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centre for democratic institutions
Assessing The First Year Performance
of Indonesia’s Parliament
HAZELIA MARGARETHA
Centre For Democratic Institutions (CDI)
National Democratic Institutes (NDI) for International Affairs
ANU, 10 February 2011
Structure of the Presentation
The DPR in Post-Reformasi
Indonesia
The First Year Critiques
The Relationship between
DPR -Electorate and Constituents
Dynamic within the DPR
Dynamic between the DPR and
Executive
Summary of key points
DPR in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Increasing Assertiveness and Public‟s Expectations
Indonesia‟s National Parliament (DPR) has been transformed from a rubber-
stamp of Suharto‟s new order to one of the most powerful political institutions in
post-reformasi Indonesia.
In theory: it attempts to provide check and balances to the government, as well
as to represent the voice of the people.
The DPR through MPR impeached President Abdurrahman Wahid.
DPR used its right of investigation on the gasoline price hike (2008),
implementation of haj pilgrimage (2009), and the scandal of Bank Century
(2009)
Increasing Public Expectations for DPR 2009-2014:
The DPR Composition is younger & with higher education than the previous term
DPR‟s Composition in Three Terms
Minimal number of Bills passed
The High Absence Rate and low productivity
The Unresolved Case of Bank Century Scandal
High number of overseas trip
(19 times in 14 countries)
Allegation of corruption, sex scandals, etc.
Controversial issues such constituency
fund, a luxurious DPR building that cost IDR 1.8
trillion (US$ 178 million), DPR‟s overseas trip
expense increase 46.4 percent from the 2010
state
The First Year Critiques
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
DPR AND THE ELECTORATE AND
CONSTITUENTS
Perception on DPR 2004-2009 vs DPR 2009-2014:
There is higher rate of 1st year
performance dissatisfaction
36.0%
57.0%
10.0%
9.0%
53.0%
34.0%
2010
2005
Satisfied Don't Know/Not Answer Not Satisfied
Public Satisfaction of the
DPR‟s First Year Performance
Source: (IFES, 2005, 2010)
DPR 2004-2009
DPR 2009-2014
Perception on the
First Year Performance of DPR vs President :
Higher support for the President, than the DPR
PresidentDPR
66.0%
36.0%
4.0% 10.0%
30.0%33.0%
Satisfied Don't Know/Not Answer Not Satisfied
Public Satisfaction of the
DPR and President‟s
First Year Performance (2010)
Source: (IFES, 2005, 2010)
PresidentDPR
Not Sure/Not Answer
49.2%
21.7% 23.7%
If there is a conflict between the
DPR and the President, which
one will you support?
Source: (LkSI, March 2010)
DPR‟s Tarnished Public Image
Why?
1.DPR‟s standing in the public depends on whether they can manage the public‟s high expectation, especially since the implementation of the PR with open list system in 2009
2.The media and social networking sites‟ exposure on several MPs‟ corruption case
3.The President‟s high popularity and performance
4.The public does not feel the practical/direct impacts of the policy-debate or DPR‟s performance
There is higher rate of performance dissatisfaction in the 1st year of DPR 2009-2014 (34%) , compare than the 1st year of DPR 2004-2009 (53%).
There is a gap between the public satisfaction toward DPR and President in the 2010 about (30 percent). If there is a conflict, the public will choose to support president (49.2%), than the DPR (21.7%)
An Attempt to Build a stronger DPR-
Constituent Relations?
Nonetheless, some anecdotal evidence shows that some individual MPs are seriously developing and maintaining their relations with their constituents through several means:
1. Establishing Constituent House –Some MPs took the initiative to establish it as a means to gather public input in their electoral districts, formulate it, and channel it as a policy-relevant issue.
2. Having staff members or coordinator at the grassroots level
3. Involve local people in their local office to develop new bases of constituents
THE DYNAMIC WITHIN THE PARLIAMENT:
POLICY FORMATION, DELIBERATION &
DECISION MAKING
Legislative Performance:
Unrealistic Targets of Bills To Be Passed
Total Target Bills To be Passed DPR and
President (2009-2014):247 Bills
Total Target Bills To Be Passed by the DPR
and President in 2010
70 Bills
(36 DPR-Initiated Bills, 34 Government-
Initiated Bills)
Bills Passed by DPR and President in 201016 Bills
(6 DPR-Initiated Bills, 2Government-
Initiated Bills, 8 open cumulative bills)
A Similar Trend Compared with the Previous Term?
Yes, Even Slightly Better!
14
39 40
61
39
The First Year
(2005)
The Second
Year (2006)
The Third Year
(2007)
The Fourth Year
(2008)
The Fifth Year
(2009)
247
284
120
16
193175
2009-2014* 2004-2009 1999-2004*
Target Bills Bills Passed
Target Bills vs Bills Passed in three terms
of the DPR post-reformasi Indonesia
Number of Bills Passed Every Year
in Previous Term (DPR 2004-2009)
Note:
* 2009-2014: Bills passed in 2010
** 1999-2004: The output surpassed the target because there were many bills on the creation of
new regions (pemekaran)
What are the DPR‟s internal challenges in passing a
bill?
A multiparty system has created a more complex deliberation
and policy formation.
The consensus method of deliberation
e.g. Bill on Election Organizers. The discussion shows that the
disagreement and attempts to force a consensus on one
controversial clause on „the members of the General Election
Commission and Advisory Board should be non-partisan‟
delayed the process. In the end, only 2 out of 9 parties agree
with the clause.
Poor support system – limited number and quality of the
expert and secretariat staff
The poor management and organization of meetings
By Constitution, the bill should be formulated and discussed by both the DPR and
government. Thus, often times, though not always, a poor legislative performance is
caused by the government through:
1. Sluggish Procedures [Double screening in the Ministerial Level (Related ministries and
Ministry of justice and human rights) and in the Cabinet Meeting]
2. Deliberate effort to slow down the process
Is the DPR the only one to blame?
DPR-
Initiated
Bill
Governmen
t-Initiated
Bill
Total Target Bills
To Be Passed in
2010
36 Bills 34 Bills
Bills Submitted
to be discussed
15 Bills 9 Bills
Bills Passed by
DPR and
President in
2010
6 Bills 2 Bills
Example: DPR-initiated Bill on Social Security
Provider Agency. The President has appointed
8 ministries to discuss the bill. Along the way,
the MPs said they face three barriers:
1. That it was difficult to coordinate technicalities
(ex. Meeting schedule)
2. It was difficult find a common ground that
could accommodate the interest of 8
ministries.
3. They all have different views on how to
interpret the bill and integrate it with other
related bills.
Assessing Beyond Numbers: (1)
Some Plus Points
There is a tendency to bring policy formation and
deliberation in the Special Committee
• A more credible policy formation, as special committee consisted of MPs from across background and commissions
• There are several bills currently discuss in the Special Committees e.g. Fund Transfer bill, Financial Services Authority Bill, Social Security Provider Agency Bill
There is a tendency to have a more open and transparent process of deliberation and
policy making.
• The involvement of CSOs and media in providing input to the DPR
• Channel of input from CSOs could be through Commissions, Working Bodies, Special/Working Committee, or fraksi.
Public Accountability Committee (BAKN) which has the ultimate aim of overseeing
the government and BPK Reports.
• A potential committee that plays a role as a back up of the Commission‟s oversight on the government‟s disbursement fund.
• However, it has limited power, as they need the support of all the commission and fraksis to investigate a particular case.
There are practices undermining the deliberation and policy formation process
• Backdoor lobby and trick to pass the bill
• The Joint Secretariat, e.gFit and Proper Test on Police Chief
Several key positions in the DPR filled by incompetent
MPs
• Head of Fraksi (party caucus)
• Head of Working Bodies.
• Budget Committee
Assessing Beyond Numbers: (2)
Some Minus Points
DYNAMIC INTERFACE BETWEEN
THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
The First Year DPR‟s Oversight of Government‟s Policy:
Some Cases
Oil and gasoline subsidy
Bank Century scandal case
The electricity price hike
The cancellation of the President’s
trip to Netherland.
The President‟s wardrobe expenses
(paid from the state budget) that
almost reached IDR 893 million
The safety of consuming
Indofood’s product of Indomie
instant noodle, as a response to
Taiwan’s banning.
DPR inquiry regarding the low price of
Krakatau Steel IPO
The implementation of Law No
11 of 2006 on Government of
Aceh and Law No. 21 of 2001 on
Special Autonomy of Papua
The Wasior natural disaster
management.
The migrant workers problem in
Saudi Arabia
The oil-gas conversion
The Business Competition
Regulation Commission‟s decision
to penalize 9 Indonesian airlines
companies
SEA GAMES and ASEAN
GAMES 2011
Type Number
Committee for
discussing bill
13
Committee for topical
issue (oversight)
28
Mostly Responsive to the
public controversies,
yet
short-term oriented and
some only have limited
influence over government
policy and national policy
agenda
DPR‟s Oversight of Government‟s Policy:
Responsive, Short-term Oriented, and Limited Influence
DPR‟s Oversight of Government‟s Policy:
Responsive, Short-term Oriented, and Limited Influence
WHY?
There is no mechanism to monitor the follow up and impacts
of the DPR‟s recommendation
Some are only attempts to attract the media and as tools to
improve the MPs‟ or DPR‟s image
There is no effective follow up because most cases are
politically sensitive issues , e.g. Scandal of Century Bank
Sometimes MPs unable to provide a coherent argument and
concrete alternative solutions
There is no clear documentation and publicly accessible
materials of the DPR‟s inquiry and reports for public scrutiny
PD Golkar PKS PAN PPP PKB
148
106
93
59
42
26
6 3 4 3 2 2
Number of Seats in the DPR
Number of Ministrial Post
15
30
94
Number of Seats of the
Opposition Parties
Number of Seats and Ministerial
Posts of the Government’s Coalition
Parties
Political Dynamic:
Parties in Cabinet vs Parties in the DPR
How the DPR Operates? A Political Perspective
PARTY (party
stance; party leader)
Fraksi(determine
key player in DPR)
PARTY POSITION
as Coalition/
Opposition
DPR Performance
1. MPs‟ Interest to be
reelected or to be
a key player in the
party or „media
darling‟
2. Party‟s Interest to
maintain or
increase electoral
vote/seats in
cabinet/party
resources
(fund/network)
DPR
as a forum for contest of interest
Test Case: Coalition Cohesion?
(2009-2010)
PD, PKB,PAN
The Century Bank Scandal(Government‟s decision to bail out is a right decision)
Golkar, PKS, PPP
Gerindra, Hanura, PDIP
Golkar, PKS, PKB, PPP, PAN,
Gerindra, Hanura, PDIPPD
Yogyakarta’s Special Autonomy Bill ** (Yogyakarta‟s Governor and Deputy Gov. should be directly elected,
not appointed)
Election Organizer Bill**(The member of General Electoral Commission and Advisory Board
should be non-partisan
Golkar, PKS, PKB, PPP,
Gerindra, Hanura, PDIP
PD, PAN
Note: ** The bill is still in the progress
Test Case: Coalition Cohesiveness?
(2009-2010)
Golkar, PDIPPKS, PAN, PKB, PPP,
Hanura, Gerindra
Election Bill** (Increase the parliamentary threshold should be increased from
3.5 to 5 percent)
PKS, PKB, PPP, Gerindra,
Hanura,
PD, PAN, Golkar,
PDIP
PD
Local Election Bill** (the governor should be elected by the local parliament (DPRD), not
directly elected)
Fit and Proper Test of Police Chief (Timur Pradopo should endorsed as Police Chief)
PD, Golkar, PDIP, PKS, PAN, PKB,
PPP, Hanura, GerindraNote: ** The bill is still in the progress
Test Case: Coalition Cohesiveness?
(2009-2010)
GolkarPD, PAN, PKS, PKB, PPP,
Gerindra, Hanura, PDIP
Election Bill** (Minor parties should be able to contest in the legislative election
as “confederation” )
Golkar, PDIP, PD, PKB,
PKS
Gerindra, Hanura
Discretionary Constituency Funds(MPs should be provided with constituency fund)
Mafia Tax Inquiry** (MPs proposal to call for the political inquiry in response to the
slow investigation of tax mafia )
Golkar (75), PKS (10),
PDIP, Gerindra , HanuraPD, PAN (1), PKB (1), PPP (2)
Note: ** The bill/Inquiry proposal is still in the progress
PAN, PKB
Q. Do you think the following party is consistent or
not consistent in supporting the government?
Source: Interview of 104 MPs by Kompas, June 2010
Why the Parties in the Coalition
Behave the way they do?
Decentralized Decision Making and MP‟s
Dissatisfaction of Government‟s Performance
40.5%
36.9%
52.4%
34.5%
41.1%
59.5%
63.1%
47.6%
65.5%
58.9%
Economy
Social Prosperity
Politics and Security
Law Enforcement
Average Satisfaction toward Government's
Performance
As a member of the coalition parties, Are you satisfied with the government's performance in the following areas:
Satisfied Not Satisfied
Source: Interview of 104 MPs by Kompas, June 2010
Some Other Possible Reasons
No incentives to stay in coalition
President only secure 26 percent of seats in
the DPR
Weak Party Discipline
Loyal Voters and Future Incentive to
Cooperate?
Hatta Rajasa (PAN) and Muhaimin Iskandar
(PKB)‟s ambition as the 2014 vice-presidential
candidate?
Potential Candidate for the 2014 Elections
Nominated by: Name Background Nominated as
Democrat Party Ani Yudhoyono The first lady RI 1
Lt. Gen. Pramono Edhie
Wibowo,
The Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) chief
and Presiden Yudhoyono’s brother-in-law
RI 1
Anas Urbaningrum The Democrat Party chairman. RI 1/RI 2
Golkar Party Aburizal Bakrie The Golkar party Chairman RI 1
PDIP Megawati Sukarnoputri PDIP Chairman RI 1
Puan Maharani PDIP Head of Women Department RI 2
Gerindra Prabowo Gerindra Chairman RI 1
Hanura Wiranto Hanura Chairman RI 1
PAN Hatta Rajasa PAN Chairman and Coordinating Minister for the
Economy
RI 1/R1 2
PKB Muhaimin Iskandar PKB Chairman and Minister of Manpower and
Transmigration
RI 2
PKB/Non-Party Mahfud MD Head of the Constitutional Court (MK) R1 2
Non-Party Sri Mulyani Former finance minister and current World Bank
managing director
RI 1
Summary
DPR-Public/Electorate‟s Relationship: In general, DPR remains perceived as under-performing, but at the individual level there are serious attempts to maintain and strengthen the relations with their respective constituents
DPR-Government Dynamic: A more responsive DPR in overseeing government‟s policy, but limited influence or impact. There is an imbalanced media perception on legislative performance, which ignores the fact that the Government is also underperforming.
Dynamics within DPR: A more inclusive and open policy deliberation, yet there are practices that undermine this process. A complex interaction between MPs and Party‟s interest, which results in a more „unpredictable or inconsistent‟ process on how the coalition works to support government policies or bills in the DPR.
THANK YOU…
HAZELIA MARGARETHA
Centre For Democratic Institutions (CDI)
National Democratic Institutes (NDI) for International Affairs
