Atty. Ronald O. Solis, Bantay Balota

National National Readiness for Readiness for

Automated Automated Election System: Election System:

An AssessmentAn Assessment

� Bantay Balota’s Goal:� To achieve the shared objective of a clean,

honest, and credible automated elections (AES) on May 10, 2010

� To collaborate with COMELEC in formulating effective and practical solutions to identify issues and concerns regarding the AES and provide means for the overall improvement and security of the system

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PCOS machine(75,471 in total accomodating a

max. of 1,000 voters each)

Precinct (max. of 200 Voters

each)

Legend:

Polling Center(37,226 in total)

� Administrative Issues:� Issues which involve the effectivity of using an automated system of

elections and the actual implementation and operation of the AES in the May 10, 2010 Elections:

� Possibility of massive disenfranchisement of voters considering factors such as:

� lack of experience and the novelty of the technology � the short period available in the preparation and implementation of the system� inadequate voters’ education and the fact that only 1 ballot will be allowed per voter.

� Will COMELEC be able to adequately train all the election officers and IT personnel to operate the machines to be used in the AES?

� With the clustering of precincts which will increase the number of voters to be handled by each BEI, will all the voters be accommodated within the 11-hour period?

� Difficulty in the distribution of all the PCOS machines, CCS laptops, security keys, other equipment and election paraphernalia to the proper precincts.

� Overcoming the lack of public confidence that the system will work and truly reflect the choice of the voting populace

� Technical Issues:� Issues which involve the hardware and software

components of the AES:�Possibility of hacking and tampering of the system�Will the various machines to be used in the AES work

in real life conditions? �Will the AES accurately report the election results?�Possibility of system breakdown and how to recover

from it�Transmission concerns

� Partial automation� With difficulties in transmission and given the

probability of breakdown on some of the PCOS and CCS machines, 30% to 50% of the country might resort to manual counting and physical delivery of the election results

� Resort to manual counting in the event of a system-wide breakdown

� Critical Areas:1. Source Code Review2. Printing of Ballots3. Education and Training4. Preliminary/Final PCOS and CCS Testing &

Sealing5. Continuity Plan6. Transmission Concerns7. Access to the Media Server8. Random Manual Audit

� Periods� Before Elections

� Source Code Review (Ongoing)� Preliminary Testing (Ongoing)� Education and Training� Printing of Ballots (January 25 to end of March 2010)� Final Testing and Sealing (3 days before Election day or not later than May

7, 2010)� Election Day (May 10, 2010)

� Transmission Concerns� Access to Media Server� Continuity Plan

� Post Elections � Random Manual Audit (May 11, 2010)

� What is a Source Code?

xxx “12. Source code - human readable instructions that define what the computer equipment will do;” xxxx

- Section 2 of RA 9369, the “AES Law”

� Currently conducted by SysTest Labs, Inc. of Colorado, USA

� Review of Source Code includes:� Firmware/Software of the PCOS machines� Firmware/Software of the CCS laptops� Firmware/Software of the EMS and the Printers to be

used for printing the various election paraphernalia� Other Utilities, Tools and Devices for the Diagnostics

and Administration of the various component machines of the AES

� Purpose:� Check the integrity and robustness of the source

code� Test and Check the security features in place� Troubleshooting and debugging� Verify that the firmware/software reviewed is

what is actually installed on the machines� Deter tampering, hacking and insertion of any

spurious and/or malicious software

� Issues:� Source code itself will not be made available to the

public or at least to the major stakeholders.� No means of knowing the extent and breadth of the

review conducted or the effectiveness of the methodology used

� No way to verify and audit the findings of SysTest Labs

� Delay in the release of findings to public� Result: No real assurance that the purpose of the

review will be met

� Recommendation:� Need to conduct an independent parallel source

code review� Advantages:

� Provide an independent 3rd party assessment� May cover any overlooked areas in the review

conducted by SysTest Labs considering the amount of source code reviewed

� Increase public confidence on the automated election system

� Legal Basis� Provided by Sec. 12 of RA9369, the “AES Law”

which provides:“xxx Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. xxxx”

� Printing of ballots and other election paraphernalia and materials will be printed by the National Printing Office

� Smartmatic/TIM to provide printing equipment and paraphernalia

� Printing is estimated to take two (2) months from January 25 to end of March 2010.

� Issues:� Possible errors and malfunctions in printing

which could cause delay� Printing of spurious marks and other triggers that

could influence the PCOS in appreciating the correct choices in the ballots

� Proper alignment in the printing of the candidates’ names which could affect how the PCOS would appreciate the choices in the ballot

� Recommendations:� Need for 24/7 non-stop surveillance during the

entire 2 month period. �Watchers from the major stakeholders should be

allowed to observe the printing process.� Need to check for spurious ultraviolet markings

which cannot be seen by the naked eye without the aid of ultraviolet light as used by money changers

� Installation of cameras and other security surveillance equipment at the site of the printing

� Education for the Voters and Watchers:� According to the recent SWS survey, 60% of

Filipinos do not know anything about the AES� This is alarming since a voter will be provided

with only 1 ballot,� There can be no mistakes. Every voter should

handle the ballots with extra care to avoid smudging, crumpling and folding which could invalidate it

� Recommendations:� It is imperative that the Sample Ballots should

be released as early as possible� Educational paraphernalia containing

screenshots of the PCOS and CCS interfaces should also be disseminated in order to help educate the voters and the watchers on what to expect as to how the voting and canvassing process would look like and adequately prepare come election day

� Training for the BEIs, BOCs and IT personnel� Considering the novelty of the technology, there

may be difficulties in providing adequate training� Does COMELEC have the sufficient time and

resources to train all the election officers concerned?

� Does the DOST, which have been tasked by the law to train the BEIs, already have the training module available?

� PCOS/CCS Testing/Sealing is done to check that the machines work (including screen, keyboard, printer, feeder, scanner and other parts) and that the count is accurate.� Preliminary Testing of PCOS machines are

already ongoing � Final Testing and Sealing of PCOS machines

will be conducted 3 days before election day or not later than May 7, 2010

� Issues:� Safekeeping of the PCOS machines for at least 3 days

before the elections at all polling centers (mostly schools) will inconvenience the members of the BEI and the watchers

� COMELEC has not yet issued the Implementing Rules for the final testing and sealing of the PCOS and CCS machines

� No news or updates as to the final testing of the CCS laptops to be used in the City/Municipal, Provincial, and National level

� Likewise, no news or updates as to the testing and sealing of the various servers that will be used in the AES and will serve as the repository of all the election data

� Recomendation:� Instead of the polling centers, the PCOS

machines should be kept in the office of the Municipal or City Treasurer of their respective locations�More secure with less points of ingress and egress�Will reduce the number of areas to be guarded: from

37,226 (number of polling centers) to only 1,634 (number of cities and municipalities)

� Screenshots of the step-by-step process of final testing and sealing should be distributed to all BEIs and watchers

� COMELEC has provided an outline of a Continuity Plan in their various public presentations which consists mainly of the following scenarios:1. PCOS fails to scan 2. PCOS able to scan but fails to print ER3. PCOS able to print ER but fails to transmit4. Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS) able

to receive transmission but fails to consolidate

� Issues:� COMELEC has yet to issue an official Continuity

Plan which should provide a more detailed and definite set of rules and procedures

� It is possible that given the short amount of time left before the start of elections, the Continuity Plan that will eventually be released will not be complete and as detailed to provide sufficient procedures in the event of a breakdown in the system

� Issues:� Only a portion of the country has GPRS facilities

that are capable of wirelessly transmitting the election data, mostly in major cities and municipalities only

� Based on their previous presentations, COMELEC will avail the services of local telecommunication companies and the use of satellite phones in setting up the communication facilities in the affected areas

� However, recent reports indicate that Smartmatic/TIM has finished 93% site survey and concludes the following:� 64% of the country has coverage � 32% has no connectivity. This is further broken down as

follows: � 20% definitely has no coverage� While 12% test failed for whatever reason.

� In other words, there would be around 13,000 sites that will have no GPRS or any alternative facilities for data transmission (i.e. no DSL, cable or dial-up internet)

� Considering the foregoing, what other contingencies will COMELEC undertake to address this concern?

� Will the number of satellite phones provided by Smartmatic/TIM be sufficient to cover the affected areas?

� Possible Scenario:

There is a real possibility that there will be a significant amount of areas that will have to resort to physical delivery of the election results, especially in remote towns and barrios

� As provided in Section 19 of RA 9369 or the “AES Law”, the election results should be electronically transmitted to the following entities:1. Dominant Majority Party 2. Dominant Minority Party 3. Accredited Citizens’ Arm (PPCRV)4. Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP)

� A single server will be provided to these entities where they will be sharing its access

� The server will be in the custody of PPCRV and will be placed in their office at Pope Pius Center in Manila

� Purpose of the PPCRV Server:� In order for the said entities to receive election

results as they come in in real-time� The election data that will be sent to the PPCRV

Server will enable the said entities to quickly validate the accuracy of the election results based on their own election surveys and be able to appropriately respond to any irregularity or other contingency during the elections

� Issues:� Providing only one server to be shared by all of these

entities would possibly lead to difficulties in the access and delay in receiving the election data as they come in

� COMELEC has not yet provided the technical parameters of access to the said server. Questions include:� How will the electronic election data be managed? Is it read only

from a screen? Or will the said entities be able to interface the said server with their own data management systems?

� What will be the manner in which to interface with the said server? Will there be a local network to be installed with eachentity being provided with their own workstation?

� Recommendation:� It is imperative that the technical meeting should already

commence given the technical considerations and planning needed in order for these entities to begin with preparations to implement and establish the necessary mechanisms for access to the said server

� The level and manner of access to the said server must be sufficiently defined so as to provide seamless integration and provide instant and efficient flow of information

� RA 9369 or the “AES Law” provides that a random manual audit shall be conducted in one precinct per congressional district

� COMELEC may increase this to 1 to 3 PCOS per City/Municipality or approximately up to 4,902 PCOS machines in total

� To be conducted the day after the elections or on May 11, 2010

� Subject to 24-hour prior notice by COMELEC

� Issue:� COMELEC has yet to issue the Implementing

Rules and Guidelines as to the procedure in the random selection of the PCOS machines and the conduct of the audit itself