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Arms control: UnfulfilledexpectationsPublished online: 22 Jan 2009.

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Arms Control: Unfulfilled ExpectationsThe debate in the US over the efficacy of arms control reached a turning-point in 1999. Putting years of calculated balance behind them, Senatorsvoted in October not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).In so doing, they signalled the shift in their thinking away from armscontrol as a means of enhancing national and global security. The failure to

Arms Control: Unfulfilled Expectations 53

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and otherindependent financial institutions have a role to play inpromoting civil-military relations, training a new generation ofdefence economists, helping to restructure defence budgets andsupporting the integration of former military personnel intocivilian society and civil economy. NATO assistance should be Wconcentrated on supporting the most important new task for Sjmilitary reform in the CEE states - modernisation of their armed £forces. This can bring real benefits for future multilateral coalition &*operations. £

• Give more priority to hard-security objectives. Europeans should "Soconsider investing more money and effort to assist Russia with "nnon-proliferation and nuclear security and safety objectives. A 55multilateral European programme similar to the US CTRprogramme is required. Continuing bilateral assistance in thisarea leads to duplication and inefficiency. The crisis in Russia-NATO relations means the EU must play a greater role instructuring such a programme; this could be an importantelement of ESDI.

• Expand the range of participants. The new pressures on Europeandefence budgets necessitate the increased involvement of otheragencies, including non-governmental and private actors. Thesecan provide expertise at a lower cost and sustain public interest indefence-diplomacy activities. This will require greater coordina-tion, but will ensure that defence diplomacy is better integratedwith the other foreign and economic policies pursued byindividual states.

If these measures could be set in motion, defence diplomacy would notonly be able to survive its new challenges, but would provide a positivemodel for those other regions of the world which are similarly seeking toovercome historical divisions in favour of greater openness andengagement.

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54 Strategic Polio/ Issues

ratify the CTBT is significant enough in itself, but the move coincides witha number of other policy decisions in both the US and Russia that couldcollectively represent a further decline in the role of arms control inshaping international security. This shift in attitude has importantramifications for attempts to promote world-wide confidence and improvesecurity.

Nuclear Negotiations

There was a bad start to 1999 for nuclear arms control. In late 1998, theRussian Duma shelved hearings on the already fragile process of ratifyingthe Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II following the bombing ofIraq by the US and UK in response to Baghdad's refusal to allow the UNSpecial Commission (UNSCOM) to carry out inspections. In March 1999,when the Duma began preparing for a debate on START II legislation,proceedings came to an abrupt halt when NATO took action againstYugoslavia over Kosovo. With the loss of both of these opportunities forRussian ratification, START II has been languishing, awaiting a newpolitical impetus from Moscow or Washington.

This may yet occur in 2000, driven by a combination of a change in theRussian political climate, concerns over Moscow's ability to maintain astrategic nuclear force even at the levels called for in START II, andpresidential elections in both Russia and the US. Yet it is equally possiblethat START II may have bitten the dust for good - a casualty of worseningrelations between the world's two largest military powers. Certainly, theagreement reached in Helsinki in March 1997 on beginning talks on STARTIII before ratification of its predecessor has helped, but not enough as yet.Much depends on the Russian political process and a decision in the US onnational missile defence (NMD) deployments. This is due in 2000 beforethe US presidential elections in November, but may be delayed until thefollowing year.

The relationship between the US and China has fared little better. Inearly January 1999, a Congressional committee, chaired by RepresentativeChristopher Cox, submitted its report, which claimed that espionage hadprovided China with highly sensitive information on US missile andnuclear-warhead designs. A few days later, US Defense Secretary WilliamCohen announced that the US would seek amendments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to permit its introduction of NMD. Ifchanges could not be agreed with Russia, the US might exercise its right towithdraw from the treaty. The statement upset Moscow, but it neverthelessremains part of the dialogue between the two countries. China's reactionhas been stronger. Despite US protestations, neither China nor Russiareally believes that limited US national or shared theatre missile defenceswould be aimed solely at preventing an attack by a small state armed with

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Arms Control: Unfulfilled Expectations 55

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Indeed, Chinese officials are farfrom convinced that the US would go to such expensive lengths to countera vague threat from small states which could, in their view, be effectivelydealt with in more conventional ways.

Tests of missile-defence interceptors took place in March, June andOctober 1999. Each sparked much controversy over whether the inter- Wceptors worked. At best, it appears that the technology needs considerable 3development before it becomes clear whether NMD could work with any ,3efficiency. Despite these doubts, the issue of missile defences is at the heart Z?of the debate over arms control. The ABM Treaty acknowledged the £relationship between the offensive and defensive strategic systems of the .yUS and the Soviet Union. As a concept, nuclear deterrence between the US, 2>Russia and China relies on the mutual vulnerability of strategic nuclear Hforces. If one state becomes much less vulnerable than the other, deterrencecan break down. There is, however, one way in which defences can be seenas an aid to strategic stability. When nuclear weapons are being reduced tovery low levels, missile defences could act as a hedge against breakout orcheating on a process of reductions, thus enhancing stability. At high levelsof weapons, however, defences are more likely to induce force enhance-ments and encourage a potential first strike posture.

By the end of 1999, Russia was publicly stating that amending theABM Treaty was not negotiable, but privately analysts and officials believethat a deal over missile defences will be reached. This would tradedeployment for reductions in strategic nuclear weapons to START III levelsor even below; US technical assistance to Russia's national missiledefences; increased involvement with the US and Europe; and variousprojects involving hard currency. On the other hand, Chinese officials areadamant , at least publicly, that any deployment of missile defences,whether national or theatre, will deal a severe blow to all future arms-control efforts, and badly damage US-China relations.

Other states are also concerned about missile defences. At the UNGeneral Assembly in late 1999, France voted with Russia and Ireland infavour of a Russian resolution that the ABM Treaty should be preservedand complied with. The UK could play an important role in the overallbargain between Russia and the US, since radar and early-warningfacilities in north-east England will have to be upgraded for a US NMD towork. The debate in NATO has already exposed the divisions betweenthose countries which want greater reductions in nuclear arsenals, andthose prepared to go along with missile defences because of their lucrativetechnical opportunities, whatever the implications for arms control.

NATO's military action in Kosovo became a focus for much that otherstates feared from US military dominance. Whatever the rights and wrongsof the action, the fact that Russia was not involved in the early policydecisions, the unfortunate bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade,

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56 Strategic Policy Issues

and the hype surrounding so-called smart-bomb technology supplied anti-US factions in both Beijing and Moscow with an opportunity to strengthentheir opposition to US missile-defence plans.

In other respects as well, nuclear matters have not had an easy ride.Although not directly linked to nuclear weapons, the leak at a nuclearpower plant in Japan in July 1999 and the scandal over the failure to recordsafety data by British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) when handling Japanese fuelin September have further increased anxiety in Japan. In August 1999, theTokyo Forum on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (a Japanesefollow-on to the 1996 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of NuclearWeapons) reported its findings. The forum's report was pessimistic, andurged renewed efforts to stop a perceived decline in regional and inter-national security.

The nuclear-weapon tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998continued to reverberate, both regionally and internationally. In mid-1999,an expert panel established by the Indian government published a draftnuclear doctrine. The draft, which seemed to have swallowed the wholeWestern concept of nuclear deterrence, postulated a land-, sea- and air-based nuclear triad, resulting in the development and deployment ofhundreds of nuclear weapons. Although the Indian government posted thedraft doctrine on its website and asked the world for comments, it hasbecome clear that New Delhi is far from comfortable with it, and isrethinking its approach.

Despite public and private statements that India would sign the CTBT,neither India nor Pakistan had done so by the end of March 2000. The USSenate's decision not to ratify the treaty has had a considerable impact onthe debate in South Asia. Those opposing India's participation in the treatyhave found themselves strengthened by the Senate's action, particularlysince there are clear technical pressures to keep open the option to test.Indeed, should India test again, China would have a ready-made excusefor doing the same, thus blowing a hole in the CTBT - an outcome likely tobe applauded by certain quarters in Washington and Moscow.

All of these developments occurred in the lead-up to the first ReviewConference since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) wasextended indefinitely in 1995. In April 1998, the preparatory committeepapered over deep cracks and agreed a document to go forward to theconference in 2000. As is normal, it said little of substance, but at least thepolitical process could go ahead. However, as a serious review of the 1995-2000 period has to take place in 2000, there is little point in anything butbrutal honesty. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has suffered seriousset-backs:

• despite huge efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) to bring into force an enhanced safeguards regime, thepace of ratification of the protocol is as slow as ever;

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Arms Control: Unfulfilled Expectations 57

• confidence in the ability of the UN Security Council to dealeffectively with Iraq's WMD is the lowest it has been since theend of the Gulf War in 1991;

• countries surrounding Iraq are increasingly nervous, and Iran atleast may be developing nuclear weapons;

• dealing with North Korea is a painfully slow process;

• the nuclear-weapon states have signalled their strong oppositionto any moves that might lead to a timed programme foreliminating nuclear weapons, despite their promises to thecontrary in 1995; "to

• the US is likely to deploy limited NMD;

• Russia is considering redeploying and perhaps developing itstactical nuclear-weapon systems;

• China continues to increase its nuclear capability; and

• India and Pakistan are entrenching nuclear weapons within theirmilitary strategies.

For the time being, there seems to be little hope for nuclear arms control,and prospects for meaningful progress within the NPT are bad. The onlychink of light could be ratification by the Duma of START II, progress onSTART III and agreement between the US and Russia on the ABM Treaty.The state parties to the NPT could agree a fudged document at the ReviewConference in 2000. It seems more likely, however, that there will be noconsensus on a final document, and that the conference, like most since thefirst in 1975, will end acrimoniously.

From the perspective of the treaties the situation is undoubtedlygloomy. But there have been positive developments in the sphere ofpractical action outside the treaties. In the midst of the NATO bombingcampaign in Kosovo the US and Russia completed the negotiation of, andsigned, a protocol establishing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)program for seven years. While progress has been slower than planned, aprogramme for the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons issteadily continuing. For the period 2000 to 2005, the US has allocated $4.2billion for this activity. Some of these funds go towards the InternationalScience and Technology Centre which sponsors non-weapons projects forscientists and engineers previously employed on weapon programmes.The EU and Japan also support this activity. Important non-proliferationprogrammes like these provide an excellent opportunity for Europeans inparticular to make a substantial contribution to disarmament and stem-ming proliferation. Even a modest increase in the amount Europe spendson such activities could bring large security benefits.

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58 Strategic Policy Issues

Conventional Forces

Despite the furore over NATO's action in Kosovo and the use of high-technology conventional weapons, the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces inEurope (CFE) Treaty was adapted as planned in November 1999. Thismarked the end of three years of negotiation on adjusting the treaty so thatit better reflects the reality of European security today. The adaptationopens the treaty to states outside of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact.Each state now has individual ceilings allocated to it for armaments on anational and territorial basis, instead of allocating ceilings on the basis ofgroup levels. The new ceilings also mean further conventional disarma-ment in Europe: 11,000 weapon systems - battle tanks, artillery pieces andcombat aircraft - will be dismantled, thus cutting the number of conven-tional weapons in Europe by a further 10%. Considering the difficultiesbetween NATO and Russia over Kosovo and the ABM Treaty, it isencouraging that adapting the CFE went as smoothly as planned.

Small arms moved up the arms-control agenda in 1999. Small arms area major humanitarian issue, since they account for the vast majority ofcasualties in wars around the globe. It has been estimated that up to 500million small arms, many of them left over from the Cold War, are incirculation. Some are now exacerbating conflicts in developing countriesand ending up in the hands of terrorists and participants in organisedcrime.

In August 1999, planning for an international small-arms conference in2001 got under way, with UN General Assembly resolutions andrecommendations based on the report of the UN's Group of GovernmentalExperts on Small Arms. However, the purpose of the conference has notyet been clarified. The UN Expert Group on Ammunition and Explosivesalso completed its report to the General Assembly. It argued that controlson small arms cannot be achieved without controls on ammunition, andthus recommended the marking, stockpile management and destruction ofsurplus ammunition stocks world-wide.

Two new initiatives in 1999 considerably increased non-governmental(NGO) activity on small arms. The first, the International Action Networkon Small Arms (IANSA), attempts to coordinate NGO activities aimed atmeasures to control the spread of small arms. The IANSA is basedtemporarily in London, but operates almost entirely over the Internet. Thesecond, the Small Arms Survey based in Geneva, is an annual report on theproliferation and use of these weapons. Both initiatives, which bringtogether humanitarian organisations and disarmament groups, areworking closely with like-minded governments and key UN organs topush for increased controls on small arms and the removal of surplus armsin post-conflict regions.

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The 2001 conference is likely to lead to a number of negotiations andinitiatives. NGOs play an increasingly important role in the debate oversmall arms and, as they were in the Ottawa process on landmines, they willbe an important force in any official negotiations. This will be particularlytrue for humanitarian organisations working in regions of conflict and inpost-conflict reconstruction. On i March 1999, the Ottawa Conventionbanning anti-personnel landmines entered into force. The first meeting of 5jstate parties was held in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3-7 May. One of the Jimportant features of the Maputo meeting was a decision to establish a frprogramme of inter-sessional work in Geneva. Both governments and J3NGOs are participating in these meetings, which focus on mine clearance, .2victim assistance, stockpile destruction, mine-action technologies and the £general operation of the Convention. Even states which have yet to ratify &the Ottawa Convention have modified their behaviour in areas such asweapon sales and deployment strategies. Next on the agenda for thehumanitarian groups behind the Ottawa process are cluster bombs andunexploded ordnance.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) gotinto its stride in 1999, a year after the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC) entered into force. Some 130 states have ratified the Convention.The OPCW has inspected over 70,000 tones of stockpiled chemicalweapons, and eight million munitions and bulk containers. OPCW moni-toring teams have verified the destruction of more than a million chemicalweapons and 4,000 tonnes of chemical-warfare agents. In addition, all 60 ofthe thus-far declared facilities around the world producing chemicalweapons have been inspected and sealed. Of these, 20 have been certifiedas destroyed, and five have been approved for conversion to peacefulpurposes.

Although difficulties have been put in its path, the OPCW has beguninspecting industrial facilities throughout the world that produce, orconsume, 'dual-use' chemicals. It will be slow work, for only a tiny fractionof such facilities can be inspected in the course of a year. The CWCinspection regime was also undermined by the reservations accompanyingUS ratification. If the US does not allow certain activities to be carried outon its territory, the OPCW cannot demand that other state parties allowthem either. In addition, the US had not made its initial industrialdeclaration by the end of 1999. Once this is delivered, the volume of workof the OPCW will increase dramatically. A more serious concern than thesetechnicalities is the refusal of key states in the Middle East to ratify theConvention.

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60 Strategic Polio/ Issues

In Geneva, negotiations for an additional protocol to the Biological andToxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), to establish a verification andconfidence-building regime for the Convention, proceeded slowly. Thereare still deep divisions among the countries negotiating the protocol. Somewish to avoid a protocol altogether, citing doubts about its efficiency andcost, and fears about intrusive inspections and discrimination; others wanta protocol at almost any cost.

Despite the publication in May 1999 of Russian scientist Ken Alibek'sbook Biohazard, which reported on Soviet and Russian non-compliancewith the BTWC, fear of developments in biotechnologies and weaponry,particularly with the new genetic advances, does not seem to have had asignificantly sobering effect on many of the state parties to the treaty.Alibek's book demonstrates clearly how a country can evade detection of abiological-weapon programme, even if intrusive verification proceduresare in place. According to Alibek, Soviet scientists went to great lengths toconceal the extent of the country's programme during confidence-buildingexchange visits. Soviet scientists claimed that they did not believe that theUS had stopped developing and producing biological weapons, untilAlibek and his colleagues came to the US on an exchange visit. Accordingto Alibek, they believed they were working on weapons to counter asupposedly superior, and still developing, US capability.

Books and papers published in 1999 on Iraq's biological-weaponprogramme also demonstrated the difficulty of creating a global moni-toring regime. UNSCOM's executive chairman, Richard Butler, steppeddown at the end of his term on 30 June 1999, and the transformation ofUNSCOM into its paler shadow, the UN Monitoring, Verification andInspection Commission (UNMOVIC), had not been completed by the endof 1999. The IAEA has since undertaken a routine inspection of a nuclearfacility in Iraq, but UN inspections have not taken place since December1998. By the time UNMOVIC inspections begin, Iraq may have enjoyedseveral years without in-country monitoring, time which it could havemade very good use of.

March 2000 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into forceof the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - a treaty which has neverhad any verification provisions. Originally, negotiations on the verificationprotocol were to have been completed before the BWC's ReviewConference in 2001. This looks increasingly unlikely because of delays inthe negotiations, although a chairman's text - scheduled to be tabled in lateMarch 2000 - might prompt a speedy end-game. This is important because,if the protocol is not agreed by the end of 2000, the newly elected USpresident may find it difficult to formulate a new and consistent policy,and achieve a finalised text before the review conference. Indeed, theincoming president's policy may be so different from that of the current

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Arms Control: Unfulfilled Expectations 61

administration that the protocol negotiations could be set back by years, orcould even be put on hold.

Is There a Way Forward?

Future arms-control historians could look back on 1999 as a turning-point, Wwhere arms control either entered a long period of stagnation, or a period gthat provided a necessary catalyst for an entirely new approach. Much will %depend on whether or not Russia decides to strike a deal with the US over &the ABM Treaty. This could be a 'quick fix', in which Russia received some "3technological assistance with its own missile defences, achieved further .yreductions in nuclear arsenals and was given other sweeteners. Over the J?long haul, such a deal could mean greater gains for Russian security, but in £the short run it might not appear so appealing to politicians facing anincreasingly cynical electorate.

Multilateral arms control in Geneva, whether nuclear or biological, ishostage to the games being played between Russia and the US. This is littlechanged from the Cold War. Now, however, the role China has taken on asa blocker is increasingly important, and all other states have to take thisinto consideration. Other important players can exploit these differencesfor their own advantage in their regions, particularly in the Gulf and SouthAsia. There is a danger that some, particularly the Europeans, may becomeso obsessed with the treaties that they lose sight of the importance ofsupporting substantial activities outside of, but complementing, the WMDtreaties. These include such efforts as the safe dismantling of nuclearweapons, and the economic and social adaptation of nuclear cities andmilitary towns in Russia and other former Soviet states. Important expec-tations of the arms control process remain unfulfilled, but expectationsmust be realistic. They must take into account the security realities ofvarious regions, as well as viewing soberly and pragmatically how muchverification regimes can actually achieve.

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