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Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems Yossi Oren and Avishai Wool, http://eprint.iacr.org/2009 ipurl.com/e-voting IEEE RFID’2010, Orlando

Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

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Yossi Oren and Avishai Wool, . Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems. IEEE RFID’2010, Orlando FL. snipurl.com/e-voting. http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/422. Agenda. What’s the Israeli e-Voting Scheme? How can we break it cheaply and completely?. Not on the Agenda. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Yossi Oren and Avishai Wool,

http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/422snipurl.com/e-votingIEEE RFID’2010, Orlando FL

Page 2: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Agenda

What’s the Israeli e-Voting Scheme? How can we break it cheaply and

completely?

Page 3: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Not on the Agenda

Why the new scheme is legally unsound

Why our (ex-)ministers are all corrupt

The biometric database

Page 4: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Why do we have elections?

Page 5: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Elections

What’s a good election scheme? General Free Equal Fair

Page 6: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Preliminaries Definition: An election E is an NP

election, if…

N P

Conjecture: An election is only secure if it is NP-secure Claim: The Israeli Scheme is NP-insecure

Page 7: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

How Do We Vote Today?

Israel votes by national list proportional representation

Page 8: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

How Do We Vote Today?

Voter

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot Box

Paper Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Signed Envelopes

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Cast Votes

List of Authorized

Voters

NP

Page 9: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Voter

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot Box

Paper Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Signed Envelopes

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Cast Votes

List of Authorized

Voters

N

How Do We Vote Today?

NP

Page 10: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Voter

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot Box

Paper Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Signed Envelopes

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Cast Votes

List of Authorized

Voters

How Do We Vote Today?

NP

•72.1% participation rate•Less than 1.3% disqualified votes

(including protest “blank ballot” votes)•99% final results 6 hours after poll closes

Public Trust

Page 11: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

How Will We Vote Tomorrow?

Voter

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot BoxVoting and Counting Terminal

Verification Terminal

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Cast Votes

Population Register Terminal

Page 12: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Tomorrow’s Ballot

Page 13: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

How Will We Vote Tomorrow?

Voter

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot BoxVoting and Counting Terminal

Verification Terminal

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Cast Votes

Population Register Terminal

Page 14: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

How Will We Vote Tomorrow?

Voter

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot BoxVoting and Counting Terminal

Verification Terminal

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Cast Votes

Population Register Terminal

Page 15: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

How Will We Vote Tomorrow?

Voter

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot BoxVoting and Counting Terminal

Verification Terminal

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Cast Votes

Population Register Terminal

N PN

Page 16: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

How Will We Vote Tomorrow?

Voter

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot BoxVoting and Counting Terminal

Verification Terminal

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Cast Votes

Population Register Terminal

N PN

Page 17: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Attacks on the Voting System

Relay Attacks Ballot Sniffing Single Dissident Ballot Stuffing

Non-Relay Attacks Zapper Remote Jamming Implementation Attacks

Relay Attacks Ballot Sniffing Single Dissident Ballot Stuffing

Non-Relay Attacks Zapper Remote Jamming Implementation Attacks

Page 18: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Relay Attacks

5 cm

HF RFID Reader HF RFID Tag

L

G

HF RFID Tag

Page 19: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

The Ballot Sniffing Attack

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot BoxVoting and Counting Terminal

Verification Terminal

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

P N

N

N

PPN

N

N PNP N

N

N

PPN

N

Page 20: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

The Ballot Stuffing Attack

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot BoxVoting and Counting Terminal

Verification Terminal

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

P N

N

N

PPN

N

N P

P

P

P

NP

P

P

Page 21: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

The Zapper Attack

Voting Booth

LocalElections

Committee

Ballot BoxVoting and Counting Terminal

Verification Terminal

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

Blank Ballots

PPPP

P

P

PP

Zap!

Zap!

Page 22: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

The Government’s Response…

Page 24: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Implementation Attacks

Session Hijacking Replay Attacks Semantic Insecurity …

Page 25: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Conclusion

Is the new e-voting scheme a good scheme? General Free Equal Fair

Is the new e-voting scheme a good scheme? General Free Equal Fair

Page 26: Attacks on RFID-Based Electronic Voting Systems

Thank You!

If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!

http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/422snipurl.com/e-voting