Art XI Compiled Cases

7/27/2019 Art XI Compiled Cases

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IN RE GONZALES

The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988

from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez, "Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor"

forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint,

dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned

Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a telegram of

Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt

hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the

attention of the Court en banc in view of the important implications of

policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.

The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an

anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court"

addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for

disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice

Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about

this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel

Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco

refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the

Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the

opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Raul

Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to

file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with

Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's

intervention.

The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M

Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution, dated 17 February

1988 of the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel

Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" in which Resolution, the

Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco

against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the sameResolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to

show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for

making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan.

Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an extension

of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears

to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case

No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the

Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per

curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality

Mr Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.

It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law hereinvolved. This principle may be succinctly formulated in the following

terms. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a

Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by

him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment,

cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such

public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,

cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other

court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal

from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to remova

from office.

The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988

in Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms:

There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here

must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, unde

Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine

Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article X[2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of

the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to

circumbent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate thea

Members of the Court may be removed from office only by

impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article X

(2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect

of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to

Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on

Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the

members of the Commission on Audit who are not certified public

accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom are constitutionally

required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied)

This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this

matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said:

The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court

with jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those

in government-owned or controlled corporations." There are

exceptions, however, like constitutional officers, particularly those

declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII o

the 1973 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and

the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed

from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation

of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and

corruption."

Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the

aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method

otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by

impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office, would

be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law.

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertationon the New Constitution, states that "judgement in cases o

impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and

disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the

Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless

be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in

accordance with law. The above provision is a reproduction of what

was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the

explicit character of the above provision that the effect of

impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to


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hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is

equally manifest that the party this convicted may be proceeded

against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. There

can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the

scope of the impeachment process (The Constitution f the

Philippines, pp. 465-466)." The clear implication is, the party

convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be

liable and subject of prosecution, trial and punishment according to

law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the

official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action "in

accordance with law" may not prosper. 2

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in

Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI

of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,

and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment

for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,

bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public

trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from

office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further

than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under

the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall

nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and

punishment according to law.

It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it

Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to above are

entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for

alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed

misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental

procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability

may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court

must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of

impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987

Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus

terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either

criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any

wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriateproceedings.

The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial

independence and separation of powers. The rule is important

because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of

this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against

them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties

who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of

judicial authority by the Court.

It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer

should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brough

against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a

legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.

The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this

Resolution upon Hon. Raul M. Gonzales and Mr Miguel Cuenco.

DIGEST

Facts: Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He

forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice Fernan. The letter was said to

be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter).

The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the

charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice

Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something about it.

The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the per curiam

Resolution of the SC, dismissing the charges made by Cuenco

against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In that resolution, Cuenco

was asked to show cause why he should not be held administrativelyliable for making serious accusations against Fernan.

Issue: Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred

during his term of office

Held: A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the

Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a

qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from

office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarmen

during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public

officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before

the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense whichcarries with it the penalty of removal from office.

Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be

dismissed is because under the Constitution, members of the SC

may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision

proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to

allow such public officer who may be removed solely by

impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an

office that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be

violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.

The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position anddisqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the

Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further

than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office. But

the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to

prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

The court is not saying that the members and other constitutiona

officer are entitled to immunity from liability. What the court is merely

saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement tha

must be observed before such liability ma be determined. A member


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of the SC must first be removed from office, via the constitutional

route of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either

criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong or

misbehavior in appropriate proceedings.

Estrada v Desierto

GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Ponente :Puno, J.

Facts :1. In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected President of

thePhilippines, while Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo was elected Vice-

President. The president was accused with corruption, culminating in

Ilocos Sur Governor ChavitSingsons accusations that the president

received millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

2. The Senate and the House of Representatives began

earlyinvestigations regarding the accusation, while key socio-

politicalfigures like Cardinal Sin, former Presidents Aquino and

Ramos,the vice president, senior advisers and cabinet members

called onthe president to resign, and resigned from their cabinetpoststhemselves

.3. The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with

21senator-judges presided over by Chief Justice HilarioDavide. At

apoint when 11 senator-judges ruled gainst opening a second

envelope of evidence showing the presidents P3.3 billion bank

account under the name Jose Velarde, the public prosecutors

resigned and a mass demonstration at EDSA began.

4. CJ Davide granted Senator Raul Rocos motion to postpone the

impeachment trial until the House of Representatives resolvedthe

lack of public prosecutors.5. With the defection of more officials and

of the army and policefrom the Estrada administration, the president

attempted toappease public sentiment by announcing a snap election

and byallowing the second envelope to be opened. The measures

failed,and the calls for resignation strengthened.6. On 20 January

2001, the president negotiated withrepresentatives of the vice-

president. News broke out that Chief Justice HilarioDavide would

administer the oath of presidency tothe vice president at EDSA

Shrine. Estrada issued two statements-

one stating reservations on the constitutionality of

Arroyospresidency, and another stating that he is incapable ofdispensinghis responsibilities as president, thus allowing Arroyo to be

theacting president.7. The Arroyo administration was met with

acceptance by thedifferent branches of government, by majority of

the public, andby the international community. The impeachment trial

wasclosed, despite sentiments such as those of Senator Defensor-

Santiago that the impeachment court had failed to resolve thecase,

leaving open questions regarding Estradas qualifications torun for

other elected posts.8. The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to

file a series of casesregarding the corruption of Estrada. Estrada filed

a motioncompelling the Ombudsman to refrain from furthe

proceedingsuntil his term as president was over. He also filed a

petition to beconfirmed as the lawful and incumbent president

temporarilyunable to fulfill his duties, thus making Arroyo an

actingpresident only.9. The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the

parties that they didnot declare the Office of the President vacant on

20 January 2001,b) to prohibit either party from discussing inpublic

the merits of the case while in its pendency, c) to enjointhe

Ombudsman from resolving pending criminal cases against Estrada

for 30 days.Issues:I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable

controversy.II. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable

controversy,whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave

whilerespondent Arroyo is an Acting President.III. Whether conviction

in the impeachment proceedings is acondition precedent for the

criminal prosecution of petitionerEstrada. In the negative and on the

assumption that petitioner isstill president, whether he is immune

from criminal prosecution.IV. Whether the prosecution of petitione

Estrada should beenjoined on the ground of prejudicia

publicityRuling:I. The petitions present a justiciable controversy

because thecases at bar pose legal, and not political, questions

Hence, thecases are within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.

Definition of political questions: ...thosequestions which, under the

Constitution, are to bedecided by the people in their sovereign

capacity, or inregard to which full discretionary authority has

beendelegated to the legislative or executive branch of

government.

--Former CJ Roberto Concepcion

Arroyos government is NOT revolutionary incharacter, since her oath

was taken under the 1987Constitution. EDSA II is an exercise of

people power of freedom of speech and the right to assembly. It is

intraconstitutional in this regard (within the scope of theConstitution)

The resignation of Estrada that it causedand the subsequen

succession of of Arroyo are subject to judicial review.

II. Estrada is NOT a President onleave while Arroyo is Acting

President. Under Section 11 Article VII, Estrada saysthat only

Congress has the ultimate authority todetermine whether the

President is incapable of performing his functions in the manne

provided bysaid provision. Hence, Arroyo has no power to judge

Estradas inability to do his job as President. However, both houses

of Congress expressedtheir recognition and support of Arroyo as thenewPresident, and it is implicitly clear in this recognition tha

Estradas inability is no longer temporary. Thus,Congress has

rejected Estradas claim of inability.

Furthermore, Court cannot exercise itsjudicial power to revise

decision of Congress inrecognizing Arroyo. To do so would be to

transgress principle of separation of powers, since this is a

politicalissue.


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III. Estrada contends that he has not beenconvicted in the

impeachment case and that he enjoysimmunity from all kinds of suit.

Executive immunity provision of 1973Constitution was no longer

included in the 1986Constitution. This is in accordance with SC ruling

in InRe: Saturnino Bermudez

that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being

brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure

but not beyond. When the president has resigned, thenproper

criminal and civil cases may already be filedagainst him

IV. Estrada argued that respondent Ombudsman should be stopped

from conducting theinvestigation of the cases filed against him

because of prejudicial publicity on his guilt, and that respondent has

also developed bias. In People v Teehankee, Jr. and Larranaga

vCourt of Appeals it was laid down that the right of anaccused to a

fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.Responsible press. Our

judges are smart enough to know thelaw and to disregard camera

drama and off-court evidence. Their exposure to media does not

affect theirimpartiality

Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10

November 2003)

Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR 160261, 10 November

2003)En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate

concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote concurringand

dissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur.Facts: On 28

November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives

adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules

approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of

Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee

onJustice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the

manner of disbursements and expenditures by theChief Justice of

the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2

June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an

impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief

Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the

Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of

the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed

by House Representatives, and was referred tothe House Committee

on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of

Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled

on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was"sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003

for being insufficient in substance. Four months and threeweeks

since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day

after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second

impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the

House by HouseRepresentatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.

Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry

initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second

impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of

Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the

Members of the House of Representatives.Various petitions fo

certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme

Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which

petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint

isunconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article X

of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be

initiated against the same official more than once within a period o

one year." Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to

those arising from impeachment proceedings.Held: The Court's

power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the

government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution

The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of

powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the

course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in al

courtsas a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which

is "the power of the court to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights

which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in

Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integra

component of the delicate system of checks and balances which

together with thecorollary principle of separation of powers, forms thebedrock of our republican form of government and insures tha

itsvast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which

it serves. The separation of powers is afundamental principle in ou

system of government. It obtains not through express provision but

by actual division inour Constitution. Each department of the

government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its

jurisdiction, and issupreme within its own sphere. But it does no

follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and

distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely

unrestrained and independent of each other. TheConstitution has

provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure

coordination in the workings of thevarious departments of the

government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the

final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise

of its power to determine the law, and hence to declareexecutive and

legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The majo

difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme

Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court isthat while the power of

judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Cour

and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine Supreme

Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution

is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded

definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse odiscretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and

the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of

Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S

Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of

Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in

the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate

impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise

of such power as embodied inSection 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article X


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thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote

to impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the

same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the

above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the

Constitution did not intend to leavethe matter of impeachment to the

sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-

defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining

the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of

judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this

Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional

action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention

that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings

would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the

Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole and "one section is not to

be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of

thecalibrated system of independence and interdependence that

insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers

assigned to it by the Constitution.

Francisco vs. House of Representeatives G.R. No. 160261

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were

filed against Supreme CourtChief Justice Hilario Davide. The

justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the

subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of

impeachment providedfor by law.ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of

the second impeachment complaint against Chief JusticeHilario G.

Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and

whether theresolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted

in a political crisis.HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules

of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedingswhich were approved by

the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently,

thesecond impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide, is barred underparagraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the

Constitution.REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising

from the controversy, this Court is evermindful of the essential truth

that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among

thelegislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no

means prescribes for absoluteautonomy in the discharge by each of

that part of the governmental power assigned to it by thesovereign

people.At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and

balances which has been carefullycalibrated by the Constitution to

temper the official acts of each of these three branches mustbe given

effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists

no constitutionalbasis for the contention that the exercise of judicial

review over impeachment proceedingswould upset the system of

checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as

awhole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both

are integral components of the calibrated system of independence

and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act

beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.The framers of

the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning.

Thus when aproposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at

least one-third of all the Members of theHouse shall be necessary

to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposa

todelete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not

initiate impeachmentproceeding but rather the filing of a complain

does.Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act o

filing and referral or endorsementof the impeachment complaint to

the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at leastone-third

of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary

General of theHouse, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article Xbecomes clear. Once an impeachmentcomplaint has been initiated

another impeachment complaint may not be filed against thesame

official within a one year period.The Court in the present petitions

subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits onlythe main

issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the

Chief Justicetransgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time

bar rule. Beyond this, it did not goabout assuming jurisdiction where

it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out o

decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business o

this Court to assert judicialdominance over the other two great

branches of the government

Gutierrez vs. HR

Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House Of Representatives

Committee On Justice, et.al.

Doctrine: x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis

et non quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment

proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the

resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something

prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is

already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning

Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verifiedcomplaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action

This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps tha

follow.

Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros

Baraquel, et.al. (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complain

against petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato

Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint

Both impeachment complaints were endorsed by different Party-Lis

Representatives.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, aschairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy

Secretary General for Operations to include the two complaints in the

Order of Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the

Order of Business for the following day.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the

House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to

public respondent.


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After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1,

2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it

considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.

Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of

the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider

the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public

respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity;instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an

answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her

motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7,

2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation

of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in

substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the

complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the

truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid

judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was

served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an

answer to the complaints within 10 days.

Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present

impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the

Constitution?)

Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of

the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be

initiated against the same official more than once within a period of

one year.

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of thefirst impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four

days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She

posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second

impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public

respondent.

Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the

complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps

done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment

proceedings.

Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, whatthe Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her

reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint to den ote the

limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of

statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural

sense.

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an

impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the

candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment

complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick

alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted

matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the

complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachmen

proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed

more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time

What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is

kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning

subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those

motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon

is only made subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common

parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a

committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, bu

only as to the propriety of the referral. With respect to complaints for

impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequen

impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where officia

records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed

against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to

the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lestit becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited

second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before

the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as

the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days

within which to make the proper referral.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an

impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution

states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by

any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon

a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be

included in the Order of Business within ten session days, andreferred to the proper Committee within three session days

thereafter.

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non

quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachmen

proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the

resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something

prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is

already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning

Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified

complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action

This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps thafollow.

Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the

act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints

each having their own respective 60-session-day period o

disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduc

overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the

complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachmen

or the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public


7/18

respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as

advocated by the Reyes group), or the Committee on Justice

concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the

recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of

these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the

constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too

loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under

one proceeding.

Lecaroz vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa

Cruz, Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz,

was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of

Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its

SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang

Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil

Red won the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red

was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the

Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the

municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could

not yet sit as member of the municipal council until the Governor of

Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received

his appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But

still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the

Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie

continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was

able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration

after three years and nine months from the date he received his

appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed

with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaintsagainst the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two

officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative.

After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the

Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through

falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1)

information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The

Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty

on all counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of

violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor

Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for

reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the SupremeCourt.

Issue:Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his

successor is appointed or chosen or has qualified.

Held: YES.

To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the

terms of office of KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB and of

the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 o

the KB Constitution respectively provide -

Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all loca

elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term o

six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March

1980.

In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the

association of barangay councils and the president of the federationof kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous

with their tenure is president of their respective association and

federation .

Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shal

continue to hold office until the last Sunday of November 1985 o

such time that the newly elected officers shall have qualified and

assumed office in accordance with this Constitution.

The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectora

representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated

copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath ooffice. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue

as member of the SB although in a holdover capacity since his term

had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this

postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted

above pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying that since

no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no

holdover with respect to positions in the SB.

The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concep

of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has

a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term

It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a

fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until thei

successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is

found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the

term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, bu

the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected

and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.

In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a

Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the

expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does no

also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express

or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an

officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or

chosen and has qualified.The legislative intent of not allowing

holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the

legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the

law-making body favors the same.

Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,and courts

generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative

intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an


8/18

executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time,

wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise

its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public

policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent

public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid

a hiatus in the performance of government functions

Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)

Fast factsZaldivar (pet) is one of several defedants in Criminal CasesNos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The

Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation

and filed the criminal informations in those cases.Contention c/o

Zaldivar Gonzales (resp), as Tanodbayan and under the provisions

of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power

andauthority independently to investigate and to institute cases for

graft and corruption against public officials and employees,and hence

that the informations filed in the aforementioned Criminal Cases were

all null and void.Philippine Daily Globe article Tanod Scores SC for

Quashing Graft Case Gonzales is quoted in many occasions saying

thatstopping him from investigating graft cases, like that involving

Zaldivar, can aggravate the thought that affluent persons

can prevent the progress of trialWhat I am afraid of (with the

issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich andinfluential

persons get favorable actions from the SC, it is difficult for an

ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given duecourse. He

continues to accuse that this issue will promote further lack of

confidence in the judiciary. While he has beensupposedly been

assigned by President Aquino to preside over graft cases as

Tanodbayan, the SC has been continually preventing him to do

so.April 27, 1988 SC DecisionOrder Gonzales too cease and desist

from conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the

Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of

the Ombudsman.Statements in MFR filed by Gonzales on April 28,

19881. That he had been approached by a leading member fo the

SC and he was asked to goslow on Zaldivar and not be toohard

on him2. That he was approached and asked to refrain from

investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the SC

because it will embarrass this Court3. That in several instances, the

respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the

SC and was asked todismiss cases against 2 members of theCourtAuthority to disciplineThe SC, as regulator and guardian of the

legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys.

The authority todiscipline lawyers stems from the Courts

constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law,

whichincludes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of

law.Contentions c/o Gonzales Members of the court should inhibit

themselves as they were biased and prejudiced against him The

issues of the proceeding should be passed upon the IBP because he

does not expect due processfrom the SC, that the SC has become

incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The SC deliberately

rendered an erroneous decision when it rendered it Decision on Apri

27, 1988 That decision was rendered in retaliation by the SC agains

him for the position he had taken that the SC Justices cannotclaim

immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors, and

in order to stop respondent from investigatingcases against some o

the protgs or friends of some SC Justices. The members of the

SC have improperly pressured him to render decisions favorable to

their colleagues and friends,including dismissal of cases against 2

of its own members.Held & RatioConsidering the kinds of statements

of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past

penalized as contemptuousor as warranting application o

disciplinary sanctions, the SC holds that the statements made by

Gonzales clearly constitutecontempt and call for the exercise of the

disciplinary authority of the SC. The statements, especially the one

which mentionsthat the SC made a deliberately erroneous decision

constitute the grossest disrespect for the Court. Such statements

veryclearly debase and degrade the SC and, through the SC, the

entire system of administration of justice in the

country.DispositiveAtty. Raul M. Gonzales is suspended from the

practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from theSC, thesuspensions to take effect immediately

Almonte v. Vasquez

Facts:

This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners

Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record

custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and

Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to

Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as

vouchers from enforcing his orders.

Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while

Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division

The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in

connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging tha

funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had

been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written

by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed

to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished severa

government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.

May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB hasa syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is

manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents

or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency

had salary differential last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla

were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and

converted to ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects

payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers

every week for them not to be apprehended.


9/18

In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all

the allegations written on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to

quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was denied.

Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of

privilege of an agency of the government on the ground that

"knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services

Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its

operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the

whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."

Issue:

Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to

personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea

that such documents are classified without violating their equal

protection of laws.

Held:

YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is

recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military,diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold

the identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In

the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets

will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the

personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and

evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal

activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,

economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."

Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be

sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there

is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose

military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can

be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in

the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for

these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and

other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the

designated protectors of the people of the Constitution.

Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the

laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the

aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified

complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,"while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman

anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place,

there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in

the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in

permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the

framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known

reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against

official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the

Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and

prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its

jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and

influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held agains

them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor

and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces

tecum would violate petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is

enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this

case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces

tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or

custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the

disbursement by the EII of funds for personal service has already

been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should objec

to the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman

CABALIT V. COA (2012)

[G.R. No. 180236, January 17, 2012]

FACTS:

As per investigation of the State Auditors Cabalit and Coloma

in their Joint-Affidavit, a scheme was perpetrated by LTO employees

Leonardo G. Olaivar, Gemma P. Cabalit, Filadelfo S. Apit and

Samuel T. Alabat, in the vehicle registration fees.

In a Joint Evaluation Report, Graft Investigators Pio R

Dargantes and Virginia Palanca-Santiago found grounds to conduc

a preliminary investigation.[11] Hence, a formal charge for dishonesty

was filed against Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat before the Office o

the Ombudsman-Visayas, and the parties were required to submi

their counter-affidavits.

In response, Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat submitted

separate counter-affidavits, all essentially denying knowledge and

responsibility for the anomalies.

After proper hearing the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas

rendered judgment, finding petitioners liable for dishonesty for

tampering the official receipts to make it appear that they collected

lesser amounts than they actually collected. Accordingly, they were

given the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory

penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture o

retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the

government service.

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the decision, but thei

motions were denied by the Ombudsman. Hence filed with the CA

separate petitions.

The CA dismissed the consolidated petition and modified tha

Olaiver be held administratively liable for gross neglect of duty which

carries the same penalty as dishonesty.


10/18

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but the

CA denied their motions.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the right of due

process.

2. Whether or not the petitioners were administratively liable.

Ruling:

1. No. In this case, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded

petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them

to submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other

evidence in their defense. Since petitioners have been afforded the

right to be heard and to defend themselves, they cannot rightfully

complain that they were denied due process of law. It is satisfied

when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an

opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative

proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity

for the person so charged to answer the accusations against himconstitute the minimum requirements of due process. More often, this

opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties

submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long as a party

is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course,

said party is not denied due process.

2. Yes. Neglect of duty implies only the failure to give proper

attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either

carelessness or indifference. However, the facts of this case show

more than a failure to mind one's task. Rather, they manifest thatOlaivar committed acts of dishonesty, which is defined as the

concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's

office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a

disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack

of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle. Hence,

the CA should have found Olaivar liable for dishonesty.

The CA correctly imposed the proper penalty upon Olaivar.

Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative

Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty, like gross neglect of duty, is

classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even if

committed for the first time. Under Section 58, such penalty likewisecarries with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service

eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from re-

employment in the government service.

In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given full

administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely

to receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He

is to conduct investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and

require production of evidence and place respondents under

preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the

penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a

public officer or employee.

CRUZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN

GARCIA, J.:

Thru this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court, petitioner Buencamino Cruz seeks to set aside the Decisiondated 30 January 1998[1] of the Sandiganbayan in its Criminal Case

No. 22830, finding him guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic

Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graf

and Corrupt Practices Act, and its Resolution dated 14 July 1998,[2

denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents are not at all disputed:

Following the May 1992 local elections and his proclamation as

mayor-elect of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Victor Miranda

sought an audit investigation of the municipalitys 1991-1992 financia

transactions. Petitioner Buencamino Cruz served as municipal mayoof the town in 1991 until his term ended in the middle of 1992.

Acting on the request, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued COA

Order No. 19-1700 constituting a Special Audit Team. In the course

of the investigation, the Special Audit Team discovered that certain

anomalous and irregular transactions transpired during the covered

period, the most serious being the purchase of construction materials

evidenced by Sales Invoices No. 131145 and 131137 in the

aggregate amount of P54,542.56, for which payment out of municipa

funds was effected twice. The double payments were made in favo

of Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply (Kelly Lumber, for short)

and were accomplished through the issuance of two (2)disbursement vouchers (DVs), i.e., DV No. 101-92-06-1222 and DV

No. 101-92-01-195. Petitioner signed the vouchers and encashed the

two (2) corresponding PNB checks, both of which were payable to

his order.

The findings of the Audit Team were embodied in a 336-page SAO

Report No. 93-28, on the basis of which petitioner was charged with

violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The provision reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts o

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the

following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer andare declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the

government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits

advantage or preference in the discharge of his official

administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, eviden

bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply


11/18

to officers and employees of offices or government corporations

charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The Information[3] against petitioner, filed before the Sandiganbayan

and thereat docketed as Criminal Case No. 22830, alleged:

That on June 26, 1992, or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Philippines, and within

the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused

Buencamino M. Cruz, a public officer being then the Municipal Mayorof Bacoor, Cavite and while in the performance of his official function,

acting in evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully

and criminally pay Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply the amount

of Fifty Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two Pesos and 56/100

(P54,542.56), Philippine Currency, despite the fact that said account

had been previously paid by the Municipality, thus, causing undue

injury to the Government in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of Not Guilty. In time,

trial ensued.

In a decision[4] dated 30 January 1998, the respondent court found

petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e)

of R.A. 3019 and sentenced him to serve imprisonment of Seven (7)

years, and One (1), month as minimum, to Ten (10) years of prision

mayor as maximum, with consequent perpetual disqualification from

holding public office, as provided by law.

The anti-graft court predicated its judgment of conviction on

the strength of the following main premises:

The numerous, other alleged anomalies and

irregularities fully detailed and outlined in said S.A.O. Report No. 93-

28 did not appear to the Special Audit Team, as meriting prosecution

of those who might have been guilty thereof. But, the same report

strongly recommended prosecution as notwithstanding . . . the

subsequent refund of the total amount of P54,542.56 from the

supplier, Kelly Lumber . . . for the alleged double payment especially

due . . . to the fact that the amount was not directly paid to the

supplier but the Municipal Mayor, as shown in Exh. 1 for

P150,000.00 and Exh. H for P20,000.00 and Exhs. 1-1 and H-1

showing that the said two checks were actually encashed by theMunicipal Mayor, respondent herein ( See: p.192 of the S.A.O.

Report No. 93-28). A painful examination of Exhs. B and B -1 to

B-11 shows that although there was a total sum due of P31,198.01

and supported by documents under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-

9201-194, they are really, only supported by documents showing the

statement of the account thereof and yet Sales Invoice No. 131145

was not attached to support the voucher. Besides, said Sales Invoice

No. 131145 had already been paid previously as shown by a

photocopy of PNB Check No. 214785, dated January 30, 1992 (see.

Exh. B-2-A) which proves that payment was made upon the prio

request of the accused Buencamino M. Cruz, and that the said

amount of P21,041.56 had already been paid under the same

Voucher No. 101-9201-194. Also Exhs. E, E-1 to E-7 show tha

under Disbursement Voucher No. 1163, dated June 26,1992

payment had been made together with other invoices, per PNB

Check No. 197813 in the total sum of P150,000.00; whereas, the

same account of P33,501.00 had already been paid on January 30

1992, thereby, showing that there is double payment and the two

checks issued in payment of these two invoices to the accused

Buencamino Mallari-Cruz as payee, shows indubitably, that there

was a willful act, with malice aforethought, in having a second

payment made, in order that the accused may be able to pocket the

money, as he in fact did by encashing the said two checks. For it is

likewise evident under the principle RES IPSA LOQUITOR (The thing

speaks for itself), namely: that if the money of P54,542.56 were

indeed payment for the goods delivered by the supplier-Kelly Lumbe

and Construction Supply, simple reason and well accepted

commercial practice demand for the checks in the first place, to

made payable to the suppliers of goods sold in payment thereof. But

why should payment be made to Mayor Buencamino M. Cruz, whenhe ought not to derive any material benefits, whatsoever, or any

pecuniary interest from the transactions entered into by him, for and

on behalf of the Municipality, . . . .

The only excuse given by the accused when he finally

testified in his own defense, in very lame. For the excuse he gave, in

explaining the anomaly or irregularity is that he was not aware of the

double payment and that, he just signed the voucher for payment, as

the last officer to sign the voucher, in order to effect paymen

thereon, to the supplier . . ., and that it was the duty of the Municipa

Treasurer to verify the actual deliveries of the goods sold and thei

payment afterwards. This may be true, if the ensuing checks issuedin payment of the goods covered by the voucher for payment, were

made payable, indeed, to the real suppliers of the goods, and no

made payable to the Mayor, . . ., and who in fact encashed the

checks. The only real defense put up here by the accused is that

The supplier-Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply had

subsequently reimbursed the Municipality of the amount o

P54,542.56 thereby precluding denial of the double payment as

shown in Exh. 1 of the accused, . . . . (Underscoring in the original)

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, per the graf

courts resolution of 17 July 1998,[5] petitioner is now with us via the

instant recourse.

Petitioner acknowledges signing the DVs which paved the way for

the double payment situation. He also admits encashing the checks

corresponding to the DVs in question. He nonetheless urges the

setting aside of the assailed decision, anchoring his virtual plea fo

acquittal on four (4) basic issues, to wit: (1) the fatally flawed

Information filed against him; (2) the applicability in his favor of wha

he tagged as the Arias Doctrine; (3) the absence of bad faith on his

part; and (4) the refund of the amount representing overpayment.


12/18


13/18

Moreover, petitioner even admitted in his memorandum[9] that the

refund by Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply is the best proof

that he did not pay himself for the costs of the supply x x x.

It bears stressing that an information needs only allege the

acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense[10], in

this case, the fact that petitioner made payment to Kelly Lumber

twice, without need of going into specifics of how such payment was

made. The accompanying details of the process of payment can be

established during trial through evidentiary offer.

Invoking the lessons taught in Arias vs. Sandiganbayan[11],

petitioner next argues that he cannot be held guilty of violation of

Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for, following the doctrine established in that

case, he had every right to rely, to a reasonable extent, on the bona

fides of his subordinates, referring to the municipal treasurer and

accountant, who prepared the DVs and the checks in question.

Petitioners reliance on Arias is very much misplaced. As may be

recalled, this Court, in acquitting the accused in Arias, made the

following pronouncements:

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records,

inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned persons.

It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly-sized office could personally do

all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The

Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have

to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good

faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into

negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors,

the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the

amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at

the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served,

and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement vouchers

accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added

reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any

executive head of even small government agencies or commissions

can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are

hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and

supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. x x x.

There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval

appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and

conviction. (Italics in the original; Underscoring supplied).

Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an

exceptional circumstance which should have prodded petitioner, if he

were out to protect the interest of the municipality he swore to serve,

to be curious and go beyond what his subordinates prepared or

recommended. In fine, the added reason contemplated in Arias

which would have put petitioner on his guard and examine the

check/s and vouchers with some degree of circumspection before

signing the same was obtaining in this case.

We refer to the unusual fact that the checks issued as payment fo

construction materials purchased by the municipality were not made

payable to the supplier, Kelly Lumber, but to petitioner himself even

as the disbursement vouchers attached thereto were in the name of

Kelly Lumber. The discrepancy between the names indicated in the

checks, on one hand, and those in the disbursement vouchers, on

the other, should have alerted petitioner - if he were conscientious o

his duties as he purports to be - that something was definitely amiss

The fact that the checks for the municipalitys purchases were made

payable upon his order should, without more, have prompted

petitioner to examine the same further together with the supporting

documents attached to them, and not rely heavily on the

recommendations of his subordinates.

It need no stretching of the mind to understand that the person or

entity in whose favor a voucher is processed should also be the

payee appearing in the checks issued to satisfy the same. Yet, fo

still unexplained reasons, petitioner chose to deviate from what to us

is an ordinary accounting procedure, doubtless for a consideration

less than honest.

Apropos the third issue, it is petitioners submission that, while he

might have been negligent in the performance of his duties, the

prosecution had not, at its end, established his being in bad faith.

Whether or not petitioner acted in good or bad faith in effecting what

at bottom, is an unauthorized double payment, addresses a question

of credibility. As a general proposition, the determination of credibility

is the domain of the trial court, not this Court.[12] And it cannot be

overemphasized that the respondent court has declared petitioner to

have acted with malice afterthought, a disposition which, in the

language of that court, is evident from checks originally issued in

payment for goods paid twice made in favor of the accused himself.

Added the respondent court:

Indeed by the mere fact that the accused herein had two (2)

checks issued to him in his name, and then, collecting the money in

cash without any reason therefore (sic), is evident bad faith, as

against bonafides (good faith) for his very act of having these two (2

checks in his name runs against the gamut of public accountability .

Lest it be overlooked, the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A

3019 may be committed even if bad faith is not attendant, the

elements of the crime being:

(1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in

conspiracy with them;

(2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the discharge of the public

officers official, administrative or judicial functions;

(3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether Government o

a private person;


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(4) that such injury is caused by giving any unwarranted benefits,

advantage or preference to such party; and

(5) that the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad

faith or gross inexcusable negligence. [14]

In Sistoza vs. Desierto, et al.,[15] we held:

xxx Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are

not enough for one to be held liable under the law since the act ofbad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest,

respectively, while the negligent deed should both be gross and

inexcusable. Xxx

Given the above perspective, it is abundantly clear that a

violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed even

through negligence provided that said negligence is both gross and

inexcusable.

Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that petitioner did not act in bad faith,

he cannot plausibly deny that his negligence under the premises was

not only gross but also inexcusable. For, although the checks wereon their face payable to him even as the supporting disbursement

vouchers were in the name of Kelly Lumber, petitioner still affixed his

signature thereon. It is unthinkable that such irregularity, given his

stature and the nature of his position, would have passed him

unnoticed. In turn, his subordinates could not have so easily, and

with such daring, presented him with a set of questionable

documents - as petitioner would want to impress this Court - without

his instructions.

Finally, it is puerile for petitioner to contend that Kelly

Lumbers act of refunding the amount subject of double payment

argues against the idea of the government suffering damages. Theinjury suffered by the government is beyond cavil. This conclusion

was aptly explained by the Sandiganbayan in the following wise:

Damage to the government in that instance [referring to the

alleged double payment] is inevitable for the simple reason that

money taken from the coffers was used by someone else for about

two years and without paying interest and without authority for its

use. (N.B. 19 March 1997 is only two months short of two years from

filing of this case).

Moreover, refund of the amount subject of the prosecution is

not one of those enumerated under Article 89 of the Revised PenalCode[16] which would totally extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of

the Revised Penal Code applies in a suppletory character as

provided for under Article 10[17] of the same Code.

As regards the penalty imposed by the respondent court, we find the

same to be proper in point of severity, albeit its employment of the

term prision mayor is inappropriate. It is proper because Section 9

of R.A. 3019 provides:

SECTION 9. Penalties for violations

(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the

unlawful acts or omission enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of

this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six

years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetua

disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in

favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained

wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawfu

income.

In the same breath, however, the use of the same term is

inappropriate because the penalty of prision mayor is imposable only

for felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code or when a

special law specifically provides for such penalty for a given crime

As we have said in People vs. Simon

With respect to the first example, where the penalties under

the special law are different from and are without reference or

relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no

suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties unde

said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on o

applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type

of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.

The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given

example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty o

14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually

equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion

temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is no

given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties fo

carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the

law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties

in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No

6539 and special laws of the same formulation. (Italics in the originalUnderscoring supplied

Republic Act 3019 under which petitioner was prosecuted and

convicted is a special law which does not provide for a penalty o

prision mayor for any of the acts punishable therein. Accordingly, a

modification of the decision under review with respect to its penalty

component is in order.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed

decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED, with the

modification that petitioner BUENCAMINO MALLARI-CRUZ is

hereby sentenced to a prison term of seven (7) years and one (1month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetua

disqualification from holding public office, as provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

BUENASEDA vs. FLAVIER GR No. 106719QUIASON, J:

Facts:


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improper or inefficient. This power has been held to include the

investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public

official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are

related to, or connected with, or arise from the performance of his

official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a

public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public

official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman

to investigate and prosecute.

In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on

prosecutors for assistance as provided in Section 31 of the

Ombudsman Act of 1989. Even if the preliminary investigation had

been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his

determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be

subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is

because under Section 31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a

prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and

control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the

power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or

modify his (prosecutor's) decision.

Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the

Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with

the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same

penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that

petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for

contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather

than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to

discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave

misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the

Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive

suspension. Sections 21 & 24 of the same Act provides for thispower.

Under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act, preventive suspension is

warranted if evidence against the public official is strong. As held in

Buenaseda v. Flavier, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to

the determination of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint

against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in

connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in

the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.

Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial

Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio

Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that theproper prosecution of that case may not be hampered. In addition,

because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave

misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if

proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman

was justified in ordering their preventive suspension. Under the same

provision of the law, it provides that the preventive suspension shall

continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman

but not more than six months, without pay. Their preventive

suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lif

Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.

PCGG vs Desierto

Facts:

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued

Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact

Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was taskedto inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and

recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.

On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order

No. 61 expanding the functions of the Committee to include the

inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest o

non-behest.

The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a

"behest loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower

corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by

high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) thestockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are

identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the

purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-

feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h)

the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."

Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working

Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and

PNB.

After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the

said loan transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtainedby NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficien

capital and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's

investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way

of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able

to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of

85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as

one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the Genera

Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then Presiden

Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the

public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage

requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the

app

Documents

Art XI Compiled Cases