Article Nationalism and Ethnic Politics PDF

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Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 10:5978, 2004Copyright C Taylor & Francis Inc.ISSN: 13537113 printDOI: 10.1080/13537110490450773

LANGUAGE AND POLITICS IN ALGERIA

MOHAMED BENRABAH

Universite Stendhal-Grenoble III, Eybens, France

Since independence, Algerian authorities have used a number of ideological pro-cesses to gain political legitimacy. One of these processes is the language policyknown as Arabization. The present article shows how this policy aims at provid-ing the regime with political legtimacy, and serves as a means of social control(Arabization/Islamization). We argue that, far from bringing about reconcilia-tion between various groups and between these and the authorities, Arabizationhas led to serious problems and major conflicts that have undermined both socialcohesion and the authority of the regime.

After Algeria won its independence in July 1962, its leaders de-cided to choose assimilation as a model of nation-building. Thismodel, which can be traced back to 18th century Liberal revolu-tions, aims at making most community members alike, sharing thesame behavior habits and thought patterns. Within this type ofintegration, citizens are expected to learn and speak the same lan-guage. Monolingualism is considered to be the means by which thepeople can be most easily united. To make a good their case for thismodel, its supporters would ask: arent the Americans, the Chineseor the French, who have adopted assimilationist language poli-cies, among the most securely united nations in the world today?Authorities in Algeria have chosen to adopt the same philosophyfor the national language policy best known as the policy of Ara-bization or Arabization for short.

The supporters of this policy believe that this type of nation-building, in which one language plays a major role, can serve toreduce conflicts that come from factors that can roughly be di-vided into two categories. First, because of geographical spreadwhich generates multilingualism, miscommunication is likely to

Address correspondence to Mohamed Benrabah, University of Grenoble III 03, Ruede Ruires, 38320, Eybens, France. E-mail: [email protected]

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occur between the people of the same nation. Second, the useof more than one language in a community can create inequal-ity and exclusion among its citizens. A language policy thatencourages monolingualism is thus meant to produce national in-tegration both horizontally and vertically. Political and social lead-ers, who prefer this approach, openly put these forward as theirobjectives and Algerian leaders are no exception. For example,one member of this group, who served the regime for twenty-fiveyears, described Algerian linguistic and cultural pluralism as divi-sive and as a mixing of elements from ill-assorted cultures, andoften contradictory, inherited from periods of decadence and thecolonial period.1 In 1973, the then General Secretary of the Min-istry of Education said that Arabization was meant to fill in the gapbetween those in leadership and the people.2

In this paper, we show how Arabization has failed as a processof national integration designed to reduce conflicts. We argue thatbecause it was almost entirely dictated by political and ideologicalfactors, Arabization has, in fact, exacerbated these conflicts. Butbefore dealing with these aspects, it is necessary to consider firstthe issue of why language and politics have been wedded in anindissoluble union3 in Algeria, as in many other countries.

Lack of Legitimacy

At the source of the relationship between language and politics inAlgeria, there is the question of legitimacy. Bernard Cubertafondquite rightly states: In Algeria, the crisis of legitimacy is profound. It isthe essential problem of this country.4 Political leaders, who assumedleadership positions in Algeria in 1962, tried to found a State with-out taking into consideration this state of affairs. This crisis oflegitimacy can be traced back to Algerian ancestral attitudes to-wards the central power with which they have almost always beenin bad terms. These relations are vitiated by mistrust due to thepopulations mode of representation of the State.

Before the French invasion in 1830, the Turks had controlledAlgeria since the 16th century. During the Turkish period, the col-lective consciousness associated the notion of the State with thatof the payment of taxes. The Ottoman central power made no ef-fort to integrate within a single community something like 516 or

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Language and Politics in Algeria 61

more tribes that lived in the country.5 These tribes often had differ-ent languages (or dialects) and cultures. French colonization putan end to this tribal system but did not improve the populationsmistrust towards the authorities: the relationship between the ad-ministration and the individual existed in a state of domination-subjection maintained by brutal force. Exclusion maintained thepopulations suspicion towards central power.

Even the national movement, the Front de Liberation Na-tionale (FLN), which helped free Algeria, has failed to unite thepeople within a homogeneous national community. Following EricHobsbawm, we would argue that, as for other independence move-ments in the Third World, the Algerian FLN was not nationalisthat is, a movement which seeks to bond together those deemed to havecommon ethnicity, language, culture, historical past, and the rest6butinternationalist. This failure has further weakened the authoritieslegitimacy. In fact, tensions appeared right after the liberation ofAlgeria between the different constituent parts of the indepen-dence movement (e.g. Kabylie unrest in 1963). What is more, thevery nature of Algerian political leadership has exacerbated thiscrisis of legitimacy. A former political cadre, familiar with the mys-teries of Algerian politics, gives his own account:

In an oligarchy, men of power play an important role, but in Algeria, maybeeven more than elsewhere. Thus, they will be very actively involved, becausea rigid and powerful authority, detained by a small group, could only butgive an extremely heavy weight to individuals.7

Today, the idea of the state as an institutional system is stillnot well fixed in peoples minds. Many Algerians associate it withthe men that represent it. Building a state in these conditions be-comes almost impossible especially when those in charge of doingit are not disinterested. They believe they are building a state whenthey set up a strong central power. This populist way of assimilat-ing power with the state tends to make leaders identify themselveswith their people.8 As soon as the leader identifies himself with thepeople, confusing his own interests with those of the entire popu-lation, he tends to do everything he can to remain in a dominantposition and exclude the majority of the population. This mutualnegation produces a kind of hatred of the state.9

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Instruments of Legitimacy: Islam and Arabic

Immediately after independence, those that assumed politicalleadership used various instruments to compensate for their lackof legitimacy. Among these, three ideologies can be mentioned:(1) socialism, (2) nationalism, and (3) Islam.10 The search forlegitimacy via nationalism and Islam makes the language issue be-come apparent.

In a society where the majority of the population is Muslim, Is-lam is legitimizingthis is part of the main characteristics of Arab-Muslim countries.11 In fact, authoritarian regimes, which are therule in these communities, can find their justification in the Koranitself (4th S, v 59): Oh you believers! Obey the prophet and thoseamongst you who are in position of authority.12 What is more,during the French colonization, Islam was a powerful instrumentfor resistance. For example, the colonial school was perceived as ameans for Algerian children to lose their religion.13 Consequently,Algerians were led to live in a state of cultural rigidity.14 Contraryto what happened in Egypt and Tunisia, where colonized peoplelooked for ways of acquiring the colonizers secrets, Algerianparents preferred their children to remain illiterate rather thansending them to French schools. The few who did attend theseinstitutions were considered renegades by the majority of theircompatriots.

As to nationalism, it imposed itself as a natural tool for gain-ing legitimacy since Algeria had been marked by French coloniza-tion. This fundamental legitimizing instrument has been effec-tive in three areas:15 (1) a militant diplomacy which was meantto turn Algeria into a model for the Third World so as to re-inforce the countrys image within and without; (2) a height-ened nationalism through a re-invented history-saga (histoire-epopee) often entirely fabricated; and (3) the language policy ofArabization.

The Algerian authorities could not do without a language pol-icy: Algerians had been demanding a status for their language(s)since the birth of the independence movement in the 1920s. Thelanguage issue was part of an element among the constituent partsof Algerian nationalism. In fact, the linguistic claim was in the po-litical agenda of the three founding parties of the movement. Forexample, in its 1927 program, the first party for independence

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(lEtoile Nord Africaine, lENA) included the demand for grant-ing the Arabic language an official status.16 This was a reaction tocentralized Jacobin French practice, which could not tolerate thepresence as a rival of another language with a great tradition.17

So French was imposed as the unique official language in Algeria.Colonial legislators even declared Classical Arabic as a foreignlanguage by decree (Arrete du 8 mars 1938). This very legislationhad the effect of reinforcing the status of Arabic as a martyr lan-guage: it served as the language of independence.18 But Arabicalso became a constituent part of Algerian nationalism because ofits link with the Koran and Islam.

In Algeria, what links together Islam and nationalism is theArabic language. Indeed, in the post-independence era, the lan-guage that was imposed as the unique national and official lan-guage (Article 3 in all successive constitutions) is Classical Arabic,the liturgical language, the language of the holy book of Mus-lims. This is how one political leader (M.K. Nat Belkacem), whowas a fervent advocate of Arabization, describes this code: TheArabic language and Islam are inseparable. Arabic has a privilegedposition as it is the language of the Koran and the Prophet, andthe common language of all Muslims in the world, language ofscience, language of culture.19

The impossibility to disassociate language from religion leadsAlgerian leaders to equate the Arabization of society with itsIslamization. This view is largely held by members of the move-ment whose ideology has served the regime since independence:the Ulemas, a religio-conservative movement which has becomeactively involved in the process of Arabization after the militaryoverthrow in June 1965. After this coup detat, the authorities hadto work harder to find instruments of legitimacy. The Ulemas of-fered their help. Since then, they have been granted a third ofgovernment positions (ministries).20 They were in charge of theMinistry of Cult, the Ministry of Information, and, most importantof all, the Ministry of Education. These religio-conservative ideo-logues cannot conceive language as a vehicle of an already existingculture. They rather see it as an instrument for imposing anotherculture. According to an Algerian historian,

[the Ulemas ideology rejects] the cultures of the people, the religionof peasants and systematically depreciate dialects that express them. The

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Arabic language is not thought of as a means of transmitting knowledgebut as a support for religion which must hold the highest influence overideas. The revival of Arabic doesnt only aim at putting it in competitionwith French but as a barrier erected against foreign influences.21

For the Ulemas, the Berber, Phoenician, Roman, Vandal,Spanish, Turkish and French past is nothing but a heresy. All theconstituent parts of the Algerian cultural and linguistic heritagemust give way to a unique dimension, the Arab-Islamic one whichis deliberately amplified. For example, the refusal to recognizeFrench language and culture is seen as a way of disposing of theinfluences left by the infidels.

Implementation: Language Expropriation

As far as language implementation is concerned, the first indepen-dent Algerian government (19621965) chose to adopt a central-ized language policy that favors monolingualism even though thepopulation is characterized by multilingualism and multicultural-ism. Its implementation was authoritarian: there was no attemptto reach a consensus on this sensitive issue and there was a totaldisregard towards the linguistic and cultural make-up of the coun-try. To illustrate this authoritarianism, it is worth mentioning herethe authoroties reaction to a sociolinguistic survey conducted inAlgeria. In 1963/1964, the Algerian government hired a team ofAmerican sociolinguists (University of Berkeley) to draw up thesociolinguistic profile of the country. As a conclusion to their sur-vey, the researchers recommended the institutionalization of Al-gerian Arabic and Berber as inter-regional languages because theywere the most widely used and most consensual. But the Algerianauthorities signed a contract with this group of sociolinguists un-der the terms of which the conclusions of their survey of Algeriashould never be made public.22 Kaplan and Baldauf,23 among oth-ers, consider the sociolinguistic survey as the most sophisticatedway of collecting the information necessary for any language plan-ning process. In Algeria, those involved in this process rejectedsuch an approach and preferred to reinforce classic diglossia.24

Charles Ferguson describes classic diglossia as a social context inwhich two clearly distinguished languages coexist, one High and

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one Low. Among his case studies, Ferguson mentions the Arabworld with Classical Arabic as High and mother tongues as Low.25

At the core of the Algerian authorities decisions, there is theimpossibility for those in power to separate religion from politics.There is also the very powerful ideological status of the languageof the Koran among Arabs. Note that these language attitudes,which are widespread in the Arab world, are not found in allIslamic countries. For example, non-Arab Muslim countries likeTanzania and Indonesia have adopted language policies that donot neglect the populations mother tongues (or languages ofwider communication).26 In Algeria, the language issue has beenfurther polluted by pan-Arab nationalism (the Baath movement,which favors the promotion of a centralized language policy andmonolingualism in the entire Arab world), religious fundamental-ism, the Arab/Berber conflict (which has been a reality since theend of the 1930s), and the deep resentment of intellectual leaderstowards French, the language of the ex-colonizers.27

As a conclusion to the first part of this paper, we will relyon Robert Coopers accounting scheme for the study of languageplanning in Algeria. Coopers framework can be summarized asfollows: What actors attempt to influence what behaviors of whichpeople for what ends under what conditions by what means throughwhat decision-making process (decision rules) with what effect.28 Thediscussion so far provides an answer most of these questions.For Algeria, actors refers to the members of a small group ofthe military and religio-political establishment that has imposedArabization authoritatively from above (by what means). Thedecision-making process was dictated by ideological and politicalconsiderations under post-colonial conditions marked by militaryhegemony and lack of legitimacy. In the next section, we shallattempt to deal with the remaining part of Coopers questions:[actors] influence what behaviors of which people for what endswith what effect.

Implementation: Language-in-Education Planning

In the following section, our theoretical orientation assumesthat schools function as major socializing agents that can reflectand (re)produce the dominant social order or the order that

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the dominant group(s) aim(s) to set up. Language-in-educationplanning29 or acquisition planning30 is one aspect of languageimplementation. [It] is often seen as the most potent resource forbringing about language change.31 Through schools, one can in-troduce language changes among large groups of children. Suchchanges can affect the larger community and increase the popu-lation for whom the language policy is designed. In Algeria, theeducational system was the first institution to be Arabized. This be-came a priority for the religio-conservatives when they were offeredthe Ministry of Education in July 1965.

Arabization was put in place in two steps. During the firstthree years (19621965), which were marked by uncertainty anddifficulties, the authorities did not get involved in any systematicimplementation of this language policy. However, even though itdid not have the necessary human nor the material means to do so,the government decided to introduce Arabic in the curriculum:seven hours a week in 1962 and ten hours in 1964. To compensatefor a serious shortage of teachers, one thousand Egyptians werehired, even though most of them had not had any training inteaching. The majority of these recruits had one thing in common:they were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is how Islamicfundamentalism was first introduced in Algeria at a large scale.32

In fact, systematic Arabization or Arabization at all cost be-gan with the military coup in 1965. The newly appointed Ministerof Education, described by an Algerian political observer as in-telligent and learned, a magnificent product of bilingualism,33

declared during a government session: This [Arabization] willnot work, but we have to do it. . . .34 The Ministers words revealthe authorities need for legitimacy and social control. In Novem-ber 1965, that very Minister asked the question: What kind ofman do we want to train (in schools)?35 In a report drawn up inAugust 1966, he writes: National Education is, in some respects,like a business firm which needs to plan its production accordingto its forecasts/perspectives mapped out not only for a few years,but for almost a generation.36 He also writes: the school is thesilent revolution.37 In his book, he even goes as far as quoting T.S.Eliots definition of the word culture: Culture is something thatneeds to be developed. It is not in mans power to build a tree. Allhe can do is plant it, take care of it and wait until it grows little bylittle.38

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One can find in these quotations the discourse that is charac-teristic of totalitarian regimes: the need to transform the governedand dominated by creating a new man and a new society. Forexample, the newly appointed Minister of Education, who usesthe expressions a new Algerian and a new Algeria, talks aboutthe necessary emergence of a new generation that needs to learnto think in Arabic.39 Other religio-conservatives prefer the newschool to Arabize thinking first or aim at an Arabization of mindsand hearts before that of languages.40

Following the military coup, course and school manual de-signers embarked on this process of arabizing minds and hearts.The first step consists in disposing of French as a language of in-struction. Gradually, it is replaced by Classical Arabic. For example,since 1980, children start French as a subject when they enter theFourth Grade [quatrie`me annee fondamentale]. This is the case inurban centers but not all over the country. When a French teachingpost is freed inland, for example, the local educational authoritiesoften refuse to appoint a new teacher. This more or less vindic-tive practice does not take into account the fact that most fields ofstudy at the university (particularly those in sciences) are taughtin French.

Before considering the content of manuals designed for Read-ing and History, it is worth mentioning at this point that Arabiza-tion has been accompanied by the adoption of traditional teach-ing methods, rigid Pavlovian pedagogical techniques that stressobedience, memorization and repetition.41 The instructions forteachers that accompany the books for Reading for primary schoolscontain the following:

The program will consist in correcting and organizing the linguis-tic expressions that children bring from their homes.

The program starts with the childs language and his previousacquisitions with a view to correcting them.

The school contribution only serves as a substitute for correctingthe childrens expressions.

To bowdlerize and correct the expressions that were acquired bychildren before entering school.42

The authors of these instructions use a language of denigra-tion: the childs mother tongue is constantly described as a small

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language, a dialect, faulty, defective, unorganized, unso-phisticated, etc. Most of this discourse gives the impression thatAlgerian speakers are disabled linguistically and culturally andneed some kind of rehabilitation. Another series of ministe-rial Instructions on Reading, Conversation, Religious education,Koran, Writing, Arithmetic, published in 1971 by a governmentinstitution called IPN (Institut National Pedagogique), clearlystates: Our job will be twofold. We will correct through the childthe language of his family. As the child is under the influence ofhis family, he will influence it in turn.43 This kind of disassocia-tion of child and family was considered by one FLN party cadreas a solution to the problem of the Berber language. He statedthat in Algeria, the problem of the Berber language will be solvedwhen the children will not be able to understand their parents andvice versa.44 These instructions aim at producing gagged children(enfants ballonnes) by refusing them any spontaneous languageand by stripping them of their cultural heritage.

In the books designed for Reading for the very young, womenhave an unenviable status and position. Pictures and texts do notencourage equality or understanding between the sexes. For ex-ample, in the book designed for 8 to 9-year-olds (Third Grade orTroisie`me Annee Fondamentale), we can find, among other things,a poem accompanied by a picture with a young female kneelingdown in a pool of water and busy doing the washing. The poem,which is devoted to female submissiveness and obedience, reads:

Every day, I help my mother with the house work/From morning toevening I do what she needs/I never go and play before I have helpedmy mother/Oh mother! I am a dutiful daughter and attentive to what Iam told/And all you ask of me, I do it quickly and without delay/Bestowblessings on me, I will be obedient and submissive.

How are cultural elements presented to children in primaryreading textbooks? For example, in a study published in 1991, S.Redoune compares the contents of two Reading manuals (onein French and one in Arabic) designed for the 11 to 12-year-olds(Sixth Form). He examines the way the same cultural elementsare presented in the two books. The author analyzes the atti-tudes towards (a) Nature, (b) technology, and (c) the dichotomyArab-Islamic vs. universal values. In the book in Arabic, natureis presented in idyllic and romantic terms. It is an object of

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contemplation and admiration. No hint is made of its exploitationand transformation. In the book in French, however, the authorspresentation is, according to Redouane, more realistic and prag-matic. In order to survive, man tries to dominate nature and toexploit it. He then comes into conflict with it.45 The messagesconveyed by the two books are in total opposition. As an illustra-tion, the author compares two stories appearing in each manualand dealing with a child abandoned in nature. In the French text,the child manages to vanquish nature and control it. In the Arabictext, the child, completely subdued, discovers God. As to the worldof technology, the Arabic text introduces instruments such as thetelephone as magical objects and does not try to show how theywork, nor does it attempt to give a brief history of its discovery, anapproach that encourages children to remain passive consumersrather than as active producers of their own technology. In thebook in French, the approach is totally different: the child is giveninstructions to understand the various technical processes. As faras the Arab-Islamic vs. universal values dichotomy is concerned,the book in Arabic describes the Arab-Islamic world in the singlelight of its prestigious past. The vastness of its territory and thenumerical importance of its population are emphasized. Nowherein this idyllic presentation can one find any mention of the under-development of this world and its political, economic and culturaldependence, as well as interstate conflicts. This idealized pictureis given to the child so as to guarantee his sense of belonging tothe Arab world and his adherence to its unification. In the Frenchbook, besides texts about Asia and Africa, most of the chaptersignore the Arab-Islamic dimension and try to introduce the childto the Algerian national cultural heritage so as to develop a senseof national identity and belonging.

The teaching of history in the Sixth Grade was the first tobe Arabized both in form and content. Starting from September1966, history was henceforth taught in Classical Arabic. This is howa former cadre of the Algerian Ministry of Education describes theArabization of content: for that particular year [1966], schoolchildren tackled history starting not from Antiquity but from thebeginnings of Islam. These measures were symbolic of the newdirection taken by the educational policy.46

Arabization has served as a process for eliminating the schoolchildrens historical conscience, self-esteem and national pride.

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Part of this has resulted from the falsification of history. In thehistory book designed for the Eighth Gradethe only book whichdeals with Medieval Algeriathe Arab conquerors are constantlycalled Muslims and presented as the liberators of the nativeinhabitants, the Berbers. Berbers, described as Maghrebans andbeing colonized, then, by the Byzantines, were liberated by theArabs. Children are also taught that Berbers completely lost theiridentity and fused into Islam. Nowhere can we find any reference toslavery or war treasures collected by force from the native Berbersby the conquering Arabs.

Moreover, designers of the manual for the Eighth Grade showtheir beatitude towards the populations of the Middle East, a beati-tude that is clearly found in secondary schools History manuals. Inhis research study, Hassan Remaoun47 discovered that 75 percentof the contents of these books deal with the history of the Mid-dle East. Five centuries of the Roman presence in Algeria (e.g.,archeological traces) are absent from these manuals. The absenceof these relics from Algerias pre-Islamic past reinforces and main-tains a kind of collective amnesia. One should note here, thatsuch a misrepresentation of historical facts under the influence ofArab-Islamic ideology can even lead some foreign observers with asuperficial understanding of Algerias modern history to be wideoff the mark.48

Selective amnesia is further enhanced by attacks on school-childrens psychological integrity. In this respect, the Fifth Gradehistory manual designed for 8- to 9-year-olds is striking. In this bookentirely devoted to the Algerian war of liberation (19541962), onediscovers that school children are confronted with the crude realityof war and its atrocities. The book is meant to cultivate the principleof violence as a means for founding a nation. It contains severalauthentic pictures which show populations being humiliated bythe French army, corpses, and mutilated bodies of young children.What is more, the national educational institutions even embarkon a panegyric of violence that is glorified. For example, on 1 and2 June 1997 (on the eve of the celebration of the InternationalDay of Children,) children who sat for the entrance examinationfor Sixth Grade had the following dictation:

This country is dear to us and will remain invulnerable as long as its coura-geous combatants will defend it. This is the destiny of the sons of Algeria,

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as long as everyone will respond to the roll call with determination. Be afaithful combatant who does not fear death and who faces the enemiesbullets by offering his chest, shouting in the name of God, the Merciful,Allah Akbar. Dear children, why live in fear? Sooner or later you will die(death is inevitable). The Homeland is ours, its honor is ours.49

Effects of Language Planning in Algeria

What are the effects of language-in-education planning inAlgeria? Let us first consider cognitive and psycholinguistic con-sequences. An Algerian researcher studied the production ofnarratives among two groups of school-children: a group of 5 to6-year-olds (age when they first enter school) and another of9-year-olds. The results prove that 5 and 6-year-olds could pro-duce, in an oral examination, non-deviant and correct lan-guage, a text the length of which corresponds to the age of thechild. The quantity of sentences far exceeds the content set inhis school manual.50 The results for the creative work with thegroup of 9-year-olds show that, after three or four years at school,childrens linguistic competence becomes fossilized.

Among the first non-Algerians to sound the alarm, we canmention John P. Entelis, an American political scientist who livedin Algeria in the late 1970s. In a paper published in 1981, hewarned against the mediocre and incomplete nature of much ofthe educational process [if it] continues unchecked. He fearedthat a third generation of disillusioned and economically un-absorbable counter-elites, as described by Waterbury and Zartmanfor Morocco, would emerge.51 A decade earlier, J. Waterbury andW. I. Zartman had written the following about Morocco:

The fact that these [third generation counter-elites] often tend to besemi-educated, traditionalist school-leavers, trained only in Arabic andmore hostile than frustrated in their feelings toward modernization,suggest that their reaction will be neo-traditionalist, . . . Islamic, populist,and Qadhafite. It will be one of cynical radicals, suspicious of anyleadership . . . , intolerant, impatient, and embittered over being excludedfrom the public benefits that private [and public] corruption make appearinexhaustible.52

Let us consider two more field work studies that show howArabization in Algeria has failed as a linguistic process but has

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succeeded as a political and ideological process. In 1989/1990,James Michael Coffman, a PhD student from Stanford University,carried out a qualitative and quantitative study at the universitycampus in the capital, Algiers. The academic year Coffman did hisfieldwork (1989/1990) is particularly important: it coincided withthe first promotion of entirely arabized students being admittedto higher education. In his dissertation, J.M. Coffman comparesthe linguistic competence and attitudes of this group of studentswith those of older bilingual students. His results show that thefreshers were much weaker in French, without being competentin Arabic.53 According to the author,

[Arabization] has produced secondary graduates with no mastery of bodiesof knowledge and very weak critical and analytical skills. [. . . ] the tool kitprovided students leaving the Arabized secondary system in Algeria appearsto be both more Arab-Islamic than the previous system, and more limitedin its breadth and depth.54

In his concluding chapter, the American fieldworker states thatstudying in Arabic has grounded students in a different cognitiveand symbolic order of thinking.55 He further adds:

This rise in Islamization accompanying the shift in language competenceand preference needs to be explained, for it is not simply the result ofa change in the socio-economic, geographical, or ethnic groups enteringthe university. The high correlation between Arabization and Islamizationpersists across all groups.56

The Islamic orientation of childrens instruction has pro-duced a whole generation of school-leavers and students who valuereligious beliefs and Islam more than the Arabic language. This isconfirmed by another fieldwork study conducted by an Algerianhistorian, in the early 1990s. He used a questionnaire with a closedchoice presented to 1629 pupils their A levels while preparing fi-nal examination (Terminale). The results for two questions areworth noting here. The questions are: (1) In which field wouldyou like the school to teach you more things? (2) What are thevalues that you most adhere to? The results57 (see Table 1) showthat Islam fares the highest while the Arabic language the lowest:

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TABLE 1. Pupils Attitudes Toward Their Preferred Field of Study and theValues They Adhered To

Question 1 Question 2

Preferred field % Values adhered to %

Islam as religion & civilization 20.5 Religion 16.2Meaning of life 16 Family 16Current affairs 15.8 Honor 15.2Work techniques 15.5 Work 13.2History of Algeria 10.6 Equality 8.5

Honesty & integrity 6.7Nationalism 5.8School 4.9Language 4.9

To sum up: let us come back to the remaining componentsof Coopers framework: [what actors] influence what behaviors ofwhich people for what ends with what effects. It is clear now that,through the educational system, the Algerian authorities intentin the first place was to modify the behaviors of the majority of thepopulation (what behaviors of which people). However, they tookthe precaution to keeping their own offspring away from the pub-lic schools that are attended by the general population. As in therest of Africa, the politics of language in Algeria is characterizedby elite closure.58 It is a language strategy where the dominantgroups children are sent to bilingual (French/Arabic) or mono-lingual (French-only) schools while those of the vast majority haveno other choice but to attend Arabic-only schools.

One of the main goals of Arabization (what ends) is theneed for the actors to control the populations behaviors. As to itseffects, the preceding section leads us to the following conclusion:if Islam as a religion is not to blame, its manipulation via such a typeof language-in-education planning with a definite Islamic orienta-tion could but lead to the emergence of new generations of schoolleavers with radical Islamic views. According to many scholars,59

the process of Arabizing the minds and hearts has resulted in agreater Islamization of the Algerian society. It is certainly a case ofidentity planning carried out through language planning.60

Another consequence of Arabization that cannot be ignoredis its failure to reduce conflicts that impede national integration.One can only agree with E.H. Jahr when he asserts that language

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planning activity may itself be the cause of serious problems aswell as major conflicts.61 The ideological and political decision-making process and the refusal to acknowledge the sociolinguisticreality of the country have produced a language policy that hasexacerbated existing conflicts and created new ones. Algeria isnow a highly segmented community in which Arabophones areopposed to Francophones, Arabic-speaking to Berber-speakingAlgerians, democrats who yearn for secularism, equality betweenthe sexes and individual freedom to fundamentalists who rejectthese values as non-Islamic, and so on and so forth. These tensionswithin the Algerian society have led to a kind of cultural civilwar with dramatic results: many French-speaking intellectuals inparticular were assassinated in the 1990s, and many female Frenchteachers were slaughtered sometimes in their very classrooms infront of their pupils.

As to the long-lasting lack of legitimacy of the state, it hasgained almost nothing. Up to the late 1970s, the Algerian regimehad seemed to be unstoppable, even invincible, and its languagepolicy unshakeable. A policy secured by a totalitarian regime thatimposed a concrete screed over the country. The first major crackthat appeared in this screed came from the resistance to Arabiza-tion from one part of the population. In the spring of 1980, theauthorities prohibited an almost insignificant cultural event: theAlgerian writer Mouloud Maameri was to give a conference onold Berber poetry at the university campus of Tizi Ouzou, theadministrative center of Kabylia, a Berber-speaking area. The pop-ulations reaction was unparalleled in post-independent Algerianhistory: the entire Kabylian region went into civil disobedience.This Berber unrest triggered a series of other outbreaks of vio-lence all over the country which has shaken the regime to its foun-dations. It has never managed to get over it since. Hence, far fromproviding the Algerian authorities with the necessary legitimacyfor its permanence, Arabization, used for political and ideologicalpurposes with a total disregard for the sociolinguistic reality of thecountry, has generated conflicts that undermine and weaken it.

Conclusion

Although introduced to bring the colonial cultural legacies toan end, Arabization has led to the emergence of a new type of

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alienation for the Algerian individual, on the one hand, and pro-voked a deep crisis within the Algerian society, on the other. Forthe last two decades at least, Algerian and foreign observers havepointed out that time had come for a serious evaluation of Algerianlanguage policy and planning. However, the current socio-politicalsystem remains the major obstacle to such a process. Within thissystem, language planning is authoritarian and characterized by atop-down approach.62 One can seriously question whether suchplanning has ever existed as many politicians (and others whopropose language plans) go about planning as if it could andshould be done only on the basis of their intuitive feelings, that is,in terms of [a] language planning model [which begins with] thepolicy decisions.63 This is partly the reason why language and poli-tics in Algeria are wedded in an indissoluble union. One possibleway out is to give priority to a global societal project grounded onan ideology that favors pluralism in general and multilingualismin particular.64 In other words, to allow Algeria to head towardslinguistic democracy, one prerequisite would be to embark ona real language plaining process based on methodology and so-ciolinguistic surveys, an approach that would reflect bottom-upplanning.

Notes

1. Taleb Ibrahimi, A., De la decolonisation a` la revolution culturelle (19621972),(Alger: SNED, 1981), 63.

2. Berri, Y., Algerie: la revolution en arabe, Jeune Afrique, N 639 (7th April1973), 1418.

3. Weinstein, B., The Civic Tongue. Political Consequences of Language Choices(New York & London: Longman, 1983), 155.

4. Cubertafond, B., LAlgerie contemporaine (Paris: PUF Que sais-Je?, 1995),93.

5. Harbi, M., LAlgerie et son destin. Croyants ou citoyens (Alger: Medias Associes,1994), 226.

6. Hobsbawm, E.J., Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 179.

7. Hasan, Algerie, histoire dun naufrage (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1996), 10.8. Addi, H., LImpasse du populisme. LAlgerie: collectivite politique et Etat en construc-

tion (Alger: ENAL, 1990), 10.9. Boukhobza, M., Octobre 88: evolution ou rupture? (Alger: Editions Bouche`ne,

1991), 2128.10. Cubertafond, LAlgerie contemporaine, 94.

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76 M. Benrabah

11. Grandguillaume, G., Language and legitimacy in the Maghrib, in Language Pol-icy and Political Development, ed. B. Weinstein (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex,1990).

12. Quoted in Cubertafond, LAlgerie contemporaine, 106.13. Heggoy, A.A., Colonial education in Algeria: assimilation and reaction, in Education

and the Colonial Experience, eds. P.G. Altbach and G. Kelly (New Brunswick, N.J.:Transaction Books, 1984), 97116.

14. Djeghloul, A., Huit etudes sur lAlgerie (Alger: ENAL, 1986).15. Cubertafond, LAlgerie contemporaine, 109.16. Stora, B., Histoire de lAlgerie coloniale (18301954), (Paris: Editions La

Decouverte, 1994), 119120.17. Fishman, J.A. Sociolinguistics and the language problems of the developing

countries, in Language Problems of Developing Nations, eds. J.A. Fishman, C.A.ferguson, and J. Das Gupta (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968), 9.

18. Benrabah, M., Langue et pouvoir en Algerie. Histoire dun traumatisme linguistique(Paris: Editions Seguier, 1999), 5859.

19. Rouadjia, A., Les Fre`res et la mosquee. Enquete sur le mouvement islamiste en Algerie(Alger: Editions Bouche`ne, 1991), 111.

20. El-Kenz, A., Algerie, les deux paradigmes, Revue du monde musulman et de laMediterranee, Vols. 6869 (1994), 8384.

21. Harbi, M., La Guerre commence en Algerie (Bruxelles: Editions Complexes,1984), 117118.

22. Elimam, A., Le Maghribi, langue trois fois millenaire. Explorations en linguistiquemaghrebine (Alger: Edition ANEP, 1997), 158.

23. Kaplan, R.B., and Baldauf, R.B., Jr., Language Planning from Practice to Theory(Clevedon: Multilingual Matters Ltd, 1997), 102118.

24. Fasold, R., The Sociolinguistics of Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell: 1984), 54.25. Ferguson, C., Diglossia, Word, Vol. 15 (1959), 325340.26. Whiteley, W., Swahili, the Rise of a National Language (London: Methuen,

1969); Labrousse, P., Reforme et discours sur la reforme: le cas indonesion,in La Reforme des langues, vol. 2, eds. I. Fodor & C. Hage`ge (Hambourg: BuskeVerlag, 1983).

27. Calvet, L.J., Les Politiques linguistiques (Paris: PUF Que Sais-Je?, 1996), 120.28. Cooper, R.L., Language Planning and Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1989), 98.29. Kaplan and Baldauf, Language Planning from Practice to Theory.30. Cooper, R.L., Language Planning and Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1989).31. Kaplan and Baldauf, Language Planning from Practice to Theory, 122.32. Boudjedra, R., Le FIS de la haine (Paris: denoel, 1994).33. Hasan, Algerie, histoire dun naufrage, 180.34. Grandguillaume, G., Comment a-t-on pu en arriver la`?, Esprit, N 208,

(janvier 1995), 18.35. Taleb Ibrahimi, De la decolonisation, 72.36. Taleb Ibrahimi, De la decolonisation, 101.37. Taleb Ibrahimi, De la decolonisation, 76.38. Taleb Ibrahimi, De la decolonisation, 66.

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39. Taleb Ibrahimi, A., De la decolonisation, 98.40. Rakibi, A. (1975/1982), Arabiser la pensee dabord, in Culture algerienne dans les

textes, ed. J. Dejeux (Alger: OPU-Publisud, 1982), 137.41. Boudalia-Greffou, M., LEcole algerienne de Ibn Badis a` Pavlov (Alger: Editions

Laphomic, 1989); Grandguillaume, G., Etre algerien chez soi et hors de soi,Cahiers intersignes, N 10, (printemps 1995), 7988.

42. Greffou, M., LEcole algerienne, 3335.43. Greffou, M., LEcole algerienne, 36.44. Saadi, N., FIS: traffic de culture, in Telerama hors-serie: Algerie, la culture face

a` la terreur (mars 1995), 23.45. Redouane, S., A propos des manuels de lecture de 6e`me annee fondamen-

tale, Alger Republicain (25th November 1991), 9.46. Haouati, Y. Trente ans deducation, Le Monde de leducation, N 223 (fevrier

1995), 56.47. Remaoun, H., Sur lenseignement de lhistoire en Algerie ou la crise identi-

taire a` travers (et par) lecole, Naqd: Revue detudes et de critiques sociales, N 5(avril-aout 1993), 5764.

48. See, for example, Souaiaia, M., Language, education and politics in theMaghreb, Language Culture and Curriculum, Vol. 3 (1990), 109123.

49. Published in LHumanite (5th June 1997), p. 18.50. Ghettas, C., LEnfant algerien et lapprentissage de la langue arabe a` lecole

fondamentale. Essai danalyse des competences narrative et textuelle delenfant algerien entre cinq et neuf ans. (The`se de Doctorat en linguistiqueet didactique des langues. Universite Stendhal-Grenoble 3, 1995), 324.

51. Entelis, J.P., Elite political culture and socialization in Algeria: tensions anddiscontinuities, Middle East Journal, Vol. 25 (1981), 208.

52. Quoted in Entelis, Elite political culture . . . , 208.53. Coffman, J.M., Arabization and Islamization in the Algerian University (Unpub-

lished Ph.D thesis, Stanford University, 1992), 146147.54. Coffman, Arabization and Islamization, 147.55. Coffman, Arabization and Islamization, 185.56. Coffman, Arabization and Islamization, 185.57. Remaoun, H., Ecole, histoire et enjeux institutionnels dans lAlgerie

independante, Les Temps modernes, N 580 (janvier/fevrier 1995), 7374.58. Myers-Scotton, C., Elite closure as a powerful language strategy: the African

case, International Journal of the Sociology of Language, Vol. 103 (1993), 149163.

59. See, among others, Entelis, Elite political culture . . .; Harbi, La Guerre com-mence en Algerie; Rouadjia, Les Fre`res et la mosquee; Coffman, Arabization andIslamization ; Benrabah, M., Larabisation des ames, in Linguistique et anthro-pologie, ed. F. Laroussi (Rouen: Presses Universitaires de Rouen, 1996), 1330;Dourari, A., Malaises linguistiques et identitaires en Algerie, Anadi. Revuedetudes amazighes, N 2 (Juin 1999); Benrabah, Langue et pouvoir en Algerie.

60. Pool, J., Language planning and identity planning, International Journal ofthe Sociology of Language, Vol. 20 (1979), 521.

61. Jahr, E.H., ed., Language Conflict and Language Planning (Berlin: Mouton deGruyter, 1993), 1.

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78 M. Benrabah

62. Kaplan, R.B., Language planning vs. planning language, in Language, Learn-ing and Community, eds. C.H. Candlin and T.F. McNamara (Sydney: NCELTR,1989), 193203.

63. Kaplan and Baldauf, Language Planning from Practice to Theory, 118.64. Benrabah, M., An Algerian paradox: Arabization and the French language,

in Shifting Frontiers of France and Francophonie, eds. Y. Rocheron & C. Rolfe(Bern: Peter Lang, 2004), 58.

Mohamed Benrabah is Professor of English Linguistics and Sociolinguis-tics at Universite Stendhal-Grenoble III. He taught at the University ofOran (Algeria) for 16 years before moving to France in 1994. His publi-cations are concerned mainly with foreign-language learing/teaching andsociolinguistics.

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