Austin’s Criticisms of Ayer’s Argument From Illusion

Jonathan Surovell

2 July 2012

0 Background to Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia: OrdinaryLanguage Philosophy

Austin’s approach is unusual in two, possibly related, ways. First, he sometimesdetracts from the argument from illusion in ways that seem to fall short of a directobjection to a premise or inference in the argument. Thus, Austin identifies one ofhis aims as “exposing a wide variety of concealed motives” (p. 5; quoted in ?, p. 24.)Second, he frequently invokes the uses of words when, one would think, he couldinstead talk about the actual behavior of the things the words refer to.

Both of these features of Austin’s work reflect his involvement in the “ordinarylanguage” approach to philosophy that was dominant at Oxford during roughly theperiod betewen 1940 and 1965. Ordinary language philosophers were influenced byWittgenstein’s later work (though he believed that they misunderstood him). Theschool included a number of philosophers who no doubt had different understandingsof their common approach. But they shared a common approach all the same.Martinich identifies their basic shared outlook as a commitment “to use features ofcertain words in ordinary or non-philosophical contexts as an aid to doing philosophy”(?). Austin believed that attention to the use of ordinary language had the potentialto dissolve (as opposed to solve) puzzling philosophical questions. Thus he saysin Sense and Sensibilia he does not aim to show that this or that philosophicalconception of perception is true, but rather to uncover “a technique for dissolvingphilosophical worries” (p. 5; quoted in ?, p. 24).

1 Chapter III: ‘Illusions’, ‘Delusions’, and the First Premiseof the Argument From Illusion

At the beginning of chapter III of Sense and Sensibilia, Austin argues that ‘the ar-gument from illusion’ is a bad name for an argument one of whose conclusions is

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that “at least some of our ‘perceptions’ are delusive” (p. 22).1 Austin thinks theuse of such a name for such an argument implies “(a) that all the cases cited inthe argument are cases of illusions ; and (b) that illusion and delusion are the samething” (p. 22).

Austin claims that both (a) and (b) are false. Moreover, he thinks “it is by nomeans unimportant to point this out, for, as we shall see, the argument trades onconfusion at just this point” (p. 22).

1.1 ‘Illusions’ and ‘Delusions’ in Proper English

After giving some examples, Austin explains that the “most important differences”between the term ‘illusions’ and the term ‘delusions’ are “the term ‘an illusion’ (in aperceptual context) does not suggest that something totally unreal is conjured up...whereas the term ‘delusion’ does suggest something totally unreal, not really thereat all” (p. 23).

If Austin is right about the proper English use of the words ‘illusions’ and ‘delu-sions’, then when Ayer describes the perception of a bent stick (when an in factstraight stick is submerged in water) or of an elliptical coin (when a coin with areally circular surface is seen from a certain angle) by the word ‘delusive’, he ismisusing this word.

1.2 Who Cares About proper English?

Why does Ayer’s conflation of illusions and delusions matter for the argument fromillusion? Austin writes,

So long as it is being suggested that the cases paraded for our attentionare cases of illusion, there is the implication (from the ordinary use ofthe word) that there really is something there that we perceive. But then,when these cases begin to be quietly called delusive, there comes in the verydifferent suggestion of something being conjured up, something unreal orat any rate ‘immaterial’. These two implications taken together may thensubtly insinuate that in the cases cited there really is something that we areperceiving, but that this is an immaterial something; and this insinuation,even if not conclusive by itself, is certainly well calculated to edge us a littlecloser towards just the position where the sense-datum theorist wants tohave us. (p. 25)

1Henceforth, all page references are to ?.

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By calling calling the cases in question ‘illusory’, Ayer implies that there is somethingbeing perceived; by calling the same cases delusive, he implies that was is perceivedis immaterial. These implications “quietly edge us a little closer” to accepting thatsomething immaterial is seen in the illusory cases?

2 The First Premise of the Argument From Illusion

Ayer’s argument does not strictly depend on an inference from a perception’s beingdelusive to its being of an immaterial thing. Rather, Ayer begins his argument asfollows:

(1) I see something bent.

(2) The stick is not bent.

Therefore,

(3) I see something other than the stick.

Austin now addresses this portion of the argument directly:

The straight part of the stick, the bit not under water, is presumably partof a material thing; don’t we see that? And what about the bit underwater?—we can see that too. (p. 30)

Austin is here denying (1): Austin points out that we ordinarily describe such casesby saying that I see the stick, and that it looks bent to me. But this need not temptus to suppose that I see something bent.

2.1 Seeing Something that Looks a Certain Way and Seeing Something

that Has a Certain Property: Austin’s Example of the Disguised

Church

Perhaps Ayer accepts (1) because he infers: since the stick looks bent to me, I amseeing something bent. The following example might be intended as an objection toinferences of this kind:

If, to take a rather different case, a church were cunningly camouflaged sothat it looked like a barn, how could any serious question be raised aboutwhat we see when we look at it? We see, of course, a church that now lookslike a barn. We do not see an immaterial barn, an immaterial church, oran immaterial anything else. And what in this case could seriously temptus to say that we do? (p. 30)

Is this example analogous to the submerged stick example?

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3 Retreat to the Argument From Hallucination

Austin’s denial of premise (1) of the argument from illusion rests on there beinga physical object that Austin can claim is what is seen. In Ayer’s mirage example,there is no such physical object. And consequently, Austin thinks the argument from“hallucination”2 is not open to the objections just raised against the argument fromillusion (cf. p. 32).

Austin nonetheless balks at accepting Ayer’s sense-data idiom: “We don’t actuallyhave to say, however, even here that he is ‘experiencing sense-data’; for though, asAyer says above, ‘it is convenient to give a name’ to what he is experiencing, the factis that it already has a name—a mirage” (p. 32).

However, foregoing use of the word ‘sense-data’ does not obviously have any sig-nificant affect on the argument from “hallucination”. For if we were to grant theother premises, we get:

(1�) I see an oasis.

(2�) There is no oasis before me.

(3) In every perceptual experience, the perceiver is perceptually related to an object.

Therefore,

(4) I see a non-material object; call it a ‘mirage’.

But

(5) The objects perceived in veridical experiences and experiences of mirages are ofthe same kind.

Therefore,

(6) The objects of perception, in both veridical experiences and experiences of mi-rages, are mirages.

Forcing Ayer to give (1�)–(6), where the word ‘mirage’ replaces the word ‘sense-datum’, instead of his original argument from “hallucination”, seems to me a hollowvictory for Austin.

Austin, I think, sees this, and accordingly sets his sights on premise (5) of theargument from hallucination. Recall that Ayer defends premise (5) as follows:

2I use scare quotes because Austin might be uncomfortable with this name for the argument, where a mirage is

involved. Austin notes that it is not clear whether mirages are due to a neural malfunction (i.e., a hallucination) or

to some kind of reflection effect.

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Qualitative Indistinguishability (i) If two kinds of experience were of differentobjects, then there would be a qualitative difference between them; (ii) Thereis no qualitative difference between hallucinations and veridical experiences;therefore, (iii) hallucinations and veridical experiences are of the same kind ofobjects.

Austin first denies (ii):

Again, we should be wise not to accept too readily the statement thatwhat he [the man seeing a mirage] is experiencing is ‘similar in characterto what he would be experiencing if he were seeing a real oasis’. For is itat all likely, really, to be very similar? And, looking ahead, if we were toconcede this point we should find the concession being used against us ata later stage—namely, at the stage where we shall be invited to agree thatwe see sense-data always, in normal cases too. (p. 32)

4 Chapter V: Austin’s Objections to Ayer’s Qualitative In-distinguishability Argument

We have just seen Austin deny premise (ii) of Ayer’s Qualitative Indistinguishabilityargument for premise (5). In chapter V, Austin develops this objection, as well asan objection to premise (i). Before we get to these, it is worth noting that Austinrejects premise (3), taking Ayer to task for assuming:

that there is at any rate some kind of entities of which we are aware inabsolutely all cases—namely ‘perceptions’, delusive or veridical. But ofcourse, if one has already been induced to swallow the idea that everycase, whether ‘delusive’ or ‘veridical’, supplies us with ‘perceptions’, oneis only too easily going to be made to feel that it would be straining at agnat not to swallow sense-data in an equally comprehensive style. (p. 47)

Austin then turns to (ii) and (i) of Ayer’s Qualitative Indistinguishability Argument.Regarding (ii), Austin says, Ayer’s claim that “there is no intrinsic difference in kindbetween those of our perceptions that are veridical in their presentation of materialthings and those that are delusive” (p. 48) is false.

He offers as reason for denying (ii): “I may have the experience (dubbed ‘delu-sive’ presumably) of dreaming that I am being presented to the Pope. Could it beseriously suggested that having this dream is ‘qualitatively indistinguishable’ fromactually being presented to the Pope? Quite obviously not” (p. 48). Austin hereinvokes the concept of a dream-like quality.

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Consideration of individual cases will not provide a knock-down argument against(ii). This is why it will be important for Austin to deny (i). If (i) stands, then Ayerneeds just one example of a hallucination (a) in which something non-physical isseen and (b) that is qualitatively indistinguishable from a veridical perception.

Regarding (i), Austin says:

if, for example, I had never seen a mirror, but were told (a) that in mirrorsone sees reflections of things, and (b) that reflections of things are not‘generically the same’ as things, is there any reason why I should forthwithexpect there to be some whacking big ‘qualitative’ difference between seeingthings and seeing their reflectings? Plainly not; if I were prudent, I shouldsimply wait and see what seeing reflections was like. (p. 50)

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