ASYLUMCASE(SUMMARY)

Overview:

Columbiagrantedasylum to aPeruvian,accusedof takingpart in amilitaryrebellion inPeru.WasColumbiaentitled tomake aunilateralanddefinitivequalificationoftheoffence(asapoliticaloffence)inamannerbindingonPeruandwas Peruwas under a legal obligation to provide safe passage for thePeruviantoleavePeru?

FactsoftheCase:

PeruissuedanarrestwarrantagainstVictorRaulHayadelaTorre“inrespectof the crime ofmilitary rebellion”which took place onOctober 3, 1949, inPeru. 3months after the rebellion,Torre fled to theColombianEmbassy inLima, Peru. The Colombian Ambassador confirmed that Torrewas granteddiplomaticasylum inaccordancewithArticle2(2)oftheHavanaConventionon Asylum of 1928 and requested safe passage for Torre to leave Peru.Subsequently,theAmbassadoralsostatedColombiahadqualifiedTorreas apolitical refugee in accordance with Article 2 Montevideo Convention onPoliticalAsylumof1933(notethetermrefugeeisnotthesameastheRefugeeConventionof1951).Peru refused toaccept theunilateralqualificationandrefusedtograntsafepassage.

QuestionsbeforetheCourt:

(1)IsColombiacompetent,asthecountrythatgrantsasylum,tounilaterallyqualify the offence for the purpose of asylum under treaty law andinternationallaw?

(2) In this specific case,was Peru, as the territorial State, bound to give aguaranteeofsafepassage?

(3)DidColombiaviolateArticle1and 2(2)of theConventiononAsylumof1928(hereinaftercalledtheHavanaConvention)whenitgrantedasylumandisthecontinuedmaintenanceofasylumaviolationofthetreaty?

TheCourt’sDecision:

RelevantFindingsoftheCourt:

(1) IsColombia competent, as the country that grants asylum, tounilaterallyqualifytheoffenceforthepurposeofasylumundertreatylawandinternationallaw?

1.Thecourtstatedthatinthenormalcourseofgrantingdiplomaticasylumadiplomatic representative has the competence to makeaprovisionalqualification of the offence (for example, as apolitical offence)and the territorialStatehas theright togiveconsent to thisqualification. IntheTorre’scase,Colombiahasasserted,astheStategrantingasylum,thatitiscompetent toqualify thenatureof the offence in aunilateral anddefinitivemannerthatisbindingonPeru.Thecourthadtodecideifsuchadecisionwasbinding on Peru either because of treaty law (in particular the HavanaConventionof1928andtheMontevideoConventionof1933),otherprinciplesofinternationallaworbywayofregionalorlocalcustom.

2.Thecourtheld that therewasnoexpressedor implied rightofunilateralanddefinitivequalificationoftheState thatgrantsasylumundertheHavanaConvention or relevant principles of international law (p. 12, 13). TheMontevideo Convention of 1933, which accepts the right of unilateralqualification, and on which Colombia relied to justify its unilateralqualification, was not ratified by Peru. The Convention, per say, was notbinding on Peru and considering the low numbers of ratifications theprovisions of the latter Convention cannot be said to reflect customaryinternationallaw(p.15).

3. Colombia also argued that regional or local customs support thequalification.Thecourtheld that theburdenofproofon theexistenceofanallegedcustomarylawrestswiththepartymakingtheallegation:

“ThePartywhichreliesonacustomofthiskindmustprovethatthiscustomisestablished in such amanner that ithasbecomebindingon theotherParty…(that)itisinaccordancewitha(1)constantanduniformusage(2)practicedbythe States in question, and that this usage is (3) the expression of a rightappertainingtotheStategrantingasylum(Columbia)and(4)adutyincumbent

on the territorialState (in thiscase,Peru).This follows fromArticle38of theStatute of the Court, which refers to international custom “as evidence of ageneralpracticeacceptedaslaw(textinbracketsadded).”

4.Thecourtheld thatColumbiadidnotestablish theexistenceof aregionalcustombecauseitfailedtoproveconsistentanduniformusageoftheallegedcustom by relevant States. The fluctuations and contradictions in Statepracticedidnotallow for theuniformusage (seealsoMendelson,1948andsee also Nicaragua case, p. 98, the legal impact of fluctuations of Statepractice).ThecourtalsoreiteratedthatthefactthataparticularStatepracticewasfollowedbecauseofpoliticalexpediencyandnotbecauseofabeliefthatthesaidpractice isbindingon theStatebywayof a legalobligation (opiniojuris) is detrimental to the formation of a customary law (seeNorth SeaContinentalShelfCasesandLotusCaseformoreonopiniojuris):

“[T]he Colombian Government has referred to a large number of particularcasesinwhichdiplomaticasylumwasin factgrantedandrespected.Butithasnot shown that the alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualificationwasinvokedor…thatitwas,apartfromconventionalstipulations,exercisedbytheStates granting asylum as a rightappertaining to them and respected by theterritorialStatesas aduty incumbent on themandnotmerely for reasons ofpoliticalexpediency.ThefactsbroughttotheknowledgeoftheCourtdisclosesomuchuncertaintyandcontradiction,somuchfluctuationanddiscrepancyintheexercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed on variousoccasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession ofconventionsonasylum,ratifiedbysomeStatesandrejectedbyothers,and thepracticehasbeensomuchinfluencedbyconsiderationsofpoliticalexpediencyinthevariouscases, that it isnotpossible todiscern inall thisanyconstantanduniform usage,mutually accepted as law,with regard to the alleged rule ofunilateralanddefinitivequalificationoftheoffence.”

5. The court held that even if Colombia could prove that such a regionalcustom existed, it would not be binding on Peru, because Peru“far fromhaving by its attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it byrefraining fromratifyingtheMontevideoConventionsof1933and1939,whichwere the first to include a rule concerning thequalification of theoffence [as“political” innature] inmattersofdiplomaticasylum.”(See inthisregard,thelesson onpersistent objectors. Similarly in theNorth Sea Continental Shelf

Casesthecourtheld‘inanyeventthe...rulewouldappeartobeinapplicableasagainstNorwayinasmuchasshehadalwaysopposedanyattempttoapplyittotheNorwegiancoast’.)

6. The court concluded that Columbia, as the State granting asylum, is notcompetent to qualify the offence by a unilateral and definitive decision,bindingonPeru.

(2) In this specific case, was Peru, as the territorial State, bound to give aguaranteeofsafepassage?

7. The court held that therewas no legal obligation on Peru to grant safepassage either because of theHavana Convention or customary law. In thecase of the Havana Convention, a plain reading of Article 2 results in anobligation on the territorial state (Peru) to grant safe passage only after itrequests the asylum granting State (Columbia) to send the person grantedasylum outside its national territory (Peru). In this case the PeruviangovernmenthadnotaskedthatTorreleavePeru.Onthecontrary,itcontestedthelegalityofasylumgrantedtohimandrefusedtograntsafeconduct.

8.ThecourtlookedatthepossibilityofacustomarylawemergingfromStatepractice where diplomatic agents have requested and been granted safepassage forasylumseekers,before the territorialStatecouldrequest forhisdeparture.Oncemore, thecourtheld that thesepracticeswere a resultof aneedforexpediencyandotherpracticeconsiderationsoveranexistenceofabeliefthattheactamountstoalegalobligation(seeparagraph4above).

“Thereexistsundoubtedlyapracticewherebythediplomaticrepresentativewhograntsasylumimmediatelyrequestsasafeconductwithoutawaitingarequestfromtheterritorialstateforthedepartureoftherefugee…butthispracticedoesnotandcannotmean that theState, towhom such a request for safe-conducthasbeenaddressed,islegallyboundtoaccedetoit.”

(3)DidColombiaviolateArticle1and2(2)oftheHavanaConventionwhen itgrantedasylumand is thecontinuedmaintenanceofasylumaviolationof thetreaty?

9. Article 1 of theHavana Convention states that “It is not permissible forStates to grant asylum… to persons accused or condemned for commoncrimes… (such persons)shall be surrendered upon request of the localgovernment.”

10.In other words, the person-seeking asylum must not be accused of acommoncrime(forexample,murderwouldconstituteacommoncrime,whilea political offence would not).The accusations that are relevant are thosemadebefore thegrantingofasylum.Torre’saccusation related to amilitaryrebellion,whichthecourtconcludedwasnotacommoncrimeandassuchthegrantingofasylumcompliedwithArticle1oftheConvention.

11.Article2(2)oftheHavanaConventionstatesthat“Asylumgrantedtopoliticaloffendersinlegations,warships,militarycampsormilitaryaircraft,shallberespectedtotheextentinwhichallowed,asarightorthroughhumanitariantoleration,bytheusages,theconventionsorthelawsofthecountryinwhichgrantedandinaccordancewiththefollowingprovisions:First:Asylummaynotbegrantedexceptinurgentcasesandfortheperiodoftimestrictlyindispensableforthepersonwhohassoughtasylumtoensureinsomeotherwayhissafety.”

12.Anessentialpre-requisiteforthegrantingofasylumistheurgencyor, inotherwords,thepresenceof“animminentorpersistenceofadangerforthepersonoftherefugee”.Thecourtheldthatthefactsofthecase,includingthe3months that passed betweenthe rebellion and the time when asylum wassought,did not establish theurgency criteria in this case (pp.20 -23).Thecourtheld:

“Inprinciple,itisinconceivablethattheHavanaConventioncouldhaveintendedthe term “urgentcases” to include thedangerof regularprosecution towhichthecitizensofanycountry laythemselvesopenbyattackingthe institutionsofthat country… In principle, asylum cannot be opposed to the operation ofjustice.”

13.Inotherwords,TorrewasaccusedofacrimebuthecouldnotbetriedinacourtbecauseColombiagrantedhimasylum.Thecourtheldthat“protectionfrom the operation of regular legal proceedings” was not justified underdiplomaticasylum.

14.Thecourtheld:

“InthecaseofdiplomaticasylumtherefugeeiswithintheterritoryoftheState.A decision to grant diplomatic asylum involves a derogation from thesovereigntyofthatState.ItwithdrawstheoffenderfromthejurisdictionoftheterritorialStateandconstitutesaninterventioninmatterswhichareexclusivelywithin the competence of that State. Such a derogation from territorialsovereignty cannot be recognised unless its legal basis is established in eachparticularcase.”

15. As a result, exceptions to this rule are strictly regulated underinternationallaw.

Anexceptiontothisrule(asylumshouldnotbegrantedtothosefacingregularprosecutions) can occur only if, in the guise of justice, arbitrary action issubstituted for theruleof law.Suchwouldbe thecase if theadministrationofjusticewerecorruptedbymeasuresclearlypromptedbypoliticalaims.Asylumprotectsthepoliticaloffenderagainstanymeasuresofamanifestlyextra-legalcharacter which a Government might take or attempt to take against itspoliticalopponents…On theotherhand, the safetywhicharisesoutofasylumcannotbeconstruedasaprotectionagainsttheregularapplicationofthelawsand against the jurisdiction of legally constituted tribunals. Protection thusunderstoodwouldauthorizethediplomaticagenttoobstructtheapplicationofthe laws of the country whereas it is his duty to respect them… Such aconception, moreover, would come into conflict with one of the most firmlyestablishedtraditionsofLatin-America,namely,non-intervention[forexample,byColombiaintotheinternalaffairsofanotherStatelikePeru]….

16. Asylum may be granted on “humanitarian grounds to protect politicalprisonersagainsttheviolentanddisorderlyactionofirresponsiblesectionsofthepopulation.”(forexampleduringamobattackwheretheterritorialStateisunabletoprotecttheoffender).TorrewasnotinsuchasituationatthetimewhenhesoughtrefugeintheColombianEmbassyatLima.

17. The court concluded that the grant of asylum and reasons for itsprolongation were not in conformity with Article 2(2) of the HavanaConvention(p.25).

“Thegrantofasylumisnotaninstantaneousactwhichterminateswiththeadmission,atagivenmomentofarefugeetoanembassyoralegation.Anygrantofasylumresultsin,andinconsequence,logicallyimplies,astateofprotection,theasylumisgrantedaslongasthecontinuedpresenceoftherefugeeintheembassyprolongsthisprotection.”

NB:Thecourtalsodiscussedthedifferencebetweenextraditionandgrantingofasylum –you can readmoreon this inpp.12 –13of the judgment.ThediscussionsontheadmissibilityofthecounterclaimofPeruaresetoutinpp.18–19.