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ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK TAR:PHI 34081
PROPOSED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
(Financed from the Japan Special Fund
and Cofinanced by the Government of Japan)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO
STRENGTHEN THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
July 2001
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (as of April 2001)
Currency Unit – Peso (P) $1.00 = P50.50
ABBREVIATIONS ADB – Asian Development Bank APJR – Action Plan for Judicial Reform COA – Commission on Audit CSC – Civil Service Commission DBM – Department of Budget and Management FY – fiscal year IBP – Integrated Bar of the Philippines JBC – Judicial Bar Council NEDA – National Economic and Development Authority PhilJA – Philippine Judicial Academy PMES – Performance Monitoring and Evaluation System PMO – project management office TA – technical assistance US – United States
NOTE
In this report, "$" refers to US dollars.
I. INTRODUCTION 1. A prerequisite for economic growth and social development is a stable society, and the cornerstone is a judiciary that dispenses, and is seen to dispense, fair and impartial justice, efficiently and effectively. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is aware of the challenges it faces and is actively responding to them. It has taken concrete steps to establish a strong foundation for the long-term development of the judiciary. With assistance from international funding agencies, the Supreme Court undertook several studies to assess the extent of change needed, and recommend reforms. The Supreme Court established a project management office (PMO), headed by a full-time director, to manage the studies and coordinate the reform proposals. An executive committee (the Executive Committee) headed by the chief justice was created to provide overall policy direction for the reforms. The result of these efforts, the Action Program for Judicial Reform (APJR), was adopted by the Supreme Court in November 2000. The APJR has received strong support from the executive branch. 2. Among the goals of the APJR are fiscal autonomy; independence from political interference; and fair, speedy justice. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines has requested the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to provide advisory technical assistance (TA) to advance APJR components in these areas. An ADB Fact-Finding Mission was fielded in October 2000 and reached an understanding with the Government on the objectives, scope, costs, and implementation arrangements for this TA. The logical framework is attached as Appendix 1. This TA is in line with the APJR and is included in the 2001 Philippine country assistance plan.1
II. BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 3. The Philippine Constitution sets up a government with three separate, independent, but coequal branches. Congress writes the laws and appropriates the budget. The executive ensures compliance with the laws. The judiciary interprets the laws, resolves disputes, and defines the boundaries of government authority. As the judiciary has no instrument of power other than the power of its decisions, structures must be established to protect its independence and integrity. The Philippine Constitution takes the first step in this direction by recognizing that the judiciary must have fiscal autonomy.2 4. Jurisprudence defines fiscal autonomy as freedom from outside control in determining one’s needs, and full flexibility in allocating and using one’s resources. In practice the executive’s Department of Budget and Management reviews and revises the judiciary’s budget before submitting it to Congress. It also subjects the judiciary’s budget, obligation programming, and cash releases to the same terms and conditions applied to other agencies without fiscal autonomy. This has forced the judiciary to negotiate budget items with the executive on a transaction-by-transaction basis, and has compelled lower courts to accept subsidies from local governments. The judiciary’s level of fiscal autonomy fluctuates with changes in government leadership, thus undermining its impartiality and rendering it vulnerable to political change. 5. The judiciary’s resource constraints are aggravated by a lack of administrative autonomy. The evaluation and approval of salary grades; changes in staffing patterns; and creation, abolition, reclassification, and upgrade of positions are subject to the same review and approval procedures applied to executive agencies. This has resulted in work-task duplication, understaffing, inappropriate skills mix, and inefficiencies.
1 The TA first appeared in ADB Business Opportunities (Internet Edition) on 27 October 2000. 2 “The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature
below the amount appropriated for the previous year, and after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.” (Sec. 3, Art. VIII)
2
6. Fiscal independence and accountability are vital to the development of the Philippine judiciary. However, to reap their benefits and ensure the long-term sustainability of the developments, the judicial appointments system must also be reformed. The Judicial and Bar Council was created to prepare an exclusive list of names from which the President can choose appointments or promotions to the Supreme Court and the lower courts. The current rules and procedures for screening and nominating judges and justices must be improved to ensure that they are transparent and respond to the need to nominate competent and impartial members of the bench. In the case of promotions, the rules and procedures also have to be linked to a transparent and systematic performance monitoring and evaluation system. 7. Further, it is also essential that the Supreme Court be able to detect inefficiencies and corruption in the courts, and effectively impose discipline. The Philippines currently has no institutionalized, systematic, performance monitoring and evaluation of such things as legal ability, case-flow management, comportment in and out of court, impartiality, appropriateness of the judge’s manner and initiatives, and reasonableness of opinions. The absence of such mechanisms contributes to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial system. This public support is imperative if the judiciary is to maintain its role as an independent and accountable, third-branch of government. 8. A parallel step toward judicial independence and impartiality is strengthening the bench. Unfortunately, the lower courts have many vacancies, equivalent to one third of the judicial posts.3 Therefore incentives and institutional support must be improved to encourage capable candidates to volunteer for judicial posts, and encourage desirable incumbents to remain in government service. The judiciary’s salary scale must be improved as it is far lower than that of comparable institutions; good performance needs to be recognized and rewarded; and individual efforts to maintain an appropriate level of expertise must be supported through continuous, deliberate, and properly managed judicial education. The Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJA) was established to train judges, justices, court personnel, and aspirants to judicial posts. PhilJA has a critical role in upgrading the qualifications of incumbents on the bench. It has also started a prejudicature program for candidates to the bench. A comprehensive conceptual framework for judicial education will help assist PhilJA execute its mandate. 9. Providing support for judicial reform is consistent with ADB’s objective to improve governance. Independent, accountable, impartial, and competent judiciaries serve as a defense against corruption, reduce political interference in the dispensation of justice, enhance transparency, and help reduce waste of public funds. Judicial reform is central to predictability, one of four essential elements in ADB’s governance policy.4 Independent judicial institutions ensure (i) participation (by giving the public a hearing through public interest litigation), (ii) transparency (by upholding laws that require disclosure of information), and (iii) accountability (by granting citizens the right to challenge government actions before the judiciary). Additional information is available in Appendix 2.
III. THE PROPOSED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE A. Objectives 10. The goal of the TA is to contribute to the improvement of the Philippine judiciary by supporting its independence, accountability, impartiality, and competence. Under the TA, (i) a
3 Trial court judge to population ratio is about 1:35,200. As of 31 October 1999, 709 of 2,130 trial court were vacant.
These include the first level trial courts, which administer justice in municipalities and cities, and the second-level trial courts, which handle civil and criminal cases, and cases on appeal from the first level trial courts.
4 R151-95: Governance: Sound Development Management, 17 August 1995.
3
framework for the judiciary’s fiscal and administrative autonomy will be designed, (ii) the appointment process and the accountability and incentive system under which the judges and justices function will be improved, and (iii) the capacity of PhilJA to deliver judicial training will be strengthened. B. Scope 11. The TA will develop a framework to define the overall scope of judicial independence and accountability. A budget and revenue system will be designed to translate the framework into operational systems and guidelines for budget preparation, programming, and commitment, disbursement of funds, accounting procedures that meet Commission on Audit requirements, performance-based accomplishment reporting to Congress, and revenue generation actions. The judiciary’s administrative structure will be reengineered to achieve suitable skills-mix, staffing structures, and organizational and functional configurations for the courts; improve accountability and transparency; and ensure integration of functions and operating systems. The Supreme Court and the relevant executive agencies will be reviewed to identify impediments to judicial independence and accountability, and to develop fiscal systems for the judiciary that are consistent with the principles of judicial independence and prudent public expenditure practices. Appropriate amendments consistent with the Philippine Constitution will be recommended. On the basis of this work, assistance will be provided in the preparation of the judiciary’s 2003 budget. 12. The TA will conduct a detailed analysis of the legal and institutional framework for and actual implementation of the screening and nomination of judges and justices. On the basis of the review, the existing institutional arrangements, processes, and rules will be reformulated to enhance transparency and civil society’s participation in the screening and nomination of judges and justices. Performance standards will be established for, among other things, ethical conduct, judicial reasoning and writing, case-flow management, and court efficiency. A performance monitoring and evaluation system (PMES) will be developed to ensure that good performance is recognized, and deficiencies identified and disciplined. Data on case-flow management, currently being gathered by the Office of the Court Administrator, will be taken into account in setting the standards. The PMES will be linked to the screening, nomination, promotion, and discipline process. Proposals will be made for establishing a judicial tenure committee under the supervision of the Supreme Court to operate the PMES and assist the Judicial and Bar Council with the preliminary screening of candidates for appointment and promotion. 13. To improve the incentives system, a career program linked to the PMES and a competitive compensation-retirement plan will be designed for the bench. To support individual efforts to improve competence, a conceptual framework for judicial education will be developed to set educational goals and a value system, identify areas for education, and propose educational methods. Using the conceptual framework, PhilJA’s curricula will be refined, reoriented, and enriched. Distance training modules will be designed for regular courses identified by the Supreme Court, PhilJA, and ADB. Classroom-based and distance training modules will be designed to train the judiciary in the use of the new systems developed under the TA. With assistance from ADB, PhilJA will deliver classroom-based courses at its campus in Tagaytay, and deliver courses by distance training throughout the country. 14. The Ministry of Justice of the Government of Japan will offer a 3-4 week training course in Japan for about 10 court administrators, executive judges, and PhilJA trainers who will be selected based on criteria agreed between the Supreme Court, PhilJA, and ADB. The courses will be on performance evaluation, court administration, judicial career development, and judicial
4
education. The curriculum will be set upon consultation among the Ministry of Justice of the Government of Japan, PhilJA, and ADB. 15. A conference will be held at ADB to present the findings and reforms drafted under the TA. The Supreme Court, with assistance from TA consultants and ADB, will conduct nationwide workshops and dialogues to discuss the TA reforms with stakeholders including incumbent and retired members of the bench, court administrators and personnel, members of the bar, bar associations, law schools, members of Congress, and government officials. Feedback from these sessions will be considered in finalizing the TA reforms. Tools for implementing the reforms, including necessary legislative, regulatory, and administrative enactments, will be designed or formulated and the cost for reforms estimated. C. Cost Estimates and Financing Plan 16. The TA is estimated to cost $1.878 million equivalent, of which $740,000 is the foreign-exchange cost and $1.138 million equivalent is the local currency cost. The Government has requested ADB to finance $1.200 million equivalent, covering $640,000 of the foreign exchange cost and $560,000 equivalent of the local currency cost. The Government of Japan, acting through the Ministry of Justice, will provide in-kind services for the overseas training program valued at the equivalent of about $100,000. The TA will be financed by ADB on a grant basis from the Japan Special Fund, funded by the Government of Japan. The Government will finance the remaining local-currency cost, equivalent to $578,000, covering administrative and support costs including salaries of counterpart staff, secretarial support, office supplies and equipment, office accommodation, local transportation, miscellaneous costs for dialogues and training courses, and per diems associated with attendance at such events. Details of the cost estimates are set out in Appendix 3. D. Implementation Arrangements 17. The Supreme Court will be the Executing Agency; it will ensure that the PMO continues to be headed by a full-time director, is always adequately staffed, and has at least one full-time project officer reporting to the director to supervise day-to-day implementation of the TA. The director will ensure coordination among the Judicial and Bar Council, PhilJA, Office of the Clerk of Court, Office of the Court Administrator, the clerks of court of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, TA consultants, and other stakeholders. The PMO will report monthly to the Executive Committee to update it on the TA reforms. The Executive Committee, and when necessary the Supreme Court, will regularly review the reforms and provide policy direction to ensure acceptability of the final proposals. To ensure proper synchronization and acceptability of judicial reforms outside the judiciary, the Supreme Court will coordinate and liaise with the Presidential Committee on Effective Governance, a committee composed of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Finance, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Secretary of the National Economic and Development Authority. The TA will be implemented over a period of 18 months commencing in December 2001. Complete implementation is expected by May 2003. 18. Seventeen person-months of international consulting services will be required in the areas of constitutional and administrative law of comparable constitutional systems, judicial appointments and career development, performance evaluation, fiscal and administrative management of courts, and physical assets management. Reports will be required to outline the framework and processes of comparable constitutional systems, explain their theoretical and philosophical underpinnings, compare them with the Philippine system, and recommend a direction for fiscal and administrative independence and accountability, judicial nominations, and career development. The reports will be reviewed by the Supreme Court and ADB, and used as
5
a guide to formulate the reforms and strategies for advocating the reforms. Ninety person-months of domestic consultants’ services will be required in constitutional and administrative law, budget planning and management, financial planning and management, revenue generation, administration, corporate planning, asset management, procurement, auditing, staff reengineering, personnel management, career development, performance monitoring and evaluation, and training. The consultants will be engaged as a firm, under one contract, and will be headed by a domestic consultant team leader with expertise in project management, financial management, and administration. A resource person with expertise in the budgetary process of comparable court systems, and a resource person involved in performance evaluation of judges and justices, will be separately engaged to make presentations and provide inputs at the conference to be held at ADB. 19. The consultants will be recruited in accordance with ADB’s Guidelines on the Use of Consultants by Asian Development Bank and its Borrowers, and other arrangements satisfactory to ADB for the recruitment of domestic consultants. The outline terms of reference are attached as Appendix 4. 20. An inception meeting will be held within one month after engagement of the consultants. Five months thereafter, the Supreme Court and ADB will review the progress of the TA and the consultants will submit a preliminary report on the findings and reforms being developed. The conference at ADB will be held about two months after submission of the report, and promptly thereafter the consultants will submit to the Supreme Court and ADB a report on the results of the conference. The consultants will help organize workshops and dialogues. They will submit reports of the proceedings of such interactions promptly after they are held. A draft final report will be submitted to the Supreme Court and ADB within 10 months after inception, and a final report no later than a month after the draft final report is approved by the Supreme Court. The reports will include the reports of the international consultants, the reforms developed under the TA, and draft legislation if necessary. The PMO will prepare a project completion report within three months after completion of the TA to assess and evaluate the achievements of the TA. 21. Training courses developed under the TA will be subject to PhilJA’s approval. After the acceptance of the final report and approval of the training courses, PhilJA will deliver the courses, with assistance from the consultants. Trainers from the academe and the legal profession will be directly recruited as resource persons, in accordance with arrangements and criteria satisfactory to ADB, to help deliver most of the training courses. The consultants' team will help PhilJA prepare a report on the delivery of the training programs. The Supreme Court, in consultation with PhilJA and ADB, will select about 10 court administrators, executive judges, and PhilJA trainers to participate in the overseas training program. After completion of the overseas training course, the participants will be required to become regular resource persons for PhilJA. 22. Computers and other necessary information technology equipment will be procured by the consultants, in accordance with procedures acceptable to ADB, to assist them in their work. After completion of the TA, the equipment will be transferred to the Supreme Court.
V. THE PRESIDENT’S RECOMMENDATION
23. The President recommends that the Board approve the provision of technical assistance, on a grant basis, to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in an amount not exceeding the equivalent of $1,200,000 to Strengthen the Independence of the Judiciary.
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Appendix
1, page
16
(Reference
in text:
page 1,
para. 2.)
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Appendix
71 ,
2page
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10A
ppendix5
page
Executive Review of the Judiciary's BudgetA.
1. One of the systems with which the Philippine Government is constitutionallycomparable is the United States (US) Federal Government. Both have three separate,independent but coequal branches of government. In both cases, the legislatures havethe power of the "purse strings," the executives have the "power of sword," and thejudiciaries have the least coercive of the three powers - the power of judicial review.Because both systems require that courts be able to review the acts of the President andCongress, and because of the passiveness of the instrument of judicial power (i.e.,judicial decisions), the systems have had to actively protect the independence andintegrity of their judiciaries.
2. The Philippines has specified in its constitution that the judiciary will be fiscallyautonomous. The US has prohibited its President from changing the budget proposed bythe judicial branch of government. In fact, to maintain full separation and independenceof all three branches, the US President is also prohibited from changing the proposedlegislative budget. Thus,
"(b) Estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for thelegislative branch and the judicial branch to be included in each budgetunder subsection (a)(5) of this section shall be submitted to the Presidentbefore October 16 of each year and included in the budget by thePresident without change." (United States Code Annotated, Title 31,Chapter 11, Section 11 05(b), emphasis supplied)
3. The basis of the Department of Budget and Management for reviewing andrevising the judiciary's budget despite Section 3, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitutionis another constitutional provision that requires the President to submit an annual budgetto Congress. Section 22, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution provides-
"The President shall submit to Congress within thirty days from theopening of the regular session, as the basis of the general appropriationsbill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receiptsfrom existing and proposed revenue measures."
Compare this provision with the following US statute that requires the US President tosubmit an annual budget and proposed appropriations to Congress, notwithstanding theprohibition against changing the budget of judiciary:
"xxx The President shall include in each budget the following: xxx (5)except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, estimatedexpenditures and proposed appropriations the President decides are
Appendix 2, page 111
ADDITIONAL INFORMA TJON NOTES
(Reference in text: page 2, para. 9)
necessary to support the Government in the fiscal year for which thebudget is submitted and the 4 fiscal years after that year;" (United StatesCode Annotated, Title 31, Chapter 11, Section 11 05(a)(5))
4. As can be seen from the US model, an obligation on the part of the President tosubmit an annual budget is not necessarily inconsistent with a prohibition againstchanging the budgets submitted to the President by the judicial and legislative branches.
8. A Comparison of Salary Scales
5. A municipal trial court judge receives a basic salary of P19,500 a month andallowances of approximately P9,900 a month, for a total of about P29,400 a month. Aregional trial court judge receives gross compensation of about P35,OOO a month. Firstyear associates in top law firms in Makati receive annualized salaries (14 - 18 monthsequivalent) of approximately P600,000 to P800,000; senior associates, with 4 - 5 yearsof work experience, receive annualized salaries of approximately P1,OOO,OOO toP1,200,OOO.
The Judicial Bar and Council (JBC)c.
6. Structurally, the JBC is under the supervision of the Supreme Court. The chiefjustice is the ex-officio chairman. The other members are the secretary of justice (ex-officio), a professor of law, a retired justice of the Supreme Court, and onerepresentative each from the legislature (ex-officio), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP), and the private sector. The professor, retired justice, and representatives of theIBP and the private sector are appointed by the President with the consent of theCommission of Appointments. However, the judges and justices appointed by thePresident from the list prepared by JBC need no confirmation from the CongressionalCommission on Appointments. (Sections 8 and 9, Article VIII, Philippine Constitution).
Appendix 2, page 212
Foreign Local TotalItem Exchange Currency Cost
ADB Financing (JSF)1. Consultants
a. Remuneration and Per Diemi. International Consultants (17 person-months)ii. Domestic Consultants (90 person-months)iii. Resource Persons
b. International and Domestic Travel
A.
2. Conference, Workshops, and Seminars3. Training
a. Overseas Travel and Per Diemb. In-country Training (Trainers, Facilitators, Training
Material)c. Training Material and Equipment for Distance
LearningEditing and Printing of T A Reports4.
5.6.
EquipmentContingencies
Subtotal
B. Government of Japan (in-kind) 100,000 0 100,000
C. Government Financing1. Office Accommodation, Facilities & Utilities 0 40,000 40,0002. Transportation 0 35,000 35,0003. Nationwide Workshops and Seminars 0 145,000 145,0004. Counterpart Staff
a. Remuneration and Benefits 0 55,000 55,000b. Per Diem (for out of Manila workshops & seminars) 0 15,000 15,000c. Travel 0 15,000 15,000
5. Training 0 215,000 215,0006. Contingencies 0 58,000 58,000
Subtotal . 0 578,000 578,000-
Total 740,000 1,138,000 1,878,000
Source: Staff Estimates.
13 Appendix 3
COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING PLAN($)
0370,000
02,000
32,000
0
100,000
000
56,000560,000
395,000370,000
4,00027,00032,000
31,000
100,000
85,00010,00025,000
121,0001,200,000
395,0000
4,00025,000
0
31,000
0
85,00010,00025,00065,000
640,000
(Reference in text: page 4, para. 16.)
International Consultants
Review of Judicial Independence and Accountability (7 person-months
1. The consultant (i) will be based abroad for the first two months to prepare a review andrecommend directions for independence and accountability, (ii) will be resident in the Philippinesfor five months after acceptance of the review and recommendations, and (iii) must haveexpertise and extensive experience in the fiscal and administrative operation of a
constitutionally comparable judicial system.
2. The consultant will (i) review the court system of a constitutionally comparable judicialsystem (ii) detail the nature and scope of the judiciary's fiscal and administrative independenceand accountability; (iii) discuss the political and historical context within which suchindependence and accountability evolved; (iv) explain the theoretical and philosophicalunderpinnings of judicial independence and accountability; (v) describe the fiscal, budgetary,revenue, and administrative processes and mechanisms set in place for the judiciary; (vi)discuss how fiscal discipline and accountability are maintained in and by the judiciary; (vii)describe the remuneration system for judges, explain its relation to the civil service salary scale,and explain the political and theoretical context for any difference or correlation between the twoscales; (viii) (with the assistance of the legal experts on Philippine constitutional and
. administrative law) compare the reviewed system and the Philippine system; and (ix)recommend for the approval of the Supreme Court the direction for fiscal and administrativeindependence and accountability.
3. After the report is accepted by the Supreme Court, the consultant will work closely with,supervise, and guide the other consultants to ensure that the reforms developed under the TAare in line with the approved direction for independence and accountability; develop a set offiscal discipline guidelines (as part of the judicial budget process and budget formula) to ensurespending measures are responsible and within an approved expenditure program, as well asensure that the budget is coherent with the state of the national economy, inflation, and the rateof growth of overall federal spending.
Appointments and Judicial Career
4. The consultant (i) will be based abroad for the first two months to prepare a review, (ii)will be resident in the Philippines for three months after the review and recommendations areapproved by the Supreme Court; (iii) must have extensive expertise in performance evaluationand discipline within the judiciary of a constitutionally comparable system; (iv) will reviewconstitutionally comparable judicial systems, (v) outline the appointment, nomination,performance evaluation, discipline, and removal of judges and justices within those systems; (vi)describe the judicial career development system; and (vii) explain the political or theoreticalbasis for the various mechanisms. '
5. On the basis of diagnostic studies already conducted of the appointment, nomination,discipline, and removal of judges and justices in the Philippines, and with the assistance of thelegal experts on Philippine constitutional and administrative law, the consultants will prepare areport on judicial appointments and career development that (i) recommends reforms to improvethe institutional framework and organizational arrangements for the appointment and nomination
14 Appendix 4, page 1
OUTLINE OF TERMS OF REFERENCE
(5 person-months)
(Reference in text: page 5, para.19.)
15 Appendix 4, page 2
of judges and justices; (ii) develops an overall framework for the appointment, nomination,monitoring, evaluation, discipline, and removal of judges and justices; and (iii) develops aframework for judicial career development and performance incentives.
6. The consultant will (i) formulate guidelines and mechanisms to (a) ensure transparencyand accountability in the appointment and nomination process; and (b) ensure objectivity,predictability, and transparency in the discipline and removal process; (ii) establish performancestandards for judges and justices; (iii) prepare recommendations and draft legal instruments forthe establishment of a judicial tenure committee to monitor and evaluate judges, review theirconduct, and help the Judicial Bar and Council with the preliminary screening of potentialjudicial appointees and candidates for promotion; (iv) determine resource requirements forimplementation; (v) prepare instruments for implementation; and (vi) assist the legal expertsprepare the administrative, regulatory, or statutory amendments needed to implement thesystem.
3. Physical Assets Management (5
7. The consultant will (i) develop a physical assets management system, typology ofphysical assets, methocology for physical assets inventory, and physical assets monitoringsystem; (ii) develop procurement policies and procedures, a physical assets accounting andvaluation system, and a procurement, expenditure, maintenance, disposal, replacement trackingsystem; and (iii) develop training packages for relevant court personnel in the use of the newsystem.
B. Domestic Consultants
8. The domestic consultants will coordinate closely with the international consultants toensure that all proposals are in line with the strategy for fiscal and administrative independenceand accountability, and the framework for judicial appointments and career development. Eachdomestic consultant will have working knowledge of her or his aspect of court reform. Adetailed understanding of the current state of operations and policies for the management of thePhilippine judiciary is also necessary. All implementation instruments developed by theconsultants under this TA must be electronically, as well as paper, based to ensure computerreadiness of all reforms.
The Team Leader (18 person-months)1.
9. The team leader will have expertise in project management, financial management, andadministration, and will (i) supervise and coordinate consultants' activities to ensure that allreforms and proposals are compatible and acceptable to the Supreme Court; (ii) ensure regularconsultations with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Project Management Office onall reforms and proposals developed under the T A; (iii) assist ADB and the Supreme Court withadvocacy of the reforms; (iv) ensure that all reports, guidelines, and forms are user-friendly andsubmitted on time; (v) assist with organizing the conference, seminars, workshops, and trainingsessions, (vi) ensure that the necessary consultants are available to participate in thosesessions; and (vii) keep stakeholders apprised of the developments in the TA.
Judicial Independence Strategy Formulation (42.
10. The consultant should have high level experience and expertise in public sector fiscal,financial, and administrative management, familiarity with handling issues on fiscal autonomy,
person-months)
and experience managing the technical, policy, and political aspects of public sectormanagement in the Philippines.
11. In consultation with the international consultant on judicial independence andaccountability and the domestic legal expert on constitutional and administrative law, theconsultant will review all laws, legal issuances, systems, and procedures and their specificeffects/hindrances on the fiscal, financial, and administrative independence of the judiciary, andformulate a judicial independence and accountability strategy, to include (i) the specific scopeand nature of judicial independence and accountability in fiscal, financial, and administrativemanagement; (ii) a strategy for acquiring such independence and accountability, which mayinclude advocacy, agreements with the executive and legislative branches, legislation, and otherstrategies to sustain juJicial independence and accountability; and (iii) an action plan forstrategy implementation and achievement of results.
3. Budget and Expenditure Planning (9 person-months)
12. The consultant will (i) define assumptions and plan-targets for formulating the six- yearexpenditure program, which should provide a budget for the Action Plan for Judicial Reform;formulate the six-year expenditure program and a three-year detailed budget program; (ii)prepare implementation instruments; (iii) develop an objective formula for the judicial budgetlevel to be reflected in the annual National Expenditure Program and General AppropriationsAct; (iv) formulate the budget preparation, execution, and accountability framework, andguidelines for the execution and accounting of the judiciary's budget; (v) design annual budget
. preparation system, including estimation of the annual budget ceiling, prioritizationmethodology, allocation methodology, and preparation process within the fiscal disciplineguidelines delineated by the international consultant; and (vi) assist in the preparation of thefiscal year (FY) 2003 judicial budget.
4. Revenue Generation and
13. The consultant will (i) review and improve revenue audit and monitoring procedures,including the internal control mechanisms and reporting system to Congress, Commission onAudit (COA), and the public; (ii) inventory and assess existing revenue sources, localgovernment unit resource infusions, rates, collection systems and procedures, institutionalarrangements and resources, and accounting/monitoring procedures; (iii) identify new sourcesof revenues and formulate a program for the removal of local government resource infusions;(iv) implement the changes to the revenue management scheme and the necessary trainingprogram developed; (v) install the new system; (vi) define pricing assumptions to be used inpricing judicial services, improve pricing configuration of existing revenue sources, andformulate pricing configurations for new revenue sources; (vii) develop six- and three-yearrevenue-generation targets and plans; prepare instruments for implementation; (viii) estimaterevenue requirements for the FY2003 budget; (ix) develop change management schemes,including system installation, training, operation, handholding, and maintenance; (x) assist legalexperts to prepare the administrative, regulatory, or statutory amendments needed to implementthe system; (xi) develop training packages for relevant court personnel in the use of thesystems; and (xii) determine resources needed to implement the system.
5. Reengineering the Financial Management System (6 person-months)
14. The consultant will (i) formulate financial reporting framework, including the obligationand cash programming and management system and the budget accountability system; (ii)design a medium-term fiscal program development and management system; (iii) improve thefinancial accounting system while ensuring it conforms to the accounting and auditing
16Appendix 4, page 3
~
Management(6 person-months)
17 Appendix 4, page 4
requirements of COA; (iv) work with physical assets consultant to improve the physical assetsaccounting system;(v) formulate a change management strategy and implementation schedule,including system installation, training, operation, hand holding and maintenance; (vi) design formdocuments (for financial monitoring and performance) to be submitted to Congress andpublished for the general public; (vii) determine resource requirements to implement the system;(viii) prepare instruments for implementation; and (ix) assist legal experts to prepare theadministrative, regulatory, or statutory amendments needed to implement the system
6. Corporate Planning (4 person-months)
15. The Consultant will (i) formulate corporate planning philosophy, conceptual approach,and procedural templates; (ii) design a corporate planning process, scheduling methodology,outputs specification requirements, and links with the key operating systems; and (iii) formulatea six-year corporate plan for the Judiciary
7. Physical Assets Review (4 person-months)
16. The consultant will (i) assist the international consultant on physical assetsmanagement; (ii) review and report on the present physical assets management policies andprocesses, procurement policies, and physical assets accounting measures; and (iii) conduct acomplete physical assets inventory for the Judiciary
8. Administrative Management and Staffing (9 person-months)
17. The consultant will (i) design institutional mechanisms to enhance the judiciary'sadministrative independence, and establish institutional, functional and capacity requirements tomanage an administratively independent judiciary; (ii) formulate reporting systems to Congress,COA, and the public; (iii) review and redesign the formal administrative structure, removingduplication, proliferation, splitting and overlapping of oversight and housekeeping functions; (iv)redefine and delineate functions, authority, responsibility and accountability; (v) reengineer theformal administrative structure of the courts, reconfigure internal functions, and redefine thevertical relationship with central offices of the Supreme Court; (vi) assess existing staffingstructures and levels, develop the staffing pattern of the judiciary including the philosophicalbasis and objectives therefor, the detailed skills mix definition and staffing structure, andconversion methodology; (vii) identify and define objectives and specific uses of a performancemanagement system and its dimensions; (viii) review and reengineer performance indicatorssystem for evaluation of staff performance; organizational performance; and program, projectand activity performance; (ix) determine staffing, financial and physical resources needed toimplement the judicial performance management system developed by the internationalconsultant; (x) assist legal experts to prepare administrative, regulatory, or statutoryamendments necessary for implementation; (xi) design performance data generation,internal/external reporting systems, and performance assessment methodologies to assessperformances of individuals, unit heads, units, program, projects, activities organizations, andenterprises; design specific applications of performance assessment results in decision making,including definition of links to other systems.
Personnel9.
18. The consultant will (i) review existing position classifications, job descriptions andcompetency requirements; (ii) in line with the redesigned organization structure and staffingpattern, develop appropriate job descriptions and competency requirements for positions in thenew staffing pattern, formulate appropriate recruitment policies and procedures, and formulate aconversion plan from the old to the new staffing structure in coordination with the administrative
and Position Classification (6 person-months)Admin istration
18 Appendix 4, page 5
management and staffing consultant; and (iii) review, streamline, and modify personneladministration policies and implementation processes including employee deployment,maintenance of plantilla, attendance monitoring, leave administration, personnel recordscustodial and employee services, payroll administration, wage and salary administration,personnel expenditures planning and personnel budgeting, personnel discipline, personnelgrievance relief facility, and incentives and rewards administration.
10. Judicial Remuneration (4 person-months)
19. The consultant will (i) review the existing remuneration system; (ii) based on the deskreview, formulate a remuneration system for judges and justices, and develop applicationprocedures; (iii) assist legal experts to prepare administrative, regulatory, or statutoryamendments necessary to implement the reengineered remuneration system; (iv) estimate thebudget impact; and (v) develop a judicial statistics system.
11. Judicial Appointments and Performance Evaluation (8 person-months)
20. The consultant will (i) develop/reengineer the system for appointment, nomination,monitoring, evaluation, discipline, and removal to improve transparency and accountability andpredictability; (ii) define career development for judges and justices, formulate a judicial careerdevelopment program, performance incentives, and rewards; (iii) formulate applicationmethodology; (iv) deternline staffing, financial, and physical resources required to implementthe systems; (v) prepare implementation instruments; and (vi) assist legal experts prepareappropriate implementing legislation, executive enactments, or administrative orders.
12. Reengineering Judicial Training Program (6 person-months)
21. The consultant will (i) analyze training needs of judges and justices; (ii) reviewinternational experience in judicial education and prepare proposals on how it may be applied;(iii) develop conceptual framework for judicial education; (iv) refine and improve the trainingcurricula of Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), formulate judicial training programs tosupport the reform process, design and formulate distance learning modules for coursesspecified by the Supreme Court including specific courses in the use of the new systemsdeveloped under the T A; (v) train personnel to implement the reforms developed under the T A;and (vi) identify training resource requirements in coordination with PhiIJA.
13. Legal Expert in Philippine Constitutional and Administrative Law(6 person-months)
22. The consultant will (i) advise all other consultants on current law and the legality ofreform proposals; (ii) draft the administrative, regulatory, or statutory amendments orenactments necessary to implement or strengthen the reforms developed under the T A; (iii)work with the budget corsultants on the review of the legal purview of the Department of Budgetand Management (DBM) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) over the funding of theJudiciary; (iv) review the existing laws concerning the purview of the DBM and Civil ServiceCommission (CSC) over the judicial budgeting process as well as the administrativeorganization of the judiciary; and (v) determine what limitations, if any these statutes place onthe judiciary's autonomy and provide recommendations for dealing with these impediments.
.;
.
