Arrow Transportation Corp

7/27/2019 Arrow Transportation Corp

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Arrow Transportation Corp

-vs-

Board of Transportation and Sultan Rent-A-Car, Inc.

GR No. L-9655, 21 March 1975

63 SCR 193

FACTSPetitioner Arrow and private respondent Sultan are both domestic corporations. Petitioner

is a holder of a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a public utility bus. Private

respondent applied for the issuance of a CPC to operate a similar service. Without the requiredpublication, public respondent Board granted a provisional permit to operate. Petitioner moved

for reconsideration and cancellation of the provisional permit. Before resolution of the motion,

petitioner filed for herein petition arguing that there must be publication before a provisional

permit can be issued, with reference made to PD 101, which authorized the Board to grantprovisional permits when warranted.

ISSUEWhether or not the issuance of the provisional permit was legal.

HELDThe Court held in the affirmative. For a provisional permit to operate a public utility, an

ex parte hearing would suffice. The decisive consideration is the existence of public need. That

was shown in this case, respondent Board, on the basis of demonstrable data, being satisfied of

the pressing necessity for the grant of the provisional permit sought.

[G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999]

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGER

POSADAS, DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR. ISAGANI MEDINA,DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II,

DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and MARICHU LAMBINO,petitioners,

vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE,

respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA,J.:

For review before the Court is the decision of the Court of Appealsi[1] in CA-G.R. SP No.

42788, dated December 16, 1997, which granted private respondents application for a writ of

mandatory injunction, and its resolution, dated July 13, 1998, denying petitioners motion forreconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:


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Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a

Philippine visitors visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in

Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy(CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.

After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondentwent on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio

in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in

Rome. She returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on her dissertation entitled, TamilInfluences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department ofAnthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate

Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready

for her oral defense. Dr. Rolda suggested that the oral defense be held on January 6, 1993 but, in

a letter, dated February 2, 1993, Dr. Serena Diokno rescheduled it on February 5, 1993. Named

as members of the dissertation panel were Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, SriSkandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as the deans representative.

After going over private respondents dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo

Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondents dissertation that was lifted, without

proper acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia(1967), volume I, pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885 reprint) and from John Edyes article

entitled Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the

Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting

Navigation in theRoyal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal, volume I, pp. 1-14 (1833).ii[2]

Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation on February 5, 1993.Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense

by affixing their signatures on the approval form. These were Drs. Manuel, Quiason,

Skandarajah, and Teodoro. Dr. Quiason added the following qualification to his signature:

Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the suggestions I made during the successful defense of herPh.D. thesis.iii[3]

Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but added the following comment:

Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsang-ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga revisions ng

dissertation.iv[4]

Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his signature:

Kailangang isagawa ang mga mahahalagang pagbabago at ipakita sa panel ang bound copies.v[5]


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In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and addressed to her thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel, private

respondent requested a meeting with the panel members, especially Dr. Medina, to discuss the

amendments suggested by the panel members during the oral defense. The meeting was held atthe deans office with Dean Paz, private respondent, and a majority of the defense panel

present.vi[6] During the meeting, Dean Paz remarked that a majority vote of the panel members

was sufficient for a student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the consent of theDeans representative.

On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondentsgraduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation.

In April 1993, private respondent submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertation to Drs.Manuel, Skandarajah, and Quiason, who expressed their assent to the dissertation. Petitioners

maintain, however, that private respondent did not incorporate the revisions suggested by the

panel members in the final copies of her dissertation.

Private respondent left a copy of her dissertation in Dr. Teodoros office on April 15, 1993 andproceeded to submit her dissertation to the CSSP without the approvals of Dr. Medina and Dr.

Teodoro, relying on Dean Pazs March 5, 1993 statement.

Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval, while Dr. Medina did not sign the approvalform.vii[7]

Dean Paz then accepted private respondents dissertation in partial fulfillment of the courserequirements for the doctorate degree in Anthropology.

In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993, private respondent expressed concern over matters

related to her dissertation. She sought to explain why the signature of Dr. Medina was notaffixed to the revision approval form. Private respondent said that since she already had the

approval of a majority of the panel members, she no longer showed her dissertation to Dr.Medina nor tried to obtain the latters signature on the revision approval form. She likewise

expressed her disappointment over the CSSP administration and charged Drs. Diokno and

Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation, and further warned

Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious acts against her.

On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation

for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board ofRegents for final approval, included private respondents name.

On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for AcademicAffairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondents name from the list of candidates for

graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. Her letter

reads:viii[8]

Abril 21, 1993


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Dr. Milagros Ibe

Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs

Unibersidad ng PilipinasQuezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C.

Mahal na Dr. Ibe,

Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na hwag munang isama ang pangalan ni Ms. Arokiaswam[y]

William Margaret Celine sa listahan ng mga bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D. (Anthropology)ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa mga malubhang bintang nya sa ilang myembro ng panel para sa oral

defense ng disertasyon nya at sa mga akusasyon ng ilan sa mga ito sa kanya.

Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna ang ilang bagay bago makonfer ang degri kay Ms.

Arokiaswam[y]. Kelangan po ito para mapangalagaan ang istandard ng pinakamataas na degree

ng Unibersidad.

(Sgd.)

CONSUELO JOAQUIN-PAZ, Ph.D.

Dekano

Apparently, however, Dean Pazs letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because thenext day, April 22, 1993, the Board approved the University Councils recommendation for the

graduation of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, on April 24,1993, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology.

On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter to private respondent, dated April 21, 1993, thatshe would not be granted an academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusationscontained in her letter dated April 17, 1993.

In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private respondent claimed that Dr. Medinas unfavorableattitude towards her dissertation was a reaction to her failure to include him and Dr. Francisco in

the list of panel members; that she made the revisions proposed by Drs. Medina and Teodoro in

the revised draft of her dissertation; and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment.

In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May 1, 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged private

respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be

withdrawn.ix[9]

On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee, composed of faculty members fromvarious disciplines and chaired by Dr. Eva Duka-Ventura, to investigate the plagiarism charge

against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr.

Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn.x[10]


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In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against

her.xi[11]

On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least ninety

(90) instances or portions in private respondents thesis which were lifted from sources without

proper or due acknowledgment.

On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to

withdraw private respondents doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to theUniversity Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same

recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993.

On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents deferred action on the recommendation to study the

legal implications of its approval.xii[12]

Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23, 1993, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman

summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her writtenexplanation to the charges against her.

During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and provided

her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee.xiii[13] Private respondent, on the otherhand, submitted her written explanation in a letter dated September 25, 1993.

Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993 between Chancellor Roman and private

respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled on October 27,

1993 but private respondent did not attend it, alleging that the Board of Regents had already

decided her case before she could be fully heard.

On October 11, 1993, private respondent wrote to Dr. Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President, alleging

that some members of the U.P. administration were playing politics in her case.xiv[14] She sentanother letter, dated December 14, 1993, to Dr. Armand Fabella, Chairman of the Board of

Regents, complaining that she had not been afforded due process and claiming that U.P. could no

longer withdraw her degree since her dissertation had already been accepted by the CSSP.xv[15]

Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services justified the position of the University Council in

its report to the Board of Regents. The Board of Regents, in its February 1, 1994 and March 24,1994 meetings, further deferred action thereon.

On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a letter to the Board of Regents requesting a re-investigation of her case. She stressed that under the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct

and Discipline, it was the student disciplinary tribunal which had jurisdiction to decide cases of

dishonesty and that the withdrawal of a degree already conferred was not one of the authorizedpenalties which the student disciplinary tribunal could impose.


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On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents decided to release private respondents transcript of

grades without annotation although it showed that private respondent passed her dissertation with

12 units of credit.

On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94

constituting a special committee composed of senior faculty members from the U.P. units outsideDiliman to review the University Councils recommendation to withdraw private respondents

degree. With the approval of the Board of Regents and the U.P. Diliman Executive Committee,

Posadas created a five-man committee, chaired by Dr. Paulino B. Zafaralla, with membersselected from a list of nominees screened by Dr. Emerenciana Arcellana, then a member of the

Board of Regents. On August 31, 1994, the members of the Zafaralla committee and private

respondent met at U.P. Los Baos.

Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P. Diliman Registrar released to private respondent a

copy of her transcript of grades and certificate of graduation.

In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated September 1, 1994, private respondent requested that theZafaralla committee be provided with copies of the U.P. Charter (Act No. 1870), the U.P. Rules

and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, her letter-response to Chancellor Roman,dated September 25, 1993, as well as all her other communications.

On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas obtained the Zafaralla Committees report, signedby its chairman, recommending the withdrawal of private respondents doctorate degree. The

report stated:xvi[16]

After going through all the pertinent documents of the case and interviewing Ms. Arokiaswamy

William, the following facts were established:

1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive lifting from a published source word for

word and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without any acknowledgment of the source, even bya mere quotation mark. At least 22 counts of such documented liftings were identified by the

Committee. These form part of the approximately ninety (90) instances found by the Committee

created by the Dean of the College and subsequently verified as correct by the Special

Committee. These instances involved the following forms of intellectual dishonesty: directlifting/copying without acknowledgment, full/partial lifting with improper documentation and

substitution of terms or words (e.g., Tamil in place of Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of

Indianization) from an acknowledged source in support of her thesis (attached herewith is a copy

of the documents for reference); and

2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism.

Fact is, she informed the Special Committee that she had been admitting having lifted severalportions in her dissertation from various sources since the beginning.

In view of the overwhelming proof of massive lifting and also on the admission of Ms.

Arokiaswamy William that she indeed plagiarized, the Committee strongly supports the


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recommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to withdraw the doctoral degree of Ms. Margaret

Celine Arokiaswamy William.

On the basis of the report, the University Council, on September 24, 1994, recommended to the

Board of Regents that private respondent be barred in the future from admission to the

University either as a student or as an employee.

On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of Regents sent private respondent the following

letter:xvii[17]

4 January 1995

Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William

Department of Anthropology

College of Social Sciences and PhilosophyU.P. Diliman, Quezon City

Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William:

This is to officially inform you about the action taken by the Board of Regents at its 1081st and1082nd meetings held last 17 November and 16 December 1994 regarding your case, the excerpts

from the minutes of which are attached herewith.

Please be informed that the members present at the 1081 st BOR meeting on 17 November 1994

resolved, by a majority decision, to withdraw your Ph.D. degree as recommended by the U.P.Diliman University Council and as concurred with by the External Review Panel composed of

senior faculty from U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila. These faculty members were chosen by lot

from names submitted by the University Councils of U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila.

In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter requesting that you be given a good lawyer by the

Board, the Board, at its 1082nd meeting on 16 December 1994, suggested that you direct your

request to the Office of Legal Aid, College of Law, U.P. Diliman.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.)

VIVENCIO R. JOSE

Secretary of the Universityand of the Board of Regents

On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a letter to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoez,

Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, asking the commissions intervention.xviii[18]

In a letter, dated February 14, 1995, to Secretary Ricardo Gloria, Chairman of the Board ofRegents, she asked for a reinvestigation of her case. She also sought an audience with the Board


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of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President Javier, in a letter

dated June 2, 1995.

On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition formandamus with a prayer for a

writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No.

Q-95-24690 and assigned to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.xix[19] Shealleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without

affording her procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her

degree and to pay her P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and P1,500,000.00 ascompensation for lost earnings.

On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227, rendered a decision dismissing the petition formandamus for lack of merit.xx[20] Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which

on December 16, 1997, reversed the lower court. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts

decision reads:xxi[21]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents areordered to restore to petitioner her degree of Ph.D. in Anthropology.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE WRITOF MANDAMUS AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RESTORE RESPONDENTSDOCTORAL DEGREE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE

DOCTORAL DEGREE GIVEN RESPONDENT BY U.P. CANNOT BE RECALLEDWITHOUT VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

AND TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DEPRIVING

PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.xxii[22]

Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfully excluded

from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so as to justify the

issuance of the writ ofmandamus. They also contend that she failed to prove that the restoration


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of her degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal of the degree violated her right

to the enjoyment of intellectual property.

On the other hand, private respondent, unassisted by counsel, argue that petitioners acted

arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion in withdrawing her degree even prior to verifying

the truth of the plagiarism charge against her; and that as her answer to the charges had not beenforwarded to the members of the investigating committees, she was deprived of the opportunity

to comment or refute their findings.

In addition, private respondent maintains that petitioners are estopped from withdrawing her

doctorate degree; that petitioners acted contrary to 9 of the U.P. Charter and the U.P. Rules and

Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the University, which according to her, doesnot authorize the withdrawal of a degree as a penalty for erring students; and that only the

college committee or the student disciplinary tribunal may decide disciplinary cases, whose

report must be signed by a majority of its members.

We find petitioners contention to be meritorious.

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required

to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically

enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another fromthe use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no otherplain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.xxiii[23] In University of the

Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan,xxiv[24] this Court ruled that the writ was not

available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic freedom. In that case, a student whowas found guilty of dishonesty and ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents,

filed a petition formandamus and obtained from the lower court a temporary restraining order

stopping U.P. from carrying out the order of suspension. In setting aside the TRO and orderingthe lower court to dismiss the students petition, this Court said:

[T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction ofMay 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower courts finding that the

implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal would work injustice to the

petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent andgood paying job. Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into

account the circumstances, clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament.

More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which

provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon anerring student of an institution of higher learning.

From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself fromassuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful

cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of

no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretionor judgment.xxv[25]


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In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondents petition precisely on grounds of

academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied

due process. It said:

It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its

recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioners Ph.D. degree,petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was

consummated. Petitioners subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing.xxvi[26]

As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been

formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the

investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of theuniversity proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that

there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in

a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on

the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree.

Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to

explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or rulingcomplained of.xxvii[27] A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position

cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.xxviii[28]

In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against herxxix[29] and

afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which

she forwarded on September 25, 1993.xxx[30] Private respondent then met with the U.P.chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent

several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.xxxi[31]

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before

the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type

proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice.xxxii[32] It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rulesdo not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the

Board of Regents.xxxiii[33]

Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla

committee as part of her right to due process. InAteneo de Manila University v.

Capulong,xxxiv[34] we held:

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity

to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners February 14,

1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied suchopportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for

disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination.

An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students participation in a hazing activityneed not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. . .


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In this case, in granting the writ ofmandamus, the Court of Appeals held:

First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a doctorate degree in Anthropology. Aftergraduation, the contact between U.P. and petitioner ceased. Petitioner is no longer within the

ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P. As a graduate, she is entitled to the right and

enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To recall the degree, after conferment, is not onlyarbitrary, unreasonable, and an act of abuse, but a flagrant violation of petitioners right of

enjoyment to intellectual property.

Second. Respondents aver that petitioners graduation was a mistake.

Unfortunately this mistake was arrived at after almost a year after graduation. Considering

that the members of the thesis panel, the College Faculty Assembly, and the U.P. Council are all

men and women of the highest intellectual acumen and integrity, as respondents themselves aver,

suspicion is aroused that the alleged mistake might not be the cause of withdrawal but someother hidden agenda which respondents do not wish to reveal.

At any rate, We cannot countenance the plight the petitioner finds herself enmeshed in as aconsequence of the acts complained of. Justice and equity demand that this be rectified by

restoring the degree conferred to her after her compliance with the academic and other related

requirements.

Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that [a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all

institutions of higher learning. This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitutionxxxv[35] and the1973 Constitutionxxxvi[36] likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for

the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by

this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,xxxvii[37] it is

a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere ofauthority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher learning can

decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer

the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a

university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. Thisfreedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student, as the Court of

Appeals held. For it is precisely the graduation of such a student that is in question. It is

noteworthy that the investigation of private respondents case began before her graduation. If

she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too manyinvestigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been

allowed to graduate.

Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the

constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission

Committee, Loyola School of Theology, is not to be construed in a niggardly manner orin agrudging fashion.


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Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of

the Philippines.xxxviii[38] It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the

University Council.xxxix[39] It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error orfraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to

withdraw what it has granted without violating a students rights. An institution of higher

learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is notrightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a universitys highestacademic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The

pursuit of academic excellence is the universitys concern. It should be empowered, as an act of

self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an

educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has theconcomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.xl[40]

In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a

committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that private respondentcommitted no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The

Board of Regents decision to withdraw private respondents doctorate was based on documentson record including her admission that she committed the offense.xli[41]

On the other hand, private respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain herside but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her

responses to the charges against her were not considered by the Board of Regents before it

rendered its decision. However, this claim was not proven. Accordingly, we must presume

regularity in the performance of official duties in the absence of proof to the contrary.xlii[42]

Very much the opposite of the position of the Court of Appeals that, since private respondentwas no longer a student of the U.P., the latter was no longer within the ambit of disciplinarypowers of the U.P., is private respondents contention that it is the Student Disciplinary

Tribunal which had jurisdiction over her case because the charge is dishonesty. Private

respondent invokes 5 of the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Disciplinewhich provides:

Jurisdiction.All cases involving discipline of students under these rules shall be subject to the

jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal, except the following cases which shall fall under

the jurisdiction of the appropriate college or unit;

(a) Violation of college or unit rules and regulations by students of the college, or

(b) Misconduct committed by students of the college or unit within its classrooms orpremises or in the course of an official activity;

Provided, that regional units of the University shall have original jurisdiction over all cases

involving students of such units.


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Private respondent argues that under 25 (a) of the said Rules and Regulations, dishonesty in

relation to ones studies (i.e., plagiarism) may be punished only with suspension for at least one

(1) year.

As the above-quoted provision of 5 of the Rules and Regulations indicates, the jurisdiction of

the student disciplinary tribunal extends only to disciplinary actions. In this case, U.P. does notseek to discipline private respondent. Indeed, as the appellate court observed, private respondent

is no longer within the ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P. Private respondent cannot even

be punished since, as she claims, the penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinaryproceedings is suspension from the University for at least one year. What U.P., through the

Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by withdrawing from private

respondent an academic degree she obtained through fraud.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petition for

mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.


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UP Board of Regents v. Rasul G.R. No. 91551, 16 August 1991

Facts:Private respondent Dr. Felipe Estrella, Jr., was appointed by the petitioner Board of Regents as Director of thePhilippine General Hospital, to take effect 1 September 1986 until 30 April 1992. Barely 2 weeks after assumingthe presidency of UP, petitioner Jose Abueva submitted a memorandum to the Board of Regents to reorganizethe UP Manila including the Philippine General Hospital recommending that certain key positions of UP Manilaincluding that of Dr. Felipe Estrella, Jr., be declared vacant. The Board of Regents approved the reorganizationplan and a Nomination Committee was formed. Dr. Felipe Estrella, Jr., filed a petition for injunction with the RTC.The RTC granted the petition. Petitioners appealed to the SC arguing that public respondent Judge Rasul erredin not holding that Dr. Felipe Estrella, Jr., has to exhaust administrative remedies before he can bring suit

against the UP Board of Regents, et. al.

Held: Anent the issue regarding respondent Estrella's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies, this casehas special circumstances that made it fall under the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions to the rule. As thefacts show, respondent Dr. Estrella was about to be replaced by the Nomination Committee. He must havebelieved that airing his protest with the Board of Regents would only be fruitless and that unless he goes to thecourts, irreparable damage or injury on his part will be caused by the implementation of the proposedreorganization.


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Vda. de Tan vs. Veterans Backpay Commission [G.R. No. L-12944. March 30,

1959]

Post undercase digests,Political LawatTuesday, March 06, 2012Posted by Schizophrenic

Mind

Facts: Maria Natividad vda. de Tan is the widow of Tan Chiat

Bee alias Lian Lay who died in the service April 4, 1945 in the

battle at Ipo Dam, Rizal Province, Philippines. He was duly

recognized as a guerrilla veteran and certified by the Armed

Forces of the Philippines.

Natividad filed an application for back pay under the provisions

Republic Act No. 897. Although initially the VBC allowed

aliens to recover backpay, it revoked its previous stands and

ruled that aliens are not entitled to back pay.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not a petition for mandamus is proper to correct

the acts of the commission.

(2) Whether or not it is necessary in the case at bar that

Natividad should have exhausted all administrative remedies,

i.e. before the president.

Held:

(1) Yes. The discretion of the Veterans Backpay Commission is

limited to the facts of the case; that is, in evaluating the evidencewhether or not claimant is a member of a guerrilla force duly

recognized by the United States Army. It has no power to

adjudicate or determine rights after such facts are established.

Having been satisfied that the deceased was an officer or a
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guerrilla outfit duly recognized by the United States Army and

forming part of the Philippine Army, it becomes the ministerial

duty of the Commission to give due course to his widow's

application. For this reason, mandamus lies against theCommission.

(2) No. The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke the

rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies, considering

that in its resolution, it declared that the opinions of the

Secretary of Justice were "advisory in nature, which may either

be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, andany aggrieved party has the court for recourse", thereby leading

the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her

favor would be accepted by the Commission.

CORPUS VS. CUADERNOFACTS: Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank,

was administrativelycharged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the

internal regulations of the office.He was suspended by the Mnetary Board desoie the recommendation

of the investigating committee that hebe reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus.

The Board considered him resigned as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration

but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of

the Board as null and void. He was awardedP5,000 as attorneys fees. Both Petitioner and respondent

appealed the judgment. Petitioner was appealingthe amount awarded to him contending that it was

lower than what he has spent for attorneys fees. Whilethe respondent claimed that an officer holding

highly technical position may be removed at any time for lackof confidence by the appointing power

who was Governor Cuaderno.ISSUE: Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for

removing an employee or a publicofficer?HELD: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential

from the highly technical employees, and tothe latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is

not applicable. No public officer or employee inthe Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except

for a cause provided by law.Pertaining to the petitioners claim for damages, the agreement between a

client and his lawyer as toattorneys fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee

contract. While the Civil Codeallows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such

fees must lie primarily in thediscretion of the trial court.Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme

Court

1. MADRIGAL v LECAROZ


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FACTS

Public respondents, Gov. Lecaroz et. Al., abolished Petitioner Madrigals position as a permanent construction capataz in the

office of the provincial Engr. Due to lack funds of the province and the position was not essential.

Petitioner appealed to the CSC where it was held that the removal of petitioner from service was illegal. Petitioner then sent a

letter to the Provincial Board for the implementation of the CSC resolution but the Board refused to execute arguing that the

position was already abolished and instead ordered the appropriation of back salaries.

Petitioner then filed a petition in the CFI praying for the relief of mandamus and damages against public respondents for the

restoration of his abolished position, reinstatement and payment of back salaries plus damages. CFI dismissed the case on the

ground of laches because 4 years and 20 days elapsed before the action for mandamus on the ground of illegal dismissal was

made.

(Note: the case was filed only after 4 years and 20 days because, petitioner availed of remedies in the CSC first)

ISSUE

W/N the action lodged before the CFI is barred by laches.

(to state it differently, W/N an action for mandamus just like quo warranto is considered abandoned if not filed within a year

when the cause of action accrues despite the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.)

HELD

YES. The fatal drawback of petitioners cause is that he came to the court out of time. A cause of action arising from illegal

dismissal should be instituted before the courts within one year from its accrual. Although the law speaks only of quo warranto,

it is also applicable to an action for mandamus with the intent of effecting a reinstatement because by reason of public policy,

there should be a limit to the period to interpose such action since title of public office should not be subjected to continued

uncertainty. This one year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy.

The argument that administrative remedies should be exhausted first before any action before the judicial bodies is misplaced

in this case. It is fundamental that if the issue involves only pure questions of law, the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply

since it cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative body. In the present case, only pure question of law is involved

w/n the abolition of petitioners position was in accordance with law. Thus, petitioner should have done away with the

administrative remedies.

Laguna CATV vs. Maraan27 Mar

LAGUNA CATV NETWORK, INC., petitioner,

vs.

HON. ALEX E. MARAAN, Regional Director, Region IV, Dept. of Labor and Employment

(DOLE), ENRICO SAGMIT, Acting Deputy Sheriff, DOLE Region IV, PEDRO

IGNACIO, DIOMEDES CASTRO, FE ESPERANZA CANDILLA, RUBEN LAMINA,

JR., JOEL PERSIUNCULA, ALVINO PRUDENTE, JOEL RAYMUNDO, REGIE

ROCERO, LINDA RODRIGUEZ, JOHN SELUDO, ALBERTO REYES, andANACLETA VALOIS, respondents.

G.R. No. 139492 November 19, 2002

FACTS:
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Private respondents filed with the DOLE Region IV separate complaints for underpayment ofwages and non-payment of other employee benefits against their employer, Laguna CATV.

Private respondents filed their separate complaints pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code, asamended by Republic Act No. 7730.

DOLE Region IV conducted an inspection within the premises of Laguna CATV and found that thelatter violated the laws on payment of wages and other benefits.

Thereupon, DOLE Region IV requested Laguna CATV to correct its violations but the latterrefused, prompting the Regional Director to set the case for summary investigation.

Thereafter, he issued an Order directing Laguna CATV to pay the concerned employees the sumof P261,009.19 representing their unpaid claims.

Forthwith, Laguna CATV filed a motion for reconsideration. In view of Laguna CATVs failure to comply with the Order directing it to pay the unpaid claims

of its employees, DOLE Regional Director Maraan issued a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff

to collect in cash from Laguna CATV the amount specified in the writ or, in lieu thereof, to attach

its goods and chattels or those of its owner, Dr. Bernardino Bailon.

Laguna CATV and Dr. Bailon filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, notice of levy and saleon execution and garnishment of bank deposits.

Regional Director Maraan issued an Order denying the motion to quash the writ of execution,stating that Laguna CATV failed to perfect its appeal because it did not comply with the

mandatory requirement of posting a bond equivalent to the monetary award of P261,009.19;

and that the writ of execution should be considered as an overt denial of Laguna CATVs

motion for reconsideration.

Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor, Laguna CATV filed with the CA a motion forextension of time to file a petition for review.

Laguna CATV was of the view that an appeal to the Secretary of Labor would be an exercise infutility considering that the said appeal will be filed with the Regional Office and it will surely be

disapproved.

The CA denied Laguna CATVs motion for extension and dismissing the case.

The Appellate Court found, among others, that it failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Laguna CATV filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals in its

Resolution dated July 22, 1999.

Hence, it filed a petition for review on certiorari to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Laguna CATV failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

RULING:

The SC ruled that Laguna CATV failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, an order issued by the duly

authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the latter.


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Thus, petitioner should have first appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with theCourt of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.

Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless theavailable administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have

been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed

in the administrative forum.

The SC, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that if a remedy within the administrativemachinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every

opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should

be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought.

The party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrativeprocedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial

intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter

itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.

The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, ifafforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly.

Therefore, petitioner should have completed the administrative process by appealing thequestioned Orders to the Secretary of Labor.

Tags:case digests

CommentsLeave a Comment CategoriesAdministrative Law

Teotico vs. Baer

27 Mar

JOSEFINA TEOTICO (ALSO KNOWN AS BABY SANTANA), Petitioner,

vs.

ROSARIO D. BAER, Respondent.

G.R. No. 147464 June 8, 2006

FACTS:

Respondent filed before the HLURB an amended complaint for specific performance, damagesand attorneys fees against petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of her late husband.

Petitioner allegedly refused to execute an absolute deed of sale in respondents favor despitecomplete payment of a residential lot located in Rizal which was sold to her by the petitioners

husband, who died during the pendency of the case.
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The HLURB rendered judgment by default against petitioner for her failure to file her answer tothe complaint despite the proper service of summons.

The HLURB issued a writ of execution of its decision but petitioner refused to comply with it. In her opposition to respondents motion for execution and satisfaction of decision, petitioner

argued that the HLURB decision was null and void because respondent allegedly failed to prove

petitioner was appointed as the administratrix of the estate of her late husband.

The HLURB, however, denied petitioners opposition for being dilatory and without merit. Petitioner went up to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court.

However, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground of failure to exhaust all administrativeremedies.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the CA alleging that the 30-day periodfor filing a petition for review before the HLURB and to appeal to the Office of the President,

had already elapsed when she learned of the judgment of default rendered against her.

She further argued that she immediately went to the CA because there was an urgent need forjudicial intervention due to the patent nullity of the HLURB judgment.

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to

the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

RULING:

Yes. The HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and land development. It is charged with encouraging greater private sector participation in low-cost housing through

liberalization of development standards, simplification of regulations and decentralization of

approvals for permits and licenses.

The HLURB has established rules of procedure in the adjudication of the cases before it. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action

cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted.

If remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to beforeresort can be made to courts.

It is settled that non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remediesresults in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the

dismissal of the complaint.

Here, petitioner failed to exhaust her administrative remedies when she directly elevated to theCA the HLURB arbiters decision without appealing it first to the Board and then later, the Office

of the President.


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She has failed to convince the SC that her case is one of those exempted from the application ofthe doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Tags:case digests

CommentsLeave a Comment CategoriesAdministrative Law

Flores vs. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga

27 Mar

Mayor EDGARDO G. FLORES, petitioner

vs.

SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA, GOVERNOR MANUEL M.

LAPID OF PAMPANGA, MUNICIPAL COUNCILORS VANZALON F. TIZON,

ROMULO N. MANDAP, EDGARDO P. YAMBAO, JEROME M. TONGOL,

MARCIANO L. SACDALAN, and RICKY Y. NARCISO, respondents.

G.R. No. 159022 February 23, 2005

FACTS:

An administrative complaint for dishonesty and gross misconduct against then Mayor Flores ofMinalin, Pampanga, was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the same province.

The complainants were the municipal councilors of Minalin. The administrative complaint against petitioner alleged that on August 1, 2001, he executed

Purchase Request No. 1 for the acquisition of a communication equipment amounting to

P293,000.00 without any Resolution or Ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of

Minalin.

The winning bidder was one Kai Electronics. The communication equipment delivered by Kai Electronics was overpriced by more than 100%. Respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an Order recommending to Governor Manuel

Lapid of Pampanga, that petitioner be preventively suspended from office for a period of sixty

(60) days.

Without seeking a reconsideration of the Order of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan,petitioner sent a letter to respondent Governor Lapid requesting him to veto the same.

Also, without waiting for respondent Governor Lapids action on his letter, petitioner filed withthe Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.

The CA denied and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
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In ruling against the petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that he failed to exhaust alladministrative remedies before going to court.

Moreover, respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga did not gravely abuse itsdiscretion when it issued the challenged Order considering that the allegation of overpricing is

supported by documentary evidence.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorarito the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

RULING:

Yes. Section 61 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the LGC of 1991) partly provides: A complaint against any

elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan whose

decision may be appealed to the Office of the President.

After receiving the Order of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan preventively suspendinghim from office, petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration in order to give the

latter the opportunity to correct itself if there was any error on its part.

Such motion is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Section 1 of the same Rule requires that petitioner must not only show thatrespondentSangguniang Panlalawigan, in issuing the questioned Order, acted without or in

excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, but that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law.

The SC have held that the plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 isa motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution.

The SC also added that petitioner, before filing with the CA his petition for certiorari, shouldhave waited for respondent Governor Lapids action on the recommendation of

respondentSangguniang Panlalawigan.

It is a well-settled rule that where, as here, the petitioner has available remedies within theadministrative machinery against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, theintervention of the courts can be resorted to by him only after having exhausted all such

remedies.

The rationale of this rule rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given thechance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it

properly.

The strict application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies will also preventunnecessary and premature resort to the court.


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LUMIQUED VS EXEVEA 282 SCRA 125

FACTS:

Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional

Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that hewas falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance

worth P116,000.00.

Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed

the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints

were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the

second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the

services of counsel.

The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date hehimself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The

Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the

recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

ISSUE:

Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an

administrative inquiry?

HELD:

The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver

is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during

custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in acriminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar,

petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and

independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in theproceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order

No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the

law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due processunless required by the Constitution or the law.

There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled

to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by suchproceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal

profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its


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members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless

that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain

one's side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee wascured by Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

Documents

Arrow Transportation Corp