Assign No 5 Consti

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ASSIGN NO 5 CONSTI

1. LUTZ VS. ARANETA [98 Phil 148; G.R. No. L-7859; 22 Dec 1955]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to

recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal Revenue, the sum of money paid by the estate as

taxes, pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act, taxes are levied on the owners or

persons in control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the

collections made under said Act shall be for aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz contends

that such purpose is not a matter of public concern hence making the tax levied for that cause

unconstitutional and void. The Court of First Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before the

Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act 567) is

unconstitutional.

Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied with a

regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry.

Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and

advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public

concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable

bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are

alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their

prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made with the implement of the state’s police power. Inaddition, it is only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore,

the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.

2. Sison vs ancheta

Doctrines:

Where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed

rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for of such persuasive character as would lead to such a

conclusion. Thus, mere allegations of arbitrariness do not suffice.

Where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or,

in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process grounds.

At any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has

been repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or

exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.

The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly

attainable. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of

taxation. In this regard, the Court constantly held that classification, if rational in character, is allowable.

Facts:

A suit for declaratory relief or prohibition was filed by petitioner Sison, challenging the

constitutionality of Section I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, amending Section 21 of the National InternalRevenue Code of 1977, which provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation

income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and

yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements,

(e) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross

income.

Petitioner as taxpayer alleges that by virtue of such provision, "he would be unduly discriminated

against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-

a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. He further contends that

such law is arbitrary, amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character and that it

transgresses both the equal and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as the rule requiring

uniformity in taxation.

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Issue:

Whether or not Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 is constitutional.

Held:

A mere allegation of arbitrariness, as here, does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of

such unconstitutional taint This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that where the due processand equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad

standards, there is a need for of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a

showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.

It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that

it finds no support in the Constitution. It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the

jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and

unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process grounds.

Now for equal protection. The applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial of this

constitutional mandate, whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the police power or the power of

eminent domain, is to demonstrated that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the

attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination

that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons

under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being

different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. That same formulation applies as well to

taxation measures. The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be

treated in law as though they were the same." Hence, the constant reiteration of the view that classification if

rational in character is allowable. As a matter of fact, in a leading case of Lutz V. Araneta, this Court, through

Justice J.B.L. Reyes, went so far as to hold "at any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to

select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that ‘inequalities which result from a singlingout of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'"

Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of uniformity. According to the Constitution: "The

rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable." This requirement is met according to Justice Laurel in

Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco, decided in 1940, when the tax "operates with the same force and effect in

every place where the subject may be found. " He likewise added: "The rule of uniformity does not call for

perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable." The taxing power has the authority

to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation.

Apparently, what misled petitioner is his failure to take into consideration the distinction between a

tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all

deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified into

different categories. To repeat, it is enough that the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that

make real differences. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the

discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules

removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be

applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As thereis practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax

purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals

in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to

produce their income.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

3. Lladoc vs commissioner of internal revenue

Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr.

Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the

construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for suchpurpose.

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29,

1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the

Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish

priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as

the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.



Held: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution

contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes

contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for

religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter

vivos.

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the

donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.

4. Philex mining vs commissioner of internal revenue

TAXATION LAW

TAX EXEMPTION; Since the partial refund authorized under sec. 5, R.A. 1435 is in the nature of a tax

exemption, it must be construed stictissimi juris against the grantee.

FACTS: Petitioner Philex Mining Corporation entered into a Mining License Agreement with the then Ministry

of Natural Resources (now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources). From the period 1980 to

1981, petitioner purchased from several oil companies, refined and manufactured mineral oils, motor fuels

and diesel fuel oils. The specific taxes passed on to the petitioner amounted to P 2,492,677.22. Thereafter,

pursuant to R.A. 1435, petitioner filed a claim for tax refund with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for P

623,169.30, representing 25% of the specific taxes actually paid. Pending CIR action, petitioner filed a case for

tax refund with the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA rendered its decision, granting the petitioner's claim, but

only to the extent of P 16,747.36. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CTA. Petitioner now

contends that since it paid the taxes based on the increased rates (under the NIRC), its 25% refund must also

be based on the increased rates.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court erred in basing the tax refund under sec. 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435,

instead of the increased rates imposed by sec. 142 and 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as

amended.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Although Philex Mining corporation paid the taxes on their

oil and fuel purchases based on the increased rates pursuant to the provisions of the NIRC, the latter law did

not specifically provide for a refund based on the increased rates. Since the grant of refund privileges must be

strictly construed against the taxpayer, the basis for the refund remains to be the amounts deemed paid

under sec. 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435. Since the partial refund authorized under sec. 5, R.A. 1435 is in the nature of a

tax exemption, it must be construed stictissimi juris against the grantee. For this reason, petitioner's claim for

refund on the basis of the specific taxes it actually paid must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a

language too clear to be mistaken. When the law itself does not explicitly provide that a refund under R.A.

1435 may be based on higher rates which were non-existent at the time of its enactment, the Court cannot

presume otherwise. A legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. [Philex Mining Corporation vs.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue and CA; G.R. No. 120324; April 21, 1999; Second Division---

Quisumbing, J.]

5. Chavez vs pcgg

Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744

FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the people’s constitu tional

right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to

information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the

national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements

pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the

scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?

HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG

and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information

on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of

ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government,

not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the

stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory”

stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in

general -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence

and other classified information.



6. Landtex vs Salvador ayson and federation of free workers

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated 13 February 2001 and of the Resolution

dated 16 October 2001 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 50060. The Decision

ordered petitioners Landtex Industries (Landtex) and William Go to award respondent Salvador M. Ayson

(Ayson) separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and

attorney’s fees.

The Fact

Landtex, a sole proprietorship owned by Alex Go and managed by William Go, is a business enterprise

engaged in the manufacture of garments. Ayson worked in Landtex as a knitting operator from 19 May 1979

to 6 July 1996. Ayson was an officer of Landtex Industries Workers Union – Federation of Free Workers

(union) which had an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Landtex.

Ayson received a letter from Landtex dated 16 March 1996 which stated that Ayson committed acts

contrary to company policies on 2 and 7 March 1996. The letter required Ayson to explain in writing within

24 hours from receipt why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for spreading damaging rumors

about the personal life of an unspecified person, and for having an altercation with one of the company’s

owners when he was asked to submit an ID picture.

Ayson replied in writing that he could not defend himself from the charge of spreading damaging

rumors because Landtex’s letter failed to state what rumors he was supposed to have spread. Ayson further

explained that he merely replied in a loud voice to t he company owner’s request because he was carrying

textiles. Ayson then apologized for his actions.

Landtex sent Ayson another letter dated 2 April 1996 informing him of its receipt of his explanation.

Landtex informed Ayson that the omission of the details about the damaging rumors was intentional because

other employees might be able to read the letter. Furthermore, Landtex decided to conduct an investigationon 26 April 1996 in view of Ayson’s denials.

The first meeting between Ayson and Landtex’s counsel took place on 26 April 1996. The minutes of the

26 April 1996 meeting state that Ayson was informed that there were witnesses who could testify that he

spread rumors about the personal life of William Go and his family. Ayson denied that he spread rumors and

requested for another meeting so that he could hear the alleged witnesses and defend himself. Ayson further

requested that the next investigation be held at Landtex’s Mauban office because he and the union officers

accompanying him suffer salary deductions for their attendance of investigations during office hours.

Another meeting was scheduled for 5 May 1996, but Ayson was unable to attend it and went home early

because he allegedly needed to look after his child.

The second meeting between Ayson and Landtex’s counsel took place on 5 June 1996. The minutes of

the 5 June 1996 meeting state that Ayson and a union officer accompanying him appeared but refused to sign

the attendance sheet or to participate. Landtex’s counsel, Atty. Generosa Jacinto, made a note in the minutes

which reads, “Pls. advise mgt. They can take any action they want.”



In a letter dated 19 June 1996, Landtex terminated Ayson’s services effective 30 June 1996 because of

Ayson’s lack of cooperation during the investigations. Despite this notice, Ayson still reported for work until

6 July 1996.

In a letter dated 8 July 1996, the union president requested Landtex for a formal dialogue regarding

Ayson’s case. Landtex reaffirmed its decision to terminate Ayson in meetings with the union held on 10 and

16 July 1996. Landtex and the union agreed to refer the matter to a third party in accordance with the

provisions of law and of the CBA. Landtex expected Ayson to refer the issue to the National Conciliation and

Mediation Board (NCMB) for the selection of a voluntary arbitrator. Ayson and the union, however, filed a

complaint before the labor arbiter.

The labor arbiter conducted mandatory conferences for amicable settlement with the participation of all

parties. The parties agreed to the idea of payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement but differed as to

the amount. Ayson wanted to receive one month basic salary for every year of service while Landtex wanted

to pay only one-half month basic salary for every year of service from date of hiring to termination of

employment. The parties were not able to settle; hence, the labor arbiter ordered them to submit their

position papers.

In his position paper, Ayson asked whether his dismissal from employment has any just cause. Ayson

also asked whether Landtex complied with procedural due process when it terminated his employment.

On the other hand, Landtex and William Go revealed in their position paper that Ayson was seen having

a drinking session with other Landtex employees near the company premises. A Landtex security guard, who

was a part of the drinking session but whose identity was not revealed, stated that Ayson maliciously

narrated spiteful stories about the personal life of William Go. Landtex also questioned the jurisdiction of the

labor arbiter over Ayson’s case. Landtex insisted that the labor arbiter should dismiss Ayson’s case and refer

it to the NCMB for the selection of a voluntary arbitrator.

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On 30 September 1997, the labor arbiter promulgated his decision which ruled in favor of Ayson. The

labor arbiter declared that despite the union’s manifestation of its desire to refer Ayson’s case to “a third

party in accordance with provisions of law and CBA,” this manifestation did not affect Landtex’s termination

of Ayson’s employment. Ayson’s termination thus properly falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.

Moreover, the labor arbiter did not find any evidence supporting Landtex’s allegations that Ayson spread

malicious rumors about William Go or shouted at William Go’s wife. The pertinent portions of the labor

arbiter’s decision read:

Dismissal of a worker is no trifling matter; more so, of herein [Ayson] who had been employed with

[Landtex] for seventeen years, more or less. The dismissal must be for a just cause, let alone with dueprocess, and must be based on substantial evidence. Mere allegations will not suffice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [Landtex Industries and

William Go] to reinstate [Ayson] to his former position without loss of seniority rights with full backwages

from the date his salary has been withheld until the actual date of reinstatement.

[Landtex Industries and William Go] are further ordered to pay ten (10%) percent of [Ayson’s] total

monetary award as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.



Landtex and William Go appealed the labor arbiter’s decision to the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC). Landtex and William Go posted a bond in the amount of the total award in the labor

arbiter’s decision to perfect their appeal and to enjoin the execution of the decision. Landtex and William Go

insisted that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter in the present

case.

The Ruling of the NLRC

On 20 July 1998, the NLRC promulgated its decision which agreed with Landtex and William Go’s

argument that Ayson’s case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrators, as

provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code. Landtex merely imposed a disciplinary measure when it

terminated Ayson’s employment. Furthermore, the NLRC ruled that Ayson waived his right to have his case

heard before any other forum when he did not undergo the grievance process mandated by his union’s CBA

with Landtex. The NLRC declared that the disciplinary action meted out by Landtex to Ayson and the waiver

of Ayson’s right to have his case heard were matters which require the interpretation of the CBA, and thus

were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrators. The dispositive portion of the

NLRC’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction

over the subject matter. The instant case is hereby referred to Voluntary Arbitration in accordance with the

Collective Bargaining Agreement.

SO ORDERED.

The NLRC dismissed Ayson and the union’s motion for reconsideration on 11 September 1998. Ayson

and the union then filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court.

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

In a decision promulgated on 13 February 2001, the appellate court sustained the jurisdiction of the

labor arbiter and modified the award in favor of Ayson. The appellate court further stated that the records

are “bereft of any showing that a grievance mediation had been undertaken so as to thresh out any

disciplinary measure against [Ayson].” The appellate court took Landtex and William Go to task because they

took “the avenue of least resistance” and discussed the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of filing a

motion to dismiss before the labor arbiter. Moreover, the appellate court found that Ayson was illegally

dismissed because his termination was characterized by “bad faith, [and] wan ton and reckless exercise of

management prerogative.” Landtex’s allegations against Ayson failed to show that Ayson’s dismissal was for

a just cause. The appellate court awarded Ayson full backwages, separation pay (equivalent to one month’s

pay for every year of service, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year) in lieu of

reinstatement, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and attorney’s fees. The dispositive portion of the

decision of the appellate court reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED— and the decision (promulgated on July20, 1998) and the resolution (promulgated on September 11, 1998) of the public respondent (National Labor

Relations Commission) in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-04492-92 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The

decision of the labor arbiter, which was rendered on September 30, 1997 is hereby REINSTATED—subject,

however, to the MODIFICATION that separation pay shall be awarded to [Ayson] in lieu of reinstatement. No

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Landtex and William Go filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision. Ayson and

the union also contested the appellate court’s award of separation pay in lieu of reinst atement. The appellate

court dismissed both motions in a resolution promulgated on 16 October 2001.



Landtex and William Go then filed a petition for review before this Court on 11 December 2001. Ayson

and the union also filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 150392, but this petition was withdrawn

as Ayson no longer desired to question the resolution of the appellate court. Emilia P. Ayson, respondent

Ayson’s wife, later made a manifestation that she would like to represent Ayson in the present case since her

husband died on 28 August 2002. She attached Ayson’s death certificate and their marriage certificate toprove her allegations.

When Landtex and William Go filed their memorandum in the present case, they stated that Landtex

started to suffer serious business reverses in the first quarter of 2001. Landtex’s cutting and knitting

departments temporarily closed in December 2002, and Landtex permanently ceased its operations in

February 2003. Landtex and William Go attached Landtex’s notice of closure to the union dated 9 January

2003, Landtex’s balance sheets for the years 2000 to 2002, Landtex’s profit and loss statements for the years

2000 to 2002, notice of extra-judicial sale of the property of spouses Alex and Nancy Go, demand letters

addressed to Alex Go, and unpaid utility bills in the name of Alex Go to prove their allegations.

The Issues

Landtex and William Go raise the following issues before this Court:

A. Whether the NLRC correctly ruled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

instant case pertains exclusively to the voluntary arbitrator considering that

1. The existing CBA provides that “a grievance is one that arises from the

interpretation or implementation of this agreement, including disciplinary

action imposed on any covered employee”; and

2. The parties have undergone the grievance machinery of the collectivebargaining agreement.

B. Whether the instant case concerns enforcement and implementation of company

personnel policy and that the issue therein was timely raised.

C. Whether there is a valid ground for termination of the employment of [Ayson].

D. Whether [Ayson] is entitled to backwages and separation pay.

E. Whether [the appellate court] committed grave and patent abuse of discretion and

errors of law in setting aside the decision of the NLRC.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

The Labor Arbiter’s Jurisdiction

Landtex and William Go insist that the matter subject of the present petition is covered by the CBA’s

provision on voluntary arbitration and thus is excluded from the labor arbiter’s jurisdiction. They allege that

Ayson’s termination merely enforced Landtex’s personnel policy against misconduct. They further claim that

the union’s request for a formal dialogue signified the initiation of the grievance procedure outlined in the

CBA. Landtex and William Go even assert that because of Ayson’s failure to submit his cla im before the

NCMB, he is barred from seeking relief from a forum other than that provided in the CBA.

Section 1 of Article XV, Grievance Procedure, of the union’s CBA with Landtex reads:



Grievance Machinery . — For purposes of this Agreement, a grievance is one that arises from the

interpretation or implementation of this Agreement, including disciplinary action imposed on any covered

employee. Any grievance, dispute, or complaint which a covered employee or UNION may have against the

COMPANY: (a) relative to the meaning, interpretation and application of the terms of this agreement; or (b)

arising out of the employment relationship, shall be submitted to the grievance machinery in accordance with

the following procedure:

Step I The employee shall present his grievance, dispute, or complaint in

writing to the COMPANY’s Section Head/In Charge and to theUNION’s authorized representative, and thereupon the said

Section Head and UNION representative shall endeavor to work

out a settlement within four (4) working days from presentation.

Step II If, under Step I, no settlement is reached within four (4) working

days from presentation, the grievance shall be taken up by the

UNION representative with the General Manager.

Step III If, under Step II, no settlement is reached within four (4) working

days, the grievance shall be referred by the parties to the

Management-Employee Committee.

Step IV If under Step III, no settlement is reached within eight (8) working

days, the grievance shall be referred by both parties to the

National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for

submission to voluntary arbitration in accordance with NCMB’srules within ten (10) days from the date of the last meeting of the

Management-Employee Committee.

Where the grievance or complaint involves the UNION directly, Steps I and II of the foregoing procedure shall

be dispensed with and only Steps III and IV shall be followed.

Articles 217, 261, and 262 of the Labor Code tackle the jurisdiction of labor arbiters and voluntary

arbitration as follows:

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) Except as otherwise provided under

this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty

(30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the

absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-

agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages,

rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-

employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the

legality of strikes and lockouts; and

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all

other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or

household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of

whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor

Arbiters.

(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and

those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed

of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as

may be provided in said agreements.



Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. - The Voluntary

Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide

all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining

Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred

to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except

those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as

grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic

provisions of such agreement.

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and

Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction

of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the

same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

ART. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair

labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.

The labor arbiter, the appellate court, and the NLRC differed in their rulings on the matter of

jurisdiction. The labor arbiter and the appellate court agreed with Ayson and the union’s position. The labor

arbiter assumed jurisdiction and emphasized that when the union met with Landtex on 8 July 1996, Ayson

was no longer an employee because Landtex terminated him effective 30 June 1996. The manifestation of the

union’s desire to “refer the matter to a third party in accordance with law and the CBA” does not deviate from

the fact that Ayson was already dismissed. On the other hand, the NLRC sustained Landtex and William Go’s

position. The NLRC asserted that the determination of whether Ayson’s dismissal constitutes a “disciplinary

action” within the scope of the CBA calls for an interpretation of the CBA. When the union called for a

meeting with Landtex, the union effectively initiated the grievance procedure. Thus, Ayson’s case should have

been subjected to voluntary arbitration.

We agree with Ayson and the union and affirm the rulings of the labor arbiter and the appellate court.

Article 261 of the Labor Code provides that voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of

the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company

personnel policies. On the other hand, a reading of Article 217 in conjunction with Article 262 shows that

termination disputes fall under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter unless the union and the company agree

that termination disputes should be submitted to voluntary arbitration. Such agreement should be clear and

unequivocal. Existing law is an intrinsic part of a valid contract without need for the parties to expressly refer

to it. Thus, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over unfair labor practices, termination

disputes, and claims for damages cannot be arrogated into the powers of voluntary arbitrators in the absence

of an express agreement between the union and the company.

In the present case, the CBA between Landtex and the union does not clearly state that termination

disputes, as opposed to mere disciplinary actions, are covered by the CBA. The CBA defined a grievance as

“one that arises from the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement, including disciplinary action

imposed on any covered employee.” The CBA did not explicitly state that termination disputes should be

submitted to the grievance machiner

The CBA’s provisions on grievance directly involving the union state that the grievance shall be referred

by the parties to the Management-Employee Committee. The Management-Employee Committee shall be

composed of three representatives each from the union and Landtex. According to the minutes of the

meeting prepared by Landtex’s counsel, when the union met with Landtex on 10 July 1996, there were seven

union members and two Landtex representatives in attendance. The minutes of the meeting read:



The mgt.’s position is that it will no longer reconsider the termination of Mr. Ayson. The union on the

other hand opened discussion of other possibilities in lieu of reinstatement.

The union requested for time to study possibilities. The mgt. will do likewise.

Reset 16 July 96[,] 5 pm at factory.

The next meeting proceeded with the same number of representatives from both parties. The minutes of the

meeting state that there was “[n]o settlement. Union will refer matter to third party in accordance with

provision of law and CBA.”

We find nothing in the records which shows that the meetings between the union and Landtex already

constitute the grievance machinery as mandated by the CBA. The meetings happened only after the

effectivity of Ayson’s termination. The meetings did not comply with the requisite number of participants.

The CBA mandated that there should be three representatives each from the union and Landtex but there

were seven union members and two Landtex representatives who attended the meetings. More importantly,

there was nothing in the minutes that shows that the attendees constituted a Management-Employee

Committee.

Finally, the appellate court is correct in stating that if Landtex really believed that the labor arbiter did

not have jurisdiction over the present case, then Landtex should have filed a motion to dismiss in accordance

with Section 15, Rule V of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Instead of filing a motion to dismiss,

Landtex participated in the proceedings before the labor arbiter. Had Landtex immediately filed a motion to

dismiss, the labor arbiter would have determined the issue outright before proceeding with hearing the case.

In the present case, Landtex raised the issue of jurisdiction only after the labor arbiter required the parties to

submit their position papers.

Validity of Ayson’s Dismissal

The requisites for a valid dismissal are (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in

Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (2) the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself. Landtex and

William Go assert that Ayson’s termination was for a just cause as defi ned in Article 282 of the Labor Code;

hence, the two-notice rule should be followed.

The contents of Landtex’s first memorandum to Ayson, signed by Landtex’s counsel, read:

Ipinagbigay-alam sa amin ng pamahalaang Landtex Industries and [sic] tungkol sa nangyaring insidente

nuong ika-2 at 7 Marso 1996.

Ayon sa isang saksi, ikaw ay nagkakalat ng mga balitang nakakasira sa aming personal na buhay. Bukod pa

dito nuong ika-7 ng Marso ng ikaw ay hingan ng iyong ID pictures bilang isa sa mga regulasyon ng kompanya,

ikaw ay sumungaw sa harap pa mismo ng nagmamay-ari ng kompanya na naging dahilan upang

magkasagutan kayo.

Iyong nalalaman na ang ganitong gawain ay taliwas sa umiiral na patakaran ng kompanya. Bunga nito[,] ikaw

ay hinihingan ng nakasulat na paliwanag 24 oras mula sa pagkakatanggap ng liham na ito. Ang hindi mopagsunod ay nangangahulugan na maaari ng gumawa ng susunod na aksyong pang-disiplina and [sic]

kompanya laban sa iyo.

Landtex then summoned Ayson on 26 April 1996 to a meeting to investigate the 2 and 7 March 1996

incidents. The minutes of the 26 April 1996 meeting read:

Mr. Ayson was apprised of the incident that happened on March 2 & 7 wherein it was alleged that he is

spreading some rumors involving [the] personal life of Mr. Go and his family. He was informed that there

were witnesses who can testify on this.



Mr. Ayson however requested that another investigaton be conducted wherein the alleged witnesses be

presented since he cannot answer whether what was reported was true or not. He further denies allegations

that he is spreading said rumors.

Mr. Ayson together with union officers requested that investigation be conducted instead at Mauban,

Quezon City since they are being deducted everytime they attend investigations like this during office hours.

Mr. Ayson & union to be notified when another investigation [will] be scheduled.

The next meeting was held on 5 June 1996. The minutes of the meeting read:

Mr. Ferdinand Samson, union Sgt. at Arms [and] Mr. Salvador Ayson appeared but refused to sign

attendance or participate in [the] investigation. Accord. to them, they will consult FFW.

Landtex informed Ayson of its decision to terminate his services in a letter dated 19 June 1996. The

letter, signed by Landtex’s counsel, reads:

Landtex and William Go, in their appeal before the NLRC, stated that paragraphs (a) and (d) of Article

282 were applicable to Ayson. They added that the employer, exercising management prerogative, has the

right to protect its interest by imposing the appropriate penalties on erring employees. However, upon

reading the records of the case, we cannot deduce any proof of Landtex and William Go’s accusations against

Ayson. Moreover, the NLRC did not make any pronouncement as to whether Ayson was dismissed for a just

cause. The appellate court and the labor arbiter were one in ruling that there was no just cause in Ayson’s

dismissal. We quote the labor arbiter’s factual findings with approval:

We have painstakingly read the records of this case and, sadly, this Office finds no shred of evidence to

show that indeed [Ayson] had been spreading “news and gossips” or that he ever shouted at Mr. Go and

engaged Mr. Go in a heated argument.

No affidavit of either the security guard who claimed to be one of the drinking group who heard the

alleged malicious news or gossips or that of Mr. and Mrs. Go who had been the subject of [Ayson’s] alleged

shouting has been presented if only to substantiate [Landtex and William Go’s] self -serving claims.

Procedural due process in the dismissal of employees requires notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee two written notices before termination may be effected. The first notice apprises the

employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, while the second notice

informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. In the present case, Landtex more than

complied with the two-notice rule.

The requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to

be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. In the present case, Landtex scheduled

three meetings before terminating Ayson. However, Landtex failed to understand the law’s purpose in

requiring the opportunity to be heard. Landtex scheduled meetings with Ayson but these meetings were not

free from arbitrariness. Ayson could not adequately defend himself from Landtex’s and William Go’s

accusations. No witness was ever presented against Ayson, hence Ayson could not test the veracity of their

claims.

Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of the employer are not sufficient to justify an

employee’s dismissal. The employer must prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which

the accusations are made. In Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) v. NLRC , we



ruled that the mere conduct of an investigation and the statements of the company’s security guard are not

enough to establish the validity of the charge of wrongdoing against the dismissed employees. It is not

enough for an employer who wishes to dismiss an employee to charge him with wrongdoing. The validity of

the charge must be established in a manner consistent with due process. A suspicion or belief no matter how

sincerely felt cannot substitute for factual findings carefully established through an orderly procedure.

Landtex and William Go failed to observe due process in terminating Ayson. They likewise failed to

establish that Ayson’s termination was for a just cause. Thus, we rule that Landtex and William Go illegally

dismissed Ayson.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 13 February 2001 and the

Resolution dated 16 October 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50060. Emilia P. Ayson, in

representation of Salvador M. Ayson, is entitled to receive the amounts due Salvador M. Ayson.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

7. Estrada vs sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act

Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid

from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law

to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;

(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the

element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly

clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation against him.

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of

this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERSOF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES

AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,

RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,

accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or

TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE

HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY

UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE

FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt

OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.

RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION

FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS

(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF

AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF

SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN

HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH

BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'

Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:

I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS

II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE

OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM



III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF

INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT

ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER

IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE

DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING

THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL

RESPONSIBILITY.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as

amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Ratio:

In view of vagueness and ambiguity

Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words

employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the

legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the

Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be

interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the

legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers —

who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use statutory phraseology in such a

manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly

accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination — the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring

into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.Series — a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal

succession.

Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it

would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the

observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par.

(d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or

criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the

pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public

officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall

unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall

unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer

and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no

such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal

acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from

ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is

whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by

common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely

requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or

mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of

what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine

is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to

the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness

that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.

In view of due process

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law

circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate

acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal actsshowing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic



mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the

presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in

demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a

combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.

There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the

accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-

gotten wealth.

In view of mens rea

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which

requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion — . . . Precisely because the

constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is

noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully,

unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any

form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very

existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context,

no less heinous are the effect and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in

death, and drug offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must

not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat

prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.

Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, onconstitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long

dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of

jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a

declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral

part of it.

In view of presumption of innocence

At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare what the law

shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial. Statutes enacted by

Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical precision how the law should be interpreted

under any and all given situations. The application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances as

adduced by evidence which will then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the

constitutionally mandated function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would give flesh

and blood to the true meaning of legislative enactments.

A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not

accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the ends that are sought to

be attained by its enactment. Viewed broadly, "plunder involves not just plain thievery but economic

depredation which affects not just private parties or personal interests but the nation as a whole." Invariably,

plunder partakes of the nature of "a crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible,

stopped permanently."

In view of estoppel

Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The case at bar has been

subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of petitioner's

counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a

Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to

questions of fact, not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice.

To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted

for its passage would result in injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this

statute.



What is RICO

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States federal law that provides for

extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal

organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452,

84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970). RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code,

18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968. While its intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were actively

engaged in organized crime, its application has been more widespread.

In view of facial challenge

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of

possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe

speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a

single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to

justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack

demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.'

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting

from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be

prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot

take chances as in the area of free speech.

In view of burden of proof (accused) according to PANGANIBAN, J.

In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to the Constitution before this

Court may declare its unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear showing that what the

fundamental law prohibits, the statute allows to be done. 40 To justify the nullification of the law, there must

be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution; not a doubtful, argumentative implication. 41 Of some

terms in the law which are easily clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at best, managed merely topoint out alleged ambiguities. Far from establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring

conflict with the Constitution, the constitutional challenge to the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the

accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, so must

a law be accorded the presumption of constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of proof.

Petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates proof of each and every component

criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern of over or criminal acts

indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy."

All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often perceived to be the reality with respect

to the crime of plunder — that "the actual extent of the crime may not, in its breadth and entirety, be

discovered, by reason of the 'stealth and secrecy' in which it is committed and the involvement of 'so many

persons here and abroad and [the fact that it] touches so many states and territorial units."'

"The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and

unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law shall not be

declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. 'The

presumption is always in favor of constitutionality . . . To doubt is to sustain.'

In view of burden of proof (State) according to KAPUNAN, J.

The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the

accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A criminal statute should not be

so vague and uncertain that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ

as to its application. There are three distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is

designed to ensure that individuals are properly warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their

conduct. This "fair notice" rationale was articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional

requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence

fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man

shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.

While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out with mathematical

certainty the standards to which an individual must conform his conduct, it is necessary that statutes provide

reasonable standards to guide prospective conduct. And where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, thestandard of certainty is higher. The penalty imposable on the person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is



reclusion perpetua to death. Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness required of R.A. No.

7080 is unarguably higher than that of other laws.

It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot mount a "facial challenge" to the Plunder Law, and

that "facial" or "on its face" challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute. Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed

to several problematical portions of the law that were left unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you

have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be

criminal?" The meanings of "combination" and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.

To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to

constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder and

sentence the accused to death than to convict him for each of the component crimes otherwise punishable

under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are bailable offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at

the very heart if the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.

The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and immoral, are

patently mala in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must clearly be

established together with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. By eliminating

mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the component acts

constituting plunder and imposes a lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paying the way for the

imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process

and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the

life and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a

tool against political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.

In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and excitement, when the desire to do justice is

tarnished by anger and vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections accorded an accused may

be taken away.

Substantive due process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in

any law which deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other procedures leading to conviction

may be fair and proper. But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation, due process is violated. Thus, an

accused may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or life imprisonment for an offense understood

only after judicial construction takes over where Congress left off, and interpretation supplies its meaning.

The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the

accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Substantive due process

requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and uncertain. More explicitly — That the terms of a

penal statute. . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part

will render them liable to penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions

of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in

terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its

application, violates the first essential of due process.

In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to control or prevent

activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily

broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 9

A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A statute is vague or

overbroad, in violation of the due process clause, where its language does not convey sufficiently definite

warning to the average person as to the prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people of

common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.

In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important element of the

criminal acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed. Equally disagreeable is the

provision of the Plunder Law which does away with the requirement that each and every component of the

criminal act of plunder be proved and instead limits itself to proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of

the unlawful scheme or conspiracy. 18 In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis of a

proven scheme or conspiracy, and does away with the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes

are concerned. In other words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation of the prosecution to prove beyondreasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because the law requires merely



proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the specifications of details

in an information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An information cannot rise higher than

the statute upon which it is based. Not even the construction by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous

provision can supply the missing ingredients of the Plunder Law. The right of an accused to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care with which a

complaint or information should be drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required of an information

should also be present in the law upon which the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any

particularity in the information will come from the prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of

Congress.

In view of vagueness according to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime possesses inviolable rights

founded on the Constitution which even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override. The rights

guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social

interest. Thus, no matter how socially-relevant the purpose of a law is, it must be nullified if it tramples upon

the basic rights of the accused.

When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove each

and every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the enumerated "criminal acts"

under Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as essential elements of plunder. This is constitutionally

infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play. As a matter of due process, the prosecution is

required to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the

defendant is charged. The State may not specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. 8 With

more reason, it should not be allowed to go around the principle by characterizing an essential element of

plunder merely as a "means" of committing the crime. For the result is the reduction of the burden of the

prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be convinced of the existence of a

"combination or series." As to which criminal acts constitute a combination or series, the Justices need not be

in full agreement. Surely, this would cover-up a wide disagreement among them about just what the accused

actually did or did not do. Stated differently, even if the Justices are not unified in their determination on what

criminal acts were actually committed by the accused, which need not be proved under the law, still, they

could convict him of plunder.

The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three of the acts enumerated under Section

1(d) thereof." 33 But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least three times. And the

Office of the Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the House of Representatives, contends

differently. It defines the term series as a "repetition" or pertaining to "two or more."

A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already punished with

lesser penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be cured by judicial

construction.

In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr. Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The issue before this

Court is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the constitutionality of the law. I vote to grant the

petition, not because I favor Mr. Estrada, but because I look beyond today and I see that this law can pose a

serious threat to the life, liberty and property of anyone who may come under its unconstitutional provisions.

As a member of this Court, my duty is to see to it that the law conforms to the Constitution and no other. I

simply cannot, in good conscience, fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.

Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR

TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to

alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred

that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU

and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That

NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not

able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.



HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative

bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own

case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending toestablish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity

which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with

absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be

“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as areasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the

record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent

consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in

arriving at a decision.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a

manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the

decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

8. Callanta vs Carnation Corp

G.R. No. 70615 October 28, 1986

VIRGILIO CALLANTA, petitioner,

vs.

CARNATION PHILIPPINES, INC., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION [NLRC], respondents.

Danilo L. Pilapil for petitioner.

FERNAN, J.:

The issue raised in this petition for certiorari is whether or not an action for illegal dismissal prescribes in

three [3] years pursuant to Articles 291 and 292 of the Labor Code which provide:

Art. 291. Offenses.— Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued

pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three [3] years.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 292. Money Claims. — All money claims arising from employer-employee relations

accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three [3] years from the time

the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner Virgilio Callanta was employed by private respondent Carnation Philippines, Inc. [Carnation, for

brevity] in January 1974 as a salesman in the Agusan del Sur area. Five [51 years later or on June 1, 1979,

respondent Carnation filed with the Regional Office No. X of the Ministry of Labor and Employment [MOLE],

an application for clearance to terminate the employment of Virgilio Callanta on the alleged grounds of

serious misconduct and misappropriation of company funds amounting to P12,000.00, more or less.

Upon approval on June 26, 1979 by MOLE Regional Director Felizardo G. Baterbonia, of said clearance

application, petitioner Virgilio Callanta's employment with Carnation was terminated effective June 1, 1979.

On July 5, 1982, Virgilio Callanta filed with the MOLE, Regional Office No. X, a complaint for illegal dismissal

with claims for reinstatement, backwages, and damages against respondent Carnation.



In its position paper dated October 5, 1982, respondent Carnation put in issue the timeliness of petitioner's

complaint alleging that the same is barred by prescription for having been filed more than three [3] years

after the date of Callanta's dismissal.

On March 24, 1983, Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos rendered a decision finding the termination of Callanta's

employment to be without valid cause. Respondent Carnation was therefore ordered to reinstate Virgilio

Callanta to his former position with backwages of one [1] year without qualification including all fringebenefits provided for by law and company policy, within ten [10] days from receipt of the decision. It was

likewise provided that failure on the part of respondent to comply with the decision shall entitle complainant

to full backwages and all fringe benefits without loss of seniority rights.

On April 18, 1983, respondent Carnation appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission

[NLRC] which in a decision dated February 25, 1985, 1 set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It declared

the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Virgilio Callanta to have already prescribed. Thus:

Records show that Virgilio Callanta was dismissed from his employment with respondent

company effective June 1, 1979; and that on 5 July 1982, he filed the instant complaint

against respondent for: Unlawful Dismissal with Backwages, etc.

The provisions of the Labor Code applicable are:

Art. 291. Offenses. — Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued

pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three [3] years.

Art. 292. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employer-employee relations

accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three [3] years from the time

the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.

Obviously, therefore, the causes of action, i.e., "Unlawful Dismissal" and "Backwages, etc."

have already prescribed, the complaint therefore having been filed beyond the three-year

period from accrual date.

With this finding, there is no need to discuss the other issues raised in the appeal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and

another one entered, dismissing the complaint.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition, which We gave due course in the resolution dated September 18, 1985. 2

Petitioner contends that since the Labor Code is silent as to the prescriptive period of an action for illegal

dismissal with claims for reinstatement, backwages and damages, the applicable law, by way of supplement,

is Article 1146 of the New Civil Code which provides a four [4]-year prescriptive period for an actionpredicated upon "an injury to the rights of the plaintiff" considering that an action for illegal dismissal is

neither a "penal offense" nor a mere "money claim," as contemplated under Articles 291 and 292,

respectively, of the Labor Code. Petitioner further claims that an action for illegal dismissal is a more serious

violation of the rights of an employee as it deprives him of his means of livelihood; thus, it should

correspondingly have a prescriptive period longer than the three 13] years provided for in "money claims."

Public respondent, on the other hand, counters with the arguments that a case for illegal dismissal falls under

the general category of "offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations pursuant thereto"

provided under Article 291 or a money claim under Article 292, so that petitioner's complaint for illegal

dismissal filed on July 5, 1982, or three [3] years, one [1] month and five [5] days after his alleged dismissal

on June 1, 1979, was filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period as provided under Articles 291 and 292

of the Labor Code, hence, barred by prescription; that while it is admittedly a more serious offense as it

involves an employee's means of livelihood, there is no logic in assuming that it has a longer prescriptiveperiod, as naturally, one who is truly aggrieved would immediately seek the redress of his grievance; that

assuming arguendo that the law does not provide for a prescriptive period for the enforcement of petitioner's

right, it is nevertheless beyond dispute that the said right has already lapsed into a stale demand; and that

considering the seriousness of the act committed by petitioner, private respondent was justified in

terminating the employment.

We find for petitioner.

Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a violation of the

Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation, however, does not amount to an

"offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act

which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law, but which by statute carries with it a penalty

similar to those imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. 3 It is in this sense that a general penalty



clause is provided under Article 289 of the Labor Code which provides that "... any violation of the provisions

of this code declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One

Thousand Pesos [P1,000.00] nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos [10,000.00], or imprisonment of not less

than three [3] months nor more than three [3] years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of

the court." [Emphasis supplied.]

The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense. It must be noted, however that

unlike in cases of commission of any of the probihited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article 265,

unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment activities under Article 38,

among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful, termination of an employment without just or

valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful practice.

Besides, the reliefs principally sought by an employee who was illegally dismissed from his employment are

reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges, if any, backwages and

damages, in case there is bad faith in his dismissal. As an affirmative relief, reinstatement may be ordered,

with or without backwages. While ordinarily, reinstatement is a concomitant of backwages, the two are not

necessarily complements, nor is the award of one a condition precedent to an award of the other. 4 And, in

proper cases, backwages may be awarded without ordering reinstatement . In either case, no penalty of fine

nor improsonment is imposed on the employer upon a finding of illegality in the dismissal. By the very natureof the reliefs sought, therefore, an action for illegal dismissal cannot be generally categorized as an "offense"

as used under Article 291 of the Labor Code, which according to public respondent, must be brought within

the period of three[3] years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise, the same is forever barred.

It is true that the "backwwages" sought by an illegally dismissed employee may be considered, by reason of

its practical effect, as a "money claim." However, it is not the principal cause of action in an illegal dismissal

case but the unlawful deprivation of the one's employment committed by the employer in violation of the

right of an employee. Backwages is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally dismissed employee prays the

labor arbiter and the NLRC to render in his favor as a consequence of the unlawful act committed by the

employer. The award thereof is not private compensation or damages 5 but is in furtherance and effectuation

of the public objectives of the Labor Code. 6 even though the practical effect is the enrichment of the

individual, the award of backwages is not inredness of a private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a

command upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code. 7

The case of Valencia vs. Cebu Portland Cement, et al., 106 Phil. 732, a 1959 case cited by petitioner, is

applicable in the instant case insofar as it concerns the issue of prescription of actions. In said case, this Court

had occasion to hold that an action for damages involving a plaintiff seperated from his employment for

alleged unjustifiable causes is one for " injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be brought within four [4]

years. 8

In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 448 [1980], this Court, thru then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando,

sustained the sand of the Solicitor General that the period of prescription mentioned under Article 281, now

Article 292, of the Labor Code, refers to and "is limited to money claims, an other cases of injury to rights of a

workingman being governed by the Civil Code." Accordingly, this Court ruled that petitioner Marciana Santos,

who sought reinstatement, had four [4] years within which to file her complaint for the injury to her rights as

provided under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

Indeed there is, merit in the contention of petitioner that the four [4]-year prescriptive period under Article

1146 of the New Civil Code, applies by way of supplement, in the instant case, to wit:

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years.

[1] Upon an injury to the lights of the plaintiff.

xxx xxx xxx

[Emphasis supplied]

As this Court stated in Bondoc us. People's Bank and Trust Co., 9 when a person has no property, his job may

possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood, hence, he should be protected against any arbitrary

and unjust deprivation of his job. Unemployment, said the Court in Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, 10

brings "untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage earners. The misery and pain

attendant on the loss of jobs thus could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all the

circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their means of livelihood."

It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that

one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and the wrongful interference therewith

is an actionable wrong. 11 The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional

guaranty of due process of law. 12 Clearly then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or

means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment



constitutes, in essence, an action predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as contemplated

under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four [4] years.

In the instant case, the action for illegal dismissal was filed by petitioners on July 5, 1982, or three [3] years,

one [1] month and five [5] days after the alleged effectivity date of his dismissal on June 1, 1979 which is well

within the four [4]-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code.

Even on the assumption that an action for illegal dismissal falls under the category of "offenses" or "money

claims" under Articles 291 and 292, Labor Code, which provide for a three-year prescriptive period, still, a

strict application of said provisions will not destroy the enforcement of fundamental rights of the employees.

As a statutory provision on limitations of actions, Articles 291 and 292 go to matters of remedy and not to the

destruction of fundamental rights. 13 As a general rule, a statute of limitation extinguishes the remedy only.

Although the remedy to enforce a right may be barred, that right may be enforced by some other available

remedy which is not barred. 14

More so, in the instant case, where the delay in filing the case was with justifiable cause. The threat to

petitioner that he would be charged with estafa if he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which private

respondent did after all on June 22, 1981, justifies, the delayed filing of the action for illegal dismissal with the

Regional Office No. X, MOLE on July 5, 1982. Laches will not in that sense strengthen the cause of public

respondent. Besides, it is deemed waived as it was never alleged before the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC.

Public respondent dismissed the action for illegal dismissal on the sole issue of prescription of actions. It did

not resolve the case of illegal dismissal on the merits. Nonetheless, to resolve once and for all the issue of the

legality of the dismissal, We find that petitioner, who has continuously served respondent Carnation for five

[5] years was, under the attendant circumstances, arbitrarily dismissed from his employment. The alleged

shortage in his accountabilities should have been impartially investigated with all due regard for due process

in view of the admitted enmity between petitioner and E.L. Corsino, respondent's auditor. 15 Absent such an

impartial investigation, the alleged shortage should not have been attended with such a drastic consequence

as termination of the employment relationship. Outright dismissal was too severe a penalty for a first offense,

considering that the alleged shortage was explained to respondent's Auditor, E.L. Corsino, in accordance with

respondent's accounting and auditing policies.

The indecent haste of his dismissal from employment was, in fact, aggravated by the filing of the estafa charge

against petitioner with the City Fiscal of Butuan City on June 22, 1981, or two [2] years after his questioned

dismissal. After the case had remained pending for five [5] years, the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte

and Butuan City, Branch V finally dismissed the same provisionally in an order dated February 21, 1986 for

failure of the prosecution's principal witness to appear in court. Admittedly, loss of trust and confidence

arising from the same alleged misconduct is sufficient ground for dismissing an employee from his

employment despite the dismissal of the criminal case. 16 However, it must not be indiscriminately used as a

shield to dismiss an employee arbitrarily. 17 For, who can stop the employer from filing all the charges in the

books for the simple exercise of it, and then hide behind the pretext of loss of confidence which can be proved

by mere preponderance of evidence.

We grant the petition and the decision of the NLRC is hereby reversed and set aside. Although We are

strongly inclined to affirm that part of the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges, a supervening event, which

petitioner mentioned in his motion for early decision dated January 6, 1986 18 that is, FILIPRO, Inc.'s taking

over the business of Carnation, has legally rendered the order of reinstatement difficult to enforce, unless

there is an express agreement on assumption of liabilities 19 by the purchasing corporation, FILIPRO, Inc.

Besides, there is no law requiring that the purchasing corporation should absorb the employees of the selling

corporation. 20 In any case, the very concept of social justice dictates that petitioner shall be entitled to

backwages of three [3] years. 21

WHEREFORE, respondent Carnation Philippines, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Virgilio Callanta

backwages for three [3] years without qualification and deduction. This decision is immediately executory.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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