Articule - Egypt and Phoenicia in the Persian Period Partners in Trade and Rebellion - Betlyon John W

Copyright John W Betlyon and PennState University - 2001 - All Rights Reserved - Page 1

EGYPT AND PHOENICIA IN THE PERSIAN PERIOD: PARTNERS IN TRADE AND REBELLION

EGYPT AND PHOENICIA IN THE PERSIAN PERIOD: PARTNERS IN TRADE AND

REBELLION

John W. Betlyon

I. Introduction

The close connections between Egypt and Phoenicia arewell documented as far back as the Late Bronze age, if not fur-ther. The Lebanon range of mountains was an importantsource for timber, and cities like Byblos were famous for theirpurple dye valued by Near Eastern and Egyptian royalty.Trade between the Nile Delta and the Canaanite city-states ofthe Levant followed the political and military developments ofthe time. In the Iron Age and Persian Periods, both Egypt andPhoenicia sought commercial power and stability-nothingmore, nothing less. The changes which engulfed the regionafter the fall of Assyria swept the merchants of the easternMediterranean along with them. Once partners in trade, Egyptand Phoenicia would find themselves enemies in war andallies in rebellion by the time Alexander's Hellenistic armiestook overall control.

II. Persian Conquests and Administration: ca. 539-470 BCE

By 574 BCE, Nebuchadnezzar ruled the Near East fromBabylon. Although he attempted to conquer Lower Egypt, hisefforts failed. Providing for his army across long desert supplylines meant certain failure. Had the Babylonian king soughtand favored Bedouin assistance in his Egyptian campaign, hemight well have been successful. By the end of his reign,problems in the North preoccupied his mind, including thethreat of war between Cyxares of Medea and Alyattes ofLydia. Nebuchadnezzar negotiated a truce between the twosides, and put himself in a position of power and politicalleverage in the region (Roux 1992:380). But reaching thatpoint had not been easy.

Egypt did not hide its anti-Babylonian position. In 592BCE, Psammetichus II led a procession of his priests, court,and army to Philistia and Judah. Then they traveled up thecoast to Tyre and Byblos, "to lift the spirits of the anti-Babylo-nian resistance and to cement alliances" (Redford 1992: 464).Phoenician city-states continued to supply timber to buildships, and Judah was to be the focal point of Babylonian oppo-

sition in the southern Levant. But Psammetichus II fell ill, anddied in 589 BCE. His successor and son, Wahibre (calledApries by the Greeks), immediately went to Sidon to raisemore support for the resistance. It was in this context thatNebuchadnezzar launched his 588 campaign against Judah-acampaign well documented in the ostraca written in Hebrew,found in Lachish (Stratum II). The ostraca show vividly thatthe Judeans could not defeat the Babylonians without Egyp-tian military aid. Apries marched with an expeditionary forcein the fall of 588 (Torczyner 1938; Albright 1969: 321). TheBabylonian response, however, was swift and strong, intimi-dating Apries and forcing the Egyptians to withdraw withouthelping Jerusalem-and Zedekiah-withstand Nebuchadnezzar'sforces (Redford 1992: 466). Judean fortresses-such as MezadHashavyahu and Tel Kakbri-were lost to the Babyloniansalong with their East Greek mercenaries, and Nebuchadnez-zar's victory was complete (Niemeier 2001: 22-23). Nothingstood in the way of his total domination of the eastern Medi-terranean seaboard.

But Nebuchadnezzar had other problems to deal with onlya few years later. After Jerusalem fell in 587/586 BCE, theJudean Gedaliah was put in power as "governor" acting onbehalf of the Neo-Babylonian throne. He ruled with Neo-Babylonian protection from Mizpah (identified with Tell en-Nasbeh just north of Jerusalem). Although there were proba-bly Babylonian soldiers protecting him, an armed band ofJudeans attacked and killed him in 582 BCE. Nebuchadnezzarwas forced to campaign a third time in Judah (after 596 and587/6) to restore order (Bright 1986:344-346; Wiseman1983:38; Galling 1964:51ff). This action probably did notrequire massive military force. Judah, as recent studies haveshown, was in a state of complete collapse and disrepair fol-lowing the terrible wars of Babylonian conquest in 597/6 and587/6 BCE. Many people had already been deported to placesin Babylonia. As in Assyrian times, deportation was the pun-ishment reserved for those who stood in the way of imperialpolicy (Oded 1979: 43). The Babylonians did things differ-ently than the Assyrians. The Assyrian rulers built fortressesand assigned troops to carry on "military operations other thanwar," operations which reestablished the peace and built inter-



nal security. These operations also supported the rulers chosento govern the provinces (Betlyon forthcoming).

The Babylonians' rise to power had been so meteoric.Babylon went from being a province of the Neo-AssyrianEmpire to ruling the Mediterranean world in a very short timeperiod. The Babylonians may not have been ready to take onthis great responsibility. Nebuchadnezzar appears to have beena man "in the right place at the right time" (Cf. Sack 1978).But his successors were ill prepared for the responsibilitiesthey faced. In short, Babylonian policies of conquest, whichincluded the wholesale destruction of Jerusalem, Lachish, andother parts of the region, were ill-fitted to a scheme of impe-rial administration in a post-war Levant. Judah was so weak-ened that the population appears to have been reduced bynearly 70% due to the military activities of the 590's and 580's(Carter 1999: 246-248). Except for the large public building atTell en-Nasbeh, there is little evidence of public administra-tion or possible military occupation in this southern Levantineregion.

Although the Babylonians did fortify regions in the northand east, military concerns in the south focused on attackingEgypt -an attack which failed. Babylonian governance dif-fered significantly from Neo-Assyrian rule. Only a few mili-tary posts were occupied by troops (such as Mizpeh) and thereis no evidence of substantial rebuilding in Judah to reinvigo-rate the economy.

Instead, a unique pattern of Babylonian "administration"was established in the southern Levant. It was a laissez-faireapproach to provincial governance. So long as tribute wasbeing paid, the Babylonians appear to have allowed provincesto rule themselves. The border incursions and rebellionswhich erupted in the wake of the Neo-Assyrian collapse werecontained by the 550's BCE. Nebuchadnezzar's successors-Amel-marduk, Nerglissar, Labashi-Marduk, and Nabonidus-however, were weak and too often corrupt. These rulers do notseem to have learned the "tricks" of Neo-Assyrian statecraft,which insisted on loyalty to the throne and assistance to helprebuild economies (Oded 1979: 43; Stern 2000: 46-47). How-ever, Nabu-na'id had other pressing concerns. He was keenlyaware of his nation's religious traditions leading him to exca-vate the ruins of the temenu of the Temple of Marduk in Baby-lon and rebuild it. He also focused on remodelling the Templeof Sin in Harran, to which he had a significant family attach-ment (Beaulieu 1989:205ff.; Roux 1992:381-382).

Nabonidus was devout, but there is little evidence to sug-gest that he was politically or militarily astute or aware of theimplications of his "benign neglect" of imperial problems. Hisson was unable to control affairs in the Babylon while hisfather was resident and campaigning in the faraway Arabianoasis of Tema. Nabonidus' invitation to the Persians to expelthe Medes from Harran simply invited them to pursue furtheraction in the region. But there were also the mid-sixth centuryeconomic problems, such as double-digit inflation, which alsosignificantly contributed to Babylon's downfall (Saggs1962:147-148, 261ff.).

Cyrus conducted a series of successful campaigns toenlarge his Persian kingdom. He turned west into Lydia, occu-

pying Cilicia. Breaking his alliance with the Babylonians, heestablished Persian hegemony over the northern parts ofMesopotamia, and the East Greek cities of Ionia and AsiaMinor. Before turning south, Cyrus solidified his hold on theEastern frontier, taking Parthia, Aria, Sogdia, and Bactria(Roux 1992:385).

By the time Cyrus moved on Babylon, a Babylonian pro-Persian party was lobbying for peaceful submission to hisrule. Some ancient sources depict him as Babylon's "savior,"who restored traditional religion and freed Babylon from theoppression of their own ruling family. Cyrus' attack came inthe fall of 539 BCE. Babylon fell without a fight, the god Mar-duk marching beside Cyrus to occupy the city (Grayson 1975:109-110; Beaulieu 1989:228-229). Acting immediately, Cyrusextended Persia's borders to the West, launching forays intoEgypt and throughout Asia Minor. Cyrus was unsuccessful inthe Nile Delta. But his successors, Cambyses and Darius I,carried on the fight later in the sixth century.

Persian policies toward her subject people seemed to allowcertain "freedoms," such as returning from exile to theirhomelands. The most famous example of this policy is theedict of Cyrus, recorded in Ezra 1, which dictated that theJews would be permitted to return from Babylon to Yehud.Cyrus was neither an innovator nor a particularly benign ruler,as recent studies have shown (Hoglund 1992: 23; van der Spek1982: 278-283). But from the perspective of the biblicalwriter, Cyrus' actions came about when "Yahweh stirred upthe spirit of Cyrus" to do Yahweh's will. In other words, thebiblical point-of-view understands all that happened from areligious, theocentric perspective. But how did this policyaffect the western provinces of Babylon's former empire?

As early as 876 BCE, Assurnasirpal received tribute fromthe Phoenician cities of Tyre, Sidon, Byblos and Aradus. Spe-cifically, Phoenicia sent tribute to Nineveh in the form of sil-ver and gold ingots, fine polychrome cloths and ivory (Harden1971: 49). A few years later, Shalmaneser III received furthertribute and defeated the king of Aradus, who thought he couldact independently of Nineveh. All this is illustrated on thegates of Balawat and the Black Obelisk, now in the BritishMuseum. The Black Obelisk depicts ships from Tyre bringingtribute to the mainland, while other Levantine monarchs watchfrom the seashore, including Jehu of Israel (Harden 1971: 49).

The relationships between the Phoenician city-states andtheir Assyrian overlords were sometimes "rocky." In about672, Tyre joined with Egypt to resist Esarhaddon. A stelefound at Zinjirli depicts the Assyrian king with the kings ofTyre and Egypt on leashes doing obeisance at his feet (Harden1971: 50 fig. 11). On the other hand, there can be little doubtthat the Tyrians and other Phoenician states provided invalu-able service to the Assyrians manning the merchant marine,which helped to fuel the Assyrian economy. Throughout thelate eighth and seventh centuries, Assyrian royal policy soughtto build up the economy to the benefit of the kingdom, ratherthan to tear it all down (Stern 2000: 53-54).

When Nineveh fell to the Babylonians and Nebuchadnez-zar extended Neo-Babylonian rule to the west, it was inevita-ble that problems would arise with the independently



motivated Phoenicians. In ca. 574, after a long siege, Neb-uchadnezzar defeated Tyre and finally brought all of Phoeni-cia under his rule (Harden 1971: 50).

Thirty-five years later, Cyrus moved into the Levant, andall of Phoenicia, Syria, and Cyprus formed the fifth satrapy ofhis new empire. Although Phoenicia was not really indepen-dent, her city-states' naval power became the mainstay of Per-sian power at sea-both military and commercial. In particularwhen Persia faced off with the Greeks, the Phoenician navywas central to the "order of battle." The Phoenicians were nostrangers to conflict with the Greeks, who were their maritimeand commercial rivals. In 539, Sidon was the principle city ofthe Phoenicians; Tyre was weak, and recovering from Neb-uchadnezzar's siege. Apparently for a time, Sidon was the siteof a palace for the Persian king; and excavations haveunearthed several capitals in the Susan Persian style, "in theform of bull-protomai" (Harden 1971: 50). This palace mayhave been the Persian forward "command post" near the viamaris and the sea routes to Lower Egypt.

Initially, Persian interests focused on promoting a thrivingeconomy and on extending boundaries to the northwest andsouthwest. Cambyses waged a major campaign to extend Per-sian rule into Egypt. The Greeks were already there, with theirtrading emporium and fortress at Naukratis in the Nile Delta(Gray 1969: 17; Niemeier 2001: 21-24). Amasis, the Egyptianking, was pre-eminently Philhellene; he married into thedynasty of Psammetichus II whom he overthrew, and he alsomarried Ladice, a Greek woman from Cyrene. He strength-ened Egyptian ties with Greece, making "rich presents to vari-ous Greek shrines after the destruction of the temple at Delphi(548 BCE), including a thousand talents weight of alum for itsrebuilding"(Gray 1969: 17). Amasis made his intentions clearwhen earlier he had forged alliances with Croesus of Lydia,Polycrates of Samos and Nabonidus of Babylon-all enemiesof Persia (Boardman 1973: 140-141).

Cambyses had problems to solve at home before embark-ing on a campaign against Egypt. He distrusted his ownbrother, Smerdis (Bardiya), and had him killed (according tothe Behistun inscription of Darius I). He pressured Cyprus toally with him against their Egyptian friends. According toHerodotus, a Greek renegade, Phanes, assisted him in securingwater supplies for his army as they moved along the coastalroad from Gaza to the city of Pelusium, where the Egyptianforces, with their Ionian and Carian mercenaries, weredeployed for battle. With Arab help, the Persian forcesattacked the Egyptians at Pelusium and routed them, forcingthem back on Memphis. With the capture of the capital city,Psammetichus III, who had been king of Egypt for only sixmonths, was lost. By May 525 BCE, Cambyses was recog-nized as king of Egypt. His plans to continue his campaign tothe West, into Libya, Cyrene, and perhaps even Carthage,ended in disaster-apparently a sandstorm in the el-Khargehoasis (Herodotus 3.26).

The archaeological evidence shows the effects of Persia'sinvasion on the Greek presence in Egypt. The fort at Daphnaewas abandoned. The importation of Greek pottery toNaukratis practically ceased (Boardman 1973: 129). The gar-

rison which was stationed there as early as the sixth centurywas undoubtedly destroyed (Niemeier 2001: 21-22).

Unlike Cyrus' policies in Syria, Babylonia, and Yehud,where the local gods were worshipped or acknowledged bythe Persian Great King, Cambyses desecrated the corpse ofAmasis, and openly mocked the religious customs of theEgyptians. The papyri from Elephantine mention the destruc-tion of Egyptian temples, "while the Jewish temple at Ele-phantine was left unharmed"(Cowley 1923: 30; Gray 1969:22).

Before returning to Persia, Cambyses received the name ofRe-mesuti, "born of Re;" he worshipped and made offerings toall the great gods in Sais, as all good Egyptian kings had donebefore him. Still, his less than tolerant attitude towards Egyp-tian religious traditions stands in sharp contrast to that ofCyrus. Herodotus attributes these anomalies in policy to amental breakdown on the part of Cambyses. Indeed as he trav-eled to Persia in the spring of 522, he took his own life. Butbefore doing so, he had established Persian rule further to thesouth and west than any Near Eastern ruler had ever done, andhe administered Persian rule with a thoroughness matchedonly by his conquest of Egypt (Gray 1969: 23).

In periods of interregnum, subject populations often foundexcuses to revolt against their distant Persian overlords. TheEgyptians, however, took little part in the revolts against theAchaemenids which broke out in 522 BCE, and which tookDarius I months to subdue. Aryandes, the Persian whom Cam-byses chose to rule Egypt, remained in his position until Dar-ius removed him from office and put him to death on thesuspicion that he had plans to take imperial power to himself.A first small revolt in ca. 485 BCE led to a brief enthronementof a native Egyptian, although Darius quickly restored powerto Persia.

Darius maintained Persian hegemony in Egypt with theestablishment of strong garrisons of troops at Memphis, Daph-nae in the eastern Delta, Marea in the western Delta, and atElephantine in the south on the Nile. A naval force was alsostationed in Lower Egypt. Persians made up the bulk of thismilitary force, but Jews and other Semites were part of it, aswere some Egyptians (Gray and Cary 1969: 190-191). Evi-dence suggests, however, that Darius significantly softenedthe negative attitude toward Egyptian religion, mollifying thebad feelings engendered by his predecessor. He also adoptedan Egyptian name, Stitu-Re, proclaiming his devotion to Re(Gray 1969: 24-25). He repaired the temple of Ptah in Mem-phis, and built a great temple in the oasis of Khargeh. He madeofferings to the gods and provided funds to the priests to main-tain their rituals and the priesthoods. In an inscription found atSais, the Egyptian priest, Uzahor, described how Darius com-manded him to re-establish the city's "Temple-school,"because this would awaken "to new life all that was fallinginto ruin, in order to uphold the name of all the gods, theirtemples, their revenues, and the ordinances of their feasts for-ever" (Gray 1969: 25).

Darius was also busy rebuilding the infrastructure of theEgyptian economy. Among these projects was the completionof a canal linking the Nile with the Red Sea, a project which



Neccho had begun nearly a century earlier, but had aban-doned. The Persians were keenly interested in economicgrowth and amassing wealth. By the end of the sixth century,trade with Greece was increasing, as the appearance of Athe-nian wares in Naukratis and elsewhere attests (Boardman1973: 139). Athenian silver coins also appeared, probablycoming into Egypt from East Greek merchants, travelling viaPhoenicia. Although Egypt paid a very high annual tribute toPersia-more than 700 talents, the country's agricultural wealthfar outweighed the tax burden.

In his early years, ca. 522-520 BCE, Darius dealt withrevolts in the eastern provinces of the empire. The prophetHaggai used this opportunity to prophesy that the earth was"shaking," and proposed that Zerubbabel, the Jewish princeover Jerusalem, assert himself as the "chosen,"-Messiah-ofYahweh. It is probably a tribute to Darius that nothing came ofthis prophecy, and Zerubbabel and Haggai disappeared fromhistory. Darius I very capably administered his conqueredrealms. The Great King ruled in consultation with his counse-lors from Persia; local satrapies were governed by satraps andtheir councils. While the king's authority was absolute, Per-sian government was tolerant of local concerns and traditions.No native vassal kings were created in subjugated countries,for this would only engender rebellion. As "King of Egypt,"Darius I was able to claim continuity of the royal traditions ofthe Egyptians. This was surely the case until the revolt of the460's.

The Egyptian Revolt Leads to Changes in Persian ImperialPolicy

Sources used to reconstruct the events of the Egyptianrevolt of the first half of the fifth century BCE vary exten-sively in their understanding of what happened. Some scholarshave labeled the sources "tendentious"(Hoglund 1992:97; Hill1951: 343-344). Still, a careful reading of various ancientauthors can yield a better understanding of the revolt. KennethHoglund has carefully reviewed the material. The Egyptianrevolt, he argued, came on the heals of Persia's defeat by thecoalition of Greek city-states under Athenian leadership atMarathon and Salamis (Starr 1989: 29-34). To Egypt, it musthave appeared that Persia was weakening, particularly whenDarius I died and Xerxes I came to power.

We will not be concerned here with the details of the vari-ous sources, whether Greek or Egyptian. Diodorus Siculus'claim that the revolt began when the death of Xerxes becamewidely known in Egypt seems not only plausible, but highlyprobable. By 464 BCE, the garrison at Elephantine was awarethat Artaxerxes was the new king (Cowley 1923:15-17; Hornand Wood 1954: 8-9; and Porten 1980: 6-7). When news ofDarius I's death spread through Egypt in 486 BCE, some partsof the nation immediately revolted, "suggesting that oncenews of a change in monarchs had spread rapidly from the Ira-nian plateau to Egypt, the effort to seize the opportunity fornational independence was soon to follow" (Hoglund 1992:138-139).

Diodorus claims that the rebels immediately expelled Per-sia's leadership and made Inaros the king; the year would havebeen ca. 464 BCE. Inaros is a Hellenized form of the Egyptian

irt-Hr-itw, meaning "May the eye of Horus be against them"(Hoglund 1992: 139; Guentch-Ogloueff 1941: 117). He isidentified as a Libyan, apparently one of the powerful chief-tains of the Libyan tribes from the Egyptian West. He is, inter-estingly, not identified as "king of the Egyptians" until afterthe revolt. Herodotus' assertion that he was a son of Psammet-ichus is probably a reference to a non-royal Psammetichus-thename being quite popular during the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty(Cf. Redford 1983: 90 n. 171). So Inaros was a leader of oneof the large ethnic groups resident in the western Delta. Soalso was Amyrtaeus, his associate, who was called "GreatChief of the Meshwesh," the western Delta "marsh dwell-ers"(Thucydides 1.110). All of this means that the Egyptiansrevolted against Persia internally-without outside help or insti-gation.

Following Hoglund's reconstruction, after assemblingloyal forces, the revolutionary army "moved down the Cano-pic branch of the Nile" (Hoglund 1992: 142). The PersianSatrap mustered his forces and advanced to meet the revolu-tionaries. Achaemenes, one of Xerxes' brothers, was killed inaction at Papremis, a site probably located along the western-most branch of the Nile (Lloyd 1975: 270-272). Inaros' forceswon an early victory there, and he called on Athens for aid tocompletely defeat the Persians in Egypt. Persian forces tookrefuge in Memphis, which was the satrapal seat of governmentand the site of a Persian military garrison (Porten 1980: 29,53-54; Kraeling 1953: 32). Kraeling estimates that 10,000-12,000 troops may have been stationed in Memphis, basinghis estimate on Herodotus' discussion of the rations consumedby the troops. Ctesias estimated that up to 200,000 Persiantroops were in Egypt at the time-a figure which must begrossly inflated. News of the Persian naval defeats at Salamis(479 BCE) and Eurymedon (ca. 466 BCE) circulated widelythroughout the eastern Mediterranean. Further news of thebattlefield death of Achaemenes in the Delta may have givenAthenian and Delian League allies hope that Persia's hold onEgypt was nearly over.

The factors which convinced Athens to lead an expedition-ary force to Egypt to fight the Persians, however, remainunclear. The economy was expanding, and Athens's leadersmay have seen an opportunity to solidify their leadership ofthe Delian League with a sweeping victory. This militaryaction would also open Egypt's markets for Athenian exploita-tion (Meiggs 1972: 102-103). Even with the arrival of Athe-nian forces in the Delta, however, the "White Fortress" atMemphis did not fall easily, frustrating Inaros' claims to theEgyptian throne and Athenian aspirations to dominate theeastern Mediterranean trade zone.

Persian Imperial efforts to stifle the rebellion initiallyfocused on an emissary from Artaxerxes to Sparta, whoattempted to entice the Spartans to revolt, which would haveforced the Athenians to return home. Sparta refused the Per-sian bribes (Lewis 1977: 50-51). The Great King had no alter-native other than to muster an expeditionary force to crush therevolt in the Delta. Persia perceived the Athenian presence tobe more dangerous than the native Egyptian rebels. Diodorusnoted that Persian and allied forces gathered in Cilicia and



Phoenicia, where they rested and trained for the campaign tofollow (Diodorus 11.75). The palace at Sidon may have been apart of this campaign, serving as a forward "command post"during the mobilization and reception of forces embarking forthe "theater of operations" in Egypt.

Sites in the southern Levant, such as Tell el-Hesi, Tell esh-Shariah, and Tell Jemmeh, were also used as logistical basesand "power projection platforms," from which Persian forceswere supplied and projected into the area of operations in theNile Delta (Betlyon forthcoming). We have discussed theselogistical bases elsewhere--bases which supplied food, cloth-ing, weapons, and all the necessary combat service and com-bat service support the Persian armed forces may haverequired in their campaign against Egypt (Betlyon 1991: 39-42; Bennett and Blakely 1990: 134-137).

Persian forces moved south along the coast, while navalforces, presumably Phoenician war ships, sailed offshore pro-tecting the army from potential raids by Greek marines(Diodorus 11.77.1). 'Akko was used by the Persians as a mar-shaling area for forces against Egypt in ca. 374 BCE and itmay have been a rally point to suppress this 464 BCE rebel-lion as well. There are no clues in the ancient sources to sug-gest how the forces moved to the south, whether along thecoast around Mount Carmel, or through the passes atYoqne'am or Megiddo (Cf. Hoglund 1992: 152). It may be thatall three routes were used to facilitate movement of forces onsuch a massive scale. The concentration of logistical bases justnortheast of Gaza may indicate that this area near 'Ashdod wasthe final staging area for the invasion.

The forces moved on Egypt in ca. 457/456 BCE, andimmediately broke the Greek/ Egyptian siege of Memphis.This battle was decisive, destroying Inaros' forces. The DelianLeague's troops retreated north into the Nile to the island ofProsopitis, where they came under siege by other Persianforces (Herodotus 2.41; Hoglund 1992:154-155). The Greekswere overwhelmed, and most died. The loss of so many troopsand over 200 ships was devastating to the Athenian state andits economy, hampering Athens' ability to collect its DelianLeague tribute in later years (Meiggs 1963: 4-9).

Following the Egyptian disaster, Athens took extraordi-nary steps to heal its wounds with Sparta and to reassert con-trol over the Delian League (Hoglund 1992: 156-157). At thesame time, Persian forces occupied Egypt, and expanded theirefforts to "hold on" to other areas of the Near East, includingSyria, Phoenicia, and Yehud. At least in the southern Levant,with potential future problems in Egypt, the Persians beganconstruction of a series of fortresses in all major populationcenters and other areas requiring special security consider-ations. These forts-the Chronicler's biraniyot-were the key-stone in the Persian army's "military operations other thanwar," including peace keeping operations, guarding industrialsites, patrolling major highways and road junctions, supportfor local authorities, rebuilding infrastructure, and caring forimportant public installations such as water supplies, and taxcollection (Cf. Betlyon forthcoming; US Army Field Manual100-20). These operations significantly changed Persia'sapproach to imperial satrapal governance. With military

forces, albeit small units, stationed throughout the region, thelikelihood of revolts was greatly reduced. Professional mili-tary forces helped Persia to maintain its imperial control afterthe Egyptian revolt. With little fear of more rebellion, the Per-sians turned their attention to more pressing economic issuesand moved to increase their market share of the eastern Medi-terranean trade. This share, after all, was another viableweapon in the fight against Athenian efforts to control themonetary economy in the Aegean/Mediterranean sphere ofinfluence.

Phoenicia in the mid-fifth century BCESidon, Tyre, Byblos, and Aradus were the principle city-

states of Phoenicia in the period following the Egyptian revolt.Phoenicia's naval forces played an important part in thedeployment which defeated the Egyptian rebels and theirAthenian allies. In return for Phoenician loyalty, it is reason-able to expect that Persia granted the Phoenicians some extraliberties. We doubt that the Phoenicians were particularlyinterested in the political machinations of their Persian over-lords. The Phoenicians had always been more interested ineconomic development and profits. Phoenician merchants andtradesmen built their reputations on receiving raw materialsand processing them into luxurious, high-priced goods. Phoe-nician markets included the entire Mediterranean basin, withher colonies as far west as Carthage, Sardinia, Marseille, andCartagena on the Iberian peninsula (Cf. Boardman 2001: 36-41).

As early as the Late Bronze Age, Phoenician (or Canaan-ite) merchants were travelling throughout Asia Minor toGreece and westward. Phoenician commercial settlementswere built in the Delta and in Memphis in the Iron Age, whereHerodotus mentioned a part of the city called the "TyrianCamp," in which a temple of 'Ashtart was founded (2.112;Harden 1971:55-56). A monetary economy was evolving rap-idly in the region. This new economy required increasing sup-plies of coined money from mints in Greece and East Greece.Now in the mid-fifth century, Persian authorities began tostrike coins in gold and silver, supporting this new economicand monetary growth. Smaller denominations were needed tomore readily facilitate commercial growth and the inherentpayment of tariffs, taxes, and tribute (Betlyon 1992: 1079-1080). Mints opened in Tyre and Sidon in the mid- to late-fifthcentury, with other mints to follow in Byblos and Aradus.

These new mints struck coins in silver and bronze denomi-nations bolstering the Persian economy. Initially the mintsstruck small silver denominations. Over time, more denomina-tions appeared, struck on weight standards which supportedPersian economic initiatives in Asia Minor and Egypt-that is,coins struck on the Persian and Phoenician standards. Phoeni-cia had always been an important trading partner with Egypt.The cessation of hostilities in the revolt and the beginnings ofcoinage no doubt increased the possibilties for trade betweenthe two longtime commercial partners. These coins were prob-ably also used to pay the mercenary soldiers garrisoning Per-sia's fortresses throughout the Levant (Cf. Machinist 1994:365-380).



Sidonian and Tyrian local mints struck silver types whichincluded ethnics unique to the Phoenician mints: Sidon, forexample, always depicted a war galley on the obverse types(Betlyon 1982: 4ff.). Tyre, on the other hand, struck coinsbearing the likeness of Ba'al Milqart riding on the back of aseahorse on the obverse, and the Athenian-style owl with theEgyptian crook and flail-symbols of authority and kingship inancient Egypt-on the reverse (Betlyon 1982: 42ff.). Thesetypes identified the Phoenician mints in the regional economy.The Egyptian artifacts on the Tyrian series raise certain ques-tions: Why did Tyre use Egyptian symbols to identify theirown coin series? Furthermore, why did they employ the Athe-nian owl-a symbol of their principle economic competitor?Sidon depicted the Great King of Persia on the reverse of hercoins. The King is followed by the Sidonian king in his role aschief priest of the Great King's cult. That is not so unusual;however the Sidonian king was usually dressed in "traditionalEgyptian style" (Betlyon 1982: 9-10). Do these types reflectthe close commercial ties between the satrapies? There wasthe Ophir trade via the Red Sea port of Etzion-Geber. Bywhich the Phoenicians brought African goods to the Mediter-ranean coast to tempt the growing markets of Greece, EastGreece, and Italy. Phoenician goods often exhibited Egyptiancharacteristics, particularly their metalwork (Harden 1971:155, 188-192). Even some of their stone sarcophagi and stelefrom the Phoenician mainland depict rulers and deities inEgyptian style (Harden 1971: 180-182; Bey and Reinach1892).

We may ask how close the Egyptians and Phoenicianswere in the mid-fifth century BCE and later. What factorsbrought them together as vassals of the Great King, or as com-mercial partners, or even as allies in rebellion against the Per-sians? All three of these possibilities presented themselves. Inthe Egyptian revolt of the 460's BCE, the Phoenicians weresimply part of the Persian expeditionary force sent to quell therebellion. We agree with Gerhard Herm that Phoenician par-ticipation was probably "reluctant" at best (1973: 155). TheEgyptians were among the Phoenicians "oldest friends," peo-ple who had helped to shape Phoenician civilization. Follow-ing this military action when Cambyses sent forces into thewestern desert to take Libya and Cyrene and possiblyCarthage, the Tyrians refused to go along. Enough wasenough, and the Phoenicians were not going to threaten theirown colonies in the central and westesn Mediterranean. Hero-dotus reminds us that the entire Persian fleet was made up ofships from Sidon and Tyre; "Cambyses' whole navy wasdependent upon the Phoenicians," and the Great King knewthis. The Phoenician tax burden was apparently lighterbecause of this important military requirement levied by thePersians. From a purely economic perspective, the Pax Persicagave the merchants of Lebanon precisely what they needed toprosper-peace and order. The excellent Persian post and roadnetwork also helped, as did the gold daric issued by Darius I tostabilize and standardize the monetary system (Herm1973:154-156).

By 464 BCE, the Egyptians were again vassals underArtaxerxes I, vassals with the Phoenicians, with whom trade

was reinstated. The Phoenicians maintained their separatecity-states under Persia. Their commercial ventures prospered,except in periods of imperial interregnum. The nature of Per-sian kingship lent itself to this volatile predicament. In ancientIran, as among other Indo-European peoples, a king waselected from a certain family which had the charisma of king-ship. The ruler was elected by the warriors, making the king a"king of many kings" (Frye 1963: 91; Widengren 1959: 242-257). The king was said to be descended from the gods and tobe divine. He was a priest and chief among the religious lead-ers of the nation. When the king died, his "personal fire" wasextinguished and mourning by his family or servants some-times took the most extreme forms of suicide or mutilation. Itis no wonder that revolt sometimes broke out when word of aGreat King's death reached the outer extremities of the realm.

III. Phoenician, Cypriot, and Egyptian Resis-tance to Persian Dominion

Periods following the death of a king were often times forrebellion. Artaxerxes I died in 424 BCE. He was succeededfor a short time by Xerxes II, who died in 423 BCE, to be suc-ceeded by Darius II (423-404 BCE). Artaxerxes II becameking in 404 and ruled until 359, when Artaxerxes III reigneduntil 338 BCE. At that time, Arses ruled for two to three yearsto be followed by Darius III, who fought Alexander the Greatin the period 333 to 330 BCE (Frye 1961: 281). To maintaincontrol during these unstable periods, the Persians imposed asort of military organization over and above the satrapal gov-ernments. Units of approximately 100 soldiers-usually merce-naries from vassal nations-were stationed in many places. InYehud, the size of the small biraniyot, or "fortified towers/for-tresses," is even smaller suggesting that these units (calleddegel in Old Persian) were probably subdivided into smallerunits of 10's or 20's. These units were tasked with the daily"operations other than war" which maintained the peace andstability the merchants desperately wanted (Frye 1961: 105).

The Persians, under Darius I and his successors, developeda complex system of taxation. Taxes were paid by nobles andby military leaders on holdings of land granted to them by theGreat King. This was the institution of the qashtu, a piece ofland granted to a military servant of the king as part of hisremuneration, a portion of the profits from which go to thecrown (Frye 1961: 107-109). Taxes on the land were depen-dent upon the land's potential yield in crops. Texts preservedfrom the late fifth century BCE in Babylon provide a detailedaccount of this system and the collection of taxes for the impe-rial government (Cardascia 1951: 7 foll.).

The taxes imposed by the Persians covered everythingfrom harbor fees, market tolls, tolls on gates and roads, to tollson frontier crossings, taxes on domestic animals, as well ascorvee labor. Corvee was imposed to provide labor to con-struct roads, public buildings and the like, and was employedboth by satrapal and imperial officials. Public works were usu-ally paid for by local authorities and local taxes, while goldand silver streamed to Persepolis and Susa. Gold remained thedomain of the Great King, and only he could authorize strik-



ing coins in gold. Satrapal mints struck silver coins, but usu-ally with the same figures of a royal archer on bended knee onthe obverse type (Frye 1961: 110). Autonomous cities, such asthe Phoenician city-states, struck silver and copper of a differ-ent form, and potentially on different standards for economicreasons.

We have little information to prove economic cooperationbetween Phoenicia and Egypt in the years following the 464BCE revolt. However, there is also little doubt that this eco-nomic cooperation occurred. The growing economic ties withAthens and Corinth strengthened all of the coastal Mediterra-nean economies. While the Persians failed militarily to con-quer Greece, their great wealth gave them ample gold withwhich to bribe local Greek and East Greek rulers, making itdifficult for Athens to build a unified Greek federation, andkeeping the empire safe from Greek attack. However, it wasnot "safe" from Greek influence. In Anatolia and elsewherealong the coast, Greek language and customs became moreand more prevalent.

Xerxes I, in the wake of Darius I's death, was much lesslenient with Egypt than his predecessor(Herodotus 8.7). He nolonger pretended to be a successor to the Pharoahs, nor did herespect native customs or religious practices. Similar treat-ment was meted out to Babylon after it revolted, and this maybe the reason that Egyptian and Babylonian influence were onthe wane throughout the region (Frye 1961: 118). Xerxes' per-sonal interests focused on rebuilding Persepolis and buildingup his harem. He was assassinated in 465 BCE.

Artaxerxes I came to power by this intrigue. The Egyptiansapparently again revolted against the crown. But this time thePersians had forces in place, and by 455 BCE, the Egyptianrebellion was put down. Darius II stabilized affairs for a while,although he had rebellions to put down as well. Upon hisdeath in ca. 404 BCE, Artaxerxes II had to fight Cyrus, DariusII's younger brother, to secure the throne. The Egyptians werequick to capitalize on this instability, revolting yet again.Problems at home and elsewhere particularly in East Greece,meant that the Persians were never able to reconquer Egypt. Itremained free under a native dynasty. The southern provincesof 'Abernahara', such as Yehud and the city-states of'Ashqelon and Gaza, became even more important in thisperiod, forming the new frontier with Egypt. The troops andlogistical bases in the region provided critical security toguard the border. When the satraps of central Anatoliarevolted in the 360's, it must have seemed as if the entire Per-sian empire was about to collapse. Artaxerxes III, however,rose up in 359 and, with a blood thirsty zeal, saved the empire.Satraps who had revolted and issued their own coinage werewon back to Achaemenid allegiance. But then, some of thePhoenician city-states revolted. This period of history is diffi-cult to follow because the sources are few, and usually writtenlong after the fact. The varying fortunes and allegiances of theleaders in the region seemed always to involve Greeks andGreek interests (Frye 1961: 118-119).

In the coinage of the Sidonian king 'Abd'ashtart I, whoreigned from ca. 372-362/361 BCE, there is evidence of rebel-lion against the Great King. In the eighth year of 'Abd'ashtart

I's reign, according to his monetary dating system, new cointypes were struck which changed the silver "double-sheqel"reverse to delete the image of the Great Persian King riding ina chariot followed in obeisance by the Sidonian king. The newreverse depicted 'Abd'ashtart's head, with the abbreviation ofhis name written in Phoenician characters ('ayin-bet) (Betlyon1982: 13-14). Moreover, 'Abd'ashtart I changed the standardon which he struck coins, ceasing to issue coins on the Phoeni-cian standard and switching to the Athenian standard (Betlyon1982: 13 no. 32). The year was 365/364 BCE, precisely thetime when Sidon sheltered the Egyptian king Tachos, who wastrying to escape Persian capture (Judeich 1892: 166, 209).This revolt, engineered by Tachos, coincided with the end ofArtaxerxes II's reign. It was another war in which Egyptenticed Cyprus and Sidon to participate.

This effort by Egypt and Sidon to thwart Persian controlmay have been their first unified attempt to do so, but it wasnot their last. 'Abd'ashtart I is remembered as a wealthy, pow-erful monarch. He received an Athenian embassy on its way tothe Persian court and consequently was "granted the honor ofproxenia by the Athenians" (Cf. Bey and Reinach 1892-1896:390). The numismatic evidence from Sidon suggests that thesatrap, Mazday, took over the mint for a few years, institutingmilitary rule over the city state. From ca. 362/361-358 BCE,coins were once again struck on the Phoenician standard withthe Aramaic inscription Mazday, prominently displayed on thecoin's reverse. The reverse types reverted once again to theGreat King receiving worship from the Sidonian leader (Bet-lyon 1982: 14-15). Under Artaxerxes III, a new loyal king,Tennes, was put on Sidon's throne. Tennes ruled for approxi-mately five years when Cyprus and Egypt again tried to throwoff Persian domination.

Tennes stopped issuing standard coins types in ca. 352BCE. With the death of Artaxerxes II, Egypt's revolt gainedmomentum, and Tennes apparently again led Sidon to war.The first campaign of Artaxerxes III to put down the revolt in351/350 BCE failed (Ghirshman 1954: 2-1; Kienitz 1953;Vandier 1954: 189-190). This revolt was serious. Sidon seemsto have fallen to Persian arms either during this first campaignor early in the second attack in 345 BCE-an attack whichfinally crushed Egyptian resistance as well. The coins suggestthe latter, because it was Persia's failure to subdue the revolt atits inception which enticed Tennes to join the fray, taking partsof neighboring provinces down with him. Dan Barag has sug-gested that destruction layers identified from Hazor, Megiddo,'Atlit, Lachish, and Jericho may all be connected with thisrevolt (Barag 1966: 7). Isocrates (To Philip 101-102) urgedPhilip of Macedon to attack Persia in ca. 347/346 BCE, sincethe satrapies were able to hold out so long against a weak cen-tral government. Isocrates wrote that Cilicia, Phoenicia andCyprus revolted only after Artaxerxes III failed to subdueEgypt early in the struggle (ca. 351/350 BCE) (Betlyon 1982:35 n. 66).

In this same period, the Tyrian mint struck coins using newmethodologies and a new standard. The new Tyrian seriesincluded Attic-standard didrachms, struck on new types withthinner, better made flans (Betlyon 1982: 52ff.). Some have



suggested that this change of weight standard did not occuruntil Alexander the Great conquered the region in 332 BCE.However, some of these Attic-standard Tyrian coins have beendiscovered in pre-Alexandrine archaeological contexts,cementing our insistence that these standard changes occurredas early as 352 BCE (Betlyon 1982: 53-54; Cross1969: 53-54;Cross 1974: 57-59).

The mint at Aradus participated in this insurrection aswell, shifting its minting standard from the Persic to the Atticin ca. 352/351 BCE (Betlyon 1982: 86-88). This change ofstandard was short lived, perhaps limited to only a fewmonths. Aradus was close to the mouth of the Orontes River-one of the principle "highways" leading into the Persian hin-terlands. Massive military action along the coast quicklyrestored the Aradian mint to the Persic standard, with whichPersepolis was much more comfortable (Betlyon 1982: 106notes 92-93; Rainey 1968-1971: 70-71).

When the smoke cleared, Sidon had been burned, betrayedby its own king to the Persians. Tennes defected, resulting inhis own death and the deaths of some 40,000 Sidonians, whoare said to have died in their own burning of the city, ca. 348/347 BCE (Diodorus 16.45.4-6; Betlyon 1982:18). Captivesfrom Sidon were sent to Babylon and Susa, continuing thepolicy of deporting rebellious populations to distant places(Frye 1961: 119). Mazday again was put in charge of theSidonian mint-it was just too important economically to closeit permanently (Betlyon 1982: 18). Eventually local dynastsloyal to Persia were restored to the Sidonian throne.

After Artaxerxes III subdued Sidon, he pressed the attackto the South where he saw the road open to Egypt. For a briefperiod, Persian authority over Lower Egypt was reestablished.The fighting in the Delta was probably not so much Persianfighting Egyptian but Greek mercenary fighting Greek merce-nary. A native Egyptian dynasty continued to rule in most ofUpper Egypt. However, Artaxerxes III managed to restoresome of Persia's tarnished past glory (Frye 1961: 119), if onlyfor a fleeting moment. After Bagoas assassinated the GreatKing and much of the Achaemenid royal house, Darius IIICodommanus, a distant family member, was made King. Dar-ius III kept control of Egypt, but was ill prepared to thwart theoncoming Macedonian armies (Frye 1961: 120).

When Alexander the Great reached Phoenicia in ca. 332,Aradus, Byblos, and Sidon surrendered to his authority, andtheir mints were closed. Tyre resisted his advances, wasbesieged and fell. 'Uzzimilk-the Tyrian king--and his son diedfighting the Hellenistic onslaught (Betlyon 1982: 58-59; Raw-linson 1889: 511-529). Only the mint of Byblos escaped thesefourth century problems. Byblos was the smallest of the majorPhoenician cities, and continued to support trade and com-merce as it had for centuries.

IV. Conclusions

The fifth and fourth centuries BCE were not a time of Per-sian-Egyptian enmity or Persian-Phoenician enmity. Theywere a time of tremendous rivalry between Persian and Greekworlds. In many respects, Phoenician and Egyptian economic

and political interests were nearly the same, resulting in anumber of failed collaborations against Persepolis in the earlyfourth century. Persian control of the eastern Mediterraneanseaboard and the Nile Delta, however, was ultimately impossi-ble with expanding Greek interest in the riches of the Orientand the lucrative spice trade coming from the East.

On several occasions, Egyptian and Phoenician forcesjoined together to resist Persia. Egypt fought valiantly formany years, seeking any excuse to fight for independencefrom her foreign rulers and oppressors. Perhaps it was the verysuccess of the Persians' administration of their empire whichlaid the basis for Alexander's dominion in the late fourth andthird centuries BCE. Despite many rebellions and problems,the Persians maintained power for over two hundred years.

The Persians did not have a great affinity for the people ofthe Mediterranean seaboard or the Nile Delta. Their interestswere "for profit." Taxes, tribute, and increased commerce sat-isfied the Persian kings. It was not their ideas or their politicalsavvy which increased Persian influence in East Greecethroughout the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. What wonthem friends was their money, which was liberally used tobribe vassals and other states into situations which kept thecity-states of mainland Greece "off balance," until Philip ofMacedon united the Greeks under his own banner. This wasthe beginning of the end for Darius III, whose forces could notmatch the tactical military skills of the Macedonian hoplites.

The Egyptians and Phoenicians had long been friendly,both interested in commerce and living stable, peaceful lives.Close relationships with Athens and the other leading Greekcities were to their advantage. It is no wonder that bothregions prospered under Hellenistic rule.



Bibliography

Albright, W. F.1969 - Palestinian Inscriptions. Pp. 320-322 in AncientNear Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, 3rded., J. B. Pritchard, ed. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress.

Barag, D.1966 - The Effects of the Tennes Rebellion on Pales-tine. Bulletin of the American Schools of OrientalResearch 183: 6-12.

Beaulieu, P.-A.1989 - The Reign of Nabonidus, King of Babylon 556-539 B.C. Yale Near Eastern Researches 10. NewHaven: Yale University Press.

Bennett, W. J., Jr., and Blakely, J. A.1990 - Tell el-Hesi: The Persian Period, in The JointArchaeological Expedition to Tell el-Hesi, vol. 3. K. G.O'Connell, SJ, ed. Baltimore: American Schools of Ori-ental Research.

Betlyon, J. W.1982 - The Pre-Alexandrine Coinage and Mints ofPhoenicia. Harvard Semitic Series 26. Chico, CA:Scholars Press.1991 - Archaeological Evidence of Military Operationsin Southern Judah during the Early Hellenistic Period.Biblical Archaeologist 54: 39-42.1992 - Coinage. Pp. 1076-1089, in The Anchor BibleDictionary. Vol. 1, D. N. Freedman, ed. New York:Anchor Doubleday.Forthcoming - Military Operations Other Than War inPersian Period Yehud, ca. 525-332 B.C.E, in FromJudah to Yehud: New Perspectives on the Neo-Babylo-nian, Persian, and Hellenistic Periods, G. N. Knoppers,ed.

Bey, H. and Reinach, T.1892-1896 - Une nÈcropole royale ‡ Sidon. Paris: E.Leroux.

Boardman, J.1973 - The Greeks Overseas. 2nd ed. New York: Pen-guin Books.2001 - Aspects of "Colonization." Bulletin of the Amer-ican Schools of Oriental Research 322: 33-42.

Bright, J.1986 - The History of Israel, 3rd ed. Philadelphia:Westminster Press.

Cardascia, G.1951 - Les archives des Murasu, une famille d'hommesd'affaires babyloniens ‡ l'Epoque perse (455-403 avantJ.-C.). Paris: Imprimerie nationale.

Carter, C.1999 - The Emergence of Yehud in the Persian Period:A Social and Demographic Study. JSOTS 294. Shef-field: Sheffield Academic Press.

Cowley, A.

1923 - Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C.Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Cross, F. M.1969 - Papyri from the Fourth Century B.C. fromDaliyeh. Pp. 45-69 in New Directions in BiblicalArchaeology, D. N. Freedman and J. Greenfield,eds.Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books.1974 - The Papyri and their Historical Implications, inDiscoveries in the Wadi ed-Daliyeh, P. and N. Lapp,eds. Annual of the American Schools of OrientalResearch 41: 17-29.

Frye, R. N.1963 - The Heritage of Persia. Cleveland, OH: WorldPublishing.

Galling, K.1964 - Studien zur Geschichte israels im persischenZeitalter. Tubingen: J. E. Mohr.

Ghirshman, R.1954 - Iran. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

Gray, G. B.1969 - The Foundation and Extension of the PersianEmpire. Pp. 1-25 in The Cambridge Ancient History.Volume IV. The Persian Empire and the West, J. B.Bury, S. A. Cook, and F. E. Adcock, eds. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Gray, G. B. and Cary, M.1969 - The Reign of Darius. Pp. 173-228 in The Cam-bidge Ancient History. Volume IV. The Persian Empireand the West, J. B. Bury, S. A. Cook, and F. E. Adcock,eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grayson, A. K.1975 - Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles. Texts fromCuneiform Sources 5. New York: J. Augustin.

Guentch-Ogloueff, M.1941 - Noms propres imprÈcatoires. Bulletin d'Institutfrancais d'archÈologie Orientale 40: 117-133.

Harden, D.1971 - The Phoenicians. Harmondsworth, England:Penguin Books.

Herm, G.1975 - The Phoenicians: The Purple Empire of theAncient World, C. Hillier, trans. London: Victor Gol-lancz.

Hill, G. F.1951 - Sources for Greek History between the Persianand Peloponnesian Wars, R. Meiggs, ed. Oxford: Clar-endon Press.

Hoglund, K. G.1992 - Achaemenid Imperial Administration in Syria-Palestine and the Missions of Ezra and Nehemiah.Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series 125.Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Horn, S. H. and Wood, L. H.



1954 - The Fifth-Century Jewish Calendar at Elephan-tine. Journal of Near Eastern Studies 3: 1-20.

Judeich, W.1892 - Kleinasiatische Studien. Marburg: N. G. Elw-ertsche Verlags-buchhandlung.

Kienitz, F. K.1952 - Die politische Geschichte Agyptens vom 7. Bis 4.Jahrhundert vor Der Zeitwende. Berlin: Academie-Ver-lag.

Kraeling, E. G.1953 - The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri: NewDocuments from the Fifth Century B. C. from the Jew-ish Colony at Elephantine. New Haven: Yale UniversityPress.

Lewis, D. M.1976 - Sparta and Persia. Cincinnati Classical Studiesn.s. 1. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Lloyd, A. B.1975 - Herodotus Book II: Introduction and Commen-tary. Etudes prÈliminaires aux religions orientales dansl'Empire Romain, 43. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Meiggs, R.1963 - The Crisis of Athenian Imperialism. HarvardStudies in Philology 67: 1-36.1972 - The Athenian Empire. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Niemeier, W.-D.2001 - Archaic Greeks in the Orient: Textual andArchaeological Evidence. Bulletin of the AmericanSchools of Oriental Research 322: 11-32.

Oded, B.1979 - Mass Deportations and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire. Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert.

Porten, B.1968 - Archives from Elephantine: The Life of anAncient Jewish Miliitary Colony. Berkeley: Universityof California Press.

Rainey, A. F.1968-1971 - The Satrapy "Beyond the River." Austra-lian Journal of Biblical Archaeology 1: 51-78.

Rawlinson, G.1889 - History of Phoenicia. London: Longmans,Green, and Co.

Redford, D. B.1983 - Notes on the History of Ancient Buto. Bulletinof the Egyptological Seminar 5: 67-101.1992 - Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Roux, G.1992 - Ancient Iraq, 3rd ed. New York: Penguin Books.

Sack, R.1978 - Nergal-sarra-usur, King of Babylon, as seen inthe Cuneiform, Greek Latin and Hebrew Sources.Zeitschrift fur Assyriologie 68:129-149.

Saggs, H. W. F.1962 - The Greatness that was Babylon. New York:Hawthorn Books.

van der Spek, R. J.

1982 - Did Cyrus the Great Introduce a New PolicyTowards Subdued Nations? Cyrus in Assyrian Perspec-tive. Persica 10: 278-283.

Starr, C. G.1989 - The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History.New York: Oxford University Press.

Stern, E.2000 - The Babylonian Gap. Biblical ArchaeologicalReview 26:45-51.

Torczyner, H.1938 - Lachish I: The Lachish Ostraca. London:Oxford University Press.

United States Army1979 - M/S520/8-1, Military Operations Other ThanWar. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Commandand General Staff College.N.D. Field Manual 100-20 [Air Force Pamphlet 3-20],Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Wash-ington, DC: Departments of the Army and the AirForce.

Vandier, J.1954 - Review of F. K. Kienitz, Die politischeGeschichte Agyptens vom 7. Bis 4. Jahrhundert vor derZeitwende, in Bibliotheca Orientalis 11: 189-190.

Widengren, G.1959 - The Sacral Kingship of Iran. Pp. 242-257, in TheSocial Kingship. 8th International Congress for the His-tory of Religions (Rome, 1955). Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Wiseman, D. J.1983 - Nebuchadnezzar and Babylon. The SchweichLectures. London: The British Museum.