Atlanta and Savannah Campaigns - 1864

8/9/2019 Atlanta and Savannah Campaigns - 1864

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CMH Pub 7513

Cover: Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, c. 1888, by Thure de Thulstrup(courtesy of Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park)


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byJ. Britt McCarley

Center o Military HistoryUnited States Army

Washington, D.C., 2014

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Introduction

Although over one hundred fify years have passed since thestart o the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues tomatter. Te orces unleashed by that war were immensely destruc-tive because o the significant issues involved: the existence o the

Union, the end o slavery, and the very uture o the nation. Tewar remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with oversix hundred thousand killed in the course o the our-year struggle.

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the AmericanCivil War was no exception. Te seeds o the conflict were sownin the earliest days o the republics ounding, primarily over theexistence o slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict canbegin without the conscious decisions o those engaged in the

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way topaper over the division o the country into two camps: one thatwas dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limitits spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed hal slaveand hal ree, and that could not stand.

Regardless o the actors tearing the nation asunder, thesoldiers on each side o the struggle went to war or personalreasons: looking or adventure, being caught up in the passions

and emotions o their peers, believing in the Union, avoringstates rights, or even justiying the simple schoolyard dynamico being convinced that they were worth three o the soldierson the other side. Nor can we overlook the actor that some wentto war to prove their manhood. Tis has been, and continuesto be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the proes-sion o arms. Soldiers join or many reasons but ofen stay in thefight because o their comrades and because they do not want to

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues o national impact shrinkto nothing in the intensely personal world o cannon shell andmini ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly andonly culminated with the conquest o the rebellious Conederacy,


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the preservation o the Union, and the end o slavery. Tesecampaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared incommemoration o our national sacrifices, seek to rememberthat war and honor those in the United States Army who died topreserve the Union and ree the slaves as well as to tell the story othose American soldiers who ought or the Conederacy despitethe inherently flawed nature o their cause. Te Civil War was ourgreatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study andcontemplation.

RICHARD W. SEWAR, PH.D.Chie o Military History


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the Atlanta andSavannah Campaigns

1864

Strategic Setting

In 1864, as the Civil War entered its ourth year, the mostdevastating conflict in American history seemed to grind onwith no end in sight. In order to break the stalemate, President

Abraham Lincoln appointed Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant generalin chie o the U.S. Army and nominated him or promotion tolieutenant general, which Congress duly confirmed on 2 March.As the Norths most successul field commander, Grant had builthis reputation in the Western Teater, which stretched rom theAppalachian Mountains in the east to the Mississippi River in thewest and rom the Ohio River in the north to the Gul o Mexicoin the south. His impressive rsum included victories at Forts

Henry and Donelson, ennessee; Shiloh, ennessee; Vicksburg,Mississippi; and Chattanooga, ennessee. Beore heading east toassume his new duties, Grant designated his most trusted subordi-nate, Maj. Gen. William . Sherman, to succeed him as commandero the Military Division o the Mississippi, a sprawling geographiccommand that spanned most o the Western Teater.

Sherman traveled with Grant as ar as Cincinnati, Ohio.During the trip, the two men devised the Union Armys grand

strategy. In the coming campaigns, all Federal orces would advanceas one; the main effort would occur on two ronts. Grant wouldattack General Robert E. Lees Army o Northern Virginia, whichdeended Richmond, the Conederate capital. Shermans objec-tive was General Joseph E. Johnstons Army o ennessee, which


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protected Atlanta, Georgia,the largest manuacturing andtransportation center in theDeep South. Grant directedSherman to move againstJohnstons army, to break itup, and to get into the interioro the enemys country asar as you can, inflicting allthe damage you can againsttheir war resources. Troughunified action, the Federals

would prevent the two mainConederate armies romreinorcing each other, as theyhad done in 1863.

Afer meeting withGrant, Sherman headed toNashville, ennessee, andassumed command o the

three armies he would lead in the Atlanta Campaign. By ar thelargest was Maj. Gen. George H. Tomas 75,000-strong Army othe Cumberland, consisting o Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howards IVCorps, Maj. Gen. John M. Palmers XIV Corps, Maj. Gen. JosephHookers XX Corps, and Brig. Gen. Washington L. Elliotts cavalrycorps. Next in size was Shermans ormer command, the 25,000-manArmy o the ennessee led by Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson, whichcomprised Maj. Gen. John A. Black Jack Logans XV Corps and

two small divisions rom the XVI Corps under Brig. Gen. GrenvilleM. Dodge. Te third and smallest was Maj. Gen. John M. Schofields13,000-strong Army o the Ohio, composed o the XXIII Corpsand Maj. Gen. George Stonemans cavalry division. In addition tothe inantry and cavalry units, Shermans army group boasted anartillery component numbering 254 guns commanded by Brig.Gen. William F. Barry. Altogether, Sherman led over 113,000 toughand confident soldiers who had known mostly success against their

Conederate adversaries in the West.A vast array o depots, warehouses, and arsenals linked by anextensive railroad network supported Shermans army group. Telogistical chain began at Louisville, Kentucky, Shermans base ooperations; continued south to the orward base at Nashville; and

General Sherman(Library of Congress)


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ended at Chattanooga, the advanced depot. Te two most impor-tant railroads were the Louisville and Nashville and the Nashvilleand Chattanooga, both private lines that unctioned under theArmys U.S. Military Railroad agency. South o Nashville, railroadguards, regular troop detachments, and combined arms expedi-tions operating in ennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi providedsecurity against Conederate guerrillas and cavalry raiders bent oncutting Shermans supply line. In 1864, the Military Division o theMississippi operated rom 744 to 1,062 miles o railroad. Duringthe buildup or the Atlanta Campaign, an average o 145 railcarsarrived at Chattanooga each day carrying 1,600 tons o supplies,including ammunition, provisions or soldiers and animals,

uniorms, weapons, and equipment, until the armys warehousesairly burst at the seams by early May.

Federal rail operations extended nearly to the fighting rontthroughout the march to Atlanta, with 5,000 Army wagons pulledby 33,000 mules carrying supplies rom the railhead to the combattroops. Over 28,000 horses kept officers and cavalrymen mountedor served as draf animals or the artillery batteries. In addition,900 horse-drawn ambulances transported battlefield casualties.

Georgias state-owned Western and Atlantic Railroad connectedAtlanta, the Gate City o the South, with Chattanooga, a distanceo 140 rail miles. Both the Northern and the Southern armies usedthe Western and Atlanticthe Federal rail line running southrom Chattanooga and the Conederate line heading north romAtlanta.

Opposing Shermans legions was the Army o ennesseeunder General Johnston. One o the ranking officers in the ante-

bellum Regular Army, Johnston had risen to quartermaster generalbeore resigning his commission and offering his services to theConederacy. He was quickly appointed as a ull general in theConederate Army. He commanded the main Conederate armyin the field in Virginia until he was wounded at the Battle o SevenPines in the spring o 1862, losing his command to Robert E. Leein June o that year. During his tenure, he had ofen quarreled withConederate President Jefferson Davis, establishing a contentious

relationship that worsened over time. In December 1863, Davishad appointed Johnston commander o the Army o ennesseeonly afer his first choice, Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee, had reusedthe job. Further aggravating an already tense situation was amemorandum that Johnston had submitted to Davis in January


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1864 proposing that slaves be recruited and armed as soldiers. Teproposal was the brainchild o Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne, one

o Johnstons division commanders. Te Conederate presidenthad ound the document so inflammatory that he immediatelysuppressed it.

At the start o the Atlanta Campaign, the Army o ennesseenumbered about 55,000 men divided into three corps. Since itsinception, the Conederacys second-largest field army had sufferedone deeat afer another beore it achieved a stunning victory atChickamauga, Georgia, in September 1863, only to be routed at

Chattanooga just two months later. Commanding the two inantrycorps were General Hardee and Lt. Gen. John B. Hood, and Maj.Gen. Joseph Wheeler led the cavalry corps. Te artillery consistedo 144 guns and was commanded by Brig. Gen. Francis A. Shoup.In short, the Conederates in northern Georgia were outnumberedby roughly two to one. In mid-May, President Davis improved theodds considerably by transerring Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polks Armyo Mississippi to the Army o ennessee, providing an additional

20,000 troops or the deense o Atlanta.Unlike the Federals, the Conederates had devised no over-arching campaign plan. Shortly beore Johnston had assumedcommand o the army, Davis had written him a long letter paintinga rosy picture o the armys condition, conveying the hope that

General Hardee(Library of Congress)

General Johnston(National Archives)


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you will soon be able to commence active operations against theenemy, deeat the Federal orce at Chattanooga, and recapturelost territory in ennessee. Te ever-cautious Johnston repliedthat difficulties appear to me [to be] in the way o assuming anaggressive posture. He maintained that I can see no other mode otaking the offensive here than to beat the enemy when he advances,and then move orward. But to make victory probable, the armymust be strengthened. Johnston offered numerous reasons orremaining on the deensive, ranging rom logistical difficulties tothe enemys superior numbers. Tis exchange set the pattern oruture correspondence between Davis and Johnston, in which thepresident would attempt to prod the general into attacking, only to

be told that the conditions or an assault were unavorable.Afer the Federals had driven the Conederates rom the

mountain ridges overlooking Chattanooga, the Army o ennesseeestablished its winter camp at Dalton, Georgia. Johnston anchoredhis deensive line on Rocky Face Ridge, which rose 700 eet above thesurrounding plain and extended 15 miles south to the north bank othe Oostanaula River beyond Resaca, Georgia. An army could crossthe rugged ridgeline at only three points: Mill Creek Gapalso

known as Buzzard Roostnorthwest o Dalton and through whichthe Western and Atlantic Railroad passed; man-made Dug Gap,southwest o Dalton; and the tortuous Snake Creek Gap, northwesto Resaca. Despite its menacing appearance, Rocky Face Ridge hadseveral weaknesses. First, the northern end was open to attack romCleveland, ennessee. Second, the railroad ran along the easternace, leaving it vulnerable to interdiction rom the three gaps. Tird,Rocky Faces seeming natural strength, especially along its northern

end, ed Johnstons careless hope that Sherman would oblige him bylaunching rontal assaults against his positions (Map 1).In reality, Shermans plan or dealing with the Conederate

stronghold at Dalton evolved over time, assuming final ormonly afer he had responded to changing conditions. He initiallyconsidered having Tomas and Schofield demonstrate againstRocky Face, while McPherson executed a deep turning movementrom his northeastern Alabama base to threaten the industrial

center o Rome, Georgia, about fify miles southwest o Dalton.But Johnston had anticipated Shermans operational plan and sentPolks command to deend Rome.

What Johnston had ailed to oresee was an attack on Resacavia Snake Creek Gap. Tough aware o the gap and the danger it


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posed to his line o communications, he had ailed to post a cavalrydetachment in a position to detect enemy movements there. WhileSherman knew nothing about this critical omission, he soonbenefited rom it. Due to detachments resulting rom bureaucraticmiscues and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks Red River campaign inLouisiana, McPhersons army was lef with only our o its nine divi-sions, rendering an advance on Rome impractical. Instead, Shermandecided to send McPherson through Snake Creek Gap to cut theWestern and Atlantic at Resaca. o the north but within supportingdistance, Tomas would conduct diversionary attacks along RockyFace Ridge rom Mill Creek Gap to Dug Gap, while Schofield threat-ened Dalton rom the north. Shermans intent was to pry Johnstons

army rom its entrenchments by placing McPhersons army on therailroad between the Conederates and Atlanta. Johnston wouldbe orced to fight in the open to regain his supply line, presentingSherman with an opportunity to destroy the Army o ennessee inone decisive battle at the start o the campaign.

Operations

FROMROCKYFACERIDGETORESACATe Atlanta Campaign began on 7 May 1864, when the

Union IV, XIV, and XXIII Corps advanced toward Rocky FaceRidge at Mill Creek Gap and into Crow Valley north o Dalton todistract the Conederates. On the next day, the XX Corps attackedat Dug Gap in a urther effort to divert Johnstons attention. Inthe meantime, lead elements o McPhersons army reached theunguarded western entrance to Snake Creek Gap afer scrambling

over undulating terrain characteristic o northwestern Georgia.Johnston remained oblivious to the threat to Resacaocusinginstead on Dalton to the north and Rome to the southwestwhileWheelers cavalry monitored every approach to the south exceptSnake Creek Gap. Concern or the saety o Rome led Johnston tospread Polks orce rom there to Resaca. On 7 May, units o Brig.Gen. James Canteys division arrived at Resaca and began diggingin along the hills west o the railroad bridge over the Oostanaula,

their position overlooking Camp Creek.About 1600 on 9 May, McPhersons troops first encounteredSouthern cavalry between Snake Creek Gap and Canteys earth-works. McPhersons mission was to cut the Western and Atlanticat Resaca and then head north, attacking Johnstons army as it


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withdrew south rom Dalton. But the discovery o Conederateswhere he had expected none caused McPherson to lose sight ohis objective. He halted, evaluated the situation, and decided towithdraw to the gap, earing that a lack o cavalry would leave himvulnerable as he advancednorth toward Johnstonsarmy. Sherman later chidedMcPherson or his loss onerve: Well, Mac, you havemissed the opportunity o alietime.

o his credit, Johnston

responded quickly and effec-tively to the sudden threat atSnake Creek Gap. First, hesent Hoods three divisionssouth toward Resaca. Ten,rom 10 to 12 May, he haltedall o Polks arriving unitsat Resaca and placed Polk

in command there. WhenWheelers troopers reportedthat nearly all o Shermansunits had lef Dalton, Johnstonimmediately ordered hisremaining inantry to march to Resaca. Te Conederate chiefaincorrectly guessed that Sherman intended to cut off the Army oennessee rom its supply line and then destroy it. By 12 May, most

o Shermans army group had crowded into the Snake Creek Gaparea to strike Resaca. Howards IV Corps was the sole exception,marching along the Western and Atlantic Railroad rom Daltontoward Resaca, its progress slowed by Wheelers cavalry.

By 14 May, most Conederate and Federal units had arrivedat Resaca. Te Southerners held the high ground east o CampCreek and west o the Western and Atlantic. Polks command,now unctioning as a corps under Johnstons direction, anchored

the Conederate lef resting on the Oostanaula downstreamrom the railroad bridge. Hardees corps occupied the center othe Conederate line, with Hoods corps holding the right andextending to the Conasauga River, which joined the CoosawatteeRiver nearby to orm the Oostanaula. Te right-angle junction

General McPherson(Library of Congress)


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between Hardees right and Hoods lef resulted in a salient on highground held by two inantry brigades and three artillery batteries.Wheelers cavalry covered the Conederate right beyond theConasauga, while Brig. Gen. William H. Jacksons cavalry divisiono Polks corps and one o Hardees inantry divisions protected thelef flank across the Oostanaula.

Despite these preparations, the Conederates occupied apotentially dangerous position, with the bulk o their orceshemmed in by a river on each flank and by a third stream behindthem. On the opposite side o Camp Creek, McPhersons armyoccupied the right o the Union line, reaching to the Oostanaula.On McPhersons lef, Hookers XX Corps and Palmers XIV Corps

extended the Federal line, ollowed by Schofields XXIII Corps,which nevertheless ended ar short o the Conasauga. Not untilearly on the first day o battle at Resaca did Howards IV Corpsdeploy on the Union lef flank, but the line still ailed to reach theConasauga, making it vulnerable to an attack.

Flaws in his deployments notwithstanding, Shermans first-day battle plan called or his army group to hit Conederate posi-tions vigorously enough to prevent Johnston rom shifing units

to conront Brig. Gen. Tomas W. Sweenys XVI Corps division asit crossed the Oostanaula downstream rom Resaca. Once across,Sweenys men would march east to cut the Western and Atlantic atCalhoun, Georgia, in the Conederate rear.

Te Union diversionary assault began about 1300 on 14 May.Consisting o a division each rom the XIV and the XXIII Corps,the Federal attackers slogged across the miry bottomlands alongCamp Creek in order to strike the enemy salient. Te Conederate

deenders repulsed the onslaught with blasts o double-shottedcanistera lethal antipersonnel roundfired by several Southernbatteries. From its vantage point east o the Conasauga, Wheelerscavalry reported the Federal lef flank open to attack, and Johnstonrushed units rom the Conederate lef to reinorce Hoods right.At roughly 1600, Hood struck with the divisions o Maj. Gens.Carter L. Stevenson and Alexander P. Stewart, and they routed theslow-moving IV Corps beore it could entrench. A lone Indiana

battery firing double-shotted canister and the timely arrival oBrig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams XX Corps division were all thatkept Shermans lef flank rom being overwhelmed. Pleased withthe days results, Johnston directed Hood to renew the attack earlythe next morning.


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o the south, elements o the Union XV Corps west o CampCreek seized a hill that placed the Western and Atlantic Railroadbridge within easy reach o Federal artillery, and they establisheda lodgment on the east bank o the creek. Tese Union successesorced Johnston to lay a pontoon bridge arther up the Oostanaulato remain connected with the railroad and the deenders southo Resaca. Having weakened his lef to support Hoods attacks,Johnston lacked the means to drive off the XV Corps.

At first, Sweenys crossing operation at Lays Ferry on theOostanaulanear the point where Snake Creek flows into theriverproceeded according to plan, with Union troops crossingon pontoon boats and scattering Conederate cavalrymen as

they reached the opposite bank. Ten the operation began tounravel. For the rest o the day and well into the night, uncertaintyreigned on both sides regarding the situation at Lays Ferry. Hadthe Federals crossed there, and, i so, had the rebels attempted todislodge them? Crediting unsubstantiated intelligence that theenemy had crossed the river and now threatened his position,Sweeny withdrew to the north bank o the Oostanaula. Due toconusing reports about Sweenys presence at Lays Ferry, Johnston

decided to cancel Hoods dawn attack. Tat night, Sherman sentHookers two remaining divisions to the Union lef and directedSweeny to recross the Oostanaula the next morning.

Starting about 1130 on 15 May, Hood repelled severalattacks launched by the IV and the XX Corps. But the 70thIndiana Inantry under Col. Benjamin Harrison managed to seizea Conederate redoubt that occupied a critical point in ront oHoods main line. In doing so, the Hoosiers captured the our

cannons o Capt. Maximilian van den Corputs Cherokee GeorgiaBattery, but enemy fire prevented the Federals rom removing theguns. Tat night, Brig. Gen. John W. Geary, a XX Corps divisioncommander, sent the 5th Ohio Inantry out to retrieve the guns.Assisted by several other troop detachments, the Buckeyes drew offthe cannons. Te incident was highly publicized and later helpedto elect Colonel Harrison president o the United States in 1888.

Johnstons plan or 15 May remained virtually the same as it

had been the day beore: Hardee was to reinorce Hood or anotherassault on the Union lef near the Conasauga. Continuing uncer-tainty over Federal operations at Lays Ferry had led Johnstonto cancel the attack order and then postpone the assault untillate afernoon, only to cancel it yet againbut not beore Hood


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struck the Union lef flank at 1600 and was repulsed with heavylosses. Meanwhile, Sweenys division recrossed the Oostanaula atLays Ferry. Using an abandoned flatboat, the Federals secured alodgment on the south bank, enabling engineers to lay a pontoonbridge there. Sweenys presence at the erry threatened JohnstonsWestern and Atlantic supply line, rendering his position at Resacauntenable. Te Army o ennessee evacuated its ortifications atnight and began marching south toward Calhoun.

Tus ended the two-day Battle o Resacathe first majorengagement o the Atlanta Campaign. Northern losses totaledroughly 4,000, while Southern casualties came to about 3,000.Although the Conederates had launched several assaults against

the Federal line, Sherman had retained the initiative throughoutthe operation. By sending Sweenys division to seize Lays Ferry,he maneuvered Johnston out o an apparently strong position atResaca. Sherman thereby established an operational pattern hewould use throughout the campaign. Using the bulk o his armygroup to fix Johnstons army in place, Sherman would send a flyingcolumn to sever the Conederate supply line, orcing Johnston tochoose between fighting a battle in the open or withdrawing to the

next strongpoint on the road to Atlanta.

CASSVILLEANDTHEDALLASNEWHOPECHURCHPICKETTSMILLLINE

Te region that the armies now entered was generally flatterand more arable than the rugged terrain through which they hadjust passed. Te remainder o Polks corps arrived, raising the Armyo ennessees troop strength to 70,000. Johnston intended to all

back along the Western and Atlantic Railroad, occupying a succes-sion o blocking positions while tempting Sherman into launching apotentially disastrous rontal assault. Because he had ailed to makea careul study o the topography south o Dalton, Johnston discov-ered ew naturally strong positions on which to anchor a deensiveline. As a result, he withdrew rom both Calhoun and Adairsville,Georgia, during 16 to 18 May, his rear guard delaying the Unionpursuit. As the Federals passed through Adairsville, Sherman

decided to split his army group into three segments to quicken thepace. While one o McPhersons divisions ollowed the OostanaulaRiver southwest to Rome, the rest o the Army o the ennessee,ollowed by Tomas IV and XIV Corps, took the road south romAdairsville toward Kingston, Georgia. Only Hookers XX Corps and


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Schofields XXIII Corps took the southeasterly road to Cassville,Georgia, a declining town that the railroad had bypassed yearsbeore. With the Federals thus divided, Johnston decided to spring atrap on the Union column marching toward Cassville.

Johnston prepared his ambush with care. He first sent Hardeescorps and the armys wagon train to the south to assume a blockingposition on the Kingston Road. Ten he directed Polks corpsto deploy along wo Run Creek north o Cassville and block theAdairsville Road. Hood would orm on Polks right and occupy arange o hills overlooking the road. Polk and Hood were to attackthe approaching Union column and destroy it. On the morning o19 May, Johnston took his place with the ambush orce, having just

issued a blustering order: Soldiers o the Army o ennessee . . . Ilead you to battle. But the commanding generals confidence soongave way to doubt, as Hood reported a Union orce o unknownstrength advancing on his rear rom the east. Losing his nerve,Johnston ordered Hood and Polk to withdraw south o Cassville. Helater regretted his decision. Tough small, the Union column wasno phantom, and yet Johnston believed that Hood had overreacted.Up to this point, Johnston had regarded Hood as a protg, but the

incident at Cassville shook his confidence in the younger man. omake matters worse, the budding Johnston-Hood command part-nership had generated considerable resentment among Hardeeand other subordinates, urther poisoning the atmosphere at armyheadquarters.

In any event, a Conederate assault at Cassville mightwell have ailed anyway because it was unlikely that Hood andPolk together could have deeated both Schofield and Hooker.

Moreover, Tomas had approached to within supporting distanceby midmorning o 19 May. Worse yet, Union artillery fire rom thehills north o town soon rendered Johnstons line untenable. Tatnight, afer conerring with several o his senior commanders,Johnston ordered a withdrawal to the Etowah River. Te Army oennessee retreated yet again, the oot soldiers pace quickening inresponse to news that Federal cavalry had seized a bridge over theEtowah southwest o Cassville. Johnstons pattern o retreating in

order to avoid battle played into Shermans hands, enabling him tocover hal the distance rom Dalton to Atlanta in barely two weeks.As a result, Union morale soared while Conederate morale beganto sink. But the return to hillier, more deensible terrain seemed toindicate more fighting ahead.


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Te terrain south o the Etowah River was rugged and heavilyorested with ew roads. Johnston initially posted his army in theAllatoona Mountains south o the river, near the Western andAtlantic Railroad cut known as the Allatoona Pass. Recalling theterrain rom a journey he had made there in the 1840s, Shermandecided to cross the Etowah more to the west, where the hillslay arther south rom the river and the countryside was flatter.Aiming or the town o Dallas, Georgia, about fifeen miles southo the river, Sherman intended to outflank Johnston rom theAllatoona Mountains all the way back to the Chattahoochee River,about ten miles northwest o Atlanta. (SeeMap 2.)

Sherman gave his armies a ew days rest beore setting out

or Dallas. For the first time in the campaign, the Federals wereoperating away rom their railroad lieline and having to carrytheir supplies. On 23 May, they crossed the Etowah with twentydays rations stuffed into their knapsacks, haversacks, and supplywagons. McPherson marched on the right, Tomas in the center,and Schofield on the lef, gradually changing direction rom southto east. rue to character, Sherman retted ceaselessly along theway. We are now all in motion like a vast hive o bees, he wrote,

and expect to swarm along the Chattahoochee in five days. Histimetable proved overoptimistic, or it would take him six weeksrather than five days to reach the Chattahoochee and the outskirtso Atlanta.

When Conederate cavalry reported the renewed Federaladvance, Johnston lef Hood to guard Allatoona Pass, sent Hardeetoward Dallas, and placed Polk between the two. Afer a single dayshard march, Shermans men neared the town rom several direc-

tions. Realizing that the Dallas crossroads was Shermans objective,Johnston concentrated his army there on 24 May. Hardee held theConederate lef, ollowed by Polk in the center and Hood on theright. From their vantage point on the crest o Elsberry Mountain,the rebels observed the approaching Union orces to the west.

On 25 May, the Federals crossed Pumpkin Vine Creek west oDallas, heading east. Johnston directed Hood to occupy the cross-roads at New Hope Church, about our miles to the northeast. By

midmorning, Hoods three divisions had deployed around theMethodist log meetinghouse, with Maj. Gen. Tomas C.Hindmansdivision on the lef, Stewarts division in the center, and Stevensonsdivision on the right. Hardee and Polk ormed on Hoods lef.Union prisoners reported Hookers XX Corps nearby. Indeed,


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Gearys division was heading straight or the church, accompaniedby Tomas and Hooker. Conederate prisoners indicated that alarge enemy orce lay ahead. In response, Geary dug in, Hookersummoned his two remaining divisions, and Tomas alerted twomore Union corps. Sherman also happened to be in the area, andhe incorrectly assumed that Hooker was on Johnstons right flank.Te sparse roads, rugged terrain, and dense woods contributed tothe Federals conusion about the enemys location and strength.

Meanwhile, the skies darkened, and rain began to all,heralding a month o oul weather that would drastically alter thecampaigns tempo. orrential rains soon transormed the roadsinto quagmires, making them virtually impassable. Te weather

turned hot and humid, and swarms o mosquitoes and otherinsects plagued the men incessantly. Dwindling supplies onlyadded to their misery. Small wonder the soldiers in blue nick-named the region around Dallas the Hell Hole.

Te XX Corps began its movement about 1600, strugglingthrough tangled thickets toward the crossroads, with Maj. Gen.Daniel A. Butterfields division on the lef, Geary in the center, andWilliams on the right, each division compressed into a narrow

column. Te battle developed into a clash between Williams Uniondivision and Stewarts Conederate division, the latter protectedby log breastworks and supported by sixteen cannons. It was nocontest. As the weather deteriorated, Williams suffered about800 casualties, while Geary and Butterfield lost another 800 mencombined. Conederate losses came to about 350 troops. Shermanblamed Hooker or the XX Corps ailure to seize the crossroads,which the latter bitterly resented.

On the ollowing day, 26 May, McPherson held Dallas, Tomasconronted New Hope Church, and Schofield extended the Federallef toward Picketts Mill. Union cavalry secured both flanks, buta gap separated McPherson and Tomas. Johnstons three corpscontinued to occupy the same positions, except that Cleburnesdivision o Hardees corps now extended the Conederate rightbeyond Hoods position toward Picketts Mill. Conederate cavalrycovered both flanks.

On 27 May, Sherman attempted to turn the strengthenedSouthern right flank. More than just a flanking maneuver, it wasalso part o a gradual shif back to the Western and Atlantic.Shermans army group had so ew supply wagons that it couldnot operate ar rom the railroad or long. Although the Federals


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but ultimately were unable to halt McPhersons advance toward therailroad. Te Conederates ailure was not due to a lack o effort.According to an Illinois captain, a heavy column o Rebels roserom a brush with a yell the devil ought to copyrightno doubtthe inamous rebel yell. Te soldiers in gray captured some Unionguns and then lost them when the Federals counterattacked inorce.

On 1 June, Federal cavalry seized the now-vacant AllatoonaPass. wo days later, the Union advance reached Acworth on theWestern and Atlantic, and the Federals caught their first glimpse oKennesaw Mountain towering above the mist to the south. Spiritsrose in Shermans army group, or they had regained the railroad

and had lef the Hell Hole ar behind. Te Union chiefain gave hismen a ew days rest while his engineers repaired the Etowah Riverrailroad bridge, beore resuming the march toward Atlanta.

Just beyond Kennesaw Mountain lay Marietta, Georgia, aflourishing railroad town. Tirty miles arther south stood the cityo Atlanta. o reach its geographical objective, Shermans armygroup would first have to cross two mountain ranges and then theChattahoochee River. Sherman chose the Sandtown Road as his

axis o advance. Te ormer Indian trail wound generally south-east rom Allatoona Pass to the Chattahoochee River and beyond,intersecting with most o the regions major roads along the way.Te first mountain range the Federals encountered consisted oBrush Mountain and Pine Mountaineach 300 eet talland LostMountain, the tallest o the trio at 500 eet. Just beyond that rangestood Kennesaw Mountain, composed o two large peaks and onespur: Big Kennesaw (700 eet), Little Kennesaw (400 eet), and

Pigeon Hill (220 eet). Te Conederates posted signal stations ontop o the mountains to monitor Federal troop movements towardAtlanta.

In early June, the Army o ennessee received what would beits last substantial reinorcement o the campaign. As Johnstonsarmy neared Atlanta, Georgia Governor Joseph E. Brownappointed Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith field commander o theGeorgia militia and directed the 2,000 state troops to guard the

numerous bridges and erries across the Chattahoochee. Toughgrateul or the reinorcement, Johnston was understandablydubious o the militia, which bore the nickname Joe Browns Petsbecause many o them had received state exemptions rom theConederate Army. Te addition o the Georgia militia boosted


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the Conederates total strength to 72,000. In the meantime, theFederals received an even larger reinorcement. On 8 June, Maj.Gen. Francis P. Blair Jr.s XVII Corps joined McPhersons Army othe ennessee. Blairs 10,000 veteran troops raised the Union armygroups total size to 106,000, offsetting most o Mays casualties.

Johnston also pressed the Conederate War Departmentor cavalry raids against the Union supply line, while Shermantook steps to prevent Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrests Conederatecavalry division rom severing railroads in ennessee. Hedirected that Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis lead a combined armsorce o 8,000 men and 18 guns rom Union-occupied Memphis,ennessee, and draw Forrest into northeastern Mississippi. On

10 June, Forrest routed Sturgis much larger orce at BricesCrossroads, Mississippi, but the Federals had prevented theSouthern cavalry rom interering with Shermans railroads orseveral critical weeks.

THEBRUSHMOUNTAINPINEMOUNTAINLOSTMOUNTAINLINEOn the evening o 9 June, Union cavalry had located the

ten-mile Southern line extending along Brush, Pine, and Lost

Mountains. Early the next morning, Federal inantry begandeploying opposite Johnstons new line. McPherson occupiedthe lef along the Western and Atlantic beore Brush Mountain.In the center, Tomas aced Pine Mountain. Schofield held theUnion right opposite Lost Mountain. Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrardscavalry division protected the Federal lef flank and scouted easttoward the actory town o Roswell, Georgia. Te troopers oGeneral Stonemans division covered the Union right, while Brig.

Gen. Edward M. McCooks cavalry division guarded the rear. woconsecutive weeks o torrential rains had flooded roads, creeks,woods, and fields. One Federal soldier complained that it beats allhow much it rains here. We have had but little good weather sincewe started. . . . We get water in our trenches and the ground is wetall the time and o course we get wet too.

On Johnstons overextended line, Hoods corps held theConederate right anchored on Brush Mountain, Polks corps

ormed the center, and Hardees corps occupied the lef to GilgalChurch, while Maj. Gen. William B. Bates division deployed onPine Mountain, orming a salient about a mile in ront o the mainline. Not surprisingly, Bates troops joked that they were being usedas Yankee bait. Wheelers horsemen patrolled the armys right


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beyond Hoods line, while Jacksons dismounted troopers coveredthe extreme lef to Lost Mountain.

Convinced that Johnstons army was too small to deend tenmiles o fieldworks, Sherman directed his army commanders topress the enemy line at all points to detect any weaknesses. Hedescribed the resulting close-range fighting in the dense woodsas a big Indian war, while a Conederate oot soldier noted thatpickets on both sides kept up a continual firing, that sounded liketen thousand wood-choppers.

Te threat to Bates salient led Hardee, Bates superior, toarrange a meeting with Johnston and Polk on Pine Mountainto observe the situation firsthand. On the morning o 14 June,

the generals and their staff officers gathered along the crest. Atthe time, Sherman happened to be riding along the Federal lineopposite the mountain. Noticing the conclave o Southern officers,he remarked, How saucy they are! and directed that a battery fireseveral rounds to break up the gathering. Te guns o Capt. PeterSimonsons 5th Indiana Battery immediately roared into action,firing three rounds at a range o 600 yards. In addition to scatteringthe Conederate officers, one o the projectiles tore through Polks

chest, killing him instantly. (By a twist o ate, Simonson would beshot and killed by a sharpshooterjust a ew days later.) Tat night,Hardee withdrew Bate rom hisprecarious position. When theFederals took possession o PineMountain the next morning, theyound this message: You damned

Yankee sons o bitches have killedour old Gen. Polk.Sherman, meanwhile, direct-

ed all his armies to continuepressing the Conederates relent-lessly. On 15 June, Butterfields XXCorps division advanced up theSandtown Road on a reconnais-

sance in orce and ound Cleburnesdivision dug in along the GilgalChurch intersection. Butterfieldlaunched a rontal assault thatCleburnes men repulsed with a

Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk(Valentine Richmond

History Center)


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lethal combination o musketry and artillery fire. Gearys XXCorps division attempted to succeed where Butterfield had ailedbut met with the same devastating result. At dusk the batteredFederals dug in opposite Cleburne and waited. Te Battle o GilgalChurch had cost the XX Corps about 650 casualties compared toCleburnes 250 losses. It was becoming all too apparent that Unionorces suffered whenever they ran up against Cleburnes division.

Elsewhere, the Federals ared much better. Schofields XXIIICorps threatened to turn Johnstons lef beyond Lost Mountain,while in McPhersons sector, Logans XV Corps overran a line orifle pits along the Conederate right at Brush Mountain, capturingseveral hundred soldiers o the 40th Alabama Inantry. Johnston

realized that the flanks o his Brush MountaintoLost Mountainline were compromised, and he began to evacuate the position atnightall on 16 June. During the eastward withdrawal o Hardeescorps to the Mud Creek line, batteries o the XX and XXIII Corpspounded Cleburnes division with solid shot and shell, inflictingseveral casualties. Among the wounded was Brig. Gen. Lucius E.Polk, one o Cleburnes brigade commanders and the nephew othe late Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk. Te younger Polks leg was so badly

mangled that it had to be amputated, bringing his field service toan abrupt end.

THEMUDCREEKLINEWhile Polks corpsnow commanded by Maj. Gen. William

W. Loringand Hoods corps held their positions, Hardees ourdivisions hastily dug in along the bluffs overlooking Mud Creek.Te point where Lorings lef joined Hardees right became known

as Frenchs Salient, a vulnerable angle in Johnstons line that wasoccupied by Maj. Gen. Samuel G. Frenchs division. Finding thisposition too weak, Johnston sent his chie engineer, Maj. StephenW. Presstman, to locate more deensible terrain to the south. Tetwin peaks o Kennesaw Mountain so impressed Presstman that hedesignated a new deensive position along the imposing Kennesawridgeline.

Te Conederates had an unlikely ally in the weather. As the

heavy rains resumed, Sherman became increasingly anxious aboutthe deteriorating tactical situation and impatient with the recentlack o progress. On 16 June, he confided to the Army chie o staff,Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, that he was now inclined to eign onboth flanks and assault the center. It may cost us dear but in results


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would surpass an attempt to pass around. . . . I, by assaulting, I canbreak [Johnstons] line, I see no reason why it would not producea decisive effect.

On 17 June, elements o the IV and XIV Corps bridged aflooded Mud Creek and prepared to strike Frenchs salient. Hardee,meanwhile, attacked the Union bridgehead twice but ailed todislodge the Federals. On the next day, Tomas concentratedhis artillery fire on Frenchs position and then sent out a stronginantry orce that scattered Conederate skirmishers screeningboth Frenchs and Maj. Gen. William H. . Walkers divisions.In the Battle o Latimers Farm, the Federals inflicted over 200Southern casualties yet ailed to capture Frenchs salient.

Writing to General Grant on 18 June, Sherman expressedrustration with his army groups sluggishness. My chie source otrouble is with the Army o the Cumberland, which is dreadullyslow, Sherman grumbled.

A resh urrow in a plowed field will stop the whole column,and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried toimpress on Tomas that we must assail and not deend; we

are [on] the offensive, and yet it seems the whole Army o theCumberland is so habituated to be on the deensive that, romits commander down to the lowest private, I cannot get it outo their heads.

Even as Sherman complained about Tomas lack o aggressive-ness, Johnston decided that Frenchs salient jeopardized his entireMud Creek line. Tat night, he directed the Army o ennessee to

evacuate under cover o a rainstorm and withdraw to their newposition on Kennesaw Mountain.

THEKENNESAWMOUNTAINLINETe ollowing morning, 19 June, Federal skirmishers

discovered that the Southerners had abandoned their fieldworks.Sherman ordered a pursuit, believing that Johnston was headedor the Chattahoochee River, but the Northerners quickly discov-

ered that the Conederates were dug in along Johnstons KennesawMountain line. Laid out in a six-mile arc, the position consistedo ormidable entrenchments that blocked three main routesto Mariettathe Stilesboro, Burnt Hickory, and Dallas Roads.Wheelers cavalry corps held the Conederate right flank, with


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Hoods corps digging in on Wheelers lef. In the center, Lorings

corps straddled the mountain rom the Western and Atlanticsouthward to the Burnt Hickory Road. Hardees corps stretchedrom Lorings lef flank, crossed the Dallas Road, and ended onhigh ground overlooking swampy John Ward Creek. On the arlef, Jacksons cavalry division patrolled the roads and ridges to thesouth. o the Federals, the Kennesaw Mountain line resembled amassive earthen ortress.

On the Union side, Garrards cavalry division covered the lef

toward Marietta to the south and Roswell to the east. McPhersonsArmy o the ennessee held the line opposite Hood, while TomasArmy o the Cumberland occupied its usual position in the center,acing both Loring and Hardee. On the right, Schofields Army othe Ohio, now unctioning as Shermans flying column, advancedalong the Sandtown Road west o Noyes Creek, approaching theConederate lef. McCooks cavalry division covered the ar Unionright toward the Chattahoochee.

Annoyed with the slow pace o his army group, on 20 JuneSherman ordered Garrard to cross Noonday Creek and attackWheeler. Col. Robert H. G. Mintys brigade was the first Federalcavalry across, and, to Mintys astonishment, Wheelers entirecommand charged his lone brigade. Te result was the largest

Kennesaw Mountain, with Federal fieldworks in foreground(George N. Barnard, Photographic Views of Shermans Campaign)


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cavalry engagement o the campaign. Afer a series o mountedsaber charges and countercharges, the heavily outnumberedMinty retreated to Noonday Creek, where Federal artillery on thenorth bank and Col. Abraham Millers amed Lightning Brigadeo mounted inantry provided timely support. Te cavalry clashresulted in about a hundred total casualties.

THEBATTLEOFKOLBSFARMWhile most o the Federals kept a close watch on the

Conederate entrenchments along Kennesaw Mountain, HookersXX Corps and Schofields XXIII Corps spent 1920 June probing orthe Southern lef flank amid heavy rains. On 21 June, the XX Corps

approached the Powder Springs Road rom the northwest andultimately deployed on the north side o the road near Kolbs arm-house. Meanwhile, the XXIII Corps headed down the SandtownRoad, crossing flooded Noyes Creek, where Jacksons Conederatecavalry had removed planks rom the bridge to delay the Unionadvance. Once over the creek, Schofields two divisions separated.Brig. Gen. Milo S. Hascalls division marched straight ahead andormed on Hookers right near the Kolb house. Brig. Gen. Jacob D.

Coxs division continued south on the Sandtown Road to the inter-section with the Powder Springs Road and then stretched northeast-ward rom there, orming a line that aced south and comprised theUnion right flank. Four miles to the southwest, Stonemans cavalrydivision patrolled the area near Powder Springs.

Jacksons delaying action on Noyes Creek had alertedJohnston to the threat to his lef flank, which on 21 June extendedonly to John Ward Creek. Tat night, Johnston sent Hoods 11,000-

man corps on a long march rom its position on the Conederateright to the extreme lef. Both Loring and Wheeler extended theirlines to fill Hoods empty trenches. Hoods column passed throughMarietta, heading southwest on the Powder Springs Road towardHooker and Schofield. By the morning o 22 June, Hood hadassembled his three divisions three miles southwest o Marietta ona north-south line straddling the Powder Springs Road at MountZion Church. Hindmans division held the right o Hoods line,

with Stevensons division manning the lef and extending to thePowder Springs Road. Stewarts division ormed in reserve behindStevenson.

Johnston directed Hood to block the Federal advance onMarietta along the Powder Springs Road. Incorrectly believing


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that Hookers three divisions constituted Shermans right flank,Hood decided, apparently on his own, to deploy his corps to turnthat flank with a vigorous attack. Uncertain o the situation alongtheir ront, Schofield and Hooker deployed one regiment each asskirmishers. Te Federals entered the tree line east o the Kolbarmhouse and captured several prisoners, who revealed thatHoods corps occupied the woods just beyond. Te skirmishersrelayed this inormation to the main Union line, where WilliamsXX Corps division occupied a ridge west o the Kolb house,stretching northward to John Ward Creek. From there, Gearys XXCorps division extended the line arther north toward the DallasRoad. On the XX Corps right,

Hascalls XXIII Corps divisiondeployed along the PowderSprings Road acing southeast.

For the first time in almosta month, the skies clearedand the sun shone, promisingavorable conditions or Hoodsassault. At 1700 Hindmans and

Stevensons divisions emergedrom the tree line arrayed inline o battle with ew skir-mishers, evidently becauseHood expected to encounterminimal resistance. As aresult, the Conederates wereunaware, until it was too late,

that the Federals had deployedorty pieces o artillery alongtheir line. According to one skirmisher in blue, Sgt. Rice C. Bullo the 123d New York Inantry, the Federal guns opened fire withshot and shell as the Southern line swept into the Kolb Farmsthousand-yard-wide field, endangering riend and oe alike. Wewere in their line o fire and or a time in as much danger romthem as the enemy, Bull recalled, so we tried to file off to the right

and lef out o range. Winded, we made a last effort and struggledthrough our lines. Everyone ell to the ground exhausted, andmany were in a dead aint.

As the rebels moved to within close range, no ewer thanfive Union batteries hammered the gray and butternut line with

General Hood(Hal Jespersen)


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case shot and canister. During the assault, Battery I, 1st New YorkLight Artillery, alone fired 669 rounds. Many o the attackers tookshelter rom the firestorm, using every available depression on thatvast killing field. As Hindmans and Stevensons assault collapsed,Stewarts division advanced on the lef but came to a halt whenit encountered Hascalls line, ending the attack. Te Battle oKolbs Farm cost the Conederates 1,000 casualties compared tothe Federals 350 losses. At nightall, Hood withdrew to MountZion Church. Tough badly managed, Hoods assault had bluntedShermans flanking maneuver via the Powder Springs Road andbought precious time or the Conederate orces on the Kennesawline. Tis latest setback urther delayed Shermans timetable,

leading him to make a ateul decision: he would orgo anotherflank attack and launch a rontal assault instead.

In the meantime, Johnstons appeals to Richmond or acavalry raid to sever Shermans supply line seemed to bear ruit.On 20 June, a orce o 1,600 Conederate cavalry under Brig. Gen.Gideon J. Pillow lef Oxord, Alabama, to cut the Western andAtlantic Railroad between Chattanooga and Dalton. Four dayslater, Pillow attacked the Union garrison at La Fayette, Georgia,

well short o his objective. He lacked artillery to batter the ortifiedbuildings that the Northern troops were using or cover and reluc-tantly withdrew when Union reinorcements arrived, returning toAlabama without having reached the Western and Atlantic. Forthe moment, at least, the Federal supply line remained intact andully operational, but Pillows ailed raid nevertheless reinorcedShermans decision to attack.

THEBATTLEOFKENNESAWMOUNTAINSherman was confident that Johnstons Kennesaw Mountainline was overextended and that launching simultaneous attackson several key points would cause it to collapse and perhapslead to a breakthrough that would end the campaign with onedecisive blow. Shermans plan was ambitious, to say the least. TeSouthern line now ran eight miles rom the Canton Road northo Kennesaw Mountain to the Marietta-Sandtown Road south

o Kolbs Farm. Sherman decided to stretch Johnstons line evenarther by probing its flanks and then breaking the line at twopoints in the center.

On 24 June, he issued orders giving his subordinates threedays to reconnoiter the enemys lines, choose the points o attack,


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and deploy the assault units. Sherman designated the Army othe Cumberland to launch the main assault. Tomas men wouldpierce the Conederate center along the Dallas Road and thenseize the Western and Atlantic just south o Marietta. On Tomaslef, McPhersons Army o the ennessee would support the maineffort by puncturing the Conederate line just south o PigeonHill, advancing a strong skirmish line to carry the summit o BigKennesaw, and sending a combined orce o inantry and cavalrytoward Marietta. On the Union right, Schofields Army o the Ohiowould conduct a diversion along the Powder Springs Road nearthe Kolbs Farm battlefield. Sherman set up his command post ona hill near the center o Tomas line. o acilitate communication,

he had telegraph wire strung to the headquarters o his three armycommanders.

On 25 June, Schofield showed Sherman the obstacle he acedon the Union right: Hoods corps was strongly entrenched along itsentire two-mile ront. Schofield noted that a rontal assault on sucha position would only waste soldiers lives. Sherman agreed andmodified Schofields mission. Te next day, two brigades rom CoxsXXIII Corps division began probing the Olleys Creek area. One o

the brigades crossed the creek unopposed, seized a hill, and dug inthere, having turned Johnstons lef flank. Johnston made no attemptto expel the lone Union brigade, leaving Schofield ree to exploitthe opportunity the next morning. As the sun set, Shermans armygroup made rantic last-minute preparations or what the Unioncommander hoped would be the decisive battle o the campaign.

MCPHERSONSASSAULT

Following an hour-long artillery barrage, McPhersonsmultipronged assault began at 0815 on 27 June. o the north, theattack on Marietta met with stiff resistance and soon stalled. Inthe center, elements o eight Union regiments, advancing in openorder on Big Kennesaw, struck our veteran Conederate regi-ments. Te combination o steep, rocky terrain and Conederatefirepower proved too much or the Federal attackers, who never-theless maintained a steady fire on the deenders. On the southern

end, roughly 5,500 inantrymen rom Logans XV Corps attackedthe Conederates dug in along Pigeon Hill. Brig. Gen. Morgan L.Smiths two brigades combined with one o Brig. Gen. WilliamHarrows brigades to orm an assault orce that hit the seambetween Walkers division o Hardees corps and Frenchs division


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o Lorings corps, but the Federals could make little headway. Heavyartillery fire orced many soldiers in blue to take cover among thehuge boulders. Some Conederate deenders even hurled rocksdown at the attackers (Map 3).

McPhersons assault lasted barely two hours, resulting in 850Union casualties compared to ewer than 300 Conederates. Sgt.Teodore F. Upson o the 100th Indiana Inantry noted that he andsome o his comrades had become trapped in the no-mans-landseparating the two orces at Pigeon Hill. We were in a bad fix,Upson recalled. We could not go ahead and could not get back. Wetook cover as best we could and kept up a desultory fire. . . . Terewe staid till night came. . . . Ten, tired and discouraged, we ell back

to a new line o works. . . . Te assault had ailed miserably along thewhole line.

THOMAS ASSAULTA mile and a hal to the south, General Tomas and his

subordinates had made careul preparations or the Army o theCumberlands part in the 27 June assault. Tomas and Howard, theIV Corps commander, had selecteda hilly ridgeline along a tribu-

tary o John Ward Creek where the opposing armies stood just330 yards apart. Te two Union generals were unaware that theConederate entrenchments onthis part o the line happenedto be flawed. Te earthworksconormed to the actual crest othe hill rather than the militarycrest, resulting in dead space

along the orward slope whereattacking soldiers might findshelter. Maj. Gen. BenjaminF. Cheathams division oHardees corps deended thispart o the Conederate line,which included a salient thatSouthern soldiers dubbed the

Dead Angle. Not surprisingly,it was on this part o the linethat the dead space was located.Cleburnes division was dug inon Cheathams right.

General Thomas(Library of Congress)


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27 June 1864

A SKETCH OF THE

B A T T L E O F K E N N E S A W M O U N T A I N

Confederate Position

Confederate Entrenchments

Union Position

Union Attack

Union Feint and Demonstration

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At 0900, nearly an hour behind schedule and ater a tokeniteen-minute artillery barrage, ive Union brigades rom theArmy o the Cumberland let their trenches in densely packedcolumns and started downhill toward the stream. From thereit was uphill to the waiting Conederates. homas plan wasor the assault troops to punch through the Southern line, andthen he would eed reserve units into the opening. Speed wasessential to the operations success, with the assault columnsunder orders to cross the lethal middle ground without pausingto shoot. All three brigades rom Brig. Gen. John NewtonsIV Corps division attacked on the northern end, while twobrigades rom Brig. Gen. Jeerson C. Davis XIV Corps division

advanced to the south.In Newtons division, only Brig. Gen. Charles G. Harkers brigade

could make much headway, thanks to a draw that partially shieldedthe attackers rom the deadly fire o Cleburnes division. Riding intobattle on a fine white horse at the head o his troops, Harker madean easy target or enemy marksmen and ell mortally wounded. Withtheir leader gone, the men o Harkers brigade lost heart and retreatedwithout having reached Cleburnes line. In the meantime, a fire started

in the allen leaves and dry brush. Te flames consumed some o thegravely wounded men o Harkers brigade, whose shrieks could beheard above the din o battle. On Cleburnes lef, Lt. Col. WilliamH. Martin, the commander o the 1st/15th Arkansas ConsolidatedInantry, ascended the parapet waving a handkerchie as a flag otruce, the Conederate officer risking death to secure the rescue owounded Federals rom the woodland inerno.

O Davis assault orce, only Col. Daniel McCook Jr.s brigade

reached Cheathams line. McCook himsel was mortally woundedas he tried to enter the Conederate works near the Dead Angle,where Pvt. Sam R. Watkins and his comrades o the 1st/27thennessee Consolidated Inantry were fighting or survival.Column afer column o Federal soldiers were crowded upon thatline, Watkins recalled,

a solid line o blazing fire . . . rom the muzzles o the Yankee

guns being poured right into our aces, singeing our hair andclothes, the hot blood o our dead and wounded spurting on us,the blinding smoke and stifling atmosphere filling our eyes andmouths. . . . My gun became so hot that requently the powderwould flash beore I could ram home the ball. . . . Tere was


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not a single man in the company who was not wounded, or hadholes shot through his hat and clothing.

Te Conederate batteries posted behind the Dead Angle enfi-laded Davis two brigades at short range with canister and caseshot. Rather than run the gauntlet back to the main line, someo the Federals retreated downhill about thirty yards to the deadspace, where they dug rantically with every available implement,including their bare hands.

By noon, it was clear that Tomas attack had also ailed.Although the our Union assault divisions had not broken throughany part o Johnstons line, they still held some orward positions.

In a flurry o telegraphic messages, Sherman queried Tomas ontheir options, indicating his preerence or another attack. ButTomas reused to acquiesce: We have already lost heavily to-daywithout gaining any material advantage; one or two more suchassaults would use up this army.

While the main attack sputtered out, Schofields XXIIICorps pushed ar beyond the Conederate lef flank, until theFederal advance stood closer to Atlanta than did Johnstons

army. o the south o Schofield, Stonemans cavalry divisionhad moved to within five miles othe Chattahoochee River. Shermanrightly called Schofields effortso 27 June the only advantage othe day.

Sherman reluctantly conclud-ed that his bid to end the campaign

with one decisive battle had ailed.He resumed his usual flankingtactics, shifing more troops to theright and collecting supplies tosupport them. In the meantime,a truce on 29 June enabled theNortherners to gather theirwounded and bury their dead. Te

Battle o Kennesaw Mountain hadcost the Union about 3,000 casual-ties and the Conederates roughly1,000the largest one-day casualtycount o the campaign thus ar.

General Schofield(Library of Congress)


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In the afermath o his Kennesaw Mountain triumph, Johnstonreceived visits rom two Conederate senators, who indicated thatPresident Davis was tiring o the generals passive strategy o with-drawing rom one deensive position to another without bringingSherman to battle. In response, the Conederate commanderrenewed his plea or Davis to send cavalrymen such as Forrestand Brig. Gen. John H. Morgan on raids to sever Federal lines ocommunications north o Chattanooga. Anticipating this possi-bility, Sherman had already planned to send another expeditionaryorce rom Memphis to keep Forrest occupied. Johnstons relianceon outside assistance thus lef him dependent on circumstancesbeyond his control. Had he adopted a more aggressive strategy in

northern Georgia, at the very least he might have appeased Davisand disrupted Shermans routine o flanking the Conederates outo their deensive lines at minimal cost to his orces.

THESMYRNALINEIn resuming his flanking tactics, Sherman intended to pry

Johnston out o the Kennesaw line through maneuver rather thanbrute orce. Once again, McPhersons army would lead the way,

advancing beyond Schofields right toward the ChattahoocheeRiver. Garrards cavalry division would occupy McPhersonstrenches, while Stonemans horsemen continued to patrol theChattahoochee to the mouth o Sweet Water Creek. McPhersonsdrive to the river began on the night o 2 July, with his wagonscarrying ten days rations or the soldiers and orage or the horses.Notified o Federal movement beyond his lef flank, Johnstonimmediately issued evacuation orders. He transerred his supplies

to the Chattahoochee, wrecked the Western and Atlantic romKennesaw Mountain to Marietta, and withdrew his three inantrycorps, posting Wheelers cavalry as a rear guard to delay the Federalpursuit. Te Kennesaw Mountain deensive line had served theConederates well, enabling them to stall the Union offensive ortwo weeks and repulse a ull-scale rontal assault while inflictingdisproportionate casualties.

On the morning o 3 July, Union skirmishers ound

the Southern trenches empty. Sherman pursued the enemy,intending to strike the Conederates while they were crossing theChattahoochee. Te Federals crowded onto all available roadsleading toward Marietta, with Tomas army advancing on the lefalong the Western and Atlantic, Schofield marching in the center,


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and McPherson moving on the right. About our miles southeasto Marietta, the rebels had used slave labor to build a six-mile lineo fieldworks running rom Nickajack Creek on the Southern lefto Rottenwood Creek on the right. Te line crossed the Westernand Atlantic Railroad at Smyrna Station.

Sherman planned to launch a diversionary attack onJohnstons center while turning his lef flank. Confident thathis adversary would evacuate the Smyrna line without a fight,Sherman predicted, No general, such as [Johnston], would invitebattle with the Chattahoochee behind him. He was mistaken.Lorings corps held the right o the Conederate line, Hardeescorps occupied the center, and Hoods corps was dug in on the lef.

Te Conederate inantry was augmented by several hundred oSmiths Georgia militia. On the Fourth o July, Howards IV Corpsattacked Lorings position along the railroad but could make littleheadway. Although Dodges XVI Corps captured some enemy riflepits at Ruff s Mill on the rebel lef, the Federals ailed to penetrateHoods main line. Afer learning that the Federals were turning hisflank, Johnston evacuated the Smyrna line on the night o 45 Julyand withdrew his army our miles to an impressive line o ortifica-

tions along the north bank o the Chattahoochee River.

THECHATTAHOOCHEERIVERLINEIn mid-June, as the Conederates had begun to occupy the

Kennesaw line, GeneralShoup, the Army o ennessees chie oartillery, approached Johnston with a proposal to construct a cres-cent-shaped line o earthworks that would cover the Western andAtlantic Railroad bridge spanning the Chattahoochee. Johnston

gave his approval, and Shoup immediately set to work, directing ateam o engineer officers who in turn supervised about 1,000 slavelaborers. In just one week, they built a marvel o military engi-neering, a five-mile-long ortified bridgehead eaturing a series omutually supporting, arrowhead-shaped redoubts later dubbedShoupades afer their designer. Te ortifications were situatedalong a chain o hills running rom the railroad bridge to Masonand urners Ferry. Shoup had intended or his entrenchments to

be held by a relatively small orce, reeing the bulk o Johnstonsarmy or offensive operations. But Johnston violated the design-ers intent by adding two miles o trenches on the lef along highground extending to Nickajack Creek and then by squeezing mosto the Army o ennessee into the extended line.


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BATTLE OF PEACHTR20 July

BATTLE OF EZRA CHURCH28 July

Ch

att

ah

ooch

eeRiv

er

Peachtree

Creek

ProctorsCreek

North Fork ofUtoy Creek

Tany

ar

Railroad Defense Line

Western&

AtlanticR

R

Macon

&

West

ern

RR

Mason andTurners Ferry

to East Point

Elliotts Mill

Utoy P. O.

Ezra Church

Mt. Zion Church

Howells Mill

Col

LICKSKILLETROAD

SAND

TOW

N RO

AD

A T L A N T

MAP4


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E CREEK

BATTLE OF ATLANTA22 July

Peach

tree

Cre

ek

ClearC

reek

SugarCreek

anch

Fortificationsof Atlanta

Outer Defensive Line

Bald Hill

Georgia

RR

to Buckhead

liers Mill

Clay

Troup Hurt

A. Hurt

D E C A T U R

Colliers Bridge

Howard

Union Entrenchments


Summer 1864

A T L A N T A A N D V I C I N T Y

0 21

Miles


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actory buildings and then transported the now-unemployedemale workers to the rear. From there, the women were sent northto find work. His mission at Roswell accomplished, Garrard ordedthe Chattahoochee. Te entire effort to gain the south bank o theriver cost the Federals ewer than a dozen casualties.

Te Union river crossings north o Atlanta compelledJohnston to abandon the Chattahoochee River line. Shoup wasdespondent, or his magnificent ortifications had not been put tothe test. By the morning o 10 July, the Army o ennessee hadreached the south bank o the Chattahoochee, having destroyed therailroad and nearby wagon bridges. As the rebels withdrew towardthe earthworks ringing Atlanta, Shermans army group paused

to rest and resupply. In addition, the railroad had to be repaired,bridges had to be rebuilt, and crossing points strengthened priorto the final drive on the Gate City. But the Union commanderwas already planning his next move. Instead o attacking Atlantadirect, or any o its orts, he noted, I propose to make a circuit,destroying all its railroads. Tis is a delicate movement, and mustbe done with caution.

A CHANGEINCOMMANDERSDeeply dissatisfied with Johnstons conduct o the campaign

thus ar, President Davis sent his military adviser, General BraxtonBragg, to Atlanta in mid-July to assess the situation there. Ina conerence with Bragg, Johnston repeated much o what hehad already told Davisthat he reused to assume the offensivebecause he was heavily outnumbered and that the surest way todeeat Sherman was to cut his line o communications, thereby

orcing him to abandon the campaign or want o supplies.Johnston urther maintained that Forrest was the best choice orthe mission because he could not spare Wheelers cavalry. Noriend o Johnstonwho had succeeded him as commander o theArmy o ennesseeBragg inormed Davis, I cannot learn thathe has any more plan or the uture than he has had in the past.Bragg urther recommended that Hood replace Johnston.

Still uncertain as to his course o action, Davis consulted the

Souths greatest field commander, General Robert E. Lee, whoadvised against the proposed command change while in the midsto a campaign. Te president tried once more to goad Johnstoninto action, but the general replied that as the enemy has doubleour number, we must be on the deensive. My plan o operations


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must, thereore, depend upon that o the enemy. It is mainly towatch or an opportunity to fight to advantage. Davis had heardenough. On 17 July, as directed, Conederate Adjutant GeneralSamuel Cooper sent the ollowing message to Johnston: As youhave ailed to arrest the advance o the enemy . . . and expressno confidence that you can deeat or repel him, you are herebyrelieved rom . . . command.

Davis appointed Hood to replace Johnston and to assume thetemporary rank o ull general pending congressional approval.Just thirty-three, Hood had earned a reputation in the EasternTeater as a hard-hitting brigade and division commander. Hisphysical appearance only enhanced that image, battlefield wounds

having disabled an arm and cost him a leg. Hood was as ambitiousas he was aggressive and had schemed with Bragg to secure thearmy command. Well aware o Hoods propensity or recklessness,Conederate Secretary o War James A. Seddon cautioned him tobe wary no less than bold. It may yet be practicable to cut thecommunication o the enemy or find or make an opportunity oequal encounter whether he moves east or west.

While Hood assumed command, the roughly 55,000 soldiers

constituting the Army o ennessee withdrew across PeachtreeCreek and filed into the earthworks north and east o town. Bythe summer o 1864, Atlanta had become one o the most heavilyortified cities in the South, and its wartime population had mush-roomed to over 20,000 civilians. In the spring o 1863, a ailedUnion cavalry raid to cut the Western and Atlantic Railroad innorthern Georgia had convinced the city athers to authorize a localengineer, Capt. Lemuel P. Grant, to design a system o ortifications

around Atlanta. Under Grants supervision, conscripted slaveshad built a ten-mile circuit o entrenchments linking numerousredoubts capable o holding about one hundred large-caliber guns.Te laborers had improved the ortifications by clearing fields ofire and placing various obstructionsincluding chevaux-de-friseand abatisin ront o the earthworks. Tese workssituated justover a mile rom the city centerconstituted the Conederatesfinal deensive line.

Sherman, meanwhile, resumed operations, sending Tomason a direct line to Atlanta rom the north via Peachtree Creek,while sending Schofield and McPherson on a more roundaboutroute to strike the Georgia Railroad east o the city. Federal troopstrength then stood at just over 106,000. On 19 July, Sherman


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learned o Hoods promotion and consulted with McPherson andSchofield, both o whom had known Hood while the three werecadets at the U.S. Military Academy. Te two men agreed that thenew Conederate commander was bold to the point o rashness,which Hood had demonstrated as recently as his impetuous attackat Kolbs Farm on 22 June.

While Shermans army group moved on Atlanta, anotherUnion expedition lef Memphis in search o Forrest, the

Conederacys most elusive cavalryman. Maj. Gen. Andrew J.Smith led some 14,000 Federal inantry and cavalry and 24 pieceso artillery into northeastern Mississippi. On 13 July, Smithscommand occupied a strong position west o upelo and repulseda series o disjointed attacks launched by 8,000 Conederatesunder Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee. Forrests cavalry division borethe brunt o the fighting, suffering 1,300 casualties, and Forresthimsel was wounded in a rearguard action at Old own Creek

the ollowing day. In the process, Smith had sidelined Forrest orseveral weeks and thus prevented him rom raiding Shermanssupply line. But Smiths success was a double-edged sword. Aferall, Forrest had prevented the bulk o Smiths veteran XVI Corpsrom joining Sherman outside Atlanta.

Confederate defenses northwest of Atlanta(George N. Barnard, Photographic Views of Shermans Campaign)


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HOODSFIRSTSORTIE: THEBATTLEOFPEACHTREECREEKOn the morning o 20 July, the Conederates manning the

trenches one mile south o Peachtree Creek anxiously awaited theorder to attack the Federals crossing that stream. Te men o thecorps o newly promoted Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart (ormerlyPolks command) held the lef o the Conederate line, their flankanchored on the Chattahoochee. Hardees corps occupied thecenter, and Hoods corps under its acting commander, GeneralCheatham, aced east toward the Georgia Railroad and the towno Decatur. Farther east, Wheelers dismounted cavalry was drawnup astride the railroad, opposing the Federals advancing rom thedirection o Decatur.

Hoods attack plan was both ambitious and complex. WhileCheatham and Wheeler delayed the Federals to the east, Hardeeand Stewart would attack en echelon rom right to lef, strikingthe Army o the Cumberland as it crossed Peachtree Creek anddestroying it in the angle ormed by the junction o the creek withthe Chattahoochee. Tough sound in concept, the assault requiredprecise timingwith no ewer than seven Conederate divisionsslated to attack in close succession (Map 5).

On 19 July, Tomas army would have been vulnerable tosuch an attack. Te Army o the Cumberland had spent most o

General Cheatham(Library of Congress)

General Stewart(North Carolina State Archives)


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that day crossing the creek, but by the next morning all units wereacross and digging in south o the stream. Even so, a two-mile gapseparated Tomas rom Schofield and McPhersona situationthat Hood sought to exploit.

M A N E Y

B AT E

W ALKER

CLEBURNE

FRENCH

WAL THAL LL O R I N G

S T E W A R

T

H A R D E E

W IL L IA M SG E A

R Y

WA

RD

(XIV)P

A LM E R

(XX)

N

E

W

T

O

N

(I

V)

H O O K E R

Peach

tree

Cre

ek

Peachtree

Creek

Tany

a

rd

B

ra

nch

ClearCreek

ColliersBridge

to Buckhead

to Atlanta

P E A C H T R E E R O A D

Embry

Red House

Mt. Zion Church

Howells Mill

Colliers Mill

20 July 1864

B A T T L E O F P E A C H T R E E C R E E K

Confederate Position

Confederate Attack


Union Position

A SKETCH OF THE

MAP5


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At 0500 on 20 July, the entire Union line advanced a shortdistance, with Logans XV Corps halting just two and a hal mileseast o Atlanta, enabling the our 20-pound Parrott rifles o Capt.Francis DeGress Battery H, 1st Illinois Light Artillery, to firethe Federals first salvo into the Gate City. Apparently killing noone, the shells damaged a ew buildings and served notice thatthe city was under attack. Hood thereore postponed his assaultrom 1300 to 1530 in order to shif the entire rebel line to theright until Cheathams corps straddled the railroad. Although theSoutherners now blocked the Federal advance into Atlanta romthe east, the delay had cost Hood valuable time.

Poor communication between Hardees and Stewarts corps

only made matters worse. Te miscues began when Stewartsdivision at the ar right under Loring launched its assault at 1445,about orty-five minutes ahead o schedule. Hardees attack beganon time at 1530, but Bates division soon bogged down in thedense woods and underbrush in Clear Creek Valley. On Bates lef,Walkers division attacked along the Peachtree Road and brieflyseized a section o the Union line held by Newtons IV Corpsdivision. But General Tomas, a ormer artillery instructor at

the U.S. Military Academy, directed the fire o several Northernbatteries and thus helped repulse Walkers assault. o the lef oWalker, Cheathams divisionnow under Brig. Gen. George E.Maneyoverlapped Newtons right, but the Federals managed toblunt Maneys flank attack. By 1800, Bate at last reached Newtonsline, only to be driven back by U.S. artillery fire. Summoned byHood, Cleburnes division lef its reserve position and headed eastto oppose the Federals approaching rom that direction. With

Cleburnes departure, Hardee had no more men to commit, andhe broke off the attack.On Stewarts ront, Lorings division advanced arther than

any other Conederate unit, its success due in part to the elemento surprise achieved by the early start. Crossing the anyardBranch on the right and the Collier Road on the lef, Loringstroops descended onto the Peachtree Creek floodplain and struckBrig. Gen. William . Wards (ormerly Butterfields) XX Corps

division, which held firm despite a erocious Conederate assault.o the west on high ground near Colliers Mill, the guns o GearysXX Corps division raked Lorings open lef flank with canister.On Lorings lef, Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthalls division sweptaround Gearys right, but Williams XX Corps division countered


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by reusing its lef flank and subjecting Walthalls exposed lef to alethal combination o musketry and artillery fire. According to oneo Williams men, Sergeant Bull o the 123d New York Inantry,Te enemy made five charges on our line, coming at times withinone hundred eet; yet I did not see a single Johnnie. Te clouds osmoke rom the muskets o both sides and rom [a nearby battery]poured down on us to hide everything but the flash o the enemysguns that gave us their position. Stewarts division at the ar lefunder French advanced but was only lightly engaged beore with-drawing. By 1900 the battle was over. Te rebel assault had ailedto drive Tomas army into the Chattahoochee.

Te Battle o Peachtree Creek cost the attacking Conederates

about 2,500 casualties, while the deending Federals lost 1,750.Tere were numerous reasons or the Southern deeat. Hood hadlef execution o his complex plan to his subordinates, and Hardeehad sent his divisions orward in piecemeal ashion, exposing theirflanks to devastating Union artillery fire. Te Federals also heldthe advantage o deending high ground, orcing the Conederatesto attack uphill and through heavy vegetation.

HOODSSECONDSORTIE: THEBATTLEOFATLANTADuring the Peachtree Creek fight, Wheelers cavalry had

captured an elevation reerred to as the Bald Hill, about two mileseast o Atlanta, extending the Conederate outer line southwardwell below the Georgia Railroad. Early on the morning o 21 July,Cleburnes division also occupied the hill and began to dig in.Advancing rom the east, Blairs two XVII Corps divisions drovethe Conederates off Bald Hill. Ten Lt. John Sullivans 3d Ohio

Light Battery unlimbered and began firing rounds into downtownAtlanta. Te projectiles caused minimal physical damage, yet theexplosions terrified the citys residents. o restore civilian morale,Hood decided to put an end to the Union armys long-range artil-lery fire while securing the Georgia Railroad.

On 21 July, Hood devised another elaborate assault to drivethe Federals rom the Gate City. Learning that McPhersons lefflank had lost its cavalry screennamely Garrards division, which

was tearing up the Georgia Railroad near Stone MountainHooddecided to launch a surprise attack on the Federals east o Atlanta.He designated Hardees corps as the main strike orce. Tat night,Hardee and two divisions o Wheelers cavalry would make a nightmarch to Decatur and assault McPhersons army rom the rear


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while Cheatham attacked rom the ront, crushing the Federals inthe jaws o the Conederate vise. In the meantime, Stewarts corpsand Smiths Georgia militia would prevent Tomas and Schofieldrom coming to McPhersons rescue.

In the darkness Hardees corps evacuated its trenches alongPeachtree Creek and headed south, the weary soldiers trudgingthrough the streets o Atlanta amid oppressive heat and chokingdust. By the time the column had reached the revised jump-offpoint north and west o errys Mill Pond, it was noon on 22 Julyhours behind schedule and well short o Decatur. But the men hadmarched fifeen miles, much o it under a hot sun, and were thor-oughly atigued, having spent the previous two days marching and

fighting on little or no sleep. While Hardees corps made its nightmarch, Cheathams corps filed out o its trenches east o Atlantain preparation or the rontal assault on McPherson. Hardee andCheathams empty earthworks led Sherman to assume that Hoodhad abandoned Atlanta, but Tomas and Schofield reported thatthe rebels still occupied Atlantas inner ring o ortifications.

On the morning o 22 July, the right and center o McPhersonsline extended along a north-south axis, straddling both the Georgia

Railroad and the Bald Hill. Earlier that morning, McPherson hadreceived word o a large Conederate orce

Documents

Atlanta and Savannah Campaigns - 1864