Asian Voices :

Promoting Dialogue Between the US and Asia

ASEAN's Evolving Regionalism:

Promise or Peril?

by

Dr. Ahmad Zakaria,Tun Abdul Razak Chair in Southeast Asian Studies

Ohio University

May 17, 2001

Seminar Transcript

Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

Washington, DC

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ASEAN’s Evolving Regionalism: Promise or Peril?by

Dr. Ahmad Zakaria

Ahmad Zakaria: Thank you very much,John. I feel very privileged and very honoredthis evening to be invited to speak and I’mdelighted to be here, especially with, I guess, Icould call them old friends and a former staffmember of mine. I am delighted also to meetsome old friends from colorful days and alsothose that I have become acquainted withthrough the years, and also to meet new ones.

When I got the invitation to speak from Dr.Ikenberry on this topic, I actually accepted itwithout much hesitation. But as I can tell you,as it got nearer to the date I was going to come,I felt that I had made a terrible mistake. Ithought that I was going to get myself into alot of trouble, you know, because funda-mentally, I think this is not an easy subject,precisely because of the fact that there are somany uncertainties.

And when we focus on Southeast Asia,obviously on the one hand, you can applaudthe success that the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations—better known as ASEAN—has been able to achieve in a good 30 years.However, after 1997, the Association hasbecome questionable in terms of its directionand in terms of whether it will be able tosustain the envious record that it has achievedin the 30 years before ’97.

What we find, therefore, as we come to the 21st Century, when you look at theSoutheast Asian nations and ASEAN, youhave a situation in which the organization hasbasically lost its luster or relevance. Somepeople want to call it a “sunset” organization.

In the last two years, ASEAN has been able toachieve, as its most notable accomplishment,something called the ASEAN Plus Three.Basically, ASEAN has an arrangement withChina, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Some people or critics have said that this isbasically the dying ASEAN’s new lifeline.Perhaps, we hope that ASEAN will be able tolead all of the parties to this new arrangement,so that it will be able to survive.

Effect of 1997 Crisis on ASEAN

It will be useful, I think, to look back andperhaps realize what the latest 1997 crisismeant for us. Basically, I think it was a true tsunami, if you want to call it that, thatstruck ASEAN. In that case, the economy ofASEAN, basically on a combined basis, fellaround 20 percent in dollar terms of itscombined GDP. This had a tremendousimpact. And among other things, you find that the currency values of all the ASEANcountries also fell basically around 40 to 60 percent.

So that meant the ASEAN countries basicallywon’t go under, but certainly will go through aperiod of tremendous economic, not failure,but certainly difficulty. And, of course, withsuch economic dislocations you had risingunemployment, businesses folded and gen-erally you could see there was a crisis ofconfidence. What it means actually, now thatyou look at it after ‘97, basically about three tofour years after ‘97, you find that the ASEANcountries, in some fashion, have been able toget out of the morass, but they are not out ofthe woods. The dangers remain, such as thefundamentals that we have seen in theeconomic performance of the ASEAN coun-tries. Among other things, especially thebanking sector.

So when you have a situation now is thatASEAN is not attracting the investments that it used to attract before. And so there is a danger that you will come up, as one Singaporean diplomat says, over the

investment radar. A market investing indexrecently showed that only four ASEAN coun-tries were listed as countries in which peoplecould invest. And together there are somecountries only given an index of 23 percent.And in those four countries one country, Idon’t think that you need to guess whichcountry, has an assignment of 12 percent.

And what you have is a situation, when youlook at Asia as a whole, that the other Asiancountries are basically getting a higher indexranking. For example, China is 11 percent,Taiwan 17 percent, Hong Kong 23 percent andKorea 20 percent. And this is just anindication, I think, of the position that theASEAN countries are in, especially inMalaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and thePhilippines, because these are the real top-performing ASEAN countries in the periodbefore ‘97. And the other indicator, of course,is that the Japanese foreign investment hasbeen halved to Indonesia, Malaysia and thePhilippines, between 1997 and 1999.

Crisis of Confidence among ASEAN Countries

Now, on top of that, we can look at ASEANafter ’97. While they were undergoing thiseconomic crisis, you might also see that theywent through a crisis of confidence. Therecertainly was, I would say, some kind of aperiod of inaction in the ASEAN countriesthemselves, and when they interacted witheach other at the ASEAN level.

And you find, for example, the ASEANcountries were not able to forge a unitedposition on how to deal with the economiccrisis. They also were not able to forge togethera united position on the environmentalproblems that would be besetting ASEAN atthat time. So you have these sets of problemsfor the ASEAN countries.

Politics of ASEAN

Now, we turn from the economics to the

politics of ASEAN. You find there that,because of what happened you have, I wouldsay, spectacular changes of government in theASEAN region. You have changes ofgovernment in Thailand and the Philippines.But perhaps the most dramatic change was onethat occurred in Indonesia with the end of theSuharto regime, which had been in power forthe past 32 years. Basically, you have a newgovernment.

Political scientists are also able to identify theinstances of the rise of, or the emergence of,political opposition and dissent in these coun-tries, which perhaps in some way, beckons toa much more democratic future in thesecountries. And definitely I think, there werecalls for more from the ASEAN countries.

But when you look at ASEAN and what’shappening in terms of the political develop-ment in these countries, what I think becomesa problem, if you are looking from an outsideangle, is what’s happening in Indonesia.Indonesia basically is undergoing what youmight call a transition to a democratic order,from what had been previously an authori-tarian political system.

Transition to Democracy Difficult for Indonesia

But a transition to democracy has obviouslybeen a difficult process, and the process is stillongoing, with tremendous challenges to thegoverning power. In fact, one of the bigproblems in Indonesia today is that we’re notsure whether the government is in power ornot. And obviously, one of the questions beingasked is whether or not the leader that theyhave is the rightful and legitimate leader: aleader who importantly would be able toprovide for order, stability and the governancethat’s necessary for Indonesia. Translated inASEAN terms, all this means is simply thatIndonesia has not been able to provide theleadership that’s been necessary for ASEANand what helped ASEAN to succeed in the past.

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Michael Leifer calls this leadership positionthe regional entitlement of Indonesia—beingthe largest country and not being the largestcountry—but the country that in many waysstands tall and provides for that feeling inSoutheast Asia that it is a region of greatimportance.

I might also add that Indonesia is also facedwith other problems. One of the problems, ofcourse, is whether the republic will continue tobe a united country and not a divided one. Soin that sense, what’s happening in Asia hasprovided basic ASEAN a rudderless andleaderless ASEAN. And that I think is achallenge that we have.

So I have two questions basically this eveningthat I would like to pose to you. Number oneis whether ASEAN can survive and numbertwo: is survival achieved through greaterregionalism? And I already mentioned to youwhat happened with the formation of theASEAN Plus Three.

Globalization Benefited ASEAN Countries

I think to address these questions, we need toconsider several factors. Factor number one, Ithink is the factor of globalization. I think thatit’s quite clear that what happened in ‘97 wasobviously something of global significance.In fact, the reason for the ASEAN countriesperformance economically in the 30 yearsbefore ‘97, and why it became basically aregion of expected economic growth, wasbasically because it interacted with the rest ofthe world. The successful economic countries,successful countries in ASEAN that hadperformed in economic terms, have beencountries that have interacted with the rest ofthe world.

In Malaysia, for example, you are talkingabout a country that has basically 25 percentdependence on foreign trade. In fact, whenyou look at manufacturing, we are talkingabout easily 70 to 80 percent trade dependencefor Malaysia. And you can cite the same kind

of statistics for the other more successfulASEAN countries.

So globalization is here to stay. And theresponses from the ASEAN countries havebeen, at the moment, quite problematic. And Ican say that for Malaysia, there’s been arethinking of whether or not Malaysia wastaking the right step when it decided to getonto its global retreat. And this is a funda-mental problem, because I think that it’sdifficult for Malaysia to retreat to a positionlike Myanmar used to do, when it isolateditself from the rest of the world. Also youhave that particular problem. So it’s achallenge of whether or not the ASEANcountries will retreat, or whether they will takehead-on the problem of globalization.

Now related to this, of course, is the fact thatthe current performance of these countries isvery much weighted to the current per-formance of the developed countries. And bydeveloped countries, you are talking basicallyof the United States, Japan and the Europeancountries. And here, when you have, forexample, some sense of an impendingeconomic recession in the United States, thiscreates tremendous challenges for thegovernment as to whether or not they cansustain the economic recovery that has takenplace in the ASEAN countries.

And this is not from the horse’s mouth, but Ican tell you that at this present moment, theMalaysian government is thinking very muchabout how it can better its relationship with theUnited States. It’s not so much that Dr.Mahathir loves President Bush more than heloved Clinton, but it’s obviously a case of thefact that the economic reality is there staringhim in the face: the country has to have abetter relationship with the United States.

The second factor would be, I would say, aquestion of regionalism, with regionalism asenforced through the ASEAN Plus Three.Whatever you will think about this ASEANPlus Three, and what I’m saying here is

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basically some people think that ASEAN PlusThree is nothing but the realization of the EastAsian economic grouping, is what Mahathirhas been talking about for the last decade. Iknow that you have basically being informedof what Mahathir dreamed all this while.

East Asian Countries See Merit in ASEAN Plus Three

I think there is some truth to that. But what Isee is that the East Asian countries also havecome to realize that there is some merit, agreat merit, in the ASEAN Plus Three, andthat’s why this thing is being formed.

But if you look at it more closely, you will find that the ASEAN Plus Three has not made much headway since it was officiallyrecognized as a grouping. And so we have yetto see the fruits of this new regionalorganization, you might say.

Now, of course, when you look at the otherdevelopments there are also attempts by theASEAN countries to forge relationships withthe rest of the world. One grouping which isnot solely ASEAN, but ASEAN with the Asiancountries is that through its association withthe European countries or ESAN. This is aninteresting grouping because it’s interregionalin nature, and I cannot think of any other suchinterregional grouping that has been formed.

Challenge of ASEAN Relations with Rest of the World

This is an interesting challenge, but thechallenges, at the moment, will be set by threeparticular conditions. Condition number oneis whether or not there can be true recovery inthe ASEAN countries. Number two is whetheror not the European unity itself, through itsregional economic integration, is able to forgea new currency form through the Euro. Andnumber three basically has to do with thelinkages being forged under ESAN. And thathas been problematic, because, in part, theEuropean countries are very concerned about

some of the political developments that aretaking place in ASEAN. And I’m talking,basically, of the Myanmar problem. So thishas been, in some sense, a stumbling block,but I think this interregional grouping hasmuch promise.

And one of the things that I will be doing inthe summer is basically to go to Europe. Andthat’s partly when we try to finance anASEAN package, which has been put forth,interestingly, through Dr. Mahathir’s initia-tive, when he set up basically what was knownas, let me get it right, the Asia- EuropeInstitute in Kuala Lumpur. That is one part, Ithink, of the terms that are being made to forgethis relationship.

Some people have said that this is an attemptof ESAN, in some ways, to give some balanceto ASEAN and the Asian countries in relationsto the other countries, principally the UnitedStates and Japan. I think there is some truth tothat, certainly. I think for the Europeancountries, themselves, they are very pleased tohave ESAN as a balancing act to that of theUnited States and Asia.

Two-tier Organization Presents Problems for ASEAN

Another factor is that of the ASEAN countriesafter ’97. Those of you who have studiedASEAN will know that ASEAN became a fullorganization of ten countries, basically in ‘97and the last country, Cambodia, was admittedone or two years later. And then you have inASEAN a new format, which some people callthe two-tier organization. This has created anew problem for ASEAN.

Some people think that this has alsocontributed to the lack of initiative withinASEAN, because of the fact that, with thelarger membership, the ASEAN countriescannot reach decisions in the same way theydid in the past. These two-tier organizationsbasically have as members the originalASEAN countries, together with the new

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countries basically the CLM countries,Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and, of course,Vietnam. And, therefore, you have basicallythe Indo-Chinese bloc being a problem withinthe ASEAN organization.

And this relates of course to another problemthat ASEAN has. In the ’92 summit inSingapore, ASEAN decided that it would nowpush for the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA).The plan, of course, was to have, by 2002,created an ASEAN free trade area. Butbecause of the two-tier nature of ASEAN, thecountries that are latecomers to ASEAN, havebeen given, I won’t say a reprieve, butcertainly a longer period in which they canthen become true members of the ASEAN freetrade area.

AFTA Does not Hold Much Promise for ASEAN

But because of the ‘97 crisis you also haveanother problem. Malaysia, for example, hasnow started to backtrack on the pursuit of anAFTA by next year, and basically has askedfor a further two years before it will be fullyintegrated within the AFTA network. So thismay suggest to us, in fact, that AFTA does nothold much promise for the ASEAN countries.That becomes yet another problem.

And perhaps I should now go into the lastfactor and this question, of course, comes backto the question I’ve asked, about whetherASEAN can survive. Not being nostalgic, butI think when you look at ASEAN, maybe it isnecessary for us to think that it’s possible thatfour months is some key or indicator tounderstanding whether or not it can surviveinto the future.

Region at Peace

So on this note, we can talk about that pastrecord by talking about number one: in the 30years of ASEAN’s existence up to ’97, andeven to now, you can say that they had been acreation of what I would call Pax Asiana,

basically a region at peace. The region hasseen no war or conflict between the countriesof ASEAN. And I think that this is no meanachievement, when you look at ASEAN’sestablishment in ’67 following the conflictsbetween Indonesia and Malaysia and Singa-ore, that the countries of Southeast Asia havebeen at peace.

At this moment in time I think when I look atASEAN, I do not see any possibility that therecan be hostilities between ASEAN countries.But perhaps I can give one little exception,because there is a problem that continues untilthe present and that is a question of Malaysiaand Singapore.

Whether or not Malaysia and Singapore willgo to war at some particular point in time… Ido not think that there is anybody from theMCA here today and I can speak with muchmore candor. But in any event that’ssomething that we can think about.

Nature of ASEAN Regionalism

The second element on ASEAN’s past record,is the nature of ASEAN regionalism, which, Ithink, is a strength and not a weakness. Andthis is basically, that ASEAN has been able toforge its unity in spite of the fact that themember countries of ASEAN actually havevery different and individual standpoints ofwhat they believe ASEAN is all about.

I would like to call this—and this is amouthful so I will try my best—-it is theunilateralism within a multilateral frameworkformat. And this was very much evident in theCambodian crisis or the Indochina War, theway the ASEAN countries actually dealt withthe Cambodian problem. While on the onehand there is a united diplomatic front in theUnited Nations on the political ground, theASEAN countries themselves all have verydifferent standpoints. And you can find, forexample, Singapore, which had the mostvociferous and the most vocal position on theVietnamese invasion of Cambodia, because

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they were, of course, the most vigorous traderswith the Vietnamese.

So there were these echoing conditions inexistence all the time. And similarly, theposition of Indonesia, for example, onCambodia was a lot different from the posi-tion of Thailand on the Cambodian issue. Soyou can find this “unilateralism within amultilateral framework” in some senseactually is the strength of ASEAN, although itshowed the contradictions that existed.

The third element of ASEAN’s past record is,of course, how to revitalize. And here wecome back to the question of leadership withinASEAN. I think the big problem for ASEANis how to deal with ASEAN in a post-Suhartoperiod. Of course, Suharto’s successor doesnot look interested at all in ASEAN, andtherefore that’s why maybe the leadershipfrom Indonesia has been lacking. But on theother hand, if you look at ASEAN carefully, Ithink to a large extent, ASEAN was able toforge unity and consensus and able to achievemany of the things that it did diplomatically,through the efforts of Malaysia, Singapore,and Indonesia.

In some sense that’s the key to understandingASEAN, because they are the ones that Iwould say have played, in my mind, acustodial role in the movements of ASEAN.And, therefore, if these three countries can gettheir act together, then I think it would providefor the revitalization of ASEAN.

ARF Conducive to Multilateral Security Dialogue

There is one final element that we can thinkabout, and that is basically on the ASEANregional front. I think that it’s quite true that,in some sense, the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) is a glorified talk shop among thecountries of Asia. On the other hand, its majorsuccess has been that it does provide for aunique architecture in the sense of multilateralsecurity dialogue among the Asia Pacific

countries. And more importantly, if not just as importantly, is the fact that it includesChina in the ASEAN regional front. And Ithink that’s a very vital component, because insome senses it is signaling the effect of theconundrum of the emergence of China as aregional, if not a global actor in the securityframeworks. China is involved in bothinternational regime levels and regional levelsin Asia.

And so when you look at the ARF in a largesense to my mind, the fact that you have thissecure dialogue, never mind that many of thetopics are soft in nature, but the fact that thereis such a mechanism holds much promise forthe future of these Asia Pacific countries.

Future of ASEAN Looks Promising

So I begin by raising to you basically what hadbeen the challenges for ASEAN. And I thinkthat, in terms of the future, maybe we can lookat the past. And in that sense, therefore, I thinkwhen we ask the question, whether or not thefuture of ASEAN is one of promise or peril, Ithink I like to be a cautious optimist and I saythat it’s somewhere between promise andperil. But it looks more promising than beingone of a perilous future.

Thank you very much.

Ronald D. Palmer: Ahmad as usual has beenbrilliant. I’m going to try to pick out just a fewthings from this rich menu he’s put before us.But one of them that I don’t think gets enoughattention is the place where ASEAN starts.And especially as many of us in the West lookat it, and perhaps make some comparisonswith other types of regional organizations and sometimes look at ASEAN, shall we say, invidiously; that we don’t think it’s done enough.

Asia Lacks History of Regionalism

I’d like just to touch on a few historical points.First of all, looking back to 1945, it’s

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extremely important to realize that there wasno Asian history of regionalism. Indeed thecountries in the region did not look laterally,as it were. They looked back to Europe. Theylooked to London. They looked to Amster-dam; they looked to Paris; and in the case ofthe Philippines, they looked to the UnitedStates. It was the Cold War. And, of course,the anti-colonialism provided the frameworkwithin which the countries of ASEAN beganto look for partners, to look for opportunitiesto cooperate. It was the United States, ofcourse, that took major initiatives, especiallythose of you who have studied the workings ofthe NSC (National Security Council).

The famous document NSC 68 of 1950 wasthe frame of reference within which opera-tions were undertaken (by the U.S.) inMalaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and soforth. And it’s the beginning of, not neces-sarily the beginning, but the impetus forAmerican bilateralism.

Now, it’s important as we look back at theUnited States in this period, to remember thatHo Chi Minh wanted very much to have a rela-tionship with the United States. But it was theUnited States that concluded there was inade-quate state capacity: that there was no “there”there, as Gertrude Stein once said. This was ageneral problem, as we saw it, dealing withcountries in the region: a lack of state capacity.I would suggest to you, leaping ahead, that it isalso a major issue in the 1997 financial crisis:there was a lack of state capacity.

Now, the United States partnered with Japan.It’s easy to say that there was no Jean Monnetin Asia or Southeast Asia. There were noAsians of the caliber of the Germans who wereinvolved. I’m not sure that that’s at all true.

When things got started, especially afterASEAN, there were statesmen of globalcharacter. I think we have to look at GhazaliShafie. We have to look at the numerouspeople in Indonesia who made regionalism,who made ASEAN go, and made it work.

West Should Remember ASEAN’sColonial Past

Now, it is also important for those of us in theWest as we look at this organization, I makethat distinction “in the West,” to rememberthat this area was a colonial area. We’relooking at the post-colonial world, and in thatworld again we have to remember that some ofthe people who were small boys at the time ofWorld War II, Mahathir is a good example,remained in power, continued to have ideasthat are very much fashioned by the types of emotions they had when they were coming along.

I was interested in Dr. Zakaria’s statementabout, as it were, cornering Mahathir andsaying that we have got to improve relations,which is a little bit strongly stated. But that’seffectively what happened. The leadership inthe country said to the PM, we just can’t go onwith this kind of rhetoric, we have to startsaying better things, or finding better things tosay with, and about, the Americans.

Now, returning to the foundations ofregionalism, of course, those foundations arein fact secure. The security relationships aresolid, when you think about Thailand and thePhilippines as the cornerstones, as it were, ofthe American policy in the region and alsothey are the keystones of the eventualdevelopment of other regional structures—-SEATO (the Southeast Asian Treaty Organi-zation) was the first example. After SEATO,there was the effort that was supported byTunku Abdul Rahman, I can’t recall now, butin the early 60s, and then into 1967 andASEAN. Now, I don’t wish to claim anythingfor any outsiders. This was after all aSoutheast Asia initiative. It is also true thatthe United States tried to help, to do it quick,to help bring Asian or Southeast Asianregionalism into existence.

There are obvious reasons why there is noSoutheast Asian NATO or no Southeast AsianEU. But I commend to you a notion, a

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concept, a thought. It took from 1957, theTreaty of Rome, to 1999, the Treaty ofMaastricht for the EU to get where it is. Andanybody will agree that they have a ways togo. By the same token, the things that liebefore the EU, some of which are going to beaddressed this summer in visits by thePresident of the United States there, includethe enlargement of NATO. They also includehow NATO and the enlarged NATO and theUnion are going to come together.

ASEAN has made Great Progress

These are big, big questions which have takenfrom ‘57 to ‘99, that’s two generations; it hastaken almost 50 years to address. It is notunusual therefore that ASEAN, starting from adead stop, has not made greater progress. Butit’s also important to realize that it has madegreat progress. Let’s take the point about thePax ASEANa. Remember that ASEANemerged from the confrontation and the effortsto stop the confrontation in 1962 and in 1965.These efforts were so successful, that the ideawas, let’s keep this going, and let’s see how wecan make it endure. In the beginning ASEANwas nothing more than an “entente cordial.”Indeed, that may be one of its continuingproblems that it remains, an “entente cordial”with a lack of institutionalization, with a lackof capacity.

ASEAN: Neither NATO nor EC

Now, this takes us back to another point, and Ihope I’m not going too quickly, but I’m tryingto use my seven minutes well. I wrote a bookin ‘87 called “Building ASEAN, Twenty Yearsof Cooperation.” And there is a quote in therethat I think remains important. A writer,talking about ASEAN in 1973, said, “NeitherNATO nor EC.” That remains basically whereASEAN is now. Now the question that needsto be addressed is that at the beginning,ASEAN was primarily about guaranteeingeach other’s borders, guaranteeing existingborders. And it is critical to recall again,evoking the Pax ASEANa, that every one of

these nations has a border problem with theother, every one of them, all ten of them, butthe peace has been kept.

Now, the machinery has been developed todeal with issues arising economically. It tooka long time for there to be an equivalent of theforeign minister’s meeting on the part of theeconomic ministers, but there is such amechanism in existence now.

Now, there have been five summits up to ‘95.Each of them, it seems to me, has had moresubstance. The problem remains that theSecretariat in Jakarta is inadequately staffed,inadequately funded, and has an inadequatechair. I understand Rod Severino is going tobe here next week, and doubtless some of youwill have a chance to talk to him. He’s theDirector General of ASEAN. So, it wouldseem to me that the next major problems ofASEAN, leaving aside ASEAN Plus Threeand so forth and so on, are the problems ofinstitutionalization. How do they get their feetunder them and go ahead from here?

ASEAN Plus Three is a Reflection of Globalization

Now, ASEAN Plus Three is a reflection ofglobalization. It’s a reflection of the fact thatthe world is here. Certainly, ASEAN has nochoice but to deal with the world and the ideaof retreating from the mounting waters ofglobalization is just wrong. It won’t work.

Now, that being the case, I’d like to pick upthe fundamental thought of our speaker,namely, that whether you look at it from thepoint of view of peril or promise, ASEAN PlusThree is an opportunity. It is an opportunitynot just for the ASEANs, but also for theseveral states, governments of the North. Howthat opportunity is used is going to be a criticalissue in world history, but it is an opportunity.

And that goes for ARF as well. It is true thatthere is a lot of talk that goes on in ARF. It isby the same token true that little progress has

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been made in preventive diplomacy or inconflict resolution. But there is a frame ofreference where people do talk about thesethings. They talk about the South China Sea.They talk about things that would sometimesbe difficult to talk about bilaterally.

Now, finally let’s just talk about ARF. ARFincludes both China and India. To myknowledge, it does not yet include Pakistan,but it is entirely possible as we look into thefuture that there could be some very inter-esting developments that come out of ARFand its parallel organization CSCAP.

I think to be a touch more optimistic than youallowed yourself to be, perhaps I’m looking atthe half full glass and perhaps I see moreprospects. These people have got themselvesup off the floor in the past and they can do it again.

Thank you.

Pek Koon Heng: Dr. Zakaria has given a veryinteresting speech, covering a whole range ofissues. And I do agree fundamentally with his premise that ASEAN has been rudderlessand leaderless for the last five years or so. Ithink there’s the question of where is ASEANgoing to go, the question of the evolvingregionalism.

Evolving Regionalism in East Asia

I have a couple of thoughts about the evolvingregionalism in East Asia. What type of com-munity does ASEAN want to build in EastAsia? And there are two competing alterna-tive visions of community-building. One isrepresented by ASEAN and ASEAN PlusThree, which is a consensus-based, looselyinstitutionalized inclusive community of EastAsians. And that is basically the ASEAN way,on consensus and consultation. That is theinimical ASEAN way. ASEAN has alwaysindicated that it doesn’t want to be rules-based, or to be deeply institutionalized, afunctionalist or near-functionalist institution.

So ASEAN has been from the very beginning,if you look at the Treaty of Amity or theBangkok Declaration, a consultative forum. Itis there to build consensus, to build trust. Itdoesn’t want to be a deep institutionalizedcommunity.

APEC Needs More Initiative

And the other alternative is APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). And APECin essence is a key member. And APEC standsfor an exclusive, deeply institutionalizedrules-based grouping. We said ASEAN hasbeen in the doldrums since the Asian eco-nomic crisis, but APEC is in a worse state.APEC is dying. APEC has had no initiative,no momentum going for it since the Osakaagenda of 1995. This is because it clashedwith the ASEAN vision. Because, basically,when APEC was first set up in 1989, ASEANwent to APEC on condition that ASEAN wasnot to be eclipsed by it. It was ASEAN’s fearof being eclipsed by APEC that prompted Dr.Mahathir to propose EAEC, the East AsianEconomic Gouping to amplify the ASEANvoice in APEC.

ASEAN came up with this common platformof conditions, so that ASEAN would not besubmerged by APEC, believing that APECshould be a consultative forum. APEC is notto be institutionalized; APEC will only do theeconomics. And APEC will proceed gradu-ally. And then ASEAN agreed to APEC onthose terms.

Clinton hijacked the APEC process in 1993with his vision of a new Pacific community.And he brought in Fred Bergstein and we’vegot this fast track agenda for creating a tradefree zone by 2010 or 2020. And ASEAN,Mahathir especially, has objected mightily to it.

So it was due to this resistance from ASEANthat caused the APEC momentum to stall. Butthe Asian financial crisis really, as Dr. Zakariamentioned it, killed off the ASEAN momen-tum also. But more seriously, it killed the

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APEC momentum. There was this feelingamong the ASEAN countries, and this is whatbrought ASEAN Plus Three together, thatASEAN would take on globalization, but notglobalization on the U.S. terms. And the Asian financial crisis showed them that glo-balization distributed the benefits so unevenly.

ASEAN Plus Three Response to Financial Crisis

And ASEAN Plus Three is a response, anAsian response, an ASEAN response, to the impact of the financial crisis. They willtake on globalization provided that theinternational financial architecture will bereformed. So ASEAN came up with an agendain 1999. It developed a common stand on theneed to reform the IMF, on the need for theWorld Bank to have more transparency as agrading agency, and the need to havetransparencies and greater disclosure rules forhighly-leveraged institutions and Wall Street.

So they said it’s not only the cronies and thecorruption. It’s not only the Asian countriesthat have to refocus, but also Westerninstitutions need to reform. And China, Japanand South Korea have signed on to this. So Isee the ASEAN Plus Three initiative as areaction to the globalization, to the badglobalization of the Asian financial crisis.

So I think I am a lot more optimistic aboutASEAN Plus Three than Zakaria is, because Isee it has only been a short time; ASEAN PlusThree was only launched in 1997, December1997, in Kuala Lumpur. It is the EAEC redux.The EAEC came up with the new guides, andin the few short years that it has been going, ithas had a lot of things on its agenda.

For example, unlike APEC, it is going to lookat not only economic monitoring of financialcorporations, but also at social and humanresource development, scientific and technicaldevelopment, culture and information, politi-cal security effects and transnational issues.All that will be subsumed under ASEAN

Plus Three. So we’ll talk about security, we’lltalk about finance, we’ll talk about humanresource development and the digital divideand e-commerce.

Chiang Mai Initiative

Now, Japan is a lynchpin. Japan is in it, due tonecessity. Japan has set up something calledthe Chiang Mai Initiative, set up in May 2000.And the Cheng Mai Initiative is a revival ofthe Asian Monetary Fund that Miyazawa hadproposed, Mahathir has proposed, and wasshot down by the Americans during the Japanfinancial crisis, because it was seen asdetracting from the IMF.

So the Chiang Mai Initiative is the IMFrevived. So now there is a billion dollars putinto it to help them in a currency swap issueexchange. And it is to prevent another finan-cial crisis and to help countries in ASEANPlus Three deal with short-term liquidityproblems. So you’ve got the Chiang MaiInitiative and you’ve got the Miyazawa Plan,which was in place during the Asian financialcrisis. But $60 billion that’s been dispersedthrough the Miyazawa Plan is going to helpout other programs. It will help out theASEAN Plus Three and the Obuchi Initiative.The Obuchi plan is for human resourcedevelopment and that’s going to require a lotof training. And a lot of that money is goingto go into the initiative for ASEAN integra-tion, which is to bring the new members up tothe same standards as the older ASEANmembers. So Indochina is going to, well,Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam willbenefit a lot from this Japanese initiative.

So having said that, I see in ASEAN Plus Threea synergy of common interests. There is acultural bond, an ideological bond, based onthe so-called Asian values. I mean, there is ahotly contested discourse. You may disagreewith it, but for the Asian leaders, they see thatthere is this kind of a shared identity and theJapanese are in it. They are part of thisdiscourse, this Asian value discourse, too.

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But having said this and having said there is alot going on in ASEAN Plus Three, I see thisas taking on its own life. It is a new life forASEAN, whereas look at ARF, look at AFTA.They are not going anywhere. So ASEANPlus Three is where I see the new initiatives. Isee a new action being carved out.

ASEAN Plus Three Will not Eclipse APEC

But ASEAN Plus Three will not eclipseAPEC. APEC has not perished, despiteASEAN’s attempts to forestall APEC. Thecoffin nail was hammered in APEC actuallyby Japan in 1998, when Japan refused toderegulate and open up its market under theearly voluntary sectoral liberalization. Japanwas supposed to open its fisheries and itsforestry market under this APEC initiative, butJapan refused to do it.

And the whole fast track, the wholeliberalization/ deregulation process has cometo a stop because of Japan’s refusal. So you’ve got now an APEC that is stalled, anAPEC that will not realize its free tradeinitiative, its creation of a trade free zone by2010. I can’t see it coming.

But on the other hand, APEC is far tooimportant for ASEAN or for any othergroupings to ignore. I mean, APEC comprises56 percent of the world’s GDP as opposed toNAFTA’s 33 percent and EU’s 3 percent.APEC is large and ASEAN’s share of GDP,world GDP, is only 1.5 percent. And ASEANcountries have prospered and benefited fromthe open multilateral system that the U.S. hasinitiated. And ASEAN is part of this globalmultilateral open system the U.S. is leading.And there are lots of intra-APEC structuresthat are going on. There are hundreds ofcommittees spanning all fields, workingcommittees. So APEC has a life of its own.

Japan is Lynchpin of ASEAN Plus Three

So basically I am seeing two visions ofcommunity. One is going one way, the other

is going the other way. But the crunch is, whathappens to Japan? Japan is a lynchpin ofASEAN Plus Three. And ultimately if the U.S. relationship with Japan is more importantthan Japan’s relationship with ASEAN, youknow, if it comes to crunch time, Japan willhave to close ranks with the U.S.

So far, ASEAN Plus Three is going wellbecause the U.S. has not objected to it, unlikethe EAEC. The U.S. has said go ahead and dowhat you want. So Japan is completing it,because it has U.S. blessings.

So the other reason or the other possibleproblem for ASEAN Plus Three is if the U.S.-Chinese relationship should deteriorate. IfChina and the U.S. should come to blows oversomething or other, Japan cannot work withChina in ASEAN Plus Three.

It depends on that triangular relationship, the U.S.-China-Japan relationship. So ASEAN Plus Three is hostage ultimately tothe relationship between Japan, U.S. andChina. And whether it will prosper, or whether it will grow, ultimately depends onhow the U.S. looks at it and what the U.S.decides to do with it. So this is basically myfeeling on it.

Q & A

John Ikenberry: Very good. Well, we didhave a kind of a sequence of different views,slightly more optimistic, actually, as we wenton. With the last comments at the very end Dr.Heng suggested the kind of context foroptimism with ASEAN Plus Three. But it wasinteresting to see the views evolve with thesequence of speakers.

What I think we will do now is open it up forquestions from the audience. Please identifyyourself and ask a question or make a shortcomment, and then we’ll let our speakersrespond. And as they do that to respond toeach other as well, emit that into theircomments.

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Questioner: I’m a colleague of John’s atGeorgetown University. I’ll maybe, for thesake of argument, take a critical perspective ofthis topic and raise some issues that I wouldlike to hear each of the speakers respond to.

We could say that the new politics of South-east Asia, of Indonesia, the struggle betweendifferent parts of the elite, this that onlyscratches beneath the surface of the currentstruggle between the people and power. Thestruggle going on in the Philippines betweenpopulism and elitist technocrats, the strugglein Thailand between the new minister andthose supporting strict constitutionalism.

We could say that this new politics is not at allreflected in ASEAN and that ASEAN, in asense, was established in the late 1960s as amutual agreement among established some-what authoritarian elites in the significantgovernments in Southeast Asia … Singapore,Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and thePhilippines. And this arrangement workedvery well, as mentioned earlier, to secure thepeace, establish a Pax Asiana, and that’s atremendous achievement.

ASEAN does not Reflect New Political Structure

But the politics of these countries, especiallyin the last ten years, has moved on light years.And yet ASEAN itself doesn’t appear toreflect that politics. The meetings go on, theexpensive hotels are still filled, the elite talksto each other. And we’re all guilty of beingparty to this, in some small or larger ways.

But if I’m really being critical, I would saythis is kind of an organization that reflects theold Southeast Asia. And where are there signsthat it’s going to reflect the politics of a newSoutheast Asia? So forgive me for beingcritical, but I would be interested in yourresponses.

Ikenberry: Why don’t we let each make acomment. That’s a very interesting question.

Zakaria: One of the questions I can answer, Ithink to an extent, is that ASEAN is, in thatfashion, an anachronism. The possibilities arethere, that if the new elites that come to powerdo not want to continue it, then obviouslyASEAN is doomed. It’s very hard to say that,you know, there are new politics that areemerging in Southeast Asia. That is true, butthe old elites also remain. The bureaucraciesof ASEAN are still basically the same,whether or not the new elites will fashionthese new bureaucracies to suit the newchanges, I am not really sure.

There were indications that there are changesthat may have taken place. Some people in theforeign policy positions in Thailand are able toforesee ASEAN taking on this constructiveengagement. In some ways it is reflected in the bureaucracy of Thailand, and alsobasically follows suit with what a politicalmass wanted it to do.

Of course, we know that within ASEAN itselfthose ideas were rejected, if not dismissed, bythe other elites and by the other bureaucraciesof the ASEAN countries. That shift did not take place, so ASEAN remains basicallywhat it is.

Challenge of Changing Economics in Asia

I think the bigger challenge is not so much that the political changes are taking place, but more, I think, what the former U.S.Ambassador to Malaysia Mallott actually said,that the economics are also changing in Asia.It can no longer be the export-led industrialstrategies, because you are getting into a newworld of e-commerce. You are getting into anew world where industry and manufacturingprocesses are changing. You are in a changingnew world where you can’t just be simplyexport-led, for those countries that hadpreviously been export-led countries. So youneed a new format. And maybe if you can takeon this challenge, then ASEAN can respondwith greater vitality to the challenges ofglobalization.

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I agree with you that there have been thesenew indications of political change inSoutheast Asia. But I cannot see many firstsin a real sense. Let’s look at the change in thePhilippines with Arroyo replacing Estrada. Imean, what has changed in the Philippines?The 15 families are still remaining the politicaleconomy of the Philippines, you know,whoever is in power. Now, if truly there hasbeen a populist change, then there is afundamental transformation of the politicallandscape in the Philippines, and I think youare quite correct. Similarly again in Thailand,I think in some sense what happened wasbasically a reversal of what had been,seemingly, a new democratic space.

And, of course, Indonesia is problematic. Justimagine what would happen now if Megawatitakes over. I mean, I don’t know. Nobody cantell. But I don’t see that Megawati is going tosay that this is a new Indonesia. And are wereally going to create the kind of society thatwill be the beacon of a democratic progress inSoutheast Asia? So it’s difficult for me.

No Change in Malaysia

For Malaysia there has been no change. Ofcourse, the prime minister is still there. But Iknow people who oppose the prime minister,who tell me that I must now write a bookabout the new Malaysia, that’s going toemerge, of the Mahathirs. You know, afantastic reformation will take place. I find ita difficulty, you know, if I were to write thisbook. I would have great difficulty; I probablywould not be able to go home. But certainly Imyself as a political scientist, I am not quitesure that really you can see those changes.

Also in Malaysia, I don’t think politics willchange. I don’t think the Malays are going togive up political power. I cannot see that, youknow. It could be a new set of Malays, but Icannot see that the Malays are going to wakeup one day and say, “Let’s share politicalpower with the other races in this country.Let’s share the wealth. Let’s share all the

opportunities.” I say this obviously with somehesitation. But knowing the Malays who arein power, I see it as very difficult for thatchange to take place.

Ikenberry: Ambassador?

Palmer: Well, first of all, it was a reallyexcellent question, and a very thoughtful andexcellent response. I will be very short. I havea piece on the net, americandiplomacy.org,which is entitled “The End of an Era.” Thereis also one there on economic nationalismversus globalism.

End of Patrimonialism

What we are seeing is an end of patri-monialism. Now, patrimonialism may take onother forms. There remains a very funda-mental predisposition toward patron-clientrelations in the area. The types of structuresthat came into place after World War II, whenindependence came, were greatly influencedby traditional values, authoritarian values,cultural values and so forth. So that hasendured for a space of time, a period of time.

And as Zakaria said, it’s not going to go away.These are going to continue to be differentialsocieties, differential political cultures. Theseare going to continue to be cultures in whicheven at this late date, this whole time,Malaysia will continue to have a good deal oftemporal power.

Progress in Thailand

Now that being said, I’m struck by Thailand.It’s very easy to look back and sort of sneer atthe various constitutions, the series of militarycoups, and so forth. But I think that if youtake a careful look at Thailand, going all theway back, let’s say to Sukarno and that era ofthe 1950s, there has been an advance.

I am struck by the fact that the constitution ofKriangsak in 1979 was the foundation. It wasthe base on which Prime Minister Prem

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subsequently was able to do many of the goodthings that he did for almost a decade. I’m notsure I know what that means, but it seems tome that there have been progressive water-marks. And as those occur, there may well bea retrogression, but that mark stays there.

It is a fact that in Thailand there is a bank-ruptcy law. It is a fact that there has been aneffort to gain control of the role of moneypolitics in the rural areas. Those will remain.It will also be the case that the king willcontinue to have a kind of allure and luster inThailand that is very difficult to imagine: analmost magical power about the man. Whathappens when he dies is going to be extremelyinteresting. The person who has that kind ofaura is the crown princess and not the crownprince. And we’ll have to see what comes outof that.

Detachment Remains in Jakarta

With respect to Indonesia, I was there from1960-62 and at times in Indonesia one felt thatone was as far out of the universe as one couldpossibly be. And I’m not sure that has changed a great deal. One of the phenomenaof the recent past was that the people felt thatJakarta, during the events, was some far awayplace and they basically didn’t know anddidn’t care. That sense of detachment,dissociation remains in Jakarta. Whether it isAbdul Rahman Wahid or Megawati SukarnoButri, the army will continue to have its troopsat the village level and will continue to playthe role that it has played through all thesemany years. It wants to change, but I doubtthat change is going to be possible in under 10or 15 years. It is going to be a very long anddifficult process.

The principal issue in the meantime is going tobe holding the country together and above all,preventing the enormous refugee problem.One of the reasons why the United Statesneeds to be much more active than it has beenin Indonesia is that if it comes to boat people,Indonesia is a scary prospect. You’ve got to

say that if it did, if it reaches that point ofpeople leaving and going to Malaysia orSingapore or whatever, I don’t even want tocontemplate that.

Elite Continues to Control Philippines

The Philippines has its 15 families, right. Iwas there for four years. And the people whoare in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s cabinet arepeople that I knew when they were in their20s. They were from the elite then, and they’re from the elite now. There needs to beultimately a populist development of somesort in the Philippines, which will enable thisvery stratified society to change.

However, having said all of the above, I sidewith Zakaria, that ASEAN is going to remainfundamentally ASEAN; it’s an organization ofbureaucracies. Some of the ways of doingthings are going to continue to be what theyare. This is not a populist area; it is adifferential area. And the ways of doing this,the ways that things have been done, are likelyto endure.

Heng: And I think the new politics is toofragile for us to see any results any time soon.It will be several more years. And with us, anenlargement with inclusion of Burma, Laos,Cambodia, Vietnam, it’s going to make thatobjective even harder to get a more demo-cratic, open kind of ASEAN.

And I think if new parties come to ASEAN, Ithink that the way that we will then seeASEAN thinking about security in terms ofhuman security. From national security tohuman security, which is what the otherorganizations are now talking about.

ASEAN Pays Lip Service to Human Security

And ASEAN made its first statement abouthuman security in Bangkok, in February 2000,where it released its joint statement for asocially cohesive and caring ASEAN. It talks

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about total human development. It talks aboutpeople-oriented programs. It pays lip serviceto this new concept of human security, but Ican’t see these programs being implementedany time soon. It talks about the environment,education and labor as a Singapore develop-ment. It says all the right things. But I don’tsee the ASEAN bureaucracy implementingany of these human security, new politics atall. I can’t see it happening.

Palmer: Any time soon?

Heng: Any time soon.

Questioner: I have a political comment and aquestion, because I thought the first questionwas very interesting and so were the com-ments. I wish to note that change reallydoesn’t happen quickly, especially in ASEAN.It’s a spiral, upward trend and therefore onecould not expect an overnight translation ofthe political change vis-à-vis ASEAN, butover a period of time one can see change inthat regard.

For example, in the case of the fifteen, perhapsthere are views that the families are thereentrenched or the fact that one cannot set asidethe fact that there was an admission of thepolitical parties. And I think in the long-termit is this examination of the values that shouldhave a fundamental effect on the overallstructure of the society.

Common Vision Only Shared among Elites

Having said that, I wish to note that we all talkabout common vision, shared vision andtherefore having a shared vision you walktogether and achieve a certain goal. I’ve heardabout economic integration, political integra-tion, but there is not much talk about culturalintegration. Perhaps it is about time that weshould reexamine, why we can’t movetowards that common vision. The commonvision is only shared among the elite people,but not shared at the local level.

For example, the British people are not sokeen about integration, because they are veryfocused as to what their vision is as far as theUnited Kingdom is concerned, which is notshared in other areas of Europe. And I thinkthis perhaps is one area that should be lookedinto by ASEAN.

And in that regard, may I ask a question of Dr.Zakaria? What are the steps or measures thatare being taken in this regard with culturalintegration?

Zakaria: Well, thank you for that veryinteresting question. I think ASEAN has not worked in the past, because of the failureas a basically elitist organization. It’s thebureaucrats who meet. And you know, and I don’t know whether this is a joke or effect by the fact, that the point is that they meetabout 250 times a year and all the ASEANdiplomats or officials enjoy themselves,because when they meet, they stay in very nicehotels and have a good meeting, and every-body seems to agree with everybody else.And, of course, they play croquet, golf, andwhat else.

So you might say wait a minute, what is thisthing about? And you know that I think Pekmentioned about the ASEAN ways, lack of atransition in ASEAN. So those are factors thatI think we should come to grips with, whenyou asked a question about whether there hasbeen a cultural integration. This I think is thewonder of ASEAN.

ASEAN does not have Sense of Common History

It’s a contradiction in many ways, because itdoesn’t have the sense of common Europeanhistory that you see in the forging of theEuropean Union— except for the British,Germans and the French— but still you cansee that there has been a greater sense ofEuropean unity there, because of the fact thatthey share a common past, in many ways, acommon culture across Europe.

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But when you come to Southeast Asia, it’s avery different problem altogether. You,yourself, are from the Philippines where allthe other people are Malays, you know. TheMalays or Malaysians who go to thePhilippines are shocked when they find thatthere are Malays who eat pork, for example.So that’s just to show you, in dramatic sense,the differentiated ways and cultures. And weare not even talking about whether or not theVietnamese fit, say, within the islands orwithin their cultures.

So that’s a problem. And we know that. It’snot a question of lip service, but beforecultural integration was talked about inASEAN, people asked, “Why don’t we havean ASEAN cultural festival?” This is actuallyjust the national dances of the variouscountries being put on in some way.

So the ASEAN top officials meet and talk inEnglish, you know, which is obviously not anAsian language, and many other things. Andwhile there is talk that maybe you can have around trip ticket across all the ASEAN capitalsfor one single price, I doubt that anybody hasactually taken up this offer.

So, there has been that problem. So it’s betterto recognize that ASEAN is basically elitist inmany ways. And that’s the way that it will befor quite some time, before we can talk aboutpeople. Actually last year, there was anattempt to have an ASEAN People’s Congress.I did not attend it, although I was invited. Butmaybe that was one attempt where you couldtry to forge this below-elite level kind ofintegration within ASEAN countries. But it’sjust one step and obviously more efforts haveto be done.

Ikenberry: Other questions, comments?Please identify yourself.

Questioner: I’m from the Brookings Institu-tion. And in the last two to three years a lot ofpeople have put APEC under a lot of scrutiny.Many have suggested that when it comes to

developments such as ASEAN Plus Three andother developments, that APEC has reallybecome a redundant organization and maybewe no longer need it. And I just wondered ifyou could respond to that.

Ikenberry: You are asking Dr. Heng?

Questioner: All three of them.

Palmer: I’ll respond. I think that APECremains a very important organization simplybecause of the powerful countries that are in it,especially the United States. I absolutely agree with Pek that for the moment APEC isdead in the water. Indeed, it’s going to be veryinteresting to see what happens first of all, atthe ASEAN ministerial in July in Hanoi,because ASEAN is also going to go throughsome kind of an intellectual exercise withregard to trade, free trade and the like. Then,of course, the APEC meeting in Shanghai in October is going to be a very interestingevent indeed.

Now, one of the problems with APEC is thatit’s been so attached to the ideology of freetrade. There are, I think, important things thatcan be achieved, as Pek was suggesting, at thesort of sublevel. There are all these hundredsof committees and so on and so on, that havedone good things, there is just no question.

I recall being really quite flabbergasted when Iwas assigned in Malaysia when one day camea message telling me that I was to undertakethe harmonization of tariffs and take up thatissue with the Malaysian authorities. I said,what the hell does that mean? But that’s thereality through the tariff structures, throughthe IPR (intellectual property rights) process.You go on and on. There has been anenormous amount of good work done withinthe APEC context.

Now, does all of it have to be attached to thefree trade locomotive? I don’t think so. Howdoes the United States move on from wherewe’ve been to where we need to go? Well, I

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think that’s absolutely the issue that the U.S. is going to be seized with. I really believehowever that this administration has not yetshown that it’s prepared to fall on its swordover free trade. We’ll have to watch that.

Ikenberry: Anything else on APEC?

Heng: No, I think that APEC is just tooimportant to be sidelined. And basically Ithink what ASEAN should fear is the UnitedStates losing interest in APEC. And withFTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas),ASEAN fears that FTAA should become theflavor of the month and ASEAN will be worseoff if the U.S. were to neglect APEC. All thecountries in ASEAN Plus Three rely on theU.S. market, rely on this open trade systemthat APEC stands for. So it is just tooimportant to just whither away.

Palmer: Just to add, we need to rememberwhere we are. This is the year 2001. In 1945GATT was initiated. It took from 1945 to 1995 for GATT to move past the UruguayRound. We are still in the process of trying tostitch together the WTO. We have a long ways to go. By the same token we’ve come a long way.

So consider the world before 1945 andconsider it now. What a change. And there area number of reasons why that has happened.APEC is part of a process that includes theEU, that includes ASEAN, that includes theFTAA, NAFTA and so forth. Some of us willbe dead by the time this long process isconcluded, but I hope the rest of you manageto carry it on.

Ikenberry: Well, on that cheery thought, let’s… It’s always good to have a panelist with along view.

Palmer: It comes with being six feet, four.

Ikenberry: After all, the 1930s and World WarII, it wasn’t the entire century from the largerperspective; it was just a blip. So …

Questioner: After 30 years, ASEAN seems tobe at a crossroads, at a crisis point. On the onehand, it has so much to be proud of. It’s madeup of ten countries, nine of them previouslycolonies. Individually the countries may betiny, but collectively, it covers a large land area,large sea area, and the population is half abillion. It has plenty of resources – rubber, tin,cooper, oil, what have you. And it has strategicsea-lanes, such as the Straits of Malacca.

On the other hand, now, despite economicproblems in so many countries, there arethreats – Philippines, Thailand, and evenMalaysia with Sabah and Sarawak. Then youadd political problems, leadership crisis andalso religious strife, ethnic strife in Indonesia,for example, against the Chinese and thenMuslims against Christians, and so on.

And Zakaria, you ended by saying that you arecautiously optimistic. I am also cautiouslyoptimistic, I agree with you. Could you justsummarize the strategies that need to beenforced for ASEAN to revitalize? What isthis traditional policy which needs to bediscarded, of non-intervention? If it’s going tobe a family of nations, a community, they aregoing to talk out problems. They’re going toshare problems and joys. Besides that, whatare some strategies?

Thank you.

Zakaria: Well, I don’t know, you actuallylisted quite a number of issues, although yousaid that you only had one question. I amintrigued because maybe as a member of thisestablishment, I should answer the question ofsuccession in Southeast Asia.

Concern over Secession of Sarawak

Well, I am a member of the establishment, butI think that I also believe in self-deter-mination. The case of Sabah-Sarawak is thatthe people of Sarawak want to leave theFederation of Malaysia. My own belief is thatthey should be allowed to do so. That is quite

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simply said. But I think the authorities inKuala Lumpur are a bit concerned if theRepublic of Indonesia were to break off, withthe formation of a new republic.

It’s not so much that this would create apattern for the rest of Southeast Asia, but itcreates other kinds of problems, which onlycompound the problems that exist in theregion. This would mean that you would haveto contend with the divisive tendencies in thethinking of ASEAN. So it would be verydifficult, for example, to deal with thegovernment of Jakarta, if there was a newrepublic in Sabah-Sarawak, and how Malaysiawould have to respond to that.

And so on that note, I think, perhaps acomment that was made by the DefenseMinister of Malaysia there is a fear in Malaysiaof the Balkanization of Southeast Asia. It hasto be seen in that light. Of course, as thinkingin Malaysia goes, there is certainly not more ofa problem there, than there is in the SouthernPhilippines, but that is a Filipino problem.

Revitalization of ASEAN

And that goes back to your main question, Ibelieve, which is, how can the revitalization ofASEAN take place? One problem obviously,which I think I probably omitted from thediscussion is why ASEAN is in a position nowwhere it seems like there is no direction; thereis no seeming centralization of some kind.There is no forging a unity among the ASEANcountries, because of the attention beingdiverted from ASEAN itself to the countrieswithin ASEAN.

They are having to deal with the problems ofdomestic turmoil that have taken place, andthat is actually a problem. And I think evenfor Dr. Mahathir, while on one hand hisposition in power you know is almostunassailable, and yet at the same time, he’sbecome much more concerned, in the last twoor three years, with the dissent that he seeswithin his own party.

So you have attention being given to that. And that’s why in ASEAN, I think, with all of the other problems, you don’t see the unity. But then surprisingly, you have ASEANPlus Three. And I’m sorry if I gave theimpression that I didn’t think ASEAN PlusThree had much promise. But there is afundamental problem with ASEAN Plus Threein my mind, you know. And that is simply thequestion of whether ASEAN has got amechanism of achieving agreement andmaking decisions.

Now, you’re dealing with the countries ofChina, Japan, Korea. These are, you know,certainly different fishes in the same kettle, ifyou might put it that way. And it’s going to bedifficult because China is a big country. Japanis a big country. And Korea too, in some sense, is a big country. I mean, they are intheir own right, you know, economicbehemoths as compared to the ASEANcountries, who combined, are strong. Butwhen you look at the ASEAN individualcountries then you’re talking again you knowof a differentiated ASEAN.

In my response to this question, I think Imentioned the fact that ASEAN is an elitistorganization. We talk about the establishmentswithin ASEAN, who think that—and I thinkthat was a point that was raised by Mr.Palmer—maybe the ASEAN Secretariat canplay a bigger role in trying to help ASEAN getmore of this thing done. Because they willtake away some of the decision making fromthe national endowments to a body that canmake certain kinds of executive decisions andnot leave those decisions to the nationalendowments. Because when you do that, thenASEAN becomes as was criticized by aformer South Korean prime minister as a sloworganization. These guys all the time theymeet, you know. But what’s coming up?

Disparities in Decision Making

Singapore can make a lot of decisions withouthaving to refer to the people. The government

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can make decisions and say, “Well, ASEAN isvery slow, so why don’t we just form our ownFTA with New Zealand?” And they go aheadwith it. And you know it actually creates aproblem for ASEAN, because Mahathirdoesn’t like that. And he said that in theASEAN informal summit that was held inSingapore last year. He actually said we don’tthink that was appropriate to do. But then theSingaporeans have an arrogant way of actingin that fashion, which probably is an un-ASEAN way. But these things go on. This isthe way ASEAN works, because it allows forthese kinds of disparities in the decisionmaking to take place.

So I don’t know, is the ASEAN Plus Three theway out? Is it attention to a secretariat?Because ASEAN has been basically institu-tionless, maybe you should institutionalize it.

But the fear in relations in Singapore is whenyou do that, then you create a bureaucracy andthe bureaucracy will do all kind of thingswhich the ASEAN governments, being fragilegovernments, find very difficult to accept.

Palmer: So just to add to that point, there’s a fundamental issue that I think your ques-tion suggests. And that’s a question ofsovereignty. Back to another point Pek hassaid that these are still very fragile younggovernments, young states. So there may haveto be some growth, before building capacity,before it becomes comfortable to think aboutpeople in Jakarta making decisions for theentire group.

Ikenberry: On that note, I think we will drawthis seminar to a close. I hope you will joinwith me in thanking our three speakers. (End)

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Main Speaker Dr. Ahmad Zakaria is the Tun Abdul Razak Chair in Southeast Asian Studies at OhioUniversity. He also was Dean of Social Sciences and Humanities at the NationalUniversity of Malaysia (UKM). He was Assistant Secretary at the Ministry of ForeignAffairs and Deputy Director-General of ISIS Malaysia. In addition, he was a Fulbright Scholar at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University and Visiting Fellowat the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre of the Australian National University, aswell as a Senior Fellow at the Resource Systems Institute, the East-West Center inHawaii and at the Department of Political Science of the National University ofSingapore. Dr. Zakaria holds a B.S. from University of Singapore, an M.A. fromMcMaster University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT in 1977. Hisextensive publications include Government and Politics of Malaysia (1989), Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia (1985), Pacific Asia in the 1990’s (Routledge,1992), and United Nations Peacekeeping: Panacea or Pandora’s Box? (1994).

Discussants Ambassador Ronald D. Palmer is Professor of the Practice of International Affairsat George Washington University. After Ambassador Palmer entered the ForeignService he was assigned to Jakarta and then Malaysia. He was Deputy Director of theOffice of Philippine Affairs and Political-military Officer at the Embassy in Manila,responsible for the U.S. bases. He has been Ambassador to Togo, Malaysia, andMauritius. He was elected to the American Academy of Diplomacy in January 2001.Ambassador Palmer holds a B.A. from Howard University and an M.A. from theSchool of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. AmbassadorPalmer writes widely for various journals. Several of his articles on Southeast Asiaare posted on the web at: http://www.Americandiplomacy.org. He is the co-author ofBuilding ASEAN: 20 years of Southeast Asian Cooperation (1987).

Dr. Pek Koon Heng is Adjunct Associate Professor at the Center for Asian Studies,the American University School of International Service. Her focus is Southeast Asianpolitics and International Relations. She has previously taught at the NationalUniversity of Malaysia, the University of Hull, and Temple University, Japan. Dr.Heng was also a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow, Visiting Fellow at the Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies (Singapore), and Visiting Professor at Peking University. Shereceived her Ph.D. from London University, School of Oriental and African Studies.Her recent publications include: “The Chinese in the Malaysian Political System,” and“The Chinese Business Community in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1999” in TheChinese in Malaysia (2000), “Robert Kuok and the Chinese Business Network inPeninsular Malaysia: A Study in Sino-Capitalism” in “Culture and Economy: TheShaping of Capitalism in Eastern Asia” (1997), and “The New Economic Policy andthe Chinese Community in Malaysia,” The Developing Economies (1997).

Moderator Dr. G. John Ikenberry is Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University.He also was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peaceand a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He receivedhis Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Dr. Ikenberry is the author of numerouspublications, including, State Power and World Markets: The International PoliticalEconomy (forthcoming), After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and theRebuilding of Order after Major Wars (2000), and Reasons of State: Oil Politics andthe Capacities of American Government (1988).

About the Panelists