The First Five Plan

Why did Mao begin the First Five Plan in 1952?

By 1952, the Chinese economy had been brought under control. Inflation was down from 1000% to 15%. A new currency had been introduced and public expenditure had been reduced and taxes on city dwellers had been increased. Mao was also able to take advantage of developments that had taken place under the GMD. It had already set up a National Resources Committee and 200,000 of its workers had stayed in China. Mao now believed that the time was right for an industrial revolution.

China changed rapidly after the creation of the People’s Republic. The population of China's cities was growing rapidly from 1949 to 1957 and increased from 57 millions to 100 millions. This was a completely new phenomenon because most growth in the past had been in the countryside. The increased urban population meant that there were many workers available for factories. Furthermore, Five Year Plans appeared to have worked in the USSR and 10,000 Soviet advisers were sent to support the new communist state. The Soviet Union also offered financial aid. A treaty had been signed with the USSR in 1950 and loans were offered over a five-year period to help China buy industrial equipment. Finally, Khrushchev offered further aid when he visited China in 1955 and offered to help Mao with the building of atomic weapons.

Despite all of the efforts of the GMD and the CCP in the years before 1952, China remained a mainly agricultural country with few industries. The First Five Year Plan was aimed at rapid industrial growth, which would enable China to develop quickly. The main areas of concentration were coal, steel and petro-chemicals.

In almost all respects the First Five Year Plan was a success. Economic growth ran at 9% per annum during the five years. Most targets were achieved, with the notable exceptions of oil and merchant ships. National expenditure rose from 6,810 million yuan in 1952 to 29,020 million yuan in 1957. However, most investment was concentrated in 150 large projects, which meant that much of Chinese industry was left untouched.

Significantly, however, the success of the First Five Year Plan was to some extent due to the presence of 10,000 advisers from Soviet Russia. These had been sent by Stalin and remained after his death in 1952. These were almost the last examples of Soviet influence in China. Mao believed that Chinese communism should be based on agricultural communes and not on the urban workers, as Marx and Lenin had stated. In addition, Mao had a deep suspicion of ‘technology experts and scientists’ and believed that the Chinese people could triumph because of their sheer numerical strength. Mao’s determination to put these ideas into practice and to reject other alternatives for modernisation was to prove disastrous in the later 1950s and 1960s.

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The Second Five Year Plan - Why was Collectivisation introduced?

Collectivisation was the second stage of the revolution in agriculture. Since Land Reform, agricultural production had fallen because peasants were more interested in subsistence farming than in producing for the market. As landholdings grew smaller, surpluses shrank. Mao believed that the fall in production would be corrected by the creation of Collective Farms.

Mao acted quickly; the first step was to create Mutual Aid Teams of ten families. These worked together sharing resources, labour and equipment from 1951. The second step was the creation of Agricultural Producers Cooperatives (APCs) from 1953. This involved 30-50 families, which again pooled their resources etc. Both these steps were voluntary.

At first, the APCs were popular and successful, but there was later resistance from richer peasants, who refused to hand over their animals. Consequently, in 1955, Mao stopped the voluntary drive ordered APCs to be set up everywhere. In 1956, he went even further and advanced APCs were set up in which private property disappeared altogether. By the end of the year, 90% of families were in Advanced APCs. Altogether, Mao ordered the creation of 25,000 Communes. Most contained about 5-6,000 people, but some were as large as several hundred thousand.

To Mao, this was a triumph and proved that he could enforce change on an unwilling people and Party. It was evidence that his principles could work and that it was going to be possible to create a socialist utopia using his version of Marxism. To most peasants, it was betrayal; after centuries of longing, Land Reform had only lasted a few years.

The overall aim of Collectivisation was to restore the balance between the cities and the countryside. The Second Five Year Plan, which began alongside Collectivisation in 1957, was also based on the Commune. Many peasants, who had migrated to the cities during the First Five Year Plan to find work, were now ordered to leave the cities and return to the Communes.

Life in the Communes was strictly regimented. Peasants were ordered to live communally in dormitories, eat in mess halls and tear down their own houses. One aim of this treatment was to try to ensure that the family would become less important. Schools would take over responsibility for the rearing of children. This would ensure that children grew up suitably indoctrinated with Maoist ideas. However, these ideas were only put into practice on a few occasions.

It was not only peasants’ lives that were strictly controlled in the Communes; strict controls were also enforced to regulate agricultural methods. All individual plots of land were confiscated by the Commune. Peasants were also ordered to farm according to instructions and not according to their own experience. This meant that peasants’ knowledge of local conditions was ignored and replaced by central planning. To make matters even worse, the ideas of the Soviet scientist Trofim Lysenko were adopted. He had put forward fraudulent theories, which did great harm to farming. For example, he ordered deep ploughing, which ruined the topsoil and bird-scaring, which allowed insects and pests to flourish.

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The results of Collectivisation were disastrous. In 1958 China produced 200 million tonnes of grain and 4.3 million tonnes of meat, but by 1960 the figures were 143.5million tonnes of wheat and 1.3 million tonnes of meat. Much of the blame lay with the central government, which had assumed that the 1958 figure was 260,000,000. The amount of land set aside for arable farming had, therefore, been reduced. In some areas the problems were made even worse by drought, which reduced crop yields even more.

The falls in production led to a major famine and about 30,000,000 Chinese died. But CCP officials dared not report this to Mao. Peng Dehuai, the Defence Minister attempted to reveal the truth in 1959, but he was condemned and dismissed. In response to Peng’s attacks, Mao had threatened to resign from all his posts if Peng was not dismissed. Eventually, however, even Mao had to admit that Collectivisation was a failure, but he reacted by accusing officials of incompetence.

Employment

Mao’s regime led to significant improvements in the lives of urban workers. Under the GMD, city workers were often exploited but under Mao unemployment fell dramatically and insurance was introduced. An eight-hour, six-day working week was introduced. Workers received one weeks paid holiday a year and up to three weeks 'family visiting' holiday. This was intended to compensate workers for the lack of choice in where they work. Often workers were allocated jobs that were hundreds, even thousands of miles distant from their homes; ‘family visiting’ allowed them time to travel backwards and forwards.

Retirement was introduced at age 50-55 for women and age 55-60 for men. Pensions were provided which were 60-80% of income at retirement. Health services and education were free for all. Education became a right and was made compulsory. By 1976, 96% of Chinese were literate. This was perhaps the biggest overall social change in China under Mao. Housing, water, electricity and other services were all subsidised.

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Urban workers had no right to choose where they worked and were assigned jobs by state labour offices. This often had little regard for the individual's abilities and was usually for life. Residence permits prevented people moving and it was virtually impossible for peasants to move to the cities.

Population control

Mao's policy had been to increase the population as much as possible because he believed in the use of manpower. Attempts at population control began in the early 1960s under Liu and Deng, when the party became aware of the overall rate of increase. Young people were required to postpone marriage and the use of contraceptives was encouraged by the state.

Women

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Before 1950, women had few rights and were considered to be second class citizens. Peasants wanted sons, so daughters were often sold as slaves or forced to marry. Men could be polygamous and women could be concubines. Some progress under the GMD had been made, but only in cities.

From 1950, equality of the sexes in education, employment and pay was made law and women were given the right to own property. In 1950, the Marriage Law banned arranged marriages, polygamy, child betrothal and concubinage, although some practices continued. Divorce was allowed in China for the first time. Illegitimate children were given equal rights. Maternity benefits were introduced in 1951, including feeding time and nurseries in government run businesses.

By the 1970s, almost 50% of China's doctors were women and 30% of engineers and scientists. But there were only two female ministers, out of 29 and only one of the twelve vice-premiers was female. The CCP remained an organisation run by elderly men.

Crime

Under the GMD, crime had become endemic. Mao appeared to want to root it out and criminals were punished severely. The death penalty was used widely: many suspects or accused were forced to commit suicide. Prostitution dropped quickly. Prostitutes were arrested and re-educated. Their handlers were often shot. The opium trade was hit with similarly violent methods. Poppy fields were destroyed; dealers were executed and addicts allowed to die after their drugs were taken away.In practice, however, the effects of these campaigns varied from province to province. Enforcement was lax at times.

Changes in social class

Mao believed that it was possible to create a socialist utopia by removing class differences. Unfortunately he aimed to do this by removing social classes, permanently. The gentry (landowners) were effectively destroyed by land reform. Any rich peasants who survived lost everything when Communes were created in 1956-7.The bourgeoisie (middle class), which had originally in large part supported the 1949 revolution, was wiped out by the 100 Flowers and the Anti-Rightist Campaign that followed.

While these changes suited Mao’s aims, they had an adverse impact on the Chinese economy. The gentry had produced most of China’s surplus agricultural produce on their estates and had had the financial capital and desire to invest in improvements. Peasants were far less likely to do this and Collectivisation was an even greater backward step. The middle class had the industrial and financial expertise that was needed for the successful development of China’s industry. Consequently, in achieving his aims for the changing of Chinese society, Mao was effectively making economic development more difficult.

In Mao’s eyes, the sacrifice was worthwhile because he had a basic hatred and suspicion for anyone who he did not understand. In his eyes, the gentry and middle

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class, who were capitalist, were always going to be untrustworthy and he was prepared to do without them whatever the cost to China.

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B: The Great Leap Forward

One cause of the fall in agricultural production was the ‘Great Leap Forward’, which Mao announced in 1957. This was part of the Second Five Year Plan. Mao was encouraged by the success of the First Five Year Plan and believed that, will power, determination and mass manual labour could turn China into an industrial superpower almost over-night. There were also urgent problems to attend to because he population of China's cities had grown, but food supplies had not matched the increase; agriculture was still not producing a surplus.

Mao decided that the peasants to pay for industrial expansion just as they had for the First Five Year Plan. There were other alternatives; he could have called on Soviet aid for a second time, but Mao’s relationship with Khrushchev cooled after the secret Speech in February 1956. He had admired and copied Stalin, but he had less time for the more populist and outspoken Khrushchev.

To make matters worse, the split with the USSR in 1960 meant that Soviet experts left and no more cheap loans were on offer. Khrushchev criticised the Great Leap Forward in 1959 and was snubbed at the celebrations on the 10th anniversary of the Revolution. In April 1960, the USSR was attacked as revisionist. Mao had always been wary of the USSR because he opposed its version of Marxism

The ending of Soviet influence left Mao free to explore his fantasy, utopian world without restraint.

Furthermore, the Hundred Flowers campaign had increased Mao’s distrust of experts and bureaucrats. However, his belief in himself and the Chinese peasantry had been greatly enhanced. Needless to say, critics of his policies were few and far between. The Anti-Rightist campaign, which had followed the 100 Flowers, had made clear that anyone who criticised Mao was likely to end up being ‘re-educated’ To ensure that there was no interference, Control of the Plan was taken away from Zhou Enlai (the Prime Minister)and the government and given to the Party. Liu Shaoqi took charge.

The Great Leap Forward was an attempt to turn China into an industrial superpower within fifteen years by using the massive manpower of the country. This was followed Mao’s belief in the value of manual labour. Like Collectivisation, the Great Leap Forward was based upon Communes. Workers who had migrated to towns during the First Five Year Plan were sent back to their communes to work. A commune of 30,000 people might have sixteen brigades, who were each divided into eight work teams of 250 people. In the winter of 1957-8 these work teams were thrown into massive scheme of irrigation and water conservation.

The Great Leap Forward was also a further stage in Mao’s reform of agriculture. Despite Land reform and voluntary collectivisation in to APCs, agriculture was still not producing enough to feed the growing population. Mao was beginning to realise that the basic conservatism of the peasants was holding back his attempts to modernise China. Consequently, he decided that peasants must be brought under central control and ordered the creation of 25,000 Communes.

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Most Communes contained about 20,000 people, but some were as large as several hundred thousand. Peasants were ordered to live communally in dormitories, eat in mess halls and tear down their houses. Private property was abolished. In the Communes, the family would become less important and schools would take over the rearing of children. In fact this only happened on a few occasions. The Communes were also to be industrial units and used for military training. All men aged from 15 to 50 were expected to take part.

Strict controls were enforced to regulate agriculture. Peasants were ordered to farm according to instructions and not according to their own experience. The ideas of the Soviet scientist Trofim Lysenko were adopted. He had put forward fraudulent theories, which did great harm. Deep ploughing ruined the topsoil and bird-scaring allowed insects and pests to flourish. This was part of the ‘Four No’s’ campaign.

The fundamental idea behind the Great Leap Forward was that industrial development could be achieved through the individual efforts of the ordinary Chinese people. It was not necessary, Mao believed, to go through the process of an industrial revolution. The Great Leap Forward also had other advantages in Mao’s eyes. Firstly, it would reinforce the rural community, which Mao believed was the main strength of China and the CCP. Secondly, it would avoid the creation of a class of ‘experts’, which Mao so distrusted.

So Mao appealed to the ordinary people of China to try to produce steel in their own backyards. All over China people began to set up backyard blast furnaces and produce steel. This was a disaster. The steel produced was often unusable as it was of very poor quality. What was worse, to produce steel, peasants neglected their crops that went to ruin. All over China the harvest was left to rot and this made the famine brought about by Collectivisation all the worse.

Why did the Great Leap forward fail?

The most important reason it that it was nonsensical. Major industrial development needed capital investment, technology and planning; Mao rejected all of these as revisionist. He was afraid that if he allowed the creation of a class of experts he would lose control of the revolution. He appears to have believed that China would have been producing more steel than the rest of the world within fifteen years.

Mao believed that the methods used in agriculture could be applied to industry. All over China people were asked to set up backyard blast furnaces and produce steel. This was a disaster: the steel produced was often unusable as it was of very poor quality. To produce steel, peasants neglected their crops that went to ruin. All over China the harvest was left to rot and this made the famine brought about by Collectivisation all the worse. Backyard furnaces had failed completely by 1959.

Nevertheless, the statistics of the Great Leap Forward were startling. Following Mao’s belief in the manual labour of the Chinese peasant, Communes dug the equivalent of 300 Panama Canals. But at the same time national income fell by 29% and inflation rose from 0.2% to 16.2%.

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Why the changes in agriculture fail?

Mao had grossly over-estimated potential production figures. He believed that agricultural production could double in a year. This was ridiculous and only Mao could have believed such preposterous figures. But any possible increases were seriously undermined by the disastrous ‘Four No’s’ campaign, which ruined agriculture in many areas. The Four No’s was an attack ordered by Mao on rats, sparrows, flies and mosquitoes. Destroying rats, flies and mosquitoes made little difference overall, but the attack on sparrows was catastrophic. Peasants were ordered to prevent sparrows from landing by banging gongs, shouting and chasing them. The results were millions of dead sparrows.

The logic behind this policy was that because sparrows ate seeds, the harvest would be better off without them. However, in 1958, the harvest was attacked by a plague of caterpillars and there were no sparrows around to eat them. One again, no one dared to criticise Mao’s policies; not even peasants.

Peasants, who, only a few years earlier had been rejoicing at Land Reform, had now lost all independence and were working in agricultural factories. In their spare time, they were expected to undertake military training. Many gave up farming to work on backyard furnaces.

No one was prepared to tell Mao what effects the changes were having. He announced that agricultural production for 1958 was more than 400 tonnes, when it was in fact about 200. The result was famine and 30,000,000 Chinese died. But CCP officials dared not report this to Mao. In 1958, China produced 200 million tonnes of grain, but in 1960 the total was 143.5. The figures for meat were 4.3 million in 1958 of meat and in 1960 the total was 1.3 million.

In July 1959, Peng Dehuai tried to warn Mao of the consequences of the famine. He had seen the effects of famine in his own province and sent Mao a letter during the Lushun Conference. Predictably, Mao used the letter against Peng. He asked the Politburo either to support Peng or himself. All but one backed Mao. Eventually even Mao had to admit that Collectivisation was a failure, but he reacted by accusing officials of incompetence.

Were Mao’s changes successful?

Mao had a deep and innate fear and distrust of experts, bureaucrats, technologists and foreigners. This was matched by his belief in the force of human will power and the all conquering and irresistible march of the Chinese peasantry. Mao believed that he could create his utopia by enforcing his will on the people of China. Censorship was ruthlessly imposed and consequently, in his drive to destroy social class, Mao almost destroyed humanity. Peasants lost their land and animals, independence and originality were discouraged and people lost their dignity and integrity.

In 1950, when Mao came to power, he was prepared to experiment to a certain extent. He was prepared to make changes to agricultural reforms to accommodate opposition. But the criticism that he encountered in the 100 Flowers and again after the disaster of the Great Leap Forward only served to encourage Mao to become

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more doctrinaire. When he attempted to return to power in the Cultural Revolution in 1966, he believed that all opposition to his concept of China was wrong.

The socialist utopia became one in which the world was governed by the ‘Thoughts of Chairman Mao’. Put simply, the way change was achieved became more important than the changes themselves.

Why did Mao lose power in China in the early 1960s?

The effects of Collectivisation and the Great Leap Forward hit Mao’s reputation very hard. In 1958, Mao had resigned as President of the People's Republic of China and was replaced by Liu Shaoqui. Mao remained, however, as remained Chairman of the CCP. In 1962, Mao handed over responsibility for the economy to President Liu Shaoqi and CCP General Secretary Deng Xiaoping and withdrew from the political scene. Liu and Deng were both more moderate and accepted that Mao's reforms had gone too far too quickly.

Liu and Deng brought in Chen Yun, the leading Chinese expert in agriculture, to advise them. He recommended that some free markets should be allowed as the only way of combating famine. This was an implied criticism of Mao's policies. Peasants' individual plots of land, which had disappeared in Collectivisation, were allowed once more. Rural markets re-opened. By 1962 about half of the farm land in China was in the hands of individual families once again.

These changes reduced the influence of Mao and also reversed many of his ideas. But whilst Mao had little influence in government or the CCP, to the great majority of the Chinese people he remained the embodiment of the Revolution. Mao was prepared to bide his time and to use other tactics to re-establish his position in China.

The question is focused on the Five-Year Plans of 1952-62, and on the extent towhich they modernised the Chinese economy. The first plan aimed to developheavy industry, with prestige projects such as the bridge across the Yangtse.The plan was deemed a great success, with a growth rate of 9% pa, and majoradvances in coal, steel, electrical power and chemicals. The second plan wasintended to advance China’s economy from a rural agricultural base to an urbanindustrial economy. Mao expected mass efforts based on heavy industry andlarge projects, such as Tiananmen Square. However, the plan was characterisedby disorder. State enterprises performed badly, with no wage differentials asincentives, and no initiative expected from managers. Backyard furnacesproduced worthless and useless metal. There were some signs of expansion to1960, but progress fell off thereafter. Factories were not run efficiently and therewas no quality control. China still had few technical skills among its workforce todraw on. Political interference made it difficult for the plan to succeed as aneconomic project, and the decline of output during the plan’s operation led tocriticism of Mao’s policies within the top ranks of the CCP. A simple outline of

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some of these points will be marked within Levels 1 and 2, and progression willdepend on relevance and range of accurate material. Answers which attempt anexplanatory focus with some support will access Level 3, though there may bepassages of free-standing narrative. At Level 4 there will be an attempt toanalyse the extent to which the Chinese economy was modernised, though theanswer may lack balance. At Level 5 will be answers which attempt to evaluatethe First Five Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward, and which draw reasonedconclusions on the question.

The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60The antirightist drive was followed by a militant approach toward economic development. In 1958 the CCP launched the Great Leap Forward ( ) campaign under the new "General Line for Socialist Construction." The Great Leap Forward was aimed at accomplishing the economic and technical development of the country at a vastly faster pace and with greater results. The shift to the left that the new "General Line" represented was brought on by a combination of domestic and external factors. Although the party leaders appeared generally satisfied with the accomplishments of the First Five-Year Plan, they--Mao and his fellow radicals in particular--believed that more could be achieved in the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62) if the people could be ideologically aroused and if domestic resources could be utilized more efficiently for the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture. These assumptions led the party to an intensified mobilization of the peasantry and mass organizations, stepped-up ideological guidance and indoctrination of technical experts, and efforts to build a more responsive political system. The last of these undertakings was to be accomplished through a new xiafang ( or down to the countryside) movement, under which cadres inside and outside the party would be sent to factories, communes, mines, and public works projects for manual labor and firsthand familiarization with grass-roots conditions. Although evidence is sketchy, Mao's decision to embark on the Great Leap Forward was based in part on his uncertainty about the Soviet policy of economic, financial, and technical assistance to China. That policy, in Mao's view, not only fell far short of his expectations and needs but also made him wary of the political and economic dependence in which China might find itself.

The Great Leap Forward centered on a new socioeconomic and political system created in the countryside and in a few urban areas--the people's communes . By the fall of 1958, some 750,000 agricultural producers' cooperatives, now designated as production brigades, had been amalgamated into about 23,500 communes, each averaging 5,000 households, or 22,000 people. The individual commune was placed in control of all the means of production and was to operate as the sole accounting unit; it was subdivided into production brigades (generally coterminous with traditional villages) and production teams. Each commune was planned as a self-supporting community for agriculture, small-scale local industry (for example, the famous backyard pig-iron furnaces), schooling, marketing, administration, and local security (maintained by militia organizations). Organized along paramilitary and laborsaving lines, the commune had communal kitchens, mess halls, and nurseries. In a way, the people's communes constituted a fundamental attack on the institution of the family, especially in a few model areas where radical experiments in communal living--large dormitories in place of the traditional nuclear family housing-- occurred. (These were quickly dropped.) The system also was based on the assumption that it would release additional manpower for such major projects as irrigation works and hydroelectric dams, which were seen as integral parts of the plan for the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture.

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The Great Leap Forward was an economic failure. In early 1959, amid signs of rising popular restiveness, the CCP admitted that the favorable production report for 1958 had been exaggerated. Among the Great Leap Forward's economic consequences were a shortage of food (in which natural disasters also played a part); shortages of raw materials for industry; overproduction of poor-quality goods; deterioration of industrial plants through mismanagement; and exhaustion and demoralization of the peasantry and of the intellectuals, not to mention the party and government cadres at all levels. Throughout 1959 efforts to modify the administration of the communes got under way; these were intended partly to restore some material incentives to the production brigades and teams, partly to decentralize control, and partly to house families that had been reunited as household units.

Political consequences were not inconsiderable. In April 1959 Mao, who bore the chief responsibility for the Great Leap Forward fiasco, stepped down from his position as chairman of the People's Republic. The National People's Congress elected Liu Shaoqi as Mao's successor, though Mao remained chairman of the CCP. Moreover, Mao's Great Leap Forward policy came under open criticism at a party conference at Lushan ( ), Jiangxi Province. The attack was led by Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai ( ), who had become troubled by the potentially adverse effect Mao's policies would have on the modernization of the armed forces. Peng argued that "putting politics in command" was no substitute for economic laws and realistic economic policy; unnamed party leaders were also admonished for trying to "jump into communism in one step." After the Lushan showdown, Peng Dehuai, who allegedly had been encouraged by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to oppose Mao, was deposed. Peng was replaced by Lin Biao ( ), a radical and opportunist Maoist. The new defense minister initiated a systematic purge of Peng's supporters from the military.

Militancy on the domestic front was echoed in external policies. The "soft" foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to which China had subscribed in the mid-1950s gave way to a "hard" line in 1958. From August through October of that year, the Chinese resumed a massive artillery bombardment of the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Jinmen ( Chin-men in Wade Giles but often referred to as Kinmen or Quemoy) and Mazu ( Ma-tsu in Wade-Giles). This was accompanied by an aggressive propaganda assault on the United States and a declaration of intent to "liberate" Taiwan.

Chinese control over Xizang had been reasserted in 1950. The socialist revolution that took place thereafter increasingly became a process of sinicization for the Tibetans. Tension culminated in a revolt in 1958-59 and the flight to India by the Dalai Lama, the Tibetans' spiritual and de facto temporal leader. Relations with India--where sympathy for the rebels was aroused--deteriorated as thousands of Tibetan refugees crossed the Indian border. There were several border incidents in 1959, and a brief Sino-Indian border war erupted in October 1962 as China laid claim to Aksai Chin, nearly 103,600 square kilometers of territory that India regarded as its own. The Soviet Union gave India its moral support in the dispute, thus contributing to the growing tension between Beijing and Moscow.

The Sino-Soviet dispute of the late 1950s was the most important development in Chinese foreign relations. The Soviet Union had been China's principal benefactor and ally, but relations between the two were cooling. The Soviet agreement in late 1957 to help China produce its own nuclear weapons and missiles was terminated by mid-1959. From that point until the mid-1960s, the Soviets recalled all of their technicians and advisers from China and reduced or canceled economic and technical aid to China. The discord was occasioned by several factors. The two countries differed in their interpretation of the nature of "peaceful coexistence." The Chinese took a more militant and unyielding position on the issue of anti-

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imperialist struggle, but the Soviets were unwilling, for example, to give their support on the Taiwan question. In addition, the two communist powers disagreed on doctrinal matters. The Chinese accused the Soviets of "revisionism"; the latter countered with charges of "dogmatism." Rivalry within the international communist movement also exacerbated Sino-Soviet relations. An additional complication was the history of suspicion each side had toward the other, especially the Chinese, who had lost a substantial part of territory to tsarist Russia in the mid-nineteenth century. Whatever the causes of the dispute, the Soviet suspension of aid was a blow to the Chinese scheme for developing industrial and high-level (including nuclear) technology.

Mao tried in 1958 to push China's economy to new heights. Under his highly touted "Great Leap Forward", agricultural collectives were reorganized into enormous communes where men and women were assigned in military fashion to specific tasks. Peasants were told to stop relying on the family, and instead adopted a system of communal kitchens, mess halls, and nurseries. Wages were calculated along the communist principle of "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need", and sideline production was banned as incipient capitalism. All Chinese citizens were urged to boost the country's steel production by establishing "backyard steel furnaces" to help overtake the West. The Great Leap Forward quickly revealed itself as a giant step backwards. Over-ambitious targets were set, falsified production figures were duly reported, and Chinese officials lived in an unreal world of miraculous production increases. By 1960, agricultural production in the countryside had slowed dangerously and large areas of China were gripped by a devastating famine.

For the next several years, China experienced a period of relative stability. Agricultural and industrial production returned to normal levels, and labor productivity began to rise. Then, in 1966, Mao proclaimed a Cultural Revolution to "put China back on track". Under orders to "Destroy the Four Olds" (old thoughts, culture, customs and habits), universities and schools closed their doors, and students, who became Mao's "Red Guards", were sent throughout the country to make revolution, beating and torturing anyone whose rank or political thinking offended. By 1969 the country had descended into anarchy, and factions of the Red Guards had begun to fight among themselves.

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