1) General. The foregoing evaluations were primarily at corps orcountry-wide leel. In order to provide a more detailed evaluation of theoperational effectiveness of ARVN and WMC units, the following pages pre-sent charts and texts for each of the divisions, separate regiments andspecial organizations (airborne, ranger, armored cavalry and Marines).Organic reconnaissance companies and cavalry squadron results are notincluded in division totals.

(2) Techniques. The evaluations are based primarily on first-- quarter-and -yearly trends -in-operationaptrformm i ce-data;--For each . . .organization's evaluation the discussion is organized in terms of environ-ment, effort, combat support, results, operational effectiveness/leadership

3C

CONFIDENTIA

.. .... .. ... .. ... ..... :.. .... . - .T =" -". . .. ... i .- .. . =% .. .. .. . ... . Ir,' M

/and trends. Enemy density is based on the total estimate of maneuver unitstrength plus guerrilla strength. In order to compensate for substantialdifferences in the, number of battalions 'in a division or regiment and ininfantry battalioh strengths, "standard battalion" figures are used forsome indicators. The number of standard battalions per division is obtainedby dividing the average quarterly strength of all the battalions of thedivision by the authorized strength of an AR.N infantry battalion.

(3) Charts. The evaluation of each organization is illustratedby charts cont-ainingg combat support received, opportunity, results, andoperational assessments. In addition, yearly trends are depicted for enemyeliminated, kill ratio, advisors' assessment of operational effectivenessand leadership, and percent of effort on all missions.

Chart 27

LA R N EFFECTIVE NESS INDICATORSItoo ,,_- 4

0

A60-

60. A ELm i

40 Mc<- <9>A~b

A

EL"

o4 D

OPNL EN ELIM/ WPN CPTR/ WPN CPIR/ EN ELIM/ KILLEFFECT STD BN STD BN EN ELIM HR CONTACT RATIO

ISTDIV <U>22D DIV q5 5TH 71H D,20 DIV <g>23D DIV ' 18TH . 9TH DIV

51ST REGT 4.42D REGT L 25TH 21ST DIV

37

CONFIDENTIAL

| | in II | l | 111"Ii, Jl - I

r

CONFIDENTIALChart 28

II ST 01V- 1ST QTR CY 705 ma oo 40 00--30 0j -. 00(000)

.4 00 -400 680 .24 5-30

3 -60 300 60o I 6 60

- ---- ---- -20-

200------00 -------- 40 .12 .4 40

1 .0Jlt KI 6 .2 '20

NO. ARTY fTCAR;HEL HEL LIFT HOURS EN ELIM WNCT KL AIROUD$ Q ISP RT SORTIES OF ON

COMBAT SUPPORT CONTACT j RESULTS EFFECT

PER STANDARD BATTALION BN- 17 St SN- 16. 5

4 FREVA OTX --- AMVWIN W A

TRENDSPERET TIME ON MISSIONS

ISO--ENEY EIMINTEDOFFENSIVE UPERAIIONS

1240

IQ2 0 0 1 20 30 40 0o 20 30 4Q IQ- 20 30 49697 190 *969 _j\ 1970

-- -, AVG COMBAT O099-- ACTIVE PlC

010 KILL RATIO SECURITY. STATIT PACIFICATION

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 z 30 40 10 20 30 40969970 1969 i 1970

-OPERATIONL EFFECTIENESS ANDLEADERSHI - SE~ - - -- STAIC PAC

OPERTIOA E~CCVTNFS AD EDERHIPRESERVIETRAINING AND REHAAfIrTArION

Po : o 40 ?0 0 30 40

1969 1970

38

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL1ST DIVISION

Environment. The 1st Division's DTA has the largest enemy density *n-country at 2.14 per square kilometer which includes the largest NVAdensity. The density includes enemy units in areas contiguous to V etnamwhich move between Laos, the EMZ and Vietnam.

Effort. Most of the 1st Division's effort during the first quarter wasspent on combat operations with a slight increase to approximately '5percent. The reserve and rehabilitation time was above average at per.cent, but training time was a low 3 percent.

Combat Support. All three of the combat support elements have incr ased.The number ot artillery rounds fired being 3,500 per standard batta ion.The relatively small increase in the number of helicopter lift sort esreflects the negative effect that bad weather had on operations in hemountain areas.

Results. The 1st Division's hours of Icontact increased but remainedbelow average. Many of these contact, were small NVA units located inbunkers and caves. The number of en eliminated increased but isstill below average at approximately 38 per standard battalion. Acomparison between the number of enemy eliminated and the hours ofcontact indicates that over 3 enemy were eliminated for every hour fcontact. Under normal conditions this ratio can be used as an aggr s-siveness indicator. The 1st Division is above average in this comp ri-son with a 3.4:1 ratio. The number of weapons captured by the 1stDivision increased and is above average at appr3ximately i7 per staihdardbattalion. A comparison between the number of. weapons captured andthe number of enemy eliminated shows that one weapon was captured fprevery 2.3 enemy eliminated. This was one of the better ratios in-country. Under normal conditions this ratio can also be used as anaggressiveness indicator. The kill ratio dropped but is still above theARVN average at 6.1:1. 0 KOerational Effectiveness/Leadership. Although the large majority fthe Ist Divisions results were achieved by its 1st and 2d Regiments,the operational effectiveness of thel entire division is still consi eredexcellent.

Trends. The st Division has reversed its downward trend in the ni.beroF -enemy eliminated. Its weapons captured trend is also increasing Itskill ratio trend dropped due to losses from rockets and mortars. Thetrend in operational effectiveness is rising while the leadershipassessment remains about the same as fourth quarter. The ist Division'simproved results should continue now that the monsoon season is overand the division can expand its operations.

39

CONFIDENTIAL

lqmin"

CONFIDENTIALChart 29

ILt 20 DIV-IST QTR CY 70

- 00 - 500 - 40 - 0 134 o 0 -00(000) 1 02

e4 -0 400 30/, 24 8 -80

3 -60 .300 -60 .18 6 -60

- 20

2 1-4 .20 - -40 .,2 4 40

t .20 -t0 -20 0 .6 -2 2

NO. ARTY AiAIR; EL HEL LIF CHOUR ENLIWPCTRILRAO

NDSH SORT SORTIES OF A ENLMW KILRTOPN

COMBAT SUPPORT ONTACT RESULTS EEOPNL~EFFECT.PER STANDARD BATTALION 8N-12 STDBN- 9.7

PREVOU TR ------- ARN INF AVG

TIPR NT TIME ON MSSIS

ENEMY ELIMINATED g OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

40-

10 20 30 40 10 20 30 40 IQ , 0 30 4096 1969 / \ 1970

COWAT OM -96 ACTIVE PAC

RILL RATIO SECIJRITY.STATIC PACIFICATION

----

40 I0 20 30 40 40 1 20 0 40969 19701969 1970

SECURITY ---- STATIC PIAC

OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND LEADERSH4IP i.RESERVE,TRAINING AND REHABIL.ITATION-

949/ 970 \/ ..

h OlE 051£ RIr~ hO mo ...E.... ...... N . E AI ATIO

40

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL2D DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density in the 2d Division's crea is down slightlyas it was couxtry-wide. The friendly density has increased as it has in amjority of the I Corps areas, due to increases in PF/PF strength.

Effort. The slight increase in offensive operations to 62 percent is partoFe 2d Division's well balanced effort, which includes an above averagepercent of time on training (9 percent) and rehabilitation (14 percent).Their time on security was 14 percent.

Combat Support. The 2d Division's combat support increased with helicoptersupport Showing the greatest increase. The 298 helicopter lift sortiesreflect the extensive Eagle Flights used to reduce mine casualties.

Results. The 2d Division was able to achieve a well above average amount0f contact, with a slightly below average amount of offensive effort.. Duringtheir contacts the 2d Division's infantry battalions eliminated 102 enemyper standard battalion the most in-country and captured the greatest numberof weapons at 31 per standard battalion. It is also significant that evenwith all this activity they were able to reduce their friendly losses.This is shown by the rise to 9.5:1 in the already high kill ratio. Theselosses were reduced by using lift support to pursue the enemy, rather thanwade through a trail of mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Although all of the 2d Division'sregiments did well during the 1st quarter, the division's operationaleffectiveness was reduced by the very low assessment of the 6th Regiment.

Trends. The Zd Division leads the ARVN infantry in the number of enemyeii-liiated per standard battalion, but has shown a downward trend forthe past three quarters. The 2d Division's weapons captured trend isnot dropping with its enemy eliminated trend, which is a favorable sign.The upward trend of the 2d Division's kill ratio is also a favorablesign. The trend in operational effectiveness and leadership assessmentis still down due to the low rating awarded the 6th Regiment. The 2dDivision, one ot ARVN's most improved organizations in 1969, continued toobtain outstanding results and was a top ARVN division.

41

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 30

SIi51ST-1ST QTR CY 70

S I00 500 40 -00 30 -10 -100(oo0)

4 60 •400 3 80 -24 . 0,~30

3 60 -300 60 18 6 60

-40 0 - - - - - - 4

1 20 °00--------A i4 - 40

10 -

20 1002000

O AT E HEL LIFT HOURS EN ELIM WPN CPTR KILL RATIO

ROUND2I.NSHP SORT SORTIES OFtOMBAT SUPPORT CONTACT RESULTS OPNCEFFECT.

PER STANDARD BATTALION BN- 4 - STD BN-4.9

4 PREVIoM .T AYhN 'NI WeS

TRENDS PRCNT VE ON MISSINS

ENEMY ELIMINATED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

40

2 3 4 $0 720 30 40 0 20 3 42

-AVG COWAT 419 - ACTIV[ C0. KILL RATIO SECU ITYSTATIC PACIFICATION

IO80.:t-- - .......... H

10 20 30 40 03 0 30 40 0o 20 30 40 o 20 30 4009 170, 1969 970

----. IW STATIC PACOPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND LEADERSHIP RESERVETRAINING AND REHABILITATION

.0 0. nll le

I0 20 3 40 20 S30 40 10 2 30 40

1469 970OPESAT l lM EirRETAININ * RRNAWL.ITATIRN

42

CONFIDENTIAL

51SI REGIMENT

Environment. The enemy density dropped slightly in the Slst Regiment'sarea as it did elsewhere in-country. RE/PF strength increases almostmade up for the U.S. personnel reductions in this area.

Effort. The 51st Regiment almost doubled its amount of time on combatoperations, but it was still below average at 42 percent. This occuredwhen .the 51st Regiment moved its headquarters away from the city ofDa Nang and commenced combined operations with the 5th U.S. MarineRegiment. The percent of time spent on security, however, is stillhighest in country at 49 percent.

Combat Spport. The 51st Regiment's combat support and hours ofcontact also increased but both were still below average.

Results.- The 51st Regiment's number of enemy eliminated at 39 per stan-& TBttalion, and weapons captured at 11.4, reflect their increasedefforts and opportunity but still remained below average. The killratio dropped to 2.3:1 due to the regiment's heavy losses from mines andbooby traps. This occurred when the regiment first went out on extensivecombat operations.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The 51st Regiment's operationaleffectiveness assessment was high due to the favorable impression itcreated when it moved into the field.

Trend. The 51st reversed its downward trend in the number of enemye iminated. Its weapons captured trend line also rose. The 51st Regiment'skill ratio dropped sharply due to losses caused by mines and booby traps.Its operational effectiveness and leadership trends are rising.

43

CONFIDENTIAL

r

CONFIDENTIALChart 31

22 IV -1ST QTR CY 70--

5 '100 - 500 40 ,00 - 30 - 10(000)4

.4 0 400 8 o4°24 .8 80-30

•3 60 300 ,60 8 6 60

S20-

2 -40 .200- ------- 40 12fl 40

4 0too 2 6 .21 20

NO. ARTY AR EL HEL LIFT HOURS ENELIM WPNCPTR KILL RATIOR ND SHPSOR SORTIES - OPNL

COMBAT SUPPORT [CONTACT RESULTS EFFECT

PER STANDARD BATTALION BN-12 STDBN-10.4

4 PEVous QTR --- ARVN W am

PiCN IEON U iSIONS

ENEMY ELIMINATED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

20 4020 30 40 0G SQ 30 40 JO 20 30 40

1991970 1969 19TO

KILL RATIO SECURl.STA4C P6AC"CATION* I

g-o

to 10 20t\I 196 3" 40 \ t *

903 o 2 Ie,3 0 2,17 Q 4

O 20 30 40 10 20 30 40 1 20 30 40 I 20 30

949 970969 190

OPERATIONAL EFFEClIVENESS AND LEAERNSHP 'RESERPVE. ThANO AND RIENAlI. TATION

70L~ I 30 -C Q 2 0 4 0 2 0 40 2019; 30 40 10 20970 40

I°Tl. ,.. . A 9o 011111 E-V - TRAMIN1, ............ M(NAI.IrAINO(VOPRMRvIsEP $EER QUES"OM4,pE

EEEECTV I 4 N,. cm

44

CONFIDENTIAL

- ONFiDl ,NTIAL22D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density decreased during the quarter, while friendlydensity increased to 3.47 per square kilometer. In March the 47th Regi-mental Headquarters and three battalions were moved to thte 24th STZ inPleiku to help fill the void created by the move -of the US 4th Divisionelements from that area.

Effort. The 22d Division continued to devote the majority of its time topacif-cation. During the 1st .Qtr CY 70, the division spent only sevenpercent of its time on combat operations --lowest among ARVN organizations--while devoting 75 percent to pacification. The division has receivedorders from JGS to withdraw its 'forces from pacification missions bythe end of 2d Qtr CY 70 and plans are underway to achieve this goal.

Combat Suport. There was an increase in 'each type of combat supportprovided except tactical air and helicopter gunships, which decreasedslightly. Helicopter lift sorties more than doubled from the previousquarter, which reflects a shift from large size operations to smallairmobile operations.

Results. Hours of contact and the number of enemy eliminated decreasedsarply from the previous quarter and fell below the ARVN average. Thiswas caused by the reduction in activity following the 47th Regiment'sengagement at Bu Prang/Duc Lap. However, the enemy KIA per hour of contactwas highest in-country at 3.8:1. The increase in the number of weaponscaptured was also favorable. The kill ratio was down but remained slightlyabove the ARVN average.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Despite al overall down-trend inresults achieved during the quarter the division's assessment of opera-tional effectiveness and leadership rose to near average and the highestachieved by that organization in over a year. The commander of the 47thRegiment was replaced in February and leadership has improved throughoutthe regimental elements of the division. However, a shortage of experiencedbattalion and company level commanders still exist in some of the units.

Trends. The number of enemy eliminated dropped sharply following theb-atte at Bu Prang/Duc Lap by elements of the 47th Regiment. The killratio trend has been favorable since 3d Qtr CY.69. Although there wasa slight decrease in the first quarter the division remained slightlyabove the ARVN average. The operational effectiveness and leadershiptrend, iWhich' showed a decline during l)69, rose to near average in thefirst quarter. The 22d Division has performed adequately when employedon combat operations, however, it continues to suffer from excessive

.. employment on pacification and security missions. -Its leadership has-been recently strengthened and reflects definite improvement.

45

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 32

.5 .100 - -500 - -40 '-00 - -30 10 - 100(000)

.4 680 4C0 .80 -24 0 -8030

3 -60 -300 460 18 .6 -60

2 40 .200 - - 40 -12 44 40

1 20 -100 -20 6 2 0

No. ARTY ACAIR HEL HEL LIFT HOURS EN ELIM jWPN CPTR KILL RATIO

ti3JjQ NSHP SORT SORT IES OF -OPNLCOMBAT SUPPORT CONTACT RESULTSEFET

PER STANDARD BATTALION BN-12 STDBN-10

TRENDS E~NCTTIM ON MISSIONS7

ISO.EMY 2 INArED to- FFNSIVE2 OPERATIONS

00 IQ 0I 30 40 IQ 20 30 40

0 0 3 0 0 20 0 40 f90 3S SO

969MA OM1970:lt O

OPEILLRATIO Cv E £0 n pMSER TY A r. AN R2HIFI AT N

2 ........ 10'0203040 0Q 20 30 4 30 4 0 3 0

9S69 L 92 0 3 969, 1 19030 1 4

to PEATIONA EFECT IVNS AN EAERSHP IS W SE - TRAIN S ....... R NA S.WATIONSO r!0700SCAYWVC0003000II .S 0

=ma46

COFIENIA

23D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density decreased from the fourth quarter due tothe withdrawal of two regiments that were located near Bu Prang duringthe latter part of the fourth quarter. Friendly density increased.slightlybut was lowest among the DTAs and SIZs.

Effort. The division's effort on combat .operations was well below average,as were combat operations results. The division spent 31 percent of itstime on security missions and was second highest in-country in time devotedto static pacification. During the quarter, one battalion from each regi-

ient was assigned to primary mission. of pacification, while one battalionwas responsible for the security of Dalat, a JGS-directed mission. Thedivision also had one battalion assigned as security for a land clearingoperation by US Engineers in Quang Duc province luring most of the quarter.

Combat Support. Cambat support was well below average and decreased ineach category except, helicopter lift support, which increased. Thisreflects the corps commander's recent shift from battalion and largersize operations to small unit airmobile operations, targeted against.the -.enemy's smaller elements.

Results. The division's hours of contact decreased sharply and was secondlowest among ARVN organizations. The number of enemy eliminated andweapons captured also decreased. During the quarter the division onlyeliminated 86 enemy, and its kill ratio was lowest in-country at 1.4:1.The division lost 46 men while killing 46 enemy personnel.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership, The assessment of the division'soperational effectiveness and leadership was below average, with advisorsreporting poor leadership among company grade officers and a general lackof aggressiveness when engaged in offensive operations.

Trends. The number of enemy eliminated decreased sharply in the firs'tquarter, after having reached the AVN average in the fourth quarter.during the Bu Prang/Duc Lap battle. The kill ratio trend has general.>been unfavorable, with the division remaining below average since the1st Qtr CY 69. The increase in the fourth, quarter is attributable to

*, the results achieved during the Bu Prang/Duc Lap battle. Trends inoperational effectiveness and leadership have generally been below.average except during the 4th Qtr CY 69. Poor leadership wong companygrade commanders and a general lack of aggressiveness when engaged inoffensive operations are cited as contributing factors.

47

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 33

5 '100 - 500 - 40 -0 100 -(000)

.4 60 -400 0 80 .24 .8

3 -60 -300 -60 1S .6 .60

........... 20

N~~~O MISSIONSJ th IF

ESCNIV OOFTINCOBT UPRT CNTC ESLS0PN

noUto -nu oN t~ misi C

ENMY EUMM.TIED C PiCEPOATIO

20 30 4 102 30 40 0Q 20 SQ 40 I 10 20 i 104Q199IT 969 1970

7I m

8048

CONFIENTIA

DUII ILII I IflL

42D PEGIEI "T

Envirobnent. Enemy density decreased slightly while friendly densityincreased to 1.99 per square kilcmeter. This increase was due to themovement of the 47th Regiment minus one battalion into the STZ in Marchto occupy the TAOR vacated by elements of the 4th US infantry Division.

Effort. During the first quarter the rcgiment spent only 31 percent oftsTime on combat operations--second lowest in-country--while devoting the

greatest amount of time in-country to security operations (52 perc'.nt).The regiment continued to give considerable attention to training, devotinga total of 11 percent of its time to this effort, which was highest among.ARVN organizations.

Combat Support. Combat support provided was below average and decreasedfrom the previous quarter in each category except helicopter lift support,which increased. Within the corps, the regiment was the largest user ofhelicopter lift sorties and artillery support. The regiment was secondlowest in-country in the use of tactical air and helicopter !,Tunship support.

PRsults. Although the regiment improved in the number of enemy eliminated,weapons captured, and kill ratio, overall results achieved were belowaverage and lowest in-country for the second. quarter. During the quarterthe regiment only eliminated a total of 26 enemy persomel and captured oneweapon for every 5.2 enemy eliminated.. The above average kill ratio was of noreal significance since it was based on only 26 enemy killed during theentire quarter.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The regiments assessment of opera-tional effectiveness and leadership remains below average Inct lowest amongARVN organizations. Althcugh the regimental commander is considered to bean excellent leader, he is hampered by ineffective leaders at battalion andcompany level. The commander of the second battalion was replaced in lateMarch.

Trends, The regiment remains at or near the bottom in most measures ofit effectiveness. The number of enemy eliminated, thoupgh slightly

improved from the first quarter, has been below average since 2d Qtr CY 69..The kill ratio has shown a steady improvement over the past three quarters,but has been based on a very small number of enemy kills. Operationaleffectiveness and leadership trends continue below average, with seriousleadership problems being reported among battalion and company gradeconnanders. On 1 May 1970 this regiment was operationally assimned tothe 22d Division. This reorganization may produce improved eiploymentand results, however, serious leadership problems will continue to existand a problem of expanded control has now been added for the 22d Division.

49

CONFIDENTIAL

r

CONFIDENTIALCha.vt 34

-5h ( -0 -100 -500 - 40 100 - -30 - 10 ,100 -

4 00 -400 .80 -24 .6 00 430

3 -6 300 60 S 6 .60

- 4 20 ---- -- - - - - --

2 -4 200 - -- --- 40 .2 44 40

NIP ESORNTI 0I OFC [I OP9A7 N L

14R- L HEL TLIEFT H U S 1 E E I P C T I L 1 1 1CO BA SUP OR 40 NTS LT E FE T

IC Q 0 P0ER2 STNDR 40TAIO BN 01 20 30 40 10 20 30 4

969 970M 9am AR W0

10 2 0 40 10 20 40 0 0 0 40 IQ 20 30 40

019II0.\11

40 o 10120Q 0 301 40 12tQ~IZ01 0 3Q 4

....9UR 991 ...... 0HOLT HI

so

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL5TH DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density decreased slightly to .76 per square kilo-neter. Friendly density increased to 5.52 per square kilometer despitethe redeployment of the US 1st Division--this due primarily to increasesin ARVN strengths and realignment of FWMAF.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations by the Sth Division rose from76 percent to 79 percent, the nighest in ARVN, but total time spent onoffensive operations declined slightly due to less effort in support ofpacification. The 5th Divi3sion spent more time on small unit operationsand ambushes, which provided lower levels of command with more experienceand increased confidence.

Combat Support. The 5th Division made increasing use of combat supportin the iirst quarter, and was above average in all support categoriesexcept helicopter lift. The battalions tended to rely too heavily onair and artillery support. ...

Results. The 5th Division continued to perform below the ARVN infantryaverage with hours of contact, number of enemy eliminated and number ofweapons captured decreasing for the second straight quarter. Its killratio dropped from a respectable 7:1 for the fourth quarter, when thedivision suffered few friendly KIA, to a below average 4:1 kill ratioas friendly casualties increased. This increase in friendly casualtieswas caused hy mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The division's operational effec-tiveness and leadership assessments were above the ARVN infantry average; asharp increase from the fourth quarter when they were substantially belowaverage. Two regimental commanders were replaced during the first quarter.

Trends. The 5th Division's performance in terms of enemy eliminated perb-atalion has been on a steep down trend since the third quarter, the onlytime it exceeded the ARVN infantry average. The kill ratio dropped aftera strong fourth quarter. Operational effectiveness improved as a resultof replacing some weak battalion and regimental commanders. Its failure toshow more improvement in the first quarter is attributable to the turbulancecaused by its enlarged area of responsibility resulting from the redeploy-nent of the US 1st Infantry Division and the turnover in commanders. Moretime will be needed for this division to gain in effectiveness and confidence.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENITIALChart 35

18YHLDIV-IST 1ITR CY 7

5 '100 -500 - -40 - -- 00 .30 0 '100 -C000)

.4 00 -400 W0 -24 .8 8030

3-60 300 60 18 6 60

20 - - - ---2- - --- - - - - -----

2 40 -200 .4------- 40 -12 .4 40

ENOIC AIP 4A TI I H U S NEI WP CPTR I RATIO S

R TEK CLR TIoR- OR SOCOBA SUPOR NTC EULSN

40

790Q 20 30 40 0I0Q0 4 10 20 30 4 0 I 4

7149 190'0

wPRT9A KFTILL E 3 R ATI LEOR PR SEVE TYSNGANO P ACIIC TAON

I0 20 30 40 to 20 3 0 30 40

1%6 1990

OPRATIAL FECTIVNS N LEADERSHIP S. REE IEAIIW AN RIWABUT ATIO

g o. ter w70C.. ~l lwsoetre o

52

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

.p I, : . the 18th Division's DTA remained the most pacified in-counry.. nere was a slight drop in enemy density to .38 per squarekilometer and a slight increase in friendly density to 4.44 per squarekilometer.

Efforts. The 18th Division's amount of time on offensive operationssharply increased to 80 pCrcent il tie first quarter after a fourthquarter low of 46 percent. This increase was caused by a reductionin the amount of time spent on security--to a low 11 percent--as theRF/PF took over most of the security missions.

Combat Support. All types of combat support were below averagealthough artillery support increased slightly from the fourth quarter.This reflects the continued low hours of combat.

Results. The number of enemy eliminated and weapons. captured increasedbut were still below the ARIN infantry average. However, the divisionwas efficient in exploiting its few contacts so-that the increase inenemy KIA and a decrease in friendly KIA combined to produce the highestkill ratio (11.7:1) of any ARMN infantry division.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. In the first quarter, the divisiongained in their operational effectiveness and leadership assessmentsto positions slightly above the ARVN average. The improvement isattributed to an increasing aggressiveness and better execution when incontact, quicker reaction to intelligence, excellent training pro-gram, and more experienced small unit leaders. Commanders are learningto modify their tactics and to shift onerations to effectively counterenemy actions.

Trends. The 18th Division remained below average throughout 1969 and-rst quarter 1970 in enemy eliminated and weapons captured. The

division has been above average in kill ratio for the last four quar-ters and led all ARVN infantry divisions during the first quarter.Operational effectiveness continued to oscillate and more time isneeded to tell if this improvement is permanent. There has beensome improvement in the division's extremely high desertion rate dueto command emphasis.

53

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDE ,TIALOr rt 36

25TH DIV-1ST QTR CY 70

5 * 5o.Lroo..,40 100 -30 10 1004000)

.4 690 40 30 80 24 .8 0

3 6 30 6 b 6 60

2 4

NO.ARTY AARHELI HEL LIFTHOSENLIWNCPRILRAOR SI4P SORT SORTIES HOURF E L AI

COBA SPFRT CONTACT RESULTS EFFECTPER STANDARD BATTALION ON- 12 STD ON- 11.6

~4ms a"T- - - AMV W"G

PCNT TEU 11IISSIONS

E hMfi77 iUPE OFFENSIV OP2RATi'NS 1~ Z~ ~ __ 20 3004

1970 ~201.....

[a. KILL~ RATI 0 SECU6T.ST1c PACIFICATKAf

0 -40 0IQ 20 30 40 ' 0 I 20 30 4

em1969 1970

-- -MN o ff0omy -- STATIC PAC

---- M op 62029W rRAINNO AN0 RENASILITATIUN

L0 . 30 40 to 20 30 40 0 20 30 4

54

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFI ENTIAL2STH DIVISION

Environment. There was a slight drop in enemy density in the DTA,while friendly density increased to 8.87 per'square kilometer.Signifiant nb-:rs of INVA fillers were reported in VC units.

Effort. The 25th Division's effort was virtually all devoted tooffensive operations, a category in which it led all ARVN infantrydivisions. A substantial proportion of these op-rati-ns, moreover,was devoted to active support of pacification. The division con-tinued to conduct a large percentage of its offensive operationswith US forces.

Combat Support. The 25th Division employed the greatest amountof hlicopter lift and tactical air/gunship support in III Corps,but used !he least amount of artillery 'upport in-country. Thehelicopter lift sorties were used for multiple insertions of smallunits, following the enemy pattern of breaking down into squadsize or smaller units.

Results. The number of enemy eliminated .and weapons captured con-tinued to be highest in the corps, reflecting the increased hoursof contact. The kill ratio remained the highest of ARVN infantrydivisions for the second straight quarter at 11.7:1.

Oerational Effectiveness/Leadership. The imagination and aggres-siveness of the division leaders kept its operational effectivenessand leadership assessments among the highest in ARVN. The largenumber of small unit operations helped to develop leadership witha corresponding increase in confidence and aggressiveness.

Trends. The increase in enemy eliminated observed in 1969 continuedinto e 1st Qtr CY 70 and was th6 best achieved by any III Corpsorganization. The kill ratio likewise increased throughout 1969and first quarter 1970, and led all ARVN infantry divisions in thefourth and first quarters. Similarly, the division's operationaleffectiveness increased in each cf the past five quarters. Leader-ship improved and is high due to the extensive small unit operations.The 25th Division has emerged during the past year as one of ARVN'sbest divisions and indications are it will continue to improve itsperformance.

S5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALhrt37

DIV-1 STiITR9{IO 10 100 40 -100 30 -10 - 100

4 so -40 80 24 .6 60 4-30

3 -60 -30 s0 is 6 60

-20

.2 -4 .20 - -40 1 .40

20

NO. ATACIR. EL HEL LIF~T HOURS IEN EI P PRKL AI-RUSH s-SORT SORTIES OFWNCTKILRIOPLCOMBAT SUPPORT ICONTACT RESULTS- EFCT

*PER STANDARD BATTALION BN-12 S106N-9.9

FENT TIME ON M ISS IONS

EMNDAY ELIPAATE !00 O~FENV"E OPERATIONS

* ~~o- III

10I 40 la t 30 0I 20] 3 40 10 to304

KILRATIO_ SEUIYSTATIC PIPIOATION

to- so.

i0 g 3Q 4 IQ 20 30 40 0o 30 4S20 3 401

S OPEATONAL EECTIEES N LADESI PKID ~ ~ ~ W .0 .... S.v f REEn..RA4 AND ngAIMLTAT

7056

CONFIDENTIA

CONFIDENTIAL71! DTVTcION

Environment. The eneqmy density, l.S6 per square kilometer, is thesecond highest in-country. It decreased slightly iuring the quar-ter. Friendly dnsity in the division's DTA was tne highest in-country at 13.5 per square kiloreter, increasing with the growthof RF/PF, and employment of fhe 9th Division and three Marinebattalions in the TA.

Effort. The percent of time devo: ed to offensive operationsincreased to 62 percent, a 20 percent increase from last quarter.An excessive amount of time was spent on security (19 percent) andreserve (20 percent). The inc,-ase in offensive operations was aresult of the new division corifrmder moving his headquarters andregiments to the field.

Combat Support. The number of artillery rounds fired in supportof thebattalions increased slightly from the previous quarter -ndwas above average. The amount of helicopter gunship and tacticalair support decreased and was below average. The amount ofhelicopter lift decreased but remains above the country average.

Results. The large amount of artillery, tactical air and heli-copter gunship support resulted in the fourth largest number ofenemy eliminated in country (61 .5 per battrlion). This wastcomplished with a below average amount of contact (16.4 hoursper battalion) indicating an improvement in the efficiency ofoperations. Enemy captured and surrendered was the highest incountry (18.9 per battalion). Over 60 rc, i t of the kills resultedfrom the efforts of the 10th Re:-" i JI0 i' ts operations in KienHoa Province during th, ,i, 1ii h dii --7,'S kill ratio thoughincreased from last i, , . i.s low (3.'" wi th 48 percentof the friendly L k tr IIhuted to mine's . boot' traps. Thenumrber of weapons capiiiie'd (13.2 per batt, .0 w l.!ightly belowthe country averi, , ,nd ,hotlr ,,(db,, rease tro- 1,st fl ,arter.

Oprational Effectivenes! /.tdi hip. ,e i, , one of theIowest operition--i--e f7ctiven-- ' it resultingfrom the evaluation received b- '",. n', ,i 0,I.1h Regiments. Theleadership assessment of t1- xk' - s commanders remains one ofthe lowest in country, aga .; i, -iiily because of the llth and 12thRegiments.

Trends. The number of enerw eliminated increased from last quarter... th [ Division's kill ratio is below average but has shown the firstupw-uard tre-id since first ouarter 1969. The division continues tosuffr a high rate of casualties from mines and booby traps. Theopervtional effectiveness and leadership trends are below the countryavera- with the first quarter ratings being at a low level country-wide. Wtile still operationally low this division hes shen signsof positive improvement during the first quarter.

57

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 39

9TH DI 1ST QTR CY 70

04 O54 2.5 10 10 o0 4 40 - -00 30 - 10 - .O00t "o

(00

902 04-4 0 .4004 s 80

-30

4 .. .- . .. . . . .

2 4 2 - 12 . 2-0

i0 LNO ART ACAI.I4E SoLnIF HO.URS EN ELIM WPN CPTR KILL RATIOBQWQiR .NSIP SOT OTIES O OP___ _TON_

COMOAT SUPPORT CONTACTI RESULTS ONEFFECT

PRSTANDARD BATTALION BN- 12 STD BN- 8.6

PRVIO(J onR i~AWN IW VS

.v TENDSPfCNT TIME ON MIS SIONS

ViEMY 2UUMV" too OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

,0- 2- .. . ...... . . .. . .0 0 30 40 IQ 20 3 4010 20 30 40 10 20 30 40

1.- ism 1999 1970-CinAv OM .. ACIIVg WA

KILL RATIO R1 19S1 4

i- -TATIC Mlf?

O fIT1NAL EF!CW ESS AND LEADEKSI4 RlESEV,TRANN AND R2HAOILlTATION

0IQ 3 40 IQ 20 30 40 10 20 30 40 IQ 20 30 40

Is" 19709 97.... NIPWN amIW* --- ST ATI A

, 58

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL9TH DIVISIO'

Environment. The enemy density decreased to 0.73 per square kilo-meter even though one VCLF battalion was added to the enemy strength.Friendly strength increased slightly to 7.66 per square kilometerdue primarily to RF/PF increases.

Effort. The time on combat operations increased during the quarter.ro 59 to 68 percent.- During the quarter the division conductedtwo major operations out of its DTA, both in the 21st Division's DTA.One was conducted in January in Phuong Dinh, Kien Giang and ChuongThien Provinces and the second, during March, near the U Minh Forest.A major operation was also conducted in the 9th Division's on DTAduring February.

Combat Support. The 9th Division used the largest uber of helicopterlift sorties, and second largest axrount of artilleW tactical air and

helicopter gunship support in-country.

Results. The 9th Division's hours of contact were the third highestincountry &t 31.2 per battalion and the number of enemy eliminated-- 92.6 per battalion--and killed--80.7 per battalion--were the secondhighest in country. The number of weapons captured was above averageat 18.2 per battalion. The kill ratio of 5.6:1 was the fourth highestin country. The number of friendly personnel killed was high. with56 percent of these casualties resulting from mines and booby traps.

Oprational Effectiveness/Leadership. The Divisions operationaleffectiveness and leadership assessment dropped slightly from lastquarter but was still among the highest in-country.'#

Trends. The number of enemy eliminated has continued to increaseTi-nce-3d Qtr CY 69. The kill ratio has improved.steadily sincesecond quarter 1969. Operational effectiveness mid. leadershipassessments dropped slightly during the first quartkr but are stillabove the country-wide average. The 9th Division operated out ofits own DTA again during first quarter and the results attainedshow the division continues to improve in aggressiveness and flex-iblity. The 9th Division has greatly improved in overall performance-and effectiveness and should continue to be one of ARVN's betterdivisions.

59

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL ~

Chart 39

9 - 100 -500 - 40 4'00- 30 10 - .10(00 0)

.4 0 -400 -80 - 24 .60304

2~~~~~- -44 0-40 -2 . 4

4 KK0 461 20 0 A B 6 262

I 00 26 290

NO. ARTY TCI, E HLLF HOURS EELM WPN CPTR KILL RATIORO NDSIG OFOPNL

COMBAT SUPPORT CONTACT RESULTSEFET

PER STANDARD BATTALION BN- 12 STO BN- 9.1

4~VIOI~ Q0" W- Y W

TRENS PECENTTINE ON MISSIONS

ENEAY EU I"M I to OFESVEOPRTIN

30--IQ _ 2 30 1 Q 0 12 1 30 40I 20 30 40 0Q 20 30 402

MI19701"17- IPjAC0OnAr OPW -- ACTIVE pac

w KILL RATIO SEUTYN T ~C CIFICAION

f 0 2 0 4 0 2 0 4

0.~

IQ 20 30 4 0 10 20 30 40 10 20 30 40 10t o 0 4

199 wmm 970

I9A?~~CCUR". -~C -A7UO -1V ~ M S TAI A

l o TEo a OPEAINS( TONLEFTVEO NE S A ND L EADRHPi.RSRE RIIGAORHBLTTO

so.C.*.o* E

so60

COFIENIA

CONFIDENTIAL21ST DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density dropped slightly during the quarter--.57 per square kilometer--even though the enemy had an additionalsapper battalion in the DTA. The friendly density increased,reflecting the 9th Division's move into the ITA and an increase inRF/PF forces.

Effort. The amount of time spent on offensive operations increased5-0-percent with the majority of this increase resulting from extensivecombat ope.:ations in March. 20 percent of the divisions' time wasspent on security, reserve and rehabilitation.

Combat Support. The increased amount of time spent on offensiveoperations is reflected in the amount of combat support utilized.The number of artillery rounds increased by 40 percent while the useof air support increased by more than 90 percent.

Results. The 21st Division's hours of contact was down from last quarter;gowever, it remained above the country-wide average. The enemy eliminatedat 56.0 per battalion was above average but also showed a decline fromlast quarter. The number of weapons captured was the largest in countrywith 22.8 per battalion. -As during last quarter the division's kill ratiowas below average (2.4:1) and continues to decline. The division had thehighest number of friendly personnel killed in-country. Thirty percentof the friendly kills resulted from enemy mines and booby traps. Thedivision has one strong regiment, the 32d, which accounted for 64 percentof the total enemy killed and achieved a kill ratio of 4.2:1.

Operational EffectiVeness/Leadership. Operational effectiveness andleadership have increased during the quarter and are now above average.This increase is due primarily to the operational effectiveness andleadership of the 32d Regiment.

Trends. The enemy eliminated is above average for the quarter butcontinues the downward trend that was characteristic throughout lastyear. The kill ratio is one of the lowest in country resulting fromthe large number of friendly losses. Operational ef.fectiveness andleadership have shown an upward swing and are now above average. The21st Division has regressed slightly from its previous position as aleading division in IV Corps.

61

CONFIDENTIAL

r

CONFIDENTIALChart 40

AIR BOR NE- 1 I T Y7

5 100 10 500 -401 '-00 -30 10 100(000) 0 42

933 20

.4 460 -40 -30 -80 -24 -6 '0

3 -60 30 46 so is 6 0O

f, .20 -

2 .4 20 - 40j 12 .4 4 -40

1 20 I 20 ~6 .2 420

COMBAT SUPPORT CONTACT RESULTS EFFECT

PER STANDARD BATTALION BN- 9 STD BN- 1.

r FoRNoTIM 0mssus

DI6NY[LiPSTCDOFFENSIVE OPERATIO~NS

60 T

IQ 20 30 40 10 2 30 1 40 10 20 30 1 40 10 20 30 4

I11 f970 19,19 5970

AA U-AT -#S PAC

41-4T ;00 SO,~ICM

I0 20 9"30 40 I0 2070o30 40 10 2Q 0 6 30 40 10 2 Q-0 30 401

10 OPEATONAL EFFCTIEESAN ED M S. RESEVE T011AIND *IIIAS IIIAI I

*t969l ""1 t ITO 196 IS

62

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALAIRBORNE DIVISION

Environment. During the 1st Qtr CY 70, battalions of the AirborneDivision continued operations with the US 1st Cavalry Division, (A)in northern III Corps. Six of the nine battalions were rotatedon operations in Tay Ninh and Phuoc Long Provinces, along theCambodian border, while two battalions were under the operationalcontrol of the Capital Military District and one was JGS reserve.

Effort. Airborne battalions spent 78 percent of their time on offen-sive operations during the first quarter, 71 percent of which wasdevoted to combat operations. There was no change in the amount oftime spent on security missions from the previous quarter. Effortdevoted to training decreased, and was lowest among ARVN organizations.

Combat Support. Combat support almost doubled, and the airbornebattalions were ARVN's greatest user of artillery, tactical air,and helicopter gunship support during the quarter, and ARVN's secondhighest user of helicopter lift sorties. The large number of heli-copter lift sorties per battalion (430) illustrate the extensivesmall unit airmobile operations being conducted, and the extent ofhelicopter support being provided the airborne battalions by theUS 1st Cavalry Division (91).

Results., Hours of contact almost doubled the previous quarter and washighest in-country per standard battalion at 41.9. Operational resultsimproved markedly, and were the best achieved by the division since 2dQtr CY 69. The number of enemy eliminated and weapons captured morethan doubled and rose well above the ARVN average. However, the 3d andl1th Battalions averaged only one enemy KIA each during the quarter.The kill ratio also improved a hundred percent, but remained slightlybelow the ARVN average. Airborne units captured one weapon for every2.2 enemy eliminated. This was the best ratio among the special unitsand third highest in-country.

tOjerational Effectiveness/Leadership. Despite a marked improvement inthe operational results achieved, the division's assessment of opera-tional effectiveness and leadership dropped sharply from the fourthquarter, and was the lowest awarded to the division since 1st Qtr CY69. This is attributable primarily to the very low ratings awardedthe 9th and llth Battalions.

Trends.-- There was an up trend in the number of enemy eliminated andil-f-ratio for the first time since 2d Qtr CY 69. Results achieved in

each of these categories doubled the previous quarter. The number ofweapons captured also increased and the number of weapons captured perenemy- eliminated trend remained high. Operational effectiveness andleadership assessments, which were highest among ARVN organizationsthroughout 1969, dropped sharply during the first quarter as a resultof the low rating awarded two of the battalions. Advisors, however,still consider the majority of the airborne commanders to be excellentleaders.

63

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL,Chart -41

IENEMY KILLS BY AIRBORNE BATTALION

110~

100-236

80

7065

6060

5250 48

40 ip.

3130

20

1048

0- 0 - - - 0UNIT 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 II

00 PREVIOUS QTR64

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 42

ENEMY KILLS BYARMORED CAVALRY SQUARON

00 1 T 1CTZ MflCTZ 17 CTZ 7

TOT o 151 73317

'A

600

302

U NIl 4 7 11 17 4,' 1 5 10 15 18, 2 6 9- 12 1610 PREVIOUS QTRI

65

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 43

CVLRY - ST QT CY1

O 0 50 40 '100-- 30 '0 100(00 0)

17 4,

.4 -00 -400 4

S 0 24 .8 80

530 5

3 -60 -300 60 .18 6 6016a

S20 ------ 6

2 -40 -200 . 40 .2 .4 4()14 0 A1 4 2 10-c, 6 20

NO ARITY VC Al' HE"HLLF HO URS EN ELIM jWPNCPTR KILL RATIOROUN SH l'ORTI SORTIES OF-

COMBAT SUPPORT CONTACT RESULTS OPNL

______~1 STO____ BN___ ______8___- - . -1EFFECT

PER STANDARD BATTALION BN-7SBN0.

4PRtEVIOUS GTR - - -- ARVN INF AVIS

TRENDS r -PT~ENTTME0MISSINS

EVDY ELIMINATED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3090

0 __ 2 0 4 0 2 0 4 0 2 0 4

N 970 11119 0T

N AGCOMBATP ACIe.".

w A 0,KL RATIO SECURITY, STATIC PCIFICATION

2 30 4 0 20 0 40 IQ 20 30 40 I0 20 30 4

----- ______ - EBYI~I C-------------21WT,--STT A

00 OPERATONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND LEADERSI4P 4 9SERV2TAI AN REHAftlTA TICON

j.1f20t30t4070 20 970 40 1 0 20 30~ --;; 4Q I 20 Q 466

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALARMIRED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

Environment. The 17 cavalry squadrons were employed throughout thefour corps tactical zones during the quarter. One squadron is organicto each of the divisions, and the rest operate under corps control.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations increased but remained belowthe average. Many units continued to perform extensive securityand reserve missions, which accounted for a large portion of thecavalry's effort (42 percent) during the quarter. II Corp's squadronsspent 92 percent of their time on security missions.. Time devoted totraining was below average.

Combat Support. Combat support increased but remained below the ARVNaverage. The greatest increase was in the use of tactical air andhelicopter gunship support, which, more than doubled from the previousquarter.

Results. Hours of contact increased and rose above the ARVN average.This was primarily due to the large number of hours of contact in IVCorps, whose squadrons averaged 48 hours each, per standard battalion.The number of enemy eliminated increased due to the efforts of the 17thArmored Cavalry Squadron in I Corps, and the 16th Armored CavalrySquadron.in IV Corps. They eliminated 211 and 322 enemy personnel,respectively, during the quarter; and accounted for 61 percent of thetotal nunber of enemy eliminated by cavalry squadrons. Ten of the 17squadrons averaged less than 10 kills each during the period. Thenumber of weapons captured increased country-wide but remained belowaverage. The kill ratio was highest among ARVN organizations at 12.4:1.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of operationaleffectiveness and leadership remained below average, with no changefrom the previous quarter, even though a few individual squadrons didwell.

Trends. Although there has been an upward trend since 4th Qtr CY 69in the number of enemy eliminated, cavalry squadrons have been belowaverage for the last four consecutive quarters. The cavalry's killratio, which fell in the 3d Qtr CY 69, has increased ,ince that timeto become highest among ARVN organizations in the first quarter. Thetehas been little change in the operational effectiveness and leadershiptrend over the past three quarters.

67

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 44

VNMC- 1ST UQTR CY 70

5 o -500 - 40 '100 -30 - 10 .0(00 0) 0-

.4 -0 -400 80 -24 a30

3 so -30 60 to .S 6 60

2 -,0 - - - - -40- 4 -4

1 40 -10 40 12 2 40

HP SOEL sJ~i.1 'IES HOURS EN ELIM WPt4 CPTR KILL RATIOCO PA SPORT tlIN O - OPNL

COBTSPOT CONTACT RESULTS EFFECTPER STANDARD BATTALION BN- 7 STD BN- u

4PREVd1I OnW-- AVN IW AVG

PCNT TIME MISSINS

E NMEE OFFE!NSIVE OPERATIONS

W. ft% -0L0IQ 20 30 40 10 20 3 4010 20 30 40 10 20 30 4

IWA@-O.UA? OP" --- ACTIV9 PAC

KILL RATIO SE*I1SAICPCFCTO

to 2 30 40 10 20 30 40 1 10 20 30 40 IQ 20 in. 4

OP RANL EFFECTIVENESS ARC LEADIERSNIP !tRESERVE TPAW4RO ANO REHAIUTLATIOR

10 20 3094 70 20. 3 40 so 40 90 20 30 44

1 19o69~ AOI IWORI

68

CONFIDENTIAL

/ CONFIDENTIAL/MARINE DIVIION

Environment. The Marine battalions operated i.n IV Corps during ls"Qtr CX 70 organized under two brigade staffs. Brigade "A" was absorbedinto the joint staff of ATF 211 during January and February. The brigade be-cane OPCON to the 21st Division in late February. Brigade "B" operatedin Dinh Trong and Kien tloa Provinces OPCON to the 7th Division. Six ofthe Marine battalions have rotated between the two brigades, andone battalion is maintained in Saigon as JCS reserve. The newly activated7th Battalion was deployed in February as part of ATF 211, and the newlyactivated 8th Battalion is undergoing training. The 3d Artillery Battalionwas activated; one battery has been deployed and a second battery is currentlyundergoing training.

Effort. The combat cormitients of the Marines have been extensive duringthe 1st Qtr CY 70 as reflected by the high proportion of time spent oncombat .operations (89 percent). This was well above the ARIN infantryaverage and represents a high for all ARVN/ NMC organizations.

Combat Support. Combat support of all types increased again this quarterparticularly helicopter lifts which doubled, reflecting the extensiveairmobile operations conducted. The use of artillery support also increasedas additional artillery units become operational during the quarter.

Results. The number of enemy eliminated remained well above the ARVN averagebut was down from the previous quarter. Weapons captured increased and wereabove the ARVN average. flours of contact increased and enemy KIA per hourof contact was second highest in-country. Results obtained by the Marinebattalions generally compared higher than the other units operating in thesame DTAs and all battalions obtained good rezults including the newlydeployed 7th Battalion which obtained 28 KIA. Significant results wereobtained by the 1st Battalion during operations in the U Minh Forest inJanary. A. successful defense and counter-attack was conducted againsttwo VC battalions with resulting enemy losses at 95 KIA compared to 24VNIC KIA. The kill ratio at 2.9:1 was below &verage and resulted fromthe high number of casualties due to mines and booby traps. Forty-sixpercent of the Marine casualties were from mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Operational effectiveness andledersnip remained extremely high during the quarter. All of the Marinebattalions were commanded by excellent, aggressive officers.

Trends. The enemy eliminated by Marine battalions increased steadilySine-3d Qtr CY 69 with a slight decrease in 1st Qtr CY 70 but remainedwell above average. The kill ratio trend has been generally unfavorableexcept during the fourth quarter. Trends in operational effectivenessand leadership which increased sharply in the 3d Qtr CY 69 have remainedhigh in 1970. The improved Mlarine results which began in late 1969 weredue primarily to the improved employment of units assisted by extensiveuse of airmobile and naval craft assets.

69

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 45

102

90 87 810

8074

70

60

50

4340

30 28

2120

10

UNITI 1 2 3 4 5 6 '74

NO-PREVIOUS QTR*78N ACT I FEE70

70

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL,Mhart 46

ENEMY KILLS BY RANGER BATTALION

20751 ITZ IlCTZ M_________12_______

9 264 95

150- 144

125- 125

109

50

25-

0 212

UNIT 21 37 39 it 22 23 30 33 38 35 36 31 52 34 51 32 41 42 43 44110 PREVIOUS QTR

71

CONFIDENTIAL

,/ CONFIDENTIALChart 47

E RANGERS-JST QTR CY 70

.5 100 - -S00 40 00 -30 90N - 100 -(000)

.4 -0 -400 30 60 24 68 -0

3 60 300 i0 61 .60

a- . 2 - An - NO OR N-

21 4

20 100 10

RoN 'SHP SORT SORTIES O OPNLCOMBAT SUPPORT CONTACT ESLSEFFECT.

44 PRIEVIOW QTR - - -- ARVN INF AVG

TRENDS PERET TIME MWlIS=SIONS

IEM EO6UAEAI0 O F ECTIVE OPRTIN

Im

30 I20-

IG 20 3 40 IQ 20 30 140 IQ 20 30 40 1 '0 20 30 40949 970969 1910

- 9E0.r- OP" ... ATIVE PAC

OP-ATINA RAFTIOS N EDRI1 9SE9V ,T ATIC ACR6IFITON

20 3 400.0 20 4

94. 700

aP 39 TRINN 10*-.9NAi91

0. 9 V 6ONIQ3 2* 30 40 1 0 2 0I 0 3 0 1 0 3

1969 0 -gig- 172

CO FDE T ALry-- SAI A

CONFIDENTIALRANGERS

Environment. The 20 ranger battalions are located throughout the fourCorps Tactfcal Zones and conditions under which they operated during thequarter varied widely. Ranger battalions in I Corps operated primarily inthe western sections of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, while IV Corpsbattalions operated along the Cambodian border areas in Chau Doc Province.II Corps battalions spent most of the quarter in and around Pleiku, in the24th STZ, however, one battalion spent one month on combat operations inthe 23d [WA, south of Dalat. The nine battalions of III Corps spent themajority of their time in the Capital Military District.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations increased slightly but remainedwell below the ARVN average. Time devoted to security operations increasedto 44 percent as compared to 38 percent during the previous quarter. This wasprimarily due to the predominance of security operations among the battalionssituated in the Capital Military District. Time devoted to training decreasedfrom the previous quarter, but remained above the ARVN average.-------.

Combat Support. Combat support increased and was above average in eachcategory except artillery support, which was slightly below the ARVN average.The increase in combat support is reflected in the increased hours of contact,which more than doubled from the fourth quarter.

Results. Operational results more than doubled the previous quarter, andwere the best achieved by ranger battalions in well over a year. The majorityof success attained by the rangers is attributable to the outstanding performanceof the battalions of I and IV Corps, which accounted for 88 percent of thetotal nunber of enemy eliminated during the quarter. In I Corps, the 37thand 39th Ranger Battalions achieved exceller* results while operating asa part of the 1st Armored Brigade Task Force during operation DIUNG SOU 70/3,conducted in February and March. During the quarter, these two battalions

.. eliminated over 550 enemy personnel. Likewise, in. IV Corps, ranger battalionsoperating in Chau Doc and Kieng Giang Provinces eliminated over 600 enemypersonnel in that area. III Corps battalions achieved the least results.The nine battalions stationed in the Captial Military District averagedless than six enemy personnel eliminated during the arter. Two of thethree battalions in II Corps average four kills each Airing the quarter.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment lf operational effec-tiveness and leadership rose above average and refled : an overall improve-ment in leadership and combat effectiveness among ranl r units.

-Trends*--- The--number-en-meliminatcd- reached a lo - -in the-3d Qtr -CY -.and remained below the ARVN average for the remainder of the year. The

t uard trend began in the fourth, quarter and rose sharply in 1st Qtr CY 70.Te kill ratio which showed a downtrend during the last half of 1969 alsoincreased the first quarter to above average. The operational effectivenessand leadership assessment trend has shown a steady increase since 2d QtrCY 69, and reached a new high in the first quarter.

73

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL4. (C-NOFORN) ARVN/M C Problem Areas.

a. General. Major objectives of SEER are to identify weaknesses andproblem areas which reduce combat effectiveness and through analyticalmethods determine courses of action by which RXTNAF, with MACV assistance,may increase the effectiveness of their forces. This section contains majorproblem areas reported by senior advisors to AM7N units and M'tCV staff actionstaken to assist in resolving the problems. In addition this section containsmajor problems highlighted in the WtACV analysis of ARVN/VNU organizations.

b. Infantry Battalion Strength. ARVN and Marines expanded slightlyduring the first quarter to 430,000, approximately 30,000 aborethe authoriz6dlevel (Chart 48). Personnel in the pipeline decreased by 10 percent to 94,000with half of these in training and schools. The large number in pipelinecontinues to severely limit the personnel available in combat organizations.Chart 49 shows the authorized and average assigned strength of ARVN infantrybattalions by division. The total assigned strength of ARVN infantry unitsincreased by 2,500 during the first quarter, but was 19 percent belowauthorized levels, which also increased by 4,100 on 1 January 1970. The ARVNcombat understrength in terms of combat units represents 22 battalions. The9th Division has the lowest assigned strength with a 30 percent shortfall,while the 25th Division is highest with six percent. Shortages were approxi-mately 10 percent in late 1968 and first quarter 1969.

Chart 48

ARYN/VNMC PERSONNEL ASSIGNED

600

THOUSAND

450

300

Fla%

15

0962 19"0

I OTHER - AUTHORIZED

74

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALMohrt 4

ASSIGNED STRENGTH ARVN iNFANTRY NS

r.CsatisDet Mie -n Bob Traps.- *-

5

25

IT 20 5ST 220 23DI420 15TH I8TH15TH17TH 19TH121STII CORPS 11I CORPSCOP [ IV CORPSI

-AUTHORIZED STRENGTH 4 PREVIOUS QUARTER

c. Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps.

(1) Mines and booby trap casualties continue to be a serious problemin ARVN/VNMC. In the first quarter deaths from mines and booby traps decreasedand since total friendly KIA decreased a resulting increase in percent of totalcasualties due to mines and booby traps resulted. Chart 50 depicts the magni-tude of the problem during the last five quarters. In the fourth quarter 1968,casualties due to these devices were at a low of 278 and accounted for only 22percent of the total.

Ohrt SO

NUMB R OF ARVN/VNMC DEATHS TACAUSED By MINES 8 60ABY TRAPS

800

600 r*2f00

10 20314 20 130 401969 1970

INDICATES PCPC!NT Or TOTAL ARVNVNMC OSrATH CAUS!? B'f MRiFmrswswe y TR APS;

75

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(2) Chart 51 presents data on this problem for each major organiza-

tion. The problem has been particularly acute for TV Corps units, includingthe VNMIC, as well as the 51st Regiment and the 22d and 5th Divisions.

Chart S1

PERCENT OF FRIENDLY KIA/FROM MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

KIA TOTALI PERCENT OF TOTALMINES KIA I

UNIT BOB 0 10 2 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

__~ ICORPS 93 249 ~~

I st Div 23 100 '

2d Div. 31 9251 st Regt 39 57 '

11 CORPS 28 112 w-22d Div 24 61

23d Div 3 45

42dRegt I 6 '

MI CORPS 46 1305 th Div 26 54 '

18th Div 5 26

25th Div 15 50 '

IZC0RPS 210 4607th Div 76 124 '

21st Div L3212 ______________

INIF TOTAL J'77 951RANGER 163____ ____

ARMD CAV 18 64_____

AIRBORNE 3 122

MARINES 70 1541____________

,w PREVIOUS QTR AVG

76

CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIALd. Battalion Problem Areas.

(1) During the fourth quarter advisors to the 186 ARVN/VNMCmaneuver battalions and armored cavalry squadrons submitted responses toquestions contained in the MACV SEER Questionnaire which indicatedpotential problem areas. Chart 52 - Part I and II on the next pagecontains the questions which were indicated by a high frequency ofunsatisfactory responses. The percentages are based on the frequencyof responses from approximately 372 questionnaires. SEER problem areasevaluations include only battalions since the areas of concern are basedon problems which exist primarily at that level. Certain problemsshow noticeable differences between ARVN infantry battalions and specialunits (airborne, Marines,.cavalry and rangers) and, while not indicatedon the chart, these are noted in the comments below. This quarter allproblems show improvement from the previous quarter. The problem areasin the order they appear on Chart 52 are as follows:

(2) Inadequate Dependent Housing. Dependent housing has beena continual concern of ARVN and major efforts to improve its quantity andquality are being made. Conditions have improved slightly from thefourth quarter, but 78 percent of advisors still consider the amount ofhousing to be inadequate and 57 percent reported the quality as inadequate.Special units report slightly fewer problems in dependent housing thanARVN infantry battalions.

(3) Intelligence. The intelligence function in ARVN battalionshas presented major problems as indicated by the responses concerningtimeliness, collection efforts, and security leaks. Forty-three percent ofadvisors report that the intelligence received by the unit was untimely 50percent or more of the time during the first quarter. This, however,represents a slight improvement from the previous quarter. Efforts to collectintelligence was judged inadequate in eight percent of the units, which isonly half of those so judged in the fourth quarter--a significant improve-ment. However, the special unit percentage was three times that of ARVNinfantry. While not displayed on the chart it is noted that advisorsreported most units as reacting appropriately to available intelligencemost of the time, with 16 percent reporting it as a problem. There isreason to be believe that the enemy is sometimes forewarned of the unit'scombat operations by security leaks. Approximately 26 percent of theadvisors reported this area as a problem, with the percentage in ARVNinfantry organizations .being more than twice that of special units.

(4) Reinforcement. 18 percent of the advisors reported thattheir units failed to reinforce elements in contact with adequate speed

. and in sufficent strength half of the time or moretbut this is still animprovement from the previous quarter. The problem is more serious inspecial units than in infantry battalions.

(5) Leadership. NCO leadership capability is reported as agreater problem fthan o ficer leadership with 13 percent reporting a

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CONFIDENTIALChart 52-I

I BATTALION PROBLEM AREASPERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS:

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

INADEQUATE QUANTITY OF DEPENDENT HOUSING

LOW QUALITY OF DEPENDENT HOUSING

UNTIMELY INTELLIGENCE

UNITS EFFORTS TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE

..1

SECURITY LEAKS________V

REINFORCEMENTS

MANEUVER BATTALIONSV PREVIOUS QUARTER

NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER DUESTIONAIRE€FFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69

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CONFIDENTIALChart 52-11

II BATTAIJON PROBLEM AREAS

PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS-

0.10 .20 30 .4.0 50 60 70 80

WEAK NCO LEADERSHIP

WEAK rnFFICER LEADERSHIP

LACK OF AGGRESSIVENESS

-y

INDECISIVE. ACTIONSv

DESERTION MEASURESv

SPARE PARTS AVAILABILITY

MANEUVER BATTALIONSSARTILLERY BATTALIONS

V PREVIOUS QUARTERNOT: DATA ONE TIMS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONAIRE

EFFECTIVE 4TH OYR CYSI

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CONFIDENTIALproblem in the first quarter, an improvement from the previous quarter.Company grade officer leadership ability was reported as inadequate byeight percent of the advisors during the first quarter. The leadershipproblem is greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(6) Aggressiveness. 12 percent of the advisors reported that unitsfought aggressively when in contact one-half or less of the time, an improve-nent from the previous quarter.. This problem is slightly greater in ARVNinfantry battalions than special units.

(7) Indecisive Actions. Some unit commanders failed to .takedecisive action when the opportunity arose. Approximately 14 percent ofthe advisors reported this occurred 50 percent or more of the time inthe first quarter, with the problem slightly less in ARVN infantry battalionsthan special units.

(8) Desertions. Desertions are a continuing problem in AWN, andhave been receiving command emphasis. Consequently, unit commanders' actionsdesigned to cope with the desertion problem are reported to be inadequate inonly seven percent of the ARVN maneuver battalions, a significant decreasefrom the previous quarter. The problem is not as great in special units.

(9) Spare Parts Availability. The availability of spare parts wasreported to be inadequate in a large number of units. This problem is par-ticularly serious in artillery battalions, which reported critical shortagesof parts for mission essential items such as. fire control equipment, panoramictelescopes and firing mechanisms. Some combat vehicles of armored cavalrysquadrons, and vehicles and weapons in all type units were deadlined for lackof spare parts; one regiment reported 30 of 64 1/4 ton trucks were deadlinedfor this reason. Advisors report the supply system has been distorted byfailure of units to requisition items known to he in short supply, purchaseof parts on the local economy, procurement of parts by advisors and failureof units to distribute available parts to the user. The solution to theproblem lies in making the supply system work; adequate supplies of repairparts are reported in-country in the supply system, but are not properlyrequisitioned and distributed.

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CONFIDENTIALe. Staff Problem Areas.

(1) Chart 53 - Part I and II on the next page covers selectedstaff functions reported as inadequate in the SEER Questionnaire by advisorsto ARVN/VNMC organizations. The problem area functions are grouped separatelyby maneuver battalion staffs, and by regiment, group, brigade and divisionstaffs, since battalions have experienced greater difficulty in staff opera-tions then higher units. While the analysis includes all staff functionsfor completeness the GI/SI and most of the G4/S4 functions appear to beoperating effectively due to the low number of advisors reporting these asa problem.

(2) Gl/Sl Functions. The personnel and morale-functions have shownsome improvement during the last quarter, with a substantial improvementbeing reported in the morale area. The chart presents percentages of inade-quate ratings of the GI/S1 section in the following categories:

a Maintains organization strength, keeps records, andarranges for replacements.

b Supervises personnel management by classifying, assigning,promoting and-transferring troops.

c Develops and maintains morale through personnel services,decor, )ns and awards, and graves registration.

(3) G2/$2 Functions. The intelligence function for all staffshas shown little improvement since the fourth quarter. The chart presentspercentages of inadequate ratings of the G2/S2 section in the following.categories:

a Supervises, coordinates, and plans intelligence collectionactivities.

b Processes intelligence information through recording,

evaluation, and interpretation, and disseminates intelligence.

c .' Plans and supervises counterintelligence activities.

(3) G3/$3 Functions. The operations and training functions haveshown substantial improvement since the fourth quarter, particularly in thearea of training programs. The chart presents percentages of inadequateratings of the G3/$3 section in the following categories:

a' Analyzes missions, recommends priorities for utilizationof manpower and equipment, and recomnends requirements for tables ofequipment and organization.

b Analyzes the training situation and proposes and implementstraining programs.

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CONFIDENTIALChart 53-T

V1 GI/SI,G2/S2 STAFF FUNCTIONS~II

PROBLEM AREAS

PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING FUNCTIONS INADEQUATE

o 10 2p 30 40 50

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

GI/Sl .

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENTV -

-vb

MORALE FUNCTIONS

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTIONG2/S2 y

INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

- I

REGIMENT/ GROUP/ BRIGADE / DIVISION STAFFS%llk MANEUVER BATTALION STAFFS

V PREVIOUS QUARTER

NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONAIREEFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69

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CONFIDENTIALChart 53-Il __

~G3 /S,4S STAFFFUNCTIONSI

PERCENTGE OF ADVISORS REPORTING INADEQUATE-

0 10 20 30 40 50

MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT

G3/S3 -v

TRAINING PROGRAMS

OPERATIONS PLANNING

- v

SUPPLY MANAGEMENT64/ S4

*MEDICAL SUPPORT

MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR PROGRAMS

vV

REGIME NT/GROUP/ BRIGADE /DIVISION STAFFSSMANEUVER BATTALION STAFFS

V PREVIOUS QUARTER

NOTE' DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER OUESTIONAIREEFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALc Analyzes the tactical situation, develops courses of

action, md makes recommendations to the commander for operations.

(4) G4/S4 Functions. The logistics functions show little improvementsince the fourth quarter, with higher staffs regressing in supply and mainte-nance. Battalion staffs show some improvement in all areas. The chart presentspercentages of inadequate ratings of the G4/S4 section in the followingcategories:

a Determines requirements for, procures, stores and allocatessupplies.

.b. Makes-provisi-on for adequate medical support.

c Formulates, coordinates and supervises maintenance andrepair programs .

f. Training Assessment. Training programs continue to receive emphasisin developing AVNIKC effectiveness. To provide more depth, the revisedSEER questionnnaire has expanded the coverage of the training function, andthis additional information is provided in this evaluation.

(1) Training Effectiveness. The 1st Qtr CY 70 training effective-ness evaluations presented in Chart 54 are based on advisors' responses to 16different questions on frequency of training programs, results from trainingprograms, and the maraier in which training programs are conducted. I, II andIII Corps organizations displayed an overall improvement from the previousquarter, and were above the ARVN infantry average. IV Corps regressed from•-he fourth quarter and remained below avervge, due primarily to the assessmentof the 9th Division. The rangers were the only special unit showing improve-ment this quarter, while the airborne and Marine units showed significantiegression.

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CONFIDENTIALChart 54

ARVN/VNMC TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS

________ASSESSMENTS

UNIT 0 10p 20 04 5~0 0 O80 9 101,

I CORPS AVG 63.91st Div 67.0

2d Div 56.5 w_______

51 stReg? 72.6Ir CORPS AVG #61.0

22d Div 48.1

42dRegt 62.81ME CORPS. AVG 63.9

5 th Div 64.0

25thDiv 66.01_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Mr CORPS AVG 536L

INFANTRY AVG 60.5RANGER 63.4 _________ w

ARMD CAV 56.2_______'

AIRBORNE 68.0 '

MARINES 72.0 _________'

ARVNIVNMC AVG 61.2VW PREVIOUS QUARTER

NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER OUESTIONAIREEFFECT;VE 4TH OTR CY69

85

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CONFIDENTIAL/

/

(2) Training at Division Training Schools and the National TrainingCenter (Chart 55). The quality of training at division training schools andthe National Training Center is being addressed for the first time in therevised SEER questionnaire. Advisors report improvement since the previousquarter, however, 16 percent rate such training to be in the "poor" category.

(3) Training to Reduce Casualties (Chart 55). Training to reducecasualties has been separated into two categories: mine and booby trapcasualties, and casualties from other causes. The number of advisors report-ing the quality of training to reduce mine and booby trap casualties as"poor" dropped to 21 percent.- Reports rating the training to reduce

-other casualties as "poor" increased to 17 percent.. This latter category,however, showed a significant increase in the amount of "good" qualitytraining.

(4) Training of Officers and NCOs (Chart 55). The evaluation ofthe quality of training received by company grade officers and unit NCfs-remains high at 19 percent for officers and 25 percent for NCOs. The quantityof in-place leadership and responsibility training received by companygrade officers and unit NCOs decreased from the fourth quarter.

(5) Training to Improve Combat Skills (chart 55). The quality oftraining to improve combat skills has improved slightly from the fourthquarter, but the quantity of such training has decreased. During the firstquarter, 2. percent of the advisors reported this training to be "poor"and 56 percent stated their units conducted such training for 30 hours orless during the entire quarter.

(6) Marksmanship Training (chart 55). As in other training areasthe quality of marksmanship training has improved this quarter, but 27percent of the advisors still rate the training to be "poor". The amountof marksmanship training has also improved since the previous quarter,the only category to do so. However, units receiving no marksmanship trainingremain high at 20 percent.

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CONFIDENTIALChart 55

ADVIORS' ASSESSMENTOF RAININGi

AT DIV 8 NATIONAL TO REDUCE MINE 8 TO REDUCE OTHERTRAINING CENTERS BOOBY TRAP LASLIALTIES CASUALTIES

41 4 0FAIR 39

6 2 POOR 2166 170

469 70140 69 10 70 14 07

I COMP' ANY GRADE OFFICER Ek UNIT NCO TRAININGQUALITY OF QUALITY OF QUANTITY OF OFFICER

OFFICER TRAINING NCO TRAINING 8 NCO TRAINING

7F T~7 .~ 37+ -3

GOOD 26GOOD '1 7123 - 36I7

23 13 - 22,27:

43' FAIR 42" 42 FAIR .1 12 4 ,

4 I0 69 10 TO 40 69 IQ TO 14Q 69 109TO

O EAT A NKTI S COMAT DEIVED FR M REVSEASHER MARST MANAHR P

QUALIYCOUNIDENTIQALYQATY

CONFIDENT! L'I L(7) Time Spent on Training by ARVN/VN X Battalions.

(a) Training Time. Time spent by AJRVN organizations ontraining has decreased since last quarter. Tdis reflects total time devotedby battalions to training and provides' for co.bining the time spent by smallertnits into battalion days. Time spent on maj r training programs such asnational and division level training is also ncluded. Chart 56 reflects aslight decrease in total time spent on traini g during the first quarter,a reversal of the 1969 favorable trend. Ther was, however, considerablevariation in the time reported by each organization, with a low .5 percentreported by the 21st Division and a high 11.4 percent in the 42d Regiment.

(b) Refresher Training. Training programs for the maintenanceof unit combat proficiency are conducted at tr ining centers as unit refreshertraining--a four week course for the infantry Dattalions--or as commandsupervised in-place training. Each unit is re uired to complete refreshertraining once every three years. Chart 57 shoes the. percent of ARVN infantrybattalions and special units which have either completed battalion refreshertraining since 967-or are scheduled to receiv it in 1970. The 1st Division.is the only orgnization having its battalion 'raining completed for thethree year peritI The 2d Division, 42d Regimnt, and the Marines are'scheduled to cotiete the training during 1970 while all other ARVN organi-zations will fall short by the indicated amount.

(c) In-place Training. The gene al consensus of the MACVstaff is that there is a positive correlation etween: unit in-place trainingand unit combat effectiveness. In-place training is not necessarilylimited to formalized classes held during stand-down time, but also includespre-operational rehearsals, preparation and post-operation critiques. Shorttraining sessions conducted at squad, platoon and company level to makeinmmediate corrections of operational deficiencies are ideal in-place training.

lETil SPENT O ThAINING BY ARVN

IIrANTRY BATTALIONS

IGNOO

Smoo

14- .00. 1 4.

0 IQ I 2Q 4

It" 1970

UINICATES PERCENT O TIME OVVOTED TO TMAINING

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 57

ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION

0 ;10 -

25

500

o0 ;,o

25

0 -c N- - -T v co -s

I SPECIAL UNITS !

,oo, PS C III CP

rIRN N I -- RGJA

COMPLETED I SCHEOULED-1970 W OVERDUE

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CONFIDENTIALg. Action on Fourth Quarter Problem Areas. Problems noted below were

reported during the fourtn quarter to MACV staff agencies. Actions takenduring the first quarter to assist in resolving these problems are indicated.

(1) Rotation System for Commanders.

(a) Problem: III Corps 'feels there is a need to estab-lish a rotation system for commanders, after they have completed a pre-determined amount of time in command. (This should not be over two years,and probably less)

(b) Comments: RVNAFpersonnel at every echelon after twoyears of service in a unit are authorized to submit a request for reassign-ment. Units are required to forward the request to the responsible agencyfor consideration and approval. Individuals may send a copy of their re-quest for transfer directly to AG/JGS for consideration. The rotationplan still depends, hoseever, on the strength proportion and personnel re-quirements of the units.

(2) Quality of US Advisors to ARVN Units.

(a) Problem: The shortage and low qualifications of some USadvisors to ARN combat units adversely effects efforts to improve combateffectiveness of these units.

(b) Comments: MACV is cognizant of the grade and branch ofservice substitutions currently made to fill advisor positions and is seek-ing improvement by several means. First, stricter adherance by the Depart-ment of the Army to requirements of the requisitions submitted. Severalmessages and letters have been dispatched to document the substitutions andin November the MACV AG visited DCSPER, DA to work on solutions for theproblem. Improvement should become apparent in June 1970. The second meansfor improvement involves -a measure of amelioration in assignments made byULARV. Third is the adjustment of assigned priorities within MACV. Thiswas revised in January 1970 to upgrade the field advisory effort.. The Army'soverall shortage of officers, however, must be borne in mind. For example;the worldwide shortage of infantry majors is nearly 30 percent and ofinfantry captains nearly 40 percent. On the other hand, infantry lieutenantsin MACV are 148 percent of authorization. In order to avoid repetitive,nonvolunteer tours, one-grade and combat arms substitutions are authorizedby assignment policy. This policy will continue to make the best possible useof available personnel resources.

___- -(3-) - ity of AIWN ReplacementsfromNati onaL TrainingCenters.

(a) Problem: The physical condition of personnel received fromthe NTC is occasionally unsatisfactory.

(b) Comments: JGS has directed discontinuance of accepting con-scripts physically unfit for combat duty; the regulation was effective on15 Oct 69. In regard to personnel drafted before Oct 69, units must movethem to military hospitals for classification according to current regulations.

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CONFIDENTIAL(4) Assigned Strength of ARVN Divisions.

(a) Problem: The strength of the three rV Corps ARVN infantrydivisions, which is currently 91 percent of authorized, is still below theminimum satisfactory goal of 95 percent of authorized as established by JGS.During CY 69, IV Corps divisions were able to recruit only 7,255 men, comparedwith a quota of 12,300. At the sane time, JGS provided 23,566 inductees tomeet a programmed quota of 39,600.

(b) Comments: An analysis of total assigned to authorizedstrengths of ARVN infantry divisions shows that IV Corps divisions comparedfavorably with other divisions. JGS is aware of the existing problems ofARVN divisions and recruiting and induction centers to recruit an adequatenumber of volunteers to fill projected quotas. JGS has taken action to improverecruiting of volunteers for ARVN divisions by publishing a recent memorandumon the division recruiting system. This memorandum outlines actions to betaken to increase division recruiting. JGS has placed a great deal of emphasison this program and follow-up action. As a consequence there has been anupward trend in the number of volunteers recruited by ARVN divisions.

(c) Problem: A contributing factor to the continuing unsatis-factory strength is the fact that no funds are authorized to the divisions tosupport a recruiting program. All funds are allocated to and retained by the4th Recruiting and Induction Center and their subordinate R&I Offices atprovince level.

(d) Coments: During each quarter of CY 69, Central POLWARDiviSion allocated 9,000$VN per infantry division to support their recruitingprogram. Funds have also been programmed for CY 70. On a central levelCentral POLWAR Command is charged with responsibility for publicizing therecruiting campaign in support of ARIN divisions in such media as radio .andTV, posters and banners, and newspapers. At the local level, the divisionPOLWAR representative is required to use available publicity materials andsupport provided by the CTZ POLWAR and Central POLWAR Command.

(e) Problem: An additional factor which precludes divisionsfrom attaining satisfactory strength levels is the fact that volunteers forthe recruiting program are required to have birth certificates and ID cards,while inductees are not required to have these documents.

(fJ Qomments: JGS Directive 100-9, subject: Missions, Proceduresfor Management of Recruitment and Induction Offices, Subordinates and Centers,dated 5 December 1968 requires that both volunteers and draftees have eitherbirth certificates or ID cards, but not both...

(5) Command and Control in the 44th Special Tactical Zone. Ccoments:This problem is under study at HQ MACV. Recent recommendations from EMAC arebeing considered along with proposals by RVNAF (JGS).

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(6) Increase Infantry Battalions to Four Rifle Companies.

(a) Problem: The need for a fourth rifle company in infantrybattalions.

(b) Comments : MACV agrees that ARVN infantry battalions wouldbe more effective with a fourth rifle company to provide more riflemen forcombat operations. However, how to accomplish it within the total manpoweravailable and still meet other manpower requirements is the real problem.Approximately 31,000 personnel would be required to authorize four riflecompanies for all infantry battalions including required medics, forwardobserver teams and additional personnel for administration and logisticssupport. Since RVNAF has reached a point where manpower to fill currentlyauthorized spaces has become a real problem the basic question is how toallocate the total force between the various services and achieve a properbalance. A secondary problem which would be aggravated by the addition ofa fourth rifle company is the leadership problems currently existing at batta-lions and lower levels. Presently, 47 percent of ARVN battalion comrandersare two grades below that authorized. The fourth company would increasethe already strained span of control of the battalion commander as well asdilute the leadership resources of lower levels. Accordingly, a fourthrifle company is not justifiable in view of manpower and leadership con-straints.

(7) Airborne Personnel Dectector (APD) Operations.

(a) Problem: The advisory teams are not provided the equipmentor personnel to effectively carry out APD operations.

(b) Comments: Headquarters, USAAG, III CTZ requested four XM3APD on 14 May 1969. This, as the anly request, was staffed with J4, J3 andMCMvIA. This request was not favorably considered at that time for thefollowing reasons:

1 There was no operational requirement for the XM3 APD foreither RVNAF or advisory teams.

2 The XM3 APD was procured for use within USARV with fourdetectors allocatel to each field force headquarters. These should beavailable to support requests for use in ARVN operations.

3 The concept of issuing equipment to advisors for the useof RVNAF is not consistent with MACV policy. The mission of advisors isto advise and assist the commander and staff of RVNAF units to whichassigned.

4 The XM3 APD is a highly specialized and sensitive item ofequipment. Operators require not only detailed training but also extensiveexperience in interpreting readings. Availability of RVNAF helicopter assetsto support use of the XM3 APD is another limiting factor that must be considered.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(8) Employment of the 4th Armored Brigade.

(a) Problem: Direct orders have beet issued at the local levelto eliminate severe damage or destruction of M113 and other APCs. Commanderswere directed to be less aggressive in closing with and destroying the enemy.

(b) Comments: HQ MACV is aware of the performance of the 4thArmored Brigade. Concern exists due to the achievements obtained by the 1stArmored Brigade in I Corps. The problem area letter did not indicate actionsbeing taken at DMAC level to resolve problems presented. However, MACVunderstands that some of the problems addressed are now being resolved.Recommend that fvLAC continue advisory efforts to resolve problems in armoremployment and address this area in the next quarterly report or by separateletter if appropriate. .

(9) Publishing New TOE by JGS.

(a) Problem: Major problems have been caused by the tendencyof JGS to approve increases i7 unit strength without concurrently publishinga new table of equipment (TOE). An example is TOE 38-783 which does not includea track maintenace platoon.

.-

(b) Comment: This is a continuing problem whik-h has been thesubject of correspondence to JGS as well as direct coordination between MACVand JGS staffs. The preparation of a TOE from concept to publication takesapproxi..iately nine months of joint MACv'iJGS effort. On 14 November 1969,J3/JGS .agreed to include four Track Vehicle Repair Teams (TOE20-935A) in TOE38-783. Each team is authorized eight personnel for a total of 32 perzonnelper company. This TOE is 1 of 51 being prepared for publication by J3/JGS.The TOE was published on 14 March 1970.

(10) Inadequate Artillery Resources.

(a) Problem: Inadequate artillery support of operations andterritorial security in 42d DTA.

(b) Comments: This subject has been studied and will be con-sidered in future RVNAF force structure revisions.

(11) Communications/Engineer and Reconnaissance Support.

(a) Problem: The major problem which affected the combateffectiveness of the Airborne Division during the 4th Qtr CY 69'was a lackof communications, engineer, and reconnaissance support. Signal, engineer,and reconnaissance units cf the division are not large enough to adequatelysupport the division when it is committed to multi-brigade operations inremote jungle terrain.

(b) Comments: Headquarters MACV is in receipt of correspondencefrom J3/JGS requesting increased space authorizations to resolve the abovelisted problem areas. This matter is under study at HQ MACV at this time.Additional information will be provided when the current study is completed.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(12) Logistics/Supply Shortages.

(a) Problem: There continues to be a shortage of protectivemasks in II Corps.

(b) Comments: ARVN and RF/PF units are authorized 425,549protective masks. As of 29 Jan 70, there were 280,698 on hand and 169,884due-ine. The CONUS supply sources indicate 110,959 will be shipped to ARVNby the end of the 4th Qtr CY 70.

(c) Problem: The readiness condition of both the 3d and 14thArmored Cavalry Squadrons was improved with the receipt of 3,558 track shoeassemblies and major components for the M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC).Continued emphasis in this area is recommended to achieve the steady flowof assemblies and components required to solve the problem.

(d) Comments. Track shoes for the M113 APC have been criticalsi'fe August 1969. In January, ARVN received 20,117 track shoes of whichti Zd Area Logisitcs Command (ALC) received 2,778. ARVN records show thatthis release resulted in filling 92 percent of requisitions.- There is no.pnzrent shortage in-country of major assemblies; the. 20th ARVN Ordnance'Storage Base Depot has an ample stock on hand.

(e) Problem: Slow overall progress of' dependent housingconstruction in II CTZ.

(f) Comments-:

1 The self-help program uses salvage materials inproviding additional shelters. No GVN nor US funds were identified withthe program. Therefore, the program was not officially monitored by MACV.

2 The GVN funded program consists of the commodity supportARVN portion and t~e non-commodity support portion for VNN, VNAF, and RF.All housing units in both portions are either under construction or completed.Exact status is as follows:

COCMDITY NON-COtvvDITYSUPPORT SUPPORT

Under construction 1,180, 320

Completed 10 220

------------ Total in program 1,190 ... .- ...... 540 -- -

3 Slow response by contractors in the non-commoditysupport portion is-no longer a problem...

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CONFIDENTIAL

TCONFIDENTIAL

4 The commodity support portion continues to behindered by a lack-of construction materials to complate the projects.II CTZ has received relatively few materials as compared to I, III, &IV crz.

(g) Problem: The 223d Artillery Battalion (105mm) missed itsdeployment date of- -e 69 as the result of a shortage of seven howitzers.

(h) Comments: Sufficient assets were in country to meet thedeployment schedule for this unit. Seven howitzers were released for ship-ment from the 20th OSBD on 8 Dec 69. These howitzers arrived at the 22Cth OSCon 28 Dec 69. They were issued to the 223d Artillery Battalion on 30 Dec 69.

(i) Problem: Sling Equipment for Airmobile Operations. Tablesof organization require amendment to reflect an authorization of six slingsets per artillery battalion to provide simultaneous airlift.

(j) Comments: On 4 February 1970, letters to II Corps and IEACwere forwarded requesting corps G-4 advisors to reevaluate all unit authoriza-tions within their respective corps areas. In addition, a recommendation wasmade that all authorizations resulting from the reevaluation be placed onone document, a table of allowance, to insure that any unique requirementsare satisfied.

(k) Problem: Shortage of Repair Parts to Fill Prescribed LoadLists (PLL),.

.(l) Comments: This problem has surfaced as a result of ARVNunits using concurrent spare parts without placing a demand on their directsupport unit or submitting a valid requisition to fill their prescribedload lists. With few exceptions in each technical service, repair parts areavailable in country in the ARVN supply system. The long order-and-shiptime to-fill field depot requisitions from base depots in Saigon has beenstudied by the Central Logistics Command. Within the past six monthswater shipment has been reduced from 30-45 days to 15-20 days betweenSaigon and II CrZ Field Depots. Continued efforts will be made by theDCSLOG/CLC Advisory Division to monitor the progress of filling requisitionsfor repair parts in II Corps.

(m) Problem: The present ARVN combat boot is reported asunsatisfactory for tropical use and long lead times exist in obtaining anacceptable replacement.

(n) Comments:

1 The complaint voiced bj" the soldier is that he experiencessore feet which is-caused by shrinking fibers after use. QM/CAD has requestedMatick Laboratories to evaluate the jungle shoe currently manufacturdd inKorea to determine if the criticisms associated with the jungle shoe are reallywarranted and, if so, what might be done to eliminate or minimize the reportedshortcoming. The following factors are also pertinent:

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALa The anticipated demand for jungle shoes is

923,939 pair for CY 70:.

b The average unit price of the jungle shoe whichis currently produced Ei Korea is $1.90 a pair.

c A contract has been let for production of animproved jungle boot wl-thin RVN. The ultimate average price has not yetbeen determined.

d The US-made jungle shoe costs $8.86 a pair(plus shipping costs).

2 The reevaluation of the current jungle shoe andthe production of an improved boot in RVN are considered to. be interim stepsto resolving the jungle shoe issue. q4/CAD does not recommend trying toobtain the higher priced US-made jungle shoes for the RVNAF at this time.

h. Current Problem Areas Reported by Senior Advisors. The problems. indicated below have been reported to MACV staff agencies for appropriate

assistance. Actions taken during the quarter to resolve these areas will.be reported in the 2d Qtr CY 70, MACV SEER Report. While not covered indetail, major effort is also conducted in each corps to correct many ofthese problems.

(1) Desertions. II Corps organizations continue to experienceproblems with high esertion rates. It has been determined that the primarycause of desertions in the highlands has been the poor personnel servicesavailable to the troops. The corps commander has taken special interestin the improvement of personnel services and has recommended appropriatecourses of action to JGS. These recommendations have been discussed in thelast two quarterly problem areas reports, but no significant action hasbeen taken to improve the situation.

(2) Dependent Housing. The GVN funded program in II Corps is pro-gressing at a slow pce, however, the CY 69 program appears to be nearingcompletion as necessary material continues to be delivered to the buildingsites. As experienced with the CY 69 program, the excessive time to completecontract action is expected to cause delay in the CY 70 program. It isrecommended that ARVN dependent housing receive a higher national prioritywith an accompanying increase in funds. This appears to be the only way inwhich ARVN dependent housing needs can be realistically met.

(3) Civil Affairs. A lack of funds and materials continue tohamper civic action -programs. -The reduction of RMNAF appropriated civic ...action funds and the disapproval of MACV contingency funds for civic actionpurposes preclude any outstanding accomplishments in civic action. Materialsand funds must be made available for ARVN if the civic action program is tobe effective.

96

CONFIDENTIAL

SIDENTIAL(4) Leadership. Leadership continues to be weak among lower rank-

ing fficers and nocofmissioned officers. Even the most competent captainor 1 eutenant lacks the experience to effectively command and control a

- ...... .batt lion size force. Action should be taken to fill all scnior ccmmandand taff positions with experienced field grade officers.

(5) Repairs and Utilities (RU) Suport. Experienced gained inthe icent turnover of bases to ARVN units in III Corps has indicated theneed for substantial improvement of ARVN base maintenance or RU support.Insulficient funds and lack of effective R&U organizations and systemsare tampering the ability of ARVN units to maintain base facilities.Espec ally critical are water supply, electrical power and communicationssystens.

(6)' Communication Security. Communications security practicesthrou ghout RVNA in IV Corps are weak. TIAC has started corrective actionsby a eries of formal memorandums and meetings pointing out existingdefic encies, to IV Corps staff and offering assistance to correct these.Consi rable 'assistance could be afforded by a combined MACV/JGS OPSECTeam urvey of IV Corps Headquarters and representative subordinate units,with follow-up command emphasis by JGS to correct all improper proceduresbeing used.

(7) Officer Program. Senior commanders feel that ARVN officerprogr ms have ew motivating factors. The present ARVN system for imposingpunis mnts for poor performance or presenting awards for outstandingperfoi~mane are often ineffectively employed by commanders. The lack ofqualitied replacements for those who should be relieved is also a limiting

facto+.

(8) Quality of ARVN Replacements from National Training Centers.The qality of replacements being assigned from the training centers continueto be unsatisfactory in the 42d Regiment. The majority of replacementsreceived during Ist Qtr CY 70 were category "B" conscripts. It appearsthat the high desertion rate in the 42d Regiment is directly related to therimbe of Category "B" conscripts contained within its units.. In an effortto improve the overall capability of the 42d Regiment -nd reduce thedeser~io, rate, action must be taken by JGS to reduce the number of category"B" conscripts being assigned to the regiment.

(9) Logistics/Supply Shortages.

(a) Shortages in artillery fire direction equipment such aspanoramic sights and aiming circles exist in I Corps artillery units.These shoi cages seriously degrade combat support when artillery units aredeployed in platoon and battery minus configurations.

97

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(b) Borescoping of ARVN artillery weapons is currently being

performed by the the US. This capability should be provided to ARVN DirectSupport Ordnance Battalions so that self-sufficiency can be achieved.

(c) Due to a change in the infantry battalion Table ofOrganization and Equipment, dated 29 September 1969, the authorizationfor M-60 machine guns was increased from nine to 22 per battalion. Uponreceipt of the new authorization document, II Corps organizations submittedrequisitions to their supporting Area Logistics Commands, however, coordination-indicates an estimated 90 days delay before delivery can be accomplished.

(d) A serious shortage of repair parts exist in the 14thArmored Cavalry Squadron. On 1 May 1970 the responsibility for repairparts support for the 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron will be assumed by the22d Logistical Battalion. Representatives of the 2d ALC have indicated,however, that repair parts are not likely to be available to the 22d LogisticalBattalion until 30 June 1970.

(e) A shortage of. printing material, paper, ink and chemicaldeveloper offset fluid, exists in the 22d Division. Requisitions havebeen submitted and action has been initiated on a regular basis; however,supplies have not been received. Full utilization of organic printingfacilities at division level is not possible due to these shortages.

98

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL5. (C-NOFORN) Vietnamese Naval Forces Evaluation.

a. Introduction.

(1) This report addresses the ope-ational effectiveness of the Viet-namese Navy (VNN). The report is based on the Naval Forces Evaluation System(NFES), a subsystem of SEER.

(2) In measuring the operational effectiveness of the VNN there arethree major areas of interest:

(a) Improvement and Modernization.

(b) Operational Performance.

(c) Operational Results.

(3) Although unquantifiable results frequently overshadow the quan-tifiable ones, a general feel for the situation can be obtained by examiningthe factors that make up these areas.

(4) A glossary of acronyms is included at the end of the section.

b. Summary of Performance.

(1) Effectiveness.

(a) Craft turnovers are on schedule.

(b) Supply center performance is satisfactory.

(c) The VNN measure of effort (craft employment) met the desiredstandards during the quarter with the exception of the river assault craft.The assault craft continued to recover from combat datage sustained on opera-tions during the latter part of 4th Quarter 1969. The performance indicators,which depict effective craft employment, tended to be high during the quarterreflecting the VNN's aggressiveness on the small scale onerations conducted.

(d) The VNN assumed command of 9peration Tran Hung Dao I alongthe Cambodian border during the quarter. Th e of the major operations arenow commanded by VNN officers and all operat Ins are scheduled to be turnedover to VNN commanders by November 1970.

(e) Operational results were 1 er than last quarter due pri-

marily to operations being conducted on a st ler scale.

(2) Problem Areas.

(a) Forces are short of officers and petty officers because ofthe rapid expansion of the VNN. Corrective programs will alleviate the offi-cer shortage by December 1970. The most severe problem in this middle

99

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALmanagement area is the shortage of qualified petty officers. Preliminaryactions to solve the petty officer shortage have included increasing thecapacity of the petty officer classes in Saigon, shifting gunners mate andbosun mate petty officer schools to Cam Ranh Bay and better identificationof personnel available for schooling incident to promotions. These programs,plus others being developed, should provide 90 percent of the required pettyofficer strength by the end of CY 71.

(b) Civilian repair facilities and shipyard strengths remainbelow a satisfactory level. The personnel allowance has been increased anda wage increase was approved; however, the Vietnamese government has frozenthe civilian work force at 2205 personnel. / ...

(c) A recruiting shortfall of 31 percent has been experienceddue to a delay in recruiting authorization from JGS. This has been reflect-ed in shortfalls in other training programs. Upon approval of. the newauthorization the recruiting and training programs should return to theirnormal schedule.

c. Improvement and Mdernization.

(1) Improvement and modernization will be measured by examining:

(a) Craft Inventories.

(b) Personnel Strengths.

(c) Training.

(d) Logistics.

(2) Craft Inventories.

(a) Actual and planned VNN combat and logistics lift craftinventories are shown in Table 2. Craft' assets are made available to the VNNthrough Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) deliveries and throughturnover of in-country USN assets. The craft turnover is on schedule.

100

CONFIDENTIAL

UUMMJ1UIN lAL

Chart 58

USN CRAFT TURNED OVER TO VNN '(UMULATIVE SIN CE JAN. 1969)

60 0 1- 5

0, 494.

- 450

- 300

- 150

I2Q 30 40 14Q-l3

1969

101

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALTABLE 2

ACTUAL AND PLANNED VNN CRAPT INVENTORIES

END OF ON HAND PROGRAMMEDCATEGORY CY'69 31 MAR 70 CY 70 ULTIMATE

Coastal SurveillancePC, PCE, PGM, NBC 30 30 32 32PCF, PB 41 58 88 95JUNKS 226 226 .240 240DER/ IEC 0 0 1 4

River Security/InterdictionPBR 88 88 248 250MLMS/LGV 16 16 16 16LSL/LSIL 11 11 11 11Escort Craft 28 28 28 28

-- River -Assault/ Interdiction- - -

RAG Craft 202 202 202 202RAID Craft 108 108 185 189 4'

Logistic LiftLST, L&I, LCU, YOG, AKL 20 22 25 30

Total Craft 770 789 1,076 1,097

(b) Chart 58 shows the cumulative craft turnovers to the VNNsince 1 January 1969. During the first quarter 1970 nineteen craft wereadded to the VNN inventory. During the second quarter 277 craft are scheduledto be turned over to the VNN bringing the cumulative craft turnover to 494since 1 January 1969.

102

CONFIDENTIAL

I,

CONFIDENTIALChart 59

VNN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED

40 1(THOUSAND)97

30 our-'mJm

20 _1'"

12648

I0

1 130140 0 JQ 1 2Q 30

1969 1970

PIPELINE MOTHER . --. AUTHORIZED

103

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(3) Personnel Strength. Chart 59 shows the VNN personnel strength

expansion from fi arter 1969. The personnel strength is 33,927 and iscomposed of 2,015 officers, 6,439 petty officers and 25,473 enlisted. Themmer of personnel in the pipeline (12,648) is still high due primarily topersonnel in training.

(a) Ship, craft, and support activity personnel manning levelsare displayed in Table 3 as percentages of TOE allowances.

TABLE 3

PERSONNEL MANNING LEVELS

CATEGORY AS OF 31 MAR 70

Coastal Surveillpnce

Officer 50%PO 42%Enlisted 124%TOTAL 90% . . . .. . . . . .

River Security/Interdiction

Officer 65%PO 23%Enlisted 97%TOTAL 70%

River Assault/Interdiction

Officer 74%PO 41%Enlisted 104%TOTAL 83%

Logistic Lift

Officer 81%P, 48%Enlisted 99%TOTAL 83%

Pipeline, TrainingFacilities & Support

. . . .. ..... . A c tiv ities ......................... .......... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ "____

Officer 92%P0 1653Enlisted 135%TOTAL 140%

Civilian Repair 64%104

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(b) All categories are short of officers and petty officers

except the last category which consists primarily of pipeline personnel.

(c) Officer strength will reach a satisfactory level inDecember 1970. The most severe middle management problem in the VNN isthe shortage of qualified petty officers. A recent N proposal made to theJGS recommended specific alterations to the promotion system that would makeit more responsive to VNN needs. Stronger programs to increase petty offi-cer procurement are being developed. The new programs include' night school,better distribution of the training load to the training centers and betteridentification of personnel available for schooling incident to promotion.These programs should improve the petty officer strength situation to theextent that 90% petty officer strength should be attained by the end ofCY 1971.

(d) Civilian Repair Facility and shipyard strengths :emainbelow a satisfactory level.. The shipyard civilian personnel allowance wasincreased to 3110 during early 1970 and the Minister of Defense approved awage increase to stimulate recruiting of the additional personnel. However,

. during the. month of March the Vietnamese Government froze the shipyardcivilian work force at 2205 personnel. Until the shipyard is permitted torecruit again, strength levels will remain below a satisfactory level.

(4) Training. Training programs to support asset turnover and toupgrade the competence level of the VNN are on schedule; deviations remainwithin acceptable limits. Cumulative inputs to these programs, as percentagesof the number of personnel progrxmned to start training, are shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

TRAINING

1 APR CUIULATIVECATEGORY CY 70 INPUTS

Recruit 69%Basic Specialist 111%Advanced Specialist 134%Petty Officer 25%Midshipmen 98%Warrant Officers 145%English School 82%Boat School *On-the-Job Training, Crew 130%On-the-Job Training, Other than Crew-----------..........78% .Off-Shore (Outside the Country) 97%

*No inputs programmed

105CONFIDENTIAL

i i l Ii

CONFiDENTiAL

(a) The recruiting shortfall of 31% was the result of arecruiting authorization delay from JGS to Phase III Improvement and Moderni-zation manpower ceiling increases. Authorization from JGS to resume recruit-ing was received and it is expected that recruiting will be back on scheduleby April 1970.

(b) One thousand ten petty officer candidates were programmedfor the first quarter CY 70. Two hundred forty-eight was the cumulativeinput for the quarter. Classes at Cam Ranh Bay and Saigcn for February andMarch did not commence due to the non-availability of students.

(c) An 86 man shortfall in English Language School input re-sulted from a shortage of available recruit graduates and is attributed tothe time lag that resulted while waiting for JGS approval of the recruitingauthorization.

(d) The 351 man OJT (except crew) shortfall consists of 151USN OJT programmed spaces and 200 unfilled maintenance spaces in the CombatCraft Orientation School. Not enough recruits finished recruit trainingto meet all the on-the-job training requirements, 'A" school needs, andvarious other training programs. .

(e) Chart 60 shows the average monthly inputs, outputs and num-ber of personnel in training during the quarter. The progranmed goals werenot met due primarily to the shortage of recruits and the lack of input tothe petty officer training program.

106

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 60

VNN TRAINING

20

THOUSAND)

- 15.

11528

10 ,/

N

A~io -4,. __

1969 1970

iINPUT IN TRAINING I~IlOUTPUT

107

CONFIDENTIAL

it i0;0 l

CONFIDENTIAL

(5) Logistics.

(a) Logistics performances will be measured by examining:

1 Supply Performance.

2 Transportation Performance.

3 Craft Availability.

(b) Supply Center Performance. VNN Supply Center performancedata and standards established for RTMS are listed in Table 5. Customersatisfaction is a measure of ability to fill requisitions from the center's,load list. Demand accomodation measures the validity of the Supply Center'sload list. Rejection rate is the percent of requisitions which were incompleteor improperly submitted and therefore rejected. Taken-together the indicatorsreveal that the Supply Center has a valid load list and is able to meet

...... . . .... customer demands.

TABLE 5

SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS

INDICATOR DESIRED SATISFACTORY 31 MAP, 70

Customer Satisfaction 70% 60% 69.1%Stockage Satisfaction 85% 75% 88.6%Demand Accomodation 90% 75% 78.0%Requisition Rejection Rate 10% 15% 6.4%

108

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL /1

(c) Transportation Performance. The number of tons of cargoand POL lifted by the logistics flotilla and the RVNAF Improvement andModernization System desired standard are shown on Chart 61. The desiredstandard is based on average capacities and a 70% utilization of craft. InSeptember 1969 the desired standard was raised from 39,000 tons to 42,000tons due to the addition of an LST to the logistic lift craft assets. Al-though craft availability and employment have been high, inefficient schedul-ing and cargo handling have resulted in the standards not being met. TheJoint General Staff (JGS) has been assigned scheduling control of most ofthe major logistic craft. The VNN logistic flotilla commander notifies theJGS when a craft is available for a mission. JGS then schedules a cargo liftmission. This,short notice practice has resulted in inefficient utilizationof assets, short loading, and no backloading of cargo for the return trip-to Saigon.

(d) Craft Availability. Availability is a gross measure of VNNability in craft maintenance and supply of spare parts. Since the USN andVNN presently have a single logistics tail, and USN facilities are responsiblefor the support of VNN craft until the turnover of all repair facilities inFY 72, the indicator is currently a measure of the combined effort to maintainPCFs, PBRs and RAC. Since VNN facilities maintain the older craft, the indi-cator is a truer measure of strictly VNN capability for those craft.

1 If a craft is capable of getting underway, it is consider-ed available. The-indicator does not measure the operability of armament,communication equipment, or auxillary engineering equipment.

2 The availability of selected craft is shown on Chart 62.

a PCF/WPB availability met the desired standard duringthe quarter. During the first portion of the quarter the availability wasabove the desired standard. During March five boats went into overhaul causingthe quarterly average available to drop to 90 percent. These five boats hadbeen on a severe operating schedule in the An Thoi area the past five monthsand their overhaul periods were dalayed to meet operational commitments.

b PBR availability remained high throughout the quarter.RPG detachments have Seen successfully employed in locations remote from theirmaintenance bases and have been able to maintain their high availability.

c RAID and RAG craft remain below their desired avail-ability-resulting from their slow recovery from the battle damage sufferedduring the operations conducted in the U Minh area during November.

d Logistic lift craft continued to be above thestandard. Inefficient craft scheduling by JGS provides more time in portfor these units. Routine maintenance and upkeep during the report p.,riods isa contributing factor to the availability of these craft.

109

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 61

TOLOGISTICS LIFT CRAFT RESULTS

(THOUSAND)

60

- 40+-

2'27

204

IQ02Q13Q 04 IQ 2Q 3 4Q1969 1970

-- OPTIMUM LIFT CAPACITY

110

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL.Chart 62

II CRAFT AVAILIBILITY

PCF/WPB 8 PBR 7

1969 PERCENT 1970100

75

50

25O I-10 1201 30 40 10 20 30 40

RAID a RAG

100 _____7550

25

10 2Q 30 44 00 20 30 4

LOGISTIC LIFT

100

75 I50

10 120 130 14QI 10 1 2Q -30 Q0

-DESIRED AVAILABILITY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL//

d. Operational Performance.

(1) Operational performance will be measured by examining:

(a) Craft Employment.

(b) Performance Indicators.

(2) Craft Mloment. Employment is a measure of the VNN level ofactivity. A craft.is employed if it gets underway. A fleet command ship,however, is considered employed the entire time it is deployed from Saigon,even if in port. The indicator does not reveal whether or not the unit was .gainfully employed. It must be used in conjucnction with advisor reports andthe performance indicators. Charts 63 and 64 show the quarterly craft em-ployment statistics for 1969 and first quarter 1970.

(a) The standards for employment were based, for older craft,upon past VNN performance, and for newer assets, such as PCF, PBR and RACon past USN performance.

(b) Coastal surveillance craft employment increased over lastquarter due to an increase in the number of Market Time stations patrolledby the VNN. Employment was not up to the desired level due to four of theAn Thoi PCFs going into a long overdue overhaul and a portion of the smallercraft employment being hindered by inclement weather. The VNN continue tomeet their operational committments as they assume more of the coastal sur-veillance responsibility.

(c) River security craft employment remained above the desiredstandard. PBR employment continues to be high even though some of the craftare deployed to locations remote from their home base.

(d) River assault craft employment is still below the desiredstandard. Employment during January was .ow as the units continued to re-cover from the battle damage suffered during the U Minh operation in 4thquarter 1969. During February the assault craft were within three percentof their desired standard, however during March combat damage resulting fromoperations in the U Minrh area again lowered the employment for the month.The overall effect lowered the employment for the quarter.

(e) A logistic lift craft is employed if it is loading, un-loading or underway. Similar to the logistic craft availability, in theabsence of a firm employment schedule, the indicator is somewhat invalid as

*a true measure of the ability to meet their employment schedulei

(3) Performance Indicators. The four indicators listed in Table 6have been developed to give an indication of the performance and readinessof the three major VNN operating groups. These indicators have been normalized(averaged over all craft in a specific group). Bias still remains, for example,one division of boats operating in a high risk area versus one in a low riskarea. As a result the numbers have meaning only when compared to a standard.

112

CONFIDENTIAL

buflriu~flIAL

Chart 63

IETNAMESE NAVAL CRAFT EMPLOYME NTJ

[COASTAL SURRVEILLANCE CRAF

1969 401970-

m - 300

200--

100

0I0 20 30 4Q 10 20 30Q 4Q

[~pVERSECURITY CRAF

200,

150

F 100

50

0

-- mum ASSIGNED N EMPLOYED --- # DESIRED-- EMPLOYMENT--

113

CONFIDENTIAL

CON 'IDENTIALciart 64

ASA CRAF

1969 1970400-

- 300

200

100

10 5Q 3 40 1 20Q 30 40

LOGISTICS L-IFT CRT

40

30

20j

10

m-ASSIGNED *EMF LOYED 0, DESIRED EMPLOYMENT

114

CONFIDENTIAL

The standard values were computed from historical data obtained on USN unitsoperating in the three major operating groups. An expanded data base is beingcompiled to give more meaningful standards considering present operations.All four indicators must be used conjointly and subjected to a value judgementto obtain a relative picture of VNN performance and readiness. The data istaken from VNN operational summaries, USN spot reports, and advisor spot re-ports. Although these indicators were chosen as possible comparison measuresthey often have little meaning because the VNN craft in Market Time, forexample, have had less than one percent of the opportunity to get in fire-fights that USN PCF in river operations have had. In operations such as GiantSlingshot, where VNN river patrol groups are integrated with USN river divisions,it is difficult to see any differences in readiness and training of the twonavies.

TABLE 6

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Indicator Standard JAN FEB MAR

Coastal Divisions

Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit .03 0 .05 0Incidents per Unit .54 .07 .12 .07Friendly Casualties per Unit .10 0 .02 0Enemy KIA per Unit .26 0 0 .07

River Patrol Groups

Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit .37 .02 .02 .01Incidents per Unit .85 .47 .32 .53Friendly Casualties per Unit .15 0 .09 .05Enemy KIA per Unit .52 .30 .02 .14

River Assault F Interdiction Divisions

Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit .27 .06 .01 .15Incidents per Unit .17 .34 .23 .19Friendly Casualties per Unit .27 0 .05 .31Enemy KIA per Unit .22 .34 .28 .07

(a) Coastal Divisions. The ',.NN presently has three coastalflotillas divided into six coastal squadrons deployed on Market Time patrols.The VNN controls 48 of the 58 coastal surveillance stations 1', indicated onCharts 65 and 66. Market Time patrol operations are relatively quiet in com-. . .parison to Sea Lords interdiction operations. Inasmuch as only a few VNNPCFs are assigned to Sea Lords the readiness and performance indicators showa large disparity from the arbitrary standard, which is based on all PCFoperations. In the future VNN PCFs will he playing a larger part in SeaLords operations and a more apt picture wul1 be presented by the readiness andperformance indicators.

115

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 65

MARKE T TIME SURVEILLANCE STATIONS

80

60 - 8- ____ __

40

20

IQ 2Q 40 1 Q1 20 iE 309.. .. 40L1969, I1970

VNN USN

1 16

CONFIDENTIAL

i rUNiUi L i iChart 6b

MARKET TIME SURVEILLANCE STATIONS

E- VNN STATIONS(END OF LAST QTR)

* STATIONS TURNED OVER TOVNN DURING REPORTED QTR

SUSN STATIONS

2 CTZ

- -,- -.- ..... ...

1,

CONFIDENTIAL-Z CTZII

CONFIDENTIAL(t) River Patrol Group . There are four WN River Patro. Groups

(RPG' vith aprox1,,1tely 20 PBRs-per group, RPG 51 -id 5? are erloyed in theRunt Sat Sxzi. Zz ne" (RSSZ) and Soi TIp P-11.-r with th - vital Jo of protcxtingshippir;g. lcc, :'; a detachme.nt of PP', 51 r.. bcc.., -sijied t.' -he Real Deckarea of ope-,ti,-.. PPG 53 is employed in the 6iat Slhngshe* , Atte ;eginnirc. of the year RPC 34 had 10 boats eaci .. T'-. an ic,g Dao Icperation ar.: o.i ':he [assac ,iver. Purn1lrg J Warn. t', 10 -Gra 54 bocts on tl>e5assac River ,w:re redeployed to the Tran Ihg P. lcperatixn along the Cam-bodian border. Liu- shifting of units into areas of hgber enemy activity isreflected in the first quarter's monthly indicators.

- (c) River Assault and InterdictionDivisi_.ns. There are six

RAIDs consisting cF-apioximately 18 boats per divisiorf--At the beginning ofthe year four of these PAIDs were part of ATF 211 operating in the U Minharea and two RAIDs were assigned to the Giant Slingshot operation. DuringMarch one RAID from ATF 211 was shifted to the Search Turn operation and operat-ed with the USN units for the remainder of the quarter. The level of activity . .. .for the RAID craft drcpped off from last quarter, however, thc performance indi-cators show that the units continued to achieve results. The friendly casualtyindicator was high and this is reflected in the kill ratio being slightly lowerthan last quarter.

e. Area of Operational Responsibility. Chart 67 shows the locations ofthe various naval operations that are commanded by USN and N and unilateralUSN operations. The combined operations join USN and VNN personnel in thesame staff and fighting effort with the W.NY eventuallv ssuming total controlof these operations. During the quarter the XNN assumed co.and of Tran HtmgDao I. Three of the seven operations are now commanded by Vietnamese offic.erswith USN deputy commanders. Operations Breezy Cove and Barrier Reef are uni-lateral USN operations. Breezy Cove was a joint operation at the beginning ofthe year but deployment of the ,NN gunfire stpport units to the INN commandedTran Hung Dao now makes Breezy Cove a. unilateral USN operation.

f. Operational Results.

(1) Operational results attained by the VNN during the four quarters of1969 and the first quarter 1970 are shown on Chart 68. The number of coastalcraft searched in the Market Tine operation has dropned slightly due to inclementweather along portions of the coast preventing the smaller aircraft from deploy-ing. Enemy and VN craft captured, destroyed and damaged dropped during thequarter primarily because of smaller scale operations upe- termination of ATF211's operation in the U Minh area._ The number of enemy killed also decreasedas ai result of the smaller scale operations. The kill ratio, though less than

k last quarter,'still remains high.

(2) Chart 69 is a comparison of the USN/\NN results for CY 69 and firstquarter 1970. High US results include efforts of US air support of USN andVNN waterborne operations. This display 'ndicates the total effort necessaryon the part of the Vietnamese, assuming the current level of fighting continues.

11O

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 67

Z COMBINED AND USNREDBARRIER OPERATIONS ___-~GATSIGHTDECK

RUNG SAT

TRAN HUNG DAO ZOEA

DOC _qj BARRERCOMMANDOER

CANCMANE

(CRIGREORE QR

USN COMMANDERBREEZY(EN OFV [f ILAST UTR)

OPERATIONS

119

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 68

II VIETNAMESE NAVY RESULTS I

SENEMY-VNN CRAFT CAPTURED, DESTROYED, AND DAMAGED

1969 1970, 9' 21 51 3.91

300

I 200

100

IQ 20 30 40 10 2Q 30 40

ENEMY VNN * DATA NOT AVALABLE

JENEMY- VNN KIA

31A 9:1 4.1 131 121300

200

IQ 20 30 4 ,C 20 30 40

ENEMY 0 VNN

ICOASTAL CRAFT SEARCHED1400

300

200i., ,oofl ~ __I

IO 10 Q 4Q 2c 1 r 3Q 4Q

120

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALChart 69

IIVNN-USN RESULTS COMPARISON

IENEMY CRAFT CAPTURED, DESTROYED, AND DAMAGED

1969 1970

3000

2000

1000

S30 4Q 0 20 30302Q 30 4

I ENEMY KIA

2000

1500Io1000

500

0141 0 10 1 0 20 3 0. 4Q

COASTAL CRAFT SEARCHED

400 -q 300100

S 40A 2Q 30 40

BY USN BY VNN * DATA NOT AVAILABLE

121

CONFIDENTIAL

CPF. F KTIALGLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACTOVLOG Accelerated Turnover Logistics ProgramAK7, Attack Cargo, LightATF Amphibious Task ForceATG Amphibious Task GroupCTZ Corps Tactical ZoneCZ Coastal ZoneDER Destroyer Escort, RadarJGS Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)L-W4 .... ---- Landing -Craft, Mechnized, MinesweeperLCM Landing Craft, MechanizedLCM- 8 Landing Craft, Mechanized Mark 8 (Large LC49)LCU Landing Craft, UtilityLSIL Landing Ship, Infantry, LargeLSSL Landing Ship, Support, Large

. .LS Landing Ship, MediumLST Landing Ship, TankMASF Military Assistance Service FundedMIMS Motor Launch Mine Sweeper gl.OJT On the Job Training

: PBR Patrol Boat RiverPC Patrol CraftPCE Patol Craft, EscortPCF Patrol Ciaft, FastPGM Patrol Mo:or GunboatRAC River Ass. ,ilt CraftRAG River Assault GroupRAID River Assault and Interdiction DivisionRPG River Patrol GroupRSSZ Rung Sat Special ZoneTF Task ForceTG Task GroupWHEC High Endurance Coast Guard CutterWPB Coast Guard Patrol BoatYOG Coastal OilerYTL Medium Yard Tug

122

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTI L

ANNA

I . y Contacts and Results Per BnResul ts per battalion in terms of hours of contact and enemy KIA per hourof contact are shrwn in this annex for each wajor orginization, by mission.For hours of ccntact all contacts were converted to contact with theequivalent of an enemy platoon, by multiplying company contacts by threeari battalion contacts by nine. Where mission headings are omitted, therewere no enemy contacts while on that mission.

A-1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONF!DENTIAi-

I crnPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND EN PLT EOUTV FN 9CIA PER PLTMISSION HPS OF CONTACT EOUIV HR OF CONTACT

07, DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS A23 1.40PACIFICATION ACTIVEPACIFICATTN STATICSECUP ITY 1 0.00TOT AL 424 1.40

n2 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS 1020 0.P4PACIFICATION ACTIVE 7 0.29PACIFICATION STATICSFCUR ITY 1q 0.95TOTAL 5 1046 0. R3

51 PEG

COMBAT OPERATIONS 56 2.23PACIFICATION ACTIVEPACIFICATION STATICSECURITY 12 0.67TOTAL 68 1.96

A-2CPNFI DENT TAL

/i .I ~ ~ AT LO'e

ENEMY CONTACTS AN) RESUtTS

OPrANTZATION AND EN PLT EQUIV EN KIA PER PLTMISSION HPS OF CONTACT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT

22 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS .. 11 1.00.PACIFICATION ACTIVE 39' 2.82PACIFICATION STAT-,C 51 3.65SECUR ITY 4 0000TOTAL 105 2.92,

23 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS 53 0.68PACIFICATION ACTIVE 28 O.4bPACIFICATION STATIC 11 0.,73SECURITY 26 0.15TOTAL 11 O.52

42 REG

COMPAT OPERATInNS 9 2.78PACIFICATION ACTIVEPACIFICATION STATICSECLR ITY 3 0.33TOTAL 12 2.17

A-3

CONFI DENT IAL

COMFIDENT TAL

III CORPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND FN PIT EQUIV EN KIA PER PITMISSION HRS CF CONTACT EQUIV HR OF CCNTACT

05 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS 150S.OPACIFICATION ACTIVEPACIFICATION STATICSECUR ITY 29 0.28TOTAL 179 1.21

18 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS 224 1.30PACIFICATION ACTIVE 3 1.67PACIFICATION STATICSECLR ITY 10 0.70TOTAL 238 1.28

25 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS 119 2.78PACIFICATION ACTIVE 112 1.97PACIFICATION STATIC 22 1.27SFCUR ITY 4 1.75

TTL257 2928

CONFf6hT TAt

CONFIDENTIAL

IV CORPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

OR6ANIZA ION AND EN PLT EQUIV EN KIA PER PLTMISSION HRS OF CONTACT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT

C7 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS 426 0.99PACIFICATION ACTIVEPACIFICATION STATICSECUR ITY 2 1.50TOTAL 428 0.99

C9 D V

COMRAT OPERATIONS 407 1.65PACIFICAT ON ACTIVE 7 1.71PACIFICATION STATIC 2 0.00SECURITY 10 1.60TOTAL 426 .1.64

21 DIV

COMeAT OPERATIONS 1437 0.28PACIFICATION ACTIVE 10 7.20PACIFICATION STATIC 6 0.00

SECURITY 1 2.00TOTAL' 1454 0.33

-

A-5CONFIDENTIAL

C (NF I DE NT I AL

ENEMY CCNTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND EN PLT EQUIV EN KIA PER PLTMISSION HRS OF CONTACT EQUIV HP OF CONTACT

CV TOTALS

COMBAT OPERATIONS 1526 0.47PACIFICATION ACTIVE 6 0.23PACIFICATION STATICSECUR ITY 122 0.59TOTAL 1708 0.47

RN TOTALS

COMBAT OPERATIONS 1241 1.00PACIFICATION ACTIVEPACIFICATION STATICSFCUP ITY 163 0.22TOTAL 1404 0.91

AS DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS 1123 0.52PACIFICATION ACTIVEPACIFICATION STATICSECURITYTOTAL 1123 0.52

VNMC

COMBAT OPERATIONS 313 1.41PACIFICATION ACTIVEPACIFICATION STATICSECUR ITYTOTAL 31.3 1.41

A-6CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B

Enemy Initiated Incidents and Results

Shown in this annex by division and separate regiment are the numbers ofenemy initiated incidents by type, whether day or night, and the resultingnumbers of friendly or enemy KIAs; friendly VIA, MIA or captured; and weaponscaptured or lost.

B-1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTAL

ENErY INITIATED INCIDE TS

INCID EN KIA FR KIA FRIENDLY WEAPONSDL N DL N DL N WIA/MIA/CAPT LOST CAPT

IST DIVASSAULT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

AMBUSH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ATTACK BY FIRE S 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0TERR/SABOTAGE 0 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 0 0HARASSMET MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 02D DIVASSAULT 0 1 0 12 0 13 32 0 '0 6AMBUSH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ATTACK BY FIRE 2 0 5 0 1 0 *2 0 0 0TERR/SABGrAGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARAS'Cr MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 05IST PEGTASSAULT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ABUSH 1 0 0 0 8 0 3 0 5 0ATTACK BY FIRE 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0TERW/SABOTAGE 3 0 0 0 1 0 S 0 0 0HARASSENT MIL 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0

ENENY INITIATED INCIDENTS

INCID EN KIA FR KIA FRIENDLY WEAPONS,, DL N DL N DL N WIA/MIA/CAYT LOST CAPT

22D DIVASSAULT 0 1 0 11 0 4 6 0 0 5AMBUSH 2 2 0 2 0 3 7 2 5 0AITACK BY FIRE 2 S 0 0 1 2 15 0 0 0TERR/SABOTAGE 0 3 0 0 1 1 4 0 0 0HARASSMENTMIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 023D DIVASSAULT 1 7 0 12 1 16 26 0 0 9AMBUSH 4 0 0 0 4 0 8 0 2 0ATTACK BY FIRE s 15 0 2 0 1 4 0 0 0TERR/SABOTAGE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARASqJTMIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

A ULT 6 0 23 0 0 0 4 0 0 5AMBUSH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ATTACK BY FIRE 3 7 0 0 1 3 is 0 0 0TERRSABOTAGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARASSENT MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C

B-2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EN__ff TNITIATED INCIDENTSINCID EN KIA FR KIA FRIENDLY WEAPONS

DL N DL N DL N WIA/MIA/CAPT LOST CAPT

5TH DIVASSAULT 0 1 0 8 0 1 6 0 0 7AMBUSH 4 0 0 0 3 0 13 0 0 0ATTACK BY FIRE 0 1 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 0TERR/SABOTAGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARASSMENT MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 018TH DIV

ASSAULT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0AMBUSH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ATTACK BY FIRE O 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0TERR/SABOTAGE 0 0 0* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARASSAENT MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 025TH DIV

ASSAULT 0 3 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 3MIBUSH 0 2 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 1ATTACK BY FIRE 0 S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0TERR/SABOTAGE o o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARAS37E",rMIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

_ ENEY INITIATED INCIDENTS ... ...

INCID EN KIA FR KIA FRIENDLY WEAPONSDL N DL N DL N WIA/MIA/CAPT LOST CAPT

7711 DIVASSAULT 21 0 3 0 2 0 16 0 0 9AMBUSH i 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1ATTACK BY FIRE 0 10 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0TERR/SA.BOTAGE 0 1 .0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0HARASSM.r MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 09TH DIV

ASSAULT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0AMBUSH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ATTACK BY FIRE 1 7 7 0 0 0 6 0 0 0TERR/SABOTAGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARAS NT MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

"ff 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0AMBUSH 1 0 .0 0 1 0 5 0 0 1ATTACK BY FIRE 2 3 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0TERR/SABO(TAGE 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARASS 2T MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

B-3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL/

_ EMY INITIATED INCIDENTS

INCID EN KIA FR KIA FRIEDLY WEAPONSDL N DL N DL N WIAiMIA/CAPT LOST CAPT

AIRBORNE - - - -

ASSAULT 0 "0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0AMBUSH' 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0ATTACK BY FIRE 1 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0TERR/SABOTAGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARASSMENT MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0CAVALRYASSAULT 0 2 0 17 0 5 20 0 0 14AMBUSH 5 2 57. 0 3 4 16 0 0 9ATI'TACK BY FIRE 37 7 17 0 4 2 38 0 0 13TERR/SABOTAGE 3 0 0 0 0 0. 2 0 0 0HARASSMENT MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0RANGERS

ASSAULT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0AIBUSH 1 2 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 0ATTACK BY FIRE 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0TERR/SABOTACE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARAS.91ENr MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 a I n

ENR'4YINITIATED INCIDENTS

INCID EN KIA FR KIA FRIENDLY WEAPONSDL N DL N DL N WIA/MIA/CAPT LOST CAPT

MARINESASSAULT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0AM.IUJSH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ATrACK BY FIRE 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0TERR/SABOTAGE u 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0HARASS r MIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ASSAULTAMUSHATTACK BY FIRETERR/SABOTAGEHARASlT MIL

ASSAULT . ..AMBUSHATTACK BY FIRETERR/SABOTAGE

LHAASMMr MIL

B-4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALANNEX C

Effort, Results and Caches Discovered

1. Distribution of effort as shown in this annex is the percent of timespent on the different types of operations by divisions and separate bat-talions. Distribution of effort is based on the actual number of bat-talion days spent on each type of operation, against the number of bat-talion days available. The following definitions apply to the operationsas used in this annex:

a. Combat Operations. Operations conducted to find, fix and destroyenemy forces, and to find and destroy his equipment, base areas and linesof communications.

b. Security Operations. Operations conducted to deny enemy access ordamage to friendly political, economic, and military resources and instal-lations, other than those specifically designated with the pacificationprogram.

c. Pacification Active. Operations conducted by a unit under OPCON ofa sector commander for support of pacification, to seek out and destroy orneutralize enemy forces which threaten the population or resources of theassigned pacification area. (Includes reconnaissance in force, directattack against located enemy forces, cordon and search operations, longrange patrols and ambushes.)

d. Pacification Static. Operations conducted by a unit under OPCON ofa sector commander for support of pacification, to deny enemy access toprotected areas where pacification is in progress, and to prevent enemyaction against the population or resources within the pacification areas.(Includes outposts, patrols, and strong points within or in the immediatevicinity of protected areas.) This category also includes reserve, train-ing and rehabilitation while the unit is formally assigned in support ofpacification.

e. Reserve (Other than support of pacification). Maneuver units,including alerted but not crmnitted reaction forces, are in reserve whenso designated by the appropriate commander and not otherwise employed.

f. Training. Those missions in which forces are involved in training.

g. Rehabilitation. Time spent restoring a unit's physical and mentalstrength with rest and resupply.

2. Pages C-I toC-18 contain tabulations for distribution of effort(combat, security, pacification active, pacification static, reservc,training and rehabilitation), friendly and enemy KIAs, enemy captured orsurrendered, weapons captured versus lost, and caches, as reported byall APVN/V\N1C organizations. Page C-18 contains tabulations for distributionfor the 4th Otr CY 69 and the ist ftr CY 70 by major ARVN/V'MC organizations.

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/

ANNE D

Advisors' Assessment Tables,

These tables depict the advisors' assessment of divisions, separate regiments,and special organizations as derived from responses to the Quarterly Effective-ness Report (SEER Questionnaire as revised, effective 4th Qtr CY 69). Battalionratings are derived from the combination of battalion and regimental advisors'assessments. The regimental ratings are derived from the combination of regi-mental and division advisors' assessments.

D-1

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ANNEX E

Combat Support Received

This annex presents the totals of various types of combat support receivedby maneuver battalions, as reported by battalion advisors. Also presentedis the "per battalion share", or the total for the major organizationdivided by the number of maneuver battalions in that organization.

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