ASPIRES Family Care Process Family-Child...ASPIRES offers technical assistance to scale up high-quality ... In practice, this seems to happen in some contexts, but not others. Johnson

ASPIRES Family Care Process Assessment: Savings Groups for Family-Child Reintegration and Prevention of Separation

ASPIRES Family Care Process Assessment: Cash Transfers i

ASPIRES Family Care Process Assessment: Savings Groups for Family-Child Reintegration and Prevention of Separation July 2018 Whitney Moret and Mike Ferguson

This report was produced under United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Cooperative Agreement No. AID-OAA-LA-13-00001 and was made possible by the generous support of the American people through USAID. The contents are the responsibility of FHI 360 and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

ASPIRES Family Care Process Assessment: Savings Groups ii

Acronyms

ASPIRES Accelerating Strategies for Practical Innovation and Research in Economic

Strengthening

CBS Catalyzing Business Skills

CT Cash Transfer

DCOF Displaced Children and Orphans Fund

ES Economic Strengthening

ESF Economic Strengthening Facilitator

ESFAM Economic Strengthening to Keep and Reintegrate Children into Families

FARE Family Resilience

FGD Focus Group Discussion

FL Financial Literacy

FS Family Strengthening

GBV

HH

Gender-Based Violence

Household

IDI In-Depth Interview

IGA Income-Generating Activity

IP

KII

Implementing Partner

Key Informant Interview

NO National Office

OVC Orphans and Vulnerable Children

PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief

PO Program Officer

PPI Progress Out of Poverty Index

PSW Parasocial Worker

SCORE The Sustainable COmprehensive REsponses (SCORE) for Vulnerable Children

and their Families

SPM Selection, Planning and Management

SG Savings Group

SW Social Worker

TA Technical Advisor

TOC Theory of Change

USAID United States Agency for International Development

VSLA Village Savings and Loan Association

ASPIRES Family Care Process Assessment: Savings Groups iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms .........................................................................................................................ii

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

Background ..................................................................................................................... 2

Overview of Intervention Strategies ................................................................................ 4

ESFAM ........................................................................................................................ 4

FARE ........................................................................................................................... 6

Methods .......................................................................................................................... 8

Findings ......................................................................................................................... 10

Theory of Change ...................................................................................................... 10

Characteristics of SGs for Vulnerable Populations .................................................... 12

Mobilization strategies ............................................................................................ 12

Training and support .............................................................................................. 13

Group size .............................................................................................................. 14

Participant gender .................................................................................................. 14

Ability to save and purpose of savings ................................................................... 15

Ability to borrow and purpose of loans ................................................................... 16

Loan repayment ..................................................................................................... 17

Perceptions and use of welfare fund ...................................................................... 18

Security .................................................................................................................. 18

Group dynamics ..................................................................................................... 18

Community perception of groups ........................................................................... 19

Government perception of groups .......................................................................... 19

Spin-off groups ....................................................................................................... 20

Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries: Interactions and Comparative Performance .......... 20

Comparative Performance by Project and Among Ugandan SG Programs ............... 25

Effects of SG Membership ......................................................................................... 27

Overall basic needs ................................................................................................ 27

Income ................................................................................................................... 27

Food security.......................................................................................................... 28

Economic shocks ................................................................................................... 28

Children’s education ............................................................................................... 29

Shelter .................................................................................................................... 29

ASPIRES Family Care Process Assessment: Savings Groups iv

Access to health care ............................................................................................. 29

How family members spend time ........................................................................... 30

Sense of self .......................................................................................................... 30

Family dynamics .................................................................................................... 30

Future outlook ........................................................................................................ 31

Advantages and Disadvantages of Group Membership ............................................. 31

Other Group Functionality and Performance Issues .................................................. 32

Rules and decisions to accommodate vulnerable members .................................. 32

Attendance and regularity of deposits .................................................................... 33

Dropouts ................................................................................................................ 34

Sustainability .......................................................................................................... 34

Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 35

Recommendations and Practical Suggestions .......................................................... 37

Limitations ................................................................................................................. 38

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 39

References .................................................................................................................... 40

ASPIRES Family Care Process Assessment: Savings Groups 1

Introduction

The ASPIRES project aims to advance household economic strengthening (ES) programs for

vulnerable populations. ASPIRES offers technical assistance to scale up high-quality

interventions in the areas of consumption support, money management, and income promotion.

The project also supports rigorous research to evaluate programs and inform a new

understanding of best practices in ES. A subproject known as ASPIRES Family Care, funded by

USAID’s Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF), aims to develop evidence and learning

related to how household-level ES can support the prevention of unnecessary family-child

separation and reintegration of children in family care in low- and middle-income countries.

Because these projects were intended to be subjects of evaluation research, the timing and

content of programming were designed to accommodate research needs in addition to

delivering results for participants. Each project offered a number of ES interventions, in different

combinations, to explore what worked best for households who were reintegrating children or

who were at risk of separating from their children.

ChildFund directly implemented the Economic Strengthening to Keep and Reintegrate Children

into Families (ESFAM) project, which aimed to support reintegration of 89 children from child

care institutions into family care in Gulu, Kamuli, and Luwero districts and prevent child

separation in 611 families assessed to be at high risk of family-child separation in 10 parishes in

those districts.

The AVSI Foundation developed the Family Resilience (FARE) project with implementing

partners Retrak, Companionship of Works Association (COWA) and Fruits of Charity

Foundation (FCF). FARE aimed to support reintegration of up to 300 (later reduced to 268)

street-connected children or children in the juvenile justice system into family care in Kampala

Capital City and Wakiso District and prevent family-child separation in 350 families identified to

be at risk of separation in eight parishes in those districts.

Both ESFAM and FARE used novel approaches to build evidence on the role of ES to prevent

separation and reintegrate separated families, including the use of SGs, and their experiences

offer practical lessons for implementers. This evaluation seeks to capture some of these lessons

by exploring design and implementation processes related to the savings group component of

the ESFAM and FARE projects. This learning is intended to inform programming for ChildFund

and AVSI and to feed into guidance to be developed by ASPIRES as a resource for similar

programs.

Additionally, this evaluation seeks to contribute to the evidence base on SG interventions for

vulnerable households and explore how such groups can contribute to preventing family

separation and reintegrating separated families. Both FARE and ESFAM included variations on

the standard savings group (SG) or village savings and loan association (VSLA) model in order


to reach very vulnerable households. Additionally, ESFAM formed VSLA groups comprised

primarily of participants identified as the most vulnerable in a program intervention led by a cash

transfer. This assessment explores lessons learned from these activities to inform future

projects targeting similar populations.

Though the projects were distinct and operated in different contexts, they both used SGs to

tackle the issue of family separation for very vulnerable households. We combined findings from

both ESFAM and FARE in this report in order to draw insights about common themes,

differences, and context-specific design features that could benefit both programs. Finally,

although ASPIRES is implementing a separate evaluation that we expect to yield insight on

program effects, this evaluation explores how staff and beneficiaries linked program design and

implementation features to the effects of savings groups.

The objectives of this evaluation can be summarized as follows:

• Explore how SGs adapted for vulnerable participants function under specific contexts.

• Gather perspectives on what works from an implementation/supply point of view.

• Gather information on what works from a beneficiary point of view.

• Take an early and exploratory look at results of SGs.

• Explore what could be improved in similar contexts.

Background

SGs are an informal, group mechanism for saving money safely and accessing credit at low

cost for populations that are unbanked or ineligible for bank loans. Because they are accessible

to poorer and more remote populations, they have become a popular ES intervention for

vulnerable households. However, ES programs seeking to target specific populations, such as

the poorest households or households with a special condition such as HIV or those

experiencing family separation, require adaptations to standard savings group methodologies.

One of the most common SG methodologies is the VSLA model standardized by CARE.

According to guidance from VSL Associates, there are several fundamental characteristics that

VSLA must have. First, groups must be self-selecting and autonomous (Allen & Staehle, 2007).

Groups consist of 10-25 members and conduct all transactions transparently in front of the

group. Savings cycles are time bound, lasting no longer than a year, and all members keep

records using a passbook. Groups develop their own written constitution establishing rules that

they jointly determine. Members save 1-5 shares at each meeting, at a share value established

by the group. Although members can temporarily stop saving for a limited period of time, they

must continue to pay off loans with interest. Loans are made every four weeks. Groups can

establish a welfare fund to meet emergency borrowing needs at no interest, but the welfare fund

is not expected to grow over time.

One key difference between the standard VSLA model and adaptations for vulnerable


populations is that mobilization strategies must ensure that target populations are included

(Johnson & Storchi, 2013). Rather than initiating an open self-selection process in a targeted

community, promoting institutions may choose to mobilize participants belonging to specific

populations by introducing related criteria for membership. An example might involve a

community leader inviting only households perceived as poor to a community meeting, then

using a participatory process to profile households at the meeting to make sure they meet

programmatic criteria for participation. Households that fit the profile might then be invited to

form their own groups. Alternatively, promoting organizations might choose a “saturation

approach.” This approach simply involves setting up a large number of groups in a single area

with the assumption that they will eventually reach the poor. In practice, this seems to happen in

some contexts, but not others. Johnson and Storchi (2013) argue that where “poverty incidence

is lower or inequality is greater, more specific targeting of the poor will likely be required to

ensure their inclusion” (p. 48).

Targeting vulnerable households for inclusion in SGs can introduce specific challenges. When

SGs include too many vulnerable members, it may reduce the availability of credit within a

group and hurt overall performance, making it preferable to have a mix of vulnerable and non-

vulnerable households (Burlando & Canidio, 2015). Additionally, although it is not well-

documented, there is a risk that relatively more well-off households might take control of a

group, resulting in “elite capture” and ultimately driving away poorer members (Allen & Panetta,

2010). Groups with members at different levels of vulnerability may also experience tension in

deciding rules on the value and number of shares required (Johnson & Storchi, 2013).

Additionally, targeting specific populations may reduce the benefit of strong social ties that come

with pure self-selection. Finally, for programs focused on reintegrating separated children with

their families, setting up SGs may be hindered by wide geographic spread between

reintegrating households (Chaffin & Kalyanpur, 2014).

Existing evidence suggests that SGs are a promising intervention to help stabilize impoverished

households at risk for experiencing unnecessary child separation. However, this evidence is

indirect in the sense that, while the domains of impact are relevant, the interventions were not

tested in the specific context of prevention of separation/reintegration. For example, reviews of

the literature on SGs have found some of the strongest evidence for SG impact on the outcome

of food security (Gash & Odell, 2013; Meaux, 2016). A number of RCTs have found statistically

significant improvements in household food security, although there is little evidence of whether

these effects trickle down to children. Consistent improvements in food security suggest

increases in households’ ability to smooth consumption, suggesting that SGs help them become

more resilient to shocks (Gash & Odell, 2013). An RCT of a program in Burundi combining SGs

with parenting training found positive effects on family functioning and reductions in harsh

discipline (Annan, Bundervoet, Seban, & Costigan, 2013). The effects of SGs on other

economic indicators are more mixed. Rigorous evaluations have found mixed evidence for the

effects of SGs on reducing poverty (Meaux, 2016) or increasing business-related spending,

profits, or business ownership (Gash & Odell, 2013).


More research is needed to understand how SGs can be used explicitly to support the

reintegration of separated children into their families as well as prevent unnecessary family-child

separation. This process evaluation is one of several contributions the ASPIRES project will

make to help build this evidence base.

Overview of Intervention Strategies

ESFAM

ESFAM identified potential participants for its at-risk-of-separation, or prevention, caseload

through a two-step process. First, in targeted communities, it used a community-based

participatory process to identify households at risk of separation. Identified households were

then verified and assessed using a standardized vulnerability assessment tool, which was used

to classify them according to economic and social vulnerability levels: destitute, struggling, and

prepared to grow. Only destitute and struggling households were enrolled. Households that

already experienced separation were identified through a process of tracing the children who

had been living in child care institutions and then returned to their families by these institutions

without preparation or ongoing support. These households were highly geographically

dispersed.

The ESFAM project planned to support targeted families with case management and social

support services including home visits to deliver psychosocial support, strengthen parenting

skills, strengthen child protection mechanisms, and link individual households to services

through referrals to health, education and other child wellbeing and protection-related services.

All participants would also take part in an ES intervention that included newly-developed

financial literacy and business skills training using its Catalyzing Business Skills for Caregivers

(CBS) curriculum and ongoing coaching by para-social workers (PSWs) at home using its

Follow-On Coaching to Households: Para-Social Workers Guide.1 Families would also be

assigned to an additional ES intervention based on their assessed level of economic

vulnerability.

According to its ES Strategy document, ESFAM’s ES interventions were intended to address

two primary drivers of separation: poverty and lack of access to education.2 For the most

destitute families, 408 in total, the program would feature a short-term cash transfer (CT)

program, amounting to UGX 420,000 total ($115), disbursed at varying amounts based on

family need on a monthly basis for up to 12 months. Of the remaining 292 families in the

program, the 155 lower-scoring families (struggling 1) would be encouraged to open a project-

matched savings account with PostBank Uganda, and the 137 higher-scoring families

1 Both the curriculum and the coaching guide were developed for the project by ESFAM partner Making Cents International. 2 Although public primary education in Uganda is nominally free, parents must still pay for children’s uniforms, educational supplies, and sometimes other fees charged by schools.


(struggling 2) would be encouraged to form VSLAs in their communities. In addition to receiving

CTs, destitute participants would also be encouraged to join a VSLA.

ESFAM also planned to provide additional material support to all families reintegrating children,

in the form of in-kind goods including mattresses, mosquito nets, bedsheets, blankets, posho,

beans, and books/pens. The project would also provide caregivers in reunification cases UGX

40,000 (around $11) for uniforms for all school-going reunified children at the relevant time of

enrollment. ESFAM also planned to engage children and youth in ES with the intention to foster

their self-confidence, build social resilience, create social cohesion among children/youth in a

group setting, and build financial literacy and money management skills. ESFAM targeted CBS

and SGs to children aged 10-13 and youth aged 14-17, with a goal of reaching 225 young

people.

Stipended community volunteers known as para-social workers (PSWs) and economic

strengthening facilitators (ESFs) would deliver home visits and provide ES support to

households. They would be overseen by one full-time, salaried social worker (SW) in each

district, who would report to the ES Specialist at ChildFund’s national office (NO).

Building on related experience and programming at ChildFund, ESFAM began to roll out

activities with project participants in December 2016. The activities were sequenced as follows:

Table 1. Summary of ESFAM HH Classification System & ES Activities

HH Economic

Classification

Destitute Struggling 1 Struggling 2

Sequenced ES

Activities3

1st - HH-based FL

Training and coaching

(Module 1 CBS) for adult

members, then

2nd - Cash Transfer, then

3rd - VSLA membership

accompanied by CBS

1st - HH-based FL

Training (Module 1 CBS)

and coaching for adult

members, then

2nd – Matched Savings

Account, then

3rd – HH-based CBS

1st – VSLA, then

2nd – Group-based CBS

for members of the VSLA

3rd- Group coaching in

VSLAs and household

coaching through home

visits

Source: ESFAM ES Guidelines

ESFAM offered subsidies to households classified as destitute and struggling 1, in the form of

cash transfers and matched savings, but did not offer a subsidy to struggling 2 households, who

were considered economically strong enough to participate in VSLAs without additional financial

support. VSLAs were not offered to struggling 1 households in an effort to collect data on the

effects of saving in a formal account. ESFAM aimed to enroll 137 struggling 2 households in

VSLAs as well as an undetermined number of destitute households after they received financial

literacy training and started receiving CTs. Separate groups were formed around participants

3 Note that all packages were accompanied by continuous HH economic and social coaching by ESFs and PSWs.


based on their vulnerability classification, with community members invited to fill out the

remaining member slots to reach a group size of 15-25 members. While destitute members

received a financial literacy module of the larger CBS training during home visits and received

the rest of the CBS training in their VSLAs, VSLAs were the only platform by which struggling 2

members received CBS training.

Table 2. ESFAM Struggling 2 HHs by Location and Type

Number

of

VSLAs

Original number of

selected

households

Current number of

households in VSLA

Number of ESFAM

households not in

VSLA

Non-

ESFAM

members

At risk of

separation

Reunified At risk of

separation

Reunified At risk of

separation

Reunified

Gulu 3 47 3 32 2 15 1 38

Kamuli 3 30 10 20 3 10 7 73

Luwero 4 42 5 11 0 31 5 84

Total 10 119 18 63 5 56 13 195

Source: ESFAM, FY17Q4

Table 3. Destitute VSLA Groups Formed with ESFAM Participants

District At Risk of

separation

Reunified Number of

Destitute

VSLAs

ESFAM

members (1

caregiver/HH)

Non

ESFAM

members

Total

members

Gulu 126 6 11 129 201 330

Kamuli/Jinja 114 25 6 127 39 166

Luwero/

Nakaseke 130 3 3 82 77 159

Total 370 34 20 338 317 655


Participation of struggling-to-make-ends-meet HHs in VSLAs was less than anticipated,

apparently reaching about 53% of targeted at-risk and about 28% of targeted reintegrating HHs.

As noted above, reaching scattered reintegrating HHs with group-based interventions was

challenging. In addition, ESFAM reported that project participants in some locations declined to

join groups, mainly because they expected direct financial gains (i.e., a cash transfer) from the

project. In contrast, many targeted destitute HHs showed interest in VSLAs earlier than was

anticipated by the project. Participation seemed to be lower in Luwero than in the other two

districts.

FARE

FARE identified households at risk of separation by asking local leaders which families were at

risk and which factors were the most important contributors to separation locally. They then

approached these households with a brief tool designed to prioritize households displaying

specific vulnerability factors for enrollment. Interested participants were then enrolled. FARE


also reunified street-connected children and children in the juvenile justice system with their

families in Kampala Capital City and Wakiso District on a rolling basis through September 2017.

The process involved counseling and preparation of the child, family tracing, and family

preparation. Following reunification, FARE continued to support these children and families to

facilitate the children’s reintegration in family and community.

Similar to ESFAM, FARE planned that all targeted families should receive a package of

“wraparound” services including case management support and home visits for counseling,

psychosocial support, assistance with resolving conflicts, and referrals to other services. These

services would work in complementarity with the ES interventions, primarily VSLAs and a

business training course for groups that reached their second cycle of saving. In addition, a

group of the poorest families (based on Progress Out of Poverty Index score) would receive

CTs with the same total ceiling as ESFAM of UGX 420,000, but delivered in the fixed monthly

amount of UGX 70,000 (around $20) over six months.

FARE planned to offer life skills training and apprenticeships for adolescents in participating

households, as well as some linkage to vocational training. The project also planned to provide

group-based parenting skills training and other community-based activities aimed at

strengthening families and communities in targeted parishes. With the exception of the cash

transfers, which would employe project-based eligibility criteria, targeted families would be free

to choose the project interventions in which they wished to participate as part of the household

development planning process (a divergence from the ESFAM approach of intervention

assignment based on poverty classification).

Table 4. Summary of FARE ES Activities

Intermediate Result 2: Targeted families/HHs have increased economic resources and capacities

• Stabilize household consumption among destitute families by providing

consumption support.

• Increase HH assets and access to resources by forming, training and supporting

VSLA groups that include targeted families.

• Increase participant household earning potential by building skills related to

financial literacy and enterprise selection, planning and management.

• Build vocational and life skills of out-of-school adolescents aged 14-17 from

targeted families/HHs and increase their income earning potential by providing an

apprenticeship program with a structured curriculum and on-the-job training.

Source: Adapted from FARE M&E Plan

FARE planned that its activities would be supported by staff at a variety of levels, including

technical advisors and program officers at the HQ level, program managers and program

officers at the implementer level, and finally staff social workers and stipended community-

based trainers who would work directly with beneficiaries.


FARE began its intervention rollout in targeted at-risk communities with extensive community

dialogues and sensitization, in which the entire local population and its leaders were made

aware of the nature and purpose of the training.

FARE had initially planned to create 52 VSLAs under the assumption that all targeted families

would participate, but later determined that its target was not realistic, given the scattering of

families reintegrating children. It subsequently decided to form 29 VSLAs including 333 target

families in its at-risk target parishes. It planned to aim for a minimum number of 15 FARE target

HHs (direct beneficiary) VSLA members and a maximum of 30 members total per group, but

decided that it would form groups with a minimum of five target HH members, plus members of

other households in their communities if needed, in order for target families to access the

intervention. FARE reported that there had been slow uptake of VSLAs in some areas and

some attendance issues as people prioritized income earning activities. By the end of June

2017, FARE had reached just under 80% of the 333 HHs it planned to reach, as shown in the

table below.

Table 5. FARE Target Household Participation in VSLA (as of December 2017)

Partner FARE VLSA

formed

FARE target HHs

in VSLA

Other HHs in

community in

VSLA

Total participants

Retrak 13 142 234 376

COWA 9 110 115 225

FCF 7 63 134 197

Total 29 315 483 798


Methods

The primary source of data for this evaluation were interviews and focus group discussions

(FGDs) conducted with project staff, participants, and local government officials during

approximately four weeks of fieldwork in the target communities. These were divided between

the two investigators and conducted separately in November and December 2017. Individual

interviews focused on both project staff and direct beneficiaries, comprised of VSLA members in

leadership positions in their groups, while FGDs focused on VSLA members as noted in Table

3. Translators were employed for interviews in the relevant local languages (Luganda and

Acholi). The project was reviewed and received a non-research determination by FHI 360’s

internal research ethics committee.

Table 6. Sample Frame

Interview Type

Number of Participants

ESFAM FARE


Project staff (Project Manager, ES Specialist, Social

Worker(s), M&E Advisor) 12 14

Local government officials 6 3

FGDs with VSLA members (9 in total, 6-15

participants each, mix of reintegration and at-risk) 43 48

VSLA leader (1 per district) 3 2

Total 64 67

Table 7. Demographic Characteristics of FGD Participants

Characteristic ESFAM FARE Total

Median age (in years)

40

39 40

Gender (%)

Women

Men

Total

32 (74.4%)

11 (25.6%)

43 (100%)

46 (95.8%)

2 (4.2%)

48 (100%)

78 (85.7%)

13 (14.3%)

91 (100%)

Median HH composition

Children

Adults

5

2

3

2

4

2

Median number of

income-earners in HH

1 2

1

Examples of sources of

incomes

Farming, agricultural

trading, casual labor,

cobbler, baker, food

sales

Education levels (%)

None

Primary

Lower secondary

Upper secondary

Tertiary

Total

3 (6.9%)

26 (60.4%)

2 (4.6%)

12 (27.9%)

0 (0%)

43 (100%)

2 (4.2%)

26 (54.1%)

13 (27.5%)

3 (5.5%)

4 (4.4%)

48 (100%)

5 (5.57%)

52 (57.5%)

25 (27.5%)

5 (5.5%)

1 (4.4%)

91 (100%)


Receiving CTs

Yes

No

23 (53.5%)

20 (46.5%)

22 (45.8%)

26 (54.2%)

45 (49.5%)

46 (50.5%)

In addition to the fieldwork, we reviewed project materials including those listed below in Table

8. We searched these materials for information on program objectives, activities, targets, and

performance related to the research questions posed by this assessment. However, given the

volume of materials available, we did not conduct a systematic qualitative analysis of the data,

and although we were able to gain a working understanding of how the projects were

implemented, we were unable to capture all of the details on how each project was

implemented.

Table 8. Project Materials Reviewed

ESFAM FARE

• ESFAM Project work plan(s)

• ESFAM Project Monitoring and

Evaluation Plan

• ESFAM Project quarterly reports

• ESFAM Economic Strengthening

Strategy

• ESFAM Cash Transfer Guidelines

• Catalyzing Business Skills for

Caregivers

• Follow-On Coaching to Households:

Para-Social Workers Guide

• ASPIRES subproject monitoring

reports (January 2017 and June 2017)

• Other project records (e.g., VSLA

records)

• FARE Project work plan(s)

• FARE Project Monitoring and

Evaluation Plan

• FARE Project quarterly reports

• FARE Cash Transfer Guidelines

• IGA Selection, Planning and

Management

• ASPIRES subproject monitoring

reports (January 2017 and June 2017)

• Other project records (e.g., learning

documents, VSLA records)

Findings

Theory of Change

ESFAM and FARE both identified household inability to meet a child’s basic needs, with an

emphasis on food and education security, as a primary driver of unnecessary child separation.

Additionally, both programs saw VSLAs, as part of a larger constellation of interventions, to

support households to meet their children’s basic needs. ESFAM’s ES strategy described the

function of a VSLA as to “generate savings to meet household needs,” but also to generate

income by investing in “productive micro-enterprises.” In this TOC, VSLA groups did not function

in isolation, but were “complemented with training and coaching in Catalyzing Business Skills

(CBS) for Destitute and Struggling HHs.” Similarly, FARE’s program guidelines envisioned a


role in VLSAs for “income smoothing” and to “provide a source of capital for income generating

activities and mitigating risks.” FARE also combined VSLA rollout with a microenterprise training

program, although they chose to delay it until groups had reached their second savings cycle.

Participants and staff from both programs mentioned with reverence the growing influence of a

“savings culture” facilitated by ESFAM and FARE. In alignment with program guidelines,

respondents saw savings as a means to better access basic needs as well as a source of

business capital. As explained by ESFAM’s ES Specialist, basic needs could be met through

emergency loans withdrawn from the VSLAs, or through profits from microenterprises

developed with capital borrowed from the groups.

Staff agreed that savings allowed participants to improve their income through microenterprise,

but what emerged from interviews that was not evident in program guidelines was that VSLAs

also serve as a platform for both social support and training on non-financial topics related to

separation. FARE’s ES Technical Advisor described VSLAs as a place for participants to “share

social information and learn from other households.” Retrak’s program manager saw VSLAs as

a way for vulnerable and socially-ostracized participants to be “recognized in the community and

seen as part of it.”

Staff also emphasized the importance of VSLAs as a platform for training on non-financial

topics, such as parenting and child protection training, which FARE’s ES TA saw as “equally

important” to the economic functions of the groups. ESFAM’s M&E Specialist saw this function

as well, describing the potential for VSLAs to take information learned from parenting and child

protection training and become “child protection structures” in their communities.

Overall, most staff from both programs agreed that the VSLA interventions were creating a

“savings culture,” and most were confident that VSLAs were delivering on their ultimate

objective of preventing separation: either through promoting income-generation or as a platform

for non-financial trainings. However, some staff noted that a substantial number of participants

were not able to start income-generating activities (IGAs).

It is important to note that the TOC proved to be largely inapplicable to one segment of the

target population: reintegrating households. In FARE, reintegrating households were almost

entirely unable to participate in VSLAs due to the distance between participant households. As

of September 2017, only six FARE VSLA participants were from reintegrating households,

although up to 23 reintegrated households reportedly joined groups for their second cycle.

Because they were unable to participate in VSLAs, reintegrating households also missed out on

other group interventions. As an alternative, some of these households were engaged in a

separate training on IGA skills called “community skills” training. As of December 2017, 104

people participated in this training. This required IPs to assemble reintegrating participants in a

specific location for each geographic zone, which required reimbursing related travel expenses,

and was therefore relatively expensive to implement. ESFAM also faced challenges engaging

reintegrating households in VSLAs due to distance. As of December 2017, ESFAM records


showed that 34 of 89 reintegrating households were active in VSLAs.

Characteristics of SGs for Vulnerable Populations

Mobilization strategies

VSLAs are usually mobilized using a general community outreach strategy where interested

participants form their own groups. However, FARE and ESFAM both targeted program

participants for mobilization, which introduced a constraint to pure self-selection. Although

community members (referred to in this report as “indirect” beneficiaries, though sometimes

called “non-target” in the context of the programs) were allowed to join, the groups were built

around a core of program participants (referred to as “direct” beneficiaries, or sometimes

“target”). Additionally, unlike traditional mobilization methods, participants did not always know

each other prior to joining a VSLA.

FARE used program officers (POs) and community-based trainers (CBTs) to work with local

leaders to mobilize target families to join VSLAs. FARE held community meetings, where they

explained that certain households would be actively encouraged to join VSLAs, although

participant households were not identified in front of the community. They then went door-to-

door to participant households to encourage them to form groups. Participants were then

allowed to invite non-participants to join the groups. FARE’s goal was to form groups that were

made up of about 50% participants (direct beneficiaries), and 50% non-participants (indirect

beneficiaries). One group was explicitly mobilized around five reintegrating households, but

FARE found that this approach was not feasible elsewhere. FARE groups were closed to new

members once they were formed.

ESFAM experienced another challenge that resulted from disaggregating groups by vulnerability

level, as determined through a PRA exercise in the community and confirmed using a

household vulnerability index tool. ESFAM gathered participants at a similar level of vulnerability

for a meeting and introduced the concept of VSLAs. At this point, participants were free to form

their own groups and, if desired, invite non-participants to join. During home visits, participants

received regular messaging to increase their awareness of the groups, including

encouragement to join during home visits. Groups were not mobilized based on whether

participants were reintegrating children or at-risk for separation, with the exception of one group

in Kamuli which was composed 14 caregivers from reintegrating households. Unlike FARE,

ESFAM’s groups admitted new members until about three months prior to shareout.

In ESFAM, communication with participants explaining the targeting process was limited by

perceptions of unfairness. While destitute families received cash transfers (CTs) and struggling

1 families could open matched savings accounts (MSA), struggling 2 families were invited to join

VSLAs without any form of subsidy. Exclusion from the CT and MSA intervention had highly

negative effects on the overall participation of struggling 2 households. Though destitute

households were receptive to the VSLA groups, about half of the ESFAM struggling 2

households declined to join a group. The rate of refusal was most extreme in Luwero district,

where over 75% of struggling 2 households had not joined a group by September 2017.


Although field staff reassured investigators that struggling 2 households understood and

accepted the targeting process for CTs and MSA, M&E figures show much lower rates of

participation among this group. When probed, a Gulu PSW reported that none of the four

struggling 2 households in her jurisdiction joined VSLA groups, likely due to not receiving cash.

Both ESFAM and FARE had to overcome negative perceptions of VSLAs in the targeted

communities. Staff and participants described community members as skeptical of VSLAs at the

onset of mobilization. Many had experienced or heard of negative encounters with previous

groups, including several reports of fraud. At the same time, participants were skeptical that

they would be able to save money at all. Regular and persistent messaging about the value and

“culture of saving” was critical to overcoming this barrier. Interviews with participants made it

clear that this messaging, particularly on the “culture of savings,” had been thoroughly

internalized and continued to inspire enthusiasm for the SGs. Both programs also reported

increased interest among participants and community members once groups began issuing

loans.

Training and support

Intensive training and support was an integral part of the program approaches taken by both

FARE and ESFAM, and a critical aspect of VSLA development for their vulnerable program

participants. In addition to receiving training on how to operate a VSLA, participants also

received training on other topics, including parenting, child protection, financial literacy, hygiene

and sanitation, and others, which participants cited as a motivating factor to join and remain in

the groups. Participants also received regular home visits from project staff, where ES

messaging, including encouragement to join SGs, was reinforced. The regularity of the home

visits seemed to vary in some cases, but most commonly took place every few months. For

ESFAM, each of the households received home visits from ESFs and PSWs at least twice a

month.

FARE guidance materials described three phases of VSLA support: 16 weeks of intensive

support, 16 weeks of “development” support, and 20 weeks of “maturity” support. While

providing intensive support to newly-formed VSLAs, CBTs attended every meeting. This was

reduced to two visits a month in the development phase, and support was provided as needed

for the maturity phase. ESFAM staff reported that economic strengthening facilitators (ESFs)

attended every meeting, with social workers (SWs) attending every other week. Despite the

intensive nature of support provided, FARE’s ES TA and at least one ESF from ESFAM did not

consider their VSLAs to require more support than standard, untargeted VSLAs.

FARE did not offer ES training to groups beyond training in basic VSLA operations during their

first cycle. As noted earlier, FARE offered IGA selection, planning, and management (SPM)

training during their second cycle, covering the following topics: identification of suitable

enterprises (knowledge and skills); operation and marketing; sources of capital and family

expenses; planning and management of capital; and cash control and risk. Staff expressed

regret that SPM was offered so late in the project cycle and thought the groups would have


benefitted from receiving SPM, or financial literacy training, during their first cycle.

ESFAM introduced additional ES training to VSLA groups immediately. In addition to basic

VSLA and group dynamics trainings, ESFAM trained all VSLA participants using a curriculum

called Catalyzing Business Skills, which was developed by Making Cents International for the

specific needs of ESFAM’s project population. The training lasted 20 hours and consisted of

financial literacy and business development topics. Destitute households received additional

financial literacy training on an individual basis during home visits, while struggling 2 households

received all trainings through the groups.

Both programs used VSLAs as a platform for other trainings related to preventing family

separation, and participants were highly enthusiastic about these trainings. One Kamuli

participant explained that extra training was one feature of ESFAM VSLAs that set them apart –

and made them better – than other VSLAs in the community. Depending on the topic, FARE

sometimes opened these supplemental trainings to community members outside of the group.

Life skills training, for example, was opened to all youth in some communities; it was well-

received and appeared to have increased interest in the SG program across the community. In

FARE, busy urban households experienced some tension between their desire for training and

taking time away from income-generation. To reduce absence from the market, group members

decided to consolidate savings activities and trainings into longer meetings, adding 2-3 hours to

savings activities about once a month. This adaptation seemed effective for busy urban

households.

Group size

Groups ranged in size from 16-30 members, in accordance with standard savings group

methodologies (though slightly larger than VSL Associates’ maximum of 25). Though FARE

aimed for a 50/50 ratio between direct and indirect beneficiaries, only about 40% of group

members were direct beneficiaries due to the geographical distance between participant

households. In terms of reaching targets, this ratio was more favorable for ESFAM’s destitute

groups, where about 2/3 members were participants, but worse for struggling 2 groups, where

less than a third (about 28%) of members were ESFAM participants as of September 2017. This

reflected ESFAM’s overarching challenges mobilizing struggling 2 households.

Targeting vulnerable households did not seem to hinder community interest in the groups. On

the contrary, once community members started seeing VSLA members withdrawing loans, they

began clamoring to join a number of groups to the point of maximum capacity. Staff from both

organizations reported that interested community members had to be turned away and asked to

attempt to join groups again during the next cycle.

Participant gender

VSLAs were overwhelmingly populated by women. 85.7% of the VSLA members interviewed

were female, compared to an average of 68.2% of VSLA members in Uganda on average,

according to Savix data from the first quarter of 2018 (VSL Associates, 2018). Although this may


be appealing as a strategy to economically empower women, it also indicated that women have

disproportionate responsibility for addressing the risk of child separation. Additionally, it

highlighted a pattern of disproportional representation of men in VSLA leadership positions that

investigators observed in both FARE and ESFAM. A Wakiso group member explained, “We

wanted the person at the forefront to be a man. His entire life he has been a leader and a

teacher,” and noted that she hoped that he would encourage other men to join the group.

ESFAM’s project manager explained that this was a symptom of larger, socially-ingrained

imbalances, where women themselves prefer men in leadership.

Participant interviews suggested that involvement in VSLAs improved women’s economic

decision-making power in the household. A Wakiso participant noted that “Initially the men were

responsible [for the household]. Now the ladies can stand in and take charge.” She explained

that husbands and men were not respectful of the group at first, but later became very

interested in it. A Wakiso CBT noted, “Before we came in, at enrollment, the major reason the

woman enrolled was because of the violence [in their households]. She didn’t have a say in the

household. This time around, the household is at peace. She is empowered and always has

some money in her pocket.”

FARE staff cited GBV as a critical problem that had to be confronted prior to engaging

households in ES activities. However, training on the topic was only provided on an ad hoc

basis, leading staff to conclude during a debrief meeting with an investigator that future

programs should more deliberately provide GBV training. Lack of male involvement in VSLAs

limited the programs’ ability to reach men with this type of training.

Ability to save and purpose of savings

A major barrier for mobilizing VSLAs among very vulnerable households was that program

participants simply did not believe they were capable of saving. Training was necessary to

overcome this notion. Throughout focus groups, VSLA participants emphasized how the group

changed their perception of their ability to save, and that they were able to save increasing

amounts as they continued in the program.

Several respondents noted they “did not know how to save” before the program, and were

eager to describe how their weekly savings increased over time starting as low as 500 UGX. A

PO from FARE estimated that most participants started saving around 500-2000 UGX a week

($0.14-$0.70) a week, which increased to up to 10,000 UGX ($2.80) a week after one or two

cycles. In one Wakiso focus group, about half of the participants reported that they were saving

before participating in the FARE VSLA. However, they described key changes in their savings

habits. One member explained, “There were risks in the way we saved before, like theft. Such

risks are now controlled.” Another said, “The way we are doing it now is motivated. We are

encouraged to save it every week.”

Participants seemed to all have a purpose for their savings, and they were excited to describe it.

Common goals included using the money to pay for school fees, cover basic household needs,


purchase land, build a house, and invest in livestock and IGAs. A Gulu PSW explained that

having a purpose for one’s savings was a critical component of the training they received:

participants had to have a purpose for their savings because they were asked about it before

they even joined the VSLAs, though it is not clear that this requirement was applied across

ESFAM or in FARE’s programs. A CDO in Luwero described VSLA members as

“ambassadors” of a “savings culture” in their communities.

Reports from FARE indicated that indirect beneficiaries, who make up a majority of group

members, save and borrow at significantly higher rates than direct beneficiaries, thus fueling the

growth of the groups’ funds to the benefit of all members, though also raising some questions

about possible “elite capture” in these groups (see additional discussion below). For ESFAM,

similar comparisons between direct and indirect financial activity yielded mixed results. These

issues will be taken on in more detail in the next section of the report.

Ability to borrow and purpose of loans

Unsurprisingly, respondents unanimously agreed that VSLAs increased their ability to borrow

money, and nearly all FGD participants reported they had taken out a loan from their group.

Participants appreciated the accommodating terms and accessibility of taking out loans through

their groups compared to their options prior to joining the VSLA. Most participants with past

experience drawing credit did so from one of two sources: money lenders or a handful of

microfinance institutions (MFIs) with a presence in these areas, particularly PRIDE and FINCA.

There was a strong consensus that both were inferior credit options compared with VSLAs, due

to high interest rates and the need for collateral. Participants also complained about the rigidity

of borrowing from these sources—i.e., when payments came due, neither money-lenders nor

MFIs cared what challenges a person might be facing at the moment. The VSLAs, on the other

hand, always considered intervening circumstances and sometimes gave extensions in

deserving situations.

Participants typically took out loans to cover school fees and invest in IGAs. Some other

purposes mentioned were: health expenses, agricultural expenses including inputs and renting

land, home expenses such as repairs, rental costs, and latrine construction, and investment in

livestock. Many participants described a strategy of borrowing for a mix of productive and non-

productive purposes with a single loan with the strategy of using productive investments to pay

it back, a strategy that groups seemed to accept. (See additional discussion on this issue

below.)

Loan terms were set in agreement with guidelines provided by VSL Associates. They ranged

from 1 month to 3 months, and interest was usually set between 5% and 10%, although at least

one group in Wakiso reported a 20% interest rate. Participants were only allowed to borrow 2-3

times their total savings amount. Even ESFAM groups made up of households designated as

destitute reported relatively short repayment periods of 1 month with relatively high interest of

10%. When asked about it, members reported they did not have a problem with these terms

because they allowed the group to grow its funds quickly.


No participants reported feeling any pressure from group members to borrow, and some pointed

out that they received training specifically advising them to not pressure other members in this

way. Some ESFAM groups reported constraints with the loan fund because it was not always

sufficient to cover all borrowing requests. In this case, one group reported that loan requests

beyond the available amount would be tabled until the next meeting. Another group reported

that loans would be distributed to all members who requested them, but at a reduced amount.

No similar reports about loan funds falling short were received in FARE interviews.

Loan repayment

Nearly all participants reported that they had borrowed from their groups, and very few reported

any problems with the process. As noted above, most participants named productive purposes

for the loans, such as investment in their IGAs, but others reported non-productive purposes,

such as home repairs.

The investigators probed heavily on the matter of loans taken out for non-productive purposes,

and whether there were concerns about participants’ ability to pay these loans back when the

funds were generating no profit. Put another way, if participants did not have the money prior to

the loan, and were not making money with the help of the loan, how would they pay it back?

Respondents offered two primary explanations. First, a consensus emerged that, in fact, few

loans were approved that went solely to non-productive purposes. Most common was a mix of

productive and non-productive uses from a single loan—so half might be applied toward home

improvements, while the other half becomes new capital for a microenterprise. These kinds of

mixed strategies were the ones that groups seemed to accept and approve most often.

For the second explanation, respondents noted that many of them had steady cashflow, but

required a lump sum for a non-productive expense that necessitated taking out a loan which

could be paid back gradually. They lacked the discipline to save this money in a gradual way

leading up to the lump sum need, but the discipline came in after taking the loan and knowing

that the group trusted and depended on them to pay it back.

Testimony varied on the frequency of late repayment. Some groups described it as rare, while

others suggested they had fairly generous policies that allowed for exceptions when the

borrower was facing personal and financial challenges. Steps taken included loan extensions,

as well as personalized counseling from the group on strategies to build the necessary

resources to repay.

True loan defaults were reported as rare to non-existent. When asked about a hypothetical case

of full-on default, in which a member simply could not pay back the loan, a FARE VSLA member

in Kampala explained, “If it happens, we start with savings in the group. If there is balance after

that, we share the loss [distributed among the members]. We don’t harass anyone, but they

don’t continue in the group.” A member from another group explained, “When your child falls

sick, it can happen. The group gives more time but the group adds penalties… We go visit the

person because we are like a family and work out a plan to pay it back.”


Perceptions and use of welfare fund

All groups interviewed had a welfare fund, which was designated for emergency borrowing

needs, usually to be paid back in a short period of time at no interest. Emergencies were

defined variably with regard to school fees. Some groups considered these expenses eligible for

borrowing against the welfare fund, and others did not. ESFAM’s ES Specialist hypothesized

this had to do with whether the group considered education to be an investment, suggesting that

less vulnerable struggling 2 groups would view education this way and require members to

borrow from the loan fund, while destitute groups might consider school fees an emergency

expense.

Welfare loan amounts were small, usually with a limit of 20,000 UGX ($5.60), and participants

universally reported they were able to pay back the loans. According to the group constitutions,

participants were required to contribute 200-500 UGX into the fund on a weekly basis. Most of

the groups interviewed were positive about the utility of the fund, but one group in Kamuli

reported that the fund was not always available to participants when they needed it because it

was easily depleted.

No respondents reported any conflict around decision-making related to the welfare fund. Group

members reported deciding together whether to grant a request for welfare funds, and negligible

disagreement was reported. There were also no reports of failure to repay the loans. Like the

loan issue, the investigation included a significant amount of probing on repayment, centered on

a similar question: if a member lacked 20,000 UGX in a moment of need, and intended to use

that money in a non-productive way, how would that person have the money to pay back in full

two weeks later? The responses received were not entirely clear, but the general consensus

seemed to be that it was not a lot of money, so people always found some way to pay it back.

Security

Groups followed a standard procedure of securing their cash boxes with three padlocks held by

three individual group members. Security was not emphasized as an important issue among

ESFAM groups, but came up recurrently for FARE. For FARE, where many groups were located

in busy urban slums, security was seen as a pressing concern. No reports of theft were made,

but groups felt insecure about their boxes and shared their anxiety with FARE staff. Staff shared

that the groups were urgently in need of bank linkages so they would not have to worry about

secure storage of cash.

Group dynamics

Groups interviewed shared a strong sense of social cohesion and reported no instances of

conflict. Social support was often described as a key advantage of group membership, and over

and over, groups described relationships between members as “like family.” Social support

emerged as an especially important function of the groups for poorer members, such as

ESFAM’s destitute groups. Very poor members described experiencing isolation and social

marginalization prior to joining the groups. The leader of a VSLA in Luwero described such

households as having lost hope, and seeing themselves as “dying,” but that group membership


renewed their hope. A widow in a Gulu group explained that she used to feel despised and

isolated, but since joining the group, she feels empowered and has increased her self-esteem.

In addition to their financial function, groups were seen as a platform for the exchange of ideas

and a place where members could help each other with their problems. Some groups described

members making interest-free loans to one another outside of the group. Although one male

VSLA leader saw the discussion of personal problems in the group setting as a distraction

created by female members, all other staff and participants interviewed were positive about this

aspect of the groups. Social support also came with positive effects on regular, disciplined

savings habits. As one FARE participant explained, “Everybody pushes the group to save. It

unites us.”

There was no evidence of discrimination within the groups based on participant status,

vulnerability status, or receipt of cash transfers. When asked about this, groups were adamant

that all participants were treated equally, and staff confirmed this. As one member in Wakiso

explained, “What combines us is our constitution. We all have to sign it… We were all equal.

From there we became family.”

Generally, the difference between direct and indirect beneficiary members of the VSLAs was

seen as small, though the report will delve more deeply into this issue in the next section.

Community perception of groups

Community members were described as “admiring” the VSLA groups and interested in joining.

A Luwero member described the ESFAM VSLAs as developing a reputation for quality that

other savings groups in the community lacked. Participants described relationships with the

larger community as either remaining the same or improving, with one Gulu group describing

how training from ESFAM has helped members become friendlier and more open with

community members. Group leaders reported feeling a greater sense of respect in the

community. A leader in Kamuli shared that since joining the group, he felt that he was more

recognized in his community. A Luwero leader reported that her leadership position gave her

the confidence to run for a local government position.

FARE fostered goodwill in the larger community by opening up supplemental trainings delivered

through groups to outside community members. A Wakiso group member described the group’s

remarkable influence on the community at large: “It has changed the community. Even the

criminals have changed. Some joined the VSLAs… but some people joined with bad intentions.

Intentions to swindle the group. But after the training, they see the value and it has changed

them. It’s like they are reintegrated from outcasts, back into the community.”

Government perception of groups

Local government representatives interviewed were unanimous in their positive views of the

VSLAs, and many were involved in the groups from the beginning. Local leaders known as LC1

chairs were engaged in the mobilization process for both ESFAM and FARE. For ESFAM,

CDOs were involved in monitoring, selecting field staff, and even facilitating training. For FARE,


CDOs participated in community dialogues where FARE introduced VSLAs and sometimes

provided monitoring support LC1 chairs were reported to help resolve household disputes for

participants, and were often members of the groups themselves.

Local government was also actively involved in helping the groups become registered as

community-based organizations (CBOs) at the ward or subcounty level. Registration required

groups to have a minimum size of 10-15, a constitution, letter of recommendation from a Local

Council member, and to pay a fee of 70,000 UGX (around $20). Registration was valued by

groups because it allowed them to be recognized as an official entity and targeted for

government programs and made them eligible for government grants. One group in Luwero

reported already seeing the benefits of registration through contact with Uganda’s national

extension service agency, the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). This was a

breakthrough for some participants, many of whom had never received extension services

before. One group member reported that connection to government services was a major

motivation for him to join the VSLA.

Despite the overall support of government representatives for the VSLA interventions, some

problems were reported. ESFAM staff reported contending with government officials’ demands

for payment for their assistance. Although ESFAM covered transport costs related to project

activities, they did not provide additional funding, which some other NGOs were said to offer in

similar circumstances. Although government officials should be assisting with these types of

activities as part of their job, expectations for additional payment created some tensions with

ESFAM. For FARE, working with local government was much easier in Wakiso than Kampala.

Despite sustained efforts to work with local government officials, Retrak found Kampala officials

to be overextended and too busy to provide regular attention and support to the program.

Spin-off groups

FARE and ESFAM VSLAs frequently inspired community members to form their own groups,

though the general consensus from participants and staff was that these groups did not get

adequate training or monitoring to function at a high level of quality. In Kamuli, one such “spin-

off” group held meetings at the same time and location as an ESFAM group, with the hope of

getting some training. FARE reported providing training to spin-off groups on an ad hoc basis

based on staff availability. Generally, FARE and ESFAM groups were seen as a good example

for the spin-off groups, with one Wakiso staff member reporting that good practices from FARE

were spreading in the community.

Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries: Interactions and Comparative

Performance

One of the central topics this investigation aimed to explore were the dynamics of SGs

composed of vulnerable target populations participating in ESFAM and FARE, mixed with

outside community members. How would differences in vulnerability of these two

subpopulations affect the functionality of the groups? Did less vulnerable members feel


resentment over obligations to accommodate rules and decisions to the needs of more

vulnerable members of the group? Did power dynamics marginalize more vulnerable members?

And how did this mix affect group performance?

The testimony provided by the beneficiaries and staff on these issues was clear and

unambiguous: intra-group relations were reported as harmonious across the board. Most

respondents explained that tensions were minimal because there was not much of a difference

between direct and indirect beneficiaries in the first place. Some respondents considered the

distinction between directs and indirects as nearly arbitrary. In other cases, members did

concede that some direct beneficiaries within their groups were obviously more needy and

vulnerable than others. In those cases, the doctrine of the groups operating “like families”

seemed to be at play. The groups reported offering both social and material support to their

most vulnerable members, rather than resenting or ostracizing them. These gestures ranged

from counseling vulnerable women on how to deal with abusive husbands, to food gifts, to

extensions on loan repayment. There was only one instance reported of less-vulnerable

members trying to exert dominance, which was reported in Wakiso, but this was addressed and

resolved with the support of a CBT.

However, direct beneficiaries were specifically targeted for their relative vulnerability in their

communities and, to some extent, might be expected to perform savings and loan activities

differently than indirect beneficiaries. The investigation used existing M&E data from both

projects to explore this difference. However, since ESFAM and FARE each developed their own

M&E systems, the types of analyses we could undertake were not comparable in many ways.

ESFAM provided M&E data for all of its groups, numbering 26 in total. The data covered the

period from the initiation of the groups (on a rolling basis starting in late 2016) through

September 2017, which included the first cycle and the start of the second cycle for some

groups. As Table 9 shows, there was relative parity between the direct and indirect populations,

with the direct beneficiaries slightly more active in terms of savings and borrowing.

Table 9. ESFAM Savings and Loan Activity by Beneficiary Status (as of September 2017)

Total Saved 38,727,451 UGX ($10,601)

Percentage Saved by Direct Beneficiaries 53%

Percentage Saved by Indirect Beneficiaries 47%

Total Value of Loan Issued 33,424.950 UGX ($9,150)

Percentage of Loans to Direct Beneficiaries 52%

Percentage of Loan to Indirect Beneficiaries 48%

Although the totals were close, there were major variations between sites, between indirect and

direct beneficiaries, and between direct beneficiaries classified at different levels of vulnerability

(see Table 10). Savings rates appeared stronger for direct than indirect beneficiary households


in Luwero and Gulu for struggling 2 households, and about the same as indirect beneficiaries in

Kamuli. For destitute households, savings rates were almost the same between direct and

indirect beneficiary households in Kamuli and Gulu, but destitute direct beneficiaries only saved

about 80% of what indirect beneficiaries saved in Luwero.

Borrowing rates show greater divergence. In Luwero, struggling 2 program participants

borrowed nearly twice as much as indirect beneficiaries, but destitute directs only borrowed

about 60% of what indirects borrowed. In Kamuli, destitute directs and indirects borrowed at

about the same rate, but struggling 2 directs borrowed about 60% of what indirects borrowed. In

Gulu, borrowing was much stronger among struggling 2 direct beneficiaries and indirect, but

slightly weaker for destitute direct than indirect beneficiaries. This suggests that highly-

contextual factors were affecting savings and borrowing rates in these sites more strongly than

participants’ vulnerability classification. The table below describes how saving and borrowing

rates varied by vulnerability level, beneficiary type, and district. It also shows the ratio of saving

and borrowing activity of direct compared to indirect beneficiaries per person. For example, if

the average direct beneficiary borrowed at the same amount as the average indirect, the ratio

would be 1.0. If they borrowed half as much per person, the ratio would be 0.5, and if they

borrowed twice as much, the ratio would be 2.0.

Table 10. Savings and Borrowing Rates for Indirect and Direct ESFAM Beneficiaries, by

Region (in UGX, as of September 2017)

Struggling 2

Destitute

Luwero

Savings Loans Total Participants

Savings Loans Total

Participants

Direct 1,835,000 775,000 12 2,646,000 1,835,000 85

Indirect 6,089,000 2,910,000 87 2,910,000 2,660,000 74

Ratio 2.18 1.93 0.14 0.79 0.60 1.15

Kamuli


Savings Loans Total

Participants

Direct 1,170,000 801,900 18 7,380,000 7,311,400 100

Indirect 2,21 0,000

2,578,100 34 3,695,200 3,762,800 50

Ratio 1.05 0.59 0.53 1.0 0.97 2.0

Gulu


Savings Loans Total

Participants

Direct 1,701,500 1,649,500 42 5,675,000 5,155,000 130

Indirect 1,005,500 1,385,000 60 2,517,700 2,600,000 57

Ratio 2.42 1.70 0.70 0.99 0.87 2.28

When aggregating only in terms of ESFAM’s vulnerability levels, we see other interesting


patterns emerge (see Figure 1). We compared struggling 2 and destitute beneficiaries, and

found that, unsurprisingly, struggling 2 households saved about 50% more than destitute

households, suggesting that ESFAM’s household classification was able to distinguish between

beneficiaries based on poverty level. However, destitute and struggling 2 households performed

very similarly in terms of borrowing rates, suggesting that, relative to their savings, destitute

households were more zealous borrowers than struggling 2 households. This is supported by

claims during interviews with ESFAM staff that destitute households were overall more

enthusiastic SG members, even if they were poorer than struggling 2 households.

Figure 1. Average Savings and Loan Amounts for ESFAM Direct Beneficiaries, by Vulnerability

Level (in UGX)

The results from the FARE analysis were somewhat different overall. Their complete data set

covered 29 VSLAS. The volume of saving and borrowing was higher overall than ESFAM,

though the period of available data was longer (though December 2017). More importantly, it

hints at some degree of an emerging, inverse pattern, compared to ESFAM. As Table 11

shows, indirects eclipsed directs in the borrowing and savings domains.

Table 11. FARE Savings and Loan Activity by Beneficiary Status (as of December 2017)

Total Saved 114,642,099 UGX ($31, 383)

Percentage Saved by Direct Beneficiaries 35.3%

Percentage Saved by Indirect Beneficiaries 64.7%

Total Value of Loan Issued 158,514,629 UGX ($43,393)

Savings Borrowing

S2 65,368 44,811

Destitute 49,844 45,401

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

S2 Destitute


Percentage of Loans to Direct Beneficiaries 37.7%

Percentage of Loan to Indirect Beneficiaries 62.3%

Most of this divergence can be pegged to the imbalance in FARE group membership (i.e. more

indirect than direct group members). And in fact, a closer look at the ratios of saving and loan

activities between direct and indirect beneficiaries per capita shows approximate parity in

borrowing for Retrak and FCF VSLA members. Direct beneficiaries were not far behind in

savings for these implementers. For COWA, savings and loan activities for each direct

beneficiary was about 80% of that of each indirect beneficiary. Clearly, this was not a major

issue at the time of the investigation, but it is something that FARE was advised to watch over

time to ensure that the gaps did not widen.

Table 12. Savings and Borrowing Rates for Indirect and Direct FARE Beneficiaries (in

UGX, as of December 2017)

Retrak

Savings Loans Total

Participants

Direct 16,653,000 27,034,500 135

Indirect 32,565,000 42,268,900 212

Ratio 0.80 1.00

COWA

Savings Loans Total

Participants

Direct 14,285,000 14,949,000 94

Indirect 17,580,000 17,320,000 89

Ratio 0.77 0.82

FCF

Savings Loans Total

Participants

Direct 9,782,000 17,850,000 61

Indirect 24,610,000 38,884,000 135

Ratio 0.88 1.02

In a more speculative vein, if the imbalance were to emerge as more significant over time, the

net effect could be positive or negative for the target population/direct beneficiaries. On the

positive side, the infusion of cash deposits from more relatively affluent indirects could translate

into a deeper loan fund and more profit from loan interest benefitting all members at shareout,

both direct and indirect. On the negative side, there is potential (and documented cases in other

SG programs) for more affluent SG members to evolve into a domineering force within the

group—using their larger deposits as a basis for control over group management and direction,

and making maximum deposits specifically for the purpose of claiming a disproportionate share

of the group profits at shareout. If true, this could be an example of the “elite capture”

phenomenon documented in SG programs elsewhere (Allen & Panetta, 2010).


Again, it is important to emphasize that nothing in the direct testimony from program participants

or staff hinted at these negative outcomes, which seems to weaken the likelihood that they

occurred or will occur over time. But it is a matter worthy of further investigation as groups

become independent from ESFAM and FARE support.

Comparative Performance by Project and Among Ugandan SG Programs

Savings and borrowing rates varied strongly between projects and by beneficiary status. As

described in the figure below, ESFAM participants (both direct and indirect beneficiaries) saved

and borrowed two to three times less than FARE participants. A possible explanation for this

variation is the rural/urban divide separating the two projects, with rural ESFAM participants

simply having less access to cash and business opportunities than urban FARE participants.

Figure 2. Average Savings and Loan Amounts for Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries, by Project (in

UGX)

To better understand how ESFAM and FARE groups compared to other SGs in Uganda, we

compared ESFAM and FARE’s average savings and loan activity per person for direct

beneficiaries to Ugandan VSLA averages at large, as recorded in Savix, an online SG database,

0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000

Average savings by direct beneficiaries

Average savings by indirect beneficiaries

Average borrowing by direct beneficiaries

Average borrowing by indirect beneficiaries

Average savings bydirect beneficiaries

Average savings byindirect beneficiaries

Average borrowing bydirect beneficiaries

Average borrowing byindirect beneficiaries

Total Average 87,076 116,333 110,201 142,784

ESFAM 49,533 50,486 42,543 43,553

FARE 140,414 171,456 206,322 225,855

Total Average ESFAM FARE


for the first quarter of 2018. These data are not directly comparable, since the Savix figures

express annualized average savings per person, and the ESFAM and FARE data express

average cumulative savings per person for groups that started at various times, some longer

and some shorter than one year, through September 2017. Similarly, the Savix data expresses

average outstanding loans per person, where the Family Care data expresses total average

borrowing per person. Despite imperfect comparability, this comparison tells us that ESFAM

groups were borrowing much less than average Ugandan SGs, especially when considering

that the ESFAM figures cover the full amount of loans, including those that have been paid

back, and the Savix figures only cover outstanding loans (which is to say, opening balance

minus any deposits). FARE groups were borrowing more than average Ugandan groups, which

may have to do with FARE’s urban context, where cash is more available and widely used than

in rural settings. However, the Savix figures were higher for annualized savings rates per person

than the average savings rates for both ESFAM and FARE. This is to be expected, since many

ESFAM and FARE groups were younger than a year, but the discrepancy is large enough to

suggest that at least ESFAM groups were saving less on average than other groups in Uganda.

Figure 3. Comparing Average Savings and Loan Amounts per Person, ESFAM, FARE,

and Uganda (in UGX)

Again, these comparisons are exploratory only, due to the lack of data comparability on multiple

levels. But the findings suggest that ESFAM’s, and likely FARE’s, SGs contained members who

were significantly poorer than average Ugandan SG members. Yet clearly, the VSLA

methodology worked for most of them, with only a handful of adjustments such as low minimum

- 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000

Average savings per person

Average loan amount per person

Average savings per person Average loan amount per person

FARE 158,464 218,411

ESFAM 49,789 42,852

Savix 231,012 139,392

FARE ESFAM Savix


deposits.

Effects of SG Membership

Overall basic needs

Enabling participants to meet basic needs is meant to be a central function of VSLAs for

ESFAM and FARE. Group members were positive about the effects of the groups, but

ultimately, a significant minority were still struggling to meet basic needs. One Kamuli group

estimated that 10 of their 30 members were unable to meet these needs, with some families still

requiring adequate shelter. However, members had hope that the groups would help them to

eventually be able to meet these needs.

Income

Income was described as changing for many participants due to two mechanisms: business

training improved participants’ skills and outlook on life, and the ability to borrow and apply their

shareouts allowed them to invest in IGAs. However, improvements varied by group. In group

interviews with ESFAM and FARE, the fraction of participants in each FGD (from each

respective SG) who reported improvements in income ranged from 6/16 in Wakiso to 8/8, also

in Wakiso. Testimony from staff also ranged widely on this issue. Some reported transformative

effects on income nearly across the board, while others suggested much more nominal

improvements on average.

Most participants reported operating a business or planning one. Staff and government officials

recognized that participants were starting businesses and improving their ability to plan for the

future. At the time of the interviews, ESFAM’s most recent quarterly report showed that 40% of

destitute VSLA members were investing in IGAs. By the end of December 2017, this increased

to just over 60%.

The value of improved income was articulated in several ways. Members repeatedly cited their

ability to borrow and invest in IGAs or livestock as a key factor. For rural ESFAM households,

borrowing also allowed some participants to rent land and grow their own food, expanding the

money they had available for other expenses. Finally, several participants linked improved

income to a new, stronger work ethic, citing the SG activity and its financial requirements and

payoffs as motivation.

Sources of income depended largely on location, with urban FARE households relying mostly

on vending and rural ESFAM households more likely to engage in agriculture. Participants in

one Gulu group for destitute households especially emphasized investment in diversifying their

businesses. ESFAM staff explained that participants had the opportunity to diversify thanks to a

nearby market. Although some participants without an IGA were able to start a new IGA since

joining SGs, a PSW in Gulu noted it was more common to switch from a less profitable to a

more profitable one. The testimony from FARE participants and staff focused most often on

“topping up” an existing IGA with new capital from a loan or shareout, or restarting an IGA that


had gone dormant due to lack of capital in the past.

Food security

Participants regularly reported improvements in food security since joining a VSLA. Most

participants reported increasing their daily intake from one to two or three meals, which was

confirmed by nearly all staff. When participants were asked about meal intake in group

interviews, however, responses were more ambiguous. Of the four FARE groups interviewed,

the fraction of participants reporting improved food intake ranged from nearly none (3/16) to

about half (7/16 and 5/8) to everyone (8/8). These highly variable results suggest there may be

a significant minority of participants still struggling with food security.

In rural areas supported by ESFAM, VSLAs facilitated participants’ ability to borrow money,

which was used to rent land to grow fruits and vegetables. Some participants elaborated on how

participation in VSLAs helped them improve the quality of their diet. However, these effects

were not seen as permanent. When asked about how they would handle the dry season, one

participant in Kamuli explained that they would not eat twice a day any more, but would “starve

or eat porridge,” even while continuing to save in the group.

Economic shocks

VSLAs seemed to be functioning as a safety net for most participants, but it remained largely

unknown whether the resources were sufficient to help them cope with major shocks. Although

some participants referred to their savings as a resource to help them weather shocks, the utility

of SG savings for offsetting shocks is typically limited by the fact that the money is bound to the

group until the time of shareout. Loans were not seen and apparently not often issued for the

purpose of economic shocks; as noted earlier, most groups reported that loans needed to be

applied for productive purposes, at least in part, in order for the group to approve them.

By far, the most common mechanism reportedly used to help offset economic shocks was the

welfare fund. However, the welfare fund’s utility in this respect can only be seen as limited. The

cap on welfare fund payouts was nearly always 20,000 UGX (less than $6) as an interest-free

loan, not a grant. Groups required that the funds were paid back in full within two weeks in most

cases. Therefore, welfare fund payments were only applicable to certain kinds of short-term,

small-scale economic shocks.

The social cohesion generated by the groups was another sort of safety net for participants,

who reported occasionally borrowing from each other outside of the group. It is difficult to

quantify how significant these informal, intra-group lending practices were in terms of offsetting

shocks.

When asked about lean times ahead, most participants anticipated reducing consumption but

continuing to save and run their businesses, even if they encountered difficulties paying for

school fees. However, one SW in Wakiso reported that most members were “still not prepared

for such experiences.”


Children’s education

School fees was named as one of the main reasons participants borrowed money. Although

some groups timed their shareouts to coincide with the period when school fees were due, most

saw borrowing as the principle mechanism for paying fees. Again, most groups made it clear

that they expected members to pair the school payouts with productive investments—in other

words, part of the loan went to the school, and part became an infusion of business capital in a

microenterprise. In this way, they helped assure that members would be able to pay back such

loans.

The results were visible within the participant population. A Kamuli CDO noted that education

was emphasized in the groups as an important expense, and group members verified that their

children’s performance improved due to better attendance. A strong majority of respondents in

group interviews reported improvements. The only major exception was an FGD in Wakiso —

one of the rare FGDs with a significant number of reintegration cases among the members. With

their relatively high level of economic vulnerability, these members reported few gains in the

areas of education.

Although participants were quick to answer that all of their children were in school, when

investigators probed, it became clear that only primary-aged children were consistently

attending school. Participants reported significant difficulty paying more expensive secondary

school fees.

Shelter

Shelter improvement came out as a common long-term goal for saving. In Kamuli and Gulu,

where many participants lived in huts made from natural materials, participants emphasized

using VSLA savings and loans to repair their homes or to build permanent structures. A number

of participants reported purchasing iron sheets for their roofs, and several Kamuli participants

used the money to build latrines in response to WASH training through the groups. In Kampala,

several homeless FARE participants were able to combine cash transfers and VSLA savings or

loans to rent shelter.

However, permanent upgrades to shelter were elusive for many participants. In one group

interview in Kampala, most participants said they were saving money for shelter improvement,

but saw this as a slow and gradual process, with one participant referring to it as a “dream.”

Another participant saw VSLA as supporting repairs, but not enough to cover a complete

upgrade. In Wakiso, focus group participants did not see the VSLA membership had much of an

effect on their shelter, with only three of the 24 participants reporting that it had. ESFAM’s ES

Specialist also saw shelter as an area where ESFAM had little impact.

Access to health care

The impact of VSLAs on health care was seen mostly as a function of the welfare fund, but they

also supported improved health through social solidarity and supplemental trainings on health

topics. Ultimately, though a majority of participants reported improvements, a significant number


did not.

Illness was named as one of the main reasons why a member would borrow from the welfare

fund. When asked about chronic illnesses, groups intimated this was not something they dealt

with directly, with one ESFAM group reporting that HIV was not a problem in their community.

Another ESFAM group said that if a participant had a chronic disease, they would need to plan

for it and borrow for relevant expenses from the loan fund, rather than the emergency fund. In

Gulu, social solidarity was invoked as a way to cope with HIV. A participant gave an example of

a fellow group-member whose child was too weak to take ARVs and urgently needed food.

Rather than lending through the welfare fund, the group contributed voluntarily to help feed the

child.

In Kamuli, VSLA members were excited to describe improvements in their children’s health,

which they attributed to improved sanitation practices thanks to WASH training provided in the

group. One Gulu VSLA member reported that borrowing from the group allowed her to go to a

local hospital that charged a small fee rather than the free district hospital, which offered lower-

quality services and longer wait times. In Wakiso, a FARE SW saw “definitely improvements” in

VSLA members’ health, although by a count of hands, most group members interviewed did not

see an improvement.

How family members spend time

Participants did not share much about how VSLA participation affected how their family

members spent time. In Gulu, a PSW saw family members as becoming more active in

participants’ IGAs to help them meet their weekly savings requirements. Some participants

mentioned that VSLA participation took time away from their IGAs, particularly in urban areas

where participants sold items in market stalls, but seemed to think it was worth it.

Sense of self

Respondents were consistent and enthusiastic about the effects of VSLA membership on

participant self-esteem. One participant in Kampala explained, “It created a sense of belonging.

It’s like a family.” A CBT elaborated on how much of a change this was from before the VSLA,

explaining that “it has changed their lives. Before this, they felt ready to die.” Groups were

reported as a source of hope for people who had been marginalized and isolated, but now had

friends from similar situations with whom they could share their problems. Self-esteem was also

boosted by the interest of the larger community in the groups.

Family dynamics

VSLA membership was reported to have a positive effect on household relationships through

supplemental trainings, reduced economic strain, and improved economic standing of women in

their households. VSLAs were used as a platform to deliver parenting, child protection, GBV,

and other trainings aimed at improving family dynamics, and participants cited these trainings as

cause for improved harmony in their households. Staff observed that these trainings were

popular and enhanced VSLA attendance. One participant in Gulu confessed he used to get


drunk and perpetrate violence in his own home, but after training, he had abandoned these

practices. Several participants mentioned that, through training, they had learned to make

decisions together with their family members, which also reduced conflict. FARE’s FS TA and

PO also noted how counseling provided during home visits had a reciprocal effect on VSLA

function in teaching households how to connect family objectives to their savings practices,

which resulted in both improved relationships and improved savings.

Several respondents reported that husbands and wives experienced less conflict related to

money because the VSLA eased their financial stress. A Wakiso group discussed how VSLA

membership improved women’s standing in their households by improving their ability to make

financial decisions. Generally, spouses were reported to be supportive of VSLA participation

and men were seen as glad when their wives were able to save, but there were some

cautionary exceptions. One Kampala VSLA leader described conflicts arising because women

kept their participation in the groups secret from their husbands. FARE’s FS TA and PO also

saw occasional, but rare, conflicts arise with the increased financial clout of female participants.

In some cases, these tensions reduced over time as husbands gained respect for the group and

saw its benefits.

Future outlook

In interviews, participants demonstrated their ability to plan for the future, and they were

enthusiastic to describe how they would spend their shareout money. A number of participants

indicated that, before they joined the SGs, they simply never had a coherent plan for the future

at all.

One Kamuli participant described how he and the other members of the group used to see

themselves as “just destitute,” but now they had the ability to plan a business. Another member

described how she now spent evenings sitting down with her children and coming up with plans

for the future. Overall, staff and participants described how groups fostered a sense of hope that

the future would be better. Participants also learned to aim higher over time: one respondent

explained that now that she had met her goal of rearing goats, her next goal would be to raise

cows. As one respondent in Kampala explained, “We all came in to deal with just one aspect of

our lives, like our business. But over time our goals have broadened and we seek improvement

in all areas of our lives.”

Advantages and Disadvantages of Group Membership

The groups were asked open-endedly what they felt to be the biggest advantages and

disadvantages of group membership, in their own words. The main advantages of membership

cited were: social support and a sense of belonging, supplemental trainings, and improved

economic wellbeing. Group members see one another as a “family” that provides support

related to both economic decision-making and personal problem-solving. Terms like “friendship”

and “unity” were often mentioned as key advantages to group membership.

Participants also repeatedly mentioned the value of parenting training in improving their


relationships with their children and preventing separation. They described improved

communication and harmony within their households, and expressed eagerness for more

training on social topics. Other advantages mentioned were the economic skills participants

gained from the groups and how these skills improved their lives. The SW in Kamuli described

participants as “so proud” of their ability to distinguish between wants and needs. Wakiso

participants described their ability to pay school fees, add capital to their businesses, and

overall improve the quality of their lives. They described how they “learned to work hard, but not

under pressure” and a new ability to plan for their future. Again, several participants expressed

commitment to a “savings culture” as a valued outcome of participating in the groups.

Finally, participants cited the ultimate outcomes of VSLA membership as advantages. Members

of the Kamuli reintegrating group described how the group helped them support children after

reunifying with them, and another Kamuli group described improved ability to care for their

children, including covering their educational expenses. We note that this investigation

recognizes reintegration/prevention of separation as longitudinal outcomes—i.e., what matters

most is whether the effect or the change is sustained—and as such we cannot offer any

definitive views based on current testimony.

The only disadvantage to group membership cited was that it reduced participants’ time to

spend working their market stalls in urban and semi-urban locations. However, some challenges

and barriers to group membership emerged from interviews. One of the groups that had the

greatest challenges to overcome was a group in Kamuli which consisted of reintegrated

households and included nine ESFAM participants. Because they formed a group based on

their reintegrating status, the households were spread far apart and participants had to travel

long distances for group meetings. Participants described traveling one to two and a half hours

for each meeting. One of the investigators interviewed a participant at her home immediately

before a meeting and drove 23km with staff over rough roads to reach the meeting site. Though

the participant would have taken a shorter route using a bicycle, staff estimated that it was still

at least a 15km ride. Participants described how bad weather could add even more time and

difficulty to the trip, and that they would have to pay fines to the group for showing up late.

Nonetheless, group members met regularly with fairly consistent attendance.

Other Group Functionality and Performance Issues

Rules and decisions to accommodate vulnerable members

Beyond modified mobilization methods, rules for both FARE and ESFAM VSLAs adhered to the

standard VSLA model. Trainers encouraged egalitarian treatment within the groups, though at

least one case was reported in Wakiso where a CBT had to step in to ensure that less-

vulnerable members did not take control of the group (the afore-mentioned “elite capture”).

Trainers also generally encouraged lower interest rates (5-10%) to ensure that vulnerable

members were able to make their payments, although one group in Wakiso opted for a 20%

interest rate. Investigators noted a fairly lax attendance policy in one of the Wakiso groups (see

additional discussion below), where absentee participants were given a few chances to improve


their attendance before being penalized with fees.

Attendance and regularity of deposits

In interviews and FGDs, participants characterized attendance and absenteeism as minor

issues. The general consensus was that attendance at group meetings was quite high, and

deposits were rarely missed.

The investigators explored the issue further by examining the paper ledgers kept by certain

groups. The most intensive analysis took place on a single ledger for a single FARE group in

Wakiso, and revealed some unexpected results. The ledger indicated that over a period of 21

weeks in the group’s first cycle, the absentee rate was 46 percent. Over a period of 11 weeks in

the second cycle, the absentee rate was 36 percent.

These findings led investigators to take a closer look at whether the absenteeism correlated with

high rates of missed deposits and welfare fund contributions. From the FARE ledger,

investigators found that the rates were not as high as the absenteeism, meaning at least some

of the time, members made their deposits despite missing the meeting—for example, by having

a friend bring in the money. But the missed deposits were still considerable: 20% of savings

deposits and 24% of the welfare fund deposits missed in the first cycle, with those numbers at

16% and 19% in the second cycle.

There are several possible explanations for these trends. On the one hand, they might suggest

that the group adapted its methodologies to reflect a greater need for flexibility to accommodate

the financial ups and downs of its vulnerable membership. Members might simply have

tolerated more lapses in attendance and payments because they knew the daily struggles their

members faced. In the other hand, the ledger findings seemed to contradict what members

themselves told us, which was that attendance was high and missed payments were few. The

findings also contradict some of the rules in this group’s written constitution—for example, that

all missed welfare payments needed to be made up, which clearly was not happening according

to the ledger.

We attempted to corroborate these trends with the M&E data provided by the project for this

group, but the results were limited because the M&E system did not track attendance or welfare

fund contributions. The system did track savings deposits, but on a monthly basis only, rather

than the weekly basis of the registers, which made direct comparison impossible.

This line of analysis was not formally planned from the start, and these findings did not come to

light until after interviews were more or less complete. Therefore, we had little opportunity to

follow up by examining the ledgers of other FARE groups and speaking with the group members

directly about what we had found. We were able to review the ledgers of some of the ESFAM

groups, but that project’s M&E system did not include any comparable individual-level data on

savings or welfare deposits. A review of partial (not full-cycle) attendance records for six

ESFAM groups found absentee rates that ranged from 15% to 46%, with an average of 23%.

According to Savix data from the first quarter of 2018, the average absentee rate for Ugandan


SGs is lower, at around 15% (VSL Associates, 2018).

Findings from the FARE ledger are concerning, as absenteeism and missed deposits can

threaten the integrity of the group. For example, the welfare fund is meant as an emergency

resource for all; if some members make payments diligently, while other miss multiple

payments, does the resource remain open to all? Will conflict arise around this, and how will it

be resolved? At the same time, such practices may simply be adaptations to accommodate

vulnerable members. To better monitor for such practices, practitioners should consider

collecting regular monitoring data on absenteeism and welfare fund deposits.

Dropouts

All groups reported very low levels of dropout during the savings cycle. A handful of cases were

reported due to participants migrating away from the area, particularly in urban areas. A very

small minority of members were asked to leave by groups when they failed to adhere to the

groups’ constitutions in terms of savings and borrowing rules. (In all such cases, the members

were given multiple chances to “turn things around” before the group asked them to leave.) The

M&E data provided by the projects confirms this low level of dropout within the savings cycle.

Among the groups that had already begun a second savings cycle, most or all experienced

some shuffling of membership. That is to say, some members elected not to continue after the

first shareout, and their spots in the group were assumed by other community members who

had become interested in the group while observing the first cycle. One group in urban Kampala

reported that seven of its 30 members chose not to continue, but their spots were quickly filled

by seven others from the community. A group in peri-urban Wakiso reported similar results with

three of 19 members after the first cycle. FARE reported similar levels of attrition between direct

and indirect beneficiaries. Generally, SG practitioners view limited between-cycle turnover such

as this as natural and not detrimental to group functioning.

Sustainability

Both FARE and ESFAM planned to phase out of their direct involvement with the SGs before

mid-2018. As such, the respondents were asked whether they would be ready to carry on their

VSLAs autonomously by that time. The responses were mixed. Some indicated they were

already knowable to do so; others expressed considerable doubt that they could carry on

without partner staff. The biggest challenge cited once again was record-keeping.

Both FARE and ESFAM were aware of these looming challenges and formulated plans for

community volunteers or local leaders to provide support after close-out. FARE’s plan was to

train local volunteers to replace them as group assistants and facilitators. These plans were still

in an early stage; the terms “Village Leaders” and “Community Support Teams” were used

variously as ways to describe the new position and function. The idea was that these individuals

would provide key support to the existing groups (in areas such as record-keeping) and perhaps

initiate new groups as well, depending on demand. ESFAM also trained community volunteers

with the intention that they carry on working with groups after the project ends. ESFAM staff


also noted that project gains would be sustained by continued support from local government

officials, many of whom were involved in training the groups or participated as members

themselves.

Group registration as CBOs was also part of the discussion on sustainability. A number of FARE

and ESFAM groups had already completed this process, though it was reported to be a more

difficult and bureaucratic for groups in Kampala. Beyond the symbolic boost to sustainability of

being an “official and recognized” CBO, the attainment of registration might also bring a

considerable material boost to the SGs. For example, in Wakiso, CBO status opens access to a

regional government program called the “Livelihoods Program” that gives grants to CBOs. The

grants are competitive but when successful they bring funds in the range of 2,000,000 UGX

(around $550). This level of funding would be huge windfall that could help sustain the winning

groups for years, perhaps as a supplement to the group’s existing loan fund. The local

government official interviewed on this topic indicated that she knew the FARE groups well and

would look favorably upon them in such a competition.

Discussion

Our investigation suggests that the ESFAM and FARE VSLA interventions functioned much like

“mainstream” (non-targeted) SG programs. The programs worked in the sense that the

participants enthusiastically embraced the model. We saw indications of positive behavioral

change—a new culture of savings that did not exist before and appeared to be more than just

lip-service. We also saw considerable evidence of improved female empowerment, and at least

some impacts on GBV. We saw very substantive effects of social networks. The idea that these

groups had become “like family” seemed very real, even in cases in which the members came

from heterogenous backgrounds and may not have known each other previously. Clearly these

“families” became sources of emotional and material support to the benefit of most members.

And finally, we saw at least some indications of direct material benefit from the SG activity itself.

Like other studies, the findings here suggest that change is not universal and tends to be small

and incremental—small increases in income after infusing cash into enterprises, fewer missed

meals, perhaps more kids in school. These changes may not be transforming lives, but the

arrow points in a positive direction.

Our findings also have implications for SGs specifically in the context of prevention of

separation/reintegration. As noted above, there were no major adaptations of the VSLA

methodology to reflect the needs of the vulnerable target population. However, some changes

were made and/or accepted, in both deliberate and organic ways. For example, the targeting

strategies of the programs ensured a mix of direct and indirect beneficiaries in all groups, and

this approach seemed to produce nothing but positivity and good-will among the participants on

both sides. In addition, the constitutions generally set forth less stringent requirement in terms of

minimum deposits and interest rates, compared to other mainstream SG programs, a point that

seems supported by the comparisons with the Savix data. These were further steps toward


inclusiveness for the direct beneficiaries. In sum, despite warnings from the literature, the mix of

participants and outside community members in groups was not a source of tension. Groups

were emphatic that they treated all members equally, and there was no evidence of

discrimination.

Two issues raised earlier in the paper may be indications of further twists on these questions.

The relatively small but noticeable imbalance of indirect and direct financial activity among the

FARE groups might raise concerns about a gradual movement toward “elite capture.” But it

may just as readily emerge as a de facto way to make more money available to directs, either in

the form of a beefed-up loan fund or more interest paid at shareout, driven by the heavier loan

activity of the indirects. Similarly, the lax attendance and deposit records noted in the Wakiso

group might be sloppy enforcement of rules, or it might be a way to offer the more vulnerable

members a break when they need it, without facing penalties.

It is safe to say that SGs generally yield at least some positive effects for their members—

whether behavioral, social, or material—no matter what their socio-economic starting point. But

it is clear that the VSLA model is not meeting the needs of everyone. We note that the

intervention largely fell short when it came reintegration cases. Neither organization managed to

enroll more than a handful of reintegration households in SGs. ESFAM was somewhat more

successful, but not by much. The most common reason cited for these difficulties was the

geographic scattering of the households. It was difficult and costly in terms of time and effort for

these households to meet on a regular basis, leading several staff members to suggest that

VSLAs are simply not an appropriate intervention for this population. Investigators looked at two

reintegration groups, and though one group was enthusiastic about meeting and laudably

overcame tremendous obstacles to fulfill their commitment to savings, the second group

reported less impact and displayed less enthusiasm for the intervention than any other group

interviewed. Clearly, it can be very challenging to effectively mobilize VSLAs for this population,

though it can work for a minority of cases.

Destitute groups, on the other hand, seemed to work well, at least in the case of ESFAM, which

disaggregated its groups in this way. Their savings rates were low, by most measures, but they

demonstrated much greater enthusiasm than struggling 2 households for the VSLA intervention,

which is reflected in high levels of participation. The fact that the destitute households were

receiving cash transfers may have heightened the commitment to save, compared with the

struggling 2 households. Another potential explanation is the social impact of bringing

marginalized people together and providing social support. Many SG practitioners continue to

theorize that the social solidarity effects of SGs are at least as important as the formal financial

activity in all kinds of SG programs, and that appears to be in alignment with our findings.

As with other mainstream SGs, the ESFAM and FARE groups highlighted some important

gender issues that future programs should address. Though women were by far the majority of

VSLA members, men were found to disproportionately occupy positions of leadership. While

most participants reported positive effects on women’s economic status and decision-making


power in the household were reported, a few cases were reported where husbands disapproved

of their wives’ participation and physically harmed them. Programs should take the potential to

do harm seriously and work to prevent this. Some practical steps include promoting clear

communication within households about SG participation, stronger efforts at male engagement

and sensitization on SGs, and providing GBV training to participant families and the broader

community.

Finally, it should be noted that VSLAs were just one intervention in a package of interventions

offered by ESFAM and FARE, and that these interventions intersected and reinforced each

other in positive ways. VSLAs were an important platform for supplemental trainings on social

topics, and home visits were used to reinforce financial literacy and ES messaging, including

encouragement to participate in VSLAs. Overall, this integrated approach seemed to strengthen

VSLA participation and helped facilitate the emergence of a “savings culture,” while

simultaneously using VSLAs to address the many other drivers of family separation.

Recommendations and Practical Suggestions

Sustainability remains of paramount performance for an SG program. One of the reasons the

concept has remained so appealing to practitioners around the world is that the programs

can/should be self-sustaining long after direct involvement of NGO/CBO ends.

In this case, we have two very promising avenues. Both FARE and ESFAM made efforts to train

community volunteers to carry on group support after their programs close. When mentioned to

the SG participants, the response was enthusiastic and suggested that finding such volunteers

would not be difficult. We recommended both programs make these initiatives a top priority in

the project’s final months. Similarly, we recommended the projects do everything they can to

assist groups in registering as CBOs. Successful registration would provide a symbolic and

potentially material boost to the groups that should have a major positive effect on sustainability.

We also strongly recommended that the programs look into several of the issues that came to

light in this investigation, at least informally or anecdotally. The attendance and regularity of

deposits are important issues to understand more fully. The extent of the patterns and their

implications remain unknown. These may be major problems that threaten the basic

functionality and fabric of these groups, or, conversely, they may be a necessary and important

concession that favors our target population. It would be gainful to know one way or the other,

for future reference. Similarly, the disparities in financial activity between directs and indirects

raise far more questions than answers. Why the extreme variation seen among the ESFAM

groups/sites, and was the imbalance on FARE side growing or affecting group dynamics in any

way?

A full understanding of both of these issues, as well as many other aspects of group

performance, was limited by data available from the M&E systems used in the two programs.

For any future programming, we strongly suggest a different approach to M&E. The two

programs used highly individualized M&E systems, which made comparative investigations


such as ours nearly impossible on many issues. Each system captured some useful data but

omitted others. The FARE system, for example, captured highly-detailed individual-level savings

and loan activity, which was useful, but omitted attendance data, so there was no way to

compare what we observed in their ledgers. ESFAM’s system captured a wider range of data

points, but inexplicably offered no way to disaggregate direct and indirect financial activity (our

findings in that area came only from review of paper ledgers).

We recommend a standardized approach to M&E for any related programming going forward.

The Savix system4 is a global standard for SG-related M&E. The platform offers a wide variety

of tools and guidance that lays out the essential for the most relevant and important data for any

SG program to capture. Moreover, the tools can be customized into more or less elaborate

templates, depending on project needs, while offering ways to insert unique new variables to

reflect particular project interests. The data generated will remain highly comparable to any

sister programs using Savix as well as SG programs around the world.

Future programming should consider gender issues: both the potential for the program to do

harm, and the potential to reinforce existing gender disparities through disproportionate male

representation in leadership positions. As mentioned in the discussion, these issues can be

addressed through stronger efforts at male engagement and sensitization on SGs, and

providing GBV training to participant families and the broader community.

Finally, there were two issues raised in the course of the interviews that we recommended the

two programs not pursue as the programs began to wind down: linkage for bank account group

savings and organization of collective group business ventures. Both practices are seen in

certain SG programs around the world. But the considerations for both can be extremely

complicated, and the results around the world have been mixed. We suggested that these

issues were too consuming to introduce near the end of the projects. If individual groups want to

pursue them on their own, they are free to do so.

Limitations

This assessment used an exploratory, qualitative approach to examine staff and beneficiary

perspectives on the effectiveness of design and implementation features of the VSLA

component of the ESFAM and FARE programs. It was not an impact evaluation and we cannot

claim to prove causality between intervention activities and beneficiary outcomes. Additionally,

ESFAM and FARE were distinct projects operating in different project contexts with different

beneficiary populations, and this assessment was not designed to collect directly comparable

data between the two projects. Although we identified some similar themes in the data, any

direct comparisons made between the projects were limited by these differences.

4 See thesavix.org


Conclusion

VSLAs appear to be a promising addition to a package of interventions to help prevent

unnecessary family separation. Some reintegrating households also reported positive effects

from participating in them. However, VSLAs do not appear to be an efficient or effective

intervention for projects to set up specifically for reintegrating families in most cases because

these families may be too geographically dispersed to meet on a regular basis. As an example

of an SG intervention for vulnerable populations, the FARE and ESFAM groups demonstrated

that the target populations and non-targeted community members were able to form successful

groups with minimal tension and similar levels of savings and loan performance within each

project. They also demonstrated that groups made up of very vulnerable people, such as

ESFAM’s destitute groups, can save and borrow regularly and in increasing amounts over time.

The enthusiasm of these groups also demonstrates the potential danger in segregating groups

by vulnerability classification and offering a subsidy to participants at one classification but not

another, which resulted in very weak participation among struggling 2 participants. Overall,

VSLAs generated positive economic outcomes of an incremental nature as well as potentially

transformative improvements in social support that emerged from the intervention.


References

Allen, H., & Panetta, D. (2010). Savings Groups: What Are They? Retrieved from Washington, DC: https://www.mangotree.org/files/galleries/PANETTA_D_SEEP_Savings-Groups-What-Are-They.pdf

Allen, H., & Staehle, M. (2007). Programme Guide Field Operations Manual Version 3.1. Retrieved from http://www.seepnetwork.org/filebin/pdf/savings_led_working_group/library/VSLA_Programme_Guide_Field_Operations_Manual_English_version.pdf

Annan, J., Bundervoet, T., Seban, J., & Costigan, J. (2013). A Randomized Impact Evaluation of Village Savings and Loans Associations and Family-Based Interventions in Burundi. Retrieved from https://www.mangotree.org/files/galleries/IRC-Burundi_New-Generation_Final-Evaluation_2013.pdf

Burlando, A., & Canidio, A. (2015). Does group inclusion hurt financial inclusion? Evidence from ultra-poor members of Ugandan savings groups. Retrieved from

Chaffin, J., & Kalyanpur, A. (2014). What do we know about economic strengthening for family reintegration of separated children? Retrieved from https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/images/zdocs/Economic-Strengthening---Family-Reintegration.pdf

Gash, M., & Odell, K. (2013). The Evidence-Based Story of Savings Groups: A Synthesis of Seven Randomized Control Trials. Retrieved from Arlington, VA:

Johnson, S., & Storchi, S. (2013). Savings group outreach and membership. In C. Nelson (Ed.), Savings Groups at the Frontier (pp. 37-63). Bourton on Dunsmore, UK: Practical Action Publishing Ltd.

Meaux, A. (2016). Community-Based Microfinance for Orphans and Vulnerable Children: Literature Review. Retrieved from New York and Washington, DC. :

VSL Associates. (2018). Savix. Retrieved March 13 http://www.thesavix.org/

http://www.seepnetwork.org/filebin/pdf/savings_led_working_group/library/VSLA_Programme_Guide_Field_Operations_Manual_English_version.pdf

http://www.seepnetwork.org/filebin/pdf/savings_led_working_group/library/VSLA_Programme_Guide_Field_Operations_Manual_English_version.pdf

https://www.mangotree.org/files/galleries/IRC-Burundi_New-Generation_Final-Evaluation_2013.pdf

https://www.mangotree.org/files/galleries/IRC-Burundi_New-Generation_Final-Evaluation_2013.pdf

https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/images/zdocs/Economic-Strengthening---Family-Reintegration.pdf

https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/images/zdocs/Economic-Strengthening---Family-Reintegration.pdf

http://www.thesavix.org/


Mission Statement ASPIRES accelerates evidence-based practice in economic strengthening for vulnerable populations through research and technical assistance. Statement of Purpose ASPIRES is a PEPFAR- and USAID-funded economic strengthening (ES) project focused on vulnerable populations, especially those affected by HIV. We aim to promote evidence-based practice by providing technical assistance (TA) for integrated ES programming most consistent with positive livelihood, health, and well-being outcomes. At the same time, we strengthen the evidentiary record through rigorous research so that future programming efforts have stronger foundations. Research is at the heart of the ASPIRES identity, and all of our projects begin with a systematic interrogation of the existing evidence base in relevant program areas. We make major investments in original evaluation research of the highest possible rigor, both for course correction in implementation and to add to the evidence base. We share our findings on best practices with partners, the broader development community, policymakers, and other key constituents, and we offer TA to support programs that seek to replicate those practices. ASPIRES provides limited direct implementation. Instead, we focus on providing existing USAID-funded projects with TA and research related to ES. This allows us to balance the collaboration necessary for in-depth research with independence from program operations. In this manner, we generate findings that contribute to identifying a core set of pathways to greater resilience for vulnerable households, and that provide insight into effective, efficient, and scalable interventions to achieve the desired impacts.

ASPIRES has no single theory of change; we are not a single-model or one-size-fits-all project. We are open to all manner of integrated ES interventions of interest to our USAID and PEPFAR stakeholders, with the ultimate aim to shape interventions around the best evidence available.


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ASPIRES Family Care Process Family-Child...ASPIRES offers technical assistance to scale up high-quality ... In practice, this seems to happen in some contexts, but not others. Johnson