ASNO and Recent Developments in Nuclear Safeguards and ... · ASNO and Recent Developments in Nuclear Safeguards and Nuclear Security Dr Robert Floyd, Director General Australian

Australian Nuclear Association Lecture

ASNO and Recent Developments in Nuclear Safeguardsand Nuclear SecurityDr Robert Floyd, Director General

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office

1 pm Thurs 26 June 2014AINSE Theatre, New Illawarra Rd, Lucas Heights, NSW.

Abstract

Dr Floyd will provide an update on recent developments in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tomodify the way it implements nuclear safeguards. The way the IAEA implements safeguards to verify thecompliance of states with non-proliferation commitments is, by design, an evolving system. It is essentialthat IAEA safeguards approaches and methodologies are able to adapt as technologies change, as the riskprofile of the nuclear fuel cycle changes, and as its experience of what does and does not work changes. Thepresentation will also cover some of the complexity of IAEA safeguards implementation in some States withnon-standard arrangements.

Dr Floyd will also describe recent developments in nuclear security. There has been strong activity in nuclearsecurity globally, highlighted by three summits of world leaders held in Washington, Seoul and this year inthe Netherlands. Australia has shown unwavering support for strong outcomes at these summits. On thedomestic front, Australia undertook an IAEA nuclear security peer review of its nuclear securityarrangements in November 2013. The mission team concluded that nuclear security within Australia has longbeen of a high standard and has been significantly enhanced in recent years. Australia’s strong nuclearsecurity credentials has also been recognised in the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Security Index whichhas twice ranked Australia’s performance first among states having significant holdings of sensitive nuclearmaterial. The presentation will outline what Australia brought to the 2014 Netherlands Nuclear SecuritySummit, provide highlights of our peer review mission and set out why Australia is ranked first in the NuclearSecurity Index.

About Dr Robert Floyd

Dr Floyd was appointed to the position of Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferationOffice (ASNO) in December 2010. He is responsible for Australia’s implementation and compliance withregard to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive TestBan Treaty as well as engaging in further development of safeguards and non-proliferation regimes. He hasbeen appointed by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to his Standing AdvisoryGroup on Safeguards Implementation, is the lead official (“Sherpa”) for Australia in the Nuclear SecuritySummit process, and Chair of the AsiaPacific Safeguards Network.

Prior to this appointment as Director General of ASNO, Dr Floyd served for more than seven years in theDepartment of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) where he held a number of senior executivepositions providing advice to the Prime Minister on policy issues covering counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, emergency management, homeland and border security. He has previously spent nearly 20years working in CSIRO as a research scientist in biological sciences and has held various senior researchmanagement positions.

27/06/2014

1

Australian Safeguards and

Non-Proliferation Office

ASNO and recent developments in nuclear safeguards and nuclear security

Australian Nuclear Association Meeting

26 June 2014

Dr Robert Floyd

Director General ASNO

2

Outline

1. Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office

2. Recent developments in nuclear safeguards

– Australia and IAEA safeguards

– State-level concept for safeguards implementation

– Further evolution of safeguards

3. Recent developments in nuclear security

– Nuclear Security Summit 2014

– International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission

– Nuclear Threat Initiative – Nuclear Security Index

2

27/06/2014

2



To enhance Australia’s and global security through activities which contribute to effective regimes against the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons

Goal of ASNO

3



• NPT and associated IAEA safeguards agreements (CSA + AP)

• CPPNM (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material)

• CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty)

• CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention)

• SPNFZ (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone)

• Network of 22 bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements

– ASNO responsible for “tracking” Australian uranium exports through

network of bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements

Regulatory and administrative responsibilities

4

27/06/2014

3



• Safeguards Act gives effect to Australia’s obligations

– NPT

– Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA

– Agreements between Australia and various countries (and Euratom) - transfers of nuclear items and cooperation

– Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment

• Safeguards Act establishes a system for control over nuclear material, associated items and facilities

– ASNO as an independent regulator

– Director General ASNO responsible directly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Parliament

– Requirements for permits for possession and transport of nuclear material and associated items

Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987

5



• Application of safeguards in Australia

– Submit reports to IAEA on nuclear materials and facilities

– Administer permits and authorities

• Physical protection and security of nuclear material, technology and facilities

– Issue permits and monitor compliance

• Operation of bilateral safeguards agreements

– Tracking and reporting for Australian obligated uranium exports and foreign obligated materials in Australia

• Advice to Government

• Development and effective implementation of International Safeguards

– SAGSI, APSN, ASSP and outreach

So what does ASNO do?

6

27/06/2014

4



• IAEA safeguards to apply or fallback safeguards should NPT or IAEA safeguards cease

• AONM is used only for peaceful purposes and in no way enhances or contributes to any military purpose

• Prior consent for retransfers, reprocessing, and enrichment to 20% or more

• AONM is properly accounted for as it moves through the nuclear fuel cycle (procedures set out in administrative arrangements)

• Adequate levels of physical protection applied to AONM

Australia’s uranium export policy

7

8

Outline

1. Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office

2. Recent developments in nuclear safeguards




3. Recent developments in nuclear security




27/06/2014

5



What are IAEA Safeguards?

• Not about ‘safe’ or ‘guards’

• Safeguards are measures applied by the IAEA to verify that non-proliferation commitments made by States under safeguards agreements with the IAEA are fulfilled

9



Comprehensive Safeguards & Additional Protocol

Comprehensive Safeguards (1972)

• Gives the IAEA the tools to determine

the correctness of state declarations

• Primarily limited to nuclear facilities and

declared nuclear material

Additional Protocol (1997)

• IAEA tools to determine correctness &

completeness of state declarations

• Broader IAEA access to info and

locations related to nuclear activities10

27/06/2014

6



• Undeclared: Detection of undeclared activities in the State

• Misuse: Detection of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities

• Diversion: Detection of diversion of declared nuclear material

Safeguards objectives

11



• IAEA collects & processes safeguards-relevant info from wide range of sources:

− Reports: information from the State;

− Boots on the ground: inspections of nuclear material inventory, facility designs, nuclear-related activities

− HQ analysis: analysis of declared info, open source info (e.g. sat. imagery) & third party info

• IAEA reviews all info and evaluates consistency with the State’s declarations

− any anomalies, questions or inconsistencies are identified and addressed in a timely manner through follow-up action.

Safeguards measures

Note: IAEA’s safeguards measures not just about detecting non-compliance;

also about deterring non-compliance by risk of detection 12

27/06/2014

7



• CSA: Evaluation and verification activities that provide credible assurance that declared nuclear material is accounted for and remains in peaceful nuclear activities (conclusion on non-diversion) - focus on correctness of declarations

• CSA + Additional Protocol: Measures to provide the international community with credible assurance that not only is all declared nuclear material accounted for, but there is also no undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State – focus on completeness of declarations

− known as the “broader conclusion”

IAEA’s safeguards compliance conclusions

13



• The IAEA has drawn the “broader conclusion” on Australia’s safeguards compliance since 2001, i.e. conclusion that

− not only is all declared nuclear material accounted for, but there is no undeclared nuclear material or activities

• Australia first “broader conclusion” country in the world

• This was due to, inter alia

− Australia’s early ratification of Additional Protocol

− Strong record of cooperation and transparency with IAEA

− Effectiveness of Australia’s system of accountancy and control of nuclear material

− Relatively small size of Australia’s nuclear industry

IAEA Safeguards Conclusions - Australia

14

27/06/2014

8



• Safeguards only on identified facilities as a condition of supply

− 1950s – early 1970s

• Safeguards on all nuclear material and facilities applied on a facility-by-facility basis

− early 1970s – today

• State-level safeguards approach – from ~2001 for some countries

− Integrated safeguards – optimum combination of all safeguards measures (CSA+AP) to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency of meeting safeguards obligations (once “broader conclusion” has been drawn)

• Further evolution is required to apply State-level approaches to all States

Evolution of Safeguards Implementation

15

16

Continued Evolution

• Enhance IAEA safeguards system providing credible assurances

• Enhance effectiveness and improve efficiency of implementation

• Move further away from prescriptive, criteria-driven implementation focused at facility-level towards safeguards implementation focused at the State-level

• More focused safeguards activities – flexible and customized

• Better use of all safeguards-relevant information

• More dynamic, robust and iterative State evaluation process

16

27/06/2014

9

17

State-Level Concept: Definition

Safeguards implementation that is based more upon

safeguards considerations for the State as a whole

rather than solely on the quantity and type of declared

nuclear material and facilities in a State

17

State-Level Concept

• A holistic approach to safeguards implementation

− Applicable to all States with SG agreements

− Based on a comprehensive and continuous State evaluation and a customized State-level approach

− Executed through an annual implementation plan

• Considering the State as a whole provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into consideration during all stages of safeguards implementation

• Implementation of the State-level concept is responsive to changes in the analysis, ensuring that safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date

18

27/06/2014

10



19



The case for further evolution of safeguards

Time

Safeguards Budget Facilities & nuclear material

20

27/06/2014

11

21

Outline

• Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office

• Recent developments in nuclear safeguards




• Recent developments in nuclear security




21

22

Safety

Security

Safeguards

Treaties, Laws,

Regulation, Design,

Inspection, Review

Assurance

The Trilogy

22

27/06/2014

12

23

Significant Nuclear Events

• Hiroshima and Nagasaki

• Windscale, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Tokai-mura, Fukushima

• Loose Nukes, Improvised Nuclear Device, Nuclear Terrorism…?

23

24

Nuclear Security Summits

• Nuclear Security Summit followed President Obama’s “Prague speech” (5 April 2009)

– Identified acquisition of a nuclear weapon by terrorists as “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security”.

– called for “a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years”.

24

27/06/2014

13

25

Washington Summit

• 1st Summit 12-13 April 2010

• 47 countries + IAEA + United Nations + European Union

• Produced Communiqué and Workplan

Seoul Summit

• 2nd Summit 26-27 March 2012

• Added Denmark, Lithuania, Azerbaijan,

Romania, Gabon, Hungary, Interpol

• Now 53 + 5 States

• New Communiqué

25

26

The Hague Summit

Opening Ceremony Scenario Based Exercise

Communique #3

Leader’s only discussionFuture of the Summit

26

27/06/2014

14

27

How Does Australia Perform?

• Adhere to International Nuclear Security Treaties and Norms

– Amended CPPNM, ICSANT, UNSCR1540

• Minimisation of HEU Norms

– Use of LEU fuel and targets for 99Mo production

• Strong use of best practice guidelines

– e.g. INFCIRC/225

27

28

• Peer Review - hosted International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission (will discuss later)

• Active in Nuclear Security Partnerships

– GICNT - chair of Nuclear Forensics Working Group

• Full support for the IAEAPartnerships

– including donations to Nuclear Security Fund (NSF)

– Incident and Trafficking Database

• International Cooperation and Outreach



28

27/06/2014

15

29

International Assurances?

• Activities undertaken, information shared, or measures implemented that provide confidence to others of the effectiveness of nuclear security within a given state

• Builds credibility and confidences

– Internal - Government and public

– External - State-to-state, multilateral

• Raise the level of practice

• Help assess effectiveness

29

30

Safeguards SecuritySafety

RulesTreaties

Conventions

Standards

Transparency & Accountability

Assurance

How much assurance is provided?

30

27/06/2014

16

31

Transparency and Openness are not absolutes

Scaled Transparency and Openness

31

32

Assurances mechanisms are diverse

ASSURANCE

PROVIDERS

ASSURANCE

ARRANGEMENTS

• Governments

– Ministries/Agencies

– Regulator

• Industry/Nuclear Operators

• Unilateral

• Bilateral

• Multilateral

ASSURANCE

RECIPIENTS

• Other Governments

– Neighbors

– Allies

– Adversaries

• International Organizations

• The Public32

27/06/2014

17

33

Security assurance

now

RulesTreaties

Conventions

Standards

Transparency & Accountability

AssuranceSecurity

assurance in the future?

Assurances… now and the future

33

34

Country CPPNM +2005

Amend

ICSANT GCINT COC* IAEA AP CTBT Nuclear

Activities

Brunei No No No No No No Ratified None

Cambodia Ratified No Signed Yes No No Ratified None

Laos Ratified No No No No BOG Ratified None

Myanmar No No No No No Signed Signed None

Indonesia Ratified Ratified No No Yes In Force Ratified RRs

Malaysia No No Signed Yes Yes Signed Ratified RR

Philippines Ratified No Signed Yes Yes In Force Ratified RR, PWR (Inop)

Singapore No No Signed Yes No In Force Ratified None

Thailand No No Signed Yes Yes Signed Ratified RR

Vietnam Ratified Ratified No Yes Yes In Force Ratified RR

China Ratified Ratified Ratified Yes Yes In Force Signed Full fuel cycle

Japan Ratified No Accept Yes Yes In Force Ratified Full fuel cycle

Korea Ratified No Signed Yes Yes In Force Ratified PWR, RR, Fuel Fab

Australia Ratified Ratified Ratified Yes Yes In Force Ratified U mines, RR

New Zealand Ratified No Signed Yes Yes In Force Ratified None

ICSANT = Nuclear Terrorism Convention, AP = IAEA Additional Protocol, COC = Code of Conduct on the Safety and

Security of Radioactive Sources, GCINT = Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,

* Formal support via Notif GC(47)/RES/7.B

Much to be done…

34

27/06/2014

18



Nuclear Threat Initiative: Nuclear Security Index

• Assesses the contribution of states toward improved global nuclear materials security conditions

– 25 states with > 1 kg or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials

– 151 states < 1 kg of weapons-usable nuclear materials

• Developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative with the Economist Intelligence Unit (publisher of the Economist)

• Reviewed by international expert panel of experts including one panelist from Australia.

• First done in 2012 and revised 2014 just before the Seoul and The Hague Nuclear Security Summits

35



NTI Nuclear Security Index

Criteria High Scores for…

Quantities and Sites Lower Inventory of sensitive nuclear material

Lower number of nuclear sites

Decreasing Inventory

Security and Control Measures

Strong on-site and transport procedures

Strong accountancy and control or materials

Personal security measures and vetting

Response capabilities

Global Norms Adherence to international security treaties

Making voluntary commitments and contribution to security

partnerships

Transparency measures

Domestic Commitments and Capacity

UNSCR 1540 Implementation

Domestic Legislation

Independent regulatory agency

Risk Environment & Societal Factors

High political stability

Low pervasiveness of corruption

Low interest in illicit trafficking 36

27/06/2014

19



High Scores for… Australia

Lower Inventory of sensitive nuclear material

Lower number of nuclear sites

Decreasing Inventory

~4 kg of HEU and separated plutonium at

one site.

Significant reparation of HEU

Strong on-site and transport procedures

Strong accountancy and control or materials

Personal security measures and vetting

Response capabilities

Australia follows IAEA Guidelines

Safeguards and Security covered by

Use of security clearances for access to

sensitive areas.

Adherence to international security treaties

Making voluntary commitments and

contribution to security partnerships

Transparency measures

Ratified both amended CPPNM & ICSANT

GICNT, PSI membership, NSF contributions

Published regulations

UNSCR 1540 Implementation

Domestic Legislation

Independent regulatory agency

Completion of UNSCR1540 reporting

ASNO Independent national authority for

security and safeguards

High political stability

Low pervasiveness of corruption

Low interest in illicit trafficking

Score well for political stability and low

corruption but lower score due to convictions

linked to interest in ANSTO.


37




38

27/06/2014

20



How could Australia improve its score?

• Some security rules to be prescribed in regulations– use of Design Basis Threat

– drug and psych tests

– security vetting review frequency to be less than 2 years

– requirement to report suspicious behaviour

• Risk environment scores– societal factors

– quality of the bureaucracy

– fewer groups interested in acquiring nuclear material.

39



Lessons from the security Index

• Methodology not perfect but the resultant debate on what comprises good nuclear security is a success in its self.

• Transparent laws and regulations score better

• Comparisons will be made

• NTI Index does not tell the full story - needs to be complemented with on-site peer review

40

27/06/2014

21



• Unlike IAEA safeguards, nuclear security treaties have no verification mechanism

• “Nuclear security is the responsibility of states”

• Increasing recognition of the value of peer review

• IPPAS mission service has provided by IAEA at request of States since 1996

• 3 weapon states have hosted IPPAS missions in last 2 years

• Review is based on Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and IAEA Guidance documents

• Final reports are Highly Confidential

• Some states have released portions of their reports

International Physical Protection Advisory Service

41



• Collection Phase (4-5 days)

– Presentations by regulators and other competent authorities

– Interviews and discussions

– Facility visits

• Reporting writing (4-5 days)

– Presentations by regulators and other competent authorities

• Review and delivery (2-3 days)

– Teams seeks additional information

– Host country has 1-2 days to review and provide feedback

– Final draft handed to host country on final day

– 2-3 months for IAEA to conduct final edit and review

IPPAS Mission Process

42

27/06/2014

22



• Australian commitment to host an IPPAS mission was announced at 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

• Mission conducted 4-15 November 2013

Australian IPPAS

43



• Team members from

– IAEA, Canada, ROK, Indonesia, Czech Republic, UK & Hungary (team leader)

• Key Australian Participants

– ASNO, ANSTO, ARPANSA

– Attorney Generals Department, AFP, ASIO, ASD

• Security Modules

– National Security Regime

– Facility Review

– Transport

– Radioactive Sources

– Information and Cyber security

Australian IPPAS

44

27/06/2014

23



• Main focus was OPAL reactor

• Looked at sufficiency of Australian legislation

• Operation of regulators (ASNO & ARPANSA)

• Management and Security Culture

Australian IPPAS

45



Documents

ASNO and Recent Developments in Nuclear Safeguards and ... · ASNO and Recent Developments in Nuclear Safeguards and Nuclear Security Dr Robert Floyd, Director General Australian