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t Investment Community Research
RIVEL RESEARCH GROUP JANUARY 2013
© 2013 Rivel Research Group. All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any
means, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.
HARNESSING IR’S POWER TO
IMPACT A COMPANY’S VALUATION
2
IR, more than any other venue, is
the road by which investors learn
about a company’s investment
appeal, stay current on
important developments and
receive the insights necessary to
support informed and favorable
investment decisions.
What drives valuation and helps lower the cost of capital? There are any number of popular
culprits: managerial prowess, strategic acumen, favorable secular trends, R&D breakthroughs
signaling growth potential, a track record of financial success, reliable returns … the list goes on
and on. But for all of these value drivers, there is a very simple common denominator without
which the institutional investors who have the power to move your stock price are immobilized
– knowledge. Given the intense competition to gain a sparkle on the buy-side radar screen, it is
imperative for public companies to ensure that investors are endowed with as fully
comprehensive array of information and insight as possible. Doing so facilitates and prompts
informed investment decision-making by the investment community. . If the story has not been
communicated effectively, if the facts are not readily at hand, if the right senior executives have
not been made available, full investor knowledge is not achieved and fair valuation could be
compromised.
Enter investor relations (IR), perhaps one of the most
underappreciated and underrated sources of knowledge
and purveyors of company investment insight. Think of
all the money, the millions upon millions spent every day
marketing products and services to the general public,
consumers and business-to-business clientele. The new
product and concept tests, the national ad campaigns,
the PR initiatives, the lobbying … the cost is staggering
(and rightfully so).
By comparison, however, one of the most powerful audiences commanding day-to-day
influence over a company’s market value often times doesn’t get its proper due– the
institutional investment community. The amount of money spent in capturing the attention
and support of the buy-side pales in comparison to these other well-established forms of
corporate outreach. Simply put, IR warrants the greater emphasis and focus typically lavished
on other marketing initiatives. After all, it is charged with marketing something equally as
important as any product or service … its currency – the company’s stock.
Around the world, a typical IR budget for a mid-cap company – one with a market capitalization
of say, $1 to $5 billion dollars – often is not much more than $500,000, not even enough money
to pay a couple lobbyists or buy 30 seconds of advertising time during the Super Bowl. Investor
relations officers (IROs) often have to fight tooth and nail for their “fair” share of a budget a
company allocates to external communications. It shouldn’t be this way. Research shows that
IR has an undeniable impact on valuation. This is because IR, perhaps more than any other
venue, is the road by which investors learn about a company’s investment appeal, stay current
on important developments and receive the insights necessary to support informed and
favorable investment decisions. These are the very decisions which drive valuation.
3
70% Percentage of US institutional
investors that believe IR has a
meaningful impact on a
company’s valuation
“Companies have no idea how much impact the personality of the
individual IR person affects the view of a total company. If they
chose an experienced person in that role, it pays back in spades,
but they can’t see it.”
—Portfolio manager
“If it is good IR but the news they have to communicate to me is bad, then even if the stock doesn’t sell
at a premium, maybe it makes me more interested in buying the stock in the future. Ultimately, the
quality of the IR is kind of important in my investment choices.”
—Buy-side analyst
“Yes, it affects how people
perceive the company. They
are the voice to the Street.”
—Buy-side analyst
-20% The “Poor IR” Discount
Measuring the IR effect
The institutional investment community believes in investor relations. They accept IR as an
essential conduit to the inner workings of a corporation (management’s mindset itself at times),
and its investment appeal. When asked to identify the sources of information they value most
when learning about investment opportunities and, more significantly, when making
investment decisions, buy-side analysts and portfolio managers
invariably rely on the bevy of intelligence coordinated by the
investor relations department. This includes earnings calls,
management access, face-to-face meetings, roadshows,
conference presentations and the IR website. Investors look to
IR as an invaluable resource in which to corroborate the often
bewildering array of material information available to them on
the hundreds of companies that they follow. In short, IR is the
gatekeeper to much of the unadulterated intelligence they
require to support their investment decisions.
Accordingly, the buy-side believes investor communications has a tangible impact on a
company’s valuation (one that is even more pronounced when a company is burdened by IR
that is perceived to be “poor”). Earlier this year, a nationally representative sample of 164 US
buy-side analysts and fund managers from various industries and with an array of different
investment objectives, were surveyed on, among other things, whether or not good IR has a
meaningful effect on a firm’s stock price. The results were convincing. Better than two out of
three (70%) said they believe it does. As a few respondents pointed out:
When asked to quantify this impact, the results were quite
compelling – and have been so on a consistent basis over the last five
years. In 2012, the US buy-side believes IR accounts for a total
variance of 30% in a company’s valuation – ranging from a premium
of 10% for “superb” IR to a discount of fully 20% for “poor” IR.
4
While the premium associated with top-notch
investor communications is impressive (a
consistent 10% bonus), the valuation penalty of
ineffective IR is far more dramatic and appears
to ebb and flow with the economy. It peaked at
a negative 25% in 2009 at the rock bottom of
the global economic downturn, lessened as the
economy recovered in a fitful manner in 2010
and 2011, but has again ramped as macro
uncertainties persisted and fear of a double-dip
recession once again intensified. The chart to
the right illustrates these findings.
The evidence of IR’s power extends well beyond
the United States and is felt even more acutely
in other countries. For example, the delta
between good and poor investor relations is
33% among investors domiciled in Europe and
fully 40% for those based in Asia-Pacific
countries. It is worth noting that European and
Asian institutional investors are more apt to
attribute more upside impact to the valuation
from effective investor relations.
At a minimum, these data points reveal sufficiently compelling evidence so as to warrant
companies to re-evaluate their investor relations effort and the corporate resources devoted to
it. Any impartial cost-benefit analysis demands it. But paying lip service to a commitment to
proactive investor outreach, regardless of how well intended, is the easy part. This includes
touting unrivaled responsiveness (gamely promising same-day or 24-hour turnaround on any and
all investor inquiries) or hiring seasoned, highly-respected IR professionals. Superb investor
relations requires much more. Some of the touchstones of a superb IR program include an
ongoing commitment of time, effort, forthrightness, transparency and robust disclosure as well
as a C-suite that regularly avails itself to the investment community. Only those companies with
IR programs that are firing on all cylinders will reap the full valuation benefits (while waylaying
the negative effects of poor IR).
That said, an optimal corporate IR program should in no way come at the expense of peak
operational execution by the C-Suite and management. No one on the buy-side expects or
advocates this. Rather, investors are advocating ensuring that the essence of a company’s
investment thesis, its strategy, key risks, benefits and opportunities are widely known so that
5
“I will not take a position without
meeting with management.”
Portfolio manager
“We have a policy that we will not
buy a company’s stock unless we’ve
met management recently. It’s a non-
starter if we don’t.”
Portfolio manager
“There’s how I feel about it and there’s reality. How I
feel about it is ‘absolutely essential’. Reality is that I
don’t always get that opportunity.”
Portfolio manager
“If it’s a company that I am totally unfamiliar with,
then I would like to meet management. I’ve been
managing portfolios for over 30 years, so if I have
knowledge of the company and “know” the
management and what they’ve been able to produce
in the past, then I am less likely to require a meeting. If
there’s a new management that just took over, then I
would require it.”
Portfolio manager
“It isn’t important before I take a
position, but it is important before the
position becomes a large position. We
can take the position and meet with
them later.”
Portfolio manager
informed investment decision-making is triggered rather than decisions made on supposition
and incomplete information available from external sources. There are some fundamental
expectations of the C-Suite:
Management Access
Despite the C-Suite’s natural aversion to roadshows or one-on-ones, there is no substitute for
direct management interaction with the buy-side. Certainly, the IRO can play the proxy
CEO/CFO at times and advise investors about the investment merits of a company’s stock. But
when it comes down to brass tacks, the one-on-one meeting with senior management is often a
buy-side-mandated prerequisite. It is an absolutely invaluable means by which investors
investigate and weigh the pros and cons of a company, to personally test the mettle of a CEO or
CFO (kick the tires if you will) in deciding whether to invest, to sustain or add to an already
existing position or sell a stock in favor of an alternative investment.
For reasons such as these, companies that do not facilitate direct interaction between senior
management and the buy-side risk alienating one in three North American investors (36%),
virtually half of those based in Europe (48%) and fully three-quarters of those domiciled in Asia-
Pacific countries. As the following chart indicates, these are the proportions of institutional
investors around the world who earlier this year stated that they would still need to meet
senior corporate management before buying a given company’s stock, even if the IRO was able
to answer all their questions about its investment appeal or thesis. Clearly, it is a mistake to
hire a skilled IRO with the expectation he or she will obviate any need for the CEO and CFO to
regularly meet with the Street.
6
Moreover, one meeting very often is not enough. Buy-side analysts and investors the world
over usually don’t invest in a stock after a single management session, even if that meeting was
with the CEO or CFO and considered highly informative or beneficial. The natural inclination of
many investors is to weigh the merits of taking a position in a stock over time, often seeking to
test the management waters more than once before taking the plunge. From another
standpoint and using an even more compelling analogy, it is a rare circumstance indeed when
people decide to marry after a single date.
Accordingly, fulfilling investor requirements for “superb IR” and the requisite amount of
management access mandates extraordinary patience on the part of CEOs and CFOs and the
empathy to put themselves in the shoes of potential investors who quite naturally resist making
what they may believe is a hasty decision. Just because a fund manager does not invest in the
company after a one-on-one meeting does not mean the session was not a success. The
manager in question is often simply processing the information that has been disseminated and
carefully weighing the pros and cons against a myriad of possible alternative investments.
Furthermore, there are often times other considerations that weigh into the timing of a buy
decision, such as top-down industry concerns, macroeconomic concerns or valuation concerns.
In such instances, managers want to have all of the due diligence complete so they are ready to
act when they deem these outlier conditions to be optimal.
An important rule of thumb to keep in mind is that it will usually take at least one, preferably
two (from the perspective of the investor), management meetings before a portfolio manager
can summon the confidence necessary to invest in a company – perhaps even three if you
happen to be targeting an investor in one of the Asia-Pacific countries.
7
Being transparent when
times are tough goes a
long way and is genuinely
appreciated by the
investment community.
©Rivel Research Group 2012
Transparency
To earn the premium associated with top-notch IR, senior corporate management also must
scrutinize and consider enhancing the quality of the information it allows to be disseminated to
the investment community. After all, no matter how capable the IRO, he/she can only share
company insights and data (and be exceptionally articulate and responsive in delivering it when
requested) that first has been approved from above. The key variable is a willingness to go
beyond simple disclosure and commit to greater transparency in financial communications.
Now, one might wonder what the difference is between
disclosure and transparency. There is a big difference in the
eyes of the investor. Investment professionals define
transparency as clear, unambiguous information through which
companies articulate definitive strategic goals, why they are
important and the drivers governing their achievement. In
essence, it’s the clarity of message that brings forward key
challenges, how they are being addressed and the frank, forthright discussions of the
company’s prospects … in both good times and bad. That last part is quite important given the
macroeconomic and industry challenges that roil the equity markets. Being transparent when
times are tough goes a long way and is genuinely appreciated by the investment community.
On the other hand, investors are becoming wary of disclosure that they perceive to be focused
on providing routine data, metrics, and operating figures on the many facets of the company in
the financial realm. But what they often crave is insight into market share data, product
development, the pipeline, competitive advantages, etc. All too often, disclosure in itself
provides insufficient color or interpretation on management’s part. A company can supply
mountains of data on their operations, but fail to provide any discussion or insight into what it
69%
Mean: 2.3 2.1 2.1 3.1
8
“Straightforwardness. I’m getting
tired of hearing spin. I would say an
ability to have an open discussion of
the puts and takes around the
various opportunities on the income
statement – margins, costs,
revenues. I would say an ability to
articulate the long-term plan with
detail.”
—Portfolio manager
“Their ability to answer our
questions thoroughly. The
receptiveness to meet with and talk
with potential investors. And those
individuals that provide information
above and beyond financial
statements. What I mean by that are
presentations, conference calls and
roadshows.”
—Buy-side analyst-
Portfolio manager
“Being candid. I think that is the
number-one thing. To be very
candid with the investors. Not
giving us a line of bull. And not
dodging questions. These are tough
issues these days so there are
tough questions to be answered. If
they are very candid in their
answers, for that they get respect.”
—Buy-side analyst-
Portfolio manager
“If I get transparency from them,
that’s good. Transparency is really,
really big for us. So understanding
what it is that the company does. A
pretty clear presentation on the
future prospects and cost structure
and operating leverage – things
like that.”
—Buy-side analyst
means now or in terms of future performance. They look to the company to provide the “what
does this mean” and the company’s interpretation – lessening the potential for misguided
investment community conjecture. Black is always preferred to gray. For example, how they are
connecting the dots between A and B (A being where they are now and B being where the
company expects to be in the future). Also, it can’t be stressed enough that the key to having
transparent communications is openness, honesty and frankness.
Guidance
The subjects of guidance and transparency are tightly intertwined. A definitive element of
transparency to many on the buy-side is having a company’s own perspective on the future,
how the strategy will play out in terms of financial and operational performance. At the same
time, guidance allows issuers to proactively set the agenda with which a company’s investment
appeal is judged, as opposed to letting others, most notably the sell-side, determine it.
While not all companies supply guidance and many buy-siders can be tolerant about not
receiving this type of forward-looking insight, guidance is often perceived as a critical
distinguishing element of superb IR (of course when done with care, prudence and a keen eye
9
To retreat from active engagement
with the investment community will
only serve to fuel rather than diminish
concerns which may, and often are,
blown out of proportion in the
absence of nuanced strategic insight
and prudent guidance.
on not over-promising and under-delivering). Providing guidance is an attribute that can
elevate the investor communications caliber of one company to a notch above that of its peers.
Guidance sets the stage for bolstering the all-
important rating of management credibility (the
single most important driver of investment decisions
over the last decade) through the setting of key
goals, the time frame by which they are expected to
be achieved and the communication of success when
the goals are realized. CEOs who consistently do
what they say they are going to do are the darlings of
the investment community and nicely set the stage
for maximizing the size of their captive audience.
The 2008 market implosion has significantly altered expectations about guidance. It need no
longer be all about earnings. Relative to a set of five types of corporate insight, earnings
guidance actually ranks fifth today. What the investment community is looking for is qualitative
insight on the strategy as well as important operational metrics. When will a new plant be
operational? How much is expected to be spent on R&D? How are you going to execute your
strategy to achieve the goals you have outlined? As the equity markets have churned and the
economy given no signs of strong recovery, investors increasingly have been saying help us to
“connect the dots.”
So while it is difficult to strike a balance between too much information and too little, studies
show that investors do understand the competitive nature of the business and are aware
there’s a fine line there. What they prefer is a sufficient level of disclosure surrounded by a
discussion on what management thinks about it, not volumes upon volumes of filler (read:
10
“Refraining from providing any guidance at all [is a problem]. When management has no insight on the
future, that's always a bad sign. It's fine for companies to correct and update the guidance, because I
don't expect 100% precision – no one is superhuman – but they should tell investors what's going on and
why the numbers are moving in a different direction.”
Buy-side analyst
“We're interested in managing for the
long term, and we're adults – there will
be surprises, negatively or positively.”
Portfolio manager
“The mistake is not providing guidance. If a company does
not provide guidance, the Street is completely guessing
and you do not have any idea as to what their earnings
will be.”
Portfolio manager
useless) data. They seek management’s take on the data and how that will translate into future
financial performance. After all, managements theoretically have the best vantage point into
what’s going on in their company and their industry.
The obvious challenge lies in further clarifying future goals without divulging competitive insight,
regardless of whether or not management thinks that what they are giving is adequate. Since the
IR program is almost always viewed as an extension of management, if a company wants that
premium of 10%, then developing a superb IR department means having to provide transparency
in their communications. It’s not necessarily MORE information, but rather, the right information
and the right level of transparency … “This is our strategy, these are the key elements, this is
some detail around those key elements, and this is how we think this will produce future financial
performance.” Without it, companies risk being judged on the poor side, and with the continued
market malaise. Why run that risk when detailed and transparent investor communications are
entirely possible with the right amount of work on the company’s part?
In many respects, this article can be considered a call to action for CEOs and CFOs alike … to work
hard in guarding against marginal proactive outreach during difficult and unpredictable economic
times –rather to consider fortifying IR with additional resources (and a bit more of their own time)
in the function’s perhaps less-than-fully appreciated role of marketing the company’s stock. To
retreat from active engagement with the investment community will only serve to fuel rather than
diminish concerns which may, and often are, blown out of proportion in the absence of nuanced
strategic insight and prudent guidance. The resonance of a company’s investment appeal is in large
part dependent upon repeated exposure to the story, growth drivers and management itself.
Investors clearly need to understand the underpinnings of a company’s success in good times and in
bad, the strategies that will be deployed to soften any downward macroeconomic or industry
pressure and the credibility management brings to bear. At the end of the road is the unique
promise and enhanced valuation implicit in providing “superb” investor relations.