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Assignment on Interpretation of Statues
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BA.LLB 4th YEAR
ASSIGNMENT ON INTERPRETATION OF STATUES
INTRODUCTION
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
Constitutional Law is the body of those legal rules which determine the constitution of our
country and provides for the working and detailing of how the executive, legislature and
judiciary are to function and allocates power to them. It also delineates the rights, liberties and
duties of the citizens. It is the epitome of the national aspirations of a free political society.
The basic features of the Indian constitution are Democratic form of Government, federal
structure, unity and integrity of the nation, secularism, socialism, social justice and judicial
review1.
For an effective functioning of democracy where, the will of the people is the supreme, the
power should not be allowed to be concentrated in one place. Thus, the Constitution allocates
power for each its pillars - The function of the legislature is to produce laws. It is the duty of the
executive, namely the government to administer the laws and it is the judiciary which is
entrusted with interpretation of laws. Though often, for the prosperity of the nation and also for
upholding the rule of law, the judiciary proactively interprets the constitution for protecting the
basic structure.
ARTICLE 21 UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution says that:
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal except according to procedure established
by law"
Prior to Maneka Gandhi's Decision, Article 21 guaranteed the right to life and personal liberty to
citizens only against the arbitrary action of the executive and not from legislative action. The
state could interfere with the liberty of citizens if it could support its action by a valid law.
1 SR Bommai Vs. UOI, SCC 1918
But after Maneka Gandhi’s decision Article 21 now protects the right to life and personal liberty
of citizen not only from the Executive action but from Legislative action also. A person can be
deprived of his life and personal liberty if two condition are complied with:
There must be a law
There must a procedure prescribed by that law, provided that the procedure is just, fair
and reasonable.
The Supreme Court proactively has constructed and laid down several wonderful legal principles
such as fair procedure, natural justice, death sentence, delay in execution, minimum punishment,
preventive detention, wrongful detention of prisoners, handcuffs on prisoners, public hanging,
delay in bringing to trial, Compensation, environment protection, forests, housing , insane
persons, legal aid, passport, livelihood, suicide, radiation, roads, under trial prisoners, public
interest litigation, minimum wages, drugs, etc., etc. It is the Apex court which interpreted right to
information as a fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution, when the same was not
specifically mentioned in the Article, only to prevent corruption and white collar crimes
perpetuated by the people covering under the shield of public authority.
Interpretation not only means giving wider scope for the law it can also include striking down the
unwanted/unconstitutional laws, to serve the fast changing needs of the society ultimately, it is
the public good – maximum good for maximum number of people and achieve stability of the
society, the government, the judiciary and politics.
"RIGHT TO LIFE" UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.’ The right to life is undoubtedly
the most fundamental of all rights. All other rights add quality to the life in question and depend
on the pre-existence of life itself for their operation. As human rights can only attach to living
beings, one might expect the right to life itself to be in some sense primary, since none of the
other rights would have any value or utility without it. There would have been no Fundamental
Rights worth mentioning if Article 21 had been interpreted in its original sense.
'Life’ in Article 21 of the Constitution is not merely the physical act of breathing. It does not
connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life.
It has a much wider meaning which includes right to live with human dignity, right to livelihood,
right to health, right to pollution free air,etc. Right to life is fundamental to our very existence
without which we cannot live as human being and includes all those aspects of life which go to
make a man's life meaningful, complete and worth living. It is the only article in the Constitution
which has received the widest possible interpretation.
Under the canopy of Article 21 so many rights have found shelter, growth and nourishment.
Thus, the bare necessities, the minimum and basic requirements which are essential and
unavoidable for a person is the core concept of right to life.
RIGHT TO LIVE WITH HUMAN DIGNITY
In Maneka Gandhi's case2 the court give a new dimension to article 21, it held that the right to
'live' is not merely confined to physical existence but it includes within its ambit the right to live
with human dignity. Elaborating the same view the Court in Francis Coralie V. Union Territory
of Delhi3, said that the right to live is not restricted to mere animal existence. It means something
more than just physical survival. The right to 'live' is not confined to the protection of any faculty
or limb through which life is enjoyed or the soul communicates with the outside world but it also
includes "the right to live with human dignity", and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare
necessities of life such as, adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading,
writing and expressing ourselves in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and
commingling with fellow human being.
Following Maneka Gandhi and Francis Coralie cases the Supreme Court in Peoples Union for
Democratic Rights v. Union of India4, held that non-payment of minimum wages to the workers
employed in various Asiad Projects in Delhi was a denial to them of their right to live with basic
human dignity and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.
2 AIR 1981 SC 7463 AIR 1978 SC 5974 AIR 1982 SC 1473
Bhagwati, J., speaking for the majority held that the rights and benefits conferred on the
workmen employed by a contractor under various labour laws are "Clearly intended to ensure
basic human dignity to workmen and if the workmen are deprived of any of these rights and
benefits, that would clearly be a violation of Article 21. He held that the non-implementation by
the private contractors and non-enforcement by the State Authorities of the provisions of various
labour laws violated the fundamental 'right of workers "to live with human dignity'."
”This decision has heralded a new legal revolution. It has clothed millions of workers in
factories, fields, mines and projects sites with human dignity. They had fundamental right to
maximum wages, drinking water, shelter creches, medical aid and safety in respective
occupations covered by the various welfare legislations.”
In Chandra Raja Kumari v. Police Commissioner Hyderabad5, It has been held that the right to
live includes right to live with human dignity or decency and, therefore, holding of beauty
contest is repugnant to dignity or decency of women and offends Art. 21 of the Constitution. The
government is empowered to prohibit the contest as objectionable performance under Section 3
of the Andhra Pradesh Objectionable Performances Prohibition Act, 1956. If it is grossly
indecent scurrilous or obscene or intended for blackmailing.
RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD
In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation6, popularly known as the 'pavement dwellers
case' a five judge bench of the Court has finally ruled that the word 'life' in Article 21 includes
the 'right to livelihood' also.
The court said "It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for
example, by the imposition and execution of death sentence, except according to procedure
established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that
right is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of livelihood. If the
right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest ways of
depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood.
5 AIR 1998 AP 3026 AIR 1986 SC 180
In view of the fact that Articles 39(a) and 41 require the State to secure to the citizen an adequate
means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pendentary to exclude the right to
livelihood from the content of the right to life."
In that case the petitioners had challenged the validity of Sections 313, 313-A, 314 and 497 of
the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 which empowered the Municipal Authorities to
remove their huts from pavement and public places on the grounded that their removal amounted
to depriving them of their right to livelihood and hence it was violative of Article 21. While
agreeing that the right to livelihood is included in Article 21 the Court held that it can be curbed
or curtailed by following just and fair procedure.
It was held that the above sections of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act were
Constitutional since they imposed reasonable restrictions on the right of livelihood of pavement
and slum dwellers in the interest of the general public. Public streets are not meant for carrying
on trade or business. However, the Court took a humanistic view and in order to minimize their
hardships involved in the eviction it directed the Municipal Authorities to remove them only
after the end of the current monsoon season. The Court also directed the Corporation to frame a
scheme for demarcating hawking and non-hawking zones and give them licenses for selling their
goods in hawking zones. License in hawking zones cannot be refused except for good reasons.
RIGHT TO DIE
Right to die - Not a fundamental Right under Art. 21.—the question whether the right to die is
included in Art. 21 of the Constitution came for consideration for the first time before the
Bombay High Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maruty Sripati Dubal7.
The Bombay High Court held that the right to life guaranteed by Art. 21 includes a right to die,
and consequently the court struck down Section 309, IPC which provides punishment for attempt
to commit suicide by a person as unconstitutional. The Judges felt that the desire to die is not
unnatural but merely abnormal and uncommon. They listed several circumstances in which
people may wish to end their lives, including disease, cruel or unbearable condition of life, a
sense of shame or disenchantment with life.
7 (1987) Cr.LJ 549
They held that everyone should have the freedom to dispose of his life as and when he desires. In
this case a Bombay Police Constable who was mentally deranged was refused permission to set
up a shop and earn a living. Out of frustration he tried to set himself afire in the corporation's
office room.
On the other hand, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chenna Jagadeeswar v. State of A.P8., held
that the right to die is not a fundamental right within the meaning of Art. 21 and hence Section
309, I.P.C. is not unconstitutional.
In P. Rathinam v. Union of India9 a Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Mr. Justice
R. M. Sahai and Mr. Justice Hansaria agreeing with the view of the Bombay High Court in
Maruti Sripati Dubal case10 held that a person has a "right to die" and declared Section 309 of the
Indian Penal Code unconstitutional which makes "attempt to commit suicide" a penal offence.
The "right to live" in Art. 21 of the Constitution includes the "right not to live", i.e., right to die
or to terminate one's life. In the present case the petitioners had challenged the validity of Section
309 on the ground that it was violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution and prayed for
quashing the proceedings initiated against the petitioner (Nagbhushan) under Section 309
pending in the Court Sub-Judge, Gunpur in the District of Koraput, Orissa for attempting to
commit suicide.
The Court held that Section 309 of the IPC was violative of Art. 21 and hence it is void. A
person cannot be forced to enjoy right to life to his detriment, disadvantage or disliking. The
Court held that Section 309 of the I.P.C. was "a cruel and irrational provision". The Court held
that "right to life of which Art. 21 of the Constitution speaks of can be said to bring in its trial the
right not to live a forced life". Explaining the reason for its decision the Court said that "Section
309 I.P.C., deserves to be effaced from the Statute Book to humanize our penal laws. It is a cruel
and irrational provision and may result in punishing a person again (Doubly) who has suffered
agony and would be undergoing ignominy because of his failure to commit suicide."
8 (1988) CR. LJ 5499 (1994) 3 SCC 39410 (1987) Cr.LJ 549
However, the Court rejected the plea that "euthanasia (mercy killing) should be permitted by
law. The Judges said that they would not decide this point as firstly it is beyond the scope of the
present petition and secondly also because in euthanasia a third person is either actively or
passively involved about whom it may be said that he aids or abets the killing of another person.
There is a distinction between an attempt of a person to take his life and action of some others to
bring to an end the life of a third person such a distinction can be made on principle and is
conceptually permissible.
The court who rejected the contention that Section 309, I.P.C. was violative of Art. 14 on the
ground that attempt to commit suicide is undefined and unguided.
Attempt to commit suicide has ceased to be legal offence in most countries. The Court approved
the decision of the Bombay High Court in Maruti Shripati Dubal v. State of Maharashtra.
This Judgment may have come as a hope of liberation to some who are in a very depressed and
irreversible state of mind or body, without fear of any punishment should their attempt fail but
what about its effect on the young immature minds which tend to act or react in desperate haste?
In this respect the author's criticism of Shripati Dubal's decision is still justified particularly in
dowry cases in India. In most of the dowry deaths accused takes the plea that the deceased has
committed suicide while it is generally otherwise. How such cases could be tackled in view of
this judgment? Again suicide owing to frustration in love, failure in examinations and failure to
get a job or even a job or promotions in service would raise many social problems.
Is individual capable of taking a decision to end his life in such conditions? Does he not owe a
responsibility towards the society to overcome these human frailties and live for it? In Indian
tradition escapism has never been approved as the philosophy of life.
In Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab11 a five judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has now
overruled the P. Rathinam's case and, rightly, held that "right to life" under Art. 21 of the
Constitution does not include "right to die" or "right to be killed" "The right to die", is inherently
inconsistent with the "right to life" as is "death with life"
Delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court Mr. Justice J.S. Verma, observed:—11 1996 2 SCC 648
"Any aspect of life which makes it dignified may be read into Art. 21 of the Constitution
but not that which extinguishes it and is, therefore inconsistent with the continued
existence of life resulting in effacing the right itself-.
"Right to life" is a natural right embodied in Art. 21 but suicide is an unnatural
termination or extinction of life and, incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of
"right to life".
Referring to protagonists of euthanasia's view that existence in persistent vegetative state
was not a benefit to the patient of terminal illness being unrelated to principle of "sanctity
of life" or the "right to live with dignity" the Court said that this argument was of no
assistance to determine the scope of Art. 21 of the Constitution for deciding whether the
guarantee of "right to life" therein includes the "right to die".
The Court made it clear that the "right to life" including the right to live with human dignity
would mean the existence of such a right upto the end of natural life. This also includes the right
to a dignified life upto the point of death including a dignified procedure of death.
This may include the right of a dying man to also die with dignity when his life is ebbing out.
But the "right to die", with dignity at the end of life is not to be confused with the "right to die"
an unnatural death curtailing the natural span of life. The Court reiterated that the argument to
support the views of permitting termination of life in such cases (dying man who is terminally ill
or in a vegetative state) by accelerating the process of natural death when it was certain and
imminent was not available to interpret Art. 21 to include therein the right to curtail the natural
span of life.
The Court, accordingly held that Section 309 of IPC is not violative of Art. 21 of the
Constitution. The Court also rejected the contention. that Section 309 of IPC is violative of Art.
14 and said that the debate on the desirability of retaining such a penal provision of punishing
attempted suicide (Section 309), including the recommendation for its delegation by the Law
Commission is not sufficient to indicate that the provision is constitutional being violative of Art.
14.
The Court said that the desirability of bringing about such a change is the function of the
legislature which may by enacting suitable law providing adequate safeguards to prevent any
possible abuse.
The Court set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Maruti Sripati Dubal v. State of
Maharashtra and the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Rathincim v. Union of India cases
wherein Section 309 IPC was held to be constitutional and upheld the judgment of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court holding that Section 309 of the IPC was not violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of
the Constitution.
EUTHANASIA
In Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaugh v. Union of India12, a writ petition was filed by Ms. Pinki
Virani of Mumbai claiming to be the next friend of Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaugh with a prayer
for direction to the respondent to stop feeding and let Aruna die peacefully.
The facts were that Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaugh who was a staff nurse in King Edward
Memorial Hospital, Parel, Mumbai, was attacked on 27th Nov. 1973 by a sweeper in the hospital
by wrapping a dog chain around her neck and yanking her back with it. He tried to rape her but
find her menstruating sodomised her. To immobilize her during it, he twisted the chain around
her neck.
Next day, a cleaner found her lying on the floor with blood all over in an unconscious state. It
was alleged that due to strangulation by the dog chain, the supply of oxygen to the brain stopped
and her brain got damaged. There was damage to cortex or some other part of the brain and brain
stem contusion injury with associated cervical cord injury. The incident had occurred about 36
years of her age and she was at the time of the judgment of Court 60 years' of age. Her physical
condition was alleged to be very weak. She was reduced to a skeleton and was of feather weight.
She had bed sores and was in a persistent vegetative state. Her brain was virtually dead. She
could be given only smashed food by putting it in her mouth.
On the basis of the report submitted by a Committee of Doctors constituted by the Supreme
Court, it was found that Aruna Shanbaugh had some brain activity, though very little. She 12 AIR 2011 SC 1290
recognized the persons around her and expressed her like or dislike by making some vocal sound
and waving her hand by certain movements. She smiled if she received her favorite food, fish
and chicken soup. She breathed normally. Her pulse rate and respiratory rate and blood pressure
were normal. She did not need a heart lung machine. She was able to blink well and could see
her doctors.
In an attempt to feed her through mouth, she accepted a spoonful of water, some sugar, and
smashed banana. She also licked the sugar and banana paste sticking on her upper lips and
swallowed it. She would get disturbed when many people entered her room but she offered to
calm down when touched or caressed gently. She digested food and her body performed other
involuntary functions without any help. She, in all probability, was to continue in the state in
which she was in till her death. She met most of the criteria for being in a permanent vegetative
stage of 37 years. Her dementia did not progress and remained stable for many years. Her parents
were dead and her close relatives had no interest in her since she had unfortunate assault on her.
Regarding the withdrawal of life support to a person in PVS or who was otherwise incompetent
to take a decision in this connection, the Supreme Court in a two Judges Bench decision, Justice
Markandey Katju and Justice Gyan Sudha Misra, laid down the law of passive euthanasia to
continue till the law made by Parliament on the subject, as follows:
A decision has to be taken to discontinue life support either by parents or the spouse or
other close relatives, or in the absence of any of them, such a decision can be taken even
by a person or a body of persons acting as a next friend. It can also be taken by the
doctors attending the patient. However, the decision should be taken bona fide in the best
interest of the patient.
It was hospital staff taking care of Aruna for a long, they were really her friends who
could take such a decision but they clearly expressed their wish of Aruna to be allowed to
live. If the hospital staff at some future time changes its mind, it would have to apply to
the Bombay High Court for approval of decision to withdraw life-support.
Even if a decision is taken by the near relatives or doctors or next friend to withdraw life
support, such a decision requires approval from the High Court concerned as there is
always a risk that the provision may be misused by some unscrupulous persons with the
help of some unscrupulous doctors by fabricating material to show that it was a terminal
case with no chance of recovery.
This is in the interest of the protection of the patient, protection of the doctors, relative
and next friend, and for reassurance of the patient's family as well as the public. This is
also in consonance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae (55-IMPT) which is a well-known
principle of law. The High Court under Article 226 of Constitution can grant approval for
withdrawal of life support to such an incompetent person.
A petition can be made to the High Court to pass suitable orders under Article 226 of the
Constitution praying for an order or direction and not for any writ. Hence, Article 226
gives abundant power to the High Court to pass suitable orders on the application filed by
the near relatives or next friend or the doctors/hospital staff praying for permission to
withdraw the life-support to an incompetent person of the kind above-mentioned.
RIGHT TO GET POLLUTION FREE WATER AND AIR
In Subhas Kumar v. State of Bihar13, it has been held that public interest litigation is
maintainable for ensuring enjoyment of pollution free water and air which is included in the
"right to live" under Art. 21 of the Constitution.
PROTECTION OF ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P14., the Court ordered the closure of
certain lime stone quarries on the ground that there were serious deficiencies regarding safety
and hazards in them. The Court had appointed a committee for the purpose of inspecting certain
lime stone-quarries. The Committee had suggested the closure of certain categories of stone
quarries having regard to adverse impact of mining operations therein. A large scale pollution
was caused by lime stone quarries adversely affecting the safety and health of the people living
in the area.
In Shiram,' Food and Fertilizer case15 the Supreme Court directed the company manufacturing
hazardous and lethal chemicals and gases posing danger to health and life of workmen and
people living in its neighborhood, to take all necessary safety measures before reopening the
13 AIR 1991 SC 42014 1985 2 SCC 43115 M.C Mehta Vs. Union Of India
plant. There was a leakage of Chlorine gas from the plant resulting in death of one person and
causing hardships to workers and residents of the locality. This was due to the negligence of the
management in maintenance and operation of the caustic chlorine plant of the Company.
The matter was brought, before the Court through a public interest litigation. The management
was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 20 lacs by way of security for payment of compensation
claims of the victims of Oleum gas leak with the Registrar of the Court. In addition, a bank
guarantee for a sum of Rs. 15 lacs was also directed to be deposited which shall be encashed in
case of any escape of Chlorine, gas within a period of three years from the date of the judgment
resulting in death or injury to any workman or any person living in the vicinity. Subject of these
conditions the Court allowed the partial reopening of the plant.
The efforts of the highest Court in environment pollution control through public interest
litigation is indeed laudable particularly when the Legislature is lagging behind in bridging the
lacuna in the existing legal system and administration is not well equipped to meet the challenge.
CONCLUSION
Right to life is a fundamental right. No doubt this right, like all fundamental rights, is subject to
reasonable restrictions, but the reasonability of the restriction must be judged from the point of
view of the prevailing social conditions, and not in the abstract. Hence what may have been
reasonable earlier may no longer be reasonable today. The social conditions existing at the time
when the constitution was made may be very different from the present conditions, and hence if
we interpret the constitution from the angle of the constitution-makers, we may arrive at a
completely outdated and unrealistic view. One has necessarily to make the broad factual
situations contemplated by the particular national interest whose advancement is proposed by the
legislation. Traditional norms of statutory interpretation must yield to broader notions of the
national interest.
BIBLOGRAPHY
BOOKS:
1. Dr. J.N. PANDEY, THE CONSTITUTION LAW OF INDIA, 248 (CENTRAL LAW AGENCY, ALLAHABAD, 50th EDITION 2013).
WEBSITES:
1. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION AVAILABLE AT : http://guide2lawyers.blogspot.in/2012/06/judicial-interpretation-of-article-21.html(Last Visited on 23rd September 23, 2015)