AROUND THE WORLD

Keeping the Peace: The U.N., Canadaand the Quest for InternationalSecurity

Internationalpeacekeepingefforts are increasinglycoming under publicscrutiny andcriticism.Yet, as Canada’speacekeepinghistory attests,perceived failuresin the peacekeepingprocessresultmost oftenfrom a combinationof the constraintsplacedon peacekeepingforcesandtherecalcitranceof the antagonists involved.Today, with the Cold War over, the U.N. is beingaskedto becomean ever more visible actoron the world stage. Are new definitions ofpeacekeepingandcollectivesecurity in order?

by Russell Field

J uly, 1993 marks a specialmomentin the annalsof Canadianpeacekeeping:the one-yearanniversaryof the airlift of

humanitarianaid to Bosnia, the longestcontinuousairlift inhumanhistory. However,the anniversaryis receiving surprisingly little media attention. Found insteadare reports of thescandalin Somaliaand of a Canadiansoldier woundingtwo ofhis comradeswhile cleaninghis weaponin Bosnia. In the former case,two Canadian soldiershave beenchargedwith murder, and twoothers face charges oftorture, in the deathof aSomali civilian. The fallout from this incident has been suchthat the Prime Minister ofHaiti has goneso far as to characterize Canadianpeacekeepersas "a pack ofNazis...with swastikason their arms."

‘Incompetentneo-fascists’is hardly the image Canadianshavecultivated during their 45 yearsas leadersin internationalpeacekeeping.Canada’sstandingon the international stageand especiallyher self-perception of herown statureis basedin large part upon the leading role taken in peacekeepingmissions. British Brigadier General Michael Harbottle, formerleaderof Britain’s U.N. detachmentin Cyprus, was impressedthat Canadians "takepeace-keepingvery seriously and haveextremelystrong ideason how it should be carriedout."

There are currently 4,382 Canadianpeacekeepersservingin 14 different operations aroundthe world. With Canada’sfull military complementstandingat only 80,000, suchinvolvement representsa rate of participationunprecedentedand unmatchedon the international scene. In fact, on thehome-front,the Canadianmilitary hasbeen repeatedlychargedwith over-extending itselfby involving its forces in manyoperationssimultaneously.

A recentrecruiting posterhighlights Canada’suniquecommitmentto peacekeeping.The photographdepicts a running, blue-helmetedsoldier carryingto safety a young childteddy bear in tow. The implicit reasonto join the Canadian

Russell Field hasa BA. in Canadian historyand an M.B.A.from Queen’sUniversity. He is currently editorof theCanadianbaseballmagazineDugout.

forces and subliminally the raison d’êtreof the military itselfis not the defenseof the nation,as is traditionally the case,but,rather,the preservationof internationalpeaceand the provisionof humanitarianaid.

Peacekeeping,Not PeacemakingOver the past 45 years,there have been fewU.N. peacekeepingmissions considered unqualified successes.In fact, many areviewed as unequivocalfailures. Today,Somalia remainsinupheaval;Bosnia appears forever shatteredand antagonistic;and, despitesuccessfulU.N. overseeingof the May elections,Cambodiacontinueson, a country divided. The popularpresstook Canada’srecent withdrawalfrom Cyprusas an opportunity to highlight the failure of peacekeepingefforts there.

Yet, insufficient distinction has been madebetweenpeacekeepingand peacemaking.As two well-known Canadianhistorians haveremarked,"the chiefobject of peacekeepingisto keeptwo potential combatants separatedwhile diplomaticefforts are mounted to resolvetheir conflict..." Peacekeepingis a military function, peacemaking,a diplomatic one.Nonetheless, peacekeepersare repeatedly expected to takeonthe role of peacemakers-arole that is often outside oftheirmandateand capabilities.

On top of the apparentfailures of peacekeepingmissionsto makepeacein troubledregions,much criticism of the wholepeacekeepingprocesshas stemmed fromthe deaths ofU.N.troops and the involvement of peacekeepersin pitchedbattlesand local skirmishes. Most recently,on June 5, 1993, 23peacekeepersof Pakistani originwere killed in Somalia.Washington-ledretaliation actions left five more U.N. troopsand some100 Somali militia dead. Mogadishuwas bombedasblue helmetedsoldiers led houseto housesearchesfor targetedwarlord MohammedFarrah Aidid. Civilians were woundedand frightened and the local power balancewas tilted towardsAidid’s rivals. Questionsaroseimmediately in response. Arethe peacekeepersin fact keepingthe peace? Is the cost in livesand dollars too high for the returnin security? Should the verymannerin which peacekeepingand peacemakingare carriedout be re-thought?

6* ORIGINS JULY1993

The OrigIns of U.N. Peacekeeping

When the draftersof the U.N. Charterin 1945 consideredtheorganization’srole in collective security they envisionedalarge military force, kept at the ready, and capableof movingagainstan act of aggressionanywherein the world. Thisnotion, however,had little practicalapplication in a Cold Warworld. The veto power in the Security Councilheld by bothEastand West realisticallyprecludedany multilateral cooperation againstacts of aggression regardless of their origin.Inaddition, no memberstate was willing to finance a standingmilitary.

As a collectivesecurity force quickly becamean unattainabledream,the idea of U.N.-sanctioned peacekeepingmissionswas born. If the U.N. could not deteracts of aggressionthrough the threatof its ownforce, at least it would be ableto maintain a short-term peacewhile a more lasting solutionwas workedout.

Canadianhistoriansarequick to point to the leadingrole played by Canadain thedevelopment ofthe peacekeeping concept. In 1950, ExternalAffairs Minister LesterPearsonproposedthat U.N. memberstates should earmark militaryunits for peacekeepingserviceand that suchmilitary operations should be coordinatedbythe Secretary-General.Laterthat sameyear, the Cold Warstalematein the Security Council was circumventedwhen aresolutionwas passedthat gavethe GeneralAssembly ratherthan the more narrow SecurityCouncil responsibility in matters of collective peaceinitiatives. The success ofthe U.N.emergencyforce in stabilizingthe SuezCrisis in 1956-thefirst serious international crisisconfronted by the U.N.-provedthe validity of Pearson’sformula. The age of U.N.peacekeepinghad begun.

Why Canada? Canada’sPeacekeeping History

Since 1947,Canadahasparticipatedin 32 different peacekeeping missionsaroundthe world [see map, page 10]. From thesupervisionof Korean electionsin 1947 to providing humanitarian aid in Somaliain 1993, tensof thousandsof Canadianmilitary and diplomatic personnelhave servedthe cause ofpeace,with 89 losing their life.

The reasonmost often citedpublicly for Canada’ssignificant role in internationalpeacekeepingcentresaround herbelief, as a nation, in peaceand humanitarianaims. ExternalAffairs Minister Paul Martin, in 1964, enunciatedthis ‘higher

principle’ while discussingCanada’sinvolvement in a varietyof peacekeeping operations:

It is a long and expensivelist and it is politicallydifficult at home becauseof the risks; and we getsmall thanks abroadfor our work. We do it not forthe glory but as our duty, sincethere are not manyof us willing and able to move in quickly with aneffectiveforce.

Outside this abstract, perhapssomewhataltruistic, justification, therewas a more pragmaticrationale. Geographicallysituatedbetweenthe world’s two greatest nuclear powers,peacekeepingrepresentednot only Canada’scontribution tocollectivesecuritybutalso servedin her own defence.

Moreover,the U.N. consideredCanadaan attractiveparticipant in peacekeepingoperations. Outside of the"great powers"-the five permanentmembersof theSecurityCouncil France,Great Britain,the SovietUnion, the U.S. andChina-Canadacould offer thegreatestnumber of battle-testedtroops and the most sophisticated military hardware. In addition, while a Westerndemocracywith strong tiestothe U.S., Canadahad an international reputationfor impartialityand few strategic interestsinotherpartsof the world.

Attempting to understandCanada’scontribution to international peacekeeping-and,infact, peacekeepingitself-isdifficult. Each missionis different in scope,intent and mandate. The U.N. hasoverseenelectionsin Cambodia,inspected biological and chemicalweaponssites in Iraq, and monitored a cease-firein Angola.However, twO well-knownCanadianpeacekeepingmissions-theU.N. force in Cyprusand the international deputationin Vietnam-speakto the variety of ‘types’ of peacekeeping

and of themandateand limitations of eachmission. In Cyprus,Canadawas actively involved in maintainingpeace,while inVietnam, Canada’srole was thatof overseerand supervisor.

Cyprus

"If you forced these people backtogetheragain,you could have another Bosnia"

- British residentin Cyprus 1993

For nearly 30 years, the United Nations Force in CyprusUNFICYP has attemptedto preservepeacebetweenthe

CanadianArmedForcesrecruiting poster,1993.[CanadianArmedForces]

JULY l3 . ORIGINS . 7

Greek and Turkish populationson the small Mediterraneanisland. Since its inception in March of 1964,Canadahasbeena substantialcontributor of personnel, equipmentandfinancingto UNFICYP. What was originally viewedas a three-monthpeacekeepingmissionbecamea regulartour of duty for Canadian military personnel. There have beenincidentsof serioushostilitiesas well as long periods of relativecalm.

Tensions betweenGreek Cypriots and the Turkish ethnicminority abouttwenty percentof the populationdate backseveralcenturies. Cyprus has beenruled by practically everyprincipal Mediterraneanpower-fromAssyria, to Egypt, Persia, Greece,Romeand the Ottomans. At the start of the FirstWorld War, Britain annexed Cyprus because ofits strategicimportancein southernEurope. It was not until 1959, withcolonial empiresaroundthe world crumbling, that Cyprusachievedits independence.

The treatythat createdtheindependentstateof Cyprus,however,also createdthe conditions for the re-emergenceofage-oldtensionson the island.Under the agreement,Britain,Turkey and Greececonsented torespect the sovereignty ofCyprus. Complex constitutionalchecks andbalances wereinstalled to satisfy both ethnicgroups-i.e. the Presidentwasto be a Greek Cypriot; the VicePresident,a Turkish Cypriot.But all three powerswere granted the right to interveneunilaterally if theseconditions nolongerexisted.

In Novemberof 1963, thepresident,ArchbishopMakarios, attemptedto amendtheCypriot constitution. Under hisproposals the PresidentandVice Presidentwould lose theirmutual veto powers, a majorityfrom bothethnic communitiesin the House of Representativeswould no longer be neededtoenact laws, andthe proportionof Turkish-Cypriotsin the military would be reduced. As aresult, in late 1963 and early1964, therewas an outbreak of civil violence betweenthe twocommunitieson the island and Turkey threatenedmilitaryintervention.

In the hope of forestalling an open conflict betweenGreeceand Turkey, Britain proposeda NATO peacekeepingforce-as both nations were NATO members. This wasstrongly opposedby the Soviet Union, who openly supportedGreeceduring theconflict. Makariosmaintainedthat he wouldonly agree topeacekeepingefforts if they werecarriedoutunderthe auspices ofthe United Nations. The U.N. had failedto act whenhostilities beganin December1963, but, withNATO efforts stymied, the U.N. reconsideredthe issue. On

March 4, 1964, the SecurityCouncil approved a temporarypeacekeepingmission in Cyprus.

SecretaryGeneralU Thant askedCanada,Brazil, Ireland,Swedenand Finland to contribute personnel tothe themission.On March 11, Turkey again threatened to invade CyprusunlessU.N. peacekeepersarrived on the island. The next day, PrimeMinister Lester PearsonconfirmedCanada’sparticipationandExternalAffairs Minister Paul Martin wentabout gatheringadditionalsupportfor the peacekeepingforce.

Canadawas the first nation to commit to UNFICYPandthe first to arrive on the scene. This readiness to participatedid not meanthat Canada enteredinto the fray without seriousreservations.Pearsontold the House ofCommonsthat Canadawould only send troopsto Cyprus ifthe durationof the missionwas fixed in advanceand a mediatorwas appointed tonegoti

ate a peacebetweenthe twosides. In reality, however,thethreatof a Turkish invasionmeant that Canadiantroopswerecommitted to UNFICYPbefore Pearsonhad receivedadequateassuranceson thesematters.

By the end of April, 1964,the Canadian contingentinCyprus numbered1150 personnel in a U.N. force of 6500.Canadawas assignedthe taskof demilitarizing the ‘GreenLine’ a buffer zone thatextendedthrough the capital ofNicosia and served to separatethe city into distinct ethniccommunities,and ofprotecting the route from Nicosia toKyrenia animportantport cityon the northern coast. Thelack of authority grantedthepeacekeepers-forcecouldonly be usedas a last resort-and the lack of respectshownthem by the warring factions,madethese tasksextremelydifficult. Canadiantroops wereforced, in many ways, to bediplomats ratherthan soldiers.

From Poisoned"Poisson" tothe Turkish Invasion

Although little had beendone by the U.N. to effect a lastingpeace,by the end of 1964, the situationin Cyprus had beenstabilized. Life for thepeacekeeperssettledinto a routine and, by1969, the Canadiancontingentwas reduced to480 personnel.Canadianforces rotated outevery six months,and a tour ofduty in Cyprus became standard practice forevery Canadiansoldier.

Minor disputes betweenCypriots, as well as the alarmingly high rate of venereal diseaseamongUNFICYP troops, representedthe greatest problemsfacing the peacekeepers. Oftenthe toughestdecision facing Canadiantroops was whetheror

CYPRUS:Tanksroll throughNicosia, patrolling the‘GreenLine.’[CanadianArmedForces]

8 . ORIGINS . JULY1993

not to spend theday at "Nipple Beach,"a topless stretch ofsandon the southerncoast. At one point, the most seriousdiplomatic dispute centred arounda crate ofrancid sardines

disposedof by the Canadiancontingentand marked‘poison’.

A Greek-Cypriotmilitia unit found the crate, interpreted‘poi

son’ as being Frenchfor ‘fish,’ andconsumedthe contents.The illnesses sufferedwere a sourceof some strain betweentheCanadianpeacekeepersand the local Greekmilitary.

This torpid patternwas shattered duringthe summer of1974. On June15th, the military junta in power in Greecesupported a coup thatoverthrewthe Makarios governmentandinstalleda presidentwho supportedthe unification of Cypruswith Greece. On July 20th, Turkey responded. An invasionforce of 40,000 groundand air troops invadednorthernCyprus. The UNFICYP commanderwas instructedto minimize casualties,offer humanitariansupportto civilians, andmaintain a U.N. presencein the situation. Neitherside in thedisputewas inhibited by the U.N. bannerand Canadianforcescame under heavyfire in their commandheadquartersat ahotel in Nicosia.

When the final cease-firewent into effect August 18th,the Turks controlled forty percent ofthe country. The ‘GreenLine’ was extendedto covertheentire 180 km width of theisland and effectively divided itinto two distinct ethnicenclaves. Mass migration andrepatriation was required toreach this end. Theline nowseparatesthe Greekand Turkishrepublics-theformer claimingto governthe entire countryandthe latter consideringitself adistinct state.

Since the cease-fire,life forthe peacekeepershasreturnedtothe routine of the 1964 to 1974period. Openhostility stillexistsbetweenthe two ethnicgroups, butthe presenceof theUNFICYP troops keepsit incheck. Today,as former CanadianPrime MinisterJoe Clarkpreparesto mediatea new round of U.N.-sponsorednegotiations designedto unite Cyprus,a three-monthmission hasbecomea thirty-year commitment and little has happenedtoimprove relationsbetweenGreek and Turkish Cypriots. InJune, 1993, the Canadiangovernment-arguingthat notenoughhad beendone to ensurea lasting solution and in thebelief that it had done its part in keepingthe peace-withdrewits commitmentto UNFICYP and Canadiantroops left theisland.

Vietnam

The goals of Canada’speacekeepingmission in Vietnamstandin marked contrastto U.N. efforts in Cyprus. Canada did notenter the situation to keep the peaceactively, but rather tooverseethe execution ofa peacetreaty. The mission was notcarriedout underthe auspices ofthe United Nations,but under

an independentsupervisorycommission. Canadawas not

expectedto be animpartial observer tothe peace,but rather torepresentWestern interestsin the region.

Whenthe 1954 Geneva peaceconferencewas convenedtodiscussthe end of the Korean War,the future of the Frenchcolonies in Indochinawas alsoput forwardfor discussion.TheFrench had regainedcontrolof theseterritories-whichincluded present-day Vietnam, Cambodiaand Laos-afterthe defeatof the Japanesethat hadendedthe SecondWorld War. Francehad hopedto maintain control of the colonies but nationalistsin all threenations,as well as an emerging communistmovement in Vietnam, rose up to challengeFrenchdominance.Combinedwith France’swar wearinessin the early-1950s,theseconditions left France looking for a way to withdrawfrom Indochina.

Agreementsreachedat Genevain 1954 createdthe conditions for this withdrawal. In the caseof Vietnam,the countrywas divided into two sectionsNorth and South and the International ControlCommissionsICC were createdto overseethe peaceful transfer of powerin the region. Themandate of

the ICCs was to supervisethecease-fireagreementthat hadbeenreachedin Geneva. Safetransportwas to beprovidedfor Frenchtroopsand personnelleaving Indochinaas well as forVietnamese movingbetweenthe North a ‘communist’ territory and the Southa ‘democratic’ region. In addition, theICCs were to monitor militaryarsenals and maintainthem at1954 levels. It was hoped thatdemocratic electionsfor a unified Vietnamesegovernmentwould takeplace by 1956.

The commissionswerethree-memberbodies,with representativesof the West, theEast,and a neutral thirdcountry. The partiesto the Genevaagreementsrequested thatCanada,Poland and India,

respectively,takepart in the ICCs. Canadawas not presentatthesediscussionsand, in fact, the Departmentof ExternalAffairs learned ofthis requestthrough its publication in themedia. Therewere three separatecommissionsestablished-one each forVietnam, Cambodiaand Laos. The ICCs forCambodiaand Laos wererelatively small peacekeepingoperations. By far the most significant commission,becauseof itsinvolvementin a full-scale conflict, was theVietnamICC.

A "PartisanPeacekeeper"

The ICCs weredivided into teamsof observers, withrepresentativesfrom eachof the three participatingnations. The role oftheseobserverswas to investigateany reportedviolations ofthe Genevaagreements.Canada beganits membershipon theICC intendingto be as impartial as the situation would allow.It soonbecameevident, however,that the Poleswere examining every situationfrom a partisan,Cold War perspective.To

VIETNAM: Supervising andobserving.[CanadianArmedForces]

JULY ig ORIGINS . 9

counter-balance,Canadafelt obligedto actas the spokespersonfor Westerninterestsin the region. A frustratedDepartmentofExternalAffairs found that:

an impartial approachon the part of Canadianscombined with thepartisanattitude of the Polesand the middle-of-the-roadpolicy adoptedby theIndians did not lead to just decisions. Since early1955, therehasbeenan increasingtendencyin theCanadianDelegationto apply pressureagainstNorth Vietnam and to defendSouthVietnam whenit was considered[that] Commissionaction...wasunduly harsh.

Canada’s awkward positionas a ‘partisanpeacekeeper’was exacerbatedby the refusal of the United States torecognize the 1954peaceaccords. The United Stateshad moved todistanceitself from the Genevaconference. The U.S-backedSaigongovernment followedsuit and refusedto hold the 1956elections-anact which prompted the North Vietnameseregime of Ho Chi Minh to do the same. It was the claim ofboth the South Vietnameseand the U.S. that the Viet Minharmy-thenorthward repatriationof which the ICC was thereto oversee-hadleft behindguerilla troops the Viet Cong in

the South. It was thistransgression ofthe Genevaaccords,andthe success ofthe guerilla action,that wasusedto justify thebuild up of arms and U.S. troops in SouthVietnam in the early1960s.

Canadianswere part of the ICC in Vietnamfrom 1954 to1972. During that entireperiod, no more than 170 Canadianpersonnelservedin the region and the averagecontingentduring the height of the Vietnam War reachedonly 66 observers.Despite this smallcommitmentof manpowerand resources,Canada’s involvementin Vietnam and its effect on relationswith the United States becamea focal domesticissue duringthe 1 960s. It was understoodfrom the outsetthat Canadawasto representWesterninterests on the ICC. Yet, controversyaroseover whetherCanadashould be playing the role of ‘partisan peacekeeper’at all. If they were not impartial,could theybe effectivein keepingthe peace?

In 1967 a CBC reporton Vietnam claimedthat two copiesof all ICC intelligence reportsweremade-onefor Ottawaandone for Washington. PrimeMinister Pearsonmoved quickly todiffuse theseallegations:

Members ofthe Canadiandelegationin Viet Namare not engagedin clandestineor spying activities.

PEACEKEEPING: A CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORLD

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The Canadiandelegation reportsto the Canadiangovernmentand the Canadian governmentonly; itis for the Canadiangovernmentto decidein thecase of these reports.. .whatuse is to be made ofthem in the courseof normal diplomaticexchangeswith othercountries.

In reality, Pearsondid not deny thecharges,he onlydeflected responsibility.The representativeson the ICC weredoing nothing unethical. But,that was not to say that theirreportsdid notwind up in theU.S. StateDepartmentanyhow.

The partisan nature ofthe supervisoryforce affectedtheability of Canadianobserversto carry out the work of the commission. The ICCswere dependentupon local governmentsfor transportationfrom their permanentposts to the investigation sites. In North Vietnam, it was commonfor a jeep to bebroken down or a bridge to be washed outwhen the ICC wanted to investigatean incident. In response,Canadianssoonbeganto turn a blind eyeto SouthVietnameseviolations,especially thoseconcerningarmaments.

In 1965, the sevenICC teams in NorthVietnam wereremovedby the government,ostensiblybecausethe NorthVietnamesecould not guaranteetheir security during American air raids.With a full-scale warin progressand neithersiderespectingthe original peaceaccord, it soonbecame clearthatthe ICC was both ineffectiveand obsolete. In 1972, it wasdisbanded.

A Pale Blue Helmet

Peacekeepingis almostby definition a processdoomedto failure. Peacewill not be made,no matterhow hard an international force strives to keep it, while the antagonistsrefuse tocometo termswith eachother. Officially, peacekeepingforceshaveno authority to intervene when hostilities break out.Their presencein any region is conditionalon the approval ofthe parties involved, and canbe revoked at any time. U.N.peacekeepersare caughtmore and more oftenin the crossfireof a region’s chaos. They becomeone of the combatants,another factionin a particularconflict-sometimes unwillingly, sometimeswillingly given their interests ina particularregion.

The distinction betweenpeacekeeperand peacemaker

should be kept in mind when evaluatingpeacekeepingmissions bothpast and present. So too should the mandateof thepeacekeepingmission-partisanor impartial, passiveor active.For nearly30 years, U.N. peacekeepers maintained peaceonCyprus. It was the failure of diplomaticefforts to find a lastingsolution to the problem-andthe recalcitrance ofthe Cypriots-thatprolongedthe need for peacekeeping.

Faced withconstraintson their actions, itis not surprisingthat the lives of peacekeepersare constantlyin dangerand thatinternationalpeacekeepingefforts are now regularly characterized as ineffective. As a CanadianForcesMajor, in Cyprus in1974,hasremarked:

It is almostaxiomatic that, if one is going to insiston flitting about a battlefield trusting in what security a paleblue helmet might provide, eventually,somewhere, somebodyis going to gethurt.BOSNIA: Tendingto the wounded.

[CanadianArmed Forces]

Sug.gestions For Further Reading

GeneralGaffer, Fred. In the Eveoft/ic Storm: A History of Canadi

an Peacekeeping.Toronto: Deneau& Wayne,1987.Granatstein.J.L. "Canada: Peacekeeper-ASurvey of

Canada’s Participationin Peacekeeping Operations"inPeacekeeping:International Challenge and CanadianResponse.Toronto: Canadian Institute ofInternationalAffairs. 1968.

Granatstein,J L. and David Bercuson. War and Peacekeeping: From SouthAfrica to the Gulf-Canada’s LimitedWars. Toronto: Key PorterBooks, 1991.

holmes, John. The Shapingof Peace: Canada and thesearchfor world order 2 volumes. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1979.

CyprusCoufoudakis,Van. "United Nations Peacekeepingand

Peacemakingandthe Cyprus Question."WesternPolitical Quarterly, volume 29, number3, September1976.pp.456-473.

Eyrc, Major K.C. "The Futureof U.N. InterpositoryPeacekeepingUnder the 1956 PearsonI IammarskjoldFormuIa: Conclusions Drawnfrom PersonalExperiencesincyprus in the Tragic Summerof 1974." CanadianDefenceQuarterly, volume 12, number I, Summer1982. pp. 31-36.

Lancashire.David. "Long memorieson Cyprus.’ TheGlobeand Mail, May 29. 1993,p. D2.

VietnamEayrs. James.In Defenceof c’anad-Indochina: Rootsof

Complicity. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1983.

Levant.Victor. Quietcomplicity: Canadianinvolvementinthe Vietnam War. Toronto: Betweenthe lines. 1986.

Ross,Douglas A. In the Interestsof Peace: CanadaandVjetfla,fl 1954-73. Toronto: University of ‘ForontoPress,1984.

Taylor. Charles. SnowJob: Canada,the United State,sandVietnam,/ 954-73. Toronto: A rlansi, 1974.

JULY 193 ORIGINS ‘11