ART.2 SEC.1

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003.*

Facts:

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power “(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order” and the power “(b) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.” Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (“Ramas”). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.

Issue:

whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.

Ruling:

We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGG’s powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113 Nov. 16, 1945

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge ArsenioDizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;

2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;

3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.

Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.

The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.

IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then

it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”

Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”

Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”

In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.

It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

ISSUE: WON judicial processes during the Japanese occupation are valid after the Commonwealth government was already reinstated.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Under international law, specifically the Hague Conventions, the functioning of courts and municipal laws remain valid during occupation. This reduces the harm done to the people of the occupied territory, and reversing judicial processes strips parties, without due process, of vested rights acquired under these processes.

Only legislative, constitutional and administrative processes are affected, and these are the “processes” MacArthur’s proclamation was construed to refer to.

Motion for reconsideration denied.

(concur) Bengzon: The preceding paragraph is in accord with classic army tradition on occupation.

(dissent) Perfecto: Majority decision gives MacArthur’s proclamation a meaning opposite to the intended one, and validates processes under a foreign authority with ideologies opposite to those of the Philippines. It also unduly restricts a restored government from revoking acts of the occupying government, when the latter was not restricted in revoking the acts of the former.

Agustin vsEdu, 88 SCRA 195

Facts: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof. This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.

Issue: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.

Summary: ACCFA vs. CUGCO (GR L-21484, 29 November 1969)On September 4, 1961 a collective bargaining agreement, which was to be effective for a period of one (1) year from July 1, 1961, was entered into by and between the Unions and the ACCFA. A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting against alleged violations and non-implementation of said agreement. Finally, on October 25, 1962 the Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on November 26, 1962.On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA (Case No. 3450-ULP) for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as affirmative and special defenses lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case, illegality of the bargaining contract, expiration of said contract and lack of approval by the office of the President of the fringe benefits provided for therein. Brushing aside the foregoing defenses, the CIR in its decision dated March 25, 1963 ordered the ACCFA:1. To cease and desist from committing further acts tending to discourage the members of complainant unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization; 2. To comply with and implement the provision of the collective bargaining contract executed on September 4, 1961, including the payment of P30.00 a month living allowance;3. To bargain in good faith and expeditiously with the herein complainants.The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of the CIR en banc. Thereupon it brought this appeal by certiorari.The ACCFA raises the following issues in its petition, to wit:1. Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction over this case, which in turn depends on whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions.2. Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner and the respondent union is valid; if valid, whether or not it has already lapsed; and if not, whether or not its (sic) fringe benefits are already enforceable.3. Whether or not there is a legal and/or factual basis for the finding of the respondent court that the petitioner had committed acts of unfair labor practice.4. Whether or not it is within the competence of the court to enforce the collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner and the respondent unions, the same having already expired.We hold, therefore, that insofar as the fringe benefits already paid are concerned, there is no reason to set aside the decision of the respondent Court, but that since the respondent Unions have no right to the certification election sought by them nor, consequently, to bargain collectively with the petitioner, no further fringe benefits may be demanded on the basis of any collective bargaining agreement.The decisions and orders appealed from are set aside and/or modified in accordance with the foregoing pronouncements. No costs.

issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary functions.

Held: The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals" continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears. In view of the foregoing premises, the Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the lower Court. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA (GR L-21824). This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act 875. With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform Code and in view of the Court's ruling as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA, the decision of the lower Court, and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice case filed by the ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the present review in GR L-21484, has become moot and academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain collectively with the Unions is concerned.

A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC September 28, 2010RE: Seniority among the Four (4) Most Recent Apppointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals

Facts:On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the Supreme

Court the appointments of Court Appeals (CA) Associate Justices Myra G. Fernandez, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela. Their respective appointment papers were attached to the transmittal letter.

All four newly appointed CA Justices took their oath before then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on March 10, 2010.

After some initial confusion, the four Justices were finally listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the following order of seniority: Justice Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice Hernando and Justice Antonio-Valenzuela (as most junior). The ranking was based in a letter dated March 25, 2010 submitted by the members of the CA Committee on Rules to CA Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.

Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member ofthe Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated 14 November 1990addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his seniorityranking in the Court of Appeals.

It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980 but took his oath of office for said position only on 29 November 1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974.

On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas PambansaBlg. 129 entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.”Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7 November 1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice; he thus ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.

Issue:whether the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner (in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 or whether the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said Executive Order No. 33. )

Ruling:

the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

It is the holding of the Court that the present Court ofAppeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986.

The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution and that the Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with appointments thereto having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations as distinguished from retroactive ones.

Spousesfontanilla

Facts:

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and RestitutoDeligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and RestitutoDeligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.

Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.

Issue: WON NIA is held liable for the negligent acts of its driver, resulting to the death of spouses’ son

Ruling:

We conclude that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

There was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.

Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable.