Asian Defence and Diplomacy Vol 15 Nov Dec 2008

Volume 15 Nov/Dec 2008

ASlAllllEltilGt & lllPlllMAGY

www. ad p rcon su lt. com. my

IT

IT

{

t

#

il

i$

qa

: s,r;4; i ; g*:t t: = . lzSr; eiii * r* * . ?, -:: ;,- :,

=, = i

= ::-. a

(=-BR/AEFI

ASIAlI

CONTENTSVolume 15 November/December 2008

IN FOCUS

REGIONAT FOCUS

Defence Developments in lndonesia

The Pakistan Armed ForcesTesting Times For The Military

AIR SYSTEMS

The Chinese Air Force Growth Path

NAVAL 5Y5TEM5

Evolution & RevolutionChinese Naval Developments

REGIONAT UPDATE

Regional Defence News Analysis

4

11

17

27

28

'46lndustry News From Around The World

Front Cover Picture: On landing with its braking parachute de-ployed, a Sukhoi Su-27SK of the Chinese Peoples Liberation ArmyAir Force (PLAAF). ln December 1991 PLAAF placed its first orderfor the Su-27SlVUBK and this acquisition would start the transfor-mation of Chinese combat aircraft capabilities.This issue of AsianDefence & Diplomacy contains articles on the Chinese Air Force

and Navy, as well as on lndonesia and Pakistan. (Photo: via SVT)

llHIIlGI a lllPl0ill[CYEDITORIALTEAM

EditorDav jd Saw [email protected]

Associate EditorR. S. Sassheen, Farouk Kamal

Copy EditorK. Arish, William Tan

Assistant EditorsR.G.G. Paran

5enior WriterAdam lsmail

Russia CorrespondentElena Laskina

LibrarianNoor Afzan Md. Affan

ContributorsProf. Dr. Bilveer 5inqh, Prof. DI Philip Davies,

Prof. Dr. K. S. Nathan. Dr. Ahmad Faruqui

ADPR Consult fMf Sdn BhdFounder Major (R) R. Sachi Thananthan (1942-2001)

DIRECTORSChairman

Dato'Hj.Ahmad Hasmuni Hj.Hussein

Managing Directorl,4dm. V. Ranee Sachi ranee,[email protected]

Executive PublisherVittorio Rorsi Prudente [email protected]

Chief Operating Offi<erSiva Sachi [email protected]

Secretary to the PublisherZariana Omar [email protected]

Web & Art Dire(tolVijay Pingili [email protected]

lTExecutive KaneshNaidu [email protected]

Ac(ountsExe(utive RuzzieHassan [email protected],my

Circulation Executive Khairul Naem

Promotions Fauziah Harun,5. Kavin

ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY is a monthly publication fordiplomats and professionals in the defence, security andacademic fields. Opinions expressed by contributors in

ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY do not necessarilyrepresent those of the publisher or editor.

This publication may not be reprcduced or transmitted in any form inwhole or in pott without the written exprcss consent of the publishers.

ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY ls published byADPR Consult (M) Sdn Bhd, which also publishes

ASIAN AIRLINES & AEROSPACE,ASIA-PACIFIC MILITARY BALANCE and SHOW DAILY.

SUBSCRIPTION, BACK COPIES and REPRINTS

Khairul Naem circuloti on@ad prconsu lt.com. my

Distributed by Vishal Magazine Distributor Sdn Bhd, Malaysia andMarketAsia Distributors (5) Pte Ltd, Singapore.

Colour Separation Spectrum Production House (M) 5dn Bhd

Print€d by Percetakan Skyline 5dn Bhd,No. 35 & 37, Jalan 1 2/328, TSI Business lndustrial Park, Batu 6'l/2,

OffJalan Kepong,52100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

nffEilGt a lllPl0ltl[GY\*

' I n.gunrtAlr ro* Progrdmm€s I hOhn e*y Adte P.otectlon

, I Cftin"* Suunodn"t I Ru3shn Hefte lndustry

ilEW]||GU$!ilEWIE[TUn[$!

IN FOCUS

ORDER IN CHAOS OR

CHAOS ON ORDER

Pick up any newspaper or look at the television whereveryou are around the world and there is a good chance thatthe leading story will be the financial crisis. Depending onthe day you decide to look its either a crisis or a crisis avert-ed, followed by the opposite the next day. lf you like the fi-nancial news to be unpredictable there is plenty for you tolike at the momentl

Financial markets are suffering there is no doubt aboutthat. Using 3lst December 2007 as our starting point, inMalaysia the KLSE

was down 34.3o/o

in local currencyterms on October15th. ln Hong Kong

the Hang Seng was

down 42.5o/o, inSingapore the STI

was down 40.60/o,

in the Republic ofKorea the KOSPI

was down 29.4o/o,in

China the SSEA was

down 62]0/o andlndia the BSE was

down 46.70lo - thebad news goes onand on.

Markets inevitably correct themselves - they are like grav-

ity where what goes up must come down. We are now in asituation where after years of cheap money there in no li-quidity in the system and those institutions, companies andfinancial markets thatthrived on this excess liquidity are nowin deep trouble. Before anybody starts thinking of jumpingout of the window, this does not mean that the end of theworld is in prospect. ln so many areas of the world there are

national economies with fundamental strengths and manycompanies that are also fundamentally strong. That is thegood news.

Equally good, unless you happen to be an oil producer, is

the fact that oil prices are declining. ln the London marketat close of business on 16th October, benchmark West Texas

Crude was down to 570.25 per barrel for December delivery.It was at over 5140 per barrel in July. That will be extremelyhelpful for many regional economies.

Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY

Turning to the bad news, the problem is there is far toomuch bad news. Whether you like it or not the world econo-my is interconnected, globalisation is a reality. The US econ-

omy is contracting and although it is estimated that Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) will grow by 1.60lo this year and by

0.60/oin 2009, this is not enough. Add to that the uncertaintyof the upcoming elections and you have the world's largesteconomy looking totally unable to generate the demandnecessary to help us out of this financial mess. ln Japan esti-

mated GDP growth for this year is down to 0.7o/o and growthin 2009 is estimated al0.60/o. The major European economies

are slowing as well and allthings considered the trend is to-wards a recession.

The Chinese economy on the other hand is still growingwith GDP estimated to increase by 9.8o/o this year and by8.5% next year, lndia is also growing with an estimated GDP

increase of 7.3o/o this year and 6.80/o next year. Domestic de-mand can account for much of this growth, but export mar-kets are still critical, particularly for China, and with the US,

Japan and Europe heading into recession there are stormclouds on the horizon.

Domestically in the region we must also consider the re-

ality of growing inflation, in lndia Consumer Price lnflation(CPl) was running al 9o/oin August, in lndonesia it was 1iol0,

in Pakistan it was at 23.9o/o in September, in Malaysia it was8.50lo in August and in Singapore 6.40/o. Add all of this to-gether and it is not a pleasant picture, when you use wordslike inflation and recession at the end of the day they are notabstracts - real people suffer.

Getting out of this mess will not be easy - it will requirepolitical leadership and economic responsibility. One can

only hope that that the political leaders of the major eco-nomic powers are up to the task.

ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008

DEFENCE DEVELOPMENTS

IN INDONESIA bYDAVIDSAW

-', -t

rqry**.-

::':i4fii,:r.-}]::i'ttr{:: :r'::.i, - -i

..,:., . .,,..:r:lr-!lj::::i.... ....rr}.:;itr.i. ,..... ,:: -- ti. I "'"f-: :: , I

_

. ,J.-.rfft

r''-"! a. ,*

-""*4'*-t ll

.r.** - tr!

rr*:&;t: ;r{L, **

:;*xr*rd*.W

, ,a:;,,1:" itr

A H# : f T: : :::?i: l""ff ."Jtneeds to start by looking at the past,

for it is the past that has shaped the

present in political, economic and de-

fence terms. lndonesia is still a state

in transition; it is still coming to terms

with a democratic political system and

still trying to overcome years of eco-

nomic mismanagement and corrup-

tion. Much progress has been made

by lndonesia in recent years, but much

still remains and needs to be done totransform th is country.

After the surrender of Japan in Au-

gust 1945, lndonesian nationalists de-

clared independence from colonial

rule by the Netherlands on lTth August

1945 and Sukarno became the firstpresident of independent lndonesia.

The return of the Dutch to lndonesia

led to an anti-colonial struggle and itwas only on 27th December 1949 thatthe Dutch finally understood that their

attempts to retain their colony had

failed and finally accepted lndonesian

independence.With the prestige of success in an

anti-colonial struggle against a west-

ern power, Sukarno became a majorpolitical figure in the emerging post-

colonial world. He was also a leading

light in the formation of the Non-

Aligned Movement (NAM). Sukarno

gradually moved closer to the Soviet

bloc, probably prompted by the grow-

ing political importance of the lndo-nesian Communist Party (PKl), and thisled to the supply of military equipmentby the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,Poland and China from 1957 onwards.

This Soviet bloc assistance totallytransformed the lndonesian military.Naval equipment supplied bythe SovietUnion included a Sverdlov class heavy

cruiser, Skory class destroyers, Riga

class frigates and 12 Project 613 Whis-key class submarines. Aircraft includedTupolev Tu-16 bombers, MiG-l9 andMiG-21 fighters. By the mid-1960s thelndonesian Air Force, Tentara Nasionallndonesia - Angkatan Udara (TNl-AU)

was the largest and best equipped in

Southeast Asia. ln addition armouredvehicles and air defence equipmentcame from the Soviet bloc.

The Tentara Nasional lndonesia (TNl)

had become a major military power in

regional terms, but lndonesia had in-creasing security concerns. For exam-ple, the US Central lntelligence Agency(ClA) was supporting separatist groupsin lndonesia with weapons, equipmentand even air support. ln 1958 therewas an attempted coup in Sumatraand Sulawesi. The reality of the situa-

tion in the lndonesia of that period was

that Sukarno was attempting to treada path between three distinct politicalcurrents, which were known as'Nasa-


kom' standing for nationalism, religionand communism. The contradictionsbetween these three political currentswould inevitably lead to conflict.

On top of this lndonesia created itsown problems as Sukarno decided on

a policy of 'Konfrontasi' with Malay-

sia that also drew in British Common-wealth forces. ln consequence, by themid-l960s, lndonesia was at the centre

of an absolutely unstable security en-

vironment.Then events suddenly spun out of

control. On 30th September 1965 thePKI attempted a coup, which was ruth-lessly suppressed by the TNI under theleadership of General Suharto. Gradu-

I

I

L

rir6,s}jA;" rs('u3ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008

ally Sukarno was eased out of powerand in 1962 Suharto became the sec-

ond president of lndonesia. Suhartoand the TNI instituted the corporatist'New Order' regime and proceeded totake an unshakeable hold on politicalpower in lndonesia. On reflection, theSuharto regime did achieve a lot for ln-donesia, but whatever the gains muchwas also lost, to cronyism, corruption,mismanagement and sheer incompe-tence.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 hitlndonesia hard and it appeared thatthe Suharto government was para-

lysed by indecision. Demonstrationsand riots erupted, the government was

losing control and eventually Suharto,who by this time was ill, was persuaded

to step down from office in May 1998.

He was succeeded by his vice presidentB.J. Habibie, who went on to contestand lose the 1999 election to Abdur-rahman Wahid. The new presidentonly lasted until July 2001, when he

l=.1

was forced to step aside in favour of thevice president Megawati Sukarnoputri,the daughter of Sukarno.

The Political Environment

ln the 2004 elections, Megawati was

faced by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonoand soundly beaten, with Susilo Bam-

bang Yudhoyono (SBY) winning 60.60/o

of the votes cast. The new governmentfaced major challenges, with the mostpressing being making the economyfunction in a more satisfactory man-ner. lndeed the SBY administration has

much to point to in this regard; in 2006and 2007 the Jakarta stockmarket (JSX)

was one of the top three performersin the world. By the end of December2007 lndonesia's foreign exchange re-serves had reached a level of 556.92 bil-lion - an all time high.

The positive signs would lose someof their lustre in 2008, as oil and food

prices rose. This forced the govern-ment to increase its subsidy payments,

with the inevitable negative outcomefor public finances. Everybody in thelndonesian political elite was perfectlywell aware that elections would beheld in 2009 and in that environment itis unlikely that politicians would makeany hard economic choices. The factthat oil prices have reduced and foodprices are now more stable is goodnews for the lndonesian government.What is not is the current internationalfinancial crisis, which will inevitably im-pact on lndonesia - it is still too early tosay what the outcome of that will be.

Despite this mixed picture, the ln-donesian economy has been doingwell this year. At the end of the secondquarter lndonesian Gross DomesticProduct (GDP) was up 6.50/o comparedto the same period in 2007. Currentestimates are that lndonesian GDP

growth will average out at 5.8% for thisyear and the predictions are that it willbe 5.50lo in 2009. These are good num-bers, but lndonesia needs its GDP togrow at a sustained higher rate if it is tomeet the needs of its growing popula-tion. There are concerns over inflation,in September Consumer Price lnflation(CPl) was running at an uncomfortable11o/o, up f rom 7o/o last year. Another is-

sue is unemployment; this had reached8,5% in February and is now believedto be runnin g al9.1o/o.

As previously mentioned there willbe an election in April 2009 and themain protagonists will once again beSBY and Megawati Sukarnoputri. Ac-

cording to recent polls, Megawati is

running ahead of SBY in terms of popu-larity, although its stilltoo close to call

and there is a long way to go until Aprilnext year. That being said, a downturnin economic conditions can only hurtSBY.

The current administration has notbeen perfect, yet it has achieved con-structive things and proved that it is

able to respond effectively to unex-

pected events, such as natural disas-

ters. lf circumstances had been dif-ferent SBY would have been expectedto win a second term, now things are

much more unpredictable. Arguably,

lndonesia could do with a bit of po-litical stability, especially in the cur-rent diffi cult economic circumstances,in the end though it will come downto the will of the estimared 174 millionvoters in lndonesia.

Governing lndonesia is no easy task.

This archipelagic nation of 12508 is-

lands has a population in excess of237.5 million people and a multiplicityof ethnic groups of which the Javanese

al 40.60/o are the most numerous. Allof this also presents the TNI with a dif-ficult task in trying to defend the coun-try against both internal and externalthreats. Added to which, the political

role of the TNI over the years has donelittle or nothing to aid it in dischargingits core security mission or giving it theappropriate tools to do so.

Defence Funding

Environment

ln real terms, the TNI and its majorconstituent elements, the TNI-Ang-katan Darat. (TNl-AD), the army, theTNI-Angkatan Laut (TNl-AL), the navy,

and the TNI-Angkatan Udara (TNl-AU),

air force, have never had the financialresources required. lt is commonlyassumed that under the New Orderregime that the TNI benefited frommajor funding - that is not the case. ln

fact in the last decade of rule by Suhar-

to military expenditure was essentially


limited.lf we take 1988 as our base year, in

financial terms using constant 2005

US dollars as a comparator lndonesianmilitary expenditure was $1,885 mil-lio n eq u iva le nt to 2o/o of G D P. ln 1996,

military expenditure was 52,840 mil-lion, which was equivalent to L6o/o ofGDP. The next year spending was re-

duced to 52,653 million or 1.5o/o of GDP,

falling to 52,079 million or 1.10/o of GDP

in 1998. ln the ten years from i988,military expenditure as a percentageof GDP either remained static or de-clined.

Entering the democratic era, militaryexpenditure hardly grew in a measur-

able fashion for many years. ln 1999

military expenditure amounted to

(...Continued on page 8)

www.nexter-group.fr a\

Eletten

NextenCAESAR':StFongGl. HIT HARDER, HARDER TO HIT

ASIANDEFENCE&DIPLOMACY No\

(...Continued from page 7)

S1,710 million or 0.9o/o of the GDP. For

the next three years it remained at the

equivalent of 1o/o of GDP, rising to 1.3%

in 2003. Here the value of using con-

stant 2005 U5 dollars as a comparison

tool is useful, in 2003 lndonesian mili-

tary expenditure amounted to 53,319

million far more than any equivalentyear in the last ten years ofthe Suharto

regime. The following year saw mili-tary expenditure as a slice of GDP ris-

ing lo 1.4o/o and expenditure of 53,653

million. However, 2005 spending was

down to 53,517 million equivalent to1.2o/o of GDP.

The improving lndonesian economY

gave the TNI an increase in funding in

both 2006 and 2007 in comParative

and percentage of GDP terms. Yet in

reality the level of military expendi-

ture in lndonesia is not enough tosupport the modernisation needs of a

military with over 300,000 personnel

and an inventory of essentially aged

equipment.With concerns growing about the

future direction of the lndonesian

economy, the government has chosen

to reduce its expenditure. One of thecasualties of this is military expendi-

ture, with a I00lo cut being made in TNI-

AD budget allocations primarily in the

procurement area. This comes on topof the fact that military expenditure as

a percentage of GDP is now running

at under 1o/o. ln this environment any

overhaul of TNI equipment resources

as part of a sustained modernisationprogramme is virtually impossible.

Modernisation Sttess

A look at the armoured vehicle re-

sources of the TNI-AD presents a ma-

jor argument for the pressing need formodernisation. There are large num-


*i'**

r'd@;&rd""

k"r,;...]3*

*a ,- j;r.i. .,1 *

. rt5::: :.!: f:::' :i&i :,':

-i"L*

e1:tr1:',

r. 'i.i. g s'i*:3 r sJ':*€'

@&

{!"

4

#

€r*r&€

.-*.: -::nra'

'j]@-

*

*

3

At home on any terrainSpecific knowledge, reliable empirical data and RUAG quality combine to create solutions

that satisfy the most stringent requirements and which will be as effective tomorrow as they

are today - in the defence technology sector as well as in the civilian market. We embrace

challenges with flexibility and commitment to create benefits for our customers. RUAG's

innovative capability and reliability make it the partner of choice for aerospace, defence and

!v\.'vw.ruac.ccll

EXCEL:ENCI iN QuAi.-] i-Y IOR YOilt S/\f :-:'Y AN;) -c:C;i,i': Y

':A:'::,.r]11:.:sl;. t;'t

technology projects

ffi#&ffi


It


bers of AMX-I3 tanks acquired in theearly 1960s, some reworked in lndo-nesia and some modernised with theSingaporean SM1 package. In termsof tracked personnel carriers there are

large numbers of AMX-VCl vehicles,the last of these was delivere d in 1962.Turning to wheeled armoured vehiclesthere are over 100 BTR-4Os acquiredin the early 1960s, many of these have

been subject to a basic modernisation,and there are some 55 British Saracen

vehicles, again acquired in the early1960s, with a limited number modern-ised.

The TNI-AD has been ingenious in

keeping its aged armoured vehicles

viable, but the fact that it has had todo this is symptomatic of the prob-lems that it faces. Years of under in-vestment, plus the imposition of arms

embargos have left the three serviceswith tremendous problems. Much ofthe legacy equipment in lndonesia isdesperately short of spares a problemfor the TNI-AU in particular. Progress

is being made on that front, the factthat spares can now be obtained for

US or European-supplied equipmentis a major bonus. However. much ofthe legacy equipment in lndonesia is

beyond economic salvation and oughtto be scrapped.

ln the past few years though therehas been some progress on acquiringnew equipment, from amongst oth-ers the Republic of Korea (ROK) andPoland. The ROK has supplied trainingaircraft, two LPDs and assisted PT PAL

in Surabaya with the construction oftwo more LPDs (the first was launchedin August). Poland supplied air defenceequipment and aircraft, with lndonesiaable to finance the purchase through a

loan from Poland. The most significantdefence supply relationship is withRussia; in 2003 lndonesia acquired fourSukhoi combat aircraft for around 5i 95

million, of which 526 million was paid

in cash and the rest in bartered prod-ucts.

This first Sukhoi contract openedthe way to an expansion of defencelinks between lndonesia and Russia.

Last year the two countries seemed toagree a major defence package witha value in excess of $1 billion to covermore Sukhoi aircraft and naval equip-

ment amongst other systems. At thetime it was believed that this package

would be financed by a loan from Rus-

sia, but this appears to have been dif-ficult to resolve.

The TNI is now trying to arrangethe delivery of three of the six Sukhoicombat aircraft that were orderedin 2007, but this is proving problem-atic. A loan has been agreed with theFrench investment bank Natixis to cov-er the 5360 million purchase price ofthese three aircraft, the only problemwas that parliamentary approval wasneeded for this release of this fundingand it was proving hard to get.

The problem in funding the Sukhoipurchase illustrates the difficulties thatlndonesia faces in trying to moderniseits military. To purchase foreign equip-ment it needs to obtain loan packages

at reasonable terms, something that is

not that easy to obtain. with the cur-

rent financial crisis finding any accept-able loan package is going to be ex-

tremely difficult, further adding to themodernisation problems of the TNl.Once again it looks as if circumstanceswill conspire to limit the ability of theTNI to acquire new equipment. r

It's offi cial !We are the official and only show daily news

published at lndo Defence & lndo Aerospace 2008.INDO

INBODEFENCE Af,ROTPACE208THE 3FO lNDONESIA'S OFFICIALTBI-SERVICE OEFENCE EVENT

2c.8THE 1ST INDONESIA'S OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL AVIATION,AIRCRAFT AND Y EVENT

Booking deadline: 7th November 2008

Material deadline: lOth November 2008

Points to ponder:

o The exhibition is fully supported by the lndonesian Government & thelndonesian Armed Forces

r lndonesia is investing significant funds into the acquisition of new defencesystems for theArmed Forces, with air, land and naval systems required

o Existing legacy equipment is to be subject to upgrade and modernization

Programmes

o lndonesia is looking to develop the capabilities of the indigenous defenceindustry through technology transfer programmes and joint ventures

o The growing lndonesian economy is generating increasing demand for airtransport with local airlines modernizing and expanding their fleets

o New major airport and infrastructure development programmes across

lndonesia to cope with increasing air transport demand


THE PAKISTAN ARMED FORCES.

TESTING TIMES FOR THE MILITARY 'YDAVDSAW

rFhe new and untested civilianI leadership in Pakistan is find-

ing that while it might have proved

far easier than expected to grasp the

levers of power, the challenges thatthey are currently facing are probably

more than they bargained for. Presi-

dent Asif Ali Zardari is now having tocome to terms with the fact that the

Pakistani economy is ialling apart and

that something must be done, and

very soon, or the country will be in the

midst of an immense crisis.

Pakistan has had to confront major

economic problems on numerous oc-

casions in recent years and has often

i\i

_*ryl*"

7

e_

Nov/De. 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY

found itself going to international do-nors in a desperate search for financial

assistance. This happened under thecivilian governments of Benazir Bhuttoand Nawaz Sharil it also happened at

the start of General Musharraf's rule.

The difference this time is that the fi-nancial situation is far worse and theoverall political environment in Paki-

stan is incredibly unstable.

Pakistan currently has an enormousbala nce of payments deficiU it will need

to obtain 53 billion just to cover its for-eign currency debt before the end ofNovember. ln fact Pakistan might ac-

tualiy require as much as 54 billion tocover its immediate difficulties! That

is just the start though. To resolve thebalance of payments crisis, Pakistan

will need to obtain anything from 510

billion to $tS billion of financial sup-port over the next two years!

The world is in the midst of an

enormous financial crisis and Pakistan

starts to look for anything between

513 billion and 519 billion of financial

support. lt is hardly surprising to notethat the level of enthusiasm for helpingPakistan out of this situation has been

virtually non-existent. The Pakistan

government had hoped that its tradi-tional friends would be prepared tohelp in its hour of need, but they have

been extremely reluctant.The government in lslamabad

thought that Saudi Arabia could bepersuaded to defer payments for oil,which could have given Pakistan theequivalent of nearly 56 billion. The

Saudi response has thus far been less

than helpful. China is also extremelyreluctant to help out, all of which leaves

Pakistan with an enormous problem.They cannot turn to the US for help, as

that is not an option at the moment.There is still a chance that they mightbe able to get some help from friendlynations, with a conference due to be

held in November in Abu Dhabito dis-

cuss financial aid.

Another option that Pakistan is ex-

ploring is assistance from the Asian

Development Bank (ADB) or even theWorld Bank. The ADB came up with

5500 million for Pakistan in September,

but obtaining anything more substan-

tial is proving difficult. The way thingsare going at the momen| the only op-tion left to Pakistan could turn out to be

the lnternational Monetary Fund (lMF).

The problem for the Pakistani govern-ment is that aid from the IMF could

come at a price they will be unwillingand perhaps even unable to pay. Ap-parently there have been meetings

between the government and the IMF

held in Dubai. The last time IMF officialsvisited Pakistan was when lslamabad's

Marriot hotel was destroyed in a ter-

rorist attack. An obvious message thatthere are forces in Pakistan who des-perately want the Pakistani economyto sink into deeper turmoil.

Getting Worse

The reason that the governmentwants to avoid going to the IMF is theterms that will be extracted for finan-cial assistance. The IMF will demandmajor cuts in government spendingand will want to see major increases in

taxation. All of which is guaranteed tomake the government highly unpopu-lar. Any Pakistani government has to be

able to offer patronage to its support-

Jl


ers and this comes through the abilityto direct government expenditure toappropriate areas. ln consequence less

government expenditure equals less

ability to buy support and that equals

unpopularity.The IMF will also demand the Paki-

stan significantly reduce the amountof money that it spends on defence.

Bearing in mind the propensity of thePakistani military to intervene in poli-

tics, aggravating them by reducingtheir budget is hardly likely to be a wise

move. All things considered it is notdifficult to see why the governmentwould wish to avoid the medicine ofthe lMF. However, unless they can findanother solution, the IMF is the onlygame in town.

The scope of the crisis in Pakistan is

immense. lnflation is running at almost30%, the Pakistan rupee has been shed-

ding value against the dollar and this isa major problem as Pakistan needs dol-lars to pay for food and fuel imports.Last year on 22nd October 60.7 rupees

was equivalent to a US dollar, this year

the rate is 81.4 rupees for a US dollar.

There is only enough foreign currency

to cover less than six weeks of imports.The picture of doom and gloom is un-

ending.What Pakistan needs, in addition

to the massive infusion of money toresolve the balance of payments cri-sis, is foreign investment to keep itseconomy growing. With terrorist in-cidents in Pakistan continuing to rise,

a less than decisive government and

a dreadful macro-economic climate,

it is hardly surprising that Pakistan ismost definitely not a favoured invest-

ment destination at present. Yet it is

not that long ago that Pakistan couldattract substantial foreign investment,from 2003 onwards the economy grew

rapidly. Last year though as political

uncertainties grew the economy suf-

fered and nothing has happened since

to slow the downward trend.One of the big contributors to

growth in Pakistan was US economicassistance, this flowed in after Pakistan

decided that it would become an ally

in the 'War on Terror'. From the end

of 2001 onwards this US assistance

amounted to s10 billion. Future US

economic assistance depends on how

they perceive that Pakistan is contrib-uting in assisting US policy objectivesin Afghanistan, future aid will come

with strings attached. Even worse isthe fact that Washington currentlysees Pakistan in a rather negative light,add to this a new administration takingoffice in January in the US and its all arecipe for uncertainty for the Pakistani

leadership. One thing is for certain, inthe future Pakistan will not receive theeasy ride that it got from the Bush ad-

ministration for so many years.

Security Scenario

There was a time when security plan-

ning in Pakistan was pretty straightfor-ward, the fundamental threat was theoverwhelming conventional superior-

ity of lndia and the requirement was tofind a means to counter this superior-

ity. The belief in Pakistani military cir-

cles was that although they could never

match the lndian military in terms ofnumbers, they could offset this numeri-cal disadvantage through what theythought was the superior quality of

l:;lit{}Xar. l*fl;{':!t,i-.1{}1!5:- I {}{ !jj

their soldiers and their martial spirit. lnreality this was a fallacy, yet it impact-ed on Pakistani defence planning foryears.

Another immense obstacle for Paki-

stan to surmount was finding a counterto lndia's possession of nuclear weap-ons. This was achieved at great cost andthe Pakistani nuclear arsenal and its as-

sociated delivery systems act as a coun-ter to lndian capabilities in this area.Howevet the nuclear programme also

led to the estrangement of Pakistan

from the U5, its main defence equip-ment supplier, for more than a decade.This resulted in a dramatic dilutionin the combat power of the Pakistan

Armed Forces as existing equipmentcould not be sustained. Furthermore,alternative sources of supply could notreplace the US in terms of both capabil-ity and cost.

When General Musharraf decidedto support US military operations in

Afghanistan in the wake of the terror-ist attacks of 11th September 2001, itmarked a dramatic reversal of Paki-

stani policy regarding the Taliban andAfghanistan. Yet, from the perspective

of the Paklstani military it was the cor-rect choice to make. By March 2004,

Pakistan had been granted Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status by the US gov-ernment. This opened the way to thefull resumption of the defence supplyrelationship and significant financial as-

sistance as well.ln equipment terms, the ability to

acquire F-16C/D aircraft, upgrade theexisting F-16A/8 fleet and acquire moreF-16A/8 aircraft was a significant bonusfor the Pakistan Air Force. The other twoservices also benefited from US equip-ment, for example the Pakistan Armyreceived attack and utility helicopters,with the Pakistan Navy receiving newP-3C Orion MPA aircraft. All of this was

extremely welcome.


Beyond this though, the critical pointwas that the decislon taken by GeneralMusharraf in 2001 to support the US

broke Pakistan out of international iso-

lation. When US economic assistance

came into play, this acted as the cata-lyst for Pakistani economic growth andencouraged more foreign investmentthat further stimulated the economy.Had Pakistan continued to pursue moresensible economic policies in recentyears, current circumstances might bevery different. Sadly, this was not to be.

Pakistan has paid a price for turningits back on Afghanistan and the Talibanin 2001 and perhaps this was not antici-pated. One of the things that Pakistan

has always lacked was strategic depthin a geographical sense, there was tre-mendous logic in allowing lnter Serv-ices lntelligence (lSl) to sponsor andsupport the Taliban, as once the Talibanhad come to power in Afghanistan theyprovided Pakistan with that strategic


.r:l'

;$

Tii

*

1L"w

depth.The lSl was supporting the Taliban

on the one side and on the other were

supporting jihadist groups in Kashmir

in furtherance of Pakistani objectives in

that area. The danger for Pakistan was

that its support of these jihadist groups

might have unintended consequences.

This is what has come to pass, with the

rise of the 'Pakistani Taliban', an insur-

gency along the Pakistan-Afghanistan

border and terrorism in the main cities

of Pakistan. The jihadist groups have

gone from being a tool that could be

manipulated to suit the purposes of the

lSl and Pakistan, to being a direct threat

to the security of the Pakistani state.

This is a classic example of the law of

unintended consequences.

The Next Step

The leadership of the Pakistan

Armed Forces currentlY find them-

selves in an incredibly difficult situ-

ation. Their aim in withdrawing sup-

port from Pervez Musharraf was tomove into the background and leave

the civilian politicians to attempt tosolve the mess that Pakistan was in.

US pressure to allow the 'democratic

process' to proceed doubtless played

a part in this decision by the military.

The only problem is that General Ash-

faq Kayani, the ArmY Chief of Staff'

must now be wondering how much

worse the security situation could get

and what options he has to deal with

it.The last thing that the Pakistani

military wants to be doing is fight-

ing a counter-insurgency campaign

within Pakistan. They are a military

that is structured to deal with conven-

tional rather than asymmetric threats,

hence the costlY nature of recent

military operations in the tribal areas

along the Afghan border. By inclina-

tion President Zardari is a dealmaker

and will seek to negotiate his way out

of dealing with the insurgency, this

might actually suit the military at this

point. Yet making deals will not make

the problem go away, esPeciallY ifeconomic conditions do not improve,

they will only postPone events.

For Pakistan it is vital that the po-

litical elites understand the danger of

the current situation in the country.

Unfortunately, over the years the po-

litical elites have proven more inclined

to self-interest rather than looking to

support the national interest. There is

no reason to believe that this will have

changed, as the current Zardari gov'ernment and the main political oppo-sition led by Nawaz Sharif are implac-

able opponents.The only certaintY in Pakistan is

that things are likely to 9et much

worse before they get any better, un-

less all concerned are truly lucky. The

sad thing is that Pakistan has never

been that lucky with its politicians.

All of which means that the Pakistan

Armed Forces, as the eventual guaran-

tor of the state, must potentially be

prepared to intervene in the politicalprocess, even though that is the last

thing they wish to do at the moment.r

AIR SYSTEMSNov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY

THE CHINESE AIR FORCE GROWTH PATH bYDAVDSAW

he Chinese People's LiberationArmy Air Force (PLAAF) was

formally established on lith Novem-ber 1949, yet its history can be tracedback to the numerous air units that theChinese Communist Party had formedduring the Civil War period with vary-ing degrees of success. The prime rea-son behind the establishment of thePLAAF in 1949 was the future availabil-ity of extensive military assistance fromthe Soviet Union in the form of equip-ment, training and support.

It was Soviet methods that wouldfundamentally shape the PLAAF andalso support the establishment of a

Chinese aerospace industry. From the

end of 1949 Soviet advisors made greatefforts to train pilots and other person-nel for the fledgling PLAAF. Not thatPLAAF was aware of yet, but a criticaltest was on the horizon that would see

them thrown into combat far earlierthan anybody had anticipated.

On 25th June 1950, Kim ll Sung un-leashed the North Korean People's

Army (NKPA) in an effort to destroy theRepublic of Korea (ROK) and unify theKorean peninsula by force. Althoughthe Chinese leadership had been in-formed about the invasion, what it didnot expect in the aftermath was Amer-ican intervention. China was marshal-Iing its forces for what it hoped would

be the final defeat of the Nationalistforces on Taiwan, now it had to dealwith a new security situation and bythe end of July 1950, PLA units startedmoving towards the Sino-North Kore-an border area.

The Chinese attitude to the Korean

conflict grew more focussed after theUS/UN amphibious landing in lnchonand the move across the 38th Parallel

into North Korean territory by the endof September 1950. ln October 1950,

Beijing was convinced that it had tointervene to protect its borders andsave North Korea. This saw PLA forcesorganized into the Chinese People'sVolunteers (CPV) under the command

NAVAL SYSTEMS


of Peng Dehuai. Peng was an experi-enced field commander and realised

immediately that if the CPV were com-mitted against the US/UN forces in

Korea it would need effective air sup-

port. The only problem was that Mao

Zedong and the Chinese leadership

had no ability to provide Peng with air

support at this time, and could onlY

hope that the Soviet Union would be

prepared to help.

On 19th October 1950 the CPV

moved into Korea, staging a sharp of-

fensive action against ROK troops on

25th October and then withdrawingon 16th November. The US/UN forces

failed to understand what was hap-

pening and after launching their ownoffensive on 24Ih November 1950,

suddenly found themselves facing a

CPV counteroffensive launched thenext day. By 4th January 1951, the CPV

had taken Seoul, but were eventually

pushed back. The middle of 1951 saw

the Korean War move to a stalemate

along the 38th Parallel, with armistice

negotiations commencing at Kaesong.

Stalemate on the ground did notmean that military operations ceased,

they would continue at tremendouscost to all involved. ln the air thoughthings were changing and the PLAAF

was finally ready to enter combatin Korea. On 25th September 1951,

MiG-15 aircraft of the 12th Regiment,

4th Air Dlvision PLAAF, saw combat forthe first time. When the armistice thatended the Korean War was signed on

ZTth )uly 1953, PLAAF units had flown26,491 sorties over Korea.

PLAAF had gone from virtuallynothing in 1949, to having 27 Ai Divi-sions and over 3,000 combat aircraft in1953. The combat experience gained

was critical to the development ofPLAAF and many of the pilots who had

flown in Korea would go on to become

the PLAAF leadership in the 1980s

and 1990s. lt was this leadership thatwould transform the PLAAF and lay

the groundwork to make it the force itis today.

Air Systems

China had its air force, but this air

force was totally dependent on theSoviet Union for the supply of equip-ment. During the 1950s PLAAF wouldreceive large deliveries of Soviet air-

craft, in parallel with this the Chinese

aerospace industry would receive

training and technology transfer pack-

ages allowing them to produce Soviet

aircraft under license. lnitially this saw

Shenyang manufacture the MiG-l5UTl

trainer as the JJ-2.

Then came the first true advance

itl


in capability with license productionrights for the MiG-17F. The Soviet Unionsupplied two complete aircraft, 15 in kitform and parts for 10 complete aircraft,as well as the plans for the aircraft. Thefirst Chinese assembled MiG-17F flew inJuly 1956 and was designated as the J-5

in PLAAF service. Shenyang later wenton to build the J-5A based on the MiG-17PF and j-5 production finally endedin 1969. A trainer version of the J-5 was

developed and built at Chengdu as theJJ-5, with its first flight in 1968 and pro-duction finally ending in 1986.

The Chinese industry did not findlicense production of Soviet combataircraft to be a straightforward proc-ess. ln particular they discovered thatthere were major differences betweenthe plans they received and the aircraftand parts kits. The reason behind thiswas that changes and modifications tothe aircraft happened on the produc-tion line, and it was a long time beforeanybody got around to changing thetechnical data packages for the aircraft.Fortunately Soviet advisors and techni-cians were available in China to explainthese mysteries and resolve any diffi-culties.

After the J-5 came the arrival of theMiG-l9, this aircraft proved extremelydifficult to master in terms of local pro-duction. lnitial efforts were plagued bypoor quality, but eventually both Shen-yang and Nanchang were involved inproduction of the J-6 (Mic-l95) and theJ-6A (MiG-l9P)from the late 1950s intothe 1960s. The J-6 actually went backinto full production in 1974 at Guizhoudue to a lack of any viable modernfighter alternative for PLAAF at thattime. J-6 production eventually endedin the early 1980s with more than 3,000built. A trainer version, the JJ-6, was

developed by Shenyang with first flighttaking place in November 1970. JJ-6production started in 1976 and some624 were built before production end-ed in 1986.

ln 1957 a license production agree-

g-*'djt-:'0q,'

ment was signed with the Soviet Unioncovering the Tupolev Tu-16 bomber,this would be the most ambitious Sino-Soviet aerospace project. The aircraftwas to be produced at Harbin and in1959 parts arrived to enable the assem-

bly of the Tu-l6 and two Tu-l6 aircraftarrived to act as models for the localassembly effort. On 27th September1959, the first Chinese manufacturedTu-16 flew and subsequently was fol-lowed by a second aircraft. lt was oneof these aircraft that became the firstPLAAF aircraft to drop a nuclear weap-on in 1965.

The bomber programme then en-tered a period of uncertainty when itwas decided to transfer productionfrom Harbin to Xian. This was an enor-mous undertaking, involving movingproduction tooling and thousands ofpersonnel to a new facility. Even worsewas the fact that it was discovered thatthe technical data package supplied toChina was incomplete, meaning that itwould be necessary to essentially re-verse engineer the Tu-l6. lt was 1968

before the first locally manufacturedXian H-6 bomber would make its firstfli9ht.

September 1958 saw the PLAAF

involved in air combat with Taiwan'sRepublic of China Air Force (ROCAF)

during what was called the 'Taiwan

Straits Crisis'. PLAAF J-5 aircraft did ex-

tremely well against ROCAF F-86 Sabre

aircraft, but then the balance of forceswas changed when the US suppliedthe AIM-98 Sidewinder air-to-air mis-sile (AAM). These early infrared-guidedmissiles were' unreliable-when theyworked they were deadly, sometimesthough the unexpected happened. A

ROCAF F-86 launched an AIM-98 at a

PLAAF J-5; the missile failed to explodeand remained stuck in the fuselage ofthe PLAAF aircraft, which returned backto base. lt was this missile that wouldreinvigorate Soviet AAM developmentand eventually result in the fielding ofthe K-13/R-3S (AA-2 Atoll) missile

End 0f The Beginning

At the end of the 1950s PLAAF hadachieved real advances in capability,even though the Chinese industrywas finding it difficult to meet thechallenges of producing advancedaircraft and systems. This was particu-larly true in the case of the MiG-.l9/J-6

,t A4:

AIR SYSTEMS


as mentioned above. This period also

saw Chinese industry attempting tostart designing its own combat air-

craft, through organisations such as

60'l lnstitute in Shenyang and the 611

lnstitute in Chengdu. The end resultsof these initial indigenous aircraft de-sign efforts were negligible, but theywere they were the start of a longprocess towards the development oftruly functional local design capabili-ti es.

Developments outside the aero-space sector were to have the mostsignificant impact on PLAAF over thenext few years. Sino-Soviet relationswere starting to worsen and in 1960

Soviet advisers and technicians leftChina. Soviet leader Khrushchev didnot want an open break in relations

with Mao and China at this point; in-deed he offered some inducementsto China to stay faithful to the Sovietbloc. Amongst these inducementswas technology transfer and licenseproduction of the MiG-21F-l3, its en-gines and the K-l3 missile, negoti-ated in March 196i. A small numberof aircraft were delivered, along withsome parts kits although China neverreceived the full technical documen-tation for the aircraft.

The MiG-21 was the last system

that PLAAF would receive from theSoviet Union. By 1962 relations be-tween China and the Soviet Unionhad ceased to exist and China was

virtually isolated internationally, withAlbania being its only overt ally. As faras PLAAF and the Chinese aerospace

industry were concerned, the splitwith the Soviet Union was a disaster.Now they would both have to makethe best of what they had alreadyobtained from the Soviet Union and

what they were able to develop on

their own.Matters were not helped by the

fact that China now plunged intothe maelstrom of disaster that was

the Cultural Revolution. This was todisrupt most of the plans that PLAAF

and the industry had to improve ex-

isting systems and introduce newtypes. Even so, there were significantdevelopments. PLAAF had decidedthat it wanted to have more llyushinll-28 light bombers, which had been

directly supplied by the Soviet Union.Harbin was tasked with reverse engi-neering the aircraft and the first H-5

prototype flew in 1966 with produc-tion commencing in 1967 (il ended in

1984).

Another PLAAF requirement was

for an attack aircraft and in 1958 Nan-

chang started work on a programmeto develop the Q-5 based on the J-6(MiG-19). lt took until 1965 for the air-

craft to make its first flight and theQ-5 did not enter production until1970. Turning the MiG-21 into a vi-able programme was more efficientwith the aircraft making its first flightin 1966 and entering producing in

1968 at Chengdu.Authentic indigenous programmes

had their problems, characterised by

the Shenyang J-8 fighter programme.PLAAF had a requirement for a high-altitude interceptor, which the 601 ln-stitute at Shenyang designed based

on an enlarged version of the MiG-21

design with two engines. Develop-ment commenced in 1964, the proto-type flew in 1969 but production didnot start until late in the i970s and

the aircraft did not enter service until1981. Even then the aircraft sufferedfrom major performance def icien-cies.

AIR SYSTEMS


A New Beginning

lf it was politics that resulted in the

Sino-Soviet split and damaging con-

sequences for PLAAF and the Chinese

aerospace industry, it was politics thatoffered new opportunities at the end

ofthe 1970s.The death ofMao Zedong

and the re-emergence of Deng Xiaop-

ing as a national leader saw major

changes in China. As Deng solidifiedhis power, he was able to sideline thepolitical radicals, and then proceeded

to break the international isolation ofChina. This had two purposes, firstly a

need to counter the Soviet Union and

its satellite states who were seen as a

major threat and secondly to modern-ise the Chinese economy.

The immense damage of the Cultur-

al Revolution and other mass political

campaigns unleashed by Mao needed

to be repaired. Deng instituted the'Four Modernisations' policy under

which China would focus on improving

the areas of agriculture, industry, sci-

ence and technology and the military.

A pragmatic leadership was now set on

unleashing the extraordinary econom-ic potential of China.

As far as PLAAF and the Chinese aer-

ospace industry were concerned there

was an immense need to access new

technology, it had become increasingly

obvious howfarthey had fallen behind.With foreign countries and companies

drawn to the huge untapped Poten-tial of the Chinese market, technologystarted to flood into China. However, in

terms of defence China was not look-

ing and was in no position to PaY forcomplete systems. The requirement

was to acquire technology that could

be applied to improve the quality ofexisting Chinese systems and create

the basis upon which new generation

systems could be built.This era saw China start working

with US, European and lsraeli compa-nies, which opened up a host of majorpossibilities to the Chinese aerospace

industry. ln 1986 Grumman startedworking with Shenyang on the Peace

Pearl programme, under which the

troubled J-8 would be upgraded withwestern avionics and other modifi-cations. Nanchang started working

with ltalian industry on an upgraded

version of the Q-5, British companies

supplied radar and other technology,

I

:*d&&s:G;:.:i;e'6ilAr* ;_!'_ 4_"r_;e*;:@'i_.]6'#

r' _-

AIR SYSTEMSASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008

while French and lsraeli companies

were working across a whole spectrumof defence programmes. The hungerfor western technology was immense.

Chinese aerospace companies thenstarted producing components forforeign companies, for example aero-engine parts were produced for GE.

This was tremendously helpful as itprovided access to modern materi-als technology and foreign currency.Equally as important in this period was

the fact that Chinese students weregoing to foreign universities and re-

search institutions; this was to have

both short and long-term benefits forChinese industry. As the 1980s contin-ued, China's economic modernisationpicked up speed and as the economygrew, so did industry and science and

technology in China.

The Tiananmen Square incident of1 989 put an end to overt defence coop-eration between the west and China,

with an embargo being imposed andprogrammes such as Peace Pearl beingcancelled. Yet China was not isolated

in wake of Tiananmen, it was too big a

market to be ignored. China still had

access to technology, much of it dual-use which could be applied to defenceprogrammes, and in a broad economicsense China was much stronger thanit had been ten years earlier. Despite

the embargo, defence cooperation didcontinue with foreign countries, withimportant benefits to China. There

were also other developments on thehorizon that would work in China's fa-VOU T.

A Different Time

By 1989, the China's main ideo-logical adversary and prime securitythreat, the Soviet Union, was startingto fall apart. This was a welcome devel-

opment and also a major opportunity.China opened discussions on the ac-

quisition of military equipment in 1990

and in March '199'l was able to evalu-ate the MiG-29 and the Sukhoi Su-27

in China. By this time the Soviet Unionwas no more and China was workingwith Russia who was desperate formoney and for products, this allowedChina to negotiate contracts whereit could pay by bartering goods andother commodities. ln 1991 a contractwas signed for 20 Su-27SK and six Su-

27UBK aircraft, which were deliveredfrom KNAAPO in 1995.

The arrival of the Sukhoi Su-27 was

a revolution for PLAAF, for the firsttime in four decades they actually had

a world-class combat aircraft. A sec-

ond batch of aircraft was purchased

from KNAAPO in 1995 and delivered in

1996, consisting of 16 Su-27SK and six

Su-27UBK aircraft. This set the scene

for the most ambitious Sino-Russian


programme of this era, the licenseproduction of the Su-27SK in China.The contract was agreed in 1995, witha contract valued at 52.5 billion beingsigned in 1996.

The license production agreementwould allow Shenyang to build up to200 Su-275K aircraft, which would beknown as the J-11 in China. lnitiallyRussia would supply complete parts

kits for assembly, gradually local con-tent would rise although the main el-ements such as avionics, engines andweapons would still be imported. Thefirst locally assembled J-l1 flew in De-

cember 1998, with local productioncommencing in 2000 with 48 J-11 air-craft built by 2002. Then a total of be-

tween 48 and 57 aircraft were built tothe end of 2004. lnstead of200 aircraft,China decided to stop Su-27SKL-11 li-cense production at

,l05.

China continued to purchase com-plete aircraft from Russia, a require-ment for a strike aircraft saw China

acquire 38 Sukhoi Su-30MKK aircraftin 1996 in a contract valued at $2 bil-lion. KNAAPO delivered these aircraftbetween 2000 and 2001. This was fol-lowed by a second contract for 38more Su-3OMKK in 2001 and these air-

craft were delivered between 2002 and2003. ln 1999 an order was placed for28 Su-27UBK aircraft, which were builtby lrkut, and delivered in 2002.

On top of this China signed nu-

merous contracts for Sukhoi-relatedspares and sub-systems, as well as forair weapons such as the R-73 WithinVisual Range (WVR) AAM, the R-27 andR-77 Beyond Visual Range (BVR) AAM,KAB guided bombs and Kh-29, Kh-31

and Kh-59 air-to-surface weapons. Rus-

sia had supplied export versions of theR-27 in the semi-active radar homing (R-

27R) and infrared homing (R-27T) ver-sions. China then went to the Ukraineand acquired the active radar homingvariant of the missile (R-27AE), they also

acquired the R-27RE and R-27TE whichwere extended range versions of thestandard R-27R and R-27T. ln 2000China acquired 124 R-27RE, R-27TE andR-73 from the Ukraine, between 200,l

AIR SYSTEMS


and 2006 they acquired a further 1,153

R-27 missiles from the Ukraine.China was extremely conscious of

becoming over-dependent on Russia; itwas therefore consistently developingits own independent aircraft, avion-ics, engine and weapons capabilities.However, the Sukhoi fleet would need

to be supported and the Su-27 offeredincredible potential for further devel-opment. This saw Shenyang start workon an indigenous variant of the Su-

27SK that was to be known as the J-l18,

activity on this programme had startedbefore 2002 with the aim of creating a

true multirole combat aircraft.More recently, the scope of the J-1 1B

programme has become clear as during2007 more prototypes were seen and

by the end of that year were conduct-ing weapons trials. The J-'l1B looks like

the Su-27SK, but there are significantdifferences. Structurally the aircraft

uses composite materials and therehave been other changes that reduceweight by as much as 700 kg according

to some sources, these changes also

extend airframe life and reduce RCS. ln

terms of avionics the aircraft features

a complete package from China and

is fitted with the Type 1474 (KLJ-4) ra-

dar, a bigger version of the radar in theindigenous J-10 fighter, new cockpitfeaturing multi-function displays and

a wide-angle HUD, navigation system,

Feibao flight control system and otherequipment.

A critical development was the abil-ity to provide an indigenous enginefor the J-l1B, this was achieved whenthe WS-10A Tai Hang was successfullyintegrated and achieved the majorityof its performance goals. The aircraftalso uses the complete array of Chi-

nese air weapons; early examples were

seen with the PL-8 wvR AAM, in reality

a local version of the Rafael Python 3,

and then with the new PL-12 BVR AAM.The PL-12 uses sub-systems from bothRussia and the Ukraine and offers ca-

pabilities equivalent to the R-77. More

recently, in mid-2002 it was disclosedthat China was working on a new indig-enous WVR AAM. Earlier this year some

images of the weapon became availa-ble and the PL-ASR designator was not-ed, although it is now called the PL-l0.

It appears that the system was actuallytested in late 2007 although there is no

firm evidence of when it could be de-ployed, with 2010 being suggested.

The J-l 1B is in production and is en-

tering service with PLAAF units in sig-

nificant numbers. Work has reportedlyalso commenced on a two-seat version

of the aircraft which some call the J-

11BS. This aircraft would make sense as

PLAAF has found that it requires largenumbers of Su-27UBK aircraft for OCU

@

AIR SYSTEMS

applications. ln addition the Su-27UBK

has been used as a mission controllerwhere a senior pilot acts as the flightleader for a Su-27SK formation. Equallya two-seat version could fulfil a rolesimilar to that of the Su-3OMKK in serv-ice with PLAAF.

Chinese Developments

The most significant developmentfor PLAAF and the Chinese aerospaceindustry is the successful entry intoservice of the Chengdu J-10 fighter.Back in the 1970s, the 611 lnstitute de-veloped a new design for the J-9 fight-er project that was based on a PLAAF

requirement for a Mach 2.4 high alti-tude fighter. This design had a canard,delta wing configuration and the de-sign was completed around 1975 be-fore the programme was cancelledin 1980. Then, in the mid-l980s workstarted at the 611 lnstitute on Project10 - a high-performance single-seat

single-engine fighter for PLAAF thatwould eventually result in the J-10.

At this time the links that had beenopened with the US, Europe and lsraelgave PLAAF and the 611 lnstitute theopportunity to explore a host of newpossibilities in working on Project10. This is where the linkage comesbetween the J-l 0 and the lsraeli Lavi

fighter programme. The lsraeli pro-gramme provided much inspirationand access to advanced avionics,equally others contributed to the J-1 0

programme as well, from US comput-ers and machine tools to design as-

sistance from European companies.lnto the .l990s as PLAAF require-

ments evolved there were changes tothe Project 10 design, which appar-ently saw two separate design tracks

- one with indigenous systems (J-10)

and the other incorporating Russian

systems (J-10A). The incorporationof the Russian Lyulka-Saturn AL-31FN

was a major step forward in the pro-gramme. First flight of the J-l0 took


place on 23rd March 1998, with thefirst J-10A production aircraft, withthe AL-31, taking place on 28th June2002.

After testing at the Central FlightTest Establishment (CFTE), the J-10A

was granted state certification at theend of 2003 allowing full-scale pro-duction to commence. First deliver-ies of the J-l0A were made in 2004to 44th Air Division PLAAF in Yunnan.The next stage in the programme sawthe development of the two-seat J-

10S for the OCU role, the prototypefirst flew on 23rd December 2003 andstate certification for production wasreceived in 2005.

Today well in excess of 100 J-10A/S

aircraft are in service with the 44th,2nd and 3rd PLAAF Air Divisions.There have been some changes to theaircraft, with more recent examplesbeing fitted with a refuelling probe.ln addition the design has reportedlybeen further developed. The J-10S

provided the basis for the develop-

AIR SYSTEMS

ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 200B

&.::*

ment of the J-108; this is a two-seataircraft for more demanding strike

and presumably air defence suppres-

sion missions. The J-108 is said tohave made its first flight this year and

should soon go to CFTE to enter thestate certification process as a prel-

ude to entering full Production.The arrival of the J-10A/S shows the

increasing capabilities of the Chinese

aerospace industry, very few nations

are able to develop what aPPears to

be a world-class fighter aircraft. Yet

this appears to only be the start, with

a future combat aircraft programme

already in the development stage' ln

1997 lhe US Navy revealed that China

was working on a future fighter pro-gramme known as JXX and theY es-

timated that the aircraft would be in

service by 2015.

It appears that the 601 lnstitute in

ta4

Shenyang was working on a futurefighter under the J-13 designation,

while the 611 lnstitute in Chengdu

had the J-14 as their future fighterconcept. All we can really surmise at

present is that the future aircraft will

have two-engines, be highly stealthy

and be equivalent to the Russian PAK-

FA aircraft (see: AD&D SePtember/

October 2008), as well as a counter tothe US F-22 and the F-35 Joint Strike

Fighter (JSF).

Presumably work on the futurefighter got underwaY in the mid-

1990s, although as we do not know

exactly who is going to build it at

this point, is difficult to determine a

real programme timescale. lncreas-

ingly there has been speculation thatShenyang will be responsible for the

new aircraft, with Chengdu assisting

in various ways. This remains to be

seen, even so a programme of thissophistication shows the confidence

of PLAAF and the Chinese aerospace

industry that they can design and de-

velop a truly advanced future combata i rc raft.

This article has sadlY onlY

scratched the surface as far as PLAAF

programmes are concerned - it trulyis a complex and fascinating area tostudy. For space reasons we have ne-

glected to mention developments ofthe J-8 fighter and H-6 bomber, as

well as the JH-7A attack aircraft. There

are also major developments in train-ing aircraft and AEW&C Platforms.The fundamental message is thatthe PLAAF of today is an increasingly

capable and well-equiPPed force.

with the future holding the promise

of even more significant capabilitygrowth. r

NAVAL SYSTEMS


EUCILUTION & REVOLUTION I

CHINESE NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS bYDAV DSAW

I n a orevious issue of Asian Defence

I a oiptorucy (AD&D) we looked at

the submarine capabilities of the Chi-

nese People's Liberation Army Navy(See: AD&D July/August 2008: 'Red Star

Rising - China's Expanding Submarine

Capabilities') and the immense growthin qualitative terms of the People's Lib-

eration Army Navy (PLAN) submarinefleet. With this article we will be look-ing at PLAN surface combatants and

describing some of the most importantship classes, as well as looking at key

future developments.PLAN was established in 1950 and

it was equipped with whatever re-

mained of the former Nationalist Navy

and anything else that could be found.At this time PLAN was just an adjunctto the dominant ground forces of thePeople's Liberation Army (PLA) and itcould provide a limited capability for

amphibious operations. Outside ofthis, the prime mission of PLAN was

coastal patrol.The first transformation of PLAN

came in the '1950s with the arrival ofextensive military assistance from theSoviet Union. This went beyond the

supply of equipmenU there was assist-

ance in the establishment of a ship-building industry and the granting oflicense production rights for Soviet

'I

r.id.ig

NAVAL SYSTEMS


naval equipment in China. ln essence

the Chinese naval sector was primarily

a product of Soviet assistance. When

relations between the Soviet Union

and China ruptured and Soviet techni-cians left China in 1960, the fate of na-

val programmes in China was thrownin to chaos.

With the break in relations with theSoviet bloc, China found itself inter-nationally isolated and in the contextof naval systems was left with a lotof 1940s and 1950s era technologywith very little ability to develop in-digenous successor technology. Even

worse, any progress that China mighthave made in the 1960s was halted by

the ideologically driven catastrophethat was the Cultural Revolution. As a

consequence of this, PLAN found itselfhaving to make do with whatever theChinese industrial base could come

up with. The end result was that PLAN

was condemned to working with infe-rior technology and therefore had todevelop strategic concepts that tookthese facts into account.

With the political changes ushered

in by the end of the Maoist period and

the arrival of a more pragmatic leader-

ship, China started to open up to theworld. There was also an understand-ing that the PLA desperately needed

to modernise and that foreign technol-ogy would be necessary to achieve thisgoal. ln this period China perceived

the Soviet Union to be a major threatto its security and forged links with theUS and European nations to acquire

defence technology to meet its needs.

This led to both the military and the de-

fence industry being confronted withthe reality of how far China had fallenbehind the rest of the world in defence

equipment and technology. The result

of this was a process of transformationin the PLA and in the Chinese defence

industry.The Tiananmen Square incident in

1989 brought a halt to open defence

links with the west, even though cer-

tain European countries would con-

tinue to supply China with defence

equipment and defence-related sys-

tems in spite of the embargo that had

been imposed on China. By this time

the Chinese economic miracle was

starting to pick up pace and the coun-try was in a far stronger position than ithad been at the start ofthat decade. ln

the context of security, China was see-

ing the Soviet bloc disintegrate whichremoved its most dangerous strategiccompetitor.

The Russian Option

The collapse of the Soviet Union and

the emergence of the successor states,

such as Russia, provided China withthe opportunity to acquire defence

systems and technology in a virtualiyunrestricted manner at extremely af-

fordable prices. Arguably it is this link-

age with Russia that has been one ofthe most important factors in the de-

velopment of the PLA and the Chinese

defence industry, as we know it today.For PLAN the opportunity to pur

chase equipment and technology fromRussia and the Ukraine offered themthe ability to radically transform theircapabilities. ln 1994 PLAN purchased

''* %**W

NAVAL SYSTEMS


two Project 877EKM class submarinesfrom Russia, following this in 1996

with the acquisition of two Project 956

Sovremenny class destroyers and twoProject 636 Kilo class submarines. Thesubmarines and surface combatantswould have an immediate impact onPLAN capabilities. Equally importantwas that fact that the Chinese naval

designers and the naval industry wouldhave access to state of the art equip-ment, which would enable them toincorporate new ideas and capabilitiesinto indigenous naval programmes.

The two Sovremenny class destroy-ers had originally been destined for theSoviet Navy, but the Soviet collapse leftthem incomplete. PLAN was thereforeable modify them to meet its needs,

the two destroyers Hangzhou (136) andFuzhou (137) were commissioned intoPLAN in December 1999 and Decem-ber 2000 respectively. The armamentof these units consists of eight 3M-80EMoskit anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM)

with a range of '120 km, the 9M38 me-dium range air defence systems (two

launchers + 48 9M38M1 missiles), twotwin 130 mm AK-l30MR-l84 guns,

four AK-630 30 mm CIWS systems,

two twin-533 mm torpedo tubes, twoRBU-1000 anti-ship rocket launchersand an embarked Kamov Ka-28 heli-copter.

in 2002, the first unit Taizhou (138) was

launched in April 2004 and commis-sioned with the East Sea Fleet in De-

cember 2005. Then came Ningbo (139),

which was launched in July 2004 andcommissioned with the East Sea Fleetin September 2006. The Project 956EM

has the 3M87 Kashtan combined gun/missile CIWS in place of the AK-630 andone of the 130 mm gun mounts was

discarded. Reportedly these units camewith the improved 3M-80MBE missilesystem that has a range of 200 km. Allfour Sovremenny class destroyers are in

service with the East Sea Fleet (ESF).

A follow on order for two improved lndigenOqs PfggfammgsProject 956EM Sovremennys was placed

*.#.' - - :r

,€._':",: i-;*:t- -

PLAN was never going to be in a

position to meet its surface combat-ant needs from foreign purchases

- fortunately it had no need to do so.

The Chinese shipbuilding industry had

been systematically improving its ca-

pabilities, the defence industry was in-creasingly able to supply sophisticatedsystems and there was now the abilityto design advanced vessels. Foreignsystems and components would stillbe used where necessary though.

China is now proving that it is ca-pable of designing, developing andproducing advanced surface combat-

ants. However, PLAN is still being verycautious, it has ordered many new de-stroyer classes but has never orderedmore than two units in each class. Nowperhaps this is due to caution or it is a

reasoned policy to add new capabilityto the fleet, learn lessons from build-ing and operating a particular class

and then apply those lessons to thefollow-on class.

ln May 2002 the Jiangnan Shipyardin Shanghai launched Guangzhou(168), the first Type 0528 Luyang class

destroyer, featuring both indigenousand foreign (Russian/Ukrainian) sys-

tems that was eventually commis-sioned into the South Sea Fleet (SSF) in

NAVAI- SYSTEMS


t rx 1- 1$1

)uly 20O4. The sister ship, Wuhan (169)

was launched in January 2003 andcommissioned into the SSF at the endof 2004. The Type 0528 design thenprovided the basis for the Type 052CLuyang-ll air defence destroyer designthat was to be built at Jiangnan.

The first Type 052C, Lanzhou (170),

was launched in April 2003 and com-missioned in July 2004, the secondunit, Haikou (171) was launched in Oc-

tober 2003 and commissioned in 2005,

both are in service with the SSF. These

impressive units are equipped with theHQ-9 vertical launch air defence sys-

tem with 48 missiles, they have eightYJ-62 ASCM, a 100 mm gun, two Type

730 CIWS systems, two triple tube 324

mm torpedo launchers, four iS-barrelASW rocket launchers and can embarkaKa-28 or Harbin Z-9C helicopter.

There are now reports that a followon class to the Type 052C is to be built,known as the Type 052D, but no real

details are available. There is specula-

tion that at least two of these couldbe built, although other reports talk offour. What will be interesting to see is

the evolution of the Type 052D com-pared to the Type 052C.

Up at the Dalian Shipyard anotherdestroyer class was being built, in themid-l990s work started on the Type0518 Luhai and in October 1997 thefirst unit Shenzhen (167) was launchedand then commissioned late in 1998.

The Type 0518 class did not progressbeyond a single unit, but its hull formand steam turbine propulsion plantprovided the basis for the Type 05lCLuzhou air defence destroyer class.

The first Type 051C, Shenyang (115),

was Iaunched in December 2004and commissioned wlth the NorthSea Fleet (NSF) in October 2006. Thesecond unit, Shijiazhuang (116) was

launched in 2005 and commissionedwith the NSF at Qingdao in March 2007.

The main weapons system of the Type051C is the Russian Rif air defence mis-

sile system, with six revolver-type VLS

each containing eight 5V55RM missiles.The system uses the 3R41 Volna radar,which has a range of 100 km and canengage six targets simultaneously,with each target being addressed withtwo missiles. Other radars include theFregat-MAE-5 3D air search radar andthe Mineral-ME surveillance and tar-geting radar. There are also are eightYJ-83 ASCM, 100 mm gun, two Type730 CIWS and two triple tube 324 mmtorpedo launchers.

The Type 051C performs a similarmission to the Type 052C, but has a to-tally different equipment fit with theprimary systems all being of Russian

origin. lt is suggested that Dalian willbe starting work on a follow up to theType 05iC design, initially designatedType 051D, and that two units will bebuilt. The hull form and propulsion willbe a development of the Type 051C,

the interesting thing to watch for in theenvisaged Type 05i D is its weapon and

tr

NAVAI- SYSTEMS

Nov/Dec20OB ASIANDEFENCE&DIPLOMACY

sensor fit, how much indigenous versus

how much foreign equiPment.ln total PLAN have 26 destroYers in

service, the most significant classes

of which we have described above. Of

the others, the two TYPe 052 Luhu are

worth noting, these were the first trulymodern indigenous destroyers to en-

ter service with PLAN. Commissioned

in 1994 and 1996 with the NSF, they

were given refits and modernised in

200312004. Significantly, the most nu-

merous destroyer class in PLAN service

is the older Type 051 Luda class.

Originally there were 17 Luda class

built, with units commissioned be-

tween 1970 and 1993, with four distinct

variants being built. One Luda was lost

in an explosion, while three have been

decommissioned. Of the four Luda in

service with the NSF, two have been up-

graded, while of the five in the SSF twohave been upgraded, none of the four

Luda in the ESF have been uPgraded.

It would be fair to assume that non-

modernised Luda class units will con-

tinue to be withdrawn in the comingyears and presumably be replaced by

the expected new TYPe 051 D and TYPe

052D classes.

Fnr ga€e Fx'*g *"e aax rc*s

The PLAN frigate force currentlY

numbers some 49 units, but the ma-

jority are older Jianghu/-Jiangwei class

units. These were launched from 1971

through to the early 1990s and were

also successful in the export market.

Bangladesh acquired a single TYPe

053H1 Jianghu-ll, Egypt acquired two

.Jianghu-ll, while Thailand acquired

four Type 053HT Jianghu-lll class. Nu-

merous different versions were builtand 43 remain in PLAN service.

The NSF has one TYPe 053 Jianghu

and fourType 053H1 Jianghu-llclass in

service, the ESF has eight Jianghu, twoJianghu-ll, three Type 053H2 Jianghu-

lll, four Type 053H2G Jiangwei and six

Type 053H3 Jiangwei-ll. Finally theS5F has two Jianghu, three Jianghu-

ll, six Type 053H1G Jianghu-V and fourJiangwei-ll. Early model Jianghu class

units are being decommissioned and

this process will doubtless continue,

other units of the class have been put

through modernisation programmes

to extend their service lives.

The key frigate class in PLAN is

the Type 054/054A Jiangkai/Jiang-kai-ll, construction of the first unit,

iLo;-*-*rsii"d l

tr

NAVAI SYSTEMS


Ma'anshan (525), started at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai in2002 and was launched in September2003, being commissioned into theESF in Februa ry 2005. The second Type054 unit, Wenzhou (526), was built bythe Huangpu Shipyard in Guangzhouand was commissioned in the ESF inJanuary 2008.

The Type 054 was then replaced inproduction by the more impressiveType 054A Jiangkai-ll class. Xuzhou(530) was launched at Huangpu inSeptember 2006, being commissionedand joining the ESF in January 2008.Hudong-Zhonghua then built theirfirst Type 054A in the form of Zhoush-an (529), which was launched in May2007 and is believed to be attachedto the SSF. Huangpu then delivered

Huangshan (570), with Hudong-Zhon-ghua building Chaohu (568) that wascommissioned in July this year. A newType 0544 is currently under construc-tion at the Huangpu Shipyard.

The Type 054 has a Chinese sensorfit and is equipped with eight YJ-83

ASCM, the HQ-7 air defence missilesystem, 100 mm gun, two AK-630CIWS systems and an embarked Ka-28or Z-9C helicopter. The Type 0544 has

a larger displacement and its sensorfit is of mixed Russian and Chineseorigin, including the Russian Fregat-MAE-5 air search radar. They have theHQ-16 air defence system with a VLS

containing 32 missiles, two Type 730CIWS and a 76 mm gun, while retain-ing the YJ-83 ASCM and the helicoptercapability.

The Type O54/054A Jiangkai classis obviously inspired by the French La

Fayette class frigate particularly withthe emphasis on RCS reduction, butit represents an impressive develop-ment in Chinese naval constructionand extremely effective addition toPLAN capabilities. The unit under con-struction at Huangpu is rumoured tofeature some changes to the standardType 0544 design, but it is too early tosay whether this will actually repre-sent a distinct new variant to this frig-ate design.

Carrier Ambitions

PLAN has been interested in acquir-ing an aircraft carrier capability for

NAVAI SYSTEMS

Nov/Dec 200B ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY

many years, realising that the posses-

sion of such a capability would make

it a true'blue water' navY. lt was how-

ever quick to understand that it could

not just rush into an aircraft carrierprogramme, it had to obtain the theo-retical knowledge to build complex

systems of this type, develop the nec-

essary personnel resources to be able

to operate a carrier and have the fleetstructure necessary to sustain a carrier

capability. Another important factorwas that PLAN had to have the budgetto acquire, operate and maintain an

aircraft carrier or carriers, and this is a

vastly expensive proPosition.

Developing a knowledge base on

carriers was not an easy process and

so PLAN took every opportunity to ob-

tain information on the subject. When

the Royal Australian Navy decided toretire and scrap the carrier HMAS Mel-

bourne, a Chinese company made themost satisfactory bid to break up theship. After being taken to China in1995, Melbourne was extensively in-

vestigated by PLAN and by Chinese in-

dustry, before being finally scrapped.

Other aspects of aircraft carrier design

were investigated when Chinese'com-

mercial' interests acquired the formerSoviet carriers Minsk in 1998 and Kiev

in 2000 and brought them to China.

Where the future destiny of Chinese

aircraft carrier ambitions lies is with a

former Soviet aircraft carrier that is cu r-

rentiy at the Dalian Shipyard in China.

Back in December 1985 the Nikolayev

South Shipyard in what is todaY the

Ukraine started work on what was tobe the second Project 1143.5 aircraft

for the Soviet Navy. The first Project

1143.5 aircraft carrier was the Admiral

Kuznetsov, which is currently in serv-

ice with the Russian NavY.

Nikolayev launched their aircraft

carrier for the Soviet Navy on 4th De-

cember 1988and itwasto begiventhename Riga in Soviet service. Building

work was still continuing when the So-

viet Union collapsed and so the newly

independent Ukraine would find itselfhaving an incomplete aircraft carrier

that they could not finish, by this timethe name of the ship was Varyag. Var-

yag languished in the Ukraine until itwas decided to sell the carrier, either

for scrapping or for any non-militarypurpose. ln 1998 a Macau-based com-

pany acquired VarYag for what theY

described as conversion into a 'float-

ing casino' that would be located offMacau.

The Ukraine accepted this offer,

but decided to strip any materiel thatmight have any military application,

essentially leaving Varyag as a hulk.

The Macau-based comPanY now had

to move Varyag to Asia after taking

possession in 1999, but this wouldnot be easy especially when the Turk-

ish government declined to let it pass

through the Bosphorous and transit

to the Mediterranean fearing an acci-

dent. This situation was only resolved

in 2001 when the Chinese government

stepped in and reassured the Turks

who then allowed VarYag to transit

through Turkish waters to begin its

long journey to China. ln 2002 Varyag

reached China and was Placed at theDalian Shipyard.

Varyag stayed at Dalian, then in

2005 it was suddenly emerging from a

dry dock having been freshly repaint-

ed. lt was now apparentlY obvious

that China was serious about obtain-ing an aircraft carrier capability. How-

ever, the magnitude of the task facing

Dalian in turning Varyag into a usable

capability was immense. Bear in mind

that Varyag is a hulk; the Ukrainians

stripped anything from the ship thatmight have a military application, so

Dalian will have a major task on theirhands to return it to a usable condi-

tion. Gorshkov, the aircraft carrier be-

ing refurbished in Russia for lndia, was

in an immensely better condition than

Varyag ever reached.

At this point it is worth discussing

aircraft carrier developments in theSoviet Union to see where Gorshkov

and Varyag fit into the picture. Gor-

shkov is a Project 1143 class carrier;

four of these were built in the shape

of Kiev, Minsk, Novorossiysk and Baku

E

NAVAL SYSTTMS


(later renamed Gorshkov in October1990). All of these units were built at

the Nikolayev South Shipyard. Witha 45,500-ton full load displacement,Gorshkov was laid down at Nikolayevin December'1978 and launched on 1st

April 1982, being completed on 11th

December 1987 and then assigned tothe Soviet Northern Fleet. All of theseProject 1143 carriers met interestingfates after the collapse of the Soviet

Union; Novorossiysk was scrapped,while Minsk and Kiev were sold to Chi-

nese commercial interests (Minsk is

used as the centrepiece of the 'Minsk

World'theme park in Shenzhen).

The fate of the Gorshkov was to be

different to that of its sister ships. Gor-

shkov remained in Russian Navy serv-

ice, but had a major machinery acci-

dent in 1992, suffered a fire in '1993

and then a boiler explosion and firein February 1994. lt was then placed

in repair, going to sea in May 1995

and then being laid up. At this pointlndia entered the picture and discus-

sions commenced on a possible sale

of the carrier to the lndian Navy. By

1999 il was announced that an agree-ment in principle had been reached

on the sale of the Gorshkov, coveringits refurbishment, modernisation and

upgrade to a STOBAR (Short Take OffBut Arrested Landing) configuration.What followed were negotiations on

how to achieve these goals and at

what cost, along with the acquisitionof an air group with the RAC MiG-29K

as the prime component.The sale of the Gorshkov to lndia

was finally signed in January 2004.

The plan was that the carrier wouldbe modified and completed to lndianNavy specifications in August 2008.

At that point the carrier would be

transferred to the lndian Navy, wouldthen return to lndia in preparation forentry into service in 2009. Consider-

ing that Gorshkov had been laid up

since mid-1995, the fact that Russia

believed that it could complete theconversion in a little over four years

seemed somewhat ambitious. Thisproved to be the case; it became ap-parent that the magnitude of the task

had been seriously underestimated in

terms of time and cost. The timeline

'9.t't ,,-*."..lrt

:It\'d\ -,,r4r,-l

lYi\d:

t'L"'!L,. &i

\N

;ft.?i^lt.-

F4

NAVAL SYSTEMS


for the programme now aPPears to be

that the carrier, which will INS Vikra-

maditya in lndian service, will finish

trials in mid-2012 and be handed over

to the lndian Navy at the end of thatyear, becoming operational in lndian

waters in 2013.

Bearing in mind the fact that Gor-

shkov was in far better condition than

the Varyag, gives you an idea of how

complex it will be for China to make

Varyag a viable carrier. Althoughthe fact that China has extensively

studied two of the sister ships of theGorshkov both Kiev and Minsk are in

China, might prove extremely useful

in gaining an understanding of thechallenges faced by the Russian ship-

yard in the Gorshkov conversion and

of what went wrong.There was a time when attemPting

to bring the Varyag back to a usable

condition would have been beyond

the capabilities of the Chinese ship-

building industry, that is no longer

the case. ln recent years Chinese ship-

yards have become a major comPeti-

tor to Japanese and Korean shipyards

in the most sophisticated segments

of the merchant shipbuilding indus-

try including chemical and oil tank-

ers. China has also developed major

skills in the repair and conversion oflarge tonnage merchant ships. All ofthis will be a major contribution to thesuccessful refurbishment of Varyag.

Another positive is the fact thatChina has strong relationships withthe Ukrainian naval industry, for ex-

ample Ukrainian DA80/DN80 gas tur-bines are widely used as powerplants

in Chinese destroyer designs. This

should give China access to a much

of the data necessary for a successful

refurbishment of Varyag. Equally as

important is the defence relationship

with Russia, which will be critical inthe provision of systems and equip-ment to complete the transformationof Varyag into an operable carrier.

Future Ptospects

Once it has been fullY refurbished

the role of the Varyag will be to act

as a training carrier, so that PLAN can

refine its naval aviation doctrine and

develop the necessary skills to put thatdoctrine into practice. ln parallel with

this, work has already started on inves-

tigating the appropriate design, tech-

nology and systems requirements for

an indigenous Chinese aircraft carrier

design. There has already been much

theoretical work carried out, however,

the possession of Varyag and its use

as a training carrier will allow PLAN to

apply real world information gained in

an operational environment to future

carrier design. China's ability to build

an aircraft carrier-sized unit is not indoubt, its commercial shipyards have

proven that they can successfully build

and deliver highly sophisticated large

tonnage ships to commercial custom-

.b-*l*f,:-,+..-

NAVAT SYSTEMS

ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLoMACY Nov/Dec 2008

ers around the world.PLAN has already started on devel-

oping the personnel resources neces-

sary to operate its future carrier fleet.A number of pilot-qualified PLAN naval

aviation officers have gone throughcommanders'courses that have led tothem commanding surface warships

such as destroyers. More recently theChinese media reported that a class of50 students have been enrolled at the

Dalian Naval Academy to be prepared

for naval aviation officertraining to pro-

vide the pilots for the combat aircraftto be used by the future PLAN aircraftcarriers. lt should be noted that in Rus-

sian Navy service that a Project 1143.5

aircraft carrier has a crew of 1,960, plus

the air group with 626 people and a

flag staff of 40 people. '

This leads us to the aircraft that PLAN

This aircraft is a logical choice, it is theaircraft used by the Russian Navy on

their carrier Kuznetsov and PLAN is

perfectly familiar with the aircraft as it is

from the Sukhoi Su-271-30 family, land-

based PLAN aviation units currentlyoperate the Sukhoi Su-30MK2. PLA Air

Force units in China also operate theSu-27SK/UBK and the Su-30MKK, while

Shenyang manufactures the Sukhoi Su-

27SK under license as the J-l1. Hence

there is plenty of Sukhoi operationaland support experience in China.

ln the beginning PLAN is only look-

ing to acquire two Su-33 aircraft for tri-als purposes, a requirement which has

complicated negotiations with Russia.

After all there is still suspicion over Chi-

nese activities in the Su-27/J-11 license

production programme at Shenyang.

The Russian suspicion of what China's

R-73 and R-27 air-to-air missiles. Signifi-

cantly in 2004 China acquired what was

described as a Sukhoi Su-27 from theUkraine. However, this was not an or-

dinary Su-27,iLwas actually a develop-ment aircraft for the 5u-33 programme.

Bearing in mind Chinese knowledgeof the Su-27/-30 family and the fact thatthey are building their own Su-27 in theform of the J-1lB, it is not difficult toimagine that this Ukrainian acquisitionwould potentially allow China to startwork on a carrier variant of the J-1 1B.

After this the acquisition of only two5u-33 aircraft makes sense, these air-

craft would give China a true pattern towork against in building a naval version

of the J-l 1 B.

Equally interesting is the fact that in2007 China acquired a Ukrainian Sukhoi

Su-25YTG aircraft. The point of this is

r**J .Ali'

will select for its new carrier capability,

for a number of years PLAN has been in

discussions with Rosoboronexport over

the acquisition of up to 50 Sukhoi Su-33

aircraft manufactured by the Komso-

molsk-na-Amure Aircraft ProductionAssociation (KNAAPO), a subsidiary ofthe Unified Aircraft Corporation (OAK).

aims are in only looking to acquire twoSu-33 aircraft for 'trials and evalua-

tion' purposes would appear to be ex-

tremely sensible and goes beyond theannoyance at the J-11B programme. ln

2000 China started acquiring weapons

and equipment from Ukrainian stocks

and by 2006 this had included 1,277

that the Su-25YTG is essentially the

Su-25UTG trainer used on the Russian

aircraft carrier. China does not operatethe Su-25; the only reason for acquiringthis aircraft is to obtain the technicaldetails necessary to help in the devel-

opment of a training aircraft to supportChinese carrier operations.

t

a

NAVAL SYSTEMS


+ Fla *a,.=>

There is no doubt that Russia is right

to be cautious in dealing with China on

the Su-33 issue. However, building a

carrier-based combat aircraft is not an

easy process and one can only presume

that the potential purchase of 50 Su-33

aircraft is a fallback position if China is

unable to meet its needs with an in-

digenous naval aircraft solution. So itwould appear that Russian suspicion ofChinese motives is justified thus far.

ln the Russian Navy the air grouP ofthe carrier Admiral Kuznetsov has 12

Sukhoi Su-33 aircraft, five Sukhoi Su-

25UTG/UBG aircraft and up to 20 Kam-

ov Ka-27 helicopters. The role of the

Sukhoi Su-25 is to provide a two-seatertrainer and light attack aircraft capabil-

ity. The Russian Navy has a single regi-

ment of 24 Su-33 aircraft, supported by

a number of 5u-27UBK training aircraftfor operational conversation purposes.

For PLAN the possession of an air-

.G

craft carrier force will mark its trans-

formation into the first rank of world

navies and offer a host of new strategic

and operational possibilities. As pre-

viously mentioned, an aircraft carrier

along with its air group is an incredibly

expensive investment. That is why it is

worth being cautious in speculating on

the number of carriers that PLAN would

be looking to acquire. There have been

suggestions that up to six carriers could

be acquired or more realistic sugges-

tions that there will be three carriers

acquired, allowing PLAN to have three

carrier battle groups (the carrier, escort

units and support units). With three

carriers PLAN will be able to have twocarriers available, with the third going

to or from a maintenance state.

With Varyag set to act as a training

carriet it is worth speculating on the

shape that the future PLAN aircraft car-

rier might take. One possible solution

is to look what the Soviet Navy was in-

tending to do ,with a successor to the

Project 1143.5 design of the Varyag.

Back in 1973 work started on the design

of Project 1153 Orel class aircraft car-

rier, this programme was terminated in

1983. Then in 1984 work started on the

Project 1143.7 Ulyanovsk aircraft car-

rier design, with the first unit being laid

down at Nicolayev South Shipyard in

November 1988. The Programme was

cancelled in November 1991 when the

carrier was 45o/o complete; it was then

scrapped in February 1992. The con-

struction materials for a second carrier

had been assembled at Nicolayev and

these were also scrapped.

Unlike Varyag, the Ulyanovsk was

a conventional aircraft carrier withcatapult assisted take off and arrested

landing (CATOBAR), whereas Varyag is

a STOBAR carrier. The Ulyanovsk has

a nuclear propulsion plant and has a

NAVAL SYSTEMS

ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLoMACY Nov/Dec 2008

substantially larger displacement thanVaryag at over 80,000 tons full load.

Crew numbers were 2,300 plus 1,500

for the air group, with the air group

consisting of 27 to 30 Sukhoi 5u-33, 10

Sukhoi 5u-25 UTG/UBG, three Yak-44

AEW aircraft and 15 to 20 Kamov Ka-27

helicopters for various missions.

Building a carrier of the Ulyanovsk

type should not be unduly difficult in

theory for the Chinese, as mentionedpreviously highly complex large dis-

placement vessels are produced quite

regularly and successfully in China.

There have been quite a few rumoursthat the proposed future Chinese car-

rier will actually have a displacementin excess of 90,000 tons. As to power-plants, nuclear propulsion is also notan unknown area to China, with PLAN

having extensive nuclear submarinepropulsion experience to draw upon.It is also highly likely that China will

rier from the Ukraine, which will be ofgreat assistance to the future carrier

construction programme.The complexity of the task that Chi-

na will be undertaking in the design ofa large displacement conventional ornuclear-powered aircraft carrier shouldnot be underestimated. Nor should thecost of two or three carriers and theirrespective air groups. However, thereseems to be a high degree of confi-dence in China that it can both affordand successfully complete these ambi-tious naval construction programmes.

It is expected by many sources thatChina will have an indigenous aircraftcarrier by the middle of the next dec-

ade, with a second by the end of thatdecade. That would appear to be an

achievable schedule for the introduc-

tion of a carrier capability by PLAN.

The PLA actually has historical expe-

rience of successful amphibious warfareoperations, for example the successful

invasion of Hainan in the Chinese Civil

War. More recently its most likely am-phibious warfare mission has been fo-cussed on a possible invasion of Taiwan.

ln this context PLAN has assembled a

large numbers of LSTs, for example thefy pe 02 / 07 2-ll / 07 21ll Yu ka n, Yuti n g a n d

Yuting ll classes. ln addition there are

medium LST classes consisting of theType 073 Yuding, Type 074/0744 Yuhai

and the Type 079 Yulian. These are sup-

ported by substantial numbers of con-

ventional landing craft. PLAN fype 072

LSTs successfully conducted landingoperations on disputed territory in the

be abre to obtain "t'"i:t,':,l::j]i: Amphibious Enhancementplans for the Project 1143.7 aircrafl car-


98%Space Booked

r? *r|L-

NAVAT 5Y5TEM5ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008

ffii#'Y4!ry-

a *€,'

,i a:* .. :

r ar-lr-t,!'a ) ?

tl

t,,rl

,1,, ,,

li -;:.. 1;f;l r ,r t-*-:,:t;.

:-e-&

While an LPD does not have the glam-our of the future aircraft carrier pro-gramme, it is proof that PLAN has notforgotten the importance of amphibi-ous warfare to modern navies.

This article on the major surfacecombatant programmes in PLAN illus-trates that it is becoming a very power-

ful military instrument for the Chinese

leadership. ln a little over a decadePLAN has transformed itself from op-erating a few capable units and a largenumber of historical curiosities into a

force with increasingly modern andsophisticated units. This process is set

to continue, with the aircraft carrierprogramme being conclusive proof ofthe level of ambitions of PLAN. Moreand more, PLAN is becoming a force tobe reckoned with in the Asian securityenvironment. r

rir:'i.$,,t'!t

u!-1,

rll_r

,%!,ry


Spratly lslands in 1988.

As with other areas of the PLAN in-ventory there have been significantimprovements in the design and capa-

bilities of the LST fleet in recent years.

However, in comparison with othermajor navies the amphibious warfarecapabilities of PLAN are somewhat lim-ited. This has started to change withthe introduction of the first LPD intoPLAN service in the form of the Type

071 class.

Kulunshan (998), the first Type 07'l

LPD was launched at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai in De-

cember 2006 and was commissioned

into the PLAN South Sea Fleet 0n 30th

November 2007. This LPD has a fullload displacement in excess of 12000

F'l

jil.q.,,.,::.::'.r

tons and can also embark up to fourChinese-designed Landing Craft AirCushion (LCAC). The LCAC can carry a

main battle tank, other armoured vehi-cles, logistic vehicles, troops and sup-plies. lt is believed that the Type 07ihas the capacity to carry between 15

and 20 armoured vehicles, and in ex-

cess of 500 troops. lt is helicopter ca-

pable with two deck spots for the Z-8(Super Frelon) helicopter. The Type 071

is equipped with a 76 mm AK-176 gun

and four AK-630 CIWS systems.

The Type 071 LPD provides PLAN

with a modern power projection capa-

bility that up to this point it has lacked.

It is to be expected that at least one

other Type 071 LPD will be built, afterwhich a modified version of the design

will be developed or PLAN will move on

to a larger and more capable LPD class.

LIMA

E:,

Mahsuri

i: ltT l:

1-5December2009

VENUE:

lnternational ExhibitionLangkawi, Malaysia

THE PREMIER MARITIME & AEROSPACE EXHIBITION

i:: ::c "_r:l r';r i,ne and aerospace sholr'r tn the teqiol just got betterL

Ir:.;r q.a',','r rie'nrtional iilarltrme dfd Aerospace Exhlbiti0n is no'i; held at a sinqle venue,

iiE,,i;ls,r fternatr0nalExhlbitionLerltre.Taking)/0ustralqhttotheheartofAsia Pacrfics

c:iei'e;ncrcr,ilqrol,rthnrarkets. i'letr',rorkvrtthover250deleqatonsernbodyinqkeydefenceand

c . I cec:ion mrhers and end Lrsers.

L i,li\'Ct the essentlal D atfornr t0 sho\,,ca5e best-in breed emerqirg te(hfologies and equ pment.

Drn't nrl-rs t.

Centre

SUPPORTED BY

Fo(er Royal fila ay5 an Nav)/

* firiiidis @

6 .{ii. SRoydl Malay5ian A r Forc€ Rolal llalaysran Pol]ce l\la ay5 a filar]t me Enfo(em€nt Aqen(y

-- t f,rrtl^

\ '.r.il:: :-;_r.:-.j:DepartmeftofF5here!ilaa!5a l,laaysanDeien(elndu5tty(o!ncl [4aritim€ln(tuteof]\4alaysia

T : +601 4l,li 169') F : +6N: +lQli';t9 E : hi'r50hi','linu.oTg W : r"'t'r'1. irra2009.cotr.nly

.6Covernment of [lalaysia

f@}f

-*rv[,la iysidn Armed

qoyal l\lalayi an C!5tom5 Departfl€it of (iv I Aviat on l,ldlays a Airports Berhad Fire and R€5(ue Department, [laJays a

, '..us: HWilMAsDNBHD l5F 1 5har2/27i(L![,Sector5,\i/anqsrLi;ir533!0KuaaLumprr

l\f nlstry of Defence

REGIONAL UPDATE


TAIWAN ACHIEVES PROGRESS

I n early October Taiwan was finallylwett on course to sign a major se-

ries of contracts with the US govern-

ment to procure a number of differentdefence systems. That being said, whatTaiwan actually got and what it really

wanted are two different things. All ofwhich is quite ironic when you consider

the fact that the Bush administration is

the most favourably disposed adminis-tration to Taiwan in many yearsl

Right from the start the Bush admin-istration was ready to support the sale

of a major package of defence equip-ment to Taiwan, including eight con-

ventional submarines (SSK), 12 P-3C Ori-

on MPA aircraft and six Patriot PAC-3 air

defence systems. This equipment was

on offer to Taiwan from April 2001 and

the Taiwan government had allocated

@l

a special budget of 519 billion to pay

for it all. The problem was that every

time the government tried to get thebudget through the Legislative Yuan,

Taiwan's parliament, the Kuomintang(KMT) who at that time was the main

opposition party blocked it.Eventually these tactics by the KMT

forced the special budget programmes

to be sidelined. Then all of a sudden,

with Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT becom-ing Taiwan's President, there is inter-

est in acquiring a host of new defence

systems from the US. By this time, theattitude of the Bush administration toTaiwan is less than friendly and thosein the US State Department who are al-

ways anxious to avoid offending China

are in the ascendant and perfectly pre-

pared to block weapon requests from

Taiwan.

This puts Taiwan in a very difficultsituation as they realise that they have

to modernise their military capabilities,

but are limited in what they can ask for.

Taiwan has actually allocated fundingfor the acquisition of some 66 Lock-

heed Martin F-16C/D Block 52 aircraftand had made a request to the US tonegotiate an acquisition programme.The US response was to sit on the re-

quest and it is unlikely that it can be

considered u ntil after Ja n uary 2009 a nd

the installation of a new administrationin Washington. What will happen nexton the F-16C/D front remains an open

question.What Taiwan will actually receive

(...Continued on paqe 44)

ffi*ffi;ilELIBHL \ii

#:',-"- -- =,-lr L,,-"

=lF-iHg

F5IH

p, +-#g€r 3I3ftA;ff

REGIONAL UPDATE


was disclosed by the US Defense Se-

curity Cooperation Agency in a notifi-cation to Congress. The four NorthropGrumman E-2T AEW&C aircraft current-ly in service with the Republic of China

Air Force (ROCAF) are to be upgradedto the Hawkeye 2000 configuration in a

contract with a potential value of $250

million.The Republic of China Army (ROCA)

will finally be able to meet its require-ment for a new attack helicopter tosupplement its existing AH-lW attackhelicopter fleet. ln total 30 Boeing

AH-64D Block lll Apache Longbow at-

tack helicopters are involved, as wellas 1,000 AGM-1141 Longbow,Hellfire

ll missiles and 173 Stinger Block 1 air-

to-air-missiles. Assuming all optionsinvolved in the DSCA notification are

taken up, the total value ofthe contractwould be 52.532 billion.

The air defence capabilities of Tai-

wan are to be improved through theacquisition of 330 Patriot PAC-3 missiles,

four AN/MPQ-65 radars and associated

command, control and communica-tions equipment. The DSCA estimates

that the total cost of this contract willbe $3.1 billion. Over seven years after itwas first offered to Taiwan, the Patriot

PAC-3 is finally on the verge of beingacquiredl

ROCAF will also be the recipient ofwhat the DSCA describes as a 'Blanket

Order Requisition Case'. ln plain Eng-

lish this is a logistic support and spares

contract for ROCAF aircraft includingthe F-l6A/8 Block 20, the AIDC Ching

Guo F-CK-lA/B lndigenous Defense

Fighter (lDF), the Lockheed Martin C-

130H Hercules and the Northrop Grum-

man F-5E/F.The value of this contract is

estimated at 5334 million.The Republic of China Navy (ROCN)

will be obtaining a total of 32 UGM-84

Sub-Launched Harpoon Block ll mis-

siles for its Sea Dragon class subma-

rines (SSK). ln addition the contract willinclude training missiles, spares, testequipment and support services. This

contract has a total value of $200 mil-lion.


t-

t4

REGIONAT UPDATE



Finally the ROCA will be acquiringthe Javelin anti-tank missile system, in

the form of 20 command launch unitsand 182 missile rounds, along with as-

sociated training and logistic supportservices. This contract will have a value

of 547 million. Add it all together and

Taiwan is on the verge of acquiring agrand total of 56.463 billion worth ofUS defence equipment.

Undoubtedly this is a vast amount ofmoney, yet it does not represent all theequipment that Taiwan would like topurchase from the US. Apart from theF-16C/D requirement, another majorcontract is the ROCA requirement forup to 60 Sikorsky S-70 utility helicoptersto replace the current fleet of some 70

Bell UH-1H helicopters. There is grow-ing uncertainty over how requests fordefence equipment from Taiwan willbe handled in the future, it all depends

on the character and attitude of the fu-ture administration that will take officein Washington in January of next year.

Submarine DevelopmentsOn 6th October the second Scor-

pene class submarine for the Royal Ma-

laysian Navy (RMN), KD Tun Razak, was

launched at the Cartagena Shipyard ofNavantia in Spain. The first Scorpene

class submarine for the RMN, KD Tunku

Abdul Rahman, was launched in Oc-

tober 2007 at the DCNS yard at Cher-

bourg in France. The building and de-

livery of these two units commencedunder a June 2002 contract, underwhich DCNS would build the forwardsection of the submarine and Navan-

tia the rear section. The French yard

would then assemble one submarineand the Spanish yard would assemble

the other. ln addition the RMN signed

a contract with NAVFCO, part of De-

fense Conseil lnternational, to provide

a full programme of training services

for the RMN submarine force and its

it.,.i

*a,i

, *!

Fryg,-e.,!r*-il

tl

>

M/.,/ r',y'r 'l

crews. The RMN is due to receive KD

Tunku Abdul Rahman in January 2009,

with KD Tun Razak following in Octo-ber 2009. (Photo: Navantia)

Helicopter HiccupThe Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF)

finally appeared to have got its replace-

ment programme for the aged 5-61A-4

Nuri helicopter underway in September,

but what was a done deal in Septemberwas undone in October. At the end ofSeptember the Malaysian governmentannounced that it would be procuring

an initial batch of 12 EC725 helicopters

from Eurocopter in preference to alter-

:.:i#'

natives such as the AW101, S-92 and

Mi-17, for a total of some $470 million.As we prepared to go to press, less than

a month after the original announce-ment, plans had changed and citing thefinancial crisis the Malaysian govern-

ment stated that it would be cancellingthe EC725 purchase. There had been

criticism of the helicopter selection

and the cost of the programme, bear-

ing in mind the fact that the politicalsituation is tense in Malaysia at present,

it is obvious that the government had

second thoughts. The only problemis how long the existing Nuri fleet can

keep flying until a successor helicopteris acquired. (Photo: Eurocopter) r

The ONLY lnternational Maritime Defence Exhibition& conference covering the Asia-Pacific Region

IMDEXASIA 2OO9INTERNATIONAL

EXHIBITIONMARITIME DEFENGE& CONFERENGE

ORGANISED BY

IMDEX Asio Ltd

OFFICIAL SUPPORT

=?: ffi

(-, uNlQuELv)ursaPor€

ffi-^'

AWARDED OFFICIAL SHOW DAILY/MEDIA PARTNER

^:S rsnl_--=--o I I nirtxctantPtolncl

PLATINUM,AA'ELCOMEBAG SPONSOR

b$.&@h*$Ms @re

Y 2009

ffi'b Aralb.':*ice ormodq ',u'lilsu** i".1"1., @

DEFEN.E

Pmgg I'l'kar @ @ffi| L*t,s.,."..". @Elfrflif/fi*r* itHlft6Y'."ffi $h! m pERnluRrT s!'!rrv ndrrskvio:rt

unmanned WARSHIPv€HtcL€s

INDUSTRY INSIGHTASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008

The Alenia Aeronautica C-27J Spartan tactical transport aircraft continues

to build major momentum in the in-

ternational marketplace. This is hardly

surprising when you consider the factthat orders for the aircraft now amountto 121 from eight air forces around theworld. The most significant victory forthis ltalian aircraft is its selection for theJoint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) programme

for the US Air Force and the US Army.

For the JCA programme, Alenia Aer-

onautica works with L-3 Communica-

tions lntegrated Systems who act as theprime contractor, supported by Alenia

North America. ln June 2007 a 52.04

billion contract was signed with theUS military, covering the acquisition of78 C-27J aircraft. The JCA requirementas outlined for the US actually covers

a total of 145 aircraft, of which 75 are

for the US Army and 70 for the US Air

Force. Eventually the US C-2il require-

ment could expand to a total over 207

aircraft over the next ten years, whichwould bring the contract value to theregion of 56 billion.

The C-27J in the JCA configurationfirst flew in June of this year at Caselle

in ltaly and in August flew to the US tothe L3 Communications facility at Waco,

Texas, for the installation and integra-tion of customer specified equipment.On 'l5th October the first C-27J was of-

ficially handed over to the US military.The second aircraft will be handed over

in November.This US contract and the potential

for follow-on US purchases puts theC-27J in a very strong position in thetactical transport aircraft category. An-

other point to note is that the aircrafthas already been successful in the Euro-

pean NATO countries. Greece was thefirst customer acquiring 12 aircraft, fol-lowed by ltaly with 12 aircraft and then

by Lithuania with three aircraft. Othercustomers in Europe include Bulgaria

with five aircraft and Romania. More

recently it was confirmed that Morocco

had ordered four aircraft in a €130 mil-lion contract.

The C-27J could also be on the verge

of finding a new application in the US.

Reports in the US media suggest thatUS Air Force Special Operations Com-

mand (AFSOC) is looking to use the C-

27J as the basis for a gunship aircraftto meet its AC-XX requirement. Exist-

ing AC-130 gunships are suffering fromover use, what AFSOC intends to do isto develop an affordable gunship alter-

native to complement its current fleet.Here the C-27J comes into the picture,with the aim being to integrate it withexisting weapon and sensor packages

to create a new gunship in the form ofthe AC-27J Stinger ll. Up to 16 of these

aircraft could be required.

INBODEFENCE208THE 3RD INDONESIA'S OFFICIAL TRI-SERVICE DEFENCE EVENT

!'HII :IILD INITONDSIA'$i NO" I OTTITIOIALILI--iIIIUTTIOH DITITIINOTT BTTDN'T

19 -22 November 2008Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base

Jakarta - lndonesiaOfiic a Publ cation

a?- e?l,-l f,o*''.,, '"Y)-t zl{Jrri' rffii lllimcrropuncr

l::;:ri.' orsan zed by

Or l.P PJbrcarols

Asi,'ltttnork fff *"0''o"

:t \\t)-\\

ln Co-operalng wth

Me,ql!-

Suppoded by

ffi

=ozIootr

I am iuterested in exhibitin_c at

O INDODEFf,NCE 2O()8

O INDOAEROSPACE 2OO8

O Please send me a space reservatiort for a

O Plerse send nre rnorc inlbnultion orr

O Exhibitor O visitol O Conlcrencc

Namc

Company

Address

Tcl

Email

Fax Reply to (62-21) 8650963

l-

J ::J, J

IZ-*\rI

:l-;u+€

INDO

"i*;3a.-

19 - 22 November 2008 | Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base I Jakarta - lndonesia

PT. Napindo Media AshatamaJl. Kelapa Sawit XIV Blok M1 No.10,Kompleks Billy & Moon Pondok KelapaJakarta '13450 - lndonesia.Phone :62-2 1 8650962, 8644756185,Fax :62-2'1 865 0963,Email :[email protected],

[email protected]

Tglfp_u}ryl lLllARY qIECHNOLOGY

-..s5,9.5;IEEEEITITtrI

Af,@SPACE2''D8

THE 1ST INDONESIA'S OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL AVIATION,AIRCRAFT AND AIRPORT TECHNOLOGY EVENT

l lfi!f

i:t lifi

reEffiUm[[

THEPOWEROF LEGACY

,i-lsstr

;)

*Rry.'r-"

in the porvet of1egac1'.

Wher-r it colnes to Naval Command & Coutrol,

this means \\'e \\'arlt y,or.r to be able to build on )'otlr

previous investrncnts and continuc usiug s1'stems

you're cor.nfortable rvith. That'.s rvl-r1'all our s1'sterus

and products are based on scalable, open archi-

tecture. 'lake our CEROS 200 radar and optronic

tracking s)'stcm, lbr example. It is designed to

facilitate trouble-lree integratior-r rvitli all t1'pes of

legacy commancl and control systems.

Thanks to the modular clesign, our Narvirl

Conmand & Control s)'stems open the grorvth

paths recluired fol future upgrades - giving you

the freeclom to crpand your capabilities as )'our

needs cl-range.

And tliat's the tt ue porver of legacy O O

\A1\;l: CEROS 200

iI-\.T ON TRACKING SYSTEM

DClrli\rN NAVALOPERATIONS

Ar. -i5,/nl'f l

7r.'il;:1 rIttt

il

.;"" -:i f. -.;-

ttb*

t -l'r'!!lt!tt.'.f

'3,

www.saabgroup.com

Documents

Asian Defence and Diplomacy Vol 15 Nov Dec 2008