Evgeny Teytelbaum (Kazan).

Polybius, Regulus and Roman Imperialism.

The story of Regulus' African campaign  during the First Punic War, and his

ultimate fate was famous at Rome, and it is the first major statement about proper

conduct and morality in the work of Polybius. Some aspects of Polybian attitude to

Regulus have already been analyzed by  previous researchers1. But both F.W.

Walbank and V. La Bua concentrated their attention mostly on the Polybian

attitude to the role of the Tyche in his account of Regulus. La Bua suggested that

the moral reflections in the story were derived from the works of Philinus. On the

other hand, Walbank considered this passage typical Polybian. At the same time

both scholars wrote that Polybius’s criticism of Regulus was related only to the

moral sphere and had no relevance to political analysis.

    The thesis of this article, however, is that the story of Regulus’s defeat can be

read as a political warning to Rome to act in a moderate way on the eve of victory

and that a proper understanding of Polybius’s account will be helpful in analyzing

Polybian views on Roman policy in general. This is especially important for

understanding Polybius's attitude towards Rome because the warning comes so

early in the «Histories».

***

Regulus’s expedition is one of the key points in Polybius’ account of the

events of the First Punic War and symbolizes the transition from brilliant success

in the initial stages of that conflict to hard struggle, which only after almost one

and a half decade resulted in Roman victory (Bleckmann, 2000, p. 30). It is well

known that the basic source both for Polybian account and his reflections on it was

the work of historian Philinus from Acragas2. 1 :  Walbank, 1945. P. 7‒10; 1957. P. 92‒94; La Bua,1966. P. 84‒872 La Bua, 1966. P. 71–102.

1

Polybius’s narration on Regulus’s campaign is divided into four parts. He

begins by describing Regulus’s initial successes (I. 26–30). Then he speaks about

the unsuccessful negotiations between Regulus and Carthaginians (I. 31). The third

part of the account tells us about the Roman defeat from the Punic army lead by

the mercenary Xanthippus (I. 32–34). In the conclusion, Polybius gives his

reflections on the fate of Regulus. The Achaean historian described the events in

dramatic style: in a short time Regulus’s status radically changes from a man on

the eve of triumph to a prisoner asking for mercy. Presenting the events in such a

way, Polybius prepares the reader for his generalizing comments, which are of

primary interest for us.

According to Polybius, the Roman strategic plan in this campaign was to

defeat the Carthaginians finally by landing Roman army in Africa and attacking

African possessions of the Carthage. (I. 26. 1 –3)3. The historian step by step

described initial Roman successes, which brought the Carthaginian state on the eve

of catastrophe. It is worth mentioning that Polybius did not give a detailed

description of Regulus’s military and moral qualities. But the way of presentation

the events can lead us to the conclusion that the historian at this stage approved

Regulus’s actions. Polybian account shows us that Regulus’s role in defeating

Carthaginians in the battle of Ecnomus was of greater importance in comparison to

the other consul, Manlius Vulso4. In the battle of Ecnomus Regulus’s initiative

helped the Romans to save their ships from the Carthaginian attack and, after this,

to make a successful counterattack, finally helping the Romans to win the battle (I.

28. 7–8). This victory allowed the Romans to land in Africa5.

Regulus’s leadership at the early stage of land campaign was also considered

effective by the historian. Polybius reported that in 255 BC Manlius Vulso was

sent back to Italy with his troops (I. 30.1) and after this Regulus had only 15 000

foot soldiers and 500 horsemen. Nevertheless, he defeated enemy In the battle of 3 On this strategy in general see: Tipps, 2003. P. 376; Rankov, 2011. P. 155‒158

4 La Bua, 1966. P. 71.

5 On the battle of Ecnomus see generally: Tipps, 1985, especially pp. 455–464. The author

thinks that the Roman victory was achieved mostly due to good luck.

2

Adys Regulus defeated the Carthaginians by using hilly terrain, which was

unfavorable for Carthaginian crack forces – cavalry and elephants (I. 30. 8–13). As

the result, Polybius wrote, the Carthaginian state was close to collapse (I. 31. 1–3).

But surprisingly the situation has changed dramatically. Polybian narration

of unsuccessful peace negotiations between Regulus and the Carthaginians plays a

central role in our understanding of historian’s views on Regulus and, especially,

explanation of his defeat. According to Polybius, Regulus sent an unsuccessful

embassy to Carthage with peace proposals (I. 31. 4–8). In his account of

Regulus’s embassy, Polybius stressed two things. First of all, Regulus acted in

arrogant manner. Thinking that the victory is already achieved, refused to make

any concessions for Carthaginians (I. 31. 6–7). Besides this, he did not want to

share glory with the successor on a post of the consul (I. 31. 4). By this way we

can clearly see an evident tendency in historian’s narration. Polybius described

Regulus as a person motivated not by rational calculation, but emotions.

According to historian such trait can lead to political and military disaster and

this thesis was clearly illustrated by the subsequent narration6.

Polybius wrote that Regulus’s merciless not only did not persuade the

Carthaginian to surrender but, on the contrary, only strengthened their morale

and desire to resist (I. 31. 7–8) 7. Polybius considered their behavior in this

situation was brave – andnoble –

The historian stressed the role of mercenary Lacedaemonian Xanthippus in

the following stage of African campaign which culminated in the battle of Tunis in

255 BC (I. 32–34). Polybius’s comparison of two opposing generals leadership,

Xanthippus and Regulus, is also noteworthy. According to Greek historian,

6 Eckstein, 1989. According to this article that according to Polybius emotionally-motivated

decisions bring to a catastrophe even talented generals and politicians (like Hannibal) who

initially achieved significant successes

7 It is worth mentioning that, according to Diodorus (XXIII. 12. 1), these peace negotiations

were a result of Carthaginian intiative. Modern researchers confirm this point of view. Walbank, 

1957. Vol. 1. P. 92–94.

3

Xanthippus persuaded the Carthaginians to change their tactics for better using

their crack units – cavalry and elephants (I. 32. 2–5). On the contrary, Regulus did

few changes in tactics (I. 33. 9–11). Especially harmful for Romans was the fact

that Regulus did nothing for counteracting Carthaginian cavalry. It is clear that

Polybius depicted Regulus considering Carthaginian army inferior to his own,

despising the enemy and relying on his previous victories. As result of such

arrogance, Regulus was defeated and taken prisoner. We clearly see that such

catastrophe was not accidental for historian. Polybius saw the reasons of Regulus’s

failure in his own mistakes – first of all merciless and underestimating of an

enemy.

Of course, Polybius here was heavily influenced by the views accordging to

which a character is punished for his or her arrogance (ὕ. In historian’s eyes,

there is a strong link between Regulus’s mercilessness and severity () and

his final defeat. Such ideas were typical for Antiquity (de Romilly, 1977, pp. 42‒

61) but the direct source here was Philinus (Walbank, 1945, p. 5).

Besides this, Polybius saw Regulus’s fate as an impressive moral lesson,

which serves the aim of improving human behavior‒ (Walbank, 1945,

p. 8). This idea, also borrowed from Philinus, again reflects a view common in

ancient historiography. According to this conception, a historical narration must

give a moral lesson to the readers (Fornara, 1983, pp. 65‒89). The stress on

Xanthippus’s role in the defeat of Roman army also derives from Philinus.

At the same time, his reflections on Regulus contain some motives which are

typically of Polybius (Pedech, 1954, p. 256 ). If Philinus considered Regulus’s

defeat a divine punishment (Diod. XXIII 15.6), Polybius thought that the fate of

this general was an example of the instability of (I. 35.3). He added that

Tyche can lead a person to disaster even at the time of his greatest success (ibid.).

That is why he considered that even in such a situation a man must not trust in

. But the most striking and, no doubt, that reflecting Polybius’s own views is

the fact that, speaking about Regulus’s fate, Polybius clearly wrote (I. 35.9–10)

4

that his readers must take some practical experience ()8) from pragmatic

history ( 9), learning from the mistakes of others. At the same

time it is well-known that the term « » had a concrete meaning

for Polybius and was related not to moral sphere , but to politics and warfare. In

the face of this evidence, we can conclude that, in Polybius’s view, after initial

success the question of a general’s or a politician’s behavior was related not only

to the moral sphere but also to politics.

Such an interpretation of Polybius’ approach to Regulus will raise a great

number of questions. First of all, it is surprising that in his criticism of Regulus

Polybius was close to Philinus, whom in other situations he fiercely and often

unfairly (Meister, 1975, pp. 129‒142) criticized for his pro-Carthaginian bias.10 No

less surprising is that in his attitude to Regulus Polybius radically contradicted

Roman tradition. Contrary to the Achaean historian, Romans (Liv. XXVII 11.3;

Verg. Aen. IV. 39.8; Enn. Ann. 293) regularly saw Regulus as providing an

example of fides (Frӧhlich, 2000).11

All of these observations lead us to suggest that the historian’s strong

contradiction to the more regular Roman version at the same time as associating

himself an anti-Roman author in treating this episode, which played such an

important role in Roman tradition, was not accidental.

8 It is worth commenting that the historian intended his work not only for the Greek, but also the

Roman political elite (Champion, 2004 (b), p. 212.). Earlier scholars have come to similar

conclusions (Scala, 1890, pp. 289‒290). 9 On the term see generally Pedech, 1964, pp. 21─32; 43─52; Mohm, 1977,

pp. 8─28.

10 It is worth mentioning that in the other cases Polybius, even when borrowing material that

derived more from Philinus than from Fabius, treated this rather critically; see Ambaglio, 2005, 

pp. 205–222.

11 This inconsistency is strengthened by the fact that all modern researchers see Polybius as a pro-

Roman author. On the historiography of Polybius’ attitude to Rome, see Baronowski, 2011 pp.

5‒10.

5

In this way we can see that Polybius’s criticism of Regulus was a complex

phenomenon and was closely related to many adjacent themes. This is the reason

why, in a detailed investigation this episode, we can hardly ignore such general

questions as the historian’s attitude to foreign expansion and, especially, to Roman

foreign policy. The key question here is how the historian viewed the problem of

how to behave following initial success and of how to preserve domination over

defeated enemies. Of course, pivotal attention will be paid to the analysis of

Polybius’s acceptance and/or rejection of Roman domination. It is worth stating at

immediately that in this study we do not plan to cover the views of all Polybius’s

views on these subjects (that would indeed be a hard task for a single article).

Answering the questions just formulated will be the crucial to solving the basic

question of our paper: what were the aims of the historian’s criticism of Regulus

and why did he consider his fate such an important lesson.

Polybius did not condemn the policy aimed at expansion and the conquest of

other territories (III. 6.12; VI. 50; VIII. 10.6; V. 106.5–6). In his view, such a

desire was natural (Eckstein, 2006, p. 193; Brown, 1964). He thought that war was

a lesser evil in comparison with humiliating concession to an enemy’s demands

(IV. 31.3). Such a view did not contradict the mainstream of ancient Greek

political thought. Similar views were shared by Plato (Leg. 218 a; Resp. 409 f),

Thucydides (II. 63.3; V. 89.5) and Xenophon (Hell. II. 7.4. Cyrop. V. 3.6.). War

was considered a normal means of solving problems that existed in interstate

relations (Plat. Resp. 272 a). Greeks of the Classical period considered that the

conqueror state had an absolute right to decide how to behave towards those it had

conquered (Thuc. V. 105.3). Such an outlook was generated by the predominance

of an archaic system of the values which went back to the Homeric era.

Correspondingly, crucial to the Greek conception of international relations were

the aristocratic views based on absolute domination of violence and revenge for

anything interpreted as an offence (Van Wees, 2004). That is why the classical

6

period was heavily characterized by a form of diplomacy in which force was by the

dominating factor.

At the same time, dating from the 4th century BC, we can identify some new

approaches to interstate relations. Such views are most fully revealed in

Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (III. 1). According to these theories, the best way of

preserving domination over the conquered was the humane treatment of those who

were defeated. Such behavior was seen as the best way for converting former

enemies into friends and allies (Heldmann, 1993, pp. 64‒66). On examining the

work of Polybius, we could not ignore the fact that these views deeply influenced

his ideas on foreign policy.

Polybius apparently tends to the view the in the process of expansion each

state goes through the stages of initial success, the acquisition of political

domination and the preservation of this (Baronowski, 2011, pp. 87‒90). That is

why it is worth investigating his views on the methods by which the political

hegemony may be reached. He wrote, for instance, that after the battle of

Chaeronea Philip II won the admiration of Athenians through his moderation (

), benevolence (), kindness () and noble

behavior () towards the enemy12 . The historian described the policy of

the Macedonian king Antigonus Doson in 221 BC after the battle of Sellasia in

similar terms (II. 70.7). Such behavior helped all the above mentioned rulers to win

the sympathies of Hellas in order to reach political hegemony. On the contrary,

oppression of the conquered territories and enemies, instead of gaining their

loyalty, only increased their resistance (V. 9.1–7; V. 10.9 – 12.4). In the eyes of

the Achaean historian, the behavior of the Macedonian king Philip V was a vivid

example of such policy. Polybius accused him of impiety () and acting

contrary to international law (, ). He noticed a clear

correlation between Philip’s crimes at home and abroad and the subsequent

12 There is a point of view (Welwei, 1963. P. 22‒28) that such favorable attitude towards Philip

II was caused by his supporting the Arcadians, the inhabitants of Polybius’s native land.

7

collapse of his state. (VII. 7; XV 24; XXIII 12.7).13 It is worth mentioning that

Polybius compared such a policy unfavorably to the humane treatment mentioned

above of Philip II towards his enemies. Another negative example of foreign

policy, in the eyes of Polybius, was the case of the Athenians and the Spartans

together with the Carthaginians.14 The Achaean historian claimed they were

victims of greed ‒ and an excessive desire for power ‒(VI. 48;

IX 12). Here we can see a clear tendency: according to Polybius, states, which

reached the hegemonic status, are faced with collapse due to their cruelty and lack

of moderation in foreign policy. This is why it will be of interest to turn now to the

problem of the historian’s perception of Roman imperialism.

Speaking in general, Polybius justified Roman policy. He wrote that the

initial stage of gaining of Roman hegemony continued up to the Third Macedonian

War in 168 BC and was altogether positive for Greece (Baronowski, 2011, p. 88).

Speaking about the consequences of the First Illyrian War, he stated that the

Roman victory over the Illyrians stopped the barbarian raids on Greek soil (II.

12.5‒6)). Polybius described the deep admiration produced by the decree of the

Roman general Titus Flamininus, which proclaimed the liberation of Greece

(XVIII 46). He added that the Romans stopped numerous internal conflicts in

Greece (III. 3. 5; XVIII 47.2). Polybius considered Greek behavior in the Third

Macedonian War as ungrateful towards Rome (XXVII. 9‒10). He thought that the

Greeks appeared to ignore many of the benefits () produced by Roman

rule (XVIII 37.1; XXVII 10.3). The Achaean historian considered Roman

domination profitable even for the Macedonians ‒ Rome showed clemency

13 More detailed information on Polybian attitude towards Philip V see generally: Walbank,

1938. P. 55–68; Walbank , 1967 , а также: Welwei, 1963.S. 38–52.

14 It is an interesting fact that the Hellenistic usage of the term differed a lot from

those of Thucydides. Athenian historian did not view it negatively and considered natural for all

states. Hellenistic conception of derived mostly from those of Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1129

b; Pol. 1282 b). On the views on in theClassical era see van Wees, 2004, pp. 34–36.

8

towards them () and freed them from the rule of despotic monarchs

(XXXVI 17.). Polybius thought that the typical Roman trait was moderation

(XXVII 7. 7) (. That is why the words of Titus Flamininus (XVIII 37)

that the winner must be generous () and moderate () seem not to

be accidental but rather symptomatic. It is worth mentioning here some of the

historian’s views on the interrelation of the political system and ethnic mentality

(in the case of Rome). The Achaean historian considered that the Roman

constitution regulated not only the state’s internal affairs but also the behaviour of

its citizens abroad, including its foreign policy (VI. 50. 4)15. In this respect, the

Roman state could, in his view, be contrasted to Sparta (VI. 48. 6): the Spartans

could achieve an almost ideal quality in their home policy, but Lycurgus did

almost nothing to make Sparta prudent () and moderate in foreign

policy as well () (ibid.). As a result, after gaining hegemony over

the other Greeks, the Lacedaemonians treated them despotically. On the contrary,

the Romans appeared to avoid such negative traits, which in the case of Sparta

ruined her supremacy over Hellas.16

We can also note some further curious facts. For all the ambiguity of the

historian’s perception of in the «Histories» (Walbank, 1957, Vol. I, pp. 18‒

20; Fowler, 1903; Roveri, 1982), we can see a clear tendency in this work to

rationalize such motives.17 This is vividly illustrated by the historian’s approval of

the words of Aemilius Paulus that the best way to be secure against the

inconstancy of Fate is not to behave impudently and ruthlessly with anybody even

in the case of success. On the contrary, even in the moment of highest success a

15 Polybian views on Roman constitution discussed by Walbank, 2002 ; 1943.16 On the other hand, there is a point of view that the Spartan political system was not

inconsistent with political expansion, cf. Shimron, 1964, pp. 147–155.

17 Some scholars consider (Pomeroy, 2000, p. 415) that Polybius often reduced the role of

Tyche and see the main reason of political successes and failures in human behavior.

9

person must behave moderately (XXIX 20). He even added that remembering such

things is a key trait of a truly great person (ibid.). The behavior of Scipio Africanus

in the final stages of the Second Punic War attracted the same approbation on the

part of the historian. Even after the victory at the battle of Zama he remembered

the instability of and that is why he offered acceptable peace terms to the

Carthaginians (XV. 17. 4). The historian added that the main trait of a truly great

person is a constant remembering of the inconstancy of Fortune (VI. 2.5–6). In

Polybius’s eyes, all Roman generals and politicians who successfully ended wars

that played such a great role in Roman expansion, were mindful of the inconstancy

of Tyche and treated the conquered kindly, and that is why their fate was the

opposite of that of Regulus. But what was the historian’s attitude to Roman policy

after the Third Macedonian War? Needless to say, an analysis of the historian’s

attitude to Roman policy after 168 BC (when Polybius’ reflections on Regulus

were written) will be extremely useful and interesting for us.

It is hard to ignore the obvious fact that the historian’s views on Rome in

this period were much more complicated. Generally, he continued to view Roman

policy in a positive way. He stressed the fact that the Romans suppressed Aetolian

piracy which caused great devastation to Greece (XXX 11.1‒3). Even after the end

of the Achaean war the Roman general Quintus Mummius treated the defeated

Greeks kindly. Describing his character, the historian used the terms

moderatefree from vicesandmerciful (XXXIX.

4). At the same time, the historian noted some negative traits in Roman behaviour.

He accused the Romans of intentionally weakening both the Seleucids (XXXI. 12)

and the Ptolemaic (XXXI. 18) states in provoking dynastic rivalries within the

kingdom of Pergamum (XXX. 1‒3). On his account, the Romans were only led by

their selfish interests (18) and not, as earlier, by a generous and benevolent

policy towards Greeks.

18 On the using of the term in Polybius, see Eckstein, 1995, pp. 84, 88, 103, 105‒107.

10

Of course, all the above mentioned were separate episodes, which did not

change the general positive attitude of the historian to Roman domination.

Nevertheless, we have some reasons to judge that these aspects were something

more than mere separate episodes and, in Polybius’ view, were not just accidental

events.

First of all, it is hard not to be aware that a great number of the historian’s

critical statements underline the development of critical tendencies within the

Roman state. On his view, after the Third Macedonian war luxury began to

penetrate Rome and Roman customs began to spoil (XVIII 34‒35; XXXI 21‒22).

The historian clearly states that in his own time the general situation in the Roman

republic was not as good as it once had been (VI. 57. 10). In his eyes,

contemporary Romans suffered from arrogance ‒ and wastefulness ‒

(VI. 57. 6‒7) ‒ the qualities which were, in his opinion, synonymous

with the crisis of the state (ibid.).19 According to Polybius, corruption was

widespread among the Romans of his time. Even in his praise of such outstanding

personalities as Aemilius Paulus and Scipio Aemilianus the historian wished to

show that these were exceptions among contemporary Romans (Baronowski, 2011.

P. 99).

Polybius went even further in his criticism. In book VI, which is

traditionally considered as an apology of the Roman constitution, he several times

claims that all states go through three stages: emergence, prosperity and collapse

(VI. 4.12; VI. 9.12‒13; 6.51. 4). Such views are partly corroborated by the words

of Scipio Aemilianus on the ruins of burning Carthage (XXXVIII 21). Many great

powers, he observed, had fallen victim to Fate, among them Mydia, Persia and

Macedonia20. He went on to express the concern that the fate of Rome would be

19 For Polybius’s views on Roman moral degradation, see ibid. pp. 142, 149, 182, 260–262;

Champion C. Cultural Politics … pp. 144–173.

20 On this fragment in general, see de Romilly, pp. 8‒9. Astin,1967., pp. 283‒284. There exists

an idea that Polybius wanted to draw some analogies between Rome and Macedonia.

11

similar. Modern researchers think (Astin, 1967, pp. 283‒285) that Polybius

exaggerated the extent of Scipio’s worries. But this was not accidental ‒ such

views clearly coincided with the historian’s own conceptions.

At first sight, all the cases mentioned above tell us only about the internal

problems of the Roman state. But, as we noted earlier, there is, in the historian’s

eyes, always a clear link to be made between internal conditions and the foreign

policy of a state. If the constitution works well, the state will be fair and moderate

towards the conquered and defeated territories. On the contrary, degradation in

internal affairs will lead the much harsher and unfair foreign policy.

There is further support to be gained for the existence suggested here of

criticism on the part of Polybius of Roman policy after 168 BC. In the same book

containing his reflections on the fate of Regulus, the historian commented

favourably on what he considered to be a wise policy of the Syracusan king, Hiero

II, in his relations with Rome (I. 83). Modern discussion (Eckstein, 1985), see this

passage as denoting admiration for such honest cooperation with Rome. In

addition, however, Polybius seems here to stress here something else besides.

Praising Hiero II, he wrote that the right model of international relations is when

both sides act in accordance with their treaties and international law. Otherwise,

Polybius worries, there is a danger of the policy of one power being based on

violence and breaking the basic rights of every state ‒

(I. 83.3). All these factors lead us to believe that the

growth of negative tendencies in Roman policy was no secret to the historian.

In assessing Polybius’s attitude to Roman policy after 168 BC, we cannot

ignore the details of his biography. It is well-known that Polybius began the

writing of his work in the first years after his deportation to Italy as a hostage

(Walbank, 1974, p. 4). In spite of the fact that the conditions of his life in Italy as a

hostage were fairly comfortable, we would suggest that the change in his status

from being the second person of the Achaean League to that of hostage could

hardly have contributed to an approval of each step of Roman foreign policy

12

(Walbank, 1974, pp. 7‒10). This is also indirectly confirmed by a fragment of his

work where he condemns the Romans for accusing the majority of Greeks for a

lack of loyalty towards Rome (XXX. 7. 6‒10). Besides this, some traces of the

historian’s criticism of Roman policy after 168 BC are to be found in the episode

describing the escape of Seleucid prince Demetrius from Rome. It is well known

that the historian exaggerated his own role in these events (XXXI 12; 19–23):

Demetrius could not have been successful without the assistance of the Scipionic

faction in Senate (Briscoe,1969, pp. 60‒63). However, we are interested here not in

the facts of the matter, but in the historian’s treatment of events. It is hard to ignore

that in this account the historian described himself as not being pleased by the

Romans weakening their rivals in the Eastern Mediterranean basin (Eckstein, 1995.

P. 100‒103).

Judging all the above-mentioned material, we can form some general

conclusions on Polybius’s criticism of Regulus and the reasons for his attention to

the fate of this general. The historian’s reflections on Regulus were caused by the

coincidence of his personal life circumstances with the general political situation in

the Mediterranean world after 168 BC, when his deportation to Rome as a hostage

added some critical notes to his attitude to Rome. In this situation Polybius, though

loyal to Rome, was nevertheless not averse to taking over some of the views of

anti-Roman authors, whom generally he condemned. Motives, typical of ancient

Greek thought, were employed by the historian to propagate political ideas,

according to which only a general who is morally superior and moderate in success

could be successful in warfare, policy and the rule over conquered territories. That

is why the reverses in fortune suffered by Regulus formed the ideal subject matter

for such reflections.

In this case the works of modern scholars help us greatly to clarify the

situation. According to the argument of Tipps (Tipps, 2003), in 255 BC the

Romans were close to victory in the First Punic war, but the defeat of Regulus

caused them to select the wrong tactics. The defeat of Regulus made them not only

13

prolong the war for more than a decade but also give up the tactics, a move which

was essentially right in the situation. In this context, Polybius thought it possible to

give some warning to the Romans based on the example of Attilius Regulus. If in

the years, when the Roman state was in an ideal condition, according to the

historian, the arrogance of Regulus at the moment of success resulted in numerous

victims and prolonged the war for a long term. And what consequences will such

behavior have if the Roman state is to face growing difficulties? A state which has

problems must, in his view, be especially moderate in its foreign policy towards

conquered territories and must avoid turning them into enemies. Such is the main

idea of Polybius’s reflections. He condemned those who thought that gaining

world hegemony must be done by different means than preserving it. In his view

the best way to achieve hegemony is a good attitude towards subjected states

(). To preserve it, the state-conqueror must give its subjects the hope

of some improvement in the state of affairs (). On the contrary,

if a dominating state changes its behavior and starts to act in a despotic way

(), then it will cause a negative reaction among

the conquered (X. 36. 5‒7).

This passage is used by Polybius in application to the Carthaginians, but it is

clear that his words here relate to every imperialistic state. In this way he wanted to

show that the Romans must preserve those ethical qualities which had helped them

to conquer the world and get rid of those which might help to lose that hegemony.

Polybius thought that only that domination which is founded on mutual

cooperation of the conquerors and conquered with the avoidance of extremes will

have any future prospect. In considering the historical context of such views, we

can further see that Polybius’s views on the nature of political hegemony have

some similarities with the conceptions of Stoic philosophers, such as Posidonius

and, probably, Panaetius (Sen. Ep. 90. 4; FGH, 2A, 87, F8).21 Borrowed and

21 For the views of Panaetius and Posidonius on the Roman imperialism ,see Capelle, 1932,

pp. 93‒104. According to Capelle these philosophers thought Romans morally superior and

14

adopted by the Romans at least from the time of Cicero, these Hellenistic views on

political domination later became an integral part of Roman official political

ideology of the pax Romana.

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1. P. 56‒68.

6. Brown T.S. Polybius’ Account of Antiochus III // Phoenix. 1964. Vol. 18.

No. 2. P. 124–131.

7. Candau-Moron J. Polybius and Plutarch on Roman Ethos // The Shadow of

Polybius / Ed. by G. Schepens и J. Bollansee. Leuven, 2005. P. 306─328.

8. Capelle W. Griechische Ethik und Römischer Imperialismus // Klio. 1932.

Bd. 25. S. 86–113.

because of that deserving of hegemony over the world; he further argued that these views also

influenced those of Cicero, as expressed in his treatise «De Republica» (cf. III. 3. 27). According

to Cicero’s conceptions, Roman rule is beneficial for the conquered people because of Roman

moral superiority. Such conclusions were challenged by Strasburger, who considered that such

views belonged to Cicero himself (Strasburger, 1965, pp. 44‒47; Strasburger, 1966, pp. 64‒65),

since the surviving fragments of the Stoic philosophers do not confirm the idea that they fully

supported Roman rule. It seems to us that even if Panaetius and Posidonius did not fully support

Roman domination, Roman propaganda could easily borrow their ideas about the rule of the

morally superior and apply them to their own needs.

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9. Champion C. Cultural Politics in the Histories of Polybius. Berkeley; Los

Angeles; London. 2004 (a).

10. Champion C. Polybian Demagogues in Historical Context // HSCPh. 2004.

Vol. 102. P. 199–212. (b).

11. Eckstein A.M. Hannibal at New Carthage: Polybius 3. 15 and the Power of

Irrationality // CPh. 1989. Vol. 84. No. 1. P. 1–15.

12. Eckstein A. M. Mediterranean Anarchy in Interstate Relations and the

Coming of Rome. Berkeley; Los Angeles; London , 2006.

13. Eckstein A. M. Moral Visions in the Histories of Polybius. Berkeley; Los

Angeles; London, 1995.

14. Eckstein A. M. Polybius, Syracuse, and the Politics of Accommodation ,

Greek, Roman and Byzantine studies. 1985. P. 265‒282.

15. Fantar M. Régulus en Afrique// //Orientalia Lovanensia Analecta. 1989.

Vol. 33. P. 75‒85.

16. Fornara C.W. Nature of History in Greece and Rome. Berkeley, 1983.

17. Frӧhlich U. Regulus, Archetyp rӧmischer Fides. Tübingen, 2000.

18. Harris W. War and Imperialism in Republican Rome. Oxford, 1979.

19. Heldmann K. Sallust über die rӧmische Weltherrschaft. Stuttgart, 1993.

20. La Bua V. Filino-Polibio Sileno-Diodoro: il problema delle fonti dalla morte

di Agatocle alia guerra mercenaria in Africa. Palermo, 1966.

21. Meister K. Historiche Kritik bei Polybios. Wiesbaden, 1975.

22. Mohm S. Untersuchungen zu den Historiographischen Anschauungen des

Polybios. Saarbrucken, 1977.

23. Pedech P. Sur les sources de Polybe: Polybe et Philinos // Revue des Etudes

Anciennes. 1952. Vol. 54. P. 246‒266.

24. Pedech P. La méthode historique de Polybe. P., 1964.

25. Pomeroy A. Polybius’ Death Notices // Phoenix. 1986. Vol. 40. No. 4.

P. 407‒423.

26. Rankov B. A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates // A Companion to

Punic Wars. Ed. By D. Hoyos. Blackwell Publishing, 2011.

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27. Romilly J. Rise and fall of states according to ancient authors. Michigan,

1977.

28. Sacks K. Polybius on Writing History. Berkeley, 1981.

29. Scala R. von. Die Studien des Polybios. Stuttgart, 1890.

30. Shimron  B. Polybius and the Reforms of Cleomenes III // Historia. 1964.

Bd. 13. Hft. 1. P. 147–155.

31. Strasburger H. «Poseidonios on Problems of the Roman

Empire»

, JRS 55 (1965). P. 40‒53.

32. H. Strasburger. Der «Scipionenkreis», Hermes. 1966. Bd. 94. S. 60‒

72.

33. Tipps G. The Battle of Ecnomus // Historia. 1985. Bd. 34. Hft.1. P. 432–465.

1. Tipps G. The defeat of Regulus in Africa. Classical Worls. 2003. Vol. 96. P.

375‒385.

2. Van Wees H. Greek Warfare. Myths and Realities. L., 2004.

3. Walbank F.W. // JHS. 1938. Vol. 58. Part 1. P. 55–68.

4. Walbank F.W. Philip V of Macedon. Cambridge, 1967.

5. Walbank F.W. Polybius between Greece and Rome // Entretiennes sur

l’antiquite classique. 1974. T. 20. Р. 1─31.

6. Walbank F. W. Polybius, Philinus and the First Punic war //

CQ, vol. 39 (1945), No. 1/2, P. 1─18.

7. Welwei K.-W. Königes und Königtum im Urteil des Polybios.

Herbede, 1963.

8. Walbank F.W. A Historical Commentary on Polybius. Volumes 1–3.

Oxford, 1957–1979.

9. Walbank F.W. Political Morality and Friends of Scipio // JRS. 1965. Vol. 55.

P. 1–16.

10. Walbank F.W. Polybius and Rome’s Eastern Policy // JRS. 1963. Vol. 53. P.

1─13.

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11. Walbank F.W. A Greek Looks at Rome: Polybius VI Revisited // idem.

Polybius, Rome and the Hellinistic World. Cambridge, 2002. P. 277–293.

List of abbreviations

JHS – Journal of Hellenic Studies. London.

JMH – Journal of Military History. Baltimore.

JRS – Journal of Roman Studies. London.

HSСPh – Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. Cambridge (Mass.).

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