Army and Marines on the China Station a Study in Military and Political Rivalry

8/6/2019 Army and Marines on the China Station a Study in Military and Political Rivalry

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Army and Marines on the China Station: A Study in Military and Political RivalryAuthor(s): Louis MortonSource: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 1960), pp. 51-73Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3636286 .

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Army and Marines on the China Station:A Study in Militaryand Political RivalryLOUIS MORTON

[For the last several years attached to the office of the chief of military history inWashington, Louis Morton has accepted appointment as professor of history atDartmouthCollege.]FOR ALMOST ORTYYEARS,rom the turn of the century to the outbreakof World War II, the United States maintained military and navalforces in China. Assigned originally to protect the American legationin Peking and safeguard the line of communications to the sea, thisgarrisonrepresented the visible sign of American involvement in China.As a military force it was negligible and so exposed as to constitute amilitary liability. But behind it, ready to come to its support, was theAsiatic Fleet, army forces in the Philippines, and, acrossthe wide ocean,the great physical resources of the United States, committed since JohnHay's day to the open door in China.The maintenance of a garrison in China created numerous problems.Not only did the Army and Navy have to maintain this force in theterritory of a foreign sovereign nation-in itself a perplexing and com-plicated task-but they also had to develop and keep up to date elabo-rate plans to reinforce the garrisonin the event of attack,or, if necessary,to withdraw it altogether. Furthermore, during most of these years,there were actually two forces in China, one consisting of marines andone of army troops, each under separatecommand and completely inde-pendent of each other. The opportunities for service disagreements insuch a situation were numerous and constituted a source of constantirritation between the local commanders and their superiors in Wash-ington.These difficulties were further aggravated by the insistence of everysecretaryof state from Hay to Hull that army and marine troops werein China solely to assist and support the American minister dischargehis responsibilities. What this meant was that the garrison in Chinawas, in the final analysis, under the control of the State Departmentfor all matters except administration and discipline. Neither the Warnor the Navy Department could reinforce, move, withdraw,or alter themission of its forces in China without the consent of the secretary of

* This article is based on research made possible by a grant from the Social Science Re-search Council under its program for the study of civil-military relations.[51]


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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWstate. Repeatedly the Army sought to wrest from the State Departmentcontrol of its troops in China and to bring the marines there underits command. Each effort met with failure, but few problems presentas instructive a study of civil-military relations as this forty-yearconflictbetween the State, War, and Navy Departments for control of the forcesin China.American military forces first entered China to stay in the year 1900as a result of the Boxer uprising. The Western powers and Japan hadreacted promptly to the siege of their legations in Peking. Troops hadbeen dispatched to North China and an Allied force organized to cap-ture the Imperial capital. After occupying Tientsin near the coast, thisAllied force had made its way inland with difficulty. Early in August,1900oo,t reached the outer defenses of Peking and on the fourteenthday of the month routed the Chinese defenders and raised the siege ofthe legations.1The negotiations between China and the interested powers that fol-lowed the operations against Peking resulted in the so-called BoxerProtocol of September 7, i90i.2 In addition to providing for punish-ment of the guilty and indemnities for damage, the agreement recog-nized in Articles VII and IX the right of the powers concerned tomaintain military forcesin China for two purposes: to guard the legationquarter in Peking, and to occupy certain points along the railway lead-ing from the capital to the sea in order to keep open the line of com-munications in the event of renewal of an antiforeign outbreak.While the negotiations were in progress,Allied forces began to with-draw. First to pull out were the Americans. By the end of May theentire American force, except for 150 men left behind to guard thelegation, had left China. The other powers withdrew their forces moreslowly, and it was not until 1906 that all foreign troops, except thoseon duty with the legations at Peking and along the railroad betweenthe capital and the sea, were out of the country.From May, go901, to September, 1905, the American garrison in Chinaconsisted only of the 150 soldiers (Company B, Ninth Infantry) left be-hind by General Chaffee as the legation guard at Peking. This use ofarmy troops represented a departure from customary practice, for lega-tion duty was usually assigned to the Marine Corps. In 1905 a detach-

'For an account of the Boxer uprising, see C. C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (N. Y.,1955); Correspondence relating to . . . The China Relief Expedition, War Department(Washington, 1902). William R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-19o9(Austin, Texas, 1958).2 The signatories of the Protocol were: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany,Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Russia, Spain, United States, China.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAment of 300 marines replaced the army garrison, and thereafter themarines continued to furnish the legation guard.The reasons for this change are not clear. Certainly those given bythe American Minister W. W. Rockhill when he requested the substi-tution can scarcely be considered convincing. A marine guard, heclaimed, would be more economical, more easily reinforced or reduced,more flexible, and better disciplined. Besides, Rockhill asserted, guardduty was exactly what the marines were trained for and customarilyperformed. Then, somewhat cryptically, he had added, "Many otherreasons for the change will certainly suggest themselves, but it seemsunnecessary to dwell on them here."8As a matter of fact, he had sub-mitted the matter to the President and secured his approvalbefore leav-ing Washington for duty in China.In the circumstances, there was little the Army could do but accedeto the substitution of marines for its own troops. This it did, but notwithout a point-by-point refutation from General Chaffee, army chiefof staff,of the reasonsgiven for the change. After challenging Rockhill'sassertion that a marine guard would be more flexible, more economical,or better disciplined, Chaffee observed that " as a military proposition"he could see no reason why guard duty was more suitable for marinesthan for army troops. And somewhat dryly he observed that the "manyother reasons for the change" that Rockhill had referred to did not"suggestthemselves" to him and therefore he could not concur in them.'The transfer took place on September 12, 1905, and for the next sixyears the American garrison in China remained virtually unchanged.But events in China, culminating in the overthrow of the Manchu dy-nasty in the autumn of i9 11, led to a request by the American ministerfor a battalion of marines, to be stationed in Tientsin. This time, theArmy not the marines got the bid. A full regiment in Manila wasalertedfor dispatch on short notice, and the consent of the Chinese governmentsecured. Eventually only 500 troops were required and on January 22,1912, a battalion of the Fifteenth Infantry arrived in Tientsin, thefirst army troops to be stationed in China since 1905. With the contin-gents of other interested powers, this force provided protection to for-eigners in the area and kept open communications between Peking andTientsin during the disorders that followed.5

3Rockhill to John Hay, June 8, 1905, copy in Army War Plans Division file WPD 938-12,in Federal Records Center of the National Archives in Alexandria, Virginia.4 Memo, Chaffee for Secy. of War, July 21, 1905, WPD 938-12. This memo was forwardedto the State Department on July 24 in a letter to the secretary by Robert Shaw Oliver,acting secretary of war, same file.5Secy. of State to Secy. of War, Jan. 9, 1912, Army War College file, WCD 6790-28,

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWAfter 1912,the United States,in common with the other treatypowers,maintained military forces at Tientsin as well as Peking, and, on occa-

sion, other locations mentioned in the Protocol of 1901o. In 1914, atthe request of the Japanese, the United States assumed responsibilityfor the German zone along the railway, and the remaining battalionof the Fifteenth Infantry (the old "China regiment") was transferredfrom Manila to Tientsin. Then, in September, 1921, with the consentof the State Department the Army withdrew one battalion of the Fif-teenth Infantry, returning it to Manila.6Thereafter, the garrison atTientsin remained fairly stable, and with the marine legation guardat Peking constituted the entire American commitment, except for theAsiatic Fleet, in China.The existence of two separateforces,each with different missions wasa matter of increasing concern to the War Department, which viewedwith pessimismJapaneseactions in the Far East. Various proposalsweremade shortly after World War I to correct the command in China, andfinally in the summer of 1921, the secretary of war, John W. Weeks,officially recommended establishment of a single command. If this wasnot done, he said, it might be advisable to remove the army troops alto-gether.The State Department did not agree. Charles Evans Hughes, thensecretary of state, preferred the existing arrangement and believed itshould be continued. "This Department," he told Weeks, "stronglyfavors retaining the Marines as a legation guard under independentcommand."7The Chinese were accustomed to the marines and to replacethem by army troops, Hughes believed, would "give rise to speculationand suspicion." He had no objection to a reduction of the army garri-son, perhaps by as much as 50 per cent, if the War Department desired.But he refused outright to consider the withdrawal of the entire force.It was in China for political, not military reasons, and by its presencealone might avert a repetition of the Boxer uprising.The State Department objections in effect constituted a disapprovalof the army proposal. The marines would continue to furnish the lega-National Archives. At the time, July, 19'1, the strength of the North China garrisons ofother countries was as follows: British 2,000 (almost half Indian troops), French 1,165,German 143, Italian 227, Japanese 555, and Russian 40. The U. S. Marine legation guardthen numbered only 138. Each of these powers also maintained naval forces on the AsiaticStation, the strongest being the British force. Memo, Brig. Gen. W. W. Wotherspoon, Pres.,Army War College for Chief of Staff, Nov. 14, 1911, sub: Role of Army... in China....WCD 6790-15.

6Secy. of State to Secy. of War, July 9, 1921, Adjutant General Files, AG 370.21 China,in National Archives.7Ibid.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAtion guard and the Army the railway guard at Tientsin. Faced with thissituation, the War Department had to be satisfied with half measures,and in September, 1921, withdrew one battalion of the Fifteenth Infan-try. The troops remaining it designated as "The United States ChinaExpedition," under the commanding general, Philippine Department.8The difficulties and confusion inherent in a divided command oftroops of different serviceswho took their mission from political author-ity in the personof the minister rather than from their military superiorswere brought home sharply in the summer of 1922. The immediateoccasion was the o.utbreakof hostilities between two contending Chinesefactions in Tientsin. The army garrison, numbering 550 officers andmen, was obviously inadequate to protect American lives and propertyin the area and at the same time carry its share of the joint responsi-bility for keeping open the railway from Peking to the sea. It was evendoubtful that the entire Allied force, numbering about 2,700 men, couldprevent rioting and looting should either of the contending Chinesegroups get out of control.9By the end of April, 1922, the situation was serious. On military ad-vice, the American minister, Jacob Gould Schurman, urgently recom-mended that the Fifteenth Infantry (less one battalion) at Tientsin bereinforced. This request came at a most inopportune moment, for onlyrecently there had been sharpcriticism in Congressof the use of Amer-ican troops in overseas garrisons. Secretary Hughes therefore declinedto authorize the increase and asked Schurman to report specifically thereasons for the reinforcements, and "whether American lives and prop-erty are in danger," or likely to be.10Schurman was nothing if not resourceful. With a keen appreciationof Hughes's position, he proposed a solution that would provide theneeded reinforcements without additional army troops. Marines fromthe Asiatic Fleet, already in the area, he thought could be used insteadof the Army. Would this be agreeable to the department?he asked. Itwould indeed, he was told, provided that Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss,the Fleet commander, and Colonel William F. Martin, commander ofthe army garrison at Tientsin, approved.1'Both did, and early in May

8Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, May 21, 1924, sub: Status andCommand of Army and Marine Forces in China, AG 320.2 AF in China (4-7-24), NationalArchives.9Great Britain had 256 men, Japan 979, and France 1,217 in May, 1922. The strength ofthe marine guard at Peking was 285. Message, Minister at Peking to Secy. of State, May 1,1922, AG 370.5 China (5-3-22), National Archives. The citations immediately following arein the same file.0Schurman to Hughes and Hughes to Schurman, Nos. 177 and 105, April 29, 1922.11Schurman to Hughes and Hughes to Schurman, Nos. 178 and o108,May i and 2, 1922.

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWSchurmanwas able to report to Washington that the 150marines armedwith machine guns had landed and were in Tientsin.'2This reinforcement of an army regiment with marines on the recom-mendation of political authority and for purely political reasons wasthe beginning of a series of confusing events. Five daysafter the marineslanded, Colonel Martinrecommended to Schurman that they be relieved"as the emergency had passed."This the minister refused to do on thegrounds that the situation was not yet stabilized and that the marineswere needed to help guard the railway and safeguard American lives.On his own responsibility, he instructed Martin by telephone to keepthe marines at Tientsin. At the same time, he sent a message to AdmiralStrauss informing him of his action.3Colonel Martin thereupon tried another tack. Without informingSchurman, he advised Admiral Straussthat the marines were no longerneeded in Tientsin and could be safely withdrawn. On this advice, andhis own estimate of the situation, Strauss withdrew the marines overthe protest of both the consul general in Tientsin and the minister.1The scene of battle now shifted to Washington. The issue was plain:did the army commander in China take his orders from the ministeror did he have discretion to act on his own authority and judgment,responsible only to his military superiors? Secretary Hughes left nodoubt about where he stood. When General Pershing inquired, a fewdays after the withdrawal of the marines from Tientsin, whether theState Department now thought the Army should reinforce the FifteenthInfantry, Hughes replied he could see no necessity for such a move.Then he read the chief of staff a lecture on the role of the Army inChina. Its sole duty, apart from the protection of American lives andproperty, he pointed out, was to guard its assigned sector of the railway.In the face of the overwhelming force the Chinese could bring to bearif they chose, it was impossible for the Army, Hughes admitted, toaccomplish this mission by military means. All it could do was to callattention, by its presence, to the interest of the United States in pro-tecting the railway and keeping open the route to the sea. And this, saidHughes, the garrison in Tientsin was already doing. It needed no rein-forcements.'

Hughes was not satisfied to let the matter rest there. Citing chapterand verse, he called to Pershing's attention Colonel Martin's "flagrant"12Schurman to Hughes, No. 197, May 4, 1922.13Schurman to Secy. of State, No. 213, May 1 , 1922.14 Schurman to Secy. of State, No. 218, May 15, 1922.165Hughes to Pershing, May 22, 1922.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAdisregard of the minister's advice. "It seemed to the Department ofState," he told the chief of staff,that the exigenciesof the situation at Tientsin demanded the utmost co-operation and this Departmenthad every reason to believe that ColonelMartin would be guided so far as possibleby the Minister's udgmentin allmattersrelating to the terms of the protocol, except of course those of apurelymilitarycharacter.Clearly, Martin had refused to accept the minister's estimate of thesituation and it could not be remedied now, Hughes observed sharply,by sending in a contingent of infantry from the Philippines. He wasnot disposed, he said, to interfere in military matters, but he did "ven-ture to suggest" that General Pershing might wishto give consideration to the desirabilityof instructingthe Commanderofthe ExpeditionaryForce n Chinato cooperate o the fullestpossiblemeasurewith the American Minister in matters connectedwith the enforcementofthe protocol of 19go1

General Pershing could not miss the meaning of Secretary Hughes'sletter. Military commanders in China would take their orders from theState Department's representative; that had been true since o901 andHughes had no intention of relinquishing this control. General Persh-ing therefore ordered the commander of the Philippine Departmentto investigate Colonel Martin's actions. A report clearing the colonelwas duly forwarded to Washington, but before the year was out Martinhad received orders to return to the United States. With him he carrieda letter from Mr. Schurman expressing regret at his departure and dis-avowing any implication that the colonel had not always been most co-operative. Schurman even sent a copy to Washington to be placed inMartin's record. But he could afford to be generous. The victory wasclearly his.17The lesson of the Martin incident wasnot lost on the Army: the forcesin China would have to be withdrawn or else placed under a singlecommander. In the summer and fall of 1922, therefore, the general staffbegan to explore both possibilities. The firstcourse,withdrawal, it aban-doned quickly. American troops were needed in China, the generalstaff believed, to maintain the prestige of the United States in the FarEast, to meet its commitments to the other Western powers, and, mostimportant, to check Japanese aggression. "Under no condition shouldour troops be withdrawn from China," wrote a G-2 officer,

16Ibid.17 Schurman to Martin, Nov. i6, 1922; Secy. of State to Secy. of War, Feb. 23, 1923.

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWwithout first entering into a definite agreementwith Japan and GreatBritain that no Japanesetroopswould be employedin China except withour expressedconsent and in conjunctionwith troopsdesignatedby us toformpartof theexpedition.?8The second alternative, establishment of a unified command in China,was preferable on all counts to withdrawal. But in view of the StateDepartment's opposition to earlier efforts to establish such a command,there seemed little likelihood of success. For a time the army plannersconsidered working through the Joint Board, the accredited agency forall interservice matters requiring co-operation of the Army and Navy.19But they abandoned this approach in favor of a plan presented in Oc-tober, 1922, by Brigadier General William D. Connor, assistant chiefof staff, G-4. Instead of a single command composed of Army and ma-rines, Connor proposed that the army force be established as an inde-pendent command under a brigadier general, reporting directly to theWar Department rather than to the Philippine Department commander.The advantages of this proposal were apparent immediately. It couldbe put into effect by the Army as a matter of internal administration,without reference to the Navy or State Department, and it would givethe Army the senior ground officer in China, one who could deal onmore nearly equal terms with the American minister.20There were many more reasons that could have been advanced insupport of General Connor's plan, but they were much the same asthose already presented on other occasions. What made this solutionso attractivewas its simplicity and practicability. On the surface,it madeno change in the composition or status of the forces in China or theirrelationship to the American minister. But by assigning a general officerand making him responsible to the War Department, the Army hopedultimately to bring about the changes it desired. The secretaryof warfrankly admitted this to the Philippine Department commander whenhe wrote,It is the intention of the War Departmentto propose action at a moreappropriatetime having for its object the consolidationof the command

18Memo, Maj. Walter C. Short for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, June 6, 1922, sub: Reasonsfor Maintaining U.S. Troops in China, WPD 938.19 Draft Memo (not used), Joint Planning Committee for Joint Board, Sept. 23, 1922, sub:Command of American Troops in China, WPD 938-12.20 Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, Oct. 17, 1922, sub: Organization ofAmerican Forces in China into a Separate Command, WPD 938. The author could notlocate General Connor's memorandum of October 5 to the chief of staff, but it is sum-marized in the memo cited.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAof all American roopsin China,Armyand Marines, nto a singlecommand.The actionnowbeingtakenwill facilitatetheaccomplishment f thisobject.2

Much discussion on the highest levels of the War Department musthave preceeded General Connor's proposal for in one day it cleared thechief of staff'soffice,was approved by the secretary,and came back downto the deputy chief of staff for necessaryaction. The job was assigned tothe War Plans Division of the General Staff, which added one impor-tant new element to General Connor's plan. The separate command,it suggested, should be designated "AmericanForces in China"-a termthat implied a broader authority than it would actually possess. WarPlans recognized this objection, but justified the designation on twogrounds: first, that the Army's troops in Germany were officiallydesig-nated as "American Forces in Germany";and, second, "that it providesfor including without further change in name the Marines and anyother American forces that may subsequently be added."22Action followed rapidly. Within a week, the War Department hadpublished a general order, effective April 1, 1923, establishing the newcommand, and a special order assigning General Connor as commander.A letter of instructions outlining his mission and responsibilities wasdrafted and approved, and letters were dispatched to the secretaryofstate and the Philippine Department commanderannouncing the actionof the War Department.2'As the War Plans Division had foreseen, the Navy objected to thedesignation "American Forces in China" for a command consistingsolely of Army troops. It raised the point at a meeting of the JointBoard, but no action was taken when the army deputy chief of staffinsisted that the matter was one to be handled by the War Department.24The Philippine Department commander protested also, but for dif-ferent reasons. The War Department's decision to establish an inde-pendent command in China, he declared, was a bad one on militaryand political grounds. The primaryreasonsfor placing American troopsin China, he reminded the secretaryof war, was to assure the safety ofthe legation and to keep open the line to the sea. In an emergency, this

21The Adjutant General to Commanding General, Philippine Department, Oct. 21, 1922,WPD 938.22 Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, Oct. 17, 1922, sub: Occupation ofAmerican Forces in China ..., WPD 938.23Ibid. The general order was dated October 24, all the other papers, including lettersto the secretary of state, Philippine Department commander, and General Connor's weredated the twenty-first. See WPD 938 for copies.24Minutes, Joint Board Meeting of Nov. 8, 1923, cited in Memo, Chief, War Plans Divisionfor Deputy Chief of Staff, Jan. 19, 1924, sub: Unity of Command... in China, WPD 938-12.

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWlatter task might well be beyond the capacity of an independent Chinacommand. If that proved to be the case, reinforcements would haveto come from his command, and the separation of the two would onlycomplicate the task.'2The Philippine commander's protest was futile, but the voice of thesecretary of state did not go unheeded. Mr. Hughes noted "with par-ticular pleasure" Secretary Weeks's desire for increased co-operation,but observed that the maintenance of armed forces in China createda situation that invited differences over the duties of these forces andtheir freedom of action. When such differences arose, the final word,Hughes assertedflatly,must be the minister's.Military forces were main-tained in China to protect the diplomatic mission at Peking, and hadno separate status except "asan organization ancillary to the legation."That being the case, instructions to the military commanders must beso clear as "to obviate any possibility of dualism in the policy directingthe activities of these forces."The orders to the commander of the ma-rines at Peking, dating from 1906 and 1907, Hughes thought a modelin this respect. These he quoted at length for the secretaryof war, andcommended to him as the basis for co-operation between the legationand the army comamnder in China.'There was no misunderstanding the secretaryof state'smeaning. Thequoted instructions to the marine commandant made co-operation withthe American minister essential to the performance of his duty, andenjoined him to give "due weight" to the opinions and advice of StateDepartment's representative. A request of the minister's was to be de-clined only for the most cogent military reason. The minister, it wastrue, could not order but only "request or desire," something to bedone. Such request, however, accordingto the instructions of the marinecommander, had the same force as an order. Here was a rule, Hughesthought, that might well serve as a guide for the newly appointed armycommander in China.The secretary of state's lecture on the proper relationship betweenthe army commander in China and the American minister was duti-fully heeded by the War Department. It modified General Connor'sletter of instructions to meet the objections of the secretary of state,and enjoined the general be guided in his relations with the ministerby the principles set forth in Hughes's letter. Thus, the letter of the

25Commanding General, Philippine Dept. to The Adjutant General, No. 1743, Dec. 26,1922; Secy. of War to Commanding General, Philippine Dept., Oct. 21, 1922, WPD 938-5.26Hughes to Weeks, Nov. 8, 1922, WPD 938-3; Weeks to Hughes, Oct. 21, 1922, AG 320China Expedition (10-17-22), National Archives.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAsecretary, including the instructions to the marine guard commander,became, in effect, a part of General Connor's instructions. There couldbe no doubt, if any had existed before, that army forces in China wereunder the American minister in all matters but internal administra-tion.' "I trust and beg," SecretaryWeeks told Hughes after the matterwas satisfactorily concluded, "that you will continue, on suitable occa-sion, to frankly inform me of your valuable views," on the conduct ofarmy troops in China.2After his arrival in China, General Connor waited a year before of-ficially requesting establishment of a unified command. The reasonshe advanced made a persuasivecase, but presented nothing new.2 Morerevealing was his personal note to the chief of the Army War PlansDivision, Brigadier General Stuart Heintzelman. Officially, he hadrested his case on operational necessity; privately he stressed the prac-tical aspects of the problem. Before he had left for China, Connor ex-plained, it had been agreed that he would wait until he had been onhis assignment for some time before recommending any changes. Thetime had come, he believed, to take action. So far as he could judge,the minister would not oppose any effort now to establish a unifiedcommand, but might even favor it actively. It was quite possible alsothat the Marine Corps might not be averse to such a move, thoughthe Navy, Connor warned, would probably oppose it.8The mechanics of the change, Connor believed, would not presentany great difficulty. If necessary,the marines could be given the over-allcommand three years out of every twelve, a ratio comparable to thestrength of the two detachments. But the matter would have to behandled "diplomatically," Connor cautioned Heintzelman, to keep theNavy and the marines "from blowing up and refusing to hear of it."The War Department was heartily in favor of merging the marinelegation guard and the China expedition into a single command. Butit was not prepared to do anything about it at the moment. GeneralPershing was in Europe, and, in view of the expected opposition fromthe Navy, it would be better to await his return. Moreover, the Wash-ington planners thought it would be preferable to wait for the StateDepartment to intiate acion.1 "I feel that the outcome...," General

27The Adjutant General to Commanding General, American Forces in China, Nov. 21,1922,WPD 938.28 Weeks to Hughes, Nov. 21, 1922, AGO 320 China Expedition (10-17-22).29Connor to Adjutant General, Dec. 19, 1923; sub: Unity of Command... in China, AG320.2 AF in China (12-19-23), National Archives.30Letter, Connor to Heintzelman, Dec. 21, 1923, WPD 938-12.31Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, Feb. 21, 1922, sub: Unity of Com-

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWHeintzelman told Connor in a personal letter, "will depend very largelyupon your ability to convince the American Minister of its desirability."32General Connor was correct indeed in his estimate of navy opposi-tion to a unified command, but quite mistaken in his belief that themarines would support him. He was not long in learning his error.The marine commandant of the legation guard, a colonel, had for al-most a year been viewing General Connor's activities with increasingconcern and a growing sense of injury. Finally he protested to RearAdmiral Thomas Washington, Asiatic Fleet commander.'3None of the incidents of which the marine commandant complainedwere of any importance and the matter was settled amicably. Connoroffered to make amends and the marine commander,whose tour of dutywas soon to end, assured the general that there was nothing personalin the complaint. But the incident was a warning of further possibledisputes, and ended all hopes that the marines would favor a unifiedcommand under the Army.Connor's hope for support from the State Department also provedillusory. In April he discussed with the American minister in Pekingthe whole question of command in China, but received no encourage-ment. The minister, he reported, had not recommended to the StateDepartment a merger of the two forces, as he had hoped, and probablywould not do so. Moreover, Admiral Washington had requested himnot to take up with the minister any "matters of policy" affecting themarines without consulting him first, and Connor, in the interests ofco-operation with the Navy, had agreed.34Thus, by April, 1924, twoyears after Connor had assumed command, the Army was no closer toa unified command than it had ever been.

Still unsettled was the propriety of the designation "AmericanForcesin China" for an armycommand. At the time this designation had beenmade, the Army hoped that Connor's command would ultimately in-clude the Marines and the choice of words was deliberate. But by May,1924, when the army planners reviewed the whole question of Chinafor the chief of staff, there seemed no further justification for its use.They recommended, therefore, that the term be dropped and the com-mand be redesignated U. S. Army Forces in China.35General Connormand ... in North China, WPD 938-13; Letter, Adjutant General to Commanding General,China, February 25, 1924, same sub, AG 320-2 AF in China (12-19-23).32Letter, Heintzelman to Connor, Feb. 21, 1924, WPD 938-12.33Connor to Washington, Feb. 21, 1924, WPD 938-12. See also Connor to Heintzelman,Feb. 25, 1924, idem.

34 Connor's letter is summarized in Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff,May 21, 1924, sub: Status and Command of Army Forces in China, WPD 938-12.35 bid.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAshould be told, also, the planners advised, that there would be no changein the strength, status, or command of the army and marine forces inChina.

This decision was a hard one for the Army and was not made lightly.First the planners had reviewed the entire situation in the Far East todetermine whether army forces were, in fact, needed in China. Theyfound conditions so unsettled and the threat to American lives and prop-erty so real that they were forced to conclude that withdrawal of theseforces would be most unfortunate. There was no doubt in their mindsthat a unified command would assure the most effective employmentof the garrison, but obviously it was impossible to hope for such a solu-tion. There was nothing left but to continue the existing arrangementwith its imperfections and hope "that a clear understanding of the mis,sion of the two forces and a proper spirit of cooperation" could beachieved. This was the course the planners recommended and theirsuperiors approved. General Connor was notified of the decision andon June 4th a general order was published redesignating AmericanForces in China as U.S. Army Forces in China.8 "In plain English,"General Heintzelman told him in a personal letter,the WarDepartmenthas abandonedcompletelythe joint command dea inChina which existed at the time you went out of there.... Now that is offthe WarDepartment's ndyourchests,cooperation o the mutualsatisfactionof all concerned houldbeeasy.37

The conditions that had led to the establishment of an Americangarrison in China had by the mid-192o's altered radically. The originalmission of the force had been to prevent a repetition of the Boxer inci-dent, an uprising by a mob. To this had been added the further missionof protecting American lives and property, keeping open the line ofcommunications to the sea, and maintaining the prestige of the UnitedStates in the Far East. These tasks and the conditions existing at theturn of the century had determined the size and composition of theforces sent to China. Since then, there had been no change in themission, though it had become perfectly clear, in view of the growingmilitary strength of the Chinese and the power position of Japan, thatAmerican forces in China were entirely inadequate to carry out theassigned tasks. To have attempted to do so would have been to invitedisaster for the garrison and the serious risk of international complica-tions. The truth was that short of sending in large bodies of troops and

36Ibid.37Heintzelman to Connor, June 7, 1924,WPD 938-12.

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWmaking war there was no way the foreign powers could compel thecontending factions in China to observe the Protocol of 1901.The last official act of General Connor was to raise a warning aboutthe consequences that might result from this situation. In his final reportto the American minister, J. V. A. MacMurray,written on the termina-tion of his duty in China in January, 1926, he declared that underexisting conditions the foreign garrisonsconstituted more of a handicapthan a help to the diplomats in China.3 "We have the armed power ofsuch considerable numbers that we are bound to assert ourselves," hepointed out, "and yet we are too few to do anything in reality if ourbluff fails to work."Against the vast numbers the Chinese could musterthe foreign troops would be impotent. But if they did nothing, theywould suffer a loss of prestige that would destroy whatever moral use-fulness their presenceserved. "Our moral ascendancy,"Connor asserted,"comes from our nationality and our flag and not from our numbers."The best course for the United States, Connor thought, would be torecognize that a repetition of the Boxer uprising was improbable andto withdraw its garrison. In the event of trouble, the Asiatic Fleet couldbe trusted to intervene. "Now is the time to discuss the matter calmly,"he told the minister, "... now is the opportunity to act of our ownvolition. If the responsible agencies do not so act, the next crisis maysuddenly force the question under circumstances where calmness anddeliberation are denied to us. ..."39

Brigadier General J. C. Castner, who succeeded General Connor,arrivedat the same conclusion. In his firstreport to the War Department,he confirmed Connor's estimate of the situation and declared that theoriginal mission wasoutdated and his instructions no longer an adequateguide. But his request that they be changed was denied, and he was told,as Connor had been before him, that nothing would be done until theminister so recommended.40Two years later he tried again to have themission changed but again the War Department ruled against him."The mission," wrote the chief of the War Plans Division, "is clear cutand well adapted to the situation there."41

38Connor to MacMurray, Jan. 13, 1926, sub: Report to American Minister on Situationin China, copy to The Adjutant General, Jan. 26, 1926, 350.05 AF in China (1-22-26), NationalArchives.a Ibid.40General Castner's report and the War Department reply are summarized in Memo, Col.Walter Krueger for Chief of Staff, Aug. 13, 1937, sub: Reasons Why American Troops areMaintained at Tientsin, WPD 3533-9.41Annual Report, Commanding General, US Army Forces in China, July 30, 1928, AG319.1; Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, Oct. 4, 1928, sub: Annual Report,WPD 2718-2.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAThe American minister, though he did not support Castner'srecom-mendations, agreed with his estimate of the situation. "Internal de-velopments in China,"he reported to his own department in June, 1928,"have virtually relegated to abeyance what was under the Protocol of1901 the primary mission of United States Army forces." Their mainmission had in fact become the protection of American lives in theTientsin area, a mission that called for an entirely different set ofassumptions than had existed before.The State Department was reluctant to reopen the question of Chinaand nothing was done until, under the pressurefor economy in the early

1930's, the War Department began to look for ways to stretch its slenderappropriations. The garrison in China, numbering about one thousandmen, appearedan expensive luxury, and the deputy chief of staffdirectedhis planners in April, 1931, to study the wisdom of withdrawing theFifteenth Infantry.The armyplannersfound, to no one's surprise,that the China garrisonwas neither vital nor important to the national defense and that itswithdrawal would not only savemoney but would also remove a possiblesource of friction with the Nationalist government of China. These con-siderations, they thought, should be balanced against the purpose thegarrison served in providing protection and upholding American pres-tige in the Far East. Withdrawal of the garrison, the planners warned,would probably be opposed by the State Department and would un-doubtedly involve many political problems. The most interestingargument they presented against withdrawal was that it would leavethe field clear for the marines. In view of the recent trend to replacearmy troops with marines for use as expeditionary forces, the plannersthought the withdrawal of the Fifteenth Infantry might well be againstthe best interestsof the Army.42Despite this injunction, Secretaryof War Patrick J. Hurley soughtthe consent of the secretaryof state to the evacuation of the armygarrisonin China. The reasons he gave did not differ materially from those thathad been advanced so often before and which had been summarizedsowell by General Connor in his final report. To these Hurley added thecompelling reasons of the moment. The War Department, he franklystated, was finding it difficult to provide the increases required underlaw for the organization of the Air Corps and other vital missions ofnational defense. Besides, an isolated garrison cost much more to main-< Memo, Chief, War Plans Division for Chief of Staff, April 3, 1931, sub: Reduction ofPorto Rican Regiment and China Garrison, WPD 3533.

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWtain than a similar force in the United States. Thus, the withdrawal ofthe Fifteenth Infantry would produce savings far out of proportion tothe number of men involved. "If you can see a way to concur in with-drawal,"Hurley closed, "it will be in the best interest of the governmentand aid the War Department in solving certain perplexing problems."43But Henry L. Stimson, then secretaryof state, could not see his wayclear at all to concurring in the move. The other powers concernedwould have to be consulted first, he told Hurley, and he did not thinkthe time was opportune for such consultation. The War Departmentcould, if it wished, reduce the number of troops in Tientsin, declaredStimson, providing it did so gradually and inconspicuously."When thetime wasright, he assuredHurley, he would be glad to take the initiative"internationally, if circumstanceswarrant,"to secure the withdrawal oftroops in China.With this Hurley had to be content, and there the matter rested untilevents in the Far East again forced the War Department into action.The danger in China for some years had come not from the Chinesebut from the Japanesewho in 1931had embarkedon the road that wouldutimately lead them into World War II. The seizure of Manchuriawasbut the first in a series of steps clearly aimed at control of North China.The next step came in the fall of 1935, when the Japanese moved toset up a pseudoautonomous state embracing both Tientsin and Pekingin North China. In this situation, the retention of the Fifteenth Infantryin China, the War Department believed, not only failed to serve anyuseful purpose but constituted a grave risk. Any time the Japanesedesired, they could create an international incident that might haveserious consequences. And in an emergency it might well prove im-possible to relieve or withdraw the small American force. Thus, thesecretaryof war felt compelled once more to recommend to the StateDepartment the withdrawal of the army garrison at Tientsin "immedi-ately upon the setting up of an autonomous State in North China."'5In the view of the secretaryof state, there was no real danger fromthe Japanese at present. The War Department, he observed, persistedin thinking of the Army's mission in China as combat or coercion, butits real mission had alwaysbeen and still was guard duty and protectiveescort. The original mission was not obsolete; it had merely been "sub-

43Hurley to Stimson, April 9, 1931, WPD 3533-1."44timson for Hurley, May 20, 1931, idem.46Secy. of War to Secy. of State, Nov. 19, 1935, WPD 3533-4; Memo, no addressee, un-dated, sub: Mission of 15th Infantry in China, Joint Board 305, Serial 573, Joint PlanningCommittee Development File.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAstantially modified" to make the garrison, in common with those ofother nations "a psychological influence of a reassuring and stabilizingcharacter."46 here was, of course, the possibility of an incident withJapanese troops, Hull admitted, but this was always true when thearmed forces of two nations were in such close juxtaposition duringperiodsof tension.Further, the withdrawal of American forces from China could wellhave harmful results, and contribute toward the further deteriorationof American relations with Japan. Moreover, the United States, Hullpointed out, had responsibilities to the signatoriesof the Boxer Protocolthat could not be ignored, and an obligation to consult with them beforewithdrawal. Also, the effect on China of withdrawal was certain to reactunfavorably on American nationals in China, Hull thought, and wouldundoubtedly be used for propagandapurposesby the Japanese. It mighteven encourage them to bolder measures in their campaign of aggran-dizement on the mainland. Thus, Hull concluded, withdrawal of theFifteenth Infantry would not be in the best interests of the UnitedStates. And if in the future the War Department planned to make anysubstantial reduction or reorganization of the garrison in China, Hullasked that he be informed in advance so that his department could con-sider the political implications of such a move.SecretaryHull's note clearlyreflectedthe views of his chief Far Easternexpert, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck. In November, 1935, at the requestof the War and Navy secretaries, Hull had designated Hornbeck torepresent the department in a comprehensive review by the Joint Boardof America's position in the Far East. In the opinion of the two servicesecretaries,developments in the Far East had so weakened the militaryposition of the United Statesvis-a-visJapan that there was a real dangerthe country might be forced into war under conditions that would makevictory impossible. It was to this situation, and the measures requiredto meet it, that the joint board planners,assistedby Hornbeck aspoliticaladviser, turned in the winter of 1935-1936.'"During the course of these discussions, Hornbeck set forth at somelength his department's views on American policy in China and thewithdrawalof armyforces.Contraryto the opinion of many, he declared,the United States did have a policy in China and had followed it con-sistently for many years. This policy derived from American interests

4aSecy. of State to Secy. of War, Feb. 7, 1936,WPD 3533-4.47Joint Letter, Secy. of War and Secy. of Navy to Secy. of State, Nov. 26, 1935; Secy. ofState to Secys. of War and Navy, Nov. 27, 1935, Joint Board 305, Serial 573, Joint PlanningCommittee Development File. Citations immediately following are from the same file.

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWin the area, and was represented by missionaries and economic enter-prises. It was possible to withdraw military and naval forces physically,Hornbeck pointed out, but not to tell the businessmen and missionariesto get out. And as long as they remained, the government had an obliga-tion to protect them.'4 Nor did Hornbeck believe that the presence ofAmerican nationals in China increased the chance of war with Japan.They did not cause the Japaneseany inconvenience or come into conflictwith them. The fact was, he asserted, the Japanese were not yet readyfor war with the United States. When they were, they would have nodifficulty finding the pretext they needed to open hostilities.The argument that military and naval forces in China added greatlyto the danger of the conflict with Japan, Hornbeck held, was not onlyincorrect but actually directly contrary to the facts. The presence ofAmerican forces, he believed, had done much to prevent an open con-flict by serving as a deterrent to Japan. To withdraw them, especiallywhen the situation was chaotic and hazardouswould imply fearof Japan;it would endanger American and foreign nationals, disturb the Chinese,and possibly encourage the Japanese to further aggression.4Moreover,if evacuated, American nationals and even the Embassywould have tobe evacuatedalso.American armed forces were in China as a symbol, Hornbeck told thejoint planners. They were not there to fight other organized forces, butfor psychologicalreasons and for guard escort duties. He waswell aware,he said, that American forces were so weak that they would probablybe wiped out quickly in the event of war. To reinforce them wouldchange their character completely. "We must think of their duty asState duty rather than military," he declared, as diplomatic troops, asymbolof co-operation.50The Army planners did not agree with Hornbeck. As one of themwrote,the objectivesof our national policy are, in the final analysis, ncompatiblewith the implementationof that policy.We cannot indefinitelysustain andprotectour objectivesagainstan aggressive mperialismbasedon force with-out the useof force.5'To the military, force was the ultimate arbiter in the relations amongnations, and a garrisonthat was at the mercyof any aggressormust eitherbe removed or strengthened. The armyplannersadmitted that the forces

48 Hornbeck Statement, First Meeting, Joint Planning Committee, no date.49 Memo by Stanley Hornbeck, no date, sub: Objectives of American Foreign Policy.50Hornbeck Statement, First Meeting, Joint Planning Committee.51Memo by Col. Sherman Miles, no date, sub: U.S. Military Position in Far East.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAin China, though militarily negligible, did provide protection for Ameri-can nationals, but argued that as Japan tightened its hold over NorthChina, American nationals would become dependent on the Japaneserather than the American garrison for protection. Ultimately the gar-rison would find itself in an anomalous position vis-/a-visJapan, "irritat-ing to that power, and provocative of trouble with it." Thus, becausethe garrison did serve a useful if limited purpose at the present time,the Army recommended it be retained temporarilyand withdrawn whenit was no longer needed-an innocuous statement with which few coulddisagree.52The view of the navy planners was closer to that of the State Depart-ment. While the Army looked inward, preoccupied with the defenseof the continental United States and its vital outposts, the Navy lookedabroad, across the oceans, for the fulfillment of its mission. One wasisolationist and conservative in outlook, the other offensive-minded andaggressive.Thus the navy planners agreed with Hornbeck that weaken-ing American forces in China might lead only to further Japaneseexpansion while lowering American prestive in the Far East. But theyalso accepted the Army's conclusion that when American forces wereno longer required there they should be withdrawn.' Since everyoneagreed, though for different reasons, that American troops could stillperform a useful service in China, nothing further was done about theirwithdrawal.

Having lost another round in the long struggle to' extricate theFifteenth Infantry, the Army in 1936 reverted to an earlier tack andtried to get the regiment's mission changed. Again, the StateDepartmentwas the main opponent. By this time, Hornbeck was meeting regularlywith the army and navy officersconcerned with Far Easternmattersandat one of these meetings the subject of the mission came up. Hornbeckread a draft that had been preparedin his office,but neither of the armyrepresentatives found it to his liking. During the heated discussion,Hornbeck asked Lieutenant Colonel Leonard T. Gerow of the WarPlans Division if he felt the army should withdraw from the Far East.Gerow answeredfrankly that he did, "becauseof our untenable militaryposition out there and the possibility of friction between our militaryforces and those of Japan."'62Memo Joint Planning Committee for Joint Board, March 5, 1936, sub: Military Positionin Far East, End. A; Report of Army Section.3 Ibid., Encl. B; Report of Navy Section.56 Memo, Gerow for Chief, War Plans Division, Nov. 24, 1936, sub: Monday Conference atState Department, WPD 3533-8.

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWIf the War Department felt that way, why, asked Hornbeck, did itnot try to get the policy changed rather than have the agencies assignedto its support removed. Gerow's reply is a revealing comment on the

role of the military in the formulation of national policy. "I told him,"he reported,that the War Department was not the state policy making agency, that beinga State Department responsibility. But that the War Department was re-sponsible for the military aspects of any policy adopted and that it was aduty of the War Department to point out the extent to which we mightbecome involved through military commitments and make recommendationsaccordingly.5`

In the end, it was the Japanese who finally resolved the question ofAmerican forces in China. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese attackedChinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking to begin a warthat did not end until the defeat of Japan in August, 1945. The attackbrought into dramatic relief the exposed position of the foreign garrisonsand opened the final phase of the War Department's campaign to with-draw its forces from China. On its side was a strongly isolationist publicopinion, anxious to avoid any incident that might lead to war, and aCongress that was asking why the army maintained troops in China.'The army answer was simple-the State Department. And it was theState Department that was now anxious to clarify the mission of thecommanders in China. On August 3 Hornbeck was in the chief of staff'soffice to talk about the situation in China with the secretary of theGeneral Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Eichelberger. He wantedto know something about Colonel McAndrew, commander of the armyforces in China, whether he had been given any fresh instructions sincethe start of the conflict, and what McAndrew was likely to do "if a bunchof Japanese troops should come up to the compound and demand thatthey evacuate." He did not think there would be any trouble with theJapanese, he told Eichelberger, but would draft fresh instructions forthe minister. Before he left, he promised to send the draft to the chiefof staff, General Malin Craig, for his comments.57Before the day was over, the draft was in the chief of staff's hands.His comment, after a quick reading, was that the mission assigned under

6' Ibid.56Memo, Chief of Staff for Chief, War Plans Division, Aug. 6, 1937, sub: Reasons WhyAmerican Troops are Maintained at Tientsin, WPD 3533-9; Chief, War Plans Division forChief of Staff, Aug. 13, 1937, same sub. AG 320 U.S. Forces in China (8-13-37), NationalArchives.67 Memo, Eichelberger for Chief of Staff, Aug. 3, 1937, no sub, AG 380.3 (7-13-37) Sec. i,National Archives.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAthe Protocol of 19go01 as impossible of execution with the Japanese inpossession of the Tientsin-Peking area of the railroad. He was opposedalso to any instructions that might hamper the initiative of the com-mander and give him the impression he was not to fight if attacked.If the secretaryof state wanted the orders of the army commander inChina changed, the chief of staff remarked,he ought to put the matterup to the secretaryof warofficially.58There is no record of any effort on the secretariallevel to clarify therole of the commanders in China, but on August o fresh instructionsfrom the State Department went out to all American officials in thearea.59 n the view of the War Department, these instructions werescarcelyadequate to meet the situation. More than ever it believed thegarrison there must be evacuated. The position of the troops in a warzone was completely untenable, and the State Department's most recentinstructions made their position more anomalous than ever. Accordingto these instructions, the garrison could defend itself, if attacked bydisorganized soldiery, but was not to do so if the attack was made byorganized units acting on higher command. How was the Americancommander to know on whose orders the Japanese or Chinese mightbe acting? Moreover, to accomplish the primary mission of protectingAmerican lives, the army commander might very well have to defendhimself against organized forces, no matter under whose orders theywere acting. Conceivably, he might even have to undertake offensiveoperations within the limits of his capabilities. Clearly, the garrisonmust be extricated from this situation, and as quickly as possible. Atthe least, the War Department must have a voice in the determinationof policy in China. No longer could the State Department call the tunewithout reference to its view.Having made this decision, the War Department appealed once moreto the State Department. Again it was turned down. But this time theWar Department refused to accept defeat, and on September i appealeddirectly to the President. "I find this action of the State Department inignoring military advice,"wrote Assistant SecretaryLouis Johnson, "hasbeen characteristicof its attitude for many yearspast."Such an attitude,he told the President, was not in the best interests of the nation andwas contrary to the practice of every other great power. None of them,he declared, "embarks upon a foreign policy having any military im-

58 Memo, Eichelberger for Hornbeck, Aug. 3, 1937, idem.59State Dept. to American Embassy in China, Aug. 10, 1937, idem. The message was sentby the War Department to the commanders in the Philippines and China.

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWplications without giving the fullest consideration to the advice of theresponsible military authorities."'?The State Department's refusal to ask for or even consider militaryadvice seemed to Johnson "a matter of the gravest concern." Recom-mendations for certain naval dispositions, presumably from Britishsources, he claimed, were being seriously considered by the State De-partment. These dispositions might commit the United States "irrevoc-ably" to the employment of large forces in the Far East, yet "as far asI can find," Johnson told the President, "no advice has been asked ofthe War Department upon these matters." It was a situation that hadno counterpart in any other nation and he asked the President to directthe secretaryof state "to afford an opportunity to the War Departmentto express its views upon all matters having a military implication,immediate or remote."6'

This wasstronglanguage, but the recorddoes not disclosewhat action,if any, Roosevelt took. Perhaps the State Department on its own initia-tive decided it must act quickly. At anyrate, the Navy earlyin Septemberordered the evacuation of all naval dependents from China "in further-ance of Government policy," as soon as possible. "Evacuation," wrotethe Asiatic Fleet commander "is obligatory and not a matter of personalchoice."62The Army was slower in acting, and on September 15, a StateDepartment official called on the deputy chief of staff to ask what planshad been made for the evacuation of dependents. On being informedof the visit, the chief of staffwanted to know whether the State Depart-ment felt the time for evacuation had arrived, and if so whether theState Department or the Navy would handle the matter. The answercame the same day. The State Department did indeed believe that thetime had come to evacuate dependents, and was already evacuating itsown dependents. The Navy was doing the same, and would arrangeforthe Army'sdependents.'The evacuation of dependents was the prelude to the close of thestruggle between the State and War Departments over the role of armyforces in China. On this last act of the drama, the military records arestrangely silent. Perhaps, despite Johnson's protest, it was made by theState Department without reference to the Army's desires; perhaps it

Johnson for the President, Sept. 1, 1937, sub: Far Eastern Situation, WPD 3533-11.61Ibid.62Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet to All Asiatic Stations, o090o6,Sept. 6, 1937, WPD4026.63Memos, Eichelberger for Chief, War Plans Division, Sept. 15, 1937; Chief, War PlansDivision for Chief of Staff, same date, sub: Evacuation of Army Dependents from China,both in WPD 4026.

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ARMY AND MARINES IN CHINAwas a political decision made on a higher level. All the record shows isa brief memorandum, dated February 3, 1938, directing the command-ing general, Philippine Department, to return the Fifteenth Infantry,with attached military personnel, civilian employees, and legal de-pendents from China to Fort Lewis in Washington, by order of thesecretaryof war. A detachment of marines from Peking would move into replace the Fifteenth Infantry at Tientsin.6 By the end of March,1938, the Army was out of China; the marines would remain until amonth before Pearl Harbor.The withdrawal of army forces from China after more than thirtyyearsof garrisonduty marked the beginning of a new era in the relationsbetween the civilian and military authorities. Under the pressure ofAxis aggression in Europe and Asia and the threat of war, the State,War, and Navy Departments drew closer together. In April, 1938, acommittee consisting of the under secretaryof state, the chief of staff,and the chief of naval operations was formed to deal with the Axis threatin Latin America. This was but the first in a series of steps designedto achieve a closer coordination between the Army and the Navy andbetween them and the State Department. By the time of Pearl Harbor,consultation among these departmentshad been established on a regularand continuous basis, though largely through informal means.In itself, the experience in China was neither important nor decisivein establishing these relations. But by emphasizing in dramatic form theweaknessesand frustrations arising from a lack of co-ordination, it con-tributed in no small measure to the development of the means for co-ordinating the political and military elements of national policy.

v4Memo, Deputy Chief of Staff for The Adjutant General, Feb. 3, 1938, sub: Return ofi5th Infantry from China, WPD 3533-11.

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Documents

Army and Marines on the China Station a Study in Military and Political Rivalry