Australian Immiflution Poli y: The Si'zjLmzce of the Events of September I I Graeme Hugo Adelaide University

In assessing the impact on Australia of the tragic events of September 11 th, one needs to consider developments with respect to immigration, especially asylum seekers, in the preceding period. With 23.6 percent of its population born in foreign countries, Australia has been more influenced by immigration than the other traditional migration countries. Refugees have been an impor- tant part of this and only Canada has settled more refugees per 1,000 resident population. However, until recently, almost all refugees accepted by Australia have been processed offshore. This has changed dramatically since 1999. Fig- ure I shows that between 1999 and November 8, 2001, some 10,343 'boat people'' have arrived on Australia's northern shores, most applying for asy- lum. In this influx, the majority have come from Afghanistan and Iraq

*Figures for 2001 calendar year are for January 1- November 8. Note: Origin of Arrivals not available by nationality for calendar years after 1999. Source: DIMIA, 2001; Ruddock, 2001

'Undocumented persons arriving by boat usually on the northern coast and departing from a Southeast Asian port.

0 2002 by the Center for Migration Studies of N e w York. All rights reserved 01 98-9 183/02/3601 .O 137

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(42.5% and 39.6%, respectively, between July 1, 1999 andJune 30,2001). The Australian government has been criticized because of its policy on detention of asylum seekers while their claims are assessed.

However, there was a major shift in Australian immigration policy in late August 200 1 when 438 asylum seekers were rescued from a sinking Indonesian vessel by the Norwegian freighter M. V Tampa. The freighter changed course to take the asylum seekers to Australia but the government refused them entry, transferred the asylum seekers to a navy ship and took them to Nauru in the Pacific where their claims were processed. Hitherto, asylum seekers detected en route to Australia or on Australian islands between Indonesia and the Aus- tralian mainland were automatically taken to Australia where they were put in detention centers to await processing of their claim for asylum. The new ‘pacif- ic solution’ was accompanied by a government attack on the people smugglers who facilitated the movement. Moreover, government rhetoric stressed the characterization of the asylum seekers as ‘queue jumpers’ and ‘illegal immi- grants’ (Hawksley, 2001).

Although the new government policy came under severe attack interna- tionally and from prominent Australians from both conservative and more pro- gressive sides of politics, there can be no question that a majority of the Aus- tralian public supported it. Polls taken in the week after the Tampa affair indi- cated that three quarters of Australians supported the decision to refuse entry to the asylum seekers and the Prime Minister‘s handling of the situation (Betts, 200 1 :42). Prior to the Empa incident the conservative government had been lagging in the opinion polls in the Iead-up to the national election to be held on November 10. In July, support for the government was at 40 percent while that for the main opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP) was at 47 percent (Paul, 2001:24-25). The government pushed the issue to the forefront of elec- tion campaign discussion and there can be no doubt that the government‘s posi- tion on asylum seekers was responsible for the government assuming leadership in the pre-election polls.

The Australian government justified its change in asylum seeker policy as follows (Ruddock, 2001:2):

The number of unauthorized boat arrivals in 1999-2001 was 8,316 com- pared with 4,114 in the previous two years. The shift in the nationality profile away from Asian to Middle Eastern ori- gins. More than 80 percent in the last two years claimed asylum compared with 46 percent.

REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AFTER 9/11 39

People smuggling has increased in significance, with Indonesia now becoming the main staging point for people arriving from the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Critics argued that the government had cynically exploited fears about security and the integrity of national borders to enhance its chances in the impending federal election.

This was the context in which Australians learned of the September 11 events. The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, happened to be in Wash- ington at the time and:

Just minutes after the atrocity, he addressed a press conference called to hear his report on talks with President George W. Bush. Right there and then Howard com- mitted Australian forces to supporting America in whatever might follow. Howard has become leader of a nation at war and a man considered able and willing to pro- tect Australia's shores from any Afghanistan-fueled invasion of refugees (Paul, 2001:25).

Prior to September 1 1, the government had decided to take its hard line on asy- lum seekers and to make this a prime issue for the election. After September 1 1, the war on terrorism also became a major issue and it became enmeshed with the immigration, especially the asylum seeker, issue. How was this connection able to be made?

The bulk of boat people in 1999-2001 were of Islamic background and hailed from countries (Afghanistan and Iraq) that were implicated in the events of September 1 1. Some members of the government inferred (without evidence) that there were possibilities that some terrorists could be seeking to infiltrate Australia through portraying themselves as asylum seekers (Sydney Morning Herak, September 14, 2001). The attacks on New York and Washington increased feelings of insecurity in Australia, as elsewhere, so that the government's pre-existing hard line on boat people and maintaining the security and integrity of Australia's bor- ders gained in attractiveness to the voting public. While the ALP opposition supported government policies on both asylum

seekers and the war against terrorism, the government and the Prime Minister were able to take the higher ground on these issues because of their direct involvement in developing and executing those policies. More boats with asy- lum seekers attempted to reach Australia from Indonesia in the period leading up to the election but all were turned back. Riots and protests in detention cen- ters also probably contributed to anti-asylum seeker sentiment.

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The conservative government won the election comfortably and while it officially denied the significance of the asylum seeker/security issue in its suc- cess, most observers see this as being crucial to their victory. These issues attracted voters to them from both sides of politics. There was an inflow of for- mer supporters of the One Nation Party (ONP) of Pauline Hanson which had espoused anti-Asian immigration policies and a substantial lowering of immi- gration (Jones, 1998). The ONP vote was halved from 8.45 percent of the pri- mary vote in 1998 to 4.4 percent in 2001. Moreover, it seems that the asylum seekedterrorist issue saw some traditional blue collar voters who have tradi- tionally voted ALP move to the conservatives. On the other hand: “Many for- mer ALP voters and some disaffected Liberal voters switched to the Greens, the only party to consistently argue that Australia has humanitarian obligations that mean it should and must take asylum seekers” (Hawksley, 2001:4).

The Australian government had moved decisively against asylum seekers before the September 1 1 events. September 1 1 probably produced a hardening of attitudes in Australia about asylum seekers although it is apparent that the government’s position had majority support in the Australian population before it. Concerns with security and the integrity of national borders were strong in Australia before September 11 and they were heightened after it. The events of September 11 also made it easier for the government to keep the asylum seek- er issue in the forefront during the election campaign. Whether there is any longer term impact in changing the broader general acceptance of immigration by Australians remains to be seen.

REFERENCES Betts, K. 2001 “Boatpeople and Public Opinion in Australia,” Peuple and Pkzce, 9(4):34-48. Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) 2001 “Unauthorised Arrivals by Air and Sea,” Fact Sheet 74, DIMIA, Canberra. Hawksley, C. 2001 “The MVTampa, the ‘Pacific Solution’ and the Federal Election in Australia,” APMRN

Update, No. 11, Oct-Nov. Pp. 3 4 . Jones, G. 1998 “‘Australian Identity,’ Racism and Recent Responses to Asian Immigration to Australia.”

In The Silent Debate: Asian Immigration and Racism in Canada. Ed. E. Laquian, A. Laquian and T. McGee. Vancouver, BC: Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia.

Paul, A. 2001 “The Lucky Prime Minister,” Asiaweek, November 9:24-26. Ruddock, P. 200 1 Background Paper on Unauthorised Arriuah Strategr. DIMIA: Canberra,