articol CEO TURNOVER following AQUISITIONS.pdf

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Execut ive Departure Following Acquisitions in Germany – An Empirical Analysis

of its Antecedents and Consequences

Prof. Dr. Torsten Wulf and Dr. Stephan Stubner

HHL Arbeitspapier Nr. 84


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HHL – Leipzig Graduate School of Management

Execut ive Departure Following Acquisitions in Germany – An Empirical Analysis

of its Antecedents and Consequences

Prof. Dr. Torsten Wulf and Dr. Stephan Stubner

HHL Arbeitspapier Nr. 84

ISSN 1864-4562 (Online-Version)

Copyright: Lehrstuhl für Strategisches Management und OrganisationLeipzig 2008

Jede Form der Weitergabe und Vervielfältigungbedarf der Genehmigung des Herausgebers


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Abstract

In this paper we analyze the relationship between executive departure inacquired companies and pre- as well as post-acquisition performance. Based

on corporate control theory and human capital theory we derive hypotheses

regarding this relationship and empirically test them using a sample of 44

German companies which were acquired between 1996 and 2004. The results

of the study show that executive departure after an acquisition indeed

constitutes a severe loss of human capital for a company, thus having a

negative effect on post-acquisition performance. However, we could find no

clear results to explain for a relationship between pre-acquisition success and

executive departure.


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Index

1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 1

2. Theoretical Positions................................................................................... 3

2.1. Corporate control theory ...................................................................... 3

2.2. Human capital theory ........................................................................... 5

3. Research Design......................................................................................... 8

3.1. Sample selection.................................................................................. 8

3.2. Definition and measurement of variables............................................. 9

3.2.1. Top management turnover................................................................ 9

3.2.2. Pre- and post-acquisition performance............................................ 11

3.2.3. Control variables ............................................................................. 12

4. Results ...................................................................................................... 12

4.1. Descriptive analysis of the sample..................................................... 12

4.2. Correlation analyses .......................................................................... 14

4.3. Regressions analyses........................................................................ 16

5. Discussions and Interpretation.................................................................. 18

6. Implications ............................................................................................... 21

List of Figures and Tables ................................................................................... I

References......................................................................................................... II

List of HHL Working Papers ..............................................................................XI


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1. Introduction

Acquisitions continue to play an important role in today´s business environment.

After a slight downturn at the beginning of the decade, the value of acquisitions

worldwide has again reached a new peak in 2006 (Tschoeke and Hofacker

(2007)). As the literature on corporate strategy mentions, various motivations for

acquisition-related activities are possible, among them the aim to secure further

growth, the will to improve competitive positioning, and – most importantly – the

goal to enhance performance (Hungenberg (2005)). However, whether

acquisitions really have a positive effect on corporate performance is not clear.

According to empirical studies, the success rates of acquisitions only lie

between 20 and 60 percent (Picken (2003); Habeck et al. (1999); Picot (2000)).

In view of these rather low and unsteady success rates, researchers in the field

of strategic management have in the last 30 years devoted a lot of attention to

the analysis of causes for success and failure of acquisitions. Their results show

that various factors – among them the ownership structure of a company, the

size of a company, and the cultural compatibility between the acquisition

partners – have an influence on acquisition success (Krishnan et al. (1997);

Markides and Ittner (1994); Hyland and Diltz (2002)).

One area of research has not caught very much attention by researchers in the

past, despite these intensive research efforts: the role of top managers of

acquired companies. Especially the causes and performance consequences of

executive departures following acquisitions have only seldom been empirically

analyzed, even though such a departure is a widely observed phenomenon.

Indeed, several empirical studies show quite consistently that in the first two

years after an acquisition acquired companies are characterized by a

significantly higher turnover rate among their top managers compared to both,

the time before the acquisition and companies which did not undergo an

acquisition process (Walsh (1988); Hambrick and Cannella (1993); Krug (2003);

Martin and McConnell (1991); Lubatkin et al. (1999)). But it remains


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theoretically and empirically unclear if this higher turnover rate has a negative,

positive or no influence on post-acquisition performance (Gerpott (1993a)).

Two theoretical positions have been brought forward in the literature on

corporate strategy which come to very different conclusions regarding the

relationship between executive departure following acquisitions and pre- as well

as post-acquisition success. These two theoretical positions are corporate

control theory and human capital theory. Corporate control theory argues that

especially poorly managed and therefore less successful companies become

acquisition targets. In this context, the substitution of the underperforming topmanagement team after an acquisition has a positive impact on the subsequent

success level of that company. Human capital theory follows a very different

reasoning. It argues that top managers constitute a particularly important

resource of a company. Thus, their departure means a significant loss of human

capital which negatively affects the success level of the company after the

acquisition.

Empirically the relationship between executive departure in acquired companies

and pre- as well as post-acquisition performance has only been addressed by

very few studies so far, and the results of these studies do not offer clear

support for either of the conflicting theoretical positions (Cannella and Hambrick

(1993); Krishnan et al. (1997); Gerpott (1994); Gerpott (1993a); Bamberger

(1994)). As a matter of fact, studies which investigated the relationship between

pre-acquisition success and top management turnover rather back the

argumentation of corporate control theory – i.e. they come to the conclusion that

a low performance level before an acquisition leads to higher turnover rates

among top managers (Kaplan (1994); Warner et al. (1988)). On the other hand,

studies which examined the relationship between executive departure and post-

acquisition success rather support the reasoning of human capital theory, i.e.

they show that a high turnover rate has negative effects on a company’s

performance after the acquisition (Cannella and Hambrick (1993); Krishnan et

al. (1997); Gerpott (1993a)).


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In this paper we build on these contradicting theoretical positions and empirical

findings and present the results of an empirical study in which we examined the

relationship between top management turnover in acquired companies and pre-as well as post-acquisition success. More precisely, we analyze executive

departure and performance of 44 German companies which were acquired

between 1996 and 2004. We start the paper by giving a brief introduction of

corporate control theory and human capital theory and by deriving central

hypotheses regarding the relationship between executive departure and pre- as

well as post-acquisition success from the viewpoint of both theories. A

description of the research design follows. Then, we present, discuss andinterpret the main results of the study. We close the paper with implications for

further research and for corporate practice.

2. Theoretical Positions

In the literature on corporate strategy two main theoretical positions concerning

the relationship between executive departure following acquisitions and pre- as

well as post-acquisition performance can be identified. These two theoretical

positions are corporate control theory and human capital theory (Gerpott

(1993a)). For deriving hypotheses in our paper, we describe the major lines of

reasoning of both theories below to guide the present empirical analysis.

2.1. Corporate control theory

Corporate control theory is based on agency theory and was mainly developed

by Manne (1965) in the late 1960s. The central idea of corporate control theory

is that different management teams compete on the market for corporate control

for the right to manage the resources of a company (Jensen and Ruback

(1983); Fama and Jensen (1983)). Corporate control theory argues that the

market for corporate control has a disciplinary effect on top managers since it

punishes chronic underperformance. Precisely, the theory claims that

companies which are less successful than they could be with a better

management team become an attractive acquisition target for other companies

or management teams who believe that they are able to manage this company


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in a better way. Accordingly, companies which show a chronic

underperformance are traded on the market for corporate control and face the

threat of being taken over by another company. After such a takeover, the maintask of the new owner then is to eliminate the causes for the acquired

company’s profitability problems. In this context, the replacement of the old top

management team by a better one is one of the first and most important

measures. This reasoning of corporate control theory is based on the central

assumption that there is a high correlation between the quality of top managers

and a company’s performance (Manne (1965); Marks (1994)).

With regard to the relationship between executive departure following

acquisitions and pre- as well as post-acquisition performance, corporate control

theory comes to very clear conclusions. As described above, the theory argues

that mainly poorly managed and thus less successful companies become

acquisition targets. Therefore, it is reasonable from the point of view of an

acquiring company to release the top managers of the acquired company and to

install a better management team. This leads to the conclusion that the degree

of executive departure after acquisitions is particularly high if a company is

characterized by a low level of pre-acquisition performance (Cannella (1990);

Hambrick and Cannella (1993); Gerpott (1991)). This reasoning is stated in

hypothesis 1A:

Hypothesis 1A: The less successful a company was previous to its

acquisition, the higher is the absolute and relative turnover of top

managers after the acquisition.

Since from the perspective of corporate control theory it is only reasonable for a

company or a management team to acquire another company on the market for

corporate control if it believes that it is capable of managing this company in a

better way, an improved post-acquisition performance should be expected. An

important precondition for this performance increase is, however, that the new

owner actually succeeds in eliminating the management deficits from which the

acquired company suffered. Accordingly, from the perspective of corporate


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control theory, the replacement of the former top management team plays an

important role for post-acquisition success, too (Lucks and Meckl (2002);

Metzenthin (2002)). This conclusion is stated in hypothesis 1B:

Hypothesis 1B: The higher the absolute and relative turnover among

top managers of acquired companies is, the higher is the level of

post-acquisition performance.

2.2. Human capital theory

Human capital theory is based on the resource-based view. Thus, it assumes

that valuable resources which cannot or can only hardly be imitated, substituted

and transferred are the main drivers of a company’s success (Barney (1991)).

Different from the resource-based view, however, human capital theory

concentrates on a specific type of resources of a company, namely human

capital (Eschen (2002)). Human capital comprises all individual skills, abilities

and experiences of a company’s employees and managers on all levels

(Edvinsson and Bruenig (2000)). Different empirical studies point out that the

quality of a company’s human capital is particularly relevant for its success

(Fitz-enz (2000)). Accordingly, access to human capital is often regarded as a

primary reason for acquisitions (Zoern (1994)).

Skills, abilities and experiences of top managers are a particularly important

type of human capital for most companies. Not only do top managers possess

valuable company- and industry-specific knowledge and experiences, but they

have in many cases also built up a personal network of relations to important

suppliers, customers, employees and other stakeholders which is of great

importance for a company’s success. Accordingly, it can be expected that

executive departure has a significant impact on the development and the

performance level of any company, but particularly on companies which are

going through an acquisition process.


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Although the reasoning of human capital theory mainly refers to the relationship

between executive departure and post-acquisition success, it also offers

conclusions for the relationship between the performance level of a companyprior to its acquisition and top management turnover. Precisely, human capital

theory argues that managers who were very successful prior to an acquisition

possess great opportunities on the executive job market. Furthermore, these

successful managers are in many cases rather willing to leave the company

than to follow the changed strategic direction which a new owner might want to

go into (Cannella (1990); Gerpott (1993a)). This reasoning is summarized in

hypothesis 2A:

Hypothesis 2A: The higher the level of pre-acquisition performance of

a company was, the higher is the absolute and relative turnover of

top managers after the acquisition.

Since – according to human capital theory – top managers represent a very

important resource of a company, their departure means a severe loss of

human capital. The main reason for this is that new managers neither have the

industry experience nor the company-specific knowledge which the former top

managers possessed (Gerpott (1994); Walsh and Ellwood (1991)). Additionally,

a top managers’ departure entails the loss of his or her network of personal

relations which is of great importance, particularly in the context of an

acquisition (Sewing (1996)).

But executive departure after acquisitions does not only lead to a loss of

valuable human capital. As a matter of fact, it also has a negative signaling

effect. Different empirical studies found for example that important stakeholders

like banks, suppliers, and customers regard an increased turnover rate among

top managers of a certain company as an alarm signal which causes them to

reduce the cooperation with that company in the aftermath (Müller-Stewens and

Lechner (2003)). Even worse is the signaling effect of an increased top

management turnover on the employees and middle-managers within the

company (Schuler et al. (2004); Krug and Nigh (2001); Cartwright and Cooper


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(1992)). In this context, different empirical studies point out that acquired

companies are characterized by declining productivity and job satisfaction rates

as a consequence of executive departure (Marks (1994); Buono (2003)).Furthermore, top managers who leave their company often take particularly

skilled employees along to their new employer. Thus, according to human

capital theory, high top management turnover after an acquisition does not only

lead to an important loss in human capital but also to an immense perturbation

and disruption of processes in a company. This leads to the conclusion that top

management turnover following acquisitions has a negative effect on post-

acquisition performance (Schrader (1995)). Hypothesis 2B reflects thisassumption:

Hypothesis 2B: The higher the absolute and relative turnover among

top managers of acquired companies is, the lower is the level of post-

acquisition performance.

Figure 1 summarizes the four hypotheses on the relationship between executive

departure following acquisitions and pre- as well as post-acquisition

performance which were derived from corporate control theory and human

capital theory. These hypotheses were tested empirically using a sample of

German companies. For this empirical test, three control variables were used in

addition to the three core variables for which detailed hypotheses have been

developed. Two of these controls – relative size and relatedness of acquired

and acquiring companies – address characteristics of the two companies

involved (Gerpott (1991)). The third control variable – status gain of top

managers of acquired companies – is related to the integration process

(Hambrick and Cannella, (1993)).


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Hypothesis 1 A Hypothesis 1 B

Hypothesis 2 A Hypothesis 2 B

Human capital theory

Executive departure as severeloss of human capital

Pre-acquisitionperformance

Top managementturnover in acquired

companies

Post-acquisitionperformance

Replacement of unsuccessful top

management team in order toregain profitability

Corporatecontrol theory

-

-+

+

Figure 1: Overview of research hypotheses

3. Research Design

3.1. Sample selection

The aim of this study is to empirically analyze the relationship between

executive departure following acquisitions and pre- as well as post-acquisition

performance. For this purpose, we identified all takeovers which took place in

Germany in the years 1996 through 2004. This time period was selected in

order to be able to sufficiently analyze post-acquisition success. The

‘Bundesanzeiger’, the official bulletin of the Federal Republic of Germany,

served as a primary source of information. This bulletin publishes all takeovers

in Germany which the ‘Bundeskartellamt’, the federal cartel office, is notified of,

i.e. all larger takeovers in Germany. All in all, between 1996 and 2004, 11,581

takeovers could be identified in Germany.


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Out of these 11,581 mergers and acquisitions, in a first step, we excluded all

those takeovers which could be classified as mergers of equals or as asset

deals. This restriction seemed necessary because for mergers of equals as wellas for asset deals the measurement of post-acquisition performance and top

management turnover is hardly possible. In a second step, we eliminated all

takeovers which only led to minority participations because in these cases it is

not guaranteed that the acquiring company actually gains control of the

acquired company. In a third step, we filtered out takeovers of companies that

did not have their headquarters in Germany and did not have the legal form of

an ‘Aktiengesellschaft’ (stock corporation). This restriction was necessary tofacilitate data collection, since the available databases only contain

performance data and information on top managers for German companies

under the legal form of an ‘Aktiengesellschaft’. In a last step, we excluded all

takeovers for which data was incomplete. Thus, we could identify 44

acquisitions of German stock corporations in the years 1996 through 2004

which we included in the analysis.

3.2. Definition and measurement of variables

3.2.1. Top management turnover

In order to measure top management turnover it is – as a first step - necessary

to determine who actually belongs to the top management of a company. US-

based studies which play a dominant role in upper echelons research normally

refer to one of three types of corporate-level top executives when analyzing

them empirically. A first group of studies considers only the CEO (Kesner and

Sebora (1994)). A second group takes the Board of Directors including the CEO

into account (Golden and Zajac (2001); Goodstein et al. (1994); Goodstein and

Boeker (1991); Westphal and Fredrickson (2001)), while a third group looks at

the whole top management team, which also includes senior vice presidents

and executive vice presidents (Gupta (1988); Tihanyi et al. (2000)).


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In Germany, due to differences in corporate governance regulations compared

to the USA, relevant top managers have to be defined differently. As a matter of

fact, empirical studies which analyze top managers in German companies eitherconcentrate on the “Vorstandsvorsitzender” (CEO) or the “Vorstand”

(management board) including the CEO (Oesterle (1999); Salomo (2001);

Poensgen (1982)). Which alternative is most appropriate depends on the

research question at hand. In this study it seemed to be reasonable to select all

members of the management board, the ‘Vorstand’, because one can assume

that all of these managers contribute more or less equally to inefficient

management or to the valuable human capital of a company respectively.

Thus, in this study we measured top management turnover as the departure of

a member of the management board from this position following an acquisition.

In order to facilitate data collection, we did not analyze, however, if this

manager also left the company. This procedure seemed to be justifiable since

several empirical studies show that top managers of acquired companies

almost always leave their company if they are not able to keep their position on

the management board after the takeover (Albach and Freund (1989); West and

Nicolson (1989)).

In order to actually measure top management turnover of the 44 companies in

the sample, first, we determined the names of all members of the respective

management boards for five different points in time – 6 months before the

acquisition as well as 6, 12, 18 and 24 months after the acquisition. A two-year

time period after the acquisition was chosen since different empirical studies

show that executive departure in the context of an acquisition mainly takes

place within this time period (Walsh (1988); Hambrick and Cannella (1993);

Krug (2003)). The electronic edition of Hoppenstedt’s Handbook of Large

German Companies, which is published biannually, served as a basis for data

collection.


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In a second step, we compared the names of all members of the management

board before and after the acquisition. In order to actually assess the degree of

executive departure after acquisitions we defined a relative measure – theturnover rate of top managers (turnrel) – as well as an absolute measure – the

absolute turnover of top managers (turnabs). The two measures of top

management turnover were calculated as follows:

tat timedeparted had whomanagerstopof Numberabs

turn

nacquisitiothe prior tomanagerstopof Number

tat timedeparted had whomanagerstopof Number

relturn

=

=

3.2.2. Pre- and post-acquisition performance

In order to determine pre- and post-acquisition success we used an accounting-

based performance measure – precisely, return on assets (ROA). While this

measure has certain limitations, its main advantage is that the necessary

accounting data are publicly available and that the ratio is easy to calculate (Fey(2000)). Furthermore, we could not use market-based performance measures

like stock returns in the present study since a number of companies in the

sample are not listed at the stock exchange. ROA was calculated as follows

(Küting and Weber (2001)):

)/21t

assetsTotalt

assets(Total

tincome Net

tROA

−+

=

In order to overcome problems of accrual accounting, we calculated pre-

acquisition performance as the arithmetic mean of the respective ROA in the

three years preceding the acquisition. For post-acquisition performance, we did

not take the year of the acquisition as a reference point, however, since the goal

of this study is to assess performance effects of executive turnover after

acquisitions. Thus, for each company, we calculated the median of thedeparture dates of the company’s executives within the two-year period

following the acquisition which served as a reference point. We then determined


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post-acquisition performance as the arithmetic mean of ROA for the three years

following this median of the departure dates. All relevant data were obtained

from Hoppenstedt’s Handbook of German Stock Corporations, fromHoppenstedt’s Financial Database and from annual reports of the companies in

the sample.

3.2.3. Control variables

Relative size of acquired and acquiring company: In order to measure the

relative size of both companies involved in the acquisition process, we usedtheir respective revenues in the year of the acquisition. Precisely, we expressed

relative size as the target company’s revenues in relation to the acquirer’s

revenues.

Relatedness of acquired and acquiring company: We measured relatedness on

the basis of SIC codes for the dominant business units of the acquired and the

acquiring companies. In order to assess relatedness, we created a dummy

variable which took on the value of 1 if the SIC codes of acquired and acquiring

companies were identical on a two-digit level.

4. Results

4.1. Descriptive analysis of the sample

The presentation of the results of this study starts with a brief descriptive

analysis of the companies in the sample. We devote special attention to the

observed levels of executive departure and to pre- as well as post-acquisition

performance. After this descriptive overview, we analyze the relationship

between top management turnover and pre- as well as post-acquisition

performance in more detail.

Altogether, the 44 companies in the sample had 148 board members before

they were acquired. This amounts to an average number of board members per


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company of 3.4. In the 24 months following the acquisition of their company 62

members of the management boards abandoned their position. In the four 6-

month periods after the takeover the average turnover rates lay at 12.8 percent,14.9 percent, 6.1 percent and 8.1 percent. Thus, two years after the acquisition

41.9 percent of all former board members had left the office (Figure 2).

12.8 % 14.9 %

27.7 %

6.1 %

33.8 %

8.1 %

41.9 %

50 %

40 %

30 %

20 %

10 %

0 %6 12 18 24 t (months)

Cumulative turnover rate

Turnover rate per 6-month period

Turnover rate

Figure 2: Top management turnover rates in the analyzed companies

The top management turnover rates, which we found in the present study,

correspond to those of other, mostly US-based studies. These studies also

came to the conclusion that turnover rates among top managers are particularly

high immediately after an acquisition and decrease in the time that follows. The

turnover rate that resulted after 24 months varied between 33 and 61 percent in

these studies, with the median being – as in the present study – 45 percent

(Walsh (1988); Hambrick and Cannella (1993); Krug (2003); Martin and

McConnell (1991); Lubatkin et al. (1999)).

The overall success rate of the acquisitions analyzed in the present study lay at

55 percent, i.e. 55 percent of the companies in the sample had a higher ROA

after the acquisition than before the takeover. Similar results were found byBühner (1990) and Gerpott (1993b) for German companies. In comparison to


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studies on acquisitions in the United States or Great Britain, however, the

success rate which we observed in the present study is relatively high. But as

Bamberger (1994) has shown in a meta-analysis German studies generallycome to more positive results regarding the success rates of acquisitions than

their American or British counterparts.

4.2. Correlation analyses

Following the descriptive overview, we examine bivariate relationships between

pre-acquisition performance, executive departure and post-acquisitionperformance in more detail. For this purpose, we computed correlations

between the single variables. Table 1 depicts the respective matrix of

correlations. It shows, first of all, that no significant relationship exists between

pre-acquisition ROA and the two executive departure variables. As far as the

relationship between top management turnover and post-acquisition

performance is concerned, however, negative correlations on a highly

significant level resulted for both executive departure variables. Additionally, the

matrix makes it clear that a highly significant correlation exists between pre- and

post-acquisition performance. For relatedness and relative size, we could not

find significant relationships.


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1 2 3 4 5 6

Corr. 11 turnrel

Sig. .

Corr. .840*** 12 turnabs

Sig. .000 .

Corr. -.159 -.141 13

ROA befor

e Sig. .302 .360 .

Corr. -.404** -.399** .410** 14 ROAafter Sig. .007 .007 .006 .

Corr. .170 .119 .006 -.220 15

Related-

ness Sig. .269 .442 .970 .151 .

Corr. .035 -.093 .040 .066 -.138 16

Relative

size Sig. .819 .547 .795 .672 .370 .

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

***Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed)

Table 1: Correlation matrix

Overall, the results of the correlation analysis offer support for hypotheses 2B,

i.e. a higher rate of executive departure has a negative effect on post-

acquisition performance, whereas hypotheses 2A has to be declined. As far ashypotheses 1A and 1B are concerned, support for none of them could be found,

i.e. pre-acquisition performance has no effect on top management turnover

following the acquisition. Before final conclusions regarding the four hypotheses

can be drawn, however, multivariate analyses are necessary in order to control

for other factors. Results of respective regression analyses are presented in the

next section.


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4.3 Regressions analyses

In order to fully explore the relationship between pre-acquisition performance,executive departure and post-acquisition performance, we conducted two sets

of regression analyses. First, we analyzed the influence of pre-acquisition

performance and the control variables on executive departure. In a second step,

we examined the impact of executive departure, pre-acquisition performance

and the control variables on post-acquisition performance.

The first set of regression models used absolute top management turnover as

dependent variable. Altogether, we computed two regression models usinghierarchical multiple regression technique (Field (2005)). The first model only

considered the two control variables. The second model then also comprised

the effect of the variable “pre-acquisition ROA” on executive departure. For both

models additional tests showed that the requirements of homoscedasticity and

normal distribution were met and that neither collinearity nor autocorrelation

could be observed. Table 2 gives an overview of the two regression models.

Control variablesRelatednessRelative size

Average pre-acqu is it ion ROA

R2

R2 Level o f signific ance

N

0.108-0.078

0.020

0.659

44

Model 1Standardizedcoefficients (Beta) Model 2

Dependent variable:Absolute top management

turnover

0.110-0.072

-0.139

0.0390.0190.376

44

Table 2: Regression analyses for top management turnover as dependent variable

Table 2 shows that neither the two regression models as a whole nor any of the

coefficients are significant. We found similar results when using the variable

“relative top management turnover” as dependent variable. Thus, the first set of

regression analyses supports the findings of the correlation analysis and shows


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that pre-acquisition performance does not have an impact on the degree of

executive departure following an acquisition.

For the second set of regression models post-acquisition ROA was used as the

dependent variable. Altogether, we computed three different regression models

using hierarchical multiple regression technique (Field (2005)). The first model

only considered the effect of the two control variables. The second model then

also comprised pre-acquisition performance, while the third model additionally

included the variable “absolute top management turnover”. For all three models

additional tests showed that the requirements of homoscedasticity and normaldistribution were met and that neither collinearity nor autocorrelation could be

observed. Table 3 gives an overview of the three regression models.

Control variableRelatednessRelative size

Average p re-acquis it ion ROA

Absolute turnover o f top managers

R2

R2 Level of significance

N

-0.2150.036

0.050

0.351

44

Model 1Standardizedcoefficients (Beta) Model 2 Model 3

* Coefficient significant at the 0.05-level**Coefficient significant at the 0.01-level

Dependent variable:Average post-acquisition ROA

-0.2200.019

0.410**

0.2180.1680.019

44

-0.184-0.005

0.365**

-0.326**

0.3200.1020.004

44

Table 3: Regression analyses using post-acquisition performance as dependent variable

Table 3 shows that, except for the first model, all regression models are highly

or very significant, explaining between 21.8 and 32.0 percent of the variance in

post-acquisition performance. Furthermore, table 3 makes it clear that top

management turnover has a significant, negative effect on post-acquisition

performance, i.e. the higher the rate of executive departure, the lower the

performance of the respective company. A likewise significant effect can be


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observed for the pre-acquisition ROA. This means that post-acquisition

performance is also positively influenced by the company’s performance level

prior to the acquisition. As far as relative size and relatedness are concerned,no significant effects resulted. We found similar results when using relative top

management turnover as dependent variable.

Thus, the results of the second set of regression analyses confirm the findings

of the correlation analysis and give support to hypothesis 2B, i.e. the reasoning

of human capital theory, whereas hypothesis 1B – the reasoning of corporate

control theory – has to be declined. These findings will be discussed in moredetail in the following section.

5. Discussions and Interpretation

All in all, the results of the present study support – at least regarding the

relationship between top management turnover and post-acquisition

performance – quite clearly the argumentation of human capital theory.

Particularly, they show that acquired companies perform better if top managers

stay in office or are even promoted to higher positions within the new joint

company. Thus, this study confirms the findings of Cannella and Hambrick

(1993), Krishnan et al. (1997) as well as Bergh (2001) for acquisitions in the

United States and of Gerpott (1993a) for takeovers in Germany.

With regard to the relationship between pre-acquisition performance and

executive departure, however, the study neither offered proof for the reasoning

of human capital theory nor for that of corporate control theory. Rather, we

could not observe any impact of pre-acquisition performance on top

management turnover. This result contradicts findings of Morck et al. (1989),

Warner et al. (1988), Weisbach (1988), Comment (1991) and Coughlan and

Schmidt (1985) who observed high degrees of top management turnover in low

performing target companies in the USA. Therefore, national differences might

have to be explored further in future research. Additionally, it certainly makes

sense to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary executive departure


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- 19 -

after acquisitions. Here, the assumption is that the reasoning of corporate

control theory holds true in the case of involuntary turnover, whereas the

argumentation of human capital theory is valid for voluntary top managementturnover. In the present study, the different effects of voluntary and involuntary

turnover might have leveled each other out.

The study has also shown that the level of pre-acquisition performance has a

significant positive effect on post-acquisition performance. Nevertheless, a more

detailed analysis of the sample gives reason to believe, that particularly

companies with low performance levels prior to the acquisition are making amistake if they do not try to tie their top managers to the company after it has

been acquired. For this analysis we divided the companies in the sample up into

two groups with high and low pre-acquisition performance respectively. In each

of the two groups we draw a further distinction between companies with high

and with low top management turnover. The results of this analysis are

displayed in figure 3. The figure shows that for companies with high pre-

acquisition performance an increased turnover among top managers after the

takeover led to a stronger decrease in performance compared to companies

with lower turnover rates. A more substantial effect, however, could be

observed for companies with low pre-acquisition performance. They were able

to strongly increase their performance if they were characterized by low

executive turnover, whereas in case of high degrees of executive departure

they almost remained on the same (low) performance level. This means that

despite the general impact of pre-acquisition performance on post-acquisition

performance a low turnover rate among top managers is particularly desirable

for companies with low performance levels before the acquisition.


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- 20 -

8 %

6 %

4 %

2 %

0 %

- 2 %

- 4 %

Companies with low top management turnover

Companies with high top management turnover

Pre-acquisitionperformance

ROA

Post-acquisitionperformance

- 6 %

- 8 %

Figure 3: Development of ROA for companies with high and low top management turnover

One has to take into account, however, that the period of observation in thisstudy is limited to the first three years after an acquisition. Thus, conclusions

regarding the long-term development of an acquired company’s performance

cannot be drawn. For this reason, it is possible that though high levels of

executive departure have negative effects on performance in the first years after

an acquisition, they turn out to be the better alternative in the long run. But, as

Krug (2003) showed in an empirical study, companies which are characterized

by high turnover rates among top managers right after an acquisition also face ahigher level of departures among the newly appointed top managers in the time

that follows. This finding gives reason to believe that high top management

turnover following an acquisition also has negative consequences in the long

term.

Finally, the issue of causality, especially between executive departure and post-

acquisition performance deserves some further attention. As a matter of fact,the present study has only shown that these two variables are positively related.

It cannot be concluded directly from the data, however, that a lower turnover


27/45

- 21 -

rate is actually the cause of higher post-acquisition performance. Nevertheless,

we measured performance in the time period following executive departure.

This time sequence of departure and performance speaks in favor of a causalrelationship. Therefore, it seems reasonable to actually regard executive

departure as a trigger of performance.

6. Implications

This study has shown that executive departure plays an important role in the

context of acquisitions and should therefore be analyzed in more depth. For thisdeeper analysis a number of starting points exists. It seems promising, for

example, to distinguish between different types of executive departure after an

acquisition. This differentiation could especially lead to better results regarding

the relationship between pre-acquisition performance and executive departure.

Also, the inclusion of moderating variables into the analysis might be useful.

Indeed, empirical studies by Krishnan et al. (1997) and by Gerpott (1993a)

showed that factors like the complementarity of top managers’ background

characteristics in both companies moderate the relationship between executive

departure and post-acquisition performance. Last but not least, an expansion of

the period of analysis seems to be reasonable in order to get a clearer picture of

the long term effects of executive departure after acquisitions (Krug (2003)).

For management practice, the most important recommendation which can be

derived from the present study is that top managers of acquired companies

should in any case be persuaded to stay in office. For this purpose, it makes

sense to actively involve these top managers in the integration process of the

acquired company and to make it very clear to them that they will be regarded

as equal partners in the new company. In this context, it is certainly beneficial to

promote the one or the other top manager of the acquired company to the

management board of the acquiring company (Cannella and Hambrick (1993);

Gerpott (1993a)).


28/45

- 22 -


29/45

I

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Overview of research hypotheses……………………………………8Figure 2: Top management turnover rates in the analyzed companies…...13

Figure 3: Development of ROA for companies with high and low

top management turnover…………………………………………...20

Table 1: Correlation matrix…………………………………………………….15Table 2: Regression analyses for top management turnover as

dependent variable…………………………………………………...16

Table 3: Regression analyses using post-acquisition performance

as dependent variable……………………………………………….17


30/45

II

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XI

List of HHL Working Papers

HHL – Leipzig Graduate School of Management

Arbeitspapiere

Die Arbeitspapiere der HHL – Leipzig Graduate School of Management erscheinen inunregelmäßigen Abständen. Bisher sind folgende Arbeiten erschienen:

Nr. 1 Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Heribert Meffert (1996), 31 SeitenStand und Perspektiven des Umweltmanagement in derbetriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung und Lehre

Nr. 2 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (1996), 28 SeitenVerluste trotz steigender Kurse? - Probleme der Performancemessungbei Zinsänderungen

Nr. 3 Prof. Dr. Arnis Vilks (1996), 26 Seiten Rationality of Choice and Rationality of Reasoning (Revised version,September 1996)

Nr. 4 Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg (1996), 36 SeitenStrategische Allianzen im Telekommunikationsmarkt

Nr. 5 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (1996), 41 SeitenDie Kapitalkosten von Rückstellungen zur Anwendung des ShareholderValue-Konzeptes in Deutschland

Nr. 6 Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg / Thomas Hutzschenreuter (1997), 32 SeitenPostreform - Umgestaltung des Post- und Telekommunikations-sektors in Deutschland

Nr. 7 Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg / Thomas Hutzschenreuter / TorstenWulf (1997), 31 SeitenInvestitionsmanagement in internationalen Konzernen- Lösungsansätze vor dem Hintergrund der Agency Theorie

Nr. 8 Dr. Peter Kesting (1997), 47 Seiten Visionen, Revolutionen und klassische Situationen – SchumpetersTheorie der wissenschaftlichen Entwicklung

Nr. 9 Prof. Dr. Arnis Vilks (1997), 36 SeitenKnowledge of the Game, Rationality and Backwards Induction


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XII

Nr. 10 Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg / Thomas Hutzschenreuter /Torsten Wulf (1997), 22 SeitenRessourcenorientierung und Organisation

Nr. 11 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Stephan Mahn (1997), 71 SeitenIPO´s: Optimale Preisstrategien für Emissionsbanken mit Hilfe vonAnbot-Modellen

Nr. 12 Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer (1997), 23 SeitenKoordination im Qualitätsmanagement – Analyse und Evaluation imKontext der Transaktionskostentheorie

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Nr. 14 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Niklas Darijtschuk (1998), 33 SeitenUnternehmensbewertung mit Hilfe der DCF-Methode – eine Anmerkungzum „Zirkularitätsproblem“

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Nr. 16 Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer (1998), 31 SeitenProzeßkostencontrolling – Gestaltungsoptionen in der öffentlichen

Verwaltung

Nr. 17 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (1998), 34 Seiten

Shareholder Value Konzept, Managementanreize und Stock OptionPlans

Nr. 18 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Serge Ragotzky (1998), 24 SeitenPreisfindung und Vertragsbindungen bei MBO-Privatisierungen inSachsen

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Nr. 21 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (1998), 25 SeitenUnternehmensbewertung unter Unsicherheit –Sicherheitsäquivalent- oder Risikozuschlagsmethode?


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XIII

Nr. 22 Dr. Claudia Löhnig (1998), 21 SeitenIndustrial Production Structures and Convergence: Some Findingsfrom European Integration

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Nr. 24 Niklas Darijtschuk (1998), 35 SeitenDividendenpolitik

Nr. 25 Prof. Dr. Arnis Vilks (1999), 25 SeitenKnowledge of the Game, Relative Rationality, and Backwards Inductionwithout Counterfactuals

Nr. 26 Prof. Dr. Harald Hungenberg / Torsten Wulf (1999), 22 SeitenThe Transition Process in East Germany

Nr. 27 Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer (2000), 28 SeitenEconomic Value Added (EVA®) - Informationen aus der externenRechnungslegung zur internen Unternehmenssteuerung?(überarb. Version Juli 2000)

Nr. 28 Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer / Tim von der Decken (1999), 32 SeitenKundenprofitabilitätsrechnung in Dienstleistungsgeschäften –Konzeption und Umsetzung am Beispiel des Car Rental Business

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Nr. 30 Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Heribert Meffert (1999), 36 SeitenMarketingwissenschaft im Wandel – Anmerkungen zurParadigmendiskussion

Nr. 31 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Niklas Darijtschuk (1999), 20 SeitenUnternehmensbewertung, Finanzierungspolitiken und optimaleKapitalstruktur

Nr. 32 Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer (1999), 40 SeitenDie Anwendung der Balanced Scorecard in Handelsunternehmen –Konzeption und Fallbeispiel

Nr. 33 Dr. Claudia Löhnig (1999), 29 SeitenWirtschaftliche Integration im Ostseeraum vor dem Hintergrund derOsterweiterung der Europäischen Union: eine Potentialanalyse

Nr. 34 dieses Arbeitspapier ist nicht mehr verfügbar

Nr. 35 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (2000), 31 Seiten

Der Einfluss von Wachstum, Risiko und Risikoauflösung auf denUnternehmenswert


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XIV

Nr. 36 Dr. Thomas Hutzschenreuter / Albrecht Enders (2000), 27 SeitenMöglichkeiten zur Gestaltung Internet-basierter Studienangebote imMarkt für Managementbildung

Nr. 37 Dr. Peter Kesting (2000), 26 SeitenLehren aus dem deutschen Konvergenzprozess – Eine Kritik des„Eisernen Gesetzes der Konvergenz“ und seines theoretischenFundaments

Nr. 38 Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Dr. Peggy Kreller (2000), 31 SeitenEtablierung von Marken im Regionenmarketing – eine vergleichendeAnalyse der Regionennamen "Mitteldeutschland" und "Ruhrgebiet" aufder Grundlage einer repräsentativen Studie

Nr. 39 Dr. Peter Kesting (2001), 23 Seiten

Was sind Handlungsmöglichkeiten? – Fundierung eines ökonomischenGrundbegriffs

Nr. 40 Dr. Peter Kesting (2001), 29 SeitenEntscheidung und Handlung

Nr. 41 Prof. Dr. Hagen Lindstädt (2001), 27 SeitenDecisions of the Board

Nr. 42 Prof. Dr. Hagen Lindstädt (2001), 28 SeitenDie Versteigerung der deutschen UMTS-Lizenzen – Eine ökonomischeAnalyse des Bietverhaltens

Nr. 43 PD Dr. Thomas Hutzschenreuter / Dr. Torsten Wulf (2001), 23 SeitenAnsatzpunkte einer situativen Theorie der Unternehmensentwicklung

Nr. 44 Prof. Dr. Hagen Lindstädt (2001), 14 SeitenOn the Shape of Information Processing Functions

Nr. 45 PD Dr. Thomas Hutzschenreuter (2001), 18 Seiten Managementkapazitäten und Unternehmensentwicklung

Nr. 46 Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Althammer / Christian Rafflenbeul (2001),

42 SeitenKommunale Beschäftigungspolitik: das Beispiel des Leipziger Betriebsfür Beschäftigungsförderung

Nr. 47 Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer / Dr. Petra Schmöl ler (2001), 32 SeitenKunden-Controlling – Management Summary einer empirischenUntersuchung in der Elektroindustrie

Nr. 48 Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Eva Grobe / Alexander Lorbeer(2003), (noch nicht erschienen) 56 SeitenEinstellung von Talenten gegenüber Arbeitgebern und regionalenStandorten : eine Analyse auf der Grundlage einer Befragung von

Talenten aus der Region Mitteldeutschland


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XV

Nr. 49 Prof. Dr. Manfred Ki rchgeorg / Alexander Lorbeer (2002), 60 SeitenAnforderungen von High Potentials an Unternehmen – eine Analyse

auf der Grundlage einer bundesweiten Befragung von High Potentialsund Personalentscheidern

Nr. 50 Eva Grobe (2003), 78, XXVI SeitenCorporate attractiveness : eine Analyse der Wahrnehmung vonUnternehmensmarken aus der Sicht von High Potentials

Nr. 51 Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer / Dr. Petra Schmöl ler /Dipl.-Kfm. Uwe Vielmeyer (2002), 35 SeitenCustomer Options – Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Bewertung vonkundenbezogenen Erfolgspotenzialen mit Realoptionen

Nr. 52 Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Fischer / Dipl.-Kfm. Uwe Vielmeyer(2002), 29 SeitenVom Shareholder Value zum Stakeholder Value? – Möglichkeiten undGrenzen der Messung von stakeholderbezogenen Wertbeiträgen

Nr. 53 Carsten Reimund (2002), 34 Seiten Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing and Investment: Evidencefrom German Corporate Groups

Nr. 54 Dr. Peter Kesting (2002), 21 SeitenAnsätze zur Erklärung des Prozesses der Formulierung vonEntscheidungsprozessen

Nr. 55 Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Althammer / Susanne Dröge (2002), 27 Seiten International Trade and the Environment: The Real Conflicts. - Pdf-Dokument

Nr. 56 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Maik Piehler (2002), 35 SeitenUnternehmensbewertung bei Wachstum, Risiko und Besteuerung –Anmerkungen zum „Steuerparadoxon“

Nr. 57 Prof. Dr. Hagen Lindstädt (2002), 12, 5 SeitenDas modifizierte Hurwicz-Kriterium für untere und obereWahrscheinlichkeiten - ein Spezialfall des Choquet-Erwartungsnutzens

Nr. 58 Karsten Winkler (2003), 25 Seiten Getting Started with DIAsDEM Workbench 2.0: A Case-Based Tutorial

Nr. 59 Karsten Winkler (2003), 31 SeitenWettbewerbsinformationssysteme: Begriff, Anforderungen,Herausforderungen

Nr. 60 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler / Carsten Reimund (2003), 31 SeitenConglomerate Discount and Cash Distortion: New Evidence fromGermany


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XVI

Nr. 61 Prof. Pierfrancesco La Mura (2003), 10 SeitenCorrelated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with QuantumSignals

Nr. 62 Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg (2003), 26 SeitenMarkenpolitik für Natur- und Umweltschutzorganisationen

Nr. 63 Stefan Wriggers (2004), 32, XXV SeitenKritische Würdigung der Means-End-Theorie im Rahmen einerAnwendung auf M-Commerce-Dienste

Nr. 64 Prof. Pierfrancesco La Mura / Matthias Herfert (2004), 18 SeitenEstimation of Consumer Preferences via Ordinal Decision-TheoreticEntropy

Nr. 65 Prof. Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler (2004), 31 SeitenMittelverwendungsannahme, Bewertungsmodell und Unternehmens-wertung bei Rückstellungen

Nr. 66 Prof. Dr. Manfred Ki rchgeorg / Lars Fiedler (2004), 47 SeitenClustermonitoring als Kontroll- und Steuerungsinstrument fürClusterentwicklungsprozesse - empirische Analysen vonIndustrieclustern in Ostdeutschland

Nr. 67 Prof. Dr. Manfred Kirchgeorg / Christiane Springer (2005),39 , XX SeitenUNIPLAN LiveTrends 2004/2005 : Effizienz und Effektivität in der Live

Communication ; Eine Analyse auf Grundlage einer branchenüber-greifenden Befragung von Marketingentscheidern in Deutschland

Nr. 68 Prof. Pierfrancesco La Mura (2005), 11 SeitenDecision Theory in the Presence of Uncertainty and Risk

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