Army Aviation Digest - Aug 1981

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AUGUST 1981 VOLUME 27 NUMBER 8

rigadier General Ellis D ParkerArmy Aviation OfficerODCSOPS, Headquarters,Department of the ArmyMajor General Carl H. McNair Jr .Commander Brigadier General Richard D KenyonDeputy Commander

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U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, Alabama U.S. Army Aviation CenterFrt Rucker, Alabama

2 Airmobility In The 1980s, LTG William R Richardson6 Aviation Warrant Officer Retention: A Matter Of Concern, CW3 Carl D Everhart and Michael G.12161819202730323436404244

Sanders, Ph .DHead Protection And A Whole Lot More,MAJ (P) Will iam W. StuckDES Report To The FieldHangar Talk: TC 1-134, Commander's Guide For TheAircrew Training Manuals, CW2 Gary R WeilandReporting FinalBlack Hawk Around The World; Part II: The Startingline, MAJ Brendan P BlackwellPEARL'sEmergency Locator Transmitters . .. Why Wait?MAJ Cecil SmithCold Weather Alert, CPT George J KerriganAviation Personnel Notes: AR 600-105, AviationService of Rated Army OfficersThreat: There Is More To Threat Than Vehicle Identification, CPT William C BarkerNuclear, Biological, Chemical Training And Development, MAJ Phillip H. Webb Jr. and CPT Timothy BSavageHitchhiking With Hueys; MAJ Robert B. Robesonand MAJ Gerald L AndersonFrom Balloon To Black Hawk; Part III: Korea,LTC David M Lam , M.D.

Inside Back Cover: ATC Action Line: ATC SystemComponent BreakdownCover: A UH-SO (left) and an AH-S4 combine to createan image of the Air Cavalry Attack Brigade symbol (theofficial symbol is at the left). These helicopters and the

ACAB symbol are representative of the latest in Army Aviationequipment and organization. But , equipment and organization alonecannot be effective components of the Army 's combat arms teamwithout an accompanying development of innovative tactics andtraining programs. In this respect, General William R Richardsonoffers some sage advice to those of us in Army Aviation in his articlebeg inning on page 2

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Honorable John A. MarsSecretary of the Arm

Richard K TierneyEditor

The mission of the U.S. Army Avl lJtlon Dlgest USPS 4 1 ~ 3 5 0 is to provideinformation of an operational functional nature concerning safety and ai rcraftaccident prevention. training. maintenance. operations. research and development.av iation med icine and other related data.

This pub lication has been approved by The Adjutant General. HeadquartersDepartment of the Army , 25 April 1980 . In accordance with Army Regulation3 10- 1

Active Army uni ts receive distributIOn under the pinpo int dlstnbution systemas outlmed n AR 310 1 Complete DA Form 125 and send di rectly to CDR, AGPublications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard . Baltimore , MD 21 220 For anychange in distribut ion requi rements. Initiate a reVised DA Form 12-5.

The Digest IS an official Department of the Army periodica l published monthlyunder the supervisio n of the Commanding Genera l U S . Army AViation CenterViews expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Armynor the U S . Army AViation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwisespecified Use of the masculine pronoun is Intended to Include both gende rsunless otherwise stated Material may be repr inted provided credit is given to theDigest and to the author. unless otherwise indicated

Ar ticles . photos and Items of interest on Army Aviati on are Invited Di rectcommunication is authorized to : Editor. U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O . DrawerP, Fori Rucker , AL 36362 Manuscripts returned upon request.

National Guard and Army Reserve uni ts under pinpoint distribution also shouldsubmit DA Form 12-5. Other National Guard units should subm it requests throughthe ir state adjutant general

Those not elig ible for o fficia l distribut ion or who desire personal copies of theDlge t can order the magazine from the Superintendent of Documents, U.SGovernment Print ing Office. Wash ington, DC 20402 Annual subSCription ratesare $2000 do mes tic and $25.00 overseas.


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AM I LIAR lTV AN overconfidence can sometimes breed complacency. For instance, we inthe community know that Army Aviation as ais an essential part of the Armyso. Unfortunately, such is not always. Some startling evidence to support

is presented in this issue's leadby Lieutenant General William R. Richarddeputy commanding general, TRAand commanding general, Army CombinedKS and curPlans Headquarters, Department of the Army.In "Airmobility in the 1980s," General Richard

to'employers' of airmobileArmy Aviation's viability andapplication in future warfare." Thethe students surveyed "admitted to knowingif anything, about the employment ofassets on the battlefield" The exclamais a very disturbingas I am sure it is to you.Certainly it would also be our consensus that

deficiency of tactical knowledge amongson cogentlyus as to measures that we should takeArmy Aviation is not only fullyas a vital member of the combinedbut is also fully integrated into theBattle. Don't skip a word of this material.believe it will help us understand that in addition"above-the-best" aviators, we must alsoes representatives For if we asdo not understand the application of"sell" it to those with whom wethey be able to understand it andit?Chief Warrant Officer, CW3, Carl D. EverhartDr. Michael G. Sanders have written "Aviation

Officer Retention: An Overview." Thisthe first of four articles the igest will publishCenter/Research Institute study project whichof the personnel and operationalan increased attrit ionaviation warrant officers from the active forceort of six members of the Warrant

officerhave already been pursued and warrantaviator retention has been greatly en-

hanced as a direct result of this study project.This is a must for reading for all aviators, especiallyour warrant officers, and illustrates how correctiveactions can be taken once the facts are properlypresented to the Army's leadership.Another most informative inclusion in this issuewhich really hits home is NBC Training andDevelopment" by Major Phillip H. Webb Jr. andCaptain Timothy B. Savage. It is an acceptedfact that the nuclear, biological, chemical threatwill be very real in tomorrow's battles; and thereis a definite need for aviation personnel to knowhow to deal with this eventuality. All too oftenwe give lip service to a need and fail to traintoward the too hard " problems. NBC is anarea in which we must train more and becomebetter prepared. Some units are doing it, but allmust be conscious of the requirement lest webe caught unprepared or unawares.Finally, I call your attention to the outsideback cover which spotlights the Army Chief ofStaff's campaign to increase the ef fic ient use ofour Army's resources. The Chief of Staff haspersonally initiated the program and it deservesour total and unqualified support at every level,from crewchief to major commander. We allhave a part to play. The wise use of resourcesmeans a better state of readiness for all ourforces. Of necessity and by our very nature,aviation is an expensive resource; but our battlefield contribution in every function of land combatfully justifies that investment. We must earn ourway and, in so doing, seek out ways to do evenmore with less-thus, becoming a more efficient,more effective element of the combined armsteam. Your ideas on means to accomplish thisimportant job are solicited. Your thoughts appliedArmywide could amount to significant savingssavings that can then be applied to enhance oureffectiveness and readiness.

Major General Carl H. McNair Jr.Commander, U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL


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IN THLieutenant General William R Richardson

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and PlansHeadquarters Department of the Army

198 sTH ARMY OF the 1980s s confronted withthe most formidable challenge in its history.The massive buildup of Warsaw Pact forces

during the past decade coupled with a demonstratedwillingness to use those forces to project power andinfluence poses a threat of unparalleled magnitudeto the security of our nation. Though this threat inEurope s the most dangerous to our national securityit s not the most likely war in which we may have tofight. Contingency operations in Southwest Asia orn Northeast Asia are far more likely to occur. TheArmy must be prepared to wage war as directed bynational command authority n any of these scenariosand we must have appropriate doctrine and trainingto employ ll the components of the combined armsteam in the most effective manner. Army Aviation s

General Richardson commanded the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center , Ft. Leavenworth, KS when he wrote this article

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underemployed comonent, and I would like to review the opportunitiesArmy Aviation in modern combined armss.Until the end of the Vietnam War, Army Aviation

elopment of doctrine, first entering combat inthree Piper L 4 Cubs flewthe deck of the USS nger to observe artillery

of North Africa. In Aprilthe Secretary of Defense directed a reexaminationthe role of Army Aviation. This benchmark decisiony history created the U.S. Army Tacticalobility Requirements Board under Lieutenanteneral Hamilton H. Howze which in turn resultedthe 11 th Air Assault Division (T). The objectivesactivities associated with the history of bothve been well-documented in Lieutenant GeneralW. O. Kinnard's article Airmobility Revisited

in the Jun e and July 1980 A at;on D;gestThe airmobility challenge to the Army in the 1960s

one of tremendous magnitude, since we hadry little in the way of approved doctrine, tactics,oven hardware systems and methods of operations.Army, however, was equal to the task and rapidlyevelop, validate and train in theconcept. I t was a concerted team effort whichvely involved the branch schools and many unitsthe field. When airmobility was finally employeda large scale in Vietnam, the concept 's feasibilityonfirmed fo r counterguerrilla and, to a limited

egree, mid-intensity war.T he early 1970s marked th e beginning of an eclipsethe influence of Army Aviation caused by twovents: the withdrawal of the final American unitsom Vietnam and the Yom Kippur War.T hat 1973 war was the most recent war in whichll-equipped, heavy combat forces have fought onmodern battlefield. The lessons learned were costlyboth sides and the U.S. Army revised its doctrinee to these lessons. The newly organizedraining and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) properly

ought to turn the Army's attention away from itsof concentration on guerilla warfare ande most dangerous threat to national security:ar on the central plains of Europe.The how-to-fight manuals, beginning with FM 100, Operations, revitalized our doctrine and focused

on a European scenario. DUr)ng, aviation doctrine and practice generallyme a subsidiary matter in combined arms warfaresurvivability of helicopters in high intensity war.As a result of these trends, airmobility lost its

eeminent position by the mid-1970s. Many lessonsarned in Vietnam have been forgotten As a

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consequence, American officers have little understanding of airmobility in its total context andconsequently profess little faith in its ability to playasignificant role on future battlefields. Many categorically dismiss much of our experience in Vietnam asinvalid or outmoded

A Command and General Staff College (CGSC)student recently conducted a random survey of 100of his fellow classmates to determine what the futureemployers of airmobile assets think about ArmyAviation's viability and practical application in futurewarfare. The questions were open-ended and purposelyavoided orienting specifically on any region of theworld, although most respondents related their answersexclusively to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) battlefield. The responses to this surveywere disturbing. Almost one-third of those surveyedadmitted to knowing little, if anything, about theemployment of airmobile assets on the battlefield.When asked what degree of confidence they have inthe ability of an airmobile force to accomplish itsmissions and survive on the mid-intensity battlefield,one-third of the students indicated a belief thatairmobile forces have little or no chance of doing so.Further, those who felt that airmobile operations inmid-intensity conflict are feasible overwhelminglystated that such operations should be restricted torear area type missions, with only a very few indicatingthat small unit operations forward of the forwardline of own troops (FLaT) are practical.

These results mayor may not accurately reflectthe base of knowledge and opinion among our youngerArmy officers; however, I fear that a similar sentimentregarding airmobility extends also into the higherranks of the officer corps.

The early 1980s have seen three events of significance to the Army which provide great opportunitiesfor Army Aviation: the changing nature of the threat,the Army's reevaluation of basic operational doctrineand the program to modernize Army equipment.In recent years, the world has grown even smallerand more dangerous. Soviet surrogates have beenemployed in a number of wars, and Third Worldnation states - whose economic and ideologicalArmy Aviation fi rst enters combat s n L4 Cub takes offfrom the U ange r during the invasion of North Afri ca in1942

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IRMOBILITYinterests run counter to our own have developedarmed forces equipped with highly sophisticatedweapons systems made possible by the sale of oil orother scarce natural resources. The United States,Western Europe and Japan now recognize all toowell their dependence on foreign oil imports andthey have seen oil used as a tool of internationalpolitics. The downfall of the Shah of Iran, the warbetween Iran and Iraq and the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan have made clear the instability withinSouthwest Asia, an area of vital interest to the UnitedStates and its allies.

At the same time as these events were occurring,the Army began to reevaluate its basic concept ofcombat operations as articulated in FM 100-5, thenew edition of which will be published this year.Defensive doctrine needed better articulation topreclude an attrition oriented defense and the Armynow focuses more on maneuver as an essential factorin war, particularly in the defense.A third major development of paramount importance to the Army is the ongoing modernizationprogram in which more than 4 major new systemswill be provided to the Army in the field betweennow and 1985. In order to properly integrate thesenew systems, the Army 86 Studies were undertakenand new forces were designed. The Heavy Division86, either armored or mechanized, was designed tofight and win against Warsaw Pact forces in highintensity war. The Infantry Division 86 was changed

Currently, the Aviation Center is conducting the ArmyAviation Mission Area nalYSis (AAMAA). This exhaust ivestudy effort is examining all of the functions of landcombat, to include the contribution of Army Aviation tothe functions of the AirLand Battle. The study is using afront-to-rear approach beginning with the threat, asdepicted below, and will identify the deficiencies (manyof which this article highlights) and related solutions inArmy Aviation doctrine, force structure, training andmateriel.

significantly to give it sufficient antitank power andtactical mobility to fight in the NATO arena as wellas strategic deployability to permit its use in contingency operations elsewhere in the world. Both ofthese new division structures incorporate an air cavalryattack brigade.

What have all these trends meant? Great newopportunities for Army Aviation, provided that Armyaviators get out in front and lead in the developmentof doctrine and procedures to bring airmobility to itsfull usefulness as a combined arms team member.This is an exciting time for Army Aviation, equalor greater in importance than that which occurredtwo decades ago under the Howze Board. Army aviators must think, analyze and apply Army Aviation invarious types of contingency operations, in the renewedapproach to maneuver warfare, and in synergy withoncoming new equipment.

Army Aviation's basic mission is to use aviationunits and aircraft whenever and however they improveour Army's ability to fight. Thus aviators must examineevery function of land combat to determine aviationapplications in warfare. How can aviation forcescontribute to success in close combat, fire support,air defense, command and control, intelligence andelectronic warfare, communications, combat supportand combat service support? Technological capabilities of aviation equipment have improved tremendously since our combat actions in Vietnam wherecan new doctrine exploit these capabilities?I'll cover several areas of doctrinal voids just to getthe aviation thinkers off to a flying start.Fundamental to our defeating an attacker on anybattlefield is the requirement to seize the initiativethrough offensive action. We must seek out andexploit every opportunity to do this using all theassets available, and Army Aviation will playa majorrole in this effort. This means employing aviationforces anywhere on the battlefield, to include acrossthe FLOT when the opportunity is there to strike theenemy deep and disrupt, delay and destroy his forces.Army Aviation is uniquely suited to such operations.The speed, firepower and maneuverability of aviationforces give them a tremendous advantage over groundmaneuver elements. Terrain, friendly force dispositionsand the nature of the enemy's doctrine will creategaps between his attacking formations, leaving himvulnerable to offensive strikes against his flanks andrear. These opportunities will be fleeting in natureand involve an element of risk. They will require arapid and violent response by a force able to capitalizeon mobility and speed superior to that of the enemy'smassed armored columns on the move; a force able tomaneuver over and position itself on terrain which isrestricted or prohibited to the enemy; a force thatcan do all of this while taking an acceptable risk in

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to deliver a rI ,,,,,,,t .-.t i ...and where he least exr)ects

, ,;;: ,-.1-II meet our needs.11 . . rt C'C'I.AY'I of enemy air defense

our

is wellfor successfulnnA . t , . cvnc on the modern battlefield.

Its on the outcome of airmobile r.np .


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AVIATION WARRANT OFFICER RETENTION

co cCW Carl D Everhart

andMichael G. Sanders Ph.D.

U.S. Army Research InstituteFort Rucker Field UnitFort Rucker AL

oTHE UNITED STATES ArmyResearch Institute has recently completed its inves-tigation of aviation warrant officerretention. We at the Army ResearchInstitute Ft. Rucker Field Unitwould like to provide you with some

direct feedback. This s the first offour articles in which we will attempt to answer some of your questions regarding AWO retention andat the same time enlighten youwith some of the facts and resultsof the study.Who Started he Project InOctober 1979 the Chief WarrantOfficer Division Military PersonnelCenter sent a let ter to ARI requesting research assistance. The letterdocumented a sizable decrease insecond tour retention for A WOswho had completed flight trainingn fiscal year 1976. MILPERCENwas concerned that the increased

separation rate might: Indicate the presence of anaviator retention problem alreadytroubling the other services. Signal the onset of a trend thatwould significantly increase ArmyAviation training costs and reduce

GlossaryARI Army Research Institute

AWO aviation warrant officerDA Department of the Army

EUSA Eighth U.S. ArmyFORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command

Y fiscal yearMACOM m jor Army command

MILPERCEN Military Personnel CenterMOS military occupational specialty

TRADOC U.S. Army Trainingand Doctrine Command

USAREUR U Army. EuropeWESTCOM Western Command

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the combat effectiveness of ArmyAviation units.Why Was ARI Involved? MILPERCEN asked us for research as-sistance because, since 1974, the Ft.Rucker Field Unit has had withinits mission the requirement to: 1)provide training research, humanresources research, and technicaladvisory support to the Army Aviation community worldwide throughdirect participation with the AviationCenter, 2) execute an advanceddevelopment research program insupport of the Aviation Center andArmy Aviation, and 3) develop atechnology-based program of research to provide future benefitsto Army Aviation. ARI is an activityoperating under the Deputy Chiefof Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army.Hasn t AWO Retention BeenStudied Before? During our initialinvestigation we found that manystudies had been conducted concerning the structure of the WarrantOfficer Corps; however, few effortswere specifically related to retentionissues. Some of the more recentstudies did provide a starting pointthat helped us identify some of thebasic issues regarding the retentionproblem.What Was The AWO RetentionRate? In the first quarter of FY1980, MILPERCEN's preliminaryfigures on retention indicated thatA WOs were leaving the Army at ahigher rate than had been observedin the past. A close look at therecords revealed that AWOs whocompleted their flight school training during FY 1973, 1974 and 1975had about a 65 percent retentionrate at the end of their 3-yearAUGUST 98

obligated tour. Those warrant officers who completed training duringFY 1976, 1977T and 1977 had abouta 45 percent retention rate at theend of their obligated tours. Thistrend represented about a 20 percent drop in retention between FY1975 and FY 1976 and contributedto the annual voluntary separationof about 500 A WOs. This figureplus 100 AWOs who were beingmedically grounded and another100 retiring equaled around 700AWOs lost each year.This high separation/ attrition ratewas of great concern for threeprimary reasons: aviator replacement trainingcosts increasing force structure needs limitations in the number ofaviators that are programed to betrained each year.It costs more than 125,000 totrain each aviator in the Initial EntryRotary Wing Course. This figuredoes not include the costs associated

8 0007,5007,0006,5006 0005,5005,000

- '

r :

------i'

with the 3 to 4 years of on-the-jobtraining required to refine and maintain proficiency in skills acquiredduring the aviator's tour. Figure 1depicts the AWO force structurerequirements as projected by MILPERCEN at the beginning of FY1980. DA increased the trainingrate to 808 AWOs per year to helpclose the gap ; however, even thisincrease in aviators will not simultaneously offset the AWO lossesand meet the future force structureneeds.What Was Our Plan? Our research goal was to identify factorsassociated with AWO attrition. Toward this goal we asked two specificresearch questions: First what werethe demographics of warrant officers who were likely to attriteSpecifically, we wanted to developa profile of their characteristics suchas age, time in service and numberof dependents. Second what werethe attitudes or considerationswhich influenced their decision to

I

.

I-......

a

REQUIREMENTSIAUTHORIZAlIONS

IINVENTORY

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986F I 5 CA lY A RFIGUR : Aviation Warrant Officer Force Structure

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.,,, ..,,j-o from the We care-reviewed aU of the informationavailable on this

cated with the Airabout their a D D n ) a ( ~ h e ~ sretention in-houseselected involved

.... hr '71 , ' .. data relevant to twoareas mentioned above through aau,estlOrmaire administered

asked all commandsfor their opinions the causes ofthe lowered retention rate. Theresults of our initial .. n , > 1 ~ ' ~ < - ; f ' _

with feedback fromU ' , ' - ' - - ' I V ' ' ~ -nrr\uu-lor the

with a s s , i g n l m ( ~ n t s , career mtlentlOl1lS,decisions and demo

graphic information.Who Wasthree different

inThe second

We surof

,,., , , ~ I I > of

was AWOs asverbal or written notice tochain of command that

intended to from activeThe group was com-...... , '., ....... ,,-1 officer aviators ' ;;:PT 'VITIO

8

757 AWOs in the randomsample group, 141 A WOs who wereplamnmg to and 320 chaincommand commissioned officers.Where Were They Surveyed? Wevisited Army installations within thefive MACOMs between .. ~ . ~ f c , . . . . .and December 1980: 14 in(USAREUR),8 in Korea6 in the continental United States

'-J'J. -U' - J'HJ. and TRADOC), and1 in Hawaii Thesecommands contained about 95 per-cent of the A WOs. Wechose these becauseof both their of avia-tors and their in mission,command and location

a standard onof the the nature of theand instructions for com--n1t:J.t-.Y1,n the survey. After

the survey, we 'nt""''''''"'''nr",,rsome members of each group toensure proper of the

I.'.' ,4l~ o ~1.< 1:''6USAREUR 199EUSA 81WESTCOM 47FORSCOM 314TRADOC 116TOTAL 757FIGURE 2: Survey Results

cOITect'Y1t"" .r, .. , j - ~ j - ; ~ Y 1dents' answers.What Were The Results? Wefound a deal of informationabout attitudes and opinionsthat exist within the aviation comIn this article we r . .rr r ian overview on our tmdulgsrandom SarnpJlecareer intentions,

entry, current career status andreasons for More information will be discussed in otherarticles of this series.

Career Intentions resultsshowed that career intentions wererelated to rank AWOsindicated either out

were undecided but wouldout as follows: 54.9WOls indicated

were in this category; 42.7 percentof the CW2s indicated they werein this 13.3 percent ofthe CW3s they were inthis and 3.8 percent of

I : ~

~ ~ : ~ l >:# 0 i1 iiiI ~ I. :,. ,fO I N~ ~ ~ o f.,-./ , , ~ t.18 10513 3814 2483 12313 30141 320



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100 --------------------------------t t t t0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~t t t t0 - - ~ ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - -t t t t0 ~ L n ~ ~t t t tt ~ 9 7 t t t050 t ~ o t t0 - - - - a - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - n - - - - - - ~ - - - -t t t t3 0 ~ - - - - - - - - - - t ~ ~ t -W ~t t ;.;-/0 1 0 - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ , ~ - - ~ ~

t t , , ; . ~ - / OWI W2 W3 W4FIGURE 3: Attritee percentages according to career intentions

CW4s indicated that they in- When asked what their career into separate prior to retire- tent ons were, those A WOs stationeligibility. ed at Ft. Ord, CA, indicated a higherLocation of the Attritees. For attrition rate than the others. Ft.installations surveyed, the Lewis, WA, had the highest percentcurrent installation assign- age of AWOs who classified themdid appear to be related to selves as undecided. USAREUR data

or her decision to separate. indicated not only the lowest per-4: Location of attritees

TypeWarrant Officer

(as per his/herstatement of intentions

centage of attritees but also the highest percentage of retainees figure 4).

he Attritee s MOS. The percentage of A WOs who indicatedthey would either get out or wereundecided, but would probably getout by MOS, figure 5) was asfollows: First, the utility/ observation helicopter pilots MOS 100B)had 39.4 percent. Second, the attackhelicopter pilots MOS lOOE) had21.5 percent. Third, the cargo helicopter pilots MOS 100C) had 21.3percent. It was no surprise to findthe fourth and smallest group inthis category to be the fixed wingpilots MOS lOOQ / lOOR) with 11.2percent.Source of Entry. We found that30.5 percent of those who cameinto the warrant officer programfrom civilian life indicated theywould either get out or were undecided but would probably get out.By comparison, we found that 31.1percent who came in from inservice/ prior enlisted entry were inthis same category. Contrary to thepopular belief these two figures weremuch closer than had been anticipated.INSTALLATION

Attritee 27.8 20.6 19.4 18.7 16.7 16.1 13.3 7.1 6.8Undecided 36.1 29.4 32.0 37.3 28.5 35.7 36.0 45.3 38.0Retainee 36.1 50.0 48.6 44.0 54.8 48.2 50.7 47.6 55.2

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100 t t t t 100 t I t0 90t t t t t I t0 80t I t t t t I0 70t t t I I t t0 60t t I t ~ 1 1 0 t t0 50t t t t I0 40. , ~ t \ 4 0 t t0 30h\S4011.\.' I h < ~ ~ O It0 20t t t t \ 110 t t I0 10t t t t t t t s ~ 1 0100B 100E loo 100Q R OBV VI RA

FIGURE 5: Attritee percentages according to MOS FIGURE 6: Attritee percentages according tocurrent career statusCurrent Career Status We learnedthat 57 percent of the obligatedvolunteer AWOs surveyed figure6 indicated they either would get

out or were undecided but leaningtoward getting out. For the voluntary indefinite group this figurewas 25.6 percent. The regular Armygroup had only 8.4 percent whodid not plan on staying in untilretirement.

easons for Leaving A majoroutcome of this research resultedin a prioritized listing of the considerations for attrition. This listindicated the considerations whichwere designated as of primary im-portance in the AW Os decisions toseparate from the Army.

1

Careful scrutiny of the top 10 attritee considerations in figure 7 indicates that these considerations relateto three primary areas: pay andbenefits items number 1, 3, 4 and9 , leadership and supervision items2, 5, 6 and 8), and assignment andcareer factors items 7 and 10 .It is highly probable that a cumulative effect of considerations existed which may have influenced theattrition decision. For example, itis unlikely that unequal flight payalone could have been the majorinfluence on attrition. However,even slight pay inequities can produce dissatisfaction whch may become a deciding factor when otherconsiderations are already influ-

encing the decision to leave.So What Now? The present studyfound that pay and benefits, leadership and supervision, and assignments and career management areareas which are the most important relative to AWO attrition. Thesimilarity between Air Force andArmy pilot attrition data is srikingin that the same kinds of factorswere found to be accountable forAir Force pilots separating from theservice. Pay and benefit issues,which were ranked highly by allpersonnel surveyed, are already aprimary part of one DA action plan.Although raising base pay, equalizing flight pay and restoring benefits may temporarily compensate

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ttriteeRank ConsiderationOrder

1 Unequal flight pay (warrant officer flight pay versus commissioned officer flight pay)2 Lack of concern for the individual3 Low pay (all pay and allowances)4 Erosion of benefits5 Lack of competence in aviation matters by chain of command6 Lack of professional respect and recognition from commissioned officers7 Lack of opportunity for desirable installation assignment8 Lack of leadership9 Potential for higher paying aviation related position outside of the Army

10 Lack of predictability of future in the Army7: The top 1 considerations influencing AWOs decisions to separate

other unresolved problems

fore action plans being devel-by DA also concern assign-/ career management improve-leadership issues and sec-

In the fourth Warrant OfficerDivision will present the action plandeveloped to aid in resolving thosefactors addressable by MILPER-CEN affecting AWO retent ion.

Additional information will be avail-able on the results of this investi-gation when published as an ARITechnical Report during the fourthquarter of FY 1981.

Pilot attrition cannot be reducedone or two simple solutions such

s higher pay. It is quite clear thatmanagement policies s

s issues related to leadershipand supervision must

other fac-causing dissatisfaction. irNovember 1980 LTCand Major Gregory.More To Come. In the secondcle of this series we will take a

at all 46 separationions and their rank order.will compare the rank order ofby AWOsthe commissioned officer avia-

on the groups surveyed.

About The AuthorsCW3 Carl D Everhart has worked at the U.S. Army ResearchInstitute Ft. Rucker Field Unit since June 1979 with one 6-monthbreak to attend the Warrant Officer Senior Course. With more than12 years as an aviation warrant officer, CW3 Everhart has attained abachelor s degree in Aeronautical Sciences, qualifications as arotary wing instrument flight examiner and a UH-1 standardizationinstructor pilot. He is a Regular Army warrant officer and has hadassignments to Vietnam; Germany; Ft. Riley, KS; Korea; and Ft.Rucker, AL. CW3 Everhart is a Senior Army Aviator with more than4,000 accident free flying hoursDr. Michael G Sanders is the Technical Team Manager for AviationSelection and Training at the Army Research Institute Ft. RuckerField Unit. He has been involved in initial entry rotary wing trainingand aviator selection research since 1978. Prior to joining ARI, Dr.Sanders conducted research on .aviator workload, fatigue and aircrewperformance at the U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratoryfrom 1973 to 1978. He is also a Mobilization Designee in the U.S.Army Reserves, serving as a Medical Service Corps Health ServiceResearch Psychologist (68T)

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ND Wa lATION HELMETS in the days of theopen cockpit were designed to provideprotection from the elements. Thesesought-after historic relics, along with the gogglesand accompanying white scarf, were signs ofthe real aviators or barnstormers or (gulp) wingwalkers.Since that time, along with other major technological advancements, came the enclosedcockpits and two-way radios. The helmet, incivilian aircraft, lost some of its glamour andsoon lost its popularity. Within the military(especially in helicopters) the helmet was here tostay. Soon, microphones and speakers for thetwo-way radio communications were built intothe helmets so that the crewmember's handscould remain on the controls while using theradio. Great strides were also taken to give thewearer protection from head injuries during acrash.Along with the growth in the size and power ofthe aircraft we fly, came the hazard of permanenthearing loss. A requirement to protect the crewfrom this danger was levied on the aircraft andthe helmet. The Army began developing a helmetwhich would: (1) reduce head injuries; (2) reduce

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Major (P) William W. StuckOffice of AAH Project Manager.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command

St. Louis, MO

LOT MOR3) house communications equip-hold a visor; and (5) become a place forpersonalized and sometimes very elaborateThe SPH-4 was the Army s solution-andthe mainstay within the Army.The advanced attack helicopter (AAH) is beingas a highly mobile tank killer, effec

ing is being conducted and will be completeASARC/DSARC (Army/DefenseAcquisition Review Councils) processfollow with an AAH production decision in1981.Among the elaborate, sophisticated equipmentaircraft are the Pilot Night Vision(PNVS) and the Target Acquisition De-Sight (TADS) which act as the eyes ofcrewmembers. I n order to provide thethe most effective display ofinformation seen by these eyes, a videowas needed o the helmet This video

provided to the crewmembers, was re-have a one-to-one size relationshipthe real world, and have a 30 degree by 40field of view. To put this in perspective,a viewing distance of 10 feet, a TV screen


16/52

Infrared Sensors

would have to be about 5 feet, 4 inches by 7feet, 3 inches, to give similar coverage.Because of size a nd weight consideration, aminiature wide screen was designed to bemounted on the helmet, so that it could be viewedwith one eye. The helmet not only supports thehelmet display unit (HOU) but also provides headline-of-sight (LOS) signals such that the naturalhead motions of the crewmember direct the TAOS/PNVS turrets and 30 millimeter (mm) gun turretin a one-to-one angular correspondence. TheLOS of the crewmember is determined electronically, using four infrared sensors mounted onthe helmet (figure 1).4

Early testing showed that even with a sophisticated wide field of view visually coupled systemsuch as this, the pilot workload could be drastically reduced by providing piloting informationon the imagery. Figure 2 shows the set of symbolsused in the transition mode (which is usuallyused during nap-of-the-earth flight). Other modeswhich have slight variations in symbology arecruise, hover and bob-up. In addition to those,weapons symbology for 2.75 rockets, HELLFIREmissiles and the 30 mm gun is shown whenrequired.The SPH-4 helmet was initially considered formodification to accommodate the video system



17/52

ft): Helmetthe infraredhelmet disunit

FIGURE 2 (below): Typical AH-64 flight symbology-transition nap-of-the-earthmode: The minimum essential set of flight symbology includes: Airspeed: 16;power management: 95 percent; radar altitude: 100 and vertical tape; artificialhorizon: dashed line; instantaneous vertical speed: ; heading: tape hover symbology:velocity vector and acceleration circle; sensor LOS: reticle; aircraft LOS: diamond;NAV steering: /\ ; status: xxxx; TAOS Sensor pointing: t also includes AAHweapon symbology for the 2.75 rockets, HELLFIRE missile and the 30 mm gunwhen appropriate. The solid line with the bu lb is the velocity vector. At the bottomthe large box represents the field of regard of the sensor and the small box is thefield of view

W 3I I9 ~ o

6 A< >V

33I I

I

NI

obut was eliminated early in the program in favorof a new lighter weight helmet shell. The newhelmet, known as the Integrated Helmet andDisplay Sight System helmet, came into beingto fulfill this requirement. It was designed toprovide equal or greater crash and acousticalprotection than the SPH-4, but at a lower weightand with more stability on the head in order tomaintain the crewmember's eye alignment withthe HDU.This helmet, unlike any other, does providehead protection and a whole lot more and isan important part of our Total Weapon System.

AUGUST 1981

3I I\

I

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1

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U S ARMY

irectorate o Evaluation StandardizationR PORT T THE FIEL AVIATIONSTANDARDIZATION

N AUGUST 1979, the Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) commander directed eachTRADOC school to form a Branch Training Team(BTT) that would visit proponent units in the field toestablish and thereafter maintain a productive dialogue between the units and the schools.

The U.S. Army Aviation Center Training Analysisand Assistance Team (ACTAAT) is the Ft. Rucker,AL, BTT. Since inception, the ACTAA T has visitednearly all active Army Aviation units. While it isdifficult to assess the effect that ACT AAT visitshave had on the field, the feedback produced hashad a measurable effect on activities at the AviationCenter. In this month's report to the field, we wouldlike to solicit your professional opinion on one majorissue that has been developed by the ACTAAT.

T CTIC L INSTRUMENT FLIGHT1 Who will emplace the tactical beacons?"2 Who will report the destination weather?"J What should I do or where do I go If I don 'tbreak out VFR?"4 "If I can't get there NOE, there is no need going "5 If the destination weather is 200 feet above thehighest obstacle, why can 't I go NOE?"6 Attack companies fight in platoons-notsingle ships. "7 "What about the air defense artillery threat?"

Do you recognize any of these thoughts? Do youunderstand the current tactical instrument philosophy?Your answers are likely to be yes and no, respectively.

To give order to this discussion of tactical instrument flight, it is important to recognize the basicguidelines requiring this activity. Army Regulation(AR) 95-1, Chapter 6, Section VIII establishes therequirement for rotary wing aviators to successfullycomplete an Army instrument flight evaluation which

6

consists, in part, of tactical instrument flight planningand an approach. Beyond the initial instrument certification, the annual instrument requalification alsorequires the aviator to successfully pass evaluationof the same two tasks.

To sustain aviator proficiency in tactical instrument flight, the aircrew training manual (ATM)requires rotary wing aviators to perform threeassociated tasks:Task Number 4511Task Number 4512

Tactical Instrument FlightPlanningTactical InstrumentTakeoff

Task Number 4513 - Tactical InstrumentApproach

Looking in Chapter 5 of your ATM (new series),you will note that two iterations of each of the threetasks are required semiannually. You will also see theasterisk indicating that the three tasks are mandatorystandardization flight tasks. The I (ATM para 5,page 5-2 reinforces the AR 95-1 requirement formandatory instrument flight evaluation.

Now, having an understanding of where the requirement to perform tactical instrument flight trainingand proficiency is found, let's look closer at thetraining publication which tells how to perform instrument flight in the tactical evironment. Field Manual(FM) 1-5, Chapter 23, gives us the how to do tacticalinstrument planning and flight.

Three points are clear in the FM. First, tacticalinstrument flight will only be performed when meteorological conditions at origin or en route precludenap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight. Second, threat weaponswill affect when and where tactical instrument flightcan be performed. Third, in view of points one andtwo, the individual aviators must be qualified andproficient in order to successfully accomplish their

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


19/52

missions in the tactical instrument environment.Look closely at the FM, figure 23-1. You willnotice that there are two instrument flight regimes-

standard and tactical that are dictated by enemydetection and engagement capabilities, terrain/obstacle clearance and navigational aids availability.Admittedly, the previous quotation is rather nondescript for peacetime purposes; however, it doesprovide three interesting items for further attentionand investigation.

What is the enemy's engagement capability on thehigh threat - mid to high intensity battlefield? Enemyaircraft are always a threat, but if they are hunting anArmy helicopter in the tactical instrument regime-how many hunters are looking at them? Since theSA-4 is found at the Soviet Army level and intendedas a deterrent to medium to high altitude aircraft,perhaps it s realistic to dismiss the SA-4 as a threatto Army helicopters. The SA-6 is likely to be themost realistic threat to an Army helicopter flyingsingle-ship at 400 feet above the highest obstaclewithin 25 kilometers (km) of the forward line of owntroops (FLOT). Certainly there are numerous threatsystems within 15 km of the FLOT. f you accept thisanalysis of the threat, then equate the distance of 25km to the tactical unit dispersal on the ground.Where are you in relation to a maneuver brigadetactical operations center (BTOC) or trains area?We might view this 25 km from the FLOT) as theforward limit of the tactical instrument flight regimebased on the SA-6 threat.

The second item, navigational aids availability, isanother factor requiring some investigation. Whosupports the beacon and advisory requirements fortactical instrument flight? The short answer to thequestion is o one FM 1-5 indicates that pathfinderswill be operating the AN/TRN-30(Vl) beacon. Asearch of division tables of organization and equipment (TOEs) (not modification TOEs) reveals thatpathfinders are not authorized below corps level(three exceptions are airborne divisions, airmobiledivisions and the air cavalry combat brigade). Infact, the AN/TRN-30(Vl) beacon is not taught in thepathfinder course.

DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attentionon an area of major importance. Write to us at: CommanderU.S. Army Aviation Center ATTN: ATZQ-ES Ft. Rucker AL

AUGUST 98

The air traffic control (ATC) platoon that s attachedto the division is there to provide an instrumentedlanding site and through the use of the three-mantactical team, the platoon leader is carable of establishing a second site. The divisional A'l C assets aresimply not capable of supporting flight in the tacticalinstrument regime. The division instrumented landingsite, provided by the ATC platoon, actually represents the forward limit of the standard instrumentflight regime, or if preferred, the rear of the tacticalinstrument flight regime.

The third issue derived from figure 23-1 is terrain/obstacle clearance must be assessed based on thearea in which your unit will operate. Some units arecurrently in that area; o thers must estimate the topographical aspects of the areas in which they expectto fight from afar. In any case, the topography willsimply exist and will affect where the tactical instrument regime can be established.

Perhaps the bottom line on whether or not a unitshould expect to employ tactical instrument flightdepends on the type missions anticipated. Our combatdevelopers have given categorical arrangement toArmy Aviation units - Supporters and Fighters. fyour unit has a supporters role, perhaps demands ofaerial resupply and logistics to the brigade trainsarea or medical evacuation will require the aviatorsin your unit to be tactical instrument qualified andproficient. f you are in a fighting unit, the ability tosafely recover from the main battle area in the eventof inadvertent instrument meteorological conditionsmay require aviators in the unit to be tactical instrument qualified and proficient.

Whether or not tactical instrument requirementsare valid for the Army aviator force is currentlybeing examined at the Aviation Center. We haveintentionally opened the issue to you, the user, throughbasic discussion in this article hoping to spark yourprofessional concern which might provide the AviationCenter better insight into the issue of tactical instrument flight. Won't you take the time to share youropinions with us? Please write to: Commander, U.S.Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES-E, Ft.Rucker, AL 36362.

36362; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or commercial 205-255-3504.A fter duty hours cal/ Ft Rucker HotLine AUTOVON558-6487 or 205 -255-6487 and leave a message

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Hangar Talk is a quiz containing questions based onpublications applicable toAnny Aviation. The answers are atthe bottom of the page. f you did not do well, perhaps youshould get out the publication and look it over.

TC 1 134COMMANDER'S GUIDE FOR THEAIRCREW TRAINING MANUALS

CW2 Gary R WeilandDirectorate of Training DevelopmentsU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

1. Meeting requirements of the Aircrew TrainingManual (ATM) may not necessarily qualify aviatorsfor flight pay.A. TrueB False

2. Individual aviators will be integrated into theunit's aircrew training program within how manyworking days after reporting for duty in an operationalflying position?A 5B.30C.90

3. Commanders may reduce the minimum semiannual flying hour requirements by 15 percent forwhat classification of highly proficient aviators?A. Aviator readiness level (ARL) 1, flight activitycategory (FAC) 2B. ARL 1, FAC 1C. Both A and B aboveD. None of the above

4. An aviator who fails a no-notice flight evaluationand is reclassified ARL 3 is relieved from meetingARL 1 flying hour requirements until he/she againbecomes ARL 1.A. TrueB. False

5. An aviator must complete ATM flying hour andtask/iteration requirements to be given credit forsuccessful completion of the Aviator Annual Proficiencyand Readiness Test (AAPART).A. TrueB False

6. What type of Night Hawk (NH)/Night VisionGoggle (NVG) training may be conducted by anNH/NVG qualified pilot on orders as an NH/NVGunit trainer?A. Daylight filter only (NVG) and NHB Day and night continuation training (NH/NVG)C. For initial NVG qualification; daylight filter onlyD. Band C above

7. What is the minimum frequency an aviator mustperform a I-hour NVG flight to maintain currency?A. Every 6 monthsB Every 30 daysC. Every 60 days

8. An aviator is required to fly both UH-l Hueysand OH-58 Kiowa helicopters. If the UH-l is designated as the primary aircraft, what will be the designation of the OH -58?

A. Alternate aircraftB Additional aircraftC. Designation not required

9. An aviator newly classified ARL 1 during thefourth month of the 6-month training period is required to complete what fraction of the semiannualflying hour requirements?A 1/3B 1/2C.2 /3D. 3/3

10. How frequently must an aviator receive lowpressure, high-altitude refresher training to maintaincurrency?A. Every 3 yearsB. Every 5 yearsC. Refresher training is not required

PL1-Z eH d) \ f 01-Z aDed uo alOU pue Z -Z eled) 8 '8(qPI -Z elect) J LD) (l)pl-zeled)a 9(e8-Z elect) 8 'S

(()P9-Z eled) 8 'J (ap-I eled) \f(PP-I eled) \f "Il)P9-Z eled) \f 6 P9Z eled) 9 .


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REPORTINGFIN LLateNews From rmy viation ctivities

FROM ST LOUISFuel Conservation. The U.S. Army AviationResearch and Development Command (AVRADCOM) has begun the initial phase of an aviationfuel conservation program. Near-term goals areto prepare and evaluate a new operator manualformat for optimum performance flying and toconduct an operational evaluation of a calculatorflying aid to assist in the fuel conservationprogram. The program includes a proceduralanalysis of flight operations, development of trialchart formats, an operational unit field evaluationof the new charts and the programing andeventual field evaluation of the calculator. Theprocedural analysis will investigate methods ofreducing ground running time and optimizingmission profiles. Flight testing is being performedby the U.S. Army Aviation Engineering Flight

Activity, Edwards Air Force Base, CA, to obtainadditional data for optimum performance operations. The U.S. Army Aviation Center, Directorateof Evaluation and Standardization, Ft. Rucker,AL, and the Troop Support and Aviation MaterielReadiness Command, St. Louis, are mutuallyinvolved with AVRADCOM in accomplishmentof the program.AVRADCOM - LTC Thomas C Rankin)

FROM WASHINGTONAviation Three-Stars. Major Generals John W.McEnery and James H. Merryman have beennominated by the President for the rank oflieutenant general and will subsequently receivenew assignments. Major General McEnery, nowchief of staff of Forces Command, will becomechairman of the InterAmerican Defense Board,Washington, DC. Major General Merryman willbe the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research,Development and Acquisition, Department ofthe Army, Washington, DC. He is now the assistantDCSRDA.

AUGUST 1981

FROM FORT IRWINNew NTC. The Army s new National TrainingCenter opened in July.Army heavy combat units throughout thecontinental United States (CONUS) will be rotatedthrough the NTC for intensive 2-week training

periods. Those rotations will be managed on anincreasing scale and eventually every tank andmechanized infantry battalion in CONUS will gothrough the training center every 18 months.The NTC s permanently assigned opposingforces (OPFOR) will be composed of troops andequipment from the 6th Battalion, 31 st Infantry(Mechanized) and the 1st Battalion, 73rd Armor.These battalions will represent a Soviet motorizedrifle regiment. They will be trained in Soviettactics, will be dressed in Warsaw Pact styleuniforms, and will be equipped with replicas ofSoviet-type threat vehicles. Both the OPFORand the friendly forces will use the multiple integrated laser engagement system, enabling themto receive immediate feedback on targets.Once a unit has completed force-on-forcetraining against the OPFOR troops, it will participate in live fire training, applying combatskills on a realistic training battlefield. The rangewill permit free play for both offensive and defensive operations, using every weapon systemavailable to the battalion commander. The defensive array will consist of more than 1,000targets. Smoke, artillery, attack helicopters, closeair support, electronic and chemical warfare allwill be employed to create the most realisticcombat environment possible. NTC-PAO)FROM KOREA

Mohawk Records. Sergeant First Class MarkG. Dvorak recently flew his 1,000th hour as atechnical observer (TO) in an OV-1 Mohawk,and he was awarded a plaque by his unit,Company A 146th Military Intelligence Battalion, Camp Humphreys. The sergeant, who hasbeen a Mohawk TO since 1965, is now stationedat Ft. Hood, TX.Brigadier General Don Parker, former commander of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat)and Eighth U.S. Army aviation officer, has logged2,000 hours as an OV-1 Mohawk pilot. He beganflying the Mohawk in 1961 and is one of the fewactive duty Army aviators who have 20 years inthe aircraft. The general left Korea in May forhis new assignment as deputy director of requirements and Army Aviation Officer with the Officeof the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations andPlans, Washington, DC. 146th MI-PAO)19


22/52

BLACKHAWKAROU DTHEWORLDPART THE STARTING LINE2

The U S Army was thefirst to fly a heHcopternonstop coast to coastwhen an 8-21 namedAmbUn Annie accompUshed the feat inAugust 1956 (seeOctober 1956 viationDigest). Now there isa golden opportunityfor the U S Army tobe the first to fly aheUcopter aroundthe world.



23/52

TH CONCEPTUAL route callsfor the flight to begin from underneath the St. Louis Arch, the Gateway to the West, in late May 198?,and terminate there after a west toeast circumnavigation of the globein late June. Each of the two ATWUH-60As will require about 65flight hours to accomplish the flightin about 30 days. The C-12 supportaircraft will each fly a little morethan 100 flight hours within thesame timeframe Each leg wasevaluated in terms of the feasibilityof flying each of the legs at 10,000

AUGUST 98

feet cruise altitude or below, andthe UH-60A can fly each leg withoutspecial routing or treatment withthe exception of the critical legbetween Nemuro, Japan and ShemyaAFB in the Aleutian Island chain.Figure 1 shows a network of theparallel activities required for thesuccess of the critical leg. Morewill be said later concerning thesupport team. A team with fueland tools will be prepositioned atthe preselected site in the vicinityof Nemuro, Japan the day prior tothe critical leg flight. The purpose

of the team is to top off the ATWUH-60As with about 500 gallons ofJP-4 each (1,000 gallons total), conduct a thorough safety-of-flightcheck of both helicopters andbaby-sit them until departure at0600 the following day.The network shows C-12 no. 2arriving at Chitose (Hokaido) thesame day the ATW aircraft land atNaha, Okinawa The personnelaboard the no. 2 C-12 will ensurethat the prepositioned U.S. Armyequipment (at Chitose) is onsiteand available to set up operations

2


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GLOSS RYADF automatic directionfinderFB ir Force BaseARS air rescue squadron

ATW around the worldDA Department of the rmyDARCOM rmy Materiel Develop-ment and ReadinessCommandDCSLOG Deputy Chief of Staff forLogisticsDOCL day of critical legDoppler navigation radar systemFMS foreign military salesFORSCOM Forces CommandIFR instrument flight rulesINS inertial navigation systemloran long-range navigationsystemmph miles per hourNATO North Atlantic TreatyOrganizationNCO noncommissioned officerNCOIC noncommissioned officerin chargeNM nautical milesOmega long-range navigationsystemREFORGER Return of Forces toGermanyTACAN tactical air navigationVHF very high frequencyVOR VH F omnidirectionalrangeVTOL vertical takeof f andlanding

2 days later at Nemuro under thesupervision of the ATW senior NCOin charge, approximately along theschedule shown in figure 1. Whilethe ATW helicopters with C-12 no.1 fly to Yokota Air Base, the supportteam is in transit on the groundand arrives at Nemuro to beginsetting up operations. The followingday (DOCL-l) the support teamwill take the final steps required tobe ready to accept the ATW aircraft when they arrive from MisawaAir Base. The day of the criticalleg, final checks will be made ofthe ATW UH-60s and they willdepart by 0600. The no. 1 C-12 willdepart from Chitose so as to passnear the helicopters as they departon the critical leg. After the ATWsupport team members are deliv-

ered to Chitose, the no. 2 C-12 willdepart and pass nearly overheadof the helicopters when they are500 to 600 NM along on the criticalleg. In this way some communications are maintained with theteam support aircraft through agood portion of the critical leg bydirect support personnel. Similarly HC-130 air sea rescue aircraftwill be onstation along the route asshown for both navigation andrescue support. Using this plan, theATW team can successfully fly thecritical leg equipped with appropriate navigation capabilities.Navigation The ARN 131 Omega

navigation system provides theATW team with a navigation capability during the 50 percent of theATW trip when standard low altitude navigation systems will notsuffice. It is planned to be theprimary system when out of reachof the ground based, limited rangesystems normally used by lightaircraft. The current system weighsabout 50 pounds. The unit is inproduction and. after the AustralianOmega station is certified willprovide.the necessary signal coverage for the entire ATW mission.Other commercial systems are available and in test aboard helicopterswith the Federal Aviation Administration and are expected to morethan meet the navigation requirements (at weights under 30 pounds)of the critical leg for the ATWmission.

Each of the two C-12 supportaircraft and each of the two ATWUH-60As would be equipped withARN 131s on loan from the AirForce.As a backup to the ARN 131s,the ATW program would receivenot only air sea rescue coverageby air sea rescue units of the AirForce, but also be provided en routewinds, sea state and weather observations by the HC-130 covering thecritical leg. On the critical leg, the33d Air Rescue Squadron based atKadina in Okinawa, Japan would

provide navigation assist to all ATWaircraft. The ARS HC-130 is equipped with T ACAN, Loran, VOR,ADF, Omega, Doppler and INStogether with weather search radar.These systems permit the HC-130to provide navigation assistanceas well as air sea rescue coveragefor the entire flight. The 33d ARSaircraft would provide as much inthe way of a safety factor as couldreasonably be included for such aworld record achievement.Risk One of the possible statements of criticism mentioned earlierwas that an aerial circumnavigation of the globe in a helicopter

would be somewhat risky. Thereis a risk of failure, but there is alsoa high probability of success.Measures have been included inthe ATW plan to avoid failures oraccommodate levels of degradationin the mission to avoid a cata-strophic conclusion to this historymaking flight.

The aircraft has demonstratedreliability and durability undersevere field conditions. Less thanhalf of the flight is over water andnone of the flight is to be conductedat gross weights beyond that permitting single engine operations. Theaircraft will experience the steadystate flight conditions of climb andcruise. The reliability of the UH-60 combined with a conservativeflight profile support a high probability of success. U.S. Army crewsduring the war in Vietnam fre-. quently flew helicopter combat andcombat support missions over periods exceeding 10 to 12 hours. Pilotssingly) flew world record missionsin the YOH-6 of more than 1,900NM which took 15.75 hours. U.S.Army pilots can readily fly the ATWmission and cope with the fatigueof extended periods of flight.If however, fatigue becomes acritical factor, the crews will berested, especially in view of theschedule flexibility permitted whereno existing world record bettermentis being attempted.

U.S. RMY VI TION DIGEST


25/52

. t ~ ~

.-t ~ ~f >.. . 011UH-60's


26/52

would result in a critical leg flighttime of under 10 hours, on theaverage, which gives the ATWaircraft more than a 3-hour fuelreserve.In June, the 90 percent worstcase winds historically result in a3-knot headwind component for aflight at 10,000 feet from Nemuro,Japan to Shemya AFB, Alaska.Using this wind factor, the flighttime on the critical leg would takeabout 11 hours and leave the ATWhelicopters a 2-hour reserve. The90' percent worst expected windsprovide an adequate margin ofsafety. The aircraft would have toexperience in excess of a 20-knotheadwind component before fuelexhaustion. Tolerance for the 90percent worst case conditions listedabove supports a high probabilityof success, but additional measuresare planned to improve the probability.

The flight will not depart untilthe average wind factor, or better,is forecasted for the flight routeand Shemya AFB is forecasted tohave near optimal surface weatherconditions. Further, HC-l30 ARSaircraft will measure the exact windfactor at 10,000 feet and sea statealong the route to verify the betterthan 10-knot wind assist factor forecasted. The ATW aircraft wouldnot depart until actual conditionswere checked by HC-130 aircraftfor both the helicopters and theC-12s. The probability of failure isgreatly reduced by departing onthe critical leg with a verified 10-knot, or better, tailwind componentfor the route. With an actual 10-knot tailwind component at takeoff, and with a forecast for thiscondition for the entire flight, thereis a small probability that the aircraft will experience a headwindcomponent beyond the 20 (+ knotlimit tolerable. In any case, intelligent decisions can be made concerning the flight as it proceedswith the HC-130s measuring actualwinds at flight altitude. The HC-130 it should be recalled, will also

24

augment the navigation functionfor the critical leg.The risk associated with theATW program is acceptable TheUH-60A has an established trackrecord of infrequent dynamic sys

tems failure which would require aforced landing. Repair/ replacementof components under austere conditions can readily be accomplished.The ATW UH-60A is expected tofly above the standard maximumgross weight fewer than 10 flighthours and never beyond normalmaximum power and transmissionlimits. It must be remembered,further, that the whole mission isessentially steady-state flying withrelatively few high-low-power cyclesand virtually no maneuvering.

The general approach consideredfor the ATW flight is one in whichpeople from an active U.S. Armyunit equipped with the UH-60A andother people from the AviationDevelopment Test Activity at Ft.Rucker, AL would, as part of adeployment exercise, fly two specifically equipped UH-60As- in addition to those required - to Europefor a REFORGER exercise. The101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and the Development TestActivity are the best units to accomplish the feat. The ATW teamwould then continue on and complete the flight by the end of theREFORGER exercise.

Cost. The following assumptionswere made with respect to costing: The flying hours for the UH-60A 2 X 165 =330) be funded within

the flying hour program for the 101 stAirborne Division (Air Assault) andFORSCOM. The flight hours for the C-12s2X108=216) be funded within theFORSCOM flying hour program. DARCOM and DA DCSLOG arrange for two C-12s for the ATWmission for a period of about 45days. The ARN 131s (four) be borrowed for the mission from the Air

Force and returned at mission completion. All aircraft preparation be accomplished at Ft. Campbell, KY, byaircraft maintenance personnel withtechnical assistance provided byDepartment of Army civilian U H-60A technical representatives. Technical representatives are routinelylocated at bases with h igh concentrations of rotary/fixed wing aircraft.

The Black Hawk Project Manager's Office oversee/manage acquisition of the ATW tanks and the safetyof flight release for the 23,250-poundATW gross weight if required in thetimeframe. The C-12 Project Manager ensure that the safety of flight releasewas generated for the C-12 ATWmaximum gross weight. TDY funds be provided by theDepartment of the Army.

Given the assumptions, it wouldrequire less than $200,000 abovethat which would normally be programed for the required flying hoursto permit the U.S. Army to flyaround the world in a helicopterfor the first time in history.

Program Design. After designation of the project, three immediatepriorities would be established bythe participating aviation units. irsta technicaVperformance study mustbe done to determine the exactaircraft configuration and airspeed/altitude profiles to optimize range.This also would include a detailedassessment of risk. A long-rangenavigation capability also would beselected/ defined.

The se ond effort would be adetailed cost definition covering allaspects of the project, and the thirdwould be a detailed route optionsand feasibility analysis.At this point, a go/ no-go decisionwould be made based on the definedaircraft capabilities, an assessmentof the risk, a detailed cost analysisof the project and the most feasibleroute. Upon approval of the project,many parallel activities would be"kicked off ' in the execution ofthe preparation phase.



27/52

It is proposed that the 101stDivision modify/upgrade the aircraft to include the additional longrange tanks and installation of thenavigation system.The pilots and the maintenanceteam should be selected from thepersonnel who are best qualifiedbecause of their demonstrated flyingskills, experimental test flight expertise, physical condition and militaryexperience. The crews also shouldbe able to present a strongly positivepublic image.

Two C-12s would fly a refinedsupport package (personnel andequipment) and assure adequateadvanced preparation at plannedlanding points. This aircraft hasthe capability to support the missionand permit the entire project to bealmost solely a u.s. Army effort.

Other activities to accomplishwould include: National Aeronautics Association/Federation Aeronautique International arrangements for certification of the record. Definition/validation of theroute, to be followed by resolutionof any international interface problems. Following definition, the navigation support package would bedeveloped. Pilots would be selected andtrained in aircraft performanceditching and navigation to includeIFR flight as an emergency procedure. The execution phase would beaccomplished in 30 days be followedby a phaseout which would includerestoration of the aircraft to standardconfiguration and return of the aircraft to the unit from which theywere drawn.

ATW Team The around-theworld flight team should be madeup of personnel from the 101stDivision and Ft. Campbell and theAviation Test Board to the extentpossible. I t is expected that theteam will include men and women(both the men's and women's recordscan be set) and represent the finestpersonnel performing in their respective specialities.

AUGUST 1981

The two UH-60As would requirefour pilots at least one of whichwould be an experimental test pilot.One would be an 0-3/0-4, the ATWmission commander and the otherswould be appropriately rated aviation warrant officers. The C-12swould be crewed by an 0 3 withmaintenance experience and theremaining three crew positionswould also be filled with aviationwarrant officers, one of whomshould have extensive maintenanceexperience.

The ATW support team wouldbe led by a UH-60A qualified 0 3maintenance officer who would alsoact as the lead element landingahead of the ATW UH-60As oneach leg to ensure that previouslyarranged billeting and facilities areready as programed. A UH-60Amaintenance test pilot qualifiedaviation maintenance warrant officer would be next in charge of the

maintenance team and be responsible for ensuring that the ATW UH-60As safely depart on each leg.The maintenance team NCOICwould be an E 6 or E 7 qualified asa UH-60A maintenance supervisor.The remaining five people wouldbe a C-12 crewchief, a UH-60Acrew chief, an engine specialist, ahydraulics specialist and an avionicsspecialist crosstrained as an electrician.The challenge exists as it didwhen the U.S. Army first flewaircraft around the world in 1924,as it did when Charles Lindbergfirst soloed the Atlantic in 1927,and when the Army's Amblin' Annieproudly completed the first nonstopcoast-to-coast helicopter flight inugust 1956Now, the Black Hawk can carrythe banner for the Army and theUnited States in the first helicopterflight Around the World r -.'

Some Army Aviation Records And Firsts Aviation igest Coverageo The first nonstop, coast to coast helicopter s flight/October 1956, page 10o The first Army aviator /June 1962, inside back covero The first Army Aviation pi lot class /July 1962, page 11o The first training fatality/July 1962, page 14o The first Army helicopter pilot/July1962 page 24o The first tactical training helicopter course/July1962 page 24o The first Army aviators in combat/November 1962, page 36o The first Army Aviation fixed wing self-deployment outside the NorthAmerican Continent/May 1963, page 12o Army Holds 13 World Aviation Records/July1964 outside back covero Army Research Compound Helicopter Flies 222 mph/August1964, page 34o New Heights/July1965 page 48o OH-6 Flight Records/December 1966, page 48o CH-54 Shoots for Record/May 1968, page 31o The first helicopters at the South Pole /September 1968, page 13o Army Aviation s first flight simulators/May 1970, page 23o CH-54 breaks existing records/September1980 (Reporting Final), page 19

Copies may be obtained by writing tothe A viation igestP.O . Drawer p,Ft. Rucker, AL 36362

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ontinuedfrom Pageand indirect) for combined arms team elements.

The pressing needs of the Army demand that weact immediately to fill these and other doctrinalvoids. But as we do this we must maintain a continuousdialogue among the schools and between these schoolsand the units in the field. We can ll afford to haveour doctrine writers operating in an ivory tower,unaware of the innovative tactics and training programsbeing developed by field units.

Doctrine must be practiced in training and Armytraining must take on a new dimension if we are toensure the success of our leaders and Soldiers onfuture battlefields. Our officers, especially commandersat all levels, must be expert in combined armsoperations and know how to integrate every elementof the combined arms team on the battlefield inorder to exploit their individual and collective capabilities to the fullest. In addition, they must be innovative and creative in their tactical thought and judgment.J.F.C. Fuller noted after World War I that leadersof modern armies need special preparation. "Themore mechanical become the weapons with whichwe fight," he wrote, the less mechanical must be thespirit which controls them." The initial entry andtransition flight programs at Ft. Rucker , AL, musttrain Army aviators in this spirit, and training programsmust be developed which will provide them with astrong foundation in tactical aviation skills.

To this end, the Command and General StaffCollege is making a concentrated effort to focus itscurriculum on the realities of maneuver warfare bydeveloping in staff officers and commanders soundtactical judgment and training them in the flexibleapplication of combat power. Historical and theoreticalreadings are being added to the course to stimulate amore challenging and creative approach to trainingin tactical operations. Tactical studies are also being

6

extended beyond the familiar arena of the FuldaGap to various other regions of the world.Similarly, the branch schools need to stress therealities of combat operations in the AirLand Battle.For the Armor and Infantry Schools the task isclear- they must revitalize the art of maneuver warfareand in so doing reeducate all elements of the combinedarms team on the neglected ar t of offensive operation.As a result of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army decisionin March 1979 to integrate aviation into the combatarms officer basic course and officer advanced coursecurriculum, 19 aviation shared tasks and 1 to 14branch specific aviation tasks will be integrated intothese programs of instruction. This solidifies theArmy decision making Army Aviation a combat armand ensures widespread instruction in employmentof Army Aviation as a full-fledged member of thecombined arms team.Effective doctrine and training are more crucialtoday than ever before. We have entered what isprobably the most dynamic period in the Army'shistory. This decade will witness the formation ofnew types of units, the restructuring of others andthe fielding of high technology equipment. TRADOCis developing a viable concept for fighting the AirLandBattle throughout an extended battlefield. This is achallenge of unprecedented dimension and farreaching demands because, as never before, the combined arms team will be employed to see deep, strikedeep and support deep. We must hammer theenemy where he least expects it and where he ismost vulnerable. To do so will require the skillfulorchestration of each element of the combined armsteam.

The next few years will see a reawakening ofArmy interest in airmobility. New concepts, organizations, procedures and techniques can and must bedeveloped by the Army and commanders at all levels,as well as our aviators who must take the lead in thiscrucial endeavor. We must draw upon the importantlessons of the Howze Board experiments, the 11 thAir Assault Division tests, the Vietnam conflict, andmore recent Middle East conflicts to synthesize theinnovative combined arms ideas. An organizationalready exists, in the Air Cavalry Attack Brigade inthe 9th Infantry Division, where new ideas can beput to the test. From that experience we shouldbegin to build a set of doctrinal and tactical conceptsthat truly makes Army Aviation a full partner in thecombined arms team in conducting the AirLandBattle. We need to stretch our imagination on howto employ attack units, air cavalry units and liftunits. The Army is waiting for those of us responsiblefor doctrinal training developments to tell all the resthow to do the business of winning with Army Aviation.Let's move out ifi>:t



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PEARL SPersonal quipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown

Cool ItFor quite some time now, we have been advisingyou to keep your survival radio and strobe lightbatteries cool (which substantially prolongs their life)

by storing them in a refrigerator. For an equal amountof time, you have been asking us how to go aboutgetting one of these handy-dandy items, which alsoseem to be equally useful for storing your lunch,snacks and an occasional six-pack. Well, commontable of allowances CTA) 50-909 authorizes you arefrigerator, mechanical, household: 12.5 cubic footcapacity- per unit, activity or element thereof asrequired for storage of batteries. This refrigerator islisted under line item number R62804 and can beordered from GO under national stock number NSN)4110-00-892-5921 (left hand door) or 4110-00-892-5948 (right hand door) at a cost of 140.00 each.Radio Pocket InstallationWe would like to draw your attention to U.S.Army Troop Support and Aviation Materiel Readiness Command (TSARCOM) message 061616Z May81, subject: Installation of the New AN / PRC-90 RadioPocket, NSN 8415-00-442-3616, on the SRU-21/PSurvival Vest, Used in All Army Aircraft Except theOV-1 and RV-l. This message provides instructionto aircrew and life support personnel for standardizingthe location of pockets and components on the vest.Included are specific directions for removing thefirst aid kit and tourniquet pockets, installing thenew radio pocket, and installing the optional huntingknife and revolver holster. These directions will bepublished in the next change to TM 55-1680-317-23&P. If you need a copy of this message or furtherinformation, contact Mr. D. B. Hopkins, TSARCOMDirectorate for Maintenance, AUTOVON 693-3715or commercial (314) 263-3715.

Michelle Morton photo by Laurence Epstein

New asis of IssueWe have some bad news and some good news foryou. First, the bad news- in some instances it hasbeen noted that some Department of the Army Civilian(DAC) personnel have been flying as crewmembersn Army aircraft without the benefit of the recommended protective helmet. This is due primarily to thefact that civilian pilots, other than test pilots andinstructor pilots, are not currently authorized this

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue /survival gear write PEARL DARCOM ATTN: DRCPO ALSE 4300 Goodfellow Blvd. St. Louis MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 693 3307 or Commercial 314 263 3307

AUGUST 98 27


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PEARI Shelmet under the provisions of CTA 50-900, eventhough DAC pilots are required to wear them inmost instances.And now for the good news-our request to amendthe CTA has been approved by Headquarters,Department of the Army. When amended, CTA 50900 will include under line item number K34252 asthe basis of issue: Per individual on flying status andpassenger seat in observation aircraft; civilian pilotcivilian test pilot and instructor . . This changeshould alleviate any problems which civilian pilotshave been experiencing in obtaining flight helmets.Rescue HoistQuestions have arisen lately concerning the properrescue hoist to use when lifting personnel and equipment onto Army helicopters. There are currentlytwo hoists available, one which is safe to use, and theother which is not, so care must be taken to use theproper one. The older Breeze hoist (NSN 1680-00-183-5994) is ot safe to use for lifting personnel orequipment; this hoist is to be used only for trainingpurposes and only with dummy loads. The newerWestern Gear hoist (NSN 1680-01-058-3671) has noFIGURE 1: M24 MASK

restrictions on its use and is perfectly safe' to use forlifting personnel and equipment. For further information, contact Mr. R. L. Sandberg, TSARCOMDirectorate for Systems Management, AUTOVON693-2955 or commercial (314) 263-2955.Battery for Night Vision GogglesMany of you have been asking for the correctbattery NSN for the AN/PVS-5 night vision goggles.Although we don't actually handle actions on thispiece of equipment, we know that sometimes it isdifficult for you to find the proper source of information; so we are glad to find out for you and provideyou with the information. The correct battery forthe AN/PVS-5 is the BA-1567/U, NSN 6135-00-485-7402. It is available from B16 at a cost of $2.32 each.For further information concerning the battery, contact the item manager, Mrs. Ruby Cottman, at CECOM,AUTOVON 992-3985.M24 Mask ProblemDuring a recent inspection of M24 protective masks,a potential safety hazard and material deficiency wereidentified. Blackspots, determined to be a fungusgrowth, were found in the layered lens of the mask.These spots obscure the wearer's vision and canhamper the safe operation of an aircraft.This problem was brought to the attention of theU.S. Army Armament Materiel Readiness Command,

V1 7 16 1 ~This sketch isintended fori n p r ~ e s sacceptanceand inspectionpurposes only

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S ~

ZONE DZONE B

ZONE

LL OUND



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Emergency locator TransmittersWhy waitTHE u s ARMY Safety Centersupports the installation ofemergency locator transmitters(ELTs) in ll Army aircraft. Withan increasing requirement for theArmy to conduct its own searchand rescue, the survival rad io andthe ELT will serve as a "system"which will ultimately save time,money, and lives.Historically, the Army hasresponded well in locatingdowned aircraft andcrewmembers. However, we cando better A survey was made of82 mishaps involving fatalitieswhich occurred between 1January 1975 and 31 December1980. Seventy-three of the mishapcrash sites were loca ted within 2hours or less. Nine crash sitesrequired extended time and effortto locate. The time ranged frombetween 3 and 4 hours to 23hours. There is evidence in two ofthe nine cases which indicates atleast two individuals may havesurvived had assistance arrived ina reasonable length of time. Inone case, a survivor of the crashwalked approximately 200 feet,sat down under a tree, and bledto death. In the other case, asurvivor, although unconscious,lived for at least 20 hours butslowly bled to death before thecrash site was located andassistance arrived.Recently, in a mishap inAlaska, one aircrewmember's lifewas saved as a direct result ofhaving a properly functioningELT on board his aircraft.Conversely, more than $300,000was expended, in flying costs

3

Major Cecil SmithDirectorate or viationSystems Managementus RMY S fm CENTER

alone, this past January searchingfor a UH IH which went down inSouth America. The aircraft wasnot equipped with an ELT, andthe aircraft and personnel havenot been found. Considering theflying costs for the searchmission, at $200 a copy, 1,500ELTs could have been boughtfor Army aircraft.

There is support for installationof ELTs in selected aircraftoperating in remote or isolatedareas where a legitimate need hasbeen established by the aviationunit commanders. Experience hasproven that prolonged searchtime has been expended inGeorgia, Kentucky, Oregon,Louisiana, and Hawaii; however,these states are not categorized asremote or isolated areas. Today,the Air Force has aircraftequipped with receivers whichwill pick up signals from downedArmy aircraft equipped withELTs. Future Army aircraft willalso be equipped with receivers,and the Army will then take overpart of the search andrescue missions involving rescueArmy aircraft.Since the early 1970s, whenCongress enacted a law to installELTs on general aviation aircraft,ELTs have been a source ofconstant problems because ofinadvertent activations andfailure to activate in an actualcrash. Before 1979, the greatestsingle cause of unreliable ELToperation was the battery. Theproblems were primarilyproduced by a lithium-sulphurdioxide (LiS02) battery which

was not sealed sufficiently toprevent leaking or outgasingwhich is noxious, eye-irritating,incapacitating, and occasionallyexplosive. This problem created afire hazard as well as a corrosionproblem for both the aircraft andthe ELT. In 1979, an FAA Airworthiness Directive requiredremoval of LiS02 batteries fromELTs. This directive has beeninstrumental in significantlyreducing ELT problems.During a recent conference atthe NASA Goddard Space FlightCenter, current problems withELTs were discussed. It wasevident that in a large pefGentageof malfunctions the problemsstemmed from improper userprocedures, improper mounting/installation, and lack of qualitycontrol for some ELTs. Thefollowing problems werediscussed:

Mounting/installation. Usersare not following mountinginstructions published by themanufacturer. Loosely mountedELTs produce vibrations whichmask g forces or result in falseactivations. There are some caseswhere users cut ELT antennas forease of installation on their aircraft. In summation, the qualitycontrol in the mounting and installation of ELTs is practicallynonexistent.

Out-of-specification switches.Lack of quality control has resulted in switches being too sensitive to vibrations and not sensitive enough to g forces. The results are false activations and no

u s RMY VI TION DIGEST


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activations during an actual crash. Batteries. The presentproblem with batteries is that theyare either overdue replacementor completely unserviceable. Crashworthiness. Many ELTsare encased in plastic and cannotmeet stringent standardsnecessary to survive a severecrash. Another problemassociated with crashworthinessof an ELT is the antennabreaking and/or the antennacable disconnecting from theELT or antenna. Antenna disconnect occurs twice as often asantenna breakage.With the current state-of-theart, there is no doubt that a good,reliable ELT can be purchasedfor Army use. There has not beenany requirement by the FAA toinstall ELTs in helicopters. Withthe Army's aircraft fleet beingpredominantly rotary wing, therehas been some concern about theadaptability of an ELT to a helicopter. f or when the Armydecides to purchase ELTs,detailed specifications andspecific requirements establishedby the Army will result in an ELTthat meets Army needs and is freeof previous defects.Consideration is being given toinstalling the ELT in the tailsection of aircraft sinceexperience has proven the tailsection to be the most survivablearea. Sometimes, however, thetail section does not receivesufficient g forces to activate theELT. Remoting the g switch tothe cockpit area of the aircraftmay solve this problem.Additionally, a control for pilotsto use inside the cockpit with anon/off reset capability, plus avisual indicator to alert the pilotthat the ELT is operating, wouldbe an ideal configuration andwould provide an indication ofinadvertent activations.In addition to mounting theELT in the most survivable areaof the aircraft, several other

AUGUST 98

requirements are beingconsidered to improve the crashworthiness of the ELT. A solidstate ELT with a good pottingmaterial, such as microballoons,encased in a metal container willmake the ELT more survivable.Microballoons are a very goodpotting substance since they areremovable, offering access to theEL T elect ronics for servicing.Their load-carrying abilityabsorbs energy to protect theelectronics and aids in thepuncture resistance of the ELT souter case. They are also thermalresistant, which will aid in thesurvivability of the ELT in case ofa fire.

The problem with the externalantenna breaking or the antennacable separating can be easilysolved with an internal antenna.Although the internal antennadoes not produce a signal asstrong as the external antenna,the signal from an internalantenna can be received atextended ranges by use ofsensitive receivers. There is noevidence of internal antennasbreaking during a crash exceptwhen the EL T is completelydestroyed.G switches meeting FAAspecifications are available. Oneconsideration for helicopter use isan omnidirectionally activated gswitch. One manufacturer hasdeveloped a switch whichoperates in conjunction with theengine oil pressure. f the engineoil pressure is lost, the ELT isactivated. A built-in delay willprevent the ELT from activatingduring start-up and shutdownprocedures.Presently, NASA is developingan ELT which will be used inconjunc tion with a satellite. Theconcept involves the use ofmultiple satellites in low, nearpolar orbits listening for distresstransmissions. The signalsreceived by the satellites arerelayed to a network of dedicated

ground stations, where thelocation of the emergency isdetermined. Information is thenrelayed to a Mission ControlCenter (MCC) which alerts theappropriate Rescue CoordinationCenter (RCC). The RCC thenbegins the actual search andrescue operation in accordancewith conventional practice. Thenew EL T will operate on thefrequencies of 121.5 and 406MHz. The expected accuracy forlocating a distress signal with the406 frequency is 2 to 5 kilometers.Studies have shown that eventhose who survive an initialaircraft crash have less than a 1percent chance of survival if therescue is delayed beyond 2 days.In contrast, if the rescue can beaccomplished within 8 hours, thesurvival rate