Asia Sentinel - Taking on Thailand s Myths

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Sentinel - Taking on Thailands myths http://www.asiasentinel.com/index2.php?option=com_content&

12/6/2007

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Taking on Thailands myths

DANIEL TEN KATE

06 December 2007

A new academic journal speaks plainly about Thaksins fall, royal power and supposedlyignorant rural voters

Celebrations for King Bhumibol Adulyadejs 80th birthday

on Wednesday once again displayed his tremendous

popularity among Thais, many of whom wore yellow and

pink to express their adoration for a monarch who has

ruled Thailand for more than 61 years.

They also served as a reminder that the king has turned

one year older, and cannot live forever. Recently the

ageing Bhumibol spent nearly a month in the hospital for

stroke-like symptoms, adding to longstanding fears about

his health and raising questions about the eventual

succession, presumably to his son Crown Prince Maha

Vajiralongkorn.

Although the massive show of support from the Thaipeople represents a genuine love for the king among many, behind the grateful tears, fawning

songs and gushing news accounts is a palpable uncertainty over what the future holds. The

palace has spent decades building up the king into a god-like figure, which has created the

prospect of a massive power vacuum that cant be discussed openly in Thailand due to strict

lese majeste laws.

These taboo issues are laid bare in a new collection of academic articles in a special issue of

Journal of Contemporary Asia, a well-regarded Asian studies journal. This collection serves as

required reading for anyone who wants to read an objective analysis of recent Thai political

events that differs substantially from the sycophantic reports found in the countrys two

English-language dailies. The journal is primarily geared towards an academic audience,

according to editor Kevin Hewison, an Asian Studies professor at the University of North

Carolina, but a limited number of copies will be made available in Thailand, particularly at the

International Conference of Thai Studies in January.

With Thais heading to the polls on December 23 in the first parliamentary elections since the

September 2006 coup, the journal offers a new lens through which to view telecom tycoon


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Thaksin Shinawatras unprecedented election victories and subsequent ouster by royalist

factions of the military. While its impossible to note all the insights in this collection, the

complementary pieces serve to repudiate two key myths that still get repeated constantly in

Thailand: 1) The palace somehow sits above politics and 2) rural voters dont know whats

good for them.

Descending from above

In kicking off the volume, historian Thongchai Winichakul minces no words in discussing how

the palace adeptly turned what seemed like a defeat during the 1932 revolution into an

advantage. After absolute monarchy was overthrown, he argues, the palace sought to assert a

political role in the new democracy precisely through staying above politics, a position it

maintains to this day.

The monarchys political role in Thai democracy is not well understood because of the

common misconception that the monarchy is above politics, the University of Wisconsinprofessor writes, adding: Because of the misconception and censorship, the monarchy, whose

unabated political experience since the 1950s was probably superior to other political actors in

Thailand, has been able to escape the attention, let alone scrutiny, by most observers and

scholars.

This position on top of Thai politics has helped the palace to carefully build up its prestige

through the revival of royal rituals that celebrated even the most minor achievements,

meaning that Thais who are currently sixty years old or younger grew up under the pervasive

aura of an unprecedented royal cult, Thongchai writes.

In particular, he singles out the move to designate the kings birthday as Fathers Day, at

which the monarch gives a televised speech in which he cryptically takes the countrys

politicians to task. The birthday speech becomes a ritual to display the hierarchy of moral

authority and to reaffirm the monarchys place above the normal realm of politics, Thongchai

writes. At the same time, the ritual draws the public to identify themselves with the moral

authority of the king. It is one of the cleverest political rituals, with the impact probably many

times that of an electoral campaign.

At this years speech, Bhumibol stressed that the country needs to remain united. It takes a

good coordination of both legs to walk well, he said, according to the Bangkok Post. I mean

when one puts ones foot in front, the other foot behind must stand on the ground properly.

By doing this alternately, we can move forward and will not fall over. Likewise, without unity,

the country would fall. Physically speaking, when we fall, we could break our bones. If we do

not take care of our country, it could fall into disaster.

Although the royal rituals may seem symbolic and innocuous, they pack a tangible political

punch. As Ukrist Pathmanand of Chulalongkorn University and Michael Conners of Australias


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La Trobe University point out in separate papers, the notion that Thaksin somehow

disrespected Bhumibol through ignoring or downplaying key rituals that supported the royalist

ideology gave the generals an opening to forcibly remove a leader who had won an

unprecedented 19 million votes just 18 months earlier.

Ukrist writes, Given their limited political power base and their apparent lack of political ideas

and ambition, it was certainly daunting for this group of royalist military to confront Thaksin,

who at that time had strong control of parliament, the media, the bureaucracy, provincial

governors, police, significant sections of the military, and the solid support of the masses,

especially in rural areas. Yet the emergence of the royalist military was possible with the

support of a royalist ideology that maintained a stronghold throughout the anti-Thaksin

campaigns from the end of 2005.

The constant royal ceremonies, nightly royal newscasts and publicity about the kings good

works have all built up the belief that Thais could ask the monarch for anything, including

Thaksins removal. The coup and its widespread acceptance may have demonstrated the

palaces strength, but it also greatly affected its standing, especially among supporters ofThaksins social and economic policies, writes Conners.

Interestingly, while the book spends a great deal of time discussing Bhumibol, it doesnt

mention Vajiralongkorn by name. Ukrist makes a passing comment about how many

well-informed Bangkokians talked of Thaksin having taken on many of the profligate crown

princes larger expenditures, thus suggesting the two are allies. He also dismisses the juntas

thinking that a royalist army commander would ensure that the succession period will be

peaceful: This transition period will depend more on the personality of the present king

because, in fact, the monarchy in Thailand is not institutionalized; it has been built up around

the personal charisma that has been created for the incumbent king.

Hewison builds upon this in his article, which opens as a review of journalist Paul Handleys

banned book The King Never Smiles. The 2006 coup, he argues, has blatantly exposed the

palaces political role, and has blurred the lines between appropriate criticism and lese

majeste. This could put the palace in a precarious role if the next king is not as popular as

Bhumibol.

The problem for the king and his advisers is that they have now placed the monarchy at the

center of ongoing political struggles, Hewison writes. This is a risky strategy and means thateverything royal now has a political meaning. As such, nationalist strategies with the king at

their center have become de rigueur. Symbols of the monarchy yellow shirts and the

sufficiency economy are also symbols of loyalty to the military-backed government and any

criticism is a dangerous if not unpatriotic act.


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Thaksins challenge

As authors Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker note, Thaksin was an unlikely candidate to

become Thailands first populist leader. The telecom billionaire originally formed his party in

1998 to rescue Thai businesses from the financial crisis and restore economic growth. His

populism came after he recruited leftist 1970s student leaders to help form his policies, and

they came up with debt relief, universal health care and village loan funds policies that have

been at the center of Thailands political troubles ever since.

The success of Thaksins policies, combined with gobs of money that allowed him to

essentially buy a huge coalition among lawmakers of the poor, heavily populated northeast

region, led him to stunning election victories in 2001 and 2005. He was certain to win by a

hefty margin yet again in November 2006, prompting the generals to oust him before that was

possible.

Hewison notes that Thaksins wide support among the rural poor put him in direct competition

with the palace for the hearts and minds of the masses.

Far from urging a return to the farm and being content with rural sufficiency, Thaksins

policies emphasized getting ahead, producing for the market and promoted

entrepreneurialism, he writes.

While most every author acknowledges that Thaksins welfare policies proved successful, they

also say that his use of the increased popularity from those policies to neuter independent

agencies as well as impose seemingly conflicting policies on privatization and free trade

combined to bring about his eventual downfall.

Thaksin pursued a lot of policies that were basic tenets of neo-liberalism with considerablevigor, and contradicted the social contract he offered to the poor, write Oliver Pye and

Wolfram Schaffar of Bonn University. These contradictions gradually unfolded in the course of

his premiership. Not, as often criticized by neo-liberal ideologues, between unsustainable

state-funded projects and fiscal prudence, but between Thaksins ambitious capitalist

restructuring of economic and social relations in the interest of big business, and the interests

of his popular base.

Throughout the course of the move to oust Thaksin, Bangkok academics and anti-Thaksin

leaders routinely labeled rural poor voters as ignorant. After the coup, junta leader Sonthi

Boonyaratglin said that many Thais still lack a proper understanding of democracy and

some have yet to learn about discipline.

Andrew Walker, an anthropologist with The Australian National University, writes that there is

little the rural electorate can do to shake off this persistent [negative] image. He argues,

however, that rural Thais vote for leaders according to a set of localized values. Vote-buying,

which certainly takes place, should be put into the broader context of the array of material

assistance that is expected of political representatives and other well-resourced people seeking


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to demonstrate their social standing, he writes.

Far from being a uniform group of mindless drones, rural voters engage with various

competing local figures in a range of political contests, and choose the leaders that most

reflect their values. Among other things, Walker writes, these values include choosing leaders

that are considered local; that bring home financial gains to local communities; and prove

competent at running an administration.

Moreover, rural voters often think on a level that is different from the love-hate, all-or-nothing

relationship Bangkok had with Thaksin, according to Somchai Phatharathananunth from

Mahasarakham University in northeastern Thailand. He cites the reluctance of farmers to join

anti-Thaksin movements led by NGOs even though they had worked together for years.

From the NGO perspective, farmers refused to join the anti-Thaksin protest because they

were unable to look beyond the short-term material benefits of the populist policies, Somchai

wrote, adding that the aid workers then tried to supply the farmers with correct information

so they could understand the long-term damage of Thaksins policies.

Such a view implied that there could only be one political line taken towards Thaksin, and to

be politically correct farmers had to adopt that line, Somchai writes. Such a thing was not

going to happen because it ran counter to many farmers way of thinking. Farmers do not

adopt totalistic views towards things or persons; they deal with them in a pragmatic way. They

judged Thaksin on an issue-by-issue basis. As a result, whether Thaksin was good or bad

depended on the issue at hand.

And indeed, though opposing Thaksin on certain issues, many rural voters still saw him deliver

them real benefits, much more so than any Thai government had done in the past. Thaksin

quickly turned his campaign promises into reality, cementing and expanding the political

support he formed when he convinced regional old-school northeastern politicians to join his

Thai Rak Thai party.

While the policies were severely criticized as a new form of vote-buying by many NGO leaders

and academics in Bangkok, farmers viewed the policies as the distribution of resources to the

countryside that helped farmers to address their needs, Somchai writes. They insisted that

the rural poor were as entitled to access the government budget as were the urban rich.

Election to w hat end?

All of this provides telling insights into the upcoming December 23 election. Although the

coup-makers have had more than a year in power to educate the population about the evils

of populism and unify the country, they appear to have failed on both counts.

Every party has adopted populist measures that are similar, if not identical, to the ones

implemented by Thai Rak Thai. Even key anti-Thaksin financier Prachai Leophairatana who


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this week announced he was resigning as leader of the Matchimathippitai party after being

sentenced to three years in prison for share manipulation four years ago had unveiled a

populist platform that went well beyond anything Thaksin proposed.

This reveals that either all parties are now pandering to a group of ill-informed voters, or the

claims that Thaksins policies would lead the country to financial ruin were greatly

exaggerated. Indeed, as the king mentioned in his speech on Tuesday, there is no need to be

stingy when the governments finances are in order. Whether the money should be spent on

more tanks or more health care will be for the elected leaders to decide.

Two more key facts about this election are that its being held under a new junta-drafted

constitution that limits the political space and that it doesnt involve Thaksin or his party, which

a military-appointed court dissolved early this year in a legally dubious decision. These facts

are interesting primarily because coup apologists argued correctly that elections were not the

only essential part to a democracy; other democratic institutions needed to be functioning

properly to ensure a free and fair result and administration. Unfortunately, Thailand is about to

have another election in which the institutions that provide checks and balances have beencorrupted. Nearly half of the next Senate will be appointed, royalist judges are in control of

key independent bodies and many northeastern provinces that formed Thaksins old base are

still under martial law. This time, its not Thaksin who is to blame, but the military junta and

royalists who assumed power after the coup.

Whether or not rural voters will elect PPP, a proxy party for Thaksin loyalists, remains to be

seen. Certainly a PPP victory will signal a repudiation of the coup group and lead to rumors

about yet another putsch. Whats more crucial, perhaps, is to see if after the election

politicians of all stripes can formulate a set of democratic rules and institutions that can unify

the country and withstand an assault from any competing group of power-hungry elites.

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Asia Sentinel - Taking on Thailand s Myths