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Post NATO Summit 2014, three participants a provides us with their insights and reflections on the NATO Summit in Wales. Daniel Hatton comments on the communication on the NATO Summit, while Marte Ziolkowski gives the reader a view from a future leaders point of view. furthermore, our Canadian Chapter, The Atlantic Council of Canada, gives the reader an insider's look on the preparation and what they took home from the Summit.
Citation preview
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 1
- Flora Pidoux & Maria Mundt
September was a key month for NATO: the
Summit in Wales gathered all the leaders of the
member and partner countries in order to
discuss the future of the Alliance. What was
meant to be an event to assess the relevance of
the organization in today’s world turned out to
be a reaffirmation of its goals. Considering the
recent crises that have emerged right at the
door of NATO, namely the crisis in Ukraine,
Syria, and caused by the emergence of ISIS, the
Alliance is faced once again with threats to the
security of its member states. NATO therefore
needs to adapt to this new situation
The coinciding Future Leaders Summit
enabled the young generation to also debate on
issues the Alliance is currently facing.
This issue of Atlantic Voices focuses on
the Wales Summit as well as the parallel Future
Leaders Summit, and their outcomes. The
articles aim at providing several viewpoints on
common threats, and how to respond to them
through NATO. A month after the NATO
Summit, this issue of Atlantic Voices presents
some of the outcomes of the Summit.
NATO Wales Summit and Atlantic Council Future Leaders Summit official logos (Photo: NATO)
NATO Summit Review
Volume 4 - Issue 10 October 2014
Contents:
Communicating The NATO Summit: A View From The Inside
Daniel Hatton offers an interesting insight on the Wales Summit, both from a
British and from an organizational perspective, presenting the challenges and
expectations from the Wales Summit.
NATO Post-Wales: Meeting Challenges In A Changed Security
Environment
Marte Ziolkowski, from the Norwegian delegation,examines the various topics
that have been touched upon during the Future Leaders Summit, from the dif-
ferent security threats to the future of the Alliance.
A View From Canada
Julie Lindhout and Christian Paas-Lang present the perspective of Canada: how
they prepared, and what they took home from the Summit.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 2
But what was the Summit going to be about?
What would the big issues be? What would our narrative
be? All good questions. And we thought we had decent
answers.
Afghanistan: 2014 would see the end of NATO’s
ISAF mission, which for
over 10 years had fought
to stop Afghanistan from
ever again becoming a
safe haven for terrorists.
We’ve built up the
ANSF. We were looking
forward to launching
Resolute Support.
Capabilities: we wanted
to strengthen NATO’s
ability to deliver security
for its members by mak-
ing sure it was fast, flexible
and fit for the future.
Partnerships: NATO’s 2010 strategic concept out-
lined ‘cooperative security’ as one of the Alliance’s core
tasks. An important part of Future NATO would be to
strengthen and deepen NATO’s already large network of
partners, both politically and operationally. The Summit
would look to deliver on all these.
And then Russia annexed Crimea, and continues
to destabilise the east of Ukraine. Russia’s actions threat-
ened the Alliance’s vision of a Europe whole free and at
peace – the very thing NATO leaders had committed to
the last time they met in the United Kingdom in 1990.
The Wales Summit had just got a whole lot bigger.
Communicating The NATO Summit:
A View From The Inside
By Daniel Hatton
I t all happened very quickly. NATO had not held
a Summit since Barack Obama had invited his
fellow heads of state and government to his
home patch of Chicago, Illinois in 2012. NATO, unlike
the European Council, with its regular meetings of Pres-
ident and Prime Ministers, only meets around every two
years or so. At the height
of the Cold War, Alliance
leaders only met once be-
tween 1957 and 1974 –
they became a bit more
regular after that.
So when the
Prime Minister decided
back in September 2013
that the UK would host
the next NATO Summit,
it was a big deal. The UK,
while no stranger to playing an
important role within the transatlantic alliance, was sud-
denly thrust to the forefront. Every word from “our
Summit hosts” would be scrutinised, every action ana-
lysed, and, in the digital world we live in, every tweet
re-tweeted. For the UK Delegation to NATO, where I
work, it was going to be a big challenge. This, in the
words of a former Ambassador, “small but perfectly
formed” part of the UK Government was going to have
to step up to the plate; but it was a challenge we rel-
ished. From a communications perspective, things got
off to an interesting start. High international diplomacy
was conducted before the public announcement of the
UK’s intention to host the Summit over what hashtag to
use. The nature of working in a multilateral setting
meant that there were many different stakeholders to
coordinate with. In the end we managed to settle on
one, and people used it, quite a lot.
Member States Leaders during aircraft demonstration (Photo: NATOWales)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 3
Comms Approach
Now I would like to talk a bit about what it was like
to work on the Summit, what I did, and what happened at
it. As I mentioned earlier, I work at the UK Delegation to
NATO, which was at the heart of the UK’s effort to deliver
the Summit. The Summit presented many challenges. Secu-
rity; logistics; policy; communications; accommodation;
catering – the list goes on. My small part in this was com-
munications. Working with two other colleagues in
UKDEL’s communications team, we helped to deliver the
UK’s communications output around the Summit. What it
means is that we used all the tools we had at our disposal,
from the traditional, such as press conferences, briefings,
articles, speeches, events and interviews; to the more mod-
ern and innovative, including digital and social media.
On the press side, we used the increased media to
set up media opportunities for our Ambassador, the Foreign
Secretary and the Defence Secretary. Every two months or
so, NATO foreign and defence ministers come to Brussels
to assess, steer and drive forward the work of the Alliance.
These high-level meetings have always garnered media at-
tention, but the added focus
of the Russia/Ukraine cri-
sis, and the steady progress
towards the Wales Summit,
meant there was even more
media attention on these
meetings. The UKDEL
comms team managed to
find some time in busy min-
isterial schedules to organise
various media engagements,
i n c l u d i n g
‘doorsteps’ (where minis-
ters make comments on arri-
val and departure from NATO HQ), and interviews with
various broadcasters, including the BBC and the British
Forces Broadcast Network.
Outside of ministerials, we organised media en-
gagements for our Ambassador, Sir Adam Thomson. Press
briefings formed the most important aspect of these engage-
ments. Our Ambassador conducted several well attended
press briefings for the Brussels based press corps, and one
pre-Summit brief to correspondents based in London.
One of the challenges of working with media on a high
profile international event is that for most of the journal-
ists covering the Summit, NATO wasn’t really their
patch. So we needed to do a lot of work to bring them up
to speed on some of the basics. What is the NAC? What
is Article 5? What is ISAF? The press briefings, as well as
conversations with journalists on the margins, provided
opportunities for us to inform their reporting, as well do
a bit of NATO jargon busting (the Alliance uses a stagger-
ing amount of acronyms).
Promoting Wales on the international stage was
another important aspect of the comms for the Summit.
At NATO HQ, UKDEL played its part. While most of
Brussels was on its holidays in late July, we hosted
NATO and national delegation staff for a ‘pre-Summit
party’, which allowed staff at HQ to get a ‘taste of
Wales’, in the midst of the final preparations for the
Summit. But the biggest event was by far the UK-hosted
foreign ministerial dinner in June. Here, we used the
opportunity of the last meeting of NATO ministers be-
fore the Summit to give NATO foreign ministers them-
selves a ‘taste of Wales’. Me-
dia, including the BBC and
ITV, and various print journal-
ists from Wales, were invited
to cover the arrivals and wel-
come reception, where minis-
ters were able to enjoy fresh
Welsh produce. The First Min-
ister for Wales also attended
and gave a speech. Dinner was
literally ‘food for thought’, as
that evening, ministers had im-
portant discussions on NATO’s
Open Door policy; agreeing a substantive package to help
Georgia come closer to NATO; and an opening of inten-
sified and focused talks with Montenegro.
But before we knew it, the Summit was upon us.
As part of a 60 strong UK media liaison team, I headed to
a Summit which we at UKDEL had been working on for
nearly a year. It was great to see the announcements,
Osprey landing (Photo: NATOWales)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 4
speeches, meetings, plans and drawings, come to-
gether into the ‘real thing’. Plans for displaying mili-
tary capabilities on site had turned into reality: an F-
35 here, a Eurofighter Typhoon there. Celtic Manor,
the Summit location,
had a real buzz about
it, helped by the pres-
ence of more than
1000 representatives
of the world’s media.
And the weather was
fantastic.
As the media
liaison officer respon-
sible for NATO’s cen-
tral Asian partners, I
helped facilitate the
media activities of the
heads of delegations
from these countries. These were mainly focussed
around the ISAF session (the final such meeting be-
fore the end of the mission in December 2014),
where central Asian countries had made important
contributions.
Day two of the Summit saw some spectacu-
lar set piece events, as well as some meaty policy
decisions. Leaders (and media liaison officers) got up
early to watch a flypast by fighter jets from nations
that had contributed to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing
mission, which has been strengthened as part of on-
going reassurance measures. At lunchtime there was
a landing of an Osprey aircraft (which can take off
and land both vertically and horizontally), to mark
the opening of NATO’s Special Forces operations
HQ. But the main headlines on day two were on the
policy side of things, mainly the announcement of a
‘spearhead force’, which will be able to be deployed
across Alliance territory in 48 hours. The spearhead
force, known in NATO jargon as the VJTF (Very
High Readiness Joint Task force), provided one of
the main components of the Readiness Action Plan,
which was also agreed at the Summit.
So after almost a year of planning, press, meet-
ings and media, the Summit was finally behind us. The
key thing now, as new NATO Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg stressed in his first public remarks earlier
this month, is to im-
plement the Summit
decisions. Russia’s
illegal annexation of
Crimea and destabili-
sation of eastern
Ukraine, and the
threat posed by ISIL,
show that we live in
a dangerous and un-
predictable world.
NATO’s core task of
collective defence, as
well as the tools it
can bring to crisis
management and co-
operative security, show that the Alliance matters now
as much as ever.
Next stop, Warsaw 2016.
Daniel Hatton studied International Relations (BA
Hons) at the University of Leeds, Daniel moved to Brus-
sels for an internship in the European Parliament.
Working for a British Labour MEP, Daniel followed
policy matters on the EP’s civil liberties, justice and
home affairs committee. After completing his intern-
ship, Daniel worked for The Parliament Magazine, or-
ganising EU policy events and discussions. Since May
2013 he has worked on press and communications at the
UK Delegation to NATO, where he was involved in the
UK’s cross-Government communications campaign for
the NATO Summit in Wales.
Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and British Prime
Minister David Cameron (Photo: NATOWales)
About the author
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 5
and the Ukraine crisis. The rhetoric used by nearly all
government officials speaking at the Future Leaders
Summit was condemning, critical and clear: Russian
aggression is not acceptable and poses a direct threat to
the entire European neighbourhood. However, handling
the threat and ensuring the security of all member states
is not as straight forward. The crisis in Ukraine has put
focus on some of the key challenges for the member
states in the time ahead.
Failing To Meet The 2% Defence Spending
Guideline
European member states still do not take enough
financial responsibility for their own security. The situa-
tion in Ukraine puts the NATO allies under pressure
when it comes to realizing the weakness of their current
capabilities given the steadily declining defence budgets.
Collective defence was a key word at the Summit, but at
the moment, the military capabilities are too weak for
the “collective defence” to have serious meaning. The
US remains the main contributor to the NATO defence
budget covering almost 75% of the expenditures. There
were high hopes that the threat of military invasion from
the East would mean that the European member states
would own up to the responsibility. However, although
there was an agreement at the Summit, the language in
the Wales Declaration reveals that there is still a serious
lack of political will. The agreement states that: “Allies
whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is
below this level will: (…) aim to move towards the 2%
guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their
NATO Capability Targets filling NATO’s Capability
shortfalls”. Not only is the phrasing unambitious, but the
language is vague and puts little pressure on the allied
nations. This is not surprising, but disappointing.
The Threat in the South: ISIL
The threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant was another key topic at the Alliance. Although
NATO Post-Wales: Meeting Challenges In A
Changed Security Environment
By Marte Ziolkowski
W eeks have passed since the world lead-
ers gathered at Celtic Manor in Wales
to discuss the future of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization. In the time leading up to the
summit, the media attention was high and the expecta-
tions were even higher. The Summit in Wales started a
new chapter for NATO in a highly unstable security
environment. In this article I seek to address some of
the impressions I am left with after attending the coin-
ciding Future Leaders Summit, and the key challenges I
believe the Alliance will be facing in the future.
The Crisis In Ukraine At The Top Of The Agen-
da
At the opening of the Wales Summit in Septem-
ber, the then Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmus-
sen, started off by stating that the Summit was “one of
the most important summits in the history of the Alli-
ance” and “a crucial summit at a crucial time”. 65 years
after the Alliance was created to “keep the Russians
out”, using Lord Ismay’s own words, it seems that the
recent changes in the security environment in Europe
have made this quote relevant again. The illegal Russian
annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the crisis in
Ukraine altered the entire NATO summit agenda. Be-
fore the crisis in Ukraine burst, it was expected that the
2014 Summit would be the meeting where the mem-
bers states needed to find a new raison d’être for the Alli-
ance, as international forces were being withdrawn
from Afghanistan and the international engagement was
coming to an end. It was therefore expected that the
withdrawal from Afghanistan would be the main discus-
sion point at the summit. However, the recent Russian
aggression and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine made Af-
ghanistan a much smaller issue on the summit agenda.
In other words, the overshadowing topic at the
Summit was, without comparison, how to handle Russia
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 6
many speakers at the Future Leaders Summit spent
most of their time focusing on the current crisis in
Ukraine, some also focused on that from the extrem-
ist Islamist group. The Norwegian Minister of For-
eign Affairs, Mr. Børge Brende, was one of them. He
underlined that there is a need to tackle the threat
from ISIL, who, with their brutal violence and crass
rhetoric towards the West and Western values, pose
a direct threat to the Alliance. If ISIL continues on
the road that they have started on, it could be that
NATO’s next Article 5 intervention will not happen
in Eastern Europe, but in the South, at Turkey’s bor-
der. Although there was no agreement during the
Summit, it was stressed in the Wales Declaration
that ISIL poses a grave threat to the Alliance and that
the member states condemned their actions in Syria
and Iraq. However, there was no agreement at
NATO-level to commit to any particular actions.
Nevertheless, during the Summit, the US in-
vited a small number of countries
to join them in a coalition against
ISIL; namely Britain, France,
Germany, Canada, Australia,
Turkey, Italy, Poland and Den-
mark. Although understandable,
this is also a worrisome move in
the position that the Alliance is
currently in. Characterized by
economic crisis and thereto low
defence budgets, there is little
that needs to be added in order to
drive the member states further
apart with coalitions like these, as
this further adds to the
weakening of a com-
mon strategic culture in
NATO. This strategic culture could be the little
nudge the member states need in order to overcome
national differences and commit to joint efforts. The
number of current crises has contributed to accentu-
ating the diverse strategic environment surrounding
the Alliance. While the Eastern European countries,
with Poland at the forefront, are raising their aware-
ness and focusing on the perceived threat from Rus-
sia, other member states are more concerned with the
situation in the Middle East. The member states need to
return to the common basis that NATO was founded
on, and the member states need to combine their re-
sources, and also figure out where to use them.
Keeping Important Partners Close
At the Summit, there seemed to be little will or
wish to expand the Alliance in either direction. Both
Montenegro and Ukraine seemed to have their hopes up
before the Summit, but were quickly reminded that
NATO is in no position to expand or negotiate new
agreements at this point, especially not in the East.
However, two countries that could join the Alliance
without much debate are Finland and Sweden. In both
of these countries, the discussion about joining NATO
has reappeared in the media and amongst politicians.
There is no doubt that both of these countries are
feeling Russia’s closer presence. Russia has violated
Swedish airspace and one of Putin’s envoys threatened
Finland by saying “they should not join
NATO unless they want to start World
War III”. Although the Finnish Minister
of Defence said at the Future Leaders
Summit that membership was currently
not an option for Finland, both Sweden
and Finland were given a so called “Gold
Card” during the Summit, which in
practice means that they are in a select-
ed group of close partners to the Alli-
ance. This could prove to be a wise
move. Both countries have vast eco-
nomic resources and are better off fi-
nancially than the majority of the
rest of the member states. By
giving these countries this Gold
Card, NATO facilitates a closer relationship while en-
suring that the Swedish and Finnish governments will
not have to face the domestic debate about whether or
not they should join the Alliance. This adds to the Alli-
ance’s resources, capabilities and training options. At
the same time, NATO needs to be careful and they need
to make sure they do not lose the incentive of member-
Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Future Leaders Summit
(Photo: NATOWales)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 7
ship by offering agreements like these.
Maintaining The Experiences And Interopera-
bility From Afghanistan
Afghanistan was downplayed in this Summit.
Somewhat because the Ukraine crisis demanded the
main attention of the politicians present, but also be-
cause there was, at the time, still no agreement between
the two Afghani presidential candidates in regards to the
outcome of the Afghani presidential election. Neverthe-
less, it was still on the summit agenda, and one of the
main issues discussed was how to maintain the experi-
ences NATO countries and their partners have achieved
after over a decade in international military operations.
The lengthy deployment to Afghanistan has taught the
diverse national armies vital lessons. The interoperabil-
ity and international training they have brought with
them from this period needs to be maintained. This can
be done through frequent training missions in all mili-
tary branches, knowledge sharing and frequent exercis-
es.
Joint Efforts And Commitment Needed To En-
sure Strong Euro-Atlantic Defence
The Wales Summit showed that the member
states still see this alliance as an important one. There is
no doubt that the member states still believe in a strong
defence, they just do not have the means to build it.
Combining resources, equipment and expertise will
continue to be vital in maintaining a strong Euro-
Atlantic defence. However, the language in the Wales
Declaration shows that there may not be enough politi-
cal will to fulfil the standards that need to be met. The
28 member states need to find common ground in eval-
uating which threats are important – and which are not.
The defence budgets will have
to be increased accordingly.
Without doing this, the Alliance
will be fumbling in an unstable
security environment without
the means and resources to han-
dle an external threat if met with one.
Marte Ziolkowski works at the Norwegian
Atlantic Committee and holds an MSc in Politics and
Government in the EU from the London School of Eco-
nomics where she specialized in European Security and
Defence. She represented Norway at the NATO Future
Leaders Summit in Wales. Her main fields of interest
are NATO and NATO-EU relations.
Barents Observer. Putin envoy warns Finland against
joining NATO. [Online] Available from: <http://
barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/06/putin-
envoy-warns-finland-against-joining-nato-09-06>;
North Atlantic Treaty Association Website, NATO
Funding [Online] Available from: <www.nato.int/cps/
en/natolive/topics_49208.htm>; North Atlantic Trea-
ty Association Website, Wales Summit Declaration.
[Online] Available from: <http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm>
The Guardian Online Edition, Nato summit in Newport
'one of the most important in alliance's history. [Online]
Available from: <http://www.theguardian.com/
world/video/2014/sep/04/nato-summit-newport-
most-important-in-alliance-history-video>
The crisis in Ukraine has put focus on some of the key challenges for the member states in
the time ahead.
About the author
Bibliography
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 8
A View From Canada
By Julie Lindhout & Christian Paas-Lang
I n January of this year, the upcoming NATO Summit in Wales looked to be a dull affair. Though the world continued to be wracked by crises, few of them direct-
ly impacted NATO states. Even the rapidly developing invasion of Iraq by ISIS forces concerned primarily just the United States, not NATO as a whole.
Events quickly robbed the summit of its potentially relaxed atmosphere. Ukrainian President Victor Yanu-kovych’s decision not to embrace an EU partnership deal sparked massive street protests that eventually led to his removal and flight from Kiev on February 22, 2014. The ouster, deemed a coup by neighbouring Russia, incited a secessionist movement in much of eastern Ukraine, a region dominat-ed by Russian speakers. In Cri-mea, the movement quickly devel-oped into a rebellion encouraged and materially supported by Rus-sia. Following a referendum in the peninsula, Russia annexed Crimea on March 18.
NATO’s response was swift.
Scheduled joint military manoeu-vres with Russia were cancelled and NATO states imposed sanctions on Crimean and Russian officials. Additional troops and warplanes were deployed in Romania, Poland and the Baltic states. Assurance of collective defence be-gan emanating from NATO headquarters in Brussels and from foreign offices on both sides of the Atlantic.
Despite this, the extent of NATO’s response suf-
fered immediately from some of the realities on the ground. Direct intervention against the growing rebel movement in Eastern Ukraine, centred around Donetsk and Luhansk, was nearly impossible due to Russia’s mas-sive deployment of troops to the border region. Political will in Atlantic states extended only so far as bolstering the defences of NATO’s newest members in Eastern Europe.
Other political considerations factored into
NATO’s actions. Many European states continue to be heavily reliant on Russian oil and natural gas for their ener-gy consumption, weakening their leverage in potential negotiations. Canada and the United States, relatively independent from foreign energy imports, have been markedly more assertive than their neighbours across the Atlantic. As the insurgency in eastern Ukraine fully devel-oped, further sanctions were laid against Russian and rebel
officials. NATO has other issues apart from the Ukrainian
crisis. NATO faces many challenges in securing Afghani-stan after the departure of the majority of International Security Assistance Forde (ISAF) troops. “Insider attacks” by Afghan security personnel against ISAF members occur often enough to be a real concern. The Taliban forces are still active in much of Afghanistan, as well as across the porous border in the tribal regions of Pakistan.
The war in Afghanistan has had effects that reach beyond the country’s borders. Do-mestically, NATO states have struggled to address the issue of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among war veterans. With fatigue and frustration running high from the experience in Afghanistan, inter-ventions like those possible in Syria and Iraq appear even less attractive. Even a previously successful intervention in Libya in 2011 fades as that country has collapsed back into conflict.
In addition, given the economic downturn of 2008, most NATO countries have cut back substantially on their defence budgets, which will affect their ability to
respond to any call by NATO to guarantee security, espe-cially in the less capable states in Eastern Europe.
NATO states, especially multicultural states such as
Canada, have experienced strong debates regarding cultur-al values, in part as a result of NATO’s actions overseas. Compounding this, the phenomenon of radicalization has led to nationals of NATO states travelling abroad to fight in foreign conflicts, and returning home with dangerous skills.
Roundtable, August 21, 2014
It was against this background that the Atlantic Council of Canada organized a Roundtable to discuss issues for the then upcoming NATO Summit. Professor Stephen Saideman of Carleton University in Ottawa, and Professor David Wright, Kenneth and Patricia Taylor Distinguished Visiting Professor in Foreign Affairs, Victoria College, University of Toronto, and former Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO led a stimulating and informative discussion with interested attendees, several of whom were experts in international politics and security issues in their own right.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen and David Cameron
welcome Stephen Harper , Prime Minister of
Canada (Photo: NATO)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 9
The discussion first turned to what is perhaps the most pressing and most significant issue facing NATO today: its changing relationship with Russia. Though Putin is clearly the driving force behind Russian aggression, there was also a dis-cussion of some dangers that Putin may be facing in the near future. First, the economic impacts of confrontation with the West may eventually undermine Putin’s support, as Russian integration into the global economy has made the country more vulnerable to international sanctions. Second, Russian nationalism, so long stoked by Putin, may be a force he is una-ble to control in the long run. Trying to tame Russian irreden-tism for practical purposes —compromise or accommodation with the West— may prove difficult and unpopular for the Russian president, who has gained enormous domestic support for his belligerent actions. Despite this, Putin risks solidifying a Russian isolation that neither he nor the country can survive. Participants felt that the situation had become even more dangerous as a result of the strong evidence that surfaced over the summer of Russian troops being active in Ukraine in support of rebel units. Some felt that marked a clear escalation of the crisis, an incontrovertible breach of international law and a strong challenge to the West and NATO. This new de-velopment would almost surely strengthen the need for NATO personnel to be deployed in countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to provide both security and assurance. The result from the emergency Security Council and NATO meetings would, no doubt, prompt additional measures, if need be. While the recent ceasefire in Ukraine was a hearten-ing sign that peace could be restored to the region, there was some doubt as to how well the ceasefire would hold, or wheth-er it would simply be a pause to allow the conflicting factions to regroup. Some suggested that NATO, in some ways, is reaping what it sowed in its waves of enlargement after the Cold War. While the perception in Russia that NATO expansion is aimed against it is misguided, Russia’s interests and strength should be taken into account. Russia has far too much influence in crisis zones like the Middle East and Central Asia to be ignored without consequence. Knowing this, it is interesting to see debate being sparked in countries like Finland, Sweden and Georgia concerning possible membership in NATO. Though talks are unlikely to start in the near future, renewed Russian aggression has led to renewed interest in NATO from coun-tries that have traditionally been sensitive to Russian interests. It was suggested, however, that such developments can pose dangers to NATO and the countries involved. If NATO shows itself to be too willing to support these states, it risks escalating any possible conflict, as occurred in Georgia in 2008, by em-boldening a faction. The situation in Afghanistan also featured heavily in the discussion. While official Canadian government policy makes it clear that Canada would have little, or nothing, to do with Afghanistan after the last of its troops has left, security con-cerns would remain. The Taliban continues to have a presence in the region, the Afghan-Pakistan border remains porous and the government unstable. NATO’s involvement has been ex-pensive, both in human life and in money, and the ambiguity of
the mission’s success has contributed to growing war-weariness in Western states. Nevertheless, no one could foresee 9/11, and no one can guarantee that there would not be some event of sufficient impact on NATO countries in the future, that might draw NATO in again. The situation in Iraq was also briefly discussed. The quasi-revival of the “coalition of the willing” by President Obama, this time to fight ISIL, was seen as an interesting development both in American foreign policy and in NATO’s role in Iraq. Many NATO states have already signed on to the mission, and Obama is working closely with Gulf and Arab League members to secure their support for a coordinated assault against the ISIL. The participants at the roundtable stressed the need for a representative gov-ernment in Iraq, while underlining the difficulties of multi-lateral military operations. It was also suggested that thanks to the challenges it faces in Ukraine and elsewhere, NATO may be experienc-ing a rejuvenation it has been searching for since the end of the Cold War. Reorienting the Alliance from an organiza-tion explicitly meant to counter the Soviet Union to one relevant in the post-Soviet world has proven difficult. With Russia as a clear and present threat to peace in Europe, NATO has in some sense regained its initial purpose. Re-newed Russian aggression may help to strengthen emphasis on transatlanticism, a policy focus previously losing ground to North America’s growing interest in the Pacific region. The Summit So how did the Summit in Wales actually deal with these issues? In the first place, the Summit addressed all the issues raised and a few more. According to the official text of the Wales Summit Declaration, its first order of business was to approve the NATO Readiness Action Plan (NRAP), an overarching plan “capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise.” The plan includes a significant enhancement of the NATO Response Force (NRF), and the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint task Force (VJTF). The VJTF will consist of a land component with appropriate air, maritime, and special operations forces support, which can be deployed quickly especially when challenges arise on the periphery of NATO’s territory. The NRAP also includes a greatly enhanced exercise program for all elements of the plan, including complex civil-military scenarios. There is special mention of a focus on the south-ern and eastern peripheries of the Alliance. Reading be-tween the lines, that allows NATO to enhance its presence in those states without permanently stationing forces there, which Russia would see as a provocation, and which some of NATO’s member states would not agree to. The second major issue addressed in the Declaration is the need to increase defence budgets and the need for a more “balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities”. While the Declaration acknowledges that “how we spend it” is also important, the major focus of Section 14, is on the amount of spending. There is much emphasis on the guideline for
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member countries to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is a guideline emphasized by successive Secretaries-General, but met by very few countries over the more than 60 years of NATO’s existence.
The Declaration also makes very strong state-ments condemning Russia’s illegal military interven-tion in Ukraine, including its “illegitimate ‘annexation’” of Crimea. It also identifies “Russia’s pattern of disregard for international law” referencing the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Con-ventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, citing Rus-sian behaviour in Georgia and Moldova as further ex-amples.
The Declaration spe-cifically acknowledges measures taken by Canada, Norway, and the United States, as well as NATO’s immediate decision to sus-pend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, to put pressure on Russia to deescalate and lead to a political solution in Ukraine. It emphasizes that political channels of commu-nication will remain open, but that any sustainable, political solution must respect “Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its inter-nationally recognised borders.” In other words, Russia is not entitled to keep Crimea. The declaration uses the same terms of sovereignty, independence and ter-ritorial integrity with reference to Armenia, Azerbai-jan, Georgia, and Moldova.
With regard to the situation in the Middle East, the declaration re-affirms NATO’s continued commit-ment to the NATO-Iraq partnership, and states that NATO will consider other assistance measures within the framework of NATO’s Defence and Related Secu-rity Capacity Building Initiative if the Iraqi Govern-ment should request it. The Declaration also expresses concern about developments in Syria and references NATO’s role in deploying Patriot missiles to defend Turkey, and the role of NATO Allies in the still ongo-ing process of securing the destruction of chemical weapon material in Syria. NATO also continues to stand ready to support Libya with advice and the will-ingness to develop a partnership which might lead to Libya’s membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue. Not surprisingly, the Declaration repeats the statement in the 2010 Strategic Concept that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance,” and affirms the “deterrence and security” value of the nuclear forces of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. It also restates the
aim “to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational Ballistic Missile Defence” to protect all Europe, but em-phasizes that this capability is purely defensive and can only complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence. A large part of the Declaration is taken up with details of enhancements that have been made or will be made to the various elements of NATO’s capabilities including the Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance initia-tive and the AWACs. It also describes various initiatives undertaken by groups of Allies for joint operations. Almost buried in the middle of the Declaration is a very important endorsement of an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy which acknowledges that a cyber attack could have sufficient harmful impact to make it an Article 5 attack, but that a decision to invoke Article 5 would be taken on a case-by-
case basis. The Declaration gives special recognition to the value of partnerships with other organiza-tions like the UN, EU, the Afri-can Union (AU), and OSCE, in enhancing international security especially in the face of terror-ism. It also celebrates internal partnerships mentioning the 20 years existence of the Partnership
for Peace, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; 20 years of the
Mediterranean Dialogue; ten years of the Istanbul Cooper-ation Initiative, and the development of a Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative to help part-ner nations. The first countries involved in this initiative will be Georgia, Jordan, and Moldova, at their requests.
The establishment of a permanent position of NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security confirms NATO’s commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and also to UNSCR 1612 on the protection of children affected by armed conflict. There is also a strong statement on the Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty as one of the Alli-ance’s great successes. NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies who meet the requirements and it is emphasized that “decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself.” Special mention is made of Georgia, including a call to Russia to reverse its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Mention is made of the good progress made by Montenegro, and that the aspirations of Bosnia and Herze-govina are fully supported, but that the country needs to meet conditions set by the NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in 2010, before it can be admitted to the Member-ship Action Plan. As at all Summits since the 2008 Bucha-rest Summit, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continues to be invited to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN. The Declaration also expresses appreciation for the country’s long-standing
Armed Forces Declaration by the NATO Heads of State and
Government (Photo: NATO)
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commitment to NATO operations and to the NATO ac-cession process. There is a separate Wales Summit Decla-ration on Afghanistan which outlines NATO’s commit-ment for short-term training, advising, and assisting of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014; con-tribution to the financial sustainment of the ANSF in the medium term; and strengthening NATO’s partnership with Afghanistan in the long term, with the commitment and cooperation of Afghanistan.
Canadian Reaction Canadian media and government opposition parties have largely concentrated on the first two topics: the Re-sponse Force and the defence spending guidelines, but not with great enthusiasm. There has been little focus even on such previously hot button items as Ballistic Missile De-fense and very few picked up on the issue of a cyber attack being a potential Article 5 attack. Most media commenta-tors are skeptical at best about the extent to which the plans for the NRF will be implemented. Even in real crisis situations like Libya and Ukraine, they contend, there is no concerted effort to provide real resources. There is always much talk, but only certain countries provide the heavy lifting and it is not always the same countries. Even the most capable countries have pulled back in recent years in active operations, so how can one expect real commit-ments to the NRF? They also point to the fact that not all NATO members see the various crises in the same way, with the same degree of urgency, and the same willingness to act in the larger interest of the Alliance rather than in their narrower national interests.
When pressed on the issue of defence spending, Prime Minister Harper has stated that 2% of GDP is an arbitrary amount. It is more important to look at specific expenditures that need to be made, rather than talk about spending a certain amount for the sake of spending it. He has also pointed out that when it was necessary, Canada spent a lot of money to equip its forces in Afghanistan and that the country continues to deliver military supplies to forces fighting ISIL in Iraq, contributes planes and ships when asked, and is spending a lot of effort and money in Ukraine. One media opinion writer also asked if countries were to meet their 2% of GDP targets in good times, would it be acceptable for them to lower their spending appreciably in bad economic times to match a reduced GDP?
The fact remains, that on the whole the Canadian public is war weary and does not support significant de-fence spending. The general reaction after Canada’s with-drawal from Afghanistan has been in effect to say, “We have done our bit, and now it is time to focus on domestic needs.” The official opposition New Democratic Party has always been pacifist, and the Liberal Party does not have a strong record from which to attack the government. The official statements from all opposition parties have usually promoted diplomatic efforts, and condemned specific ex-penditures, so there has been limited discussion of the broader defence spending issue in Parliament.
Some more hawkish commentators have attacked specific examples of lack of spending, such as the delays in replacing aircraft and ships, and the need to provide better support to veterans, but they have not, by and large, sup-ported the concept of spending a certain percentage of GDP, and have generally left the impression that when necessary, Canada will rise to the occasion and spend what it takes for its troops to do their usual excellent job. Julie Lindhout is the President of the Atlantic Council of Canada. Julie previously worked as a secondary school teacherm , then for the Ontario Ministry of Education. In 1998, Ms. Lindhout established Lindhout Associates Edu-cation Consulting, and increased her involvement with the Atlantic Council of Canada (ACC) and became President in 2002. She has also been active in the Brussels-based At-lantic Treaty Association (ATA). She is also a director of the Canadian Turkish Business Council, the Canada-Albania Business Council, and a member of the Ontario Special Education Tribunal. She is the recipient of a Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal.
Christian Paas-Lang was the program editor for Cana-da’s NATO during his internship with the ACC in the summer of 2014. His interests are wide-ranging, including topics such as economics, security and international rela-tions. He is particularly interested in European and Middle-Eastern history, international relations and culture. As a second year student, Christian has just started a specialist degree in International Relations at Trinity College, Uni-versity of Toronto. He looks forward to eventually pursu-ing graduate studies in international relations upon the completion of his degree. Opencanada.org, The NATO summit: commitmentphobia [Online] Available from: http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/roundtable/the-nato-summit-commitmentphobia/; Prime Minister of Canada, PM delivers closing remarks [Online] Available from: http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/09/05/pm-delivers-closing-remarks-nato-summit; Prime Minister of Canada, The gov-ernment of Canada’s response to the crisis in Ukraine [Online] Available from: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/09/11/government-canadas-response-situation-ukraine-0; Prime Minister of Canada, PM concludes successful NATO Summit in Wales [Online] Available from: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/09/05/pm-concludes-successful-nato-summit-wales; Pugliese, David, Stephen Harper prom-ises boost in defence spending but provides non details [Online] Available from: http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/stephen-harper-promises-boost-in-defence-spending-but-provides-no-details; Pugliese, David, Canada and Germany derail NATO request to increase military spending targets [Online] Available : http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/09/03/canada-and-germany-derail-nato-request-to-increase-military-spending-targets/; NATO, Wales Summit Declaration [Online] Available from: http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/09/03/canada-and-germany-derail-nato-request-to-increase-military-spending-targets/; NATO, NATO Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan [Online] Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm?selectedLocale=en
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In cooperation with NATO SPS, the Atlantic Treaty Association
and the Atlantic Council of Georgia are organizing a workshop in Tbilissi,
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discussions and information sharing, in order to find solutions for today's
emerging energy security challenges. The workshop will feature panels
on the role of international organizations, public and private stakeholders
in energy security; terrorism and its implica-
tions for energy infrastructure security and
cyber threats to critical energy infrastructures.
Two months after the Wales Summit, The German Atlantic Asso-
ciation and the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS) are organiz-
ing an international conference in Berlin to revisit key outcomes of the
summit and to discuss the process of policy implementation. On 4-5th
November 2014, the conference will gather high level NATO representa-
tives and experts from acedemia, national
policies, and civil society. The aim is to
provide a public platform and a forum for
young voices in the Alliance.
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