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Asset Protection & Pitfalls of Joint Ownership About the trainer: Caroline Bielanska is the former Chief Executive and former Chair of Solicitors for the Elderly, an organisation she helped to found in 1999. She lectures regularly for a number of CPD providers, including Central Law Training, The Solicitors Group, Professional Conferences and STEP, and is well known in her specialist field, advising older and vulnerable adults who have limited physical and/or mental capacity. She is an accredited Mediator. She is the author and trainer of STEP’s Advance Certificate in Advising Vulnerable Clients. She provides consultancy for law firms on an independent basis. Her work focuses on advising vulnerable adults; principally older and disabled people, their families and carers. She can be contacted at cbielanska@gmail.com Specialist Legal Areas: • Powers of attorney, deputyship, the Mental Capacity Act and Court of Protection

practice • Health and social care law (assessments, eligibility and state funding, including NHS

Continuing Health Care) • Asset Protection Trusts • Care contracts • Advance decisions to refuse life sustaining medical treatment • Adult safeguarding • Residency and care disputes Publications: • Co-editor and contributor to ‘The Elderly Client Handbook’ (The Law Society) • Co-editor and contributor to ‘Elderly Clients- A Precedent Manual‘ (Jordans) • Author of ‘The Health and Social Care Handbook’ (the Law Society) • Contributor to Heywood and Massey’s ‘Court of Protection Practice’. • On the Editorial Board and contributor to The Elder Law Journal (Jordans) • Author of ‘A Safeguarding Strategy for Recognising, Preventing and Dealing with the

Abuse of Older and Vulnerable People’ (Solicitors for the Elderly) • Author of Elderly People and the Law (Jordans) • Technical Editor of ‘Coldrick on Personal Injury Trusts’ (ARK Publishing) (1st edition) Committees: • Court of Protection Users’ Group • Caroline is a current member of the Court of Protection’s Rules Review Committee,

recommending changes to the court rules, practice directions and forms. • Caroline has been a stakeholder to the PGO and subsequently the OPG and was

heavily involved in the development of the 2009 LPA prescribed forms and guidance, has worked with the OPG on the on line tool and development of the 2015 LPAs.

• Panel expert convened by the Law Commission to input into drafting the consultations on the reform of adult social care.

Copyright and disclaimer: These notes are for the purpose of training delivery for the benefit of delegates attending the presentation. The material does not necessarily stand on its own and is not intended to be relied upon for giving specific advice. Copy right of the material belongs to Caroline Bielanska and no permission or licenses in relation to these materials are granted. No part of the handout material may be reproduced in any form. © Caroline Bielanska, June 2016

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1. TYPES OF JOINT OWNERSHIP 1.1 All jointly owned property is held by the owners on trust, i.e. the joint owner will be a trustee or at least have an interest in the trust property. 1.2 It is important to distinguish between the legal and equitable (or beneficial) interests in the property:

The owners (registered or unregistered) will always hold the legal interest in the property

The legal interests in the property can only be held by a maximum of four individuals.

The equitable interest comprises the beneficial or financial interests in the property.

1.3 Typically the owners of the equitable interest will be the same individuals as the legal owners (e.g.) spouses, partners or other joint owners. 1.4 Where land is subject to co-ownership, for there to be a tenancy in common, there will be a joint tenancy at law and a tenancy in common in equity (s1(6), Law of Property Act 1925). 1.5 Where a property is purchased or otherwise put in joint names it is important for there to be a statement as to how the beneficial interests are held, i.e. whether as joint tenants or tenants in common. Under a joint tenancy the survivor will automatically inherit on death. Under a tenancy in common the share may be left by will or pass under the rules of intestacy. Guidance

The Law Society Practice Note 14.1 2013: Joint Ownership

Land Registry Public Guide 18: Joint Property Ownership

Land Registry Practice Guide 24: Private Trusts of land 2. SEVERANCE OF JOINT TENANCY 2.1 Identify the ownership of the property Make sure the property is jointly owned (see Carr-Glynn v Frearsons (A Firm) [1998] EWCA Civ 1325). 2.2 Effective severance of a joint tenancy A joint tenancy can be converted into a tenancy in common by giving written notice of severance to the other joint tenant(s) with the effect that the severing joint tenant gains an undivided share proportionate to the number of joint tenants. As far as practically possible, the severance should be done by notice in accordance with s36(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. No particular form is prescribed so long as the intention is clear.

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2.3 It is possible to sever a joint tenancy unilaterally. It is possible to unilaterally sever a joint tenancy. Although notice must be communicated to the co-owner, there is not requirement to understand what is being communicated (s196 Law of Property Act 1925). If a deputy or registered EPA or LPA attorney wishes to unilaterally sever the joint tenancy on behalf of someone for whom they have been appointed to act who lacks mental capacity, an application to the Court of Protection is required. This is not the case, where the mentally capacitated joint owner wishes to sever the joint tenancy.

William and his daughter, Beth purchased their home in 1998 from the Council. It is held as beneficial joint tenants. William is attorney for Beth under her property and financial affairs lasting power of attorney. Beth has long term and severe mental health problems and lacks capacity to manage her finances. William wants to set up a will trust so his share of the house passes into trust.

Andrew has been granted a property and financial affairs lasting power of attorney on behalf of his grandmother, Linda, who has dementia and lives in her own home with her husband, Darren. Darren is Linda’s second husband. They have been married for 10 years. They own No 18 Wren Ave in joint names, held as beneficial tenants. Andrew would like to sever the joint tenancy so that his Grandmother’s interest passes under her will, rather than for it to pass absolutely to Darren should she die first. Her will gave her husband a life interest in her estate, with the residue passing equally to Andrew and his sister, Lucy.

2.4 A severance of a joint tenancy can be by conduct or course of action The conduct of the parties (see Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch 429 CA (Civ) and Davis v Smith CA (Civ) 23/11.2011) or a course of dealing (see Quigley v Masterson [2011] EWHC 2529 (Ch)) may be sufficient to sever the joint tenancy. 2.5 Severance of a joint tenancy is not deliberate deprivation The severance of a joint tenancy should not be regarded as a deliberate deprivation of capital by a local authority, as it redirects the equity on death and so therefore there is no deprivation.

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2.6 Retrospective severance through Deed of Variation It is possible to make a variation of the distribution of the deceased’s estate retrospective from death for IHT and CGT purposes (see s142 Inheritance Act 1984 s62 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992), within 2 years from the date of death in relation to tax planning, but no time limit in other cases. This can be done to shelter assets from care fees by excluding a co-owner (whether wholly or in part) from the estate of the deceased co-owner and diverting the interest to alternative beneficiaries or into trust. However, if the Deed of Variation is entered into at a time when the surviving co-owner had a reasonable expectation of the need for care and support, which they had an expectation they would contribute towards the cost of their eligible care needs, this will be regarded a deprivation of capital by the local authority (see Care & Support (Charging and Assessment of Resources) Regulations 2014, reg 22(1) and Care & Support Statutory Guidance, Annex E). 3. CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS THE PROPERTY

In 2014, Edward went to live with his son and daughter-in-law, Paul and Jane. He contributed £100,000 towards the purchase of the house, which was purchased in Paul and Jane’s name. The intention was that he would live with them for the rest of his life. They fell out and, in May 2016, he left.

3.1 An equitable interest in a property belonging to another may arise where a person makes a financial contribution towards the cost of buying the property or pays for or contributes towards the cost of extending or improving the property. 3.2 The first issue is to identify the common understanding of the nature of the contribution.

Was it a gift?

Was it a loan?

Was it intended that s/he would acquire a beneficial interest? or

Was it intended that s/he would have the right to reside in the property (perhaps rent-free) for the rest of her/his life?

Was s/he to be provided with care? 3.3 The second issue is to identify the extent of the person’s occupation rights. See Sekhon v Alissa and McDonnell v Loosemore [1989] 2 FLR 94: [2007] All ER (D) 252. See: the Law Society’s Practice Note: Making Gifts of Assets (6 October 2011) 4. DECLARATIONS OF TRUST 4.1 In the event that the home is purchased in the joint names of say, the elderly parent and a child and their spouse or partner, it is vital that a declaration of trust is drawn up which recites the contribution made by each co-owner, including any contribution made by way of a mortgage and how the equitable interest is to be held.

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4.2 Discuss the circumstances when one of the parties can force a sale and the circumstances where a party can block a sale. 4.3 Consider registering protective restrictions on the Land Registry title to the property e.g. a form N restriction that there should be no dealing without the consent of the elderly person or their personal representative. 4.4 When an elderly person and a younger family member contribute to the cost of the property, with assistance of a mortgage, consider whether the elderly person should have their name on the deeds as they will become jointly and severally responsible for any mortgage or whether they remain off the title and protect their interest under a declaration of trust by a restriction on the title against a disposal without their consent. The lender requires the elderly person’s interest to be postponed in their favour. 4.5 If the elderly person is lending money to the person they move in with, ensure that the arrangement is exempt from the Consumer Credit Act 1974, otherwise the debt may be unenforceable. 4.6 Advise the parties to review any declaration of trust on a regular basis as in the absence of agreement they will be bound by it (Pankhania v Chandegra [2012] EWCA Civ 1438). 4.7 Consider how the deed will impact on the person’s Will. 4.8 Consider what should happen if the person’s care needs are such that they can no longer live in the shared accommodation or they find that the arrangement is not working and they need to move out. 4.9 The parties’ responsibilities for maintenance, repairs, insurance & upkeep need to be clarified. 5. FAILURE TO HAVE AN EXPRESS DECLARATION OF TRUST 5.1 In the absence of any declaration of trust or agreement, the court will seek to establish the parties’ common understanding about the nature of the contribution by reference to:

(1) any express discussions between the parties; and (2) in default of any express discussions by examining their conduct.

5.2 Express discussions In Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1990] 1 All ER 1111, at p 1118, Lord Bridge said:

‘The first and fundamental question which must always be resolved is whether, independently of any inference to be drawn from the conduct of the parties in the course of sharing the house as their home and managing their joint affairs, there has at any time prior to acquisition, or exceptionally at some later date, been any agreement, arrangement or understanding between them that the property is to be shared beneficially. The finding of an agreement to share in this sense can only, I think, be based on evidence of express discussions between the parties, however

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imperfectly remembered and however imprecise their terms may have been. Once a finding to this effect is made it will only be necessary for the party asserting a claim to a beneficial interest against the party entitled to the legal estate to show that he or she has acted to his or her detriment or significantly altered his or her position in reliance on the agreement in order to give rise to a constructive trust or proprietary estoppel.’

5.3 Conduct Lord Bridge continued:

‘In sharp contrast with this situation is the very different one where there is no evidence to support a finding of an agreement or arrangement to share, however reasonable it might have been for the parties to reach such an agreement if they had applied their minds to the question, and where the court must rely entirely on the conduct of the parties, both as the basis from which to infer a common intention to share the property beneficially and as the conduct relied on to give rise to a constructive trust. In this situation direct contributions to the purchase price by the party who is not the legal owner, whether initially or by payment of mortgage instalments, will readily justify the inference necessary to the creation of a constructive trust. But, as I read the authorities, it is at least extremely doubtful whether anything less will do.’

5.4 This approach would probably also apply where it was claimed that the contribution was a loan or a gift or that it was intended to acquire a right to occupy the property for life. 6. OCCUPATION RIGHTS- WHERE THE PERSON IS NOT NAMED ON THE TITLE DEEDS OR THERE IS NO DECLARATION OF TRUST 6.1 There is always a risk with inter-generational property ownership that a third party, such as a mortgagee or a trustee in bankruptcy, becomes involved. The non-owner’s legal rights against the third party will depend on (a) the legal relationship between the owner and non-owner, and (b) the general law in relation to third party rights in respect of registered or unregistered land. Capital contribution cases 6.2 The courts have been inconsistent in the approach to resolving claims. In some cases, they have awarded the elderly person a beneficial interest; in others, they have ordered the repayment of his or her contribution; in some, they have awarded damages; and, in a few, they have created an equitable licence conferring occupation rights for life. Where a relationship has broken down, the Courts are realistic and do not assume that one party should have the right to continue to occupy the shared accommodation. Instead they aim to resolve the matter by a ‘clean break’ (see Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546). Hussey v Palmer [1972] 1 WLR 1286, CA. Emily Hussey, a widow in her 70s, was invited to live with her daughter and son-in-law, the Palmers, in Wokingham. A bedroom extension was built, and Mrs Hussey

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contributed £607 towards the cost. After 15 months, differences arose and she left. She sued for recovery of her money. The Court of Appeal held that the money paid by Mrs Hussey was not intended as a gift and, although there were no arrangements for its repayment, it would be unconscionable for the Palmers to retain the benefit without repayment, and so held the property on a resulting trust for Mrs Hussey in proportion to her payment. Broughall v Hunt (1983) Law Society’s Gazette, 14 September. After her husband died in 1969, it was suggested that Mrs Broughall should go and live with her daughter and son-in-law, Mr and Mrs Hunt. She did, and in 1972 paid £1,000 towards the cost of constructing a granny annexe. The Hunts paid the rest. Nothing was said about the legal nature of her contribution. In 1981, after increasing friction, the Hunts’ solicitor wrote to Mrs Broughall purporting to terminate her licence to occupy and requiring her to remove her goods from the house. The court held:

(1) the cash contribution was neither a gift, nor a loan; (2) the intention had been that she should live at the property for as long as she wished, and that on her death or when she decided to leave, the extension would belong to the Hunts unencumbered; (3) the purported termination of her licence to occupy had been wrongful; (4) she had no beneficial interest in the property, there being no grounds for imputing to the parties a common intention that she should have one; (5) Mrs Broughall was awarded £1,500 damages.

Burrows v Sharp [1989] EGCS 51, CA. Mrs Sharp bought her council house in 1986 with a mortgage funded by her granddaughter, Mrs Burrows. The idea was that Mrs Burrows and her husband would eventually inherit the property. In 1987, the Burrows realised that they couldn’t afford to pay the mortgage as well as the rent on their own flat, so they moved in with Mrs Sharp. The relationship broke down. The Court ordered that Mr and Mrs Burrows were to give up possession within 42 days; the endowment policy would be released to them; and Mrs Sharp would reimburse them to the extent that the mortgage instalments they had paid exceeded the rent of their old flat. Bonner v King [1991] NPC 136. In 1965, Mrs Bonner contributed £650 towards the purchase of a house for £4,500 by her sister and brother-in-law, Mr and Mrs King. She lived with them and paid a weekly sum towards their common living expenses. The Kings moved out in 1970 and made no further payments towards the mortgage. In 1972, Mrs Bonner paid off the mortgage arrears and remained in occupation. She claimed to be a beneficial owner of the house or, alternatively, that the Kings held the property in trust for themselves and her in such shares as the court should determine.

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The court found that Mrs Bonner did not have a beneficial interest as:

(1) The mere fact that she had paid part of the purchase price did not automatically give her a beneficial interest. At the time when she made the contribution there had to be some form of agreement, arrangement, understanding or common intention, however informal and however imperfectly thought through, that she should share in the beneficial ownership: Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991] AC 107 applied.

(2) Except in very rare cases, beneficial interests crystallise at the time of acquisition and do not depend on subsequent events. Exceptions could be: (a) a subsequent contract; or (b) a common intention at the time of acquisition that the shares should be quantified at some future date: Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 applied. The court will, however, look at the conduct after an acquisition to draw inferences as to the common intention at the time of purchase.

(3) It is not the law that, in a case of this kind, the court can decide by looking backwards and deciding what it now thinks would be fair in all the circumstances. The evidence was that Mrs Bonner’s £650 was a loan. Money provided by way of loan, and not as part of the purchase price, is outside the resulting trust doctrine. Possession would not be ordered while the £650 loan was still outstanding. The Kings could not turn her out and keep the money: Re Sharpe [1980] 1 WLR 219 applied.

Baker v Baker [1993] 2 FLR 247, CA. In 1987, Edward Baker went to live with his son and daughter-in-law, Peter and Julie. He contributed £33,950 towards the purchase of a house in Torquay. The intention was that he would live with them for the rest of his life. They fell out and, in June 1988, he left. He claimed a beneficial interest in the property on alternative grounds: resulting trust, in which he was unsuccessful; and equitable estoppel, in which he succeeded. The judge ordered that Edward’s contribution plus interest should be repaid and that, until it was repaid, the sum should be charged on the house. Peter and Julie appealed. The Court held that Edward’s contribution was designed to achieve two objectives:

(1) the provision of a family home; and (2) to provide him with rent-free accommodation for the rest of his life.

What he had lost was not his £33,950 but merely the right to rent-free accommodation for life. He was awarded compensation payable on the loss of his rent-free accommodation for life. Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 All ER 35, CA. In 1990, Charlie Cheese, 86, sold his flat in Peacehaven and moved back to Hayes, Middlesex. He paid £43,000 to his great nephew, Aubrey Thomas, 36, towards the purchase of a house costing £83,000. The house was acquired in Mr Thomas’s sole name and it was agreed that Mr Cheese could live there for the rest of his life. Thereafter it would belong to Mr Thomas, who had raised the balance of £40,000 by means of a mortgage. He failed to keep up the mortgage payments, and Mr Cheese, fearing that his security was jeopardised, sought repayment of the £43,000. The judge ordered that the house be sold and that the proceeds be

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divided 43:40 as the basic objective of the court was to restore the parties to their original positions as nearly as may be. 7. PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL

7.1 Proprietary estoppel is an equitable remedy to acquire rights over property. Unlike a contract or gift, which depend on consent, or resulting and constructive trusts that depend primarily on the fact of contribution, a proprietary estoppel arises when:

(1) they have acted to their detriment, for example by: – incurring expenditure; or – altering their position; or – prejudicing themselves in some other way;

(2) they acted to their detriment in reliance on a belief that:

– they had already acquired an interest in the property; or

– they would acquire an interest in the property at some future date – usually on the death of the owner;

(3) they acted to their detriment in reliance on a belief induced or

encouraged by the owner or by someone acting on his or her behalf:

– orally; or – in writing; or – by conduct; or – by acquiescence;

(4) there is no bar on the equity.

7.2 In awarding a remedy for proprietary estoppel, unlike a contract, it is not always apparent that a claimant should receive the full measure of what they had expected. As a consequence where proprietary estoppel has been established, the court will make an award for damages to compensate the claimant for the amount of detriment or loss. See: Re Basham (Deceased) [1987] 1 All ER 405. Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210. Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159. Thorner v Major [2008] EWCA Civ 732. Uglow v Uglow [2004] EWCA Civ 987. Yaxley v Gotts [2000] Ch 162. Bradbury v Taylor & Burkinshaw [2012] EWCA Civ 1208. 8. COURT POWER TO MAKE A PROPERTY ADJUSTMENT ORDER 8.1 Upon a divorce (or judicial separation) the court may make a property adjustment order between the parties under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s24. Similar powers are available under the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (see section 12 below). This also applies to those who have been married or converted their civil partnership under the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. Furthermore, in divorce and termination of civil partnership proceedings the court can ultimately

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overturn any transfer of property between spouses and civil partners and/or make suitable adjustments in individual or joint assets to compensate – s37 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 8.2 In the case of unmarried or unregistered same sex joint owners there are no similar procedures and the court can only give effect to the intention and contribution of the parties. 8.3 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 (see also Barnes v Philipps [2015] EWCA Civ 1056) sets out the approach to calculating beneficial interest in cases of unmarried partners where there is no express agreement as to how the joint interest is held. The court will consider:

(1) (a) Was there any express agreement that the parties intention as to the

size of the shares would change? and if not, (b) can such an intention be inferred, including having regard to the sort of evidence mentioned in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL17, namely:

any advice or discussions at the time of the transfer which cast light upon their intentions then;

the reasons why the home was acquired in their joint names;

the reasons why (if it be the case) the survivor was authorised to give a receipt for the capital moneys;

the purpose for which the home was acquired;

the nature of the parties' relationship;

whether they had children for whom they both had responsibility to provide a home;

how the purchase was financed, both initially and subsequently;

how the parties arranged their finances, whether separately or together or a bit of both;

how they discharged the outgoings on the property and their other household expenses; and

The parties' individual characters and personalities.

(2) If an agreement to vary the size of the shares exists, whether this was express or inferred and what is the size of those shares? (3) Where it was not possible to ascertain by direct evidence or by inference what was their intention as to the shares, “the answer is that each is entitled to that share which the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property” (Chadwick LJ, in Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546). In other words, the judge may impute intention, based on what it thinks is fair.

9. COURT POWER TO SELL

Powers under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 9.1 Disputes relating to joint ownership of property may be resolved under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (1996 Act).

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Ben and Adam purchased a house together in 2000. They hold it as beneficial joint tenants. They have made it the home of their dreams. Their relationship has broken down after Ben admitted to having an affair. Last month Adam moved out. Adam wants the house sold, so he can buy another home. He does not want to buy Ben out because of his emotional attachment to the home; he cannot consider Ben continuing to live there without him. Ben wants Adam to buy him out as he is not prepared to move.

9.2 Anyone who is a trustee or who has an interest in trust property may make an application to the court which is then required under s14 and s15 of the 1996 Act to have regard to the following matters in determining the application:

the intention of the person or persons who created the trust;

the purpose for which the property subject to the trust is held;

the welfare of any minor who occupies or might reasonably be expected to occupy any property subject to the trust as his or her home;

the interests of any secured creditor of any beneficiary. 9.3 In Bagum v Hafiz [2015] EWCA Civ 801 the Court of Appeal considered the question of the court's powers under ss14 and 15 of the 1996 Act. The case is a bitter family breakdown, where mother and her two sons, each had a one third share in the property as tenants in common. It had been thought that, as the court is merely exercising the power of trustees of land who cannot agree, the power was limited to ordering sale and allowing the market to find the best price, which would serve the best interests of all beneficiaries. Mum wanted one son to buy out the other, but that son didn’t want to. Briggs LJ’s said at para 23, that

“the clear object and effect of sections 14 and 15 is to confer upon the court a substantially wider discretion, exercised upon the basis of wider considerations, than might be enjoyed by the trustees themselves, acting without either the consent of their beneficiaries or an order of the court. … All this departs from the general rule of equity which requires the trustees single-mindedly to advance the interests of the beneficiaries as a class, without preferring some of them over others”.

He went on to say that the court is not rigidly constrained in the exercise of its discretion by principles of the law of equity which constrain the trustees themselves. HELD

1. the court does not have the power to transfer equity from one beneficiary to another upon the payment of a court determined price.

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2. it was within the judge's discretion under ss 14 and 15 to make an order for sale, giving one beneficiary the first opportunity to purchase the other's share at market value. In the event that this was not paid within a set period of time, the property would go to the open market.

10. TRANSFER OF PROPERTY: INSOLVENCY IMPLICATIONS 10.1 An automatic impact of insolvency is that the joint tenancy is severed to provide protection for the joint tenant’s creditors. The trustee in bankruptcy has an interest only in the proceeds of sale and not in the legal estate of a jointly owned property. The Trustee in Bankruptcy will register a standard Form J restriction with the Land Registry:

(a) Where the property is a jointly owned dwelling house; (b) Where the property is or is suspected to be jointly owned with another but it is not a dwelling house, such as where it is suspected that the bankrupt person has an interest under a trust of the property but is not registered as the proprietor; (c) Where the property is jointly owned but is not a dwelling house and it is not readily saleable at the time but there is every reason to believe that the circumstances will enable disposal at a later date.

10.2 The Land Registry will need evidence that the debtor has an interest in a property to accept the application. Furthermore, if the entry of the restriction was ever challenged in court, a trustee in bankruptcy would want to be able to show that they had acted reasonably in entering the restriction or they will be liable in damages. 10.3 If the transfer is for no consideration or at an undervalue, the implications of the Insolvency Act 1986 will need to be considered:

Transactions at an undervalue: Insolvency Act 1986, s339-341;

Transactions to defraud creditors: Insolvency Act 1986, s423-425, where the court can make any order to remedy the position where the transferor has made such a transfer to put the asset beyond the reach of creditors or potential creditors who have been prejudiced by the transfer. There is no time limit in such cases. See Derbyshire County Council and Another v Akrill and others [2005] EWCA Civ 308;

s421A to the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that the value of any interest in jointly-owned property transferred by the survivorship rules is recoverable for the benefit of the deceased’s insolvent estate and his or her creditors. The creditors may apply to the court for an order that the surviving joint tenant pays an amount to the deceased’s estate amounting to the value lost to the estate.

11. LOCAL AUTHORITY APPROACH TO CONTRIBUTION CASES

Graham had purchased his council house under the right to buy scheme in 1999, with the benefit of 60% discount. The house value at the time was £100,000 and the discount was £60,000. A mortgage was taken out for £40,000 by Graham, but his grandson, Marcus acted

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as guarantor and pays the mortgage. There is no declaration of trust. Graham’s will made at the same time as the house purchase gives the house to Marcus. Graham has moved into a care home.

11.1 Families sometimes attempt to ‘rectify’ loans/contributions made by favouring the lender/contributor within their will. This holds little weight with the local authority. 11.2 Where ownership of an asset is disputed, the local authority will seek written evidence to prove ownership, including evidence of the arrangement, the origin of the capital, and evidence to show the intentions for its future use and for its return to the rightful owner. 11.3 The ‘true owner’ may wish to protect their interest in the property, by ensuring a declaration of trust is signed, as no account should be taken of the value of the asset where the person being financially assessed is a legal owner but has no beneficial interest in the property. But even where there is conclusive evidence of beneficial ownership, local authorities may go to extraordinary lengths to bring the asset into account. 11.4 In Nottingham City Council v Berresford (Ref 2010/0577, 10th March 2011 (see also Mary Cunningham v East Lothian Council [2011] CSOH 185), the local authority registered a legal charge over a property held in the sole name of Joyce Berresford, to secure unpaid residential care charges incurred for her care. The property had been purchased under the ‘right to buy’ regime in 1995, with the benefit of 60% discount. The purchase price was paid for by two interest only mortgages, taken out by Mrs Beresford, but paid by the children. The children had repaired and maintained the property since its purchase. 14 years later, a declaration of trust was executed by Mrs Berresford and her children, which recorded that Mrs Berresford was the sole legal proprietor and that she wished to confirm the beneficial interests in the property of the beneficiaries, namely her children, having paid the mortgage. The court found the parties had communicated a shared common intention that Mrs Berresford would hold the legal interest in the property in trust for her children, in return for them maintaining the mortgage payments on the property and paying the outgoings. Mrs Berresford in turn had lived in the property rent-free for the duration. The children relied on this mutual intention to their detriment by discharging the mortgage payments and all outgoings in respect of the property. This was supported by documentary evidence. The agreement reached between Mrs Berresford and the children in 1995 created an express bargain constructive trust and as such the statutory charge placed by the local authority had to be removed. 12. LIFETIME TRANSFERS AND DELIBERATE DEPRIVATION 12.1 A lifetime transfer of property or a share in it to another person or into a trust to take advantage of the capital disregard may amount to a deprivation of capital.

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12.2 A local authority should consider: (a) whether avoiding the care and support charge was a significant motivation (b) at the point the capital was disposed of could the person have a reasonable

expectation of the need for care and support? (c) did the person have a reasonable expectation of needing to contribute to

the cost of their eligible care needs? 12.3 However, if the transfer is done at a time when the transferor was fit and healthy and could not have foreseen the need for care and support, it would be unreasonable for the local authority to assess the capital. (See CSSG, Annex E, para 12. There is no reference to timing in the Regulations). 12.4 The property when occupied by the person’s partner, former partner, relative or member of the family who is aged 60 or over, a child of the resident aged under 18, or is incapacitated is disregarded in the financial assessment (Care & Support (Charging and Financial Resources) Regulations 2014, Sch. 2, Para 4; CSSG Annex B, paras 34-41). 12.5 If the property is in the sole name of the person requiring care and support and there is a qualifying occupier in occupation, consider transferring the property into joint names, sole name or into trust. So long as one party remains in occupation, the property is disregarded and at that time the transfer is not deliberate deprivation (Care & Support (Charging and Financial Resources) Regulations 2014, Sch. 2 Para 4; CSSG, Annex B, para 34-41). 12.6 However, the local authority deprivation of assets rules (Care & Support (Charging and Financial Resources) Regulations 17(1) and 22(1) and CSSG, Annex E) may be applicable to transfers where the property is in the sole name of a person in ill health to the likely survivor as tenant in common or the transfer of a joint tenancy into a sole name.

Patricia and Bernard are in their 70s. Bernard has had a diagnosis of terminal cancer and is being cared for at home. Patricia is expected to survive Bernard. They own their home as joint tenants but have decided to transfer the home into Bernard’s sole name with Bernard making a new Will incorporating a trust to benefit Patricia during her lifetime. Bernard died a few months later and Patricia’s health has deteriorated and she will shortly move into a care home.

13. ASSET PROTECTION WILL TRUST AND PAYING FOR CARE

Magda and Viktor are an elderly couple; both in poor health. Viktor has Vascular dementia and Magda has chronic arthritis. Social services have arranged a domiciliary care package. Magda has been diagnosed with cancer and has a limited life expectancy. Both Magda and Viktor are coming to terms that it is a possibility. that Viktor may need to move into a care home. They have two children, Kris and Bella, who have been very supportive over the years. Viktor and Magda would like to ensure they receive an inheritance. Bella’s marriage is going through a difficult period and Kris’s carpet cleaning business in struggling.

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Their home is worth £340,000 and they have joint savings of £150,000. They are in receipt of State Retirement pension and Viktor has a small occupational pension. Their solicitor has advised them to sever their joint savings and the joint tenancy of their home and make new Wills incorporating an Asset Protection Trust. On first death, the deceased’s interest in the property will be held by the trustees upon trust to provide for the surviving joint owner, whilst taking into account the problems within the family.

13.1 One of the simplest, and least expensive, forms of asset protection for home-owners, when they do not wish to establish a formal trust during their lifetime, is to sever the joint tenancy with the intent of holding the property in future as tenants in common, and make new Wills incorporating an Asset Protection Trust. The survivor is given a life interest in the deceased share of the property and on the death of the survivor the share passes to named beneficiaries or into a discretionary trust. 13.2 The value of a right to receive income under a life interest trust is disregarded. (Care and Support (Charging and Financial Resources) Regulations 2014, Sch. 2, para 17; Care & Support Statutory Guidance (CSSG), Annex B, para 33). There is a distinction between a right to reside and a right to income. As such, if the survivor has a right to reside in the deceased’s solely owned property or in a share of it, this will be disregarded in a local authority financial assessment. However, if the person has an absolute right to income, whilst the underlying right is disregarded, any income received will be taken into account. 13.3 The deprivation rule is not applicable to estate planning through a Will as the survivor has not deprived themselves of assets belonging to the deceased. 14. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INHERITANCE (PROVISION FOR FAMILY AND DEPENDANTS) ACT 1975 14.1 Although there is a fear that a funding local authority can put pressure on the trustees to distribute money, or could make a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, in practice this does not happen. The local authority would have to make an application, where there was no certainty of success and where they would have a conflict of interest, particularly if they were administering the resident’s finances. 15. SURVIVING JOINT OWNER WANTS TO STAY IN THE PROPERTY 15.1 If the surviving joint owner wishes to remain in the property the court is unlikely to make an order for sale if the purpose of acquiring the property was as a home for the joint owners (s12(1)(a) Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996). 15.2 The Will Trust may set out whether or not the surviving joint owner has exclusive rights of occupation or whether others can occupy under the trust. This needs to be clarified when taking instructions on the Will Trust as others entering into occupation of the property with the surviving joint owner creates an

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opportunity for family ‘fall outs’, which could only be remedied by the property being sold. 15.3 When drafting the Will Trust, consideration should be given to financial provision for the survivor remaining in occupation of the property, funding general outgoings, repairs and maintenance and social care. The wording can be such that the financial provision will cease on the survivor being permanently admitted into a care home. 15.4 If there are insufficient resources in the trust to make provision for the survivor, the making of the provision, including funding domiciliary care, in theory but less likely in practice could be arranged through an equity release scheme with the agreement of the trustees. 16. JOINT OWNER WANTING TO MOVE TO ANOTHER PROPERTY

Harry, aged 60 has dementia. He and his long term partner, Wendy, aged 58 live in their own home in a rural area which is owned 40% Harry and 60% Wendy. Harry currently receives local authority funded care and support. Wendy proposes moving into the main town, which is 10 miles away and where property is more expensive. The plan is that Harry will move into a local care home, where she and their family and friends can visit him (something which has not easily been possible). It is the intention that a new home be purchased in the names of Harry and Wendy held in the same proportions. The Local Authority have told Wendy that once the house is sold, Harry will be self-funding as he must use his share of the sale proceeds for his care and she cannot use his money to buy the new house, and any attempt to do this would be considered a deliberate deprivation.

16.1 It is not uncommon for the partner of someone in a care home, to want to sell their home and use the proceeds to buy a more suitable property, in which to live. The home will be disregarded whilst occupied in whole or in part by the adult's partner however there is concern about whether the partner can use the sale proceeds towards the purchase. 16.2 Arguably, at the time the property is sold, the share of the proceeds of sale attributable to the person in care could be taken into account in a local authority financial assessment. 16.3 If money is required to purchase the alternative property, all or part of the proceeds belonging to the person in care could be used without invoking the deprivation of assets rules.

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Max has moved into a care home and has a 50% interest in a property that continues to be occupied by his civil partner, David. The value of the property is disregarded whilst David lives there, but he decides to move to a smaller property that he can better manage and so sells their shared home to fund this. At the time the property is sold, Max’s 50% share of the proceeds could be taken into account in the financial assessment, but, in order to ensure that David is able to purchase the smaller property, Max makes part of his share of the proceeds from the sale available. In such circumstance, it would not be reasonable to treat Max as having deprived himself of capital in order to reduce his care home charges. © Care & Support Statutory Guidance, Annex E, para 10.

16.4 This is furthermore supported by Schedule 2, para 7, of the Care & Support (Charging and Financial Resources) Regulations 2014 and Care & Support Statutory Guidance Annex B, para 47(e), which provides that capital received from the sale of the resident’s former home, will be disregarded for 26 weeks from the date of the sale, or longer where appropriate, where the capital proceeds are to be used by the resident to buy another home. 16.5 The local authority will look at the nature of the property to be purchased, such as the size and location. No guidance is given on the treatment of surplus funds or apportionment and so how it will be treated will be down to local policy. 17. JOINT OWNERSHIP AND DEFERRED PAYMENT AGREEMENTS (DPAs) 17.1 s34-36 of The Care Act 2014 obliges local authorities to offer deferred payments to those who have eligible needs to have their care provided in a care home and have insufficient financially assessable resources (i.e. under £23,250) to fund their care, save that they have a beneficial interest in a property, which is their main or only home. It is underpinned by the Care and Support (Deferred Payments) Regulations 2014 and chapter 9 of CSSG. Interest is added on a compound basis. 17.2 The local authority will not enter into a DPA unless it obtains adequate security for the payment of the deferred amount. This is usually by way of a first registered legal charge over the person’s beneficial interest in their home. Whether there is adequate security depends mainly on:

(i) The size of the weekly fees being deferred (ii) The value of the property (iii) The life expectancy of the client

17.3 A local authority will be cautious where there is an outstanding mortgage (including an equity release) on the property and will need to be satisfied that the resident can continue to meet the mortgage obligations and assessed contribution to care costs (CSSG, para 9.59).

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17.4 Where the person has chosen more expensive accommodation than the local authority would usual pay, the resident can ‘top up’ the cost of care, using the DPA as collateral. 17.5 In cases where an agreement is to be secured with a jointly owned property, the local authority must obtain all the joint owners’ consent and agreement to a charge being placed on the property. Both owners will need to be signatories to the charge agreement and the DPA, and the agreement will require the co-owner to agree to the sale of the property in the event of the death of the person receiving care.

Colin and his wife, Sally made mirror wills, giving their respective share of the home for the benefit of their children. Sally died in 2014. Colin has had a stroke and has moved into the Elms Care Home on a temporary basis. He wishes to move to the Lawns Care Home as it is nearer to his daughter, Ruth who visits daily. The Lawns costs more than the local authority contract rate. He has limited income and savings (under £14,250), but has his half share of his home, which is now unoccupied. The local authority have offered Colin a DPA to move into the Lawns but the children, Ralph, Robert, Rachel and Ruth as the beneficiaries of Sally’s half share in the home must all agree. Only Ruth is willing to agree to the DPA.

18. EQUITY RELEASE 18.1 Equity release providers require (in most cases) that the parties to the scheme own the property and will require the property to be transferred into joint names. This means that whilst the joint owners are alive and the property is owned as beneficial joint tenants, equity release can usually be obtained. The situation may be different if it is held as tenants in common or the legal estate is held by a surviving joint owner on behalf of him or herself and a Will Trust

(a) If held as tenants in common at the time of the application, the equity release provider may prohibit the property being held as tenants in common. If, after the commencement of the scheme, the homeowners wish to sever the joint tenancy as part of estate planning, some providers will require their written consent, although in most cases this will not be unreasonably withheld.

(b) If the homeowners have a drawdown facility incorporated into the equity release scheme, certain providers will withdraw access to the facility if the surviving homeowner does not own the property outright.

(c) If the property is held as tenants in common with a Will Trust arising on

first death, consideration will have to be given to terminating the trust to enable the survivor to enter into an equity release scheme whilst at the same time protecting the interests of the beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate, such as creating a new trust and restriction registered against the title.

(d) Stamp Duty will arise if the property subject to an existing mortgage is

transferred back to the survivor.

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(e) If a joint owner coming off the title did not or does not reside in the

property there may be Capital Gains Tax issues to consider, such as where homeowners have purchased their property with financial assistance from a member of the family. The applicants may be caught by the provisions of s103 Finance Act 1986, which, in certain circumstances, disallows a deduction for inheritance tax purposes for a debt on death and may ultimately have an impact on a ‘debt scheme’ in a nil-rate band discretionary trust set up in the applicant’s will. (See Personal Representatives of Phizackerley v HMRC [2007] SpC 591)

19. VALUATION OF JOINT INTEREST IN PROPERTY

Case example 1:

Mr and Mrs Green made mirror wills leaving their estate in a life interest trust for

each other, with the reversionary interest passing to their adult children, Tom and

Susan. Mr Green died in 2012. The house is currently unoccupied, as Mrs Green

needs to go into a care home.

Case example 2:

Ahmed and his son, Nadeem own No.25, The Avenue, in joint names. They

purchased it from the council in 1995. Ahmed qualified for the local authority

discount of 60% and the purchase price was funded in cash by Nadeem. They did

not sign a declaration of trust.

Ahmed has moved into care as he had a stroke and is left immobile and requires

substantial care. Nadeem lives in No.25

In both examples, the issue arises, as to how to value the service user’s share in

the property.

19.1 Where there is no occupant in the property which has the effect of triggering the automatic disregard, such as a spouse, the local authority will have to place a value on the service user’s beneficial share in an interest in land held jointly. 19.2 There is some uncertainty as to how the Care and Support (Charging and Assessment of Resources) Regulations 2014, apply to the valuation of jointly held interest in land, as the Regulations were amended following consultation and removed any specific reference as to how such an interest should be valued. Furthermore the CSSG is silent on this point. 19.3 The relevant provisions are:

Regulation 20: Calculation of capital in the United Kingdom, which provides: Capital which the adult possesses in the United Kingdom is to be calculated at its current market or surrender value (whichever is the higher), less— (a) where there would be expenses attributable to sale, 10%; and (b) the amount of any encumbrance secured on it.

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Regulation 24: Capital jointly held provides,

(1) Where the adult and one or more other persons are beneficially entitled in possession to any capital asset except an interest in land— (a) unless paragraph (2) applies, each person is to be treated as if

each of them were entitled in possession to an equal share of the whole beneficial interest; and

(b) that asset is to be treated as if it were actual capital. (2) This paragraph applies where the local authority is satisfied that

the adult is beneficially entitled in possession to a share which is less than or, as the case may be, more than an equal share of the whole beneficial estate.

(3) Where paragraph (2) applies the adult’s share of the whole beneficial interest will be the actual share (as determined by the local authority) and is to be treated as if it were actual capital.

19.4 This approach is similar to the Income support regulations. Under Regulation 52 of the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987, for the purposes of calculating the amount of capital which the claimant is treated as possessing, it makes no specific reference to interest in land and adopts a general approach which states, ‘…where a claimant and one or more persons are beneficially entitled in

possession to any capital asset they shall be treated as if each of them were entitled in possession to the whole beneficial therein in an equal share…’

19.5 In the case of The Chief Adjudication Officer v Palfrey, (CIS/39 1/92 (Palfrey) and CIS/4 17/92 (Dowel 1): The Times, 17 Feb 1995) the Court of Appeal considered the approach to be taken in valuing the beneficial interest of a jointly owned interest in land. The case concerned Mr Palfrey, a widower and his daughter, who in 1982 acquired, as beneficial joint tenants, the freehold of their house which had been the family home since the early 1950s. The deposit on the purchase and all the mortgage instalments were paid and continued to be paid by Miss Palfrey. In 1991 Mr Palfrey needed to move into a care home. At this time, funding for such care was via income support. The value of Mr Palfrey’s share would determine whether he was entitled to income support to pay for his care. 19.6 The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the whole beneficial interest in the asset must be valued and then divided into the same number of equal shares as there are persons entitled to the beneficial interest in possession, and then Mr Palfrey being debited with his share of that value. Instead they held the correct approach is its current market value. There would be no market for Mr Palfrey’s interest: Miss Palfrey, was content to rely on her right of survivorship under the joint tenancy, and had no intention of buying it. Equally, no outsider would be willing to buy into a house whose occupation would have to be shared with her. 19.7 All that would be achieved would be co-occupation and speculative rights to obtain an order for sale where one co-owner refuses to sell. There was a collateral purpose in the purchase of the property between the joint owners of the property which effectively prevents the joint owner from forcing a sale of the home against the wishes of the other(s). Accordingly, the current market value of

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Mr Palfrey’s interest would in all probability have to be brought into account at a nil value. 19.8 Regulation 27(2) of the National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) Regulations 1992 (now repealed) which concern the financial assessment of a joint interest in land for people who have had residential accommodation arranged by a local authority under Part 3 of the National Assistance Act 1948 states as follows:

27(2) Where a resident and one or more other persons are beneficially entitled in possession to any interest in land— (a) the resident’s share shall be valued at an amount equal to the price

which his interest in possession would realise if it were sold to a willing buyer, less than 10 per cent and the amount of any incumbrance secured solely on his share of the whole beneficial interest; and

(b) the value of his interest so calculated shall be treated as if it were actual capital.

19.9 Regulation 27(2)(a) means that the resident’s share is to be valued at an amount equal to the price which his interest in possession would realise if sold to a willing buyer. There would be a 10% discount, less any secured debt. The wording of Regulation 27(2)(a) and Regulation 52 of the Income Regulations are similar but not identical but paragraphs 7.017-19 of the English CRAG (7.013-7.015 in Wales) would adopted Palfrey approach, in that it states,

‘7.017 Where a resident is a joint beneficial owner of property, i.e. he has the right to receive some of the proceeds of a sale, it is the resident’s interest in the property which is to be valued as capital, and not the property itself. The value of this interest is governed by 1. the resident’s ability to re-assign the beneficial interest to

somebody else 2. there being a market i.e. the interest being such as to attract a

willing buyer for the interest. Regulation 27(2) 7.018 In most cases there is unlikely to be any legal impediment preventing a joint beneficial interest in a property being re-assigned. But the likelihood of there being a willing buyer will depend on the conditions in which the joint beneficial interest has arisen. 7.019 Where an interest in a property is beneficially shared between relatives, the value of the resident’s interest will be heavily influenced by the possibility of a market amongst his fellow beneficiaries. If no other relative is willing to buy the resident’s interest, it is highly unlikely that any “outsider” would be willing to buy into the property unless the financial advantages far outweighed the risks and limitations involved. The value of the interest, even to a willing buyer, could in such circumstances effectively be nil. If the local authority is unsure about the resident’s share, or their valuation is disputed by the resident, again a professional valuation should be obtained.’

19.10 The Local Government Ombudsman in a complaint against Lincolnshire County Council (Complaint 03/C/09384, 28 June 2004) suggested that a local authority should have ‘significant evidence or opinion giving it reason to disagree’ when refusing to accept that an interest in jointly held property had a low or nil value.

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19.11 The concept of valuing a price on the assumption of a sale to a willing buyer was considered in the case of Seager v Copydex Ltd (No.2) [1969] 1WLR 809 as being ‘the price a willing buyer- desirous of obtaining it – would pay for it’. It assumes that there is a willing person in existence who is positively desirous of purchasing what is being valued. 19.12 For the assessed person’s beneficial interest to have a value to a willing buyer, they must be able to realise the value within it. This may relate to the buyer’s potential ability (and not the potential ability of the local authority) to apply to a court to enforce a sale of the whole property. 19.13 When faced with a request such as this, a court must have regard to ss14 and 15 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (see Bagum v Hafiz [2015] EWCA Civ 801). 19.14 As CRAG at 7.019 noted, the likelihood of there being a willing buyer depends on the conditions on which the joint beneficial interest arose. Arguably where the acquisition purpose was not to provide a roof over the owners’ heads, the value is likely to be different. 19.15 In Wilkinson v Chief Adjudication Officer [2000] EWCA Civ 88, the Court of Appeal looked at the correct approach to the valuation of a person’s share in a joint capital asset under Regulation 52, of the Income Support Regulations 1987. The court noted that the purpose of a gift of property, which was inherited jointly with the claimant’s brother under the claimant’s mother’s will, was not to provide a home. There was no purpose of a trust being created and no restriction preventing a sale.

Mummery LJ noted at para 11 that Mrs Wilkinson case was different from the Palfrey case at as follows:

‘…I have no doubt that Mrs Wilkinson could have obtained an order for sale of the House with vacant possession if Mr Brian Thomas was unwilling to buy her share from her at its market value or refused to agree to such a sale. Mrs Wilkinson’s share in the House came to her as an inheritance on her mother’s death. It was a gift by Mrs Thomas jointly to her two children in equal shares. It was an absolute gift in the sense that there was no restriction or superadded purpose expressed in the will. This was not a case like Palfrey where property was acquired by joint owners for a collateral purpose, such as accommodation for both joint owners, and that purpose would be defeated if one of those acquiring the property were to insist on a sale while that purpose was still subsisting.’

19.16 As a result, the starting point for the valuation of the claimant’s share for income support purposes is half the market value of the house with vacant possession from which there may be further discount in respect of any factors that materially affect the ability of the claimant to market the house. The issue remains how is the market value to be ascertained? It would appear that the willing buyer is the correct approach. 19.17 Certainly, there is no dispute that the starting point must be what is the current market value; this is neither defined in the regulations nor is there any reference to the need to have a willing buyer, although the CSSG explains, ‘the current market value will be the price a willing buyer would pay to a willing

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seller. The way the market value is obtained will depend on the type of asset held’ (Annex B, Paragraph 15). 19.18 Paragraph 12 of Annex B of the CSSG further explains,

‘Where a person has a joint beneficial ownership of capital, except where there is evidence that the person owns an unequal share, the total value should be divided equally between the joint owners and the person should be treated as owning an equal share.’

19.19 What is notable is the focus on the market conditions rather than ownership conditions, i.e. what is the value of the property? – rather than – what is the value of the claimant’s interest in the jointly owned property? The income support regulations wording are as ambiguous as the 2014 Regulations, but nevertheless the local authority must allocate a value to the share belonging to the person being assessed. If the joint owner lives in the property, the share may be difficult to sell on the open market and so may be deemed to have a low or nil value; if the local authority follows the Court of Appeal ruling in Palfrey. If on the other hand, the joint owner does not live there, having inherited their share, the assessed person could be deemed to own 50% of the open market value of the property. In any event, even if one were to assume that it was possible to get an order for sale, there would be a cost and ‘inconvenience value’ to this which should be reflected in any valuation. 19.20 Challenging an adverse assessment by the local authority is via its complaint process. Where the assessed person can demonstrate a collateral purpose, it is more likely to succeed. Local authorities are told to use court proceedings as a last resort and as such will seek to find some leverage from which they can negotiate. 20. KEEPING RECORDS The Law Society has issued detailed guidance in Practice Notes on file closure management, and file retention in relation to Wills and Probate and Trusts:

File Closure Management: www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/file-closuremanagement

Wills and Probate: www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/file-retention-wills-probate

Trusts: www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/file-retention-trusts