Asset Integrity NDC_IADC Seminar 20 Apr 09

8/3/2019 Asset Integrity NDC_IADC Seminar 20 Apr 09

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Understanding Asset Integrity


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Asset Integrity

Ability of an asset to perform its required

function to its design capabilityeffectively and efficiently whilstsafeguarding life and the environment.

Defining Asset Integrity

Asset

All physical facilities required for theoperation.


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Asset Integrity Management

Means of ensuring that :People,

Systems,

Processes andResources

which deliver the integrity, are in place, inuse & fit for purpose over the wholelifecycle of the asset.


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Is Asset Integrity Necessary?

Are Asset Monitoring systems satisfactory? Is Key Staff Competent?

Is Maintenance of assets good?

Is Design adequate for the application?

Have you exceeded design life of asset?

Have Changes been adequately controlled?

Are Emergency procedures defined?

Is the Integrity process independently audited/verified?

The list could go on.


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Cantileverlevel

Standard turn table drive Top drive

Typical Retrofit: Topdrives

Will the derrick withstand thetorsion loads?

Like legs, has derrick beenanalyzed for inertial forces frommost severe transit motion?


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How Often Do You Check?

Worn rack teeth change the contact ratio and therebythe design assumption


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Does Operating Staff Know?

When brake discs need tobe checked?

When the springs been

renewal?

How much is the brake

holding torque?

How much lining wear is

permitted before changing

discs?

How much is the allowed

airgap?

Are these details part of

the maintenance

procedures?


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How Assets were Lost

Weve seen these before.


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26 Years Previously

Faults found indesignand construction

Ineffective regulationsand quality oversight

Loss of watertight

integrity

Water entered into theballast control room

Lack ofsurvival gearandtraining

Crewdid notunderstandhow tooperatethe ballastsystemOCEAN RANGER 1982: 84 persons died;

loss unknown

Courtesy DNV


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20 Years Back Lack of communication between

shifts Three parallel gas trains

One closed down

Safety valve removed

Next shift, started closedtrain again

Consequences escalated Platform not designed forexplosions

Surrounding platformsproduction increased

Assumed living quarters asafe place Several did not try to

evacuatePIPER ALPHA- July 1988: 167fatalities, loss $ 1270 million Courtesy HSE UK


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17 Years Before

First structurewithout independent3rd party verification

Water pressureexceeded thecapacity of thestructure - cellsimploded, thestructure sprang leakand sank

Total loss of about

$700 million

Sleipner A - August 23,1991: 0 fatality, loss $365 million

Courtesy HSE UK


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7 Years Back

Pumps for repairwithout taking any

other alternativepreventive actionOpening ballast tankfor inspection withoutfollowing proceduresDelay in activation ofthe drainage pump

Deficient proceduresand training to deal withemergency situationsPetrobras 36 March 2001: 11 fatalities,

loss $ 515 million

Courtesy HSE UK


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Recently 3 Years ago

Crane on platform non-operational, causedupwind approach

Boat collided with gasriser

Riser protectionineffective

No deluge protection

Vessel operating withdeficiencies

Only two of eightlifeboats launchedBHN Platform 2005: 22 fatalities,

loss $195 million


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Then two years ago. in 2007

Rig oscillated in roughweather

Cantilever struck

production valve tree

Sub surface safety

valves unable to closecompletely

Structural or jacking

failure suspected

Two months to kill well

Large oil spillInvestigations not yet

made publicUsumacinta 2007: 21 fatalities,losses undeclared

Courtesy HSE UK


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Evolution of Change

26 Yrs

20 Yrs17 Yrs

7 Yrs

3 Yrs 2 Yrs Are wesafetoday?

MODU CODE REVISED

SAFETY CASE REGIME

INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION

BALLASTCONTROL

ALARP PRINCIPLE


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Unfortunately.

April 2008: Helicopter crashes into Black Seadrilling rig, 19 dead

Sept 2008: Helicopter crashes while takingoff from Offshore rig in Dubai, 4 dead

Oct 2008: Delay of SCR maintenanceprogram on jack up rig causes fire, losses$200,000

Apr 2008: Sudden crane boom crash injuresone

Apr 09: Another helicopter crashes in offshore

platform operations, 8 dead

Feb 08: Crane boom crash on offshore rig, 1dead, 1 injured


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Clearly.

Asset Integrity is a pressing need Previous attempts have had limited success

Gaps are plenty

Industry cannot afford to Learn from Own

ExperienceWe need to be Wiser without being Sadder


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Why Now?

World Jack up fleet is not getting youngerWeather changes are threatening existing

operating zones

Insurance demands are making it less lucrative

to operate in some areas These rigs are now migrating to safer benign

areas

The overall average regional rig age is thus likely

to increase This does not have to be a problem except.


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The Challenges

Maintenance programs have been sporadic andtotally non-uniform

Spares for obsolete equipment is a challenge

Knowledge pool is being fast depleted

Regulatory controls are not the same

The migration/influx is changing the way things

are done

We need to have procedures in place to deal withthe change


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Are We Alone?

From 2004 to 2007:

29 organisations worked on thesubject and issued a Toolkit tohelp organisations establish AssetIntegrity.

This was done but reports indicatethe gaps still persist.


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Protective Barriers Layers of protection separate the

initial hazard from the final undesiredoutcome.

No layer is 100% effective, there areholes

When the holes line up, the undesiredevent will occur

Overview Integrity Management Model

Element Model Various key topics need to be

considered when assuring integrity. These represent the principal

aspects which need to be controlledby the Integrity Management System

Can be considered as the layers ofprotection in the Barrier model.


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Why all the Elements?

Is it not sufficient to just look at the Hardware? Is it not enough to maintain the asset?

Is this an overkill?

Has the Industry seen different?

Unfortunately .Yes

OCEAN RANGER

PIPER ALPHA

PETROBRAS 36

BHN PLATFORM


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Assessing Organisation Risks

Establish the Standards

Identify Organisation Risks

Analyse the Risks

Evaluate the Risks

Put a Management system in place for the Risks

Monitor & Review the Process


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Establishing the Barriers
http://www.clker.com/clipart-16533.html


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Asset Lifecycle Integrity

Design suitability Allocate funds for integrity in design

Ensure compliance with codes at constructionstage

Ensure availability of design criteria

Develop operating & maintenance strategy basedon design

Control asset modifications

Monitor changing operating climate

If acquiring, assets acquire carefully, addressingunknowns

If retiring/scrapping assets do so carefully


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Human Element

Ensure Equipment Serviceability

Document and Publish Work Procedures

Analyze workload for Key staff

Establish Work Authorization Processes

Above all .inculcate Integrity Behavior


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Competency

Standards

Earmark staff with critical responsibilities Identify required competencies per Job Determine level of proficiency

Training

Establish relevant training standards Verify competency levels

Monitoring

Establish and apply promotion criteria

Prepare and apply RACI charts to keystaff Refresh the competency periodically,

especially emergency response


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Monitoring & Review

Establish Asset Integrity KPIs

Verify performance standards ofbarriers

Audit performance of AssetIntegrity

Incident Investigations

Benchmark performance againststandards (Internal/ External)


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Lastly

The world financial position will result in possiblecutbacks

More is being demanded from existing units

Owners are upgrading assets, sometimes without

adequate controls and checks

Platforms are seeing much higher loads than they

were originally designed for

Additional well slots often with lower level of

protection are being added

Existing controls have failed previously

If ever Asset Integrity was a priority it is TODAY


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THANK YOU


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Establishing AIMS

Systems & Processes Identify & Introduce Standards, CoPs, RPs

Establish Integrity Documentation ( Identification,Verification, Approval & Controls, etc)

Establish Competency Assurance Systems Establish system to Identify & Register all

Integrity Critical Eqpt & Systems


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Establising AIMS Contd

Establish Performance standards for all IntegrityCritical Equipments & Systems

Revisit Project processes & introduce Integrityreview processes

Establish Quality Assurance systems for Supplychains

Establish Project Handover documentationrequirements

Establish Integrity Inspection, Testing,Monitoring, Maintenance Planning & Scheduling


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Engineering & Design

Ensure that proper engineering & design data isavailable for all assets

Confirm that the assets are being operated withindesign limits

Modify if required the operation to match designcapability


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Inspection & Certification

Ensure that clear inspection procedures andfrequency is established

Ensure that certification bodies are competent


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Competency & Training

Identify staff that have responsibilities for assetintegrity

Attach documented competency requirements forthe tasks

Evaluate staff for gaps in competency Train staff to address the gaps

Re-evaluate staff for training effectiveness


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Management of Change

Confirm that MOC addresses all aspects ofCompany business

Establish a corporate level ownership for MOC

Using the HSE Observation program revisit

previous MOCs and remove anomalies


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Audit & Quality

Establish an audit program to confirmeffectiveness of Asset Integrity Systems

Appoint suitable auditors with skills for integrityaudits


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Asset Integrity Growth

Lowest level, learner,ad hoc,defined by absence of qualities

in higher levels.

Can repeat what it has done before, but notnecessarily define what it does do.

Can saywhatit does andhowit goes about it.

Can control what it does. It lays downrequirements and ensures these are metthroughfeedback.

Is Best Practice. Capable oflearning and adapting itself. It notonly uses experience to correctany problems, but also to changethe nature of the way it operates.

Defined

Managed

Optimized

Repeatable

Initial


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Enter Asset Integrity

1. System & Processes

2. Maintenance

3 . Engineering & Design

4. Audit & Quality

5. Inspection & Certification

6.Competency & Training

7. Operation


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Is Rig Upgrades the Answer?

Maybe. but Structural Fatigue Study must be based on degraded

condition

Apply environmental loads based on operating history

Be careful with localised stiffening of structures

Prepare revised inspection plans based on design

review

Update rig documentation manuals and drawings

Re-train key staff for change

Documents

Asset Integrity NDC_IADC Seminar 20 Apr 09