ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE BUDGETING EXPERIMENT IN FOUR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Financial Accountabilily C3 Management, 2(1), Spring 1986, 0267-4424 $2.50

ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE BUDGETING EXPERIMENT IN FOUR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

PETER N. DEAN'

INTRODUCTION

T h e history of performance budgeting' is one of high hopes and disappointing achievement. The high hopes are exemplified in Malaysia's Treasury Circular No. 5 of 1968. This described its advantages as follows:

More than ever before it will make the Budget an instrument of expressing Government policy on each governmental programme. It will be a more useful document to the taxpayers and Members of Parliament since the major emphasis will be on programmes and activities, work to be accomplished and its cost. It will furnish Parliament with better information with which they can judge the effectiveness of the management of each MinistryIDepartment. It will require Government administrators and managers at all levels to think and plan in terms of programme objectives and the most efficient and economical way of attaining them. With focus on objectives and programmes - most of which cannot be accomplished within a year - it introduces the valuable element of long range planning on annual operating expenses as well as development expenditures. With major emphasis on programmes it will facilitate and improve coordination between economic planning and financial planning. With the introduction of systematic and continuous methods of evaluating performance, it will furnish the Government and officials with managerial tools heretofore unavailable to them. With the major focus on programmes it will facilitate the solution of the ever present problem - that of setting budget priorities as between competing programmes.''

Looking through the list and comparing it with the system actually introduced,

The author is from the University of Strathclyde. He wishes to acknowledge the support of the Overseas Development Administration of the British Government in making a grant available for a comparative study of performance budgeting in four Asian countries. He also wishes to thank his research collaborators: Mrs L. Briones, Secretary of the Commission on Audit, Philippines; Pro- fessor Doh Joon Chien of the Faculty of Economics and Administration, University ofMalaya; the late Professor M.J.K. Thavaraj of the Indian Institute of Public Administration and Mr T. Thirulinganathan, formerly of the Programme Budget Unit, Budget Division, Government of Sri Lanka who contributed their knowledge and energy to the project; the governments concerned for allowing access to people and documents; the interviewees who sacrificed valuable time to give their views; and Mr A. Premchand of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF whose inspiration and encouragement were vital to the completion of the research. The views expressed are the author's alone.

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one can see that some claims would be impossible to fulfil [ (e) and (h)] while others might prove difficult [(d) and (g)] .

Nevertheless, performance budgeting was introduced in developing countries in a spirit of optimism such as had prevailed in the USA.’ The UN Manual (1965) had emphasised a cautious approach and in India the working group of the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) on performance budgeting recommended that implementation should be an ‘evolutionary process to be developed and refined over a number of years’. However, the Commission itself recommended immediate implementation. The level of expectations concerning the new system, can be judged from the objectives set for it by the ARC and the advantages claimed for i t by the UN Adviser in Sri Lankae3 Such views were in line with the tone of the UN Manual (1965) which had asserted the superiority of performance budgeting over previous practices (p.28) and its usefulness for a broad range of user groups. Such assertions helped to overcome resistance to the reform but raised expectations to a level that proved difficult to fulfil.

In practice developing countries have had considerable difficulty implementing performance budgeting. For instance, Sri Lanka which embarked on the innovation in 1969, extended its depth and coverage in the next six years, but abandoned it after 1976. In India a more sustained effort has produced a working system. Each year ministries and departments of the Government of India produce very detailed performance budgets. These are separate from the Demands for Grants (Budgets) and are presented to the legislature alongside the budget for the purpose of legislative review. The major limitations are that the legislature appears to make little use of performance budgets while the ministries and departments have not adapted performance budgeting to their own management needs. In Malaysia, the reform effort was spread over three phases. In the first (1969- 72) an attempt was made to extend the system horizontally to all federal agencies. However, the reform was found to be superficial. Consequently, in the second phase (1972-80), the emphasis was on in-depth implementation in a few selected agencies. A third phase com- menced in 1981, with the objective of extending the system to agencies not subject to in-depth implementation. Malaysia’s experience of performance budgeting has been mixed. In agencies such as the ministries of Health and Public Works elaborate systems are operational but not entirely free of start-up problems. In other ministries the reform is either superficial or non-existent. For the government as a whole a programme and performance budget is produced annually as a single volume separate from the budget itself.

The Philippines were the first developing country to adopt performance budgeting. They did so in 1954. Here again the early reform effort encountered very considerable problems and it was not until some time after 1972 that an operational system was installed. The Philippines now have a relatively complete system of performance budgeting. The budget presented to the legislature is in programme, activity, project (PAP) format. Appropriation

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is by programme. Agencies monitor costs and performance by PAP, and report relevant details to the Office of Budget and Management (OBM) quarterly. Annual budget submissions must contain performance budget data. Units of work measurement have been evolved for all suitable programmes and performance is monitored by the National Accounting Office, a bureau of OBM. Thus of the five countries mentioned, this is the only one in which performance budgeting is operational on a government-wide basis. It is a sobering thought that this was achieved after more than twenty years experimentation and during the period of martial law.

The aim of this paper is to focus on the experience of four countries which adopted performance budgeting (India, Malaysia, Philippines and Sri Lanka): to assess the extent to which it satisfies the information needs of its intended users (executive, legislature, managers); to comment on its integration with related processes (planning, accounting, auditing); and finally to attempt an over-all evaluation of its achievements and prospects.

USERS OF PERFORMANCE BUDGETS

To evaluate an information system we have to compare its costs of operation with the benefits it confers on users. It is worthwhile if it generates net benefits: benefits to users in excess of its costs of operation. In practice this calculation is extremely difficult to carry out. One approach might be to value the beneficial results of decisions made possible by the information system. Here there would be difficulty establishing adequate causal links between the information supplied, decisions made and beneficial results. Another approach might be to solicit users’ views concerning the value of the information supplied. Here there is a problem of obtaining reliable evidence. Respondents might have inadequate introspection or knowledge to give the required information, or their answers might be biased. Above all, the market for this type of information is unusual. In the present instance the users of information are not themselves consumers of it. They use the information as agents of their organisations. Therefore one would be seeking not their personal valuations, but their estimates of the value to the organisation of the information supplied. Moreover, once a particular information system has been installed, its users are not presented with the costs and benefits of alternative systems. Without a competitive market in alternatives it would be difficult to find an adequate frame of reference for valuations. Analysis would be further complicated in the case of performance budgeting by the fact that it distributes information to external parties as part of a public accountability process. Public knowledge is a public good to which the exclusion principle does not apply. It would therefore be impossible to value such information on the basis of individual responses. For such reasons a cost-benefit approach is unlikely to be feasible and we are bound to seek less exacting criteria.

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An attempt is therefore made to evaluate performance budgeting by trying to discover the extent to which it is

0 used by those for whom is is intended 0 adapted to what we know of users’ needs in terms of details, timeliness,

0 designed in such a way as to fulfil its ostensible aims.

The ostensible aims of performance budgeting are set out in a number of key documents: the UN Manual; ‘and the documents referred to on page 2 above and in note 3 below. These aims are commonly linked to the major classes of information user: the legislature, budget preparers, management, government auditors and so on. Any single objective for performance budgeting takes a generalised form: that it will help a particular body to improve the way in which a particular task, decision or process is performed, by providing more relevant information. We now examine the major bodies which use performance budget data.

objectivity, subject matter etc.

The Legislature

It is generally agreed in all the key documents cited, that performance budgets will help the legislature. The legislature’s job is to review and authorise the budget, and it is entitled to accountability reports on the actual use of resources whose use it has authorised. To perform these tasks well, good information is necessary and it seems reasonable to suppose that information on government programmes and activities, their costs and achievements would be relevant to the legislature’s needs.

There has been an assumption that the information supplied within this system is value-free. An alternative view is to regard the various protagonists such as the executive, legislative and administrative branches of government as being in conflict, or at least representing different vested interests. The historical conflict in Britain between the executive and legislative branches has been traced by Reid; and the special preoccupations of the administrative branch are brought out for instance in Heclo and Wildavsky. Given the existence of such pressures, it is by no means obvious that budgetary information will remain neutral. Indeed as information is a prerequisite for the exercise of power and the public purse is a key focus of political power, one would suppose that information would be one of the weapons available in the conflict. For instance, if we take it that the administrative branch is to some extent concerned with safe-guarding its own interests, it is easy to see that the information it purveys about performance may be selective or downright misleading. One of the major reasons for public audit is to guard against such a result. Financial transactions and statements of government are verified by independent experts. Few references appear in the vast literature on budgeting concerning the verification of information on performance and achievement, despite


strong prima facie reasons for supposing this type of information will contain imparted bias.

One sees that there are likely to be significant barriers to the legislature deriving the hoped for benefits from performance budgeting. Of the countries studied, the Philippines has the weakest legislature. Is it a coincidence that it is the only country where the budget document presented to the legislature is bereft of line-itemised detail? Examining the history of performance budgeting in the Philippines, it is clear that it has been a field of conflict between the executive and legislative branches. The original proposal for a performance budget gained enthusiastic legislative support. However, two years later, with twelve agencies producing performance budgets, the House Committee on Appropriations reviewed progress. They regretted the loss of line-itemised detail and felt that legislative control had been weakened. For the next year the legislature insisted on a line-itemised budget. Six years later the two Con- gressmen who had originally sponsored the bill introducing performance budgeting, introduced a bill to eliminate it. Legislators had found the performance budget too complicated and preferred the line itemised information where ‘even the uninitiated can find any item of appropriation without any dif- f i cu l t~ ’ .~ There was even the suggestion that the performance budget represented a ‘propaganda job’. The bill did not become law.

In 1969 the President referred to performance budgeting as ‘an effective instrument for improving the management of the Government and for controlling the expenditure of funds’. In 1972 martial law was declared, and only after this was it possible to implement performance budgeting fully. Laya (1979) observes that before this ‘Congress insisted on approving a General Appropriations Act that bore no resemblance to the performance presentation of the bill. The resulting Act was essentially an itemization of personal services . . . a list of the various expenditure’ objects . . . ’ (page 44). He goes on to explain that the Budget Reform Decree of 1977, requires the General Appropriation Act to be in a strict programme/activity/project format with no line itemization (page 45). Significantly Section 24 of the Budget Reform Decree provides that the Budget Commissioner should provide line itemised detail to the President for his consideration and approval and not to the legislature. These facts support the contention that in the Philippines performance budgeting is an element in executive dominance.

Legislative rejection, or at least serious dissatisfaction, is not an isolated phenomenon. An early US study by Eghtedari and Sherwood revealed’that Los Angeles legislators had almost no understanding of the performance budget and agreed that as a consequence they had abandoned the legislative phase of budget review. Schick (197 1) reviewing performance budget innovations reports that the Maryland legislature was fearful of being deprived of line- itemised detail and insisted on a budget giving these details. An Ohio legislator asked ‘who cut it (the budget) into so many pieces so that we don’t know what’s being done?’ New York legislators could not relate the information supplied by

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the performance budget to their legislative needs. Given such reactions it comes as no surprise to find that in Nepal the 1971/72 performance budget lasted only 24 hours. The legislature demanded that the finance minister re- present the budget showing line-itemised detail under each programme and project, which he did several days later (Beyer, page 63).

Certainly in none of the four countries is there much evidence of legislators using performance budgets. While the research got no nearer legislators than some of their secretariats and select committees, an impression was gained that the vast majority of legislators had no interest whatsoever in performance budgets. On the other hand, there were two commonly voiced findings amongst the researchers working in each country: first, that the legislature had made no objection to performance budgeting (except of course in the Philip- pines) and second that a small number of legislators with appropriate interests and skills had used the information to good effect. The research did not permit any conclusive finding in this area, but the author suspects legislative use is trivial for the following reasons. First, in all countries, legislative review of the budget is compressed into a tight timetable. Second the focus of legislators is primarily on the amounts of money to be granted and the policies they repre- sent. Finally, the manner in which performance budgets are presented, discourages use. This is particularly the case in India where the 1984/85 performance budgets of 39 ministries comprised over 2,200 pages, and where ministries also produce annual reports of similar length containing further description and facts of relevance to legislators. Such a vast array of information is out of all proportion to legislators’ capacity to use it.

On the other hand it might provide a valuable source for select committees of the legislature. An interview with the Chairman of the Indian Public Accounts Committee revealed that for these purposes performance budgets do not give a clear idea of what is going on. The figures are presented annually and so do not allow monitoring of events throughout the year. The government lacks adequate data collection procedures and therefore ministries do not know what is happening in the field. Channels of communication are very poor. As a result what has actually happened may be discovered only by the Comptroller and Auditor General two to three years later. This respondent described the government’s reluctance to give relevant information to Parliament, as ‘an exercise in evasion’. This fits closely with the discussion on page 4 above. The situation in the other countries is somewhat different. In Sri Lanka the budget document contains performance data, but less and less has been included in recent years. The little that is now included is fragmentary and inadequate as a basis for evaluating efficiency. Besides, many of the figures are of a round sum nature, implying that even for past years they are not measurements, but rough estimates or guesses. The Malaysian programme and performance budget is of a size and design which would be consistent with legislators using it. There has always been a plan for it to be merged with the budget document proper. Presumably if this were accomplished, it would be more intensively used.

PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN FOUR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 In summary, the aim of making performance budgets useful to legislators is

yet to be realised. We have cited several cases where they are inimical to their interests and two, India and Sri Lanka, where their relevance to their needs is greatly in doubt. This should not be a surprise. Performance budgets are for- mulated on principles far removed from information science. No one attempted to discover legislators’ real needs for information. As a result their actual use of performance budgets is minimal.

Management

We now turn to the second major category of user of performance budgets: management. The UN Manual had stressed management usefulness and so did the key documents for India and Malaysia. In the Philippines early expectations were for use only by the executive, the legislature and the people. Later developments such as the Management and Audit Improvement Program which requires each ministry ‘to design and implement a program which identifies indicators of performance, defines target levels of accomplishment and establishes procedures for monitoring results’ (Yoingco and Guevara, page 228) are so close to performance budgeting and so clearly related to management use, that one can safely assume that management is expected to be a major user of performance budget type data.

What do we mean by management? The UN Manual distinguished two groups of managers: higher level and operating level (pages 48 - 49). Total indicators of productivity would be useful for the first and work measurement and unit cost data for the second. Very few managements are structured in this way. Indeed government consists of vast hierarchical systems of many levels and relationships. Designing information systems for such structures is very complex, yet little or no analysis of this aspect appears in the UN Manual. Governments were faced with extremely perplexing problems such as: At what levels should costs be collected? Can performance indicators be provided for those cost collection centres? From what sources should originating data be collected? How should it be reported to higher levels? What information would different managers need and what regular reporting system would supply that information? These questions are particularly dificult to answer given the great structural variety of government agencies. Some are purely supervisory; others implement their own programmes; some do both; some fund projects which are implemented by other levels of government (for instance in a federal system); some have responsibility for public enterprises and quasi-autonomous bodies. Each requires a different approach.

We now turn to the four countries under view, to try and assess their success in using performance budget data for management purpose^.^ Clearly the research method only allowed a general perspective. Nevertheless, the case of India is quite clear. Here performance budgeting is primarily a way of making information available to the legislature. However, some respondents felt that

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the performance budget was useful as an expression of commitment by management. Having committed itself to certain targets, management would be inspired to achieve them. Others were generally unenthusiastic about the management usefulness of the data, some clearly feeling that it was more of a nuisance to produce than a benefit to use. Significantly, when the Government of India decided to modernise its management information systems in 1976, the designers of new systems specifically rejected performance budgets as a basis (Dean, 1985). New systems were based on principles of information theory: the content, format and regularity of reports were determined in relation to users’ needs; information with no clear use or whose usefulness was deemed to be of too low a priority, was not required (thus the new systems often required smaller numbers of reports than those they replaced); the purposes which the reports were to fulfil were considered in detail; and, where possible, reports were designed as inputs to specified monthly/quarterly meetings. The approach was the antithesis of that taken in performance budgeting and underlines the need for further study and experimentation if performance budgeting is to fulfil this role. As one perceptive interviewee remarked: ‘There is a distinction between compilation of information for the purpose of aggrega- tion in annual reports, and MIS which must have an ultimate objective’.

The Sri Lankan case is also reasonably clear-cut. Here the programme budget experiment was very short-lived, covering no more than six or seven years. A traditional system of financial management which emphasised accountability and control, had produced an old fashioned management style. Little modern expertise had been brought to bear on the government financial system despite the energetic work of several UN advisers. The new system was primarily an information transfer from ministries to the Budget Division of the Ministry of Finance. The ministries were to formulate financial and work plans at the beginning of each year. These documents showed the phasing of expenditure to be made and work to be done on a quarterly basis. Monitoring was achieved via monthly returns from ministries to Budget Division. The returns of the third, sixth, ninth and twelfth months provided a basis for identifying variances from the financial and work plan. The leading characteristic of this system was the central part played by the Ministry of Finance. Ministries were encouraged to be timely in their submissions by the threat that periodic cash releases might be delayed. Budget Division analysed variances and brought erring ministries to book. There was the potential that the system would develop to provide information for ministries’ own management needs, but it was not regarded as a direct attempt to do this. Indeed amongst some respondents from ministries there was the feeling that it was centrally imposed for use by the centre. When the impetus from the centre disappeared in 1976, the information systems largely broke down. Since then some isolated attempts have been made to develop other systems (Dean, 1985) but they differ con- siderably from programme budgeting. Thus in Sri Lanka it would be fair to say that this type of budgeting provided few lasting benefits for managers, except


perhaps as an avenue for more modern ideas of management. Research in the Philippines did not provide an adequate basis for assessing

management’s uses of performance budget data. In 1979 a presidential Letter of Instruction established the Management Audit and Improvement Program (MAIP). The language of MAIP is very close to that of performance budgeting. Essentially, it requires agencies to use indicators of performance in order to set targets for their own achievements, and to monitor actual achievements against targets. It is specifically concerned with the establishment of agency-based management information systems and with management audit. It is not known how quickly MAIP systems have been established or how useful they may have been. Clearly, however, MAIP is an attempt to use a performance budget approach to provide data suitable for management needs.

The case of Malaysia is in sharp contrast. In-depth implementation of programme and performance budgeting (PPB) has been pursued at some length in the Ministries of Health and Public Works. In these cases PPB is conceived as a management information system. Consequently the major emphasis is on its use for internal purposes. Taking the Ministry of Health as an example, its implementation manual of 1977 shows three major budgeting/accounting structures:

- A programme/activity/sub activity structure based on the purposes for which funds are expended

- A responsibility/cost centre structure defining who, organisationally, is accountable for expenditure and for achieving performance targets at various levels of the administrative hierarchy

- An object of expenditure structure which identifies the nature of items of expenditure

Of these three, the responsibility/cost centres are of greatest importance for internal managers. Responsibility centres correspond to existing organisational units such as administrative headquarters, training schools, research institutes and hospitals. They are identified at three levels. Each is a discrete organisational unit under the direction of a responsibility centre manager. The manager has the authority to manage and spend an approved budget and he controls costs in relation to operational accomplishments. Compilation of budgets and accounts in terms of responsibility centres establishes a framework for accountability. Beneath responsibility centres are sub-responsibility centres and cost centres: further points at which costs are gathered.

Looking at the experience of using performance budgeting as a management information system, evidence is sparse and conflicting. In India and Sri Lanka management usefulness was trivial.6 In the Philippines and Malaysia efforts continue to develop this aspect more fully. In Malaysia the pace of development seems slow, as shown by the case of the Ministry of Health which has been subject to in-depth implementation since 1973. Moreover, the impact is rather narrow, with the major innovation effort occurring in only two ministries. The

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Philippines Management Audit Improvement Program of 1979 is of broader coverage, but its results are yet to be reported on. Given the practical and con- ceptual difficulties in this area it would be reasonable to expect quite slow progress.

Budget Personnel

Budget preparers constitute a third category of information user. They divide into two groups - those who compile budgets and those who review them, the latter being found in the Ministry of Finance or equivalent body dealing with the government’s budget, In principle, performance budget information would help both parties: compilers would be able to budget for costs in relation to planned achievements and reviewers would be able to investigate whether budget targets seem reasonable in relation to past performance. In practice it is dificult to achieve this, for the following reasons. First, information on performance is fragmentary and unsatisfactory. Often the figures reflect only certain aspects of performance and even then possibly not the most important aspects. Second, it has been difficult to relate performance to costs. Thus performance budgets contain figures of cost and figures of performance but often do not relate one to the other, preventing the type of informed decision envisaged by writers on performance budgeting. Third, those who compile budgets do not wish to provide ammunition for those who review them. They therefore tend to present information which is helpful to their own case. Fourth, one supposes that figures of performance are derived from information systems. However, there is little evidence that such information systems are checked for accuracy. Thus the figures of performance remain unverified and within the control of the compilers. Fifth, and this applies to all budgetary techniques, actual decisions on funding are political, and are made primarily in relation to inherited obligations, political expediency and vested interests. Sixth, the tightness of the budget timetable allows only routine examination. Budget reviewers are rarely equipped for in-depth investigation. They lack the time, expertise and powers to go behind the performance budget figures to find out what is really happening. Budget review therefore often resembles a stage-managed charade. Of course one could argue with some justice that it would be even more of a charade, if no information on achievements and performance were available.

Interviews in 1984 with staff of the Budget Division, Ministry of Finance and Planning, of Sri Lanka revealed almost no use of performance budget data in budget review. In this country budget innovation is thought of as a historical episode. With the closure of the programme budget unit no one remained in Budget Division with specific responsibility for examining programme budgets. Review of the financial budget is now conducted along traditional lines. In Malaysia the Financial Management Systems Unit continues to provide a focus for programme and performance budgeting (PPB). It undertakes review of the programmes and projects of ministries with the object of helping


ministries to evolve more appropriate programme structures. It also gives technical advice on other aspects of PPB. Budget review, however, is undertaken by budget officers of the Ministry of Finance. A few of these are knowledgeable about PPB, but the vast majority are not and do not use such an approach in budget review work. Recently budget ofticers have been given training to encourage a more PPB-based approach. The case of India was difficult to evaluate in the absence of access to a cross section of budget review officers. It seems that the Ministry of Finance’s main interest in performance budgeting is to satisfy the information demands of the legislature. It seems likely that performance budgets are used by financial advisers but that otherwise the Ministry of Finance makes little use of them for the purpose of budget review. The situation in the Philippines contrasts quite strongly. This is the only one of the four countries under review in which the performance budgets of ministries (in fact their work and financial plans) are reviewed by budget officers.

LINKAGES

Another way to evaluate a budgeting system is to gauge its degree of integration with related processes. Clearly budgeting is, or should be, closely related to accounting, auditing and planning. How well were countries able to forge the necessary links? We look at each in turn.

The Link with Accounting

The link with accounting was stressed in the UN Manual. It spoke extensively of the system of government accounting and of the appropriate basis for measuring costs. The objective was to bring the system of financial management into line with the new programme/activity classification, thus allowing a direct comparison of cost and performance. In practice the most basic accounting change was in the reformulation of appropriation accounts. The programming exercise produced new budget classifications. Consequently, the accounting structure had to be adapted in order to permit comparison between proposed and actual figures. In Sri Lanka this also involved adjustment of the standing orders of the legislature: the terms ‘programme’ and ‘project’ replaced ‘vote’ and ‘subhead’ and the Appropriation Bill was then presented using the new classifications and terminology. Little difficulty seems to have been experienced in this area, presumably because it involved re-organisation rather than elaboration of accounting data.

Another important accounting change was simplification of line-itemised detail. For instance, in Sri Lanka standardised object details were first reduced to twenty and then to twelve classes. In India, as Thavaraj relates, a team under Shri A.K. Mukherji reviewed the government accounts in 1974 and recommended a realignment in accordance with development heads and the

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needs of performance budgeting. The team’s recommendations were accepted resulting in a reformulation of major, minor, sub and detailed heads of the budget and the agreement of 26 standard objects of expenditure. Such changes, in the nature of tidying up operations, contributed to a more comprehensible and useful accounting system and were to some extent a by-product of the performance budget reform.

The major. reform of the basis of government accounts, envisaged in the UN Manual, did not, however, materialise. The Manual had expressed a clear preference for accrual based accounts (p. viii and p. 25). Since then the debate on accrual accounting in government has advanced. Accrual accounting is seen as advantageous in certain specific areas (public corporations, trading activities, etc.), but not generally for administrative ministries at least in countries with established cash or obligation based government accounting systems (UN, 1984). None of the four countries adopted the accrual basis. Indeed they all retained the previously existing basis of accounting. This was the cash basis for India, Malaysia and Sri Lanka, and the obligation basis for the Philippines. The only innovations were the adoption of a thirteen month year in Malaysia, allowing expenditures entered into in the last month of the financial year and settled in the first month of the next year to be charged to the accounts of the old year, and an abortive experiment with commitment accounting in Sri Lanka. A nineteen column commitment sheet replaced the familiar format of the Departmental Appropriation Votes Ledger. This allowed expenditure to be measured in terms of commitments entered into, as well as in ternis of cash disbursements made. The objective was to report ministries’ expenditure on the former basis in monthly returns to Budget Division. However, the account- ants whose task it was to complete the new format, found it unduly onerous. Programme budgeting had already placed extra demands on them, and in interviews in 1984 a surprising number spoke of the accounting change as a failure, or at least as an administrative inconvenience. Certainly it was rather short-lived. When the impetus behind programme budgeting diminished, this aspect fell into disuse. A few years later when financial stringency began to make itself felt, a visiting IMF team remarked on the inadequacy of the system of expenditure reporting by ministries. As a result a new system of ‘flash reports’ was introduced to cover transactions undertaken at local treasuries. Ministries were to report their monthly expenditure and revenues on the cash basis, and the commitment approach was dead and forgotten, except insofar as it had always been part of the vote register.

The Link with Auditing

Much is in doubt about performance budgeting but one aspect which is not in doubt is the valuable basis it provides for performance auditing.’ Government audit has traditionally been concerned with ‘regularity’ or conformity with rules. Within this tradition auditors have concentrated on government’s

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accounting systems and have directed their audits at answering questions such as: Have transactions been adequately accounted for? Have financial regulations been observed? Has expenditure been legitimately incurred? Are systems of accounting adequately planned and controlled? And do the financial statements of government show a correct view of the aggregate of transactions for the period and the state of affairs at the period end? Important as thew aspects are, attention has turned increasingly to questions of performance. This type of audit transcends the purely financial basis of traditional government auditing. Questions are raised such as: Have resources been acquired at the most reasonable cost in relation to their quality? How well does the entity use its resources to produce its outputs? What impact does the entity have in realising government’s policy objectives in its area of operation? These questions are concerned less with accounting than with management. They focus on the design and operation of systems which management has established to achieve objectives, and obtain value for money.

This type of auditing has spread to many countries in the last two decades, but it cannot exist in a vacuum. That is to say, when an auditor conducts a financial audit, he investigates the accounting system and the accounting statements derived from it. Similarly, when an auditor conducts a performance audit, it has to be on the basis of systems established by management. He asks: Has management set reasonable objectives, created information systems which report on the furthering of objectives, established criteria for judging whether performance is adequate, created procedures for ensuring that business is conducted efficiently, and monitored the performance of its officers and subor- dinate units so that management’s objectives are realised? In other words, in order to conduct a performance audit, the auditor has to assess management’s information and control systems. Thus there is an obvious link with budgeting.

For these reasons government auditors express considerable interest in performance budgeting. In India the Administrative Reforms Commission had expressed the idea that performance budgeting would ‘rend performance audit more purposeful and effective’. The idea was taken up r y a number of Indian writers on public finance (Khosla, 1972; Handa, 1978; and Sastry, 1979 and 1984). This type of audit is known as efficiency cum performance audit (ECPA) in India and is carried out by the Audit Board which supervises the audit of public undertakings. For the purpose of ECPA auditors refer to certain key sources: plan documents, statistical reports of ministries, and performance budgets. The latter are acknowledged to be the most important of these key documents for the purpose of ECPA.

In Malaysia the Audit Act of 1978 required the audit function to be extended to the assessment of the results of expenditure and the evaluation of performance in relation to results. Within the National Audit Office, a performance audit unit has been formed. It is well-staffed and has produced its first reports. Interest in performance budgeting is clearly expressed in the Auditor General’s 1978 report: ‘Government’s investment in terms of money and efforts in the

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new system (PPB) has been substantial and it is therefore imperative that the necessary monitoring systems, performance measures and evaluation techniques be developed and enforced quickly in order that the benefits of the system be realised as expected’. In the Philippines a requirement for performance auditing was embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines issued as Presidential Decree 1445 in 1978. It declares as the policy of the State that all government resources are to be managed in accordance with the law and safeguarded against improper or illegal loss or wastage with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in use. Agency heads have the primary responsibility of executing this policy. The role of the Commission on Audit (COA) is to determine whether they have carried out their responsibilities satisfactorily. COA has issued guidelines on comprehensive auditing which explain that this type of audit rests on concepts such as:

Agency purpose: Agency objectives:

Program/project:

The reason for which the agency was formed. The results which the agency offcials intend to accomplish to fulfil the agency’s purpose. A cluster of activities undertaken by an agency to accomplish its objectives.

This terminology and approach are strongly reminiscent of performance budgeting. Indeed in an internal memorandum on comprehensive auditing issued in 1984, performance budget documents are listed prominently as key sources for undertaking this type of audit.

In Sri Lanka Section 13 of the 1971 Finance Act specifically mentions the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness. However, very little of this type of audit is carried out. Amongst the factors preventing development are factors internal to the audit department. The failure of the programme budget experiment was also a set-back. In the period 1973 - 78 the existence of budget review cells within ministries and the development of measures of performance had made it easier to conduct efficiency studies. The Audit Department favours performance budgeting in principle, while finding the version actually installed, a little too complex for Sri Lanka’s environment. The major challenges now are seen as a simple accounting system with emphasis on performance measurement, but without a proliferation of complex paper work.

In summary, we see that for all of the four countries studied, a strong link exists between performance audit and performance budget. Top level staff in audit departments found performance budget information useful in relation to their performance audit responsibilities. They therefore favoured the performance budget experiment and were frustrated by its slow development and set- backs.

The Link with Planning

Writers on performance budgeting and the governments which adopted it, fre-


quently laid emphasis on the link with planning. The preface to the UN Manual makes it clear that there were high expectations in this area. Indeed none other than the Secretary General of the UN in his report ‘The United Nations Development Decade: Proposals for Action’ spoke of the limitations of government budgets in developing countries and the need for a planned approach to development. He envisaged changes so that the annual budget would become ‘an effective instrument for implementing development plans and policies’. Participants at UN regional seminars on government budgeting also saw performance budgeting as providing support for development plans (UN Manual p. vii). The same ideas surface in official documents in Malaysia and Sri Lanka. In the former case, the Treasury Circular of 1968 observed: ‘with focus on objectives and programmes, most of which cannot be accomplished within a year, it (PPB) introduces the valuable element of long range planning on annual operating expenditures as well as development expenditures’. In the latter case the UN adviser claimed that programme budgeting would provide comprehensive information for the executive for planning programmes, and that it would improve the system of planning and controlling the use of appropriated funds. Moreover, writers such as Cutt (1971), Handa (1978) and Sastry (1979) have written on the link with planning.

Little in the UN Manual shows how to achieve this link. A chapter on programme and performance budgeting for investment projects presents the procedures used at the time by the US Bureau of Reclamation. This case study is clearly of general use in setting out the management considerations involved but it does not address any of the central problems of development planning and consequently does not show how performance budgeting and planning may be integrated on a government-wide basis. This is not surprising given the contemporary state of budgeting ideas. At the time, conventional models of performance budgeting lacked a planning dimension. It was not until the development of the planning, programming, budgeting system (PPBS) that multi-year budgeting emerged. Thus developing countries adopted performance budgeting as a supplement or modification to the annual budgeting process. Moreover, budgeting and planning remained institutionally separate in most countries. Caiden and Wildavsky have described at length the consequences of this separation. We now discuss the planning-budgeting link in Malaysia and India.

In Malaysia the budget is divided into two: operating and development budgets. The contents of the latter are strongly influenced by the five year development plan drawn up by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) part of the Prime Minister’s Department. EPU acts as secretariat to the National Development Planning Committee (NDPC), a high level civil service committee with representation from all development ministries. At the political level decisions on the five year development plan and on the development budget are made by the National Economic Council (NEC). All development projects

16 DEAN

have to receive approval of both NDPC and NEC before being included in the five year plan. During the annual exercise, budget examination teams, comprising representatives of Treasury, EPU and the Public Services Department review agencies’ development budget submissions. Decisions are normally arrived at by consensus, with the views of EPU being given special respect. The development budget is presented to Parliament and passed by Resolution as provided in the Development Fund Act 1966. This means that it is less subject to parliamentary scrutiny and debate than the operating budget which passes the normal legislative stages as a Supply Bill.

Monitoring of federally funded development projects is undertaken by the Implementation Coordination Unit (ICU) also located in the Prime Minister’s Department. The form of monitoring is both physical and financial. SETIA (integrated project monitoring system) aims to collect in a single data base, information on project plans, yearly budgets, progress of implementation and current data on expenditure. The general format is shown in Table 1.

Information on

Project Progress of

hplernentatioi From

S3 Forms

Table 1

Integrated Project Monitoring System (SETIA)

Ministries/Departments/Government Agencies

Project Planning Process

of Economic Planning

Unit

Yearly Budgeting

Process of

Treasury Budget

Division + Project

Monitoring Process

Implementatio, Coordination

Project Payment Process

of Accountant General’s

Department

SETIA DATABASE

Information

Project Planning 1 F:lm 1 S1 Forms

Accountant-General

Information on

Project Yearly Budget

From S2 Forms

Information

Project Expenditures

FI:m 1 4 G’ Vouchers and S3 Forms

PERFORMANCE BUDGETING I N FOUR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 17

The aim is to provide an integrated system for monitoring projects, which will give central agencies the essential information they need, while simplifying the reporting responsibilities of project managers. Significantly there is no link whatsoever with performance budgeting, although the SETIA system does provide an important link between the development budget and the planning mechanism.

There have been sustained attempts in India to provide a closer link between budgeting and planning. The working group on performance budgeting of the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) numbered amongst the purposes of performance budgeting: to measure progress towards long term objectives as envisaged in plans and to bring annual budgets and developmental plans closely together through a common language. These purposes were omitted from the Report of the Study Team on Financial Administration and thre is no reference to them in the ARC’S final report. Thus performance budgeting was consigned to the purely budgetary process rather than linked with administrative planning. Nevertheless, two important initiatives have attempted to provide closer links between planning and budgeting. The first is associated with the work of a team under the leadership of A.K. Mukherji;then Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General of Government of India. The team evolved a revenue and expenditure classification scheme comprising four tiers for revenue and five for expenditure.

EXPENDITURE CLASSIFICATION SCHEME

Tier

Sector

Explanation Example

Grouping of various functions corresponding to the sectors of plan classification

Major Head Function of government corresponding Health

Social Services

to heads of development in plan classification

Minor Head Plan and non-plan programmes Control of diseases

Sub- Head Schemes or organisations Malaria eradication

Detailed Head Standard objects of expenditure Salaries

The scheme introduced in 1974 succeeded in aligning plan and budget at the first two levels but encountered difficulties at the minor head and sub-head levels. Another working group set up in 1979 with the object of overcoming these difficulties, reported in 1983. It is understood that the principles established in its report will apply to the 1986187 budget and to the Seventh Plan.

The other initiative is in the realm of monitoring of plan projects. Monitor- ing is carried out by the Monitoring Division of Planning Commission. An

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information system has been evolved which draws on data from project authorities and implementing agencies and provides reports to the administrative ministries, Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission. The system is relatively simple; it correlates performance with cost; and it is specifically designed to feed into the process of quarterly/annual review. It applies to about 250 to 300 major projects costing Rs 10 crore or above. In addition management information systems (MIS) have been developed for ministries to serve their own monitoring needs. In 1976 an advisory committee on management accountancy in government was set the task of designing suitable MIS for ministries. It identified three models:

Type o j Ministry/Department

Ministry in which the executive agencies are enterprises and the ministry’s own direct work is negligible

Ministry in which the main work is undertaken directly by its own departments

Ministry in which programmed projects are executed entirely by State governments with funds provided by Central Government

Example chosen

Department of Chemicals and Fertilizers

Central Public Works Department

Command Area Development Programme (an agency concerned with the integrated development of mediudlarge irrigation schemes)

The approach of the sub group of the advisory committee was to investigate existing information systems and to retain their good features while stressing concepts such as simplicity, timeliness, relevance, materiality, and integration with the process of annual and quarterly review. In summary, there have been important attempts in India to achieve greater integration between planning and budgeting. These attempts may appear analytically akin to performance budgeting but there the resemblance stops. Planning, and performance budgeting remain quite separate, perhaps reflecting the different preoccupations of the Planning Commission and of the Ministry of Finance.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Early claims made for performance budgeting were often misleading: minimis- ing the difficulties of implementation and exaggerating its advantages in use. From today’s perspective one can see that it presents quite severe implementation difficulties in the central areas of programming and performance measurement. These difficulties had already become apparent in the USA. However, developing countries were presented with a pre-packaged panacea apparently advantageous for a large number of purposes. In practice the alleged advan-


tages were elusive. In particular few legislators found performance budgets useful and significantly some found them to be actually inimical to their interests. Use by management was slow to materialise because implementation took far more time than had been expected. People who had expected benefits in a few years, perhaps five at the outside, grew disillusioned and impatient when implementation problems extended into the second decade. Sometimes as in Sri Lanka and Malaysia political and administrative commitment was withdrawn when the hoped for benefits failed to materialise. In others such as India, the system achieved a certain stage of development and then became frozen into a ritual. In India and Sri Lanka the budget cell responsible for the reform was disbanded or lost its separate entity. In Malaysia its resources were reduced. Moreover, budget officers and budget examiners did not quickly adopt the new system. Budget preparation and examination continued to follow largely traditional lines, attention continuing to fall on incremental com- parisons of line-itemised detail. In India compiling the performance budget is thought of as a separate exercise to be attended to once the shape of the Demands for Grants has been finalised. In other words financial provision is decided upon first and the performance implications are then worked out.

A major constraint on the performance budget experiment was the failure specifically to consider users’ needs. It was thought that the system would be of advantage to a number of different users but the needs of each class of user were not analysed in detail. Instead there was an assumption that once the system was in place, the information produced would automatically be seen to be useful. This ‘shotgun’ approach was associated with the accumulation of large amounts of data of varying quality. There was a temptation to attempt to extend the system into areas in which output measures would be meaningless. The result was good coverage, but a ponderous system containing many details of no known relevance to users. The principle: the more information the better, takes no account of the constraints faced by users: the time available to them to study the information, its relevance to their needs and their expertise in using i t . Information overkill is particularly evident in India where performance budgets are of considerable length. In summary, it appears easier to establish information systems than to ensure their value in use.

The UN Manual, widely used as the starting point for implementing performance budgeting, adopted a cautious tone and counselled a slow approach to implementation. It listed a series of preconditions for countries contemplating the reform: a sound budgetary operation, financial discipline, skilled manpower responsible for budget formulation and execution, efficient systems of recording and reporting financial and physical data, and close co-ordination between the budget department and other government departments (page 3). It is difficult to judge whether a country fulfils these conditions, because of their qualitative nature and the lack of an adequate frame of reference for judge- ment. Nevertheless, given that we are dealing with developing countries where manpower and other resources are scarce, it would be surprising if these condi-

20 DEAN

tions were completely fulfilled. This raises the question of priorities: how high was performance budgeting as a priority for a developing country compared with say perfecting the system of government accounting and financial control? The UN Manual raised some quite sophisticated issues. For example, Should government move to the accrual system of accounting? Should individual indicators be aggregated to form total indicators of productivity? It is clear that such issues are not of high priority for a country whose government accounting system is seriously defective due to lack of timeliness, or inability to perform reconciliations necessary to prove its accuracy, or to a country with no proper information systems for collecting and reporting data on performance. For such countries underlying systems must come before sophisticated elabora- tions. In this area the UN Manual appears to have had ambivalent results. On the one hand it may have elevated the level of analysis too far above basic needs. On the other it is quite clear that the performance budget movement provided a useful rallying cry for basic reforms. In most countries it was closely associated with improved expenditure and revenue classification schemes, modernisation of financial regulations and better monitoring of ministries’ ongoing expenditure.

Certain aspects of the reform were approached unrealistically. First there was the assumption that all users would benefit from the new system. There was no awareness of conflict of interest between the branches of government. A change in the format and content of budgetary information changes the rela- tionship between the executive and the legislature. There is evidence that performance budgeting may have been used as a tool of executive dominance in the Philippines. The administrative branch may also feel threatened because it is being asked to produce a rod to beat its own back. There is therefore the possibility that its members will try to censor or even distort the data made available in performance budgets. These possibilities are all the greater where performance measurement systems are not verified by an objective external party. There was also the failure to consider institutional realities. In practice ministries have sharply differing structures and all are remote from the level at which services are actually supplied to the populace. Some operate via public enterprises; others transfer funds to other levels of government, which in turn pass them on to implementing agencies in the field. Others operate via units such as hospitals and schools. In all, the chain of command is long, stretching down through several administrative levels. Theoretical models failed to envisage how performance budgeting could be applied in these circumstances. Another vitally important omission was to consider the reality of the demand side; that is to say to consider the capacity of users to handle and use the information supplied. Even in the USA there would be obstacles to managers using cost/performance data to improve efficiency, but at least in that country management education is widespread and delegation of authority common. In developing countries there may be severe constraints on managers using performance budget data. Administrative structures are strongly hierarchical and


many quite trivial decisions have to be referred to higher levels for resolution. Methods of doing business are procedural rather than managerial. Managers may not have been exposed to modern business techniques and they follow administrative methods based on precedent rather than on personal initiative. In these circumstances, a new information system may have little impact on the way decisions are taken. Certainly important efforts were made in all countries to train managers in the new system, but such training may not change strongly entrenched attitudes, particularly when the information produced by the system was slow to materialise and lacked apparent relevance to users’ needs. The realities on the demand side meant that performance budgeting rarely attained an adequate management orientation, the only exception being the case of Malaysia. In this country work is still going on in two or three ministries on fully-fledged management information systems based on the performance budget model. It is too early to judge their success.

Clearly, performance budgeting did not live up to expectations. Its usefulness to the legislature is in doubt; its use by management has only been realised on a small scale; its impact on budget formulation is small; the linkage with planning is tenuous. In Sri Lanka the reform has been left high and dry; in India it has run out of steam; in Malaysia the real impetus is restricted to two or three ministries; and in the Philippines it has ceased to be topical (although the concepts still feature prominently in various aspects of the public finance system). Was performance budgeting an unmitigated failure?

An alternative way of evaluating performance budgeting is to ask what changes it produced in the status quo. For the four countries under scrutiny we have general agreement that it has facilitated performance auditing and would do so more, if it were further developed. This is an important point, given the expansion of performance auditing world-wide in recent years. Performance auditors face issues of considerable importance to Government and the governed, but cannot resolve them unless managements have established adequate planning, monitoring and control systems. Performance budgets can furnish some of the information they need and are particularly important to the extent that other management information systems are lacking. Second, performance budgeting has an important impact on management attitudes. It leads to a broader appreciation of financial management than is possible under pure line- itemisation. In countries such as India and Malaysia, performance budgeting has played a modest part in changing management attitudes. Obviously the timescale for a change in attitudes is longer than for the introduction of a technique. O n this basis the experience gained from performance budgeting will feed into future developments in public sector management and give them a greater chance of success. Third, there may have been some advantages from better programming, i.e. from a more rational budgetary division of activities and responsibilities at below ministry level. Fourth, despite the very considerable difficulties in the area, it has resulted in better performance measurement in the public sector. This is a topic of long standing interest to govern-

22 DEAN

ments as shown in recent developments in Australia and the United Kingdom where efforts cohtinue to seek adequate measures of output for the public sector.* Fifth, as already noted, performance budgeting constituted an important rallying cry for other financial improvements in the public sector. Without it, the pace of modernisation would have been slower. Sixth, as Doh (1981) has argued budget submissions are improved and the budget dialogue is therefore more informed.

Such achievements are quite modest, but then they are bound to be, when we consider the impact of a small technique on a vast administrative system. Ideas take time to penetrate. Performance budgeting contained good ideas and they are still penetrating. Indeed when we consider contemporary attempts to analyse and improve performance in the public sector, many use concepts of programming, performance measurement, and target-setting which are similar if not identical to those forming part of performance budgeting. Pro- cesses such as the Financial Management Initiative in Britain, the Mangement Audit and Improvement Program in the Philippines, program evaluation in Canada and effectiveness auditing in Sweden make intensive use of the concepts central to performance budgeting. Contemporary interest in this type of budgeting is also reported in Australia (Cutt pp. 14- 18) and Ireland (Doyle p. 65). Thus although the term performance budgeting has become rather care-worn due to difficulties of implementation, the constituent components remain of considerable relevance to better budgeting] management, planning and resource utilization in the public sector.

NOTES

In 1965 the United Nations produced ‘A manual for programme and performance budgeting’. The terms ‘programme and performance budget’ and ‘performance budget’ are used inter- changeably to mean a budget system ‘which presents the purposes and objectives for which funds are requested, the costs of the programmes proposed for achieving those objectives and quantitative data measuring the accomplishments and work performed under each programme’ (Burkhead, 1956, page 142). Over the years many developing countries have adopted this system (Dean, 1985). In Spring 1960 Public Adminisfration Rcuicw published a group of four articles on ‘Performance Budgeting: Has the Theory Worked?’ preceding it with the words ‘Probably no major administrative technique has won so wide an interest and acceptance in a short time as has performance budgeting. Its advocates have foreseen such happy consequences as more rational legislative executive relations, administrative decentralization without loss of responsibility, more sharply drawn alternatives for program selection, and a clearer picture of costs which can spotlight inefficiency and point out cheaper routes to stated goals’. The ARC in its report on finance, accounts and audit saw the objectives of performance budgeting as follows:

‘(a) to present more clearly the purposes and objectives for which the funds are sought and to bring out the programmes and accomplishments in financial terms.

(b) to help a better understanding and better review of the budget by the legislature. (c) to improve the formulation of the budget and to facilitate the process of decision-making

at all levels of Government. (d) to enhance the accountability of the management and at the same time to provide an addi-


4 5

6

tional tool for management control of financial operations and (e) to render performance audit more purposeful and effective’

For Sri Lanka, the UN adviser listed the following advantages:

‘LEGISLATURE - -

provides comprehensive information needed for policy-making and policy control makes possible thorough appraisal of the need for services, analysis of programme expenditures and control of funds in relation to services rendered to the people

provides comprehensive information for planning programmes, for undertaking services and for controlling operations provides incentive for acceptance of responsibility for planned results by administrators, for reducing costs and for improving services

provides clear and understandable statements of services undertaken by government provides information on what their tax money is being spent for and how i t is being spent

improves the system of planning and controlling the use of appropriated funds for the operation of government’.

(Programme budgeting in Sri Lanka, UN, 1972)

EXECUTIVE -

-

PEOPLE - -

IN GENERAL -

Quoted in Yoingco and Casem, pages 167-8. In this discussion the following terms adopted by each country are used: India and the Philip- pines, ‘performance budgeting’; Sri Lanka, ‘programme budgeting’; and Malaysia ‘programme and performance budgeting’. In India this was because the initial concept of performance budgeting was as a uniform system. Detailed systems suitable for ministries’ internal purposes were expected to develop in due course, and indeed have done so under the MIS banner. By performance auditing we mean audits of efficiency and effectiveness, sometimes referred to as value for money audit. See for instance Cutt (1984, p. 14) and Mountfield (1984, p. 128).

7

8

REFERENCES

Beyer, J.C. (1973), Budgef Innovation in Developing Counfrics: the Experience ofNe@l (Praeger, 1973). Burkhead, J. (1956), Goummenf Budgctinguohn Wiley & Sons, 1956). Caiden, N. and A. Wildavsky (1974), PlanningandBudgefing in Poor Counfncs Uohn Wiley & Sons,

1974). Cutt, J. (1971), ‘Programme Budgeting in Developing Countries: Its Application and Relevance

in the Context of National Planning’, Public Finance (September 1971). ___ (1984). ‘The Evolution of Expcndifurc Budgefing in Australia’, in Premchand and Burkhead

(1984). Dean, P.N. (1985), (1) ‘Programme Budgeting in Sri Lanka’ (2) ‘Programme and Performance

Budgeting in Malaysia’ (3) ‘Performance Budgeting in India’ (4) ‘Performance Budgeting in the Philippines’ (5) ‘Performance Budgeting in Developing Countries’, Unpublished papers, Department of Accounting and Finance University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (1985).

Doh, J.C. (1981). ‘Modernizing the Budget System: The Malaysian Experience’, Public Adminisfrafion and Lkuelopmenf, Vol. 1 (1981).

Doyle, M.F. (1984) ‘Managemenf ofthc Public Finances in Ireland since 1961’ (in Premchand and Burkhead 1984).

Eghtedari, A. and F. Shenvood (1960), ‘Performance Budgeting in Los Angeles’, Public Adminisfrafion Reuiew (Spring 1960).

24 DEAN

Government of India (1968), Report on Finance, Accounts and Audit, Administrative Reforms

Government of Malaysia (1968), Treasury Circular No. 5, Treasury (1968). Handa, K.L. (1978), Programme and PcCfoormonce Budgeting, Uppal Publishers, New Delhi (1978). Heclo, H. and A. Wildavsky (1974), T h Private Couemment ofPublic Money, (Macmillan, 1974). Khosla, T.P. (1972), ‘Performance Auditing’, in Readings on PcCformunce Budgeting, M.J.K.

Thavaraj and K.G. Iyer (Eds.) (Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1972). Laya, J. (1979), Philippine Gouernment Budgeting: Policy and Pructice in th New So&&, Ministry of the

Budget (1979). Mountfield, P. (1984), ‘Recent Developments in the Control ofPublic Expmditures in the United Kingdom’,

in Premchand and Burkhead (1984). Premchand, A. and J. Burkhead (Eds.) (1984), Comparatiue Intmational Budgeting and Finunce,

(Transaction Books, 1984). Reid, G. (1966), The Politics o f Finuncial Confrol: T h Rob o f the House o f Commons (Hutchinson,

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Schick, A. (1971), Budget Innovation in the States (The Brookings Institution, 1971). Thavaraj, M.J.K. (1965), Financial Manugmnt of Coumment (Sultan Chand New Delhi, 1978). United Nations (1965), A Manual f o r Programme and Performunce Budgeting, (1965). - (1972), ‘Programme Budgeting in Sri L a n k ’ , (Mimeo, Colombo, July 1972). - (1978), Report on Budget Management Techniques in Selected Developed Countries,

United Nations (1 984), Acnurl Accounting in Dcueloping Countries, Technical Co-operation for

Yoingco, A.Q. and M.M. Guevara (1984), ‘Budgetav Practices and Dcuelopments in the Philippines’,

- and A.O.Casem (1969), ‘Performance Budgeting in the Philippines’, Philififline Economic

Comission (1968).

1979).

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in Premchand and Burkhead (1984).

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Documents

ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE BUDGETING EXPERIMENT IN FOUR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES