By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONActing Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 02269

When we used to talk about efficiencies, we referredto those little, cheaply built and cheaply rented, bare-bones apartments that single soldiers and geographicalbachelors could rent right outside the main gate of FortReally Hot. They offered some semblance of civiliza-tion: a stove top, a closet, and a commode. They wereaustere places, but a smart guy with some imaginationcould get by if he cleverly used his limited space.

Nowadays, efficiencies have come to represent some-thing a little bit different. They still demand that clever-ness from the user, but now we are talking about re-sources when we hear the word. How can you leverageyour allocations of whatever you’ve been given to ac-complish the mission, or missions? Not enough people?Look for some efficiencies. Not enough equipment?Look for efficiencies. Not enough fuel or repair parts tosupport your OPTEMPO? Look for some efficiencies.Not enough training opportunities? Simulate. Then lookfor efficiencies.

Being the mission-type guys they are, tankers andcavalrymen will always say, “We’ll do our part.” Theirunits might go without as many chemical lights as lastyear, or quite as many batteries, or fewer CL III POLpackage products to try and stretch the unit’s moneyand resources to last the year. More than likely though,they will maintain a readiness level close to where theyare supposed to be. Those new found efficiencies willprobably get ’em through enough of the exercises theyhad planned to meet the quarterly, semi-annual, andannual training objectives.

Later, after the exercises and recovery operations arecomplete, these same guys catch up on their readingand see articles about multi-billion dollar acquisitionprograms and wonder what is going on (for some en-lightenment, read about the machinations surroundingthe F/A-18 and whether to upgrade or buy new). Theylook in their motorpools and sure don’t see $3,800 toiletseats. They might see a stray, solitary bolt, inexplicablyshipped via FEDEX or Express Mail in packaging befit-

ting a critical component for the space shuttle, but theydon’t see a lot more ways to create efficiencies.

That our units are learning conservation is very good,for no one likes to see once-used but now contami-nated tubes of grease thrown out, or see scrap metalbins with untagged and perfectly good parts destinedfor a smelter, rather than the turret. No one likes to seesoldiers who are not training. Waste should make everyone of us mad.

At some point we will have reached the limit of effi-ciencies and actually begun cutting into our muscle. Idon’t pretend to know where that point is, for each unitwill be different. I do know that a number of guys feelthey have streamlined their operations a lot already.Talk of cutting annual ammo allocations or reducingPLLs and ASLs should always send a shudder throughthe force. We are all concerned about the erosion ofcollective skills that can’t be captured in simulations.Sure, you can keep the simulation running a little bitlonger to give the logisticians — that is, all of us — timeto police up the battlefield. But, a simulation just isn’tgoing to replicate the effort needed to simultaneouslyrecover two or three dozen armored vehicles and surgefor the increased casualty flow. Doing it for the first timeat a Combat Training Center certainly isn’t our modelnow, nor what we want, although it may be the directionforced on us by efficiencies.

There is everything right about operating more effi-ciently; waste in any form is a bad thing. Soldiers nottraining is bad; money that is thrown away is bad; or-dering repair parts then not using them is unconscion-able; POL products used once, then contaminated, im-poverish the unit, the Army, and ruin our environment.As budgets continue shrinking, it behooves us all to becreative, and to use our collective imaginations to effi-ciently operate within increasingly tight resource alloca-tions. But, if you see muscle getting damaged, speakup.

— TAB

Stand To

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-96-5

Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant MG LON E. MAGGART

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi­monthly by the U.S. Anny Annor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121-

Disclaimer: The infonnation contained in AR­MOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the offi­cial Anny or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any infonnation presented in other official Anny publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each annored brigade headquarters, annored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, annored cavalry squadron head­quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar­ters, armored cavalry troop, annor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Anny. In addition, Anny libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for annored, di­rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organiza­tions may request two copies by sending a mili­tary letter to the editor-in--chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency in­cludes: all annored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which ar­mor and armored cavalry organizations use ex­clusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted sol­diers; and infonnation conceming the training, logistics, history, and leadership ot ann or and ar­mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those lev­els.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

September-October 1996, Vol. CV No.5

Features

8 STAWs: New Threat from Above Smart Top Attack Weapons by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Boschma, U.S. Anny (Ret.)

10 Russia's Arena Active Protection System by First Lieutenant Adam Geibel

11 Cavalry In Force XXI by Major General Lon E. Maggart

13 Fort Knox Cavalry Branch Will Host Reconnaissance Symposium in October

14 The Indian Wars Staff Ride by Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L Kennedy, Jr.

20 Task Force Baum and the Hammelburg Raid by Richard Whitaker

31 Leadershlp ••• And Command and Control by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson

33 Honorary Colonels Can Re-energize Your Unit by Captain Dave Clark

34 Operation Just Cause: The Armor-Infantry Team in the Close Fight by Major Frank Sherman

36 Balkan Report III: The Six-Bradley Scout Platoon In Bosnia by First Lieutenant Frank Lozano

37 Kentucky Windage (Target acquisition and tracking with the M-18 Hellcat) Letter from CPT Richard Buchanan (Ret.), 704th TO Battalion

38 Tank Combat Training: Tactical Table VIII by Captain Pat White and Lieutenant Colonel Karl Gunzelman

41 Mobility Analysis for the Digitized Brigade by Captain Robert S. Mikaloff

45 The Task Force Commander's Role in Fire Support Planning by Lieutenant Colonel Harry L Leiterman

Back "Driver, how much fuel do we have?" Cover Here's an easy way to report accurately ...

by Staff Sergeant Stephen A. Krivitsky

Departments

2 Contacts 3 Letters 6 Commander's Hatch 7 Driver's Seat

52 Books

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U.S. Army Armor School

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Commanding General MG Lon E. Maggart E-Mail: MAGGART@KNOX-EMH1.ARMY.MIL

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ARMOR - September-October 1996

Mortar Doctrine Writer Responds to Article

Dear Sir:

I'm sending you this message in re­sponse to an article in your May-June 1996 issue, "Tactical Employment of the Heavy Mortar Platoon," by CPT Matt Sebenoler. I've never written to you before, but be­cause of my close, long-term association with the subject of CPT Sebenoler's article, I feel I must. You see, I have primary staff responsibility for mortar doctrinal issues at the Infantry School and wrote much of the existing literature on the tactical employ­ment of mortar units.

In this article, CPT Sebenoler states that little of the doctrine that he found in FM 7-90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, actu­ally works under combat conditions. Obvi­ously, I disagree. I'd like to present you and your readers with another side of this argu­ment.

The author makes several misstatements and misrepresentations of what is (and what isn't) the Infantry School's doctrinal position on certain mortar issues. The doc­trinal manual that CPT Sebenoler had available to him in the desert was the first version of FM 7-90, dated 11 June 1985, We have revised it once since the Gulf War, printing the upgraded version in Octo­ber 1992.

When it was published in 1985, FM 7-90 provided, for the first time, detailed doc­trinal guidance to the mortar platoon leader, as well as to company and battalion com­manders and the battalion S3s and FSOs who had staff responsibility for integrating mortar fires into the commander's tactical plan. As part of a three-piece set of up­dated mortar-related manuals which in­cluded FM 23-90, Mortars, and FM 23-91, Mortar Gunnery, FM 7-90 was a timely ad­dition to the doctrinal kitbag the Infantry and Armor combined arms team had avail­able to take to the Gulf War.

Now, let's address some of CPT Se­benoler's specific criticisms. First, he states

Issues in ARMOR

that doctrine calls for the heavy mortar pla­toon always to operate in split sections. This is not what the manual says.

On page 3-1, paragraph one says that the commander employs the mortar pla­toon based on his analysiS of the factors of MEn-T, and that there are three standard options: by platoon, section, or squad. This chapter then goes on to discuss when, and under what MEn-T conditions, each of the three options would be most appropriate, Employment by split section is the second method discussed. At no place does FM 7-90 state that operation by split section is the preferred method. Page 3-4 provides a chart that lists each employment option and then the advantages and disadvantages of each. As is the case in all American Army doctrine, the leader on the spot is required to make an informed analysiS of the exist­ing situation and then choose the most ap­propriate course of action,

The next supposed doctrinal weakness the author presents is that FM 7-90 calls for three of the most important individuals in the platoon to ride in the same vehicle and that this makes them too vulnerable to loss from a single kill. Once again, he mis­states, FM 7-90 simply does not say that.

FM 7-90 makes no declaration as to who rides in which vehicle. The riding setup that CPT Sebenoler describes, with the three FDC personnel riding in the same M577, is probably the most common in training, but it isn't, even by the wildest stretch of the imagination, demanded by doctrine.

As he pOints out in his own article, the heavy mortar platoon has two identical FDC sections, each with its own vehicle. We fought hard for several years during the late 1980s to get the platoon's TO&E changed to authorize the extra vehicle, driver, and FDC personnel.

The justification we presented was two­fold. It was to facilitate split section opera­tions, and secondly, it was to increase re­dundancy of the FDC in case of just such a catastrophic kill. It was for the same rea­sons that we authorized the platoon ser­geant's wheeled vehicle. It faCilitated his control of a section during split section op-

Issues in ARMOR has been on-line now for about four months. If you haven't visited us yet, please do, and let us know what you think.

You will find us linked off the Fort Knox home page, off the Fort Knox doctrine home page, or at the following address:

http://www.entelechy-inc.com/docs/knoxdoc/ armormag/cover.htm

ARMOR - September-October 1996

eration and lessened the chances of both senior leaders becoming casualties from a single round or mine.

As you can see, doctrine had already driven TO&E changes that accomplished the same results the author was seeking, lessening the chances that any single vehi­cle kill would render the heavy mortar pla­toon combat ineffective by killing irreplace­able personnel. CPT Sebenoler reduced that risk even further by cross-loading key personnel within his platoon. Rather than violating doctrine, he was on firm doctrinal grounds when making that decision.

The next supposed doctrinal shortcoming concerned the actions he had to take to compensate for his battalion commanders decision to restrict wheeled vehicle use to the trains area only. That decision was well within doctrinal norms, being based as it was (I assume) on an evaluation of their vulnerability and a desire to maximize the cross-country movement speed of his unit once the ground combat phase of the war began.

However, every decision a commander makes has consequences and every bene­fit has an associated cost. The conse­quence of this decision was to somewhat reduce the flexibility of the heavy mortar platoon's command and control structure. The actions the author had to take to com­pensate for that reduction seem logical, but they were certainly not necessitated by any doctrinal shortfall within FM 7-90.

The next so-called shortcoming involved the platoon leader being forced to stop dis­placing his platoon by alternate or succes­sive bounds and begin to displace as a complete platoon. He found that, despite his best efforts, the rest of the battalion was driving away from his mortar platoon as each section continually stopped, set up, waited for the other section to complete its move, broke down, and moved again.

Contrary to CPT Sebenoler's statement in his article, displacement by bounds is not the doctrinally required technique. In fact, in FM 7-90 on page 3-6, there is a detailed discussion of the factors that affect the commander's choice of displacement tech­niques. Three displacement techniques are described in the 1985 FM 7-90, the first of which is displacement by platoon. The dis­cussion of displacement by alternate and successive bounds even includes the cau­tionary note that they are slower than dis­placement by platoon.

What appears to have happened in the situation described by the author is that he and his battalion commander were basing their displacement techniques on two very different views of the existing tactical situ­ation.

If the mortar platoon leader's evaluation was correct - that the battalion needed

3

continuous and uninterrupted immediate mortar support - then the battalion com­mander should have been regulating the speed of the unit to remain within the um­brella of that support provided by the bounding sections.

However, if the battalion commander's evaluation of the existing METT-T condi­tions was correct (which appears to have been the case), then the mortar platoon was wasting its time bounding and was do­ing nothing but slowing the battalion down.

The issue seems to have been resolved in the battalion commander's favor, as they usually arel The author states that once he changed the displacement technique and began to travel as a platoon behind the maneuver companies, all was well.

Once again, none of this had anything to do with doctrinal shortcomings within FM 7-90. You could perhaps chalk it up to a lack of communication between the author and the battalion commander.

If I've come across as being harsh on CPT Sebenoler, I don't mean to. He sounds like a thoughtful and energetic young officer who successfully met the challenges that came his way in the Gulf. I congratulate him for achieving such a de­gree of proficiency within his platoon that it could complete preparation for a hip shoot in under two minutes. That's an impressive time, and it shows what a well-trained, well­led heavy mortar platoon is capable of do­ing. Some of the technology we are now integrating into the Mortar Fire Control Sys­tem will allow us to shorten into-action times even more.

To sum up, let me say that the American Army's approach to tactical doctrine is al­most unique in the world. Not only are our leaders authorized to modify the tactics and techniques they use at any particular time, basing that decision on their personal evaluation of the existing METT-T condi­tions and their commander's intent, but they are required to do sol We select, train, and promote leaders precisely on their demonstrated ability to make just these sorts of decisions and use just that sort of initiative. We do not often promote leaders that demonstrate they are incapable of such mental agility and must follow a rigid written doctrine as if it were dogma.

All of us would be better served, and would serve our soldiers better, if we un­derstood that unique aspect of our doctrinal philosophy. We should all read carefully and study our existing tactical doctrine, rather than make unsubstantiated claims that it is inadequate, based on an incom­plete understanding of its fundamentals.

4

ARTHUR A. DURANTE, JR. Deputy Chief, Doctrine Division

Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate U.S. Army Infantry School

Ft. Benning, Ga.

Javelin Opens Up Many New Possibilities

Dear Sir:

Major Morningstar's brilliant thinkpiece in the May-June 1996 ARMOR, "Javelins and Skirmishers on the Battlefield," should be required reading for force developers and doctrine writers around the world. This ob­servant young officer, apparently floating around the Atlantic somewhere, has cor­rectly identified the advent of a "new breed of smart weapons (that) are about to fun­damentally change ground battle systems, organization, and tactics." On 27 June 1996, the Javelin antitank missile system was fielded to the 3d Battalion, 75th Rang­ers, marking the world's first deployment of precision strike, flre-and-forget technology to the individual soldier. In the coming years, AT sections in the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and selected brigades of the National Guard will receive a revolutionary capability, comparable to the English long­bow at Crecy. The future is here: there now exists the ability for dismounted soldiers to kill modern tanks with a man-portable, top­attack weapon at tank ranges, with more accuracy than the tank.

As the author points out, Javelin systems properly employed have the potential to strip an advancing formation of Its key tank assets, force deployment and delay, and greatly Improve survivability in an NTC or Desert Shield scenario. Horizontally Inte­grated in an organization conducting a force projection mission, Javelin's mobility and high stowed kill precision can be a critical element in protecting an area for fol­low-on heavy forces. One could envision a light cavalry regiment built around precision weaponry, airborne units that are much more than "speed bumps," airmobile tank raids, and a thousand other concepts yet to be created. The Chief of Armor has pointed the way: ''to find ways to accommodate the change brought on by new weapons, new technology, new organizations, and new missions, within existing manpower and budget constraints ... to gird against defeat is not to change."

One hopes that we do not squander this technology, repeating our tank development experience of 1918-1940. The early signs are not good - It being so difficult to change in a period of relative peace, con­strained resources, and the "lessons" of Desert Storm. The lessons of Waterloo on the superiority of bronze cannon come to mind. The prototype Force XXI Army Divi­sion is remarkable by its lack of change and reduces manpower by removing AT units from the organization, although many iterations remain. The Future Scout Vehi­cle, a potential skirmisher if ever there was one, is focused on medium caliber machine guns, of all things. The tankers continue to ignore missiles - perhaps still learning the

wrong lessons from the Sheridan, a vehicle before its time if ever there was one. The Armored Gun System has been canceled on the eve of jts fielding, perhaps removing armor from the light forces for a generation.

Many opportunities are coming to shape the future, however. Javelin will participate in next year's Advanced Warflghtlng Experi­ment, although it probably will be analyzed only In comparison to the last generation Dragon it replaces. The U.S. Marine Corps has given a high priority to precision weap­ons and will conduct trade studies and pro­totype integration of Javelin on their Ad­vanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle and to replace TOW on the AT versions of the Light Armor Vehicle. International interest is very high, particularly in countries facing a high tank threat, those needing the low training overhead of fire-and-forget simplic­ity, and those wanting to upgrade current platforms without expensive development costs.

The next few years will tell those who see the possibilities will shape the future.

FRANK HARTLINE COL, Armor (Ret.)

Allen, Texas

Javelin Missile May Be Capable, But Is Not a Panacea

Dear Sir:

As a Field Artilleryman, I feel compelled to correct a few misconceptions and men­tion a few additional points not covered by Major James K. Morningstar in »Javelins and Skirmishers on the Battlefield" (AR­MOR, May-June 1996).

Overall, I think Major Morningstar makes an excellent case for the capabilities of the Javelin missile and a rebirth of the skir­misher concept. Moreover, I agree with his analysis of the tactical possibilities offered by this system. However, I disagree with his assertion that these tactics are not pos­sible using existing systems.

The TOW II missile is far more capable than a SAGGER ever dreamed of being, and comparing the two is unjust. TOW lis, when fired from ITVs which have been properly deployed, sighted, and supported, are capable of inflicting the type of damage that Major Morningstar describes. True, ITVs are not a "light" system, as Javelin skirmishers are, and the TOW II is not a fire-and-forget system. However, its longer range of 3750+ meters, small silhouette, and overhead armor protection do give it some capability in this area.

In addition, Major Momingstar gives the impression that the Javelin is a stand-alone weapon and that field artillery is not very effective against armored targets. Any weapon is only as effective as the sum of

ARMOR - September-October 1996

t

its parts and its integration into the overall scheme of the operation. No one weapon is capable of winning the battle on its own. not the M1A2 tank, not the M109A6 howit­zer and. most certainly, not the Javelin mis­sile.

Fire support, like all the other BOSs, is not perfect. and is most effective when it is correctly integrated and synchronized into the maneuver commander's concept of the operation. Remember, the maneuver com­mander owns the fire support plan just as surely as he owns the maneuver plan and the logistic support plan. Furthermore:

- Field Artillery does have a precision guided munition available to attack point targets - the M712 Copperhead. Although we will never have as many Copperheads available as we might wish. and it is not a fire-and-forget system. it does have the ca­pability to attack and destroy individual tar­gets (especially when they are high payoff targets).

The M 1 09A6 Paladin does not simply reduce the time threshold for em placing. ~xecuting a fire mission, and then displac­Ing; It changes those thresholds completely. M109A6-equipped FA battalions do not op­erate from traditional static firing positions. Instead, the Paladin platoon (which con­sists of four M109A6 howitzers operating in two, two-howitzer pairs and one M577A2 command track) moves continually in its position area and only stops to execute fire missions. Since the M109A6 takes far less time to emplace/displace. and fire missions are received and executed digitally, respon­siveness and timeliness are vastly in­creased. Additionally, survivability moves are not necessary as a separate act.

The employment of the FA battalions in the examples Major Morningstar gives, while probably true, are misleading and definitely not in keeping with current U.S. Army maneuver and fire support doctrine. Any FA battalion that fires continually for six minutes at its max range deserves to be acquired and destroyed, especially if an­other battalion was available to reinforce its fires but did not because it was out of range.

What should have happened is that as the Forward Security Element (FSE) en­tered the constricting terrain (as predicted by the S2, who made this area a Targeted Area of Interest or TAl), it came under the observation of the Brigade's Combat Ob­servation/Lasing Teams (COLTs). As the FSE reached the trigger point, the COLTs initiate a series of fire missions. Indirect fire lands on the FSE and an FA-delivered FASCAM minefield, which reinforces obsta­cles already emplaced by the engineers in the TAl, is emplaced. These serve to attrit, slow, and disorganize the FSE. As the FSE executes a hasty breach of this obstacle, intense indirect fire from bQth FA battalions (which were positioned so that the TAl was well within their 30,000 meter range) con-

tinues to hammer them in conjunction with direct fire from Javelin and M1A2-equipped skirmishers. The skirmishers, in conjunction with additional obstacles and continuing fires from the FA battalions and mortars continue to atlrit the FSE until it is de~ stroyed. As the Advanced Guard Main Body enters the constricting terrain, it can look forward to the same treatment, aug­mented by attacks from fixed and rotary wing CAS.

t grant that the above actions are easy to talk about. but are very difficult to achieve. However, if we expect to fight and win on the battlefield of the future, we have to im­prove our ability to integrate and synchro­nize all available weapons, and BOSs. Javelin is a wonderful system. but it cannot win by itself.

JEFFREY A. CUSHING MAJ, FA, CAARNG

Brigade FSO. 2nd Brigade 40 ID (M)

Too Much Digital Information Could Slow Operations, Not Help

Dear Sir:

It it great to see the "Issues in ARMOR" forum in place... and even Qetter to see that the first issue is one near and dear to me. I was a platoon leader along with Bob Krenzel in Al3-8 Cav for the M1A2 IOTE. I am now a Military Intelligence officer who still keeps up with new developments in ar­mor and maneuver doctrine.

One of the key issues that we will see come up with this new digital technology is that the dissemination of battlefield informa­tion and intelligence now has the ability to flow higher. lower. and to adjacent units with the push of a button. Imagery from a corps deep-look asset can be digitally sent to frontline battalions and soon, even pla­toons. Information from the critical battalion scout can be viewed by the division com­mander in near-real time. Information man­agement needs to be practiced and re­hearsed at all levels to keep only the nec­essary intelligence and information flowing. Commanders need to carefully develop Commander's Critical Information Require­ments (CCIR) and staffs need to pick Prior­ity Intelligence Requirements (PIR). Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR). and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) that support those CCIRs. These requirements need to be un­derstood at least two levels up and three levels down to assure that the vital informa­tion is pushed up ... and down. Lower eche­lon units (battalions) need to understand higher level collection techniques so they know what information can be pulled down. Staffs need to keep the commander's IVIS screen updated with what he needs ... not cluttered with nice-to-know information.

ARMOR - September-October 1996

With digital information transfer in practice at section and platoon level, our ability, as an army, to force a murderous OPTEMPO on the enemy may be constrained by users plugging the pipes with non vital information that will slow the decision-making cycle. Leaders at all levels must do their part in pulling and pushing the correct information up and down the digital pipes that feed our information-starved forces.

JAKE ROSE CPT,MI

National Guard Needs Ml A2s To Keep Up with Modernization

Dear Sir:

In reading everything I can get my hands on in reference to digitization, I am slapped in the face with the fact that the words "Army National Guard" cannot be found anywhere. It is true that National Guard magazine printed an article (Mar 96, "Lou­isiana Is Ready to Roll on the New M1A2") that suggested my battalion would be the first Guard unit to receive M1A2s. At the article's printing, a lobby effort was under­way to convince Congress to include $300 million in the FY97 budget for dedicated procurement of a battalion set of M1A2s for the Guard. Due to budget constraints and a desire by the HNSC to present a budget that they believed would fly they were already $10-$12 billion over the White House proposal - the lobby effort has dropped to one dedicated company's worth Of. -A2s. (While this is quite disappointing. it might not be a bad thing as it would show the reserve components how we would have to radically alter the way we train.)

The FUTURE must include us in the mix. Over and over again, I must repeat former Chief of Armor General Brown's words that " ... We cannot do another Desert Stor~ without the Guard's armor battalions .. : We must be able to interface with the active component if we are to fight alongside. While it would seem that a by-product of the lobby effort mentioned above is a reali· zation in Congress that 1,079 may not be enough, I argue that some Guard unit. somewhere, must start now with the M1A2 in order to find its sea legs. What is taking a daily effort of trial. error, retrial, success, etc., by the EXFOR at Ft. Hood will take even longer for the Guard to realize. While nearly every Guard leader drills more than just two days a month. all of those days not In th~ turret do nothing to add to teaching, learning. doing, and/or assessing curves.

One day, the M1A2 will be in our armory motor pools and MATES sites. It is much better that we start the process now, how-

Continued on Page 50

5

All great endeavors have one thing incommon: they were all built from theground up. Without firmly laid founda-tions, no accomplishment can stand thetest of time. The United States Army isno different. It was built from a well-organized plan, led by dedicated lead-ers of uncommon vision, and its great-est strength comes from the ground up— well-trained and highly-motivatedsoldiers.

Our soldiers are the best in the worldbecause our Army takes care of themfrom the ground up, with tough, realis-tic training, opportunities for advance-ment, skill and professional develop-ment, and quality support for them andtheir families. Make no mistake: Op-eration Desert Storm was not won byhigh technology or smart weapons. Itwas won by tough, smart soldiers, whoknew their equipment and fought withskill and bravery, because they knewthe Army would take care of them. Oursoldiers are the bone, the muscle, andthe lifeblood of our Army, and ourcountry — and it will never be anyother way.

Building from the ground up also de-scribes how our Army, and specificallythe Armor Force, must adapt to change.In the past, the Army was run from the“top down.”

Decisions were made at the top.Equipment was designed at the top. Or-ganizations were developed at the top.All this has changed now. Our soldiersand civilian employees are the bestquality we have ever had. We must usetheir input — from the ground up — to

keep the Armor Force leading changein the 21st Century.

In the past, new ideas often were de-veloped separately from their intendedusers because the gap in experienceand knowledge between users and de-signers was so great that it could not beeasily bridged. But today’s informationtechnology allows these two to workhand-in-hand. On the digitized battle-field, the increased access to informa-tion will not be used to concentratecontrol at the highest levels, but to em-power initiative by everyone in theforce to achieve decentralized execu-tion.

Passing information —and the abilityto use that information — down to thelowest levels, will help us win futurebattles. New combat vehicles, new in-formation transfer structures, new or-ganizations, and new doctrine cannotbe created by bureaucracies isolatedfrom the field. Instead, these thingsmust be created out of the experiencesand lessons learned by those who actu-ally use them everyday. That is whythe Army has invested in AdvancedWarfighting Experiments and the EX-FOR.

As warfare and technology change,the Army must accommodate thesechanges in creative ways that meet thereal needs of a changing world. TheArmor Force understands this conceptbecause it was born in response to ad-vances in mechanization, firepower,and communication. As our yellow,blue, and red insignia suggests, the Ar-mor Force was created from the combi-nation of tanks, infantry, and artillery

used in overwhelming, violent, and de-cisive actions on the battlefield.

Among its most important missions,the Armor Center has the requirementto unlock and then organize the geniusof our soldiers and junior leaders intosomething useful for the entire Army.For example, the Armor Center re-cently created Integrated ConceptTeams (ICTs) to chart out the FutureCombat System (Future Main BattleTank), future scout cavalry system(FSCS), and improvements in tank ar-maments and ammunition, as well asupgrades to the Abrams fleet.

These ICTs pulled together partici-pants from many different Army or-ganizations and disciplines to ensurethat the ideas and expertise of all con-cerned with the future of the mountedforce were focused in a manner consis-tent with today’s realities. It also was away to build the future from theground up.

We will use these same techniqueswhen developing new combat organi-zations, new doctrine, new trainingpackages, and new technologies. All ofthese will ensure that the equipment wegive our soldiers of the future will bethe best in the world. Creativity and in-novation are key ingredients to build-ing the future. Creativity and innova-tion from the entire force — not justfrom those at the top. It is, therefore,incumbent on all of us to think aboutthe future and to offer suggestions onhow to improve the mounted force.

ON THE WAY!

Building Victory From the Ground Up

MG Lon E. Maggart Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

6 ARMOR — September-October 1996

Since Fiscal Year 1990, we have seena 32 percent drawdown in the Armorenlisted force, from 26,112 to 17,742.As we continue to downsize, the re-sponsibility of leaders, to our missionsand our soldiers, will require us tomake sure we properly utilize the sol-diers under our control.

The first leader involved in this area,the unit command sergeant major, mustactively manage enlisted personnel as-signments within his unit. By thor-oughly screening records and being intune with the needs and missions of theunit, he can place soldiers in the bestpositions, both for their careers and thegood of the unit. However, the CSM isnot alone in this assignment process.

Commanders and first sergeants musttrack their personnel by MOS, assign-ing them to the proper paragraph andline number within the unit. All mem-bers of the chain of command must in-form their soldiers about staying on agood career track (See CMF 19 CareerDevelopment Model) and its impact on

a soldier’s promotion possibilities.Good soldiers must be given the oppor-tunity to compete for such prestigiousawards as the Soldier of theMonth/Year, Sergeant Morales andAudie Murphy Clubs, and the Excel-lence in Armor program (EIA). En-courage soldiers to take varied assign-ments, such as drill sergeant, recruiter,AC/RC duty, and instructor, just toname a few. Commanders must also beaware of the damage they can causewhen they keep soldiers in key, non-leadership positions within their organi-zation.

The master gunner position is a goodexample. This is a critical position thatmust be staffed by soldiers who arehighly motivated, extremely competent,and show the potential for advance-ment; in short, a soldier who is a cutabove the rest. But leaving a soldier inthat position too long, and not givinghim the chance to be a platoon ser-geant, will not only stagnate the sol-dier, but also hinder his promotion pos-

sibilities. Accomplish the mission, butnot at the expense of a soldier’s career.

The Armor Enlisted Professional De-velopment Guide provides the com-mander with 12 rules for Armor NCOprofessional development. The firstrule is “Work your soldiers in their Pri-mary MOS.” By keeping this rule inmind, we will properly utilize assignedsoldiers.

The guide also tells the soldier whathe must do to meet minimal standardsof branch qualification in each grade,and how to become eligible for thenext higher grade. The soldier mustalso play a key role in his own careerdevelopment. If he is misassigned, hemust inform the chain of command thatthe present assignment is not advanta-geous to his career. If he is in an un-authorized or invalid position, he musttake the appropriate steps to be re-leased and reassigned to a unit author-ized his MOS and grade. The soldiermust pay close attention to Item 35 onhis DA Form 2-1 and the job title on

the NCOER. Additionally, thejob that he is doing must matchwith the paragraph and linenumber on the DA Form 2A.The bottom line: the soldiermust seek out and excel in hardjobs to further his career.

Generally, the Armor commu-nity is doing a fine job utilizingArmor soldiers. As the Armycontinues to downsize, it is ourresponsibility as leaders to en-sure our soldiers receive thetraining and leadership positionsnecessary for career advance-ment. We must continue to chal-lenge our soldiers, properly util-ize them within our units, andgive them challenging and diver-sified assignments. The soldiertoo must be willing to seek hardjobs which hone his skills andprepare him to fight, if neces-sary, on any battlefield in theworld. Doing these things willensure a strong and viable Ar-mor Force and prepare our sol-diers for the XXIst Century.

DRIVER’S SEAT

Soldier Utilization: Mission and Men by CSM Ronnie W. Davis, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

ARMOR — September-October 1996 7

THE CENTER

RECOMMENDBATTLE STAFF NCO

AND/OR 1SG COURSE

CMF 19 CAREER DEVELOPMENT MODEL

INSTITUTIONAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT

OPERATIONAL LEADER DEVELOPMENT

LEADER SELF-DEVELOPMENT

INSTITUTIONALTRAINING

DUTYASSIGNMENT

RECOMMENDEDNCOES RELATED

COURSES

RECOMMENDEDREADING STD

RECOMMENDEDCMF RELATED

COURSESAND

ACTIVITIES

RECOMMENDEDCMF RELATEDCERTIFICATION

OR DEGREE

RANKSKILL LEVEL

PVT PFC SPC/CPLSKILL LEVEL 10

SGTSKILL LEVEL 20

SSGSKILL LEVEL 30

SFCSKILL LEVEL 40

MSG/1SG SGM/CSMSKILL LEVEL 50

OSUT PLDC BNCOC ANCOC SERGEANTSMAJOR COURSE

RECRUITER/RETENTION/DRILL SERGEANT/INSTRUCTOROPS/INTEL SERGEANT

LOADER/DVR GUNNER TANK COMMANDERPLATOON SGT FIRST SERGEANT

SCOUT/DVR GUNNER/SQUAD LDR SQUAD/SECTION LDR

PRIOR TO PLDC

1. ENGLISH COMP2. BASIC MATH3. COMPUTER LIT

PRIOR TO BNCOC

1. COMMUN SKILLS2. PERSONNEL SUPV3. BEHAV SCIENCE4. STRESS MGT

PRIOR TO ANCOC

1. PRINCIPLES OF MGT2. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV3. INFO MGT SYSTEMS4. TECHNICAL WRITING

PRIOR TO USASMA

1. RESEARCH TECH (STATS)2. HUMAN RESOURCE MGT

ACHIEVE ARMY WRITING STANDARD

10 10 10 10 12

SKILL LEVEL 10

1. ANTENNA/EXPED ANTENNAS (ACCP)2. PRINC OF AUTO ENGINES (ACCP)3. PRINC OF AUTO ELECTRICITY4. EFFECTIVE WRITING5. APPLY FOR EIA (MUST MEET STDS)

SKILL LEVEL 20

1. ARMY MAINT SYS (ACCP)2. MAINT OF M1 OR M3 (ACCP)3. MAINT MGT (ACCP)4. RECORDS MGT5. LAND NAV (ACCP)

SKILL LEVEL 30

1. MILITARY HISTORY2. RECOVERY VEH & CMPNTS (ACCP)3. RECOVERY FUND AND PROC (ACCP)4. NCO ROLE IN LDRSHP I&II (ACCP)5. INSTR METHODS6. INTERPER COMMUN7. COUNSELING TECH8. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS

SKILL LEVEL 40

1. FUNDAMENTAL OF OFFENSE (ACCP)2. TANK & MECH INF TASK FORCE (ACCP)3. FOUNDATIONS OF LDRSHP I-III (ACCP)4. ORGANIZATIONAL MGT5. INTERNATIONAL REL6. GROUP DYNAMICS

SKILL LEVEL 50

1. FOUNDATIONS OF LDRSHP IV-V (ACCP)2. LDRSHP & MGT3. PROBLEM SOLVING

AA/AS IN: INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES, APPLIED MANAGEMENT, GENERAL STUDIES, AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE

BY 15TH YEAR OF SERVICE

NOTES: * ARMY WRITING STANDARDS ARE OUTLINED IN DA PAM 60 0-67

MOS 19D

MOS 19K

FIGURE 8-1

New Smart Top Attack Weapons(STAWs) are rapidly emerging fromthe research world and entering the bat-tlefield, exposing our soldiers to a newthreat. We need to develop doctrine,tactics, and a training program to tellour soldiers how they can reduce theirvulnerability to this new family of anti-tank weapons.

The performance of the first-genera-tion STAWs is so impressive ---- andthe advances in STAW supporting sen-sor and computational technology sorapid ---- that we must act now to de-velop a doctrine which addresses thisthreat. To delay would virtually ensurethat American soldiers will face STAWsystems without the training andknowledge necessary to operate effec-tively in the STAW environment.

Emerging STAWs are highly mobile,deployable from a variety of platforms,deadly when striking intended targets,and are in the hands of potential enemyforces today. They are almost alwaysfired from extremely long ranges, orfrom sites which cannot be targetedwith direct-fire weapons. They searchfor armored targets from an optimumvantage point high above the battle-field, capitalize upon a range of mod-ern seeker types (visible, millimeterwave radar, infrared, acoustic, and la-ser) to find targets, and conductautonomous maneuver to attack therelatively thin top armor surfaces ofour vehicles, thus increasing their ef-fectiveness.

It is in this environment of a rapidlyemerging threat ---- probably moredeadly than any of the antitank guidedmissile systems fielded in the past twodecades ---- that triggers this call for an-other look at our doctrine, tactics, andtraining.

STAWs are attractive to Third Worldnations who do not have the financialresources or political advocacy to pro-cure advanced armored systems. TheSTAW offers an effective defenseagainst modern armor at a bargainprice. Top attack sidesteps the protec-tion value of the best modern armor,which is oriented toward defending the60-degree frontal arc of the vehicle,

and the STAWs’ down-looking seekersovercome attempts at camouflage. Be-cause of the small, portable nature ofmany STAW systems, they can be em-ployed relatively covertly, do not at-tract patrolling aircraft, and cannot beeasily seen by long range electronicsensor systems. Thus, STAWs offerThird World nations a 21st century an-titank system that is possibly more ef-fective than the easily obtained, ex-So-viet main battle tanks in the antiarmorrole.

Recent advances in the developmentof STAWs have resulted in their field-ing to (at least) two foreign armies.More than 50 non-U.S. STAW systemsare known to be under development.Additionally, several successful STAWsystems, in manufacture by foreign-owned aerospace and defense firms,are ‘‘for sale’’ on the open arms market.One Asian country is in the process ofproducing a low-cost STAW weaponspecifically developed for world-widesales. One analyst stated that ‘‘...Weshould expect to see at least 20 STAWsystems in the field within the next fiveyears.’’ So, it is virtually certain thatU.S. and Allied forces will encounterSTAW systems on the battlefield.

In the winter of 1993, a STAW For-eign Military Evaluation program wasundertaken by the Foreign Intelligence,Science and Technology (FSTC) Labo-ratory, the Army Armament Research,

Development, and Engineering Center(ARDEC), and the Army MaterielCommand, Smart Weapons Manage-ment Office (AMC-SWMO). Twoweapons were purchased: the British-manufactured MERLIN millimeterwave-guided 81mm mortar, and theSwedish STRIX 120mm infrared-guided mortar. These two weapon sys-tems were matched against M60 targettanks to examine their performanceagainst moving and stationary armoredvehicles. A total of nine STAWs werefired under a variety of environmentalconditions. Of these, five found theirintended targets and either damaged ordestroyed them.

While both weapon types managed tohit targets, the infrared 120mm mortarwas especially effective. Its thermal-en-

STAWs: New Threat from Above

Smart Top Attack Weaponsby Lieutenant Colonel James H. Boschma, U.S. Army (Ret.)

8 ARMOR ---- September-October 1996

Typical IR signature ofarmor as seen fromthe STAW’s vantage.

hanced warhead easily penetrated theM60’s topside armor. It then penetratedand exited through the floor of thetank. Its over-pressure and fragmenta-tion performance inside the tank ap-peared lethal to the crew, and possiblythe vehicle. It can be fired from reverseslope positions up to seven kilometersfrom its intended target, and its abilityto detect and strike armor was clearlyevident during the Eglin tests.

Of major concern is the combinationof viewing geometry, and sensing spec-trum (typically IR or MMW) that isachieved by STAW weapons. Thesetwo factors serve to negate, or at leastsubstantially dilute, many years of re-search and lessons learned concerningthe management of visible signaturesof armored vehicles. Battlefield STAWsrequire new thinking about vehicle sig-natures and countermeasures againsttop attack targeting sensors.

The STAW realities require develop-ment of a strategy for operations in thisnew top attack environment. U.S.forces have never been subjected toSTAW attack, and we have thus con-centrated our doctrine and tactics de-velopment, as well as our countermea-sure developments, upon threats pre-viously encountered. Our generalthought process has always been toconcentrate upon the capabilities theenemy has widely deployed today, notupon those he may display tomorrow.History is replete with examples ofmilitary disaster facilitated by suchthought, such as the fate of the Israeli2nd Armored Brigade, which fell toEgyptian Saggers, or the ‘‘FokkerScourge’’ of WWI, where German ma-chine guns firing though propellersdecimated Allied aviation for nearly ayear. Today, the computer age is uponus, and technology is moving forward

at an unprecedented pace. The rate oftechnological development demandsthat we aggressively look forward atthe emerging threat, and define a doc-trine which addresses not only the lastbattle, but both the last and our visionof the next. These words are not meantto downplay the need for conventionaldefenses, but rather to emphasize theneed for serious consideration ofemerging threat technology as part ofevery design, tactic, training, and doc-trinal development. The STAW is onethreat that we cannot afford to relegateto the status of ‘‘insignificant.’’ Wishingit away will not make it go away.

There is much to be done, and delayis not acceptable: delay may well bemeasured in American lives. We mustdevelop a fuller understanding of whatthe STAW sees as it looks down uponour forces, and then develop tactics thatwe impart to our troops to reduce theirvulnerability. Techniques and proce-dures to reduce STAW vulnerabilitycan be developed at low cost, in con-junction with training and testing al-ready underway. We have the tools tocollect the information needed, and theexpertise to convert observations to alist of actions that support our war-fighters. TRADOC can then developthe doctrine, tactics, and training pro-grams needed to impart this knowledgeto individual soldiers and reduce thesignificance of the STAW threat.

Simultaneously, the Research and De-velopment (R&D) community mustcontinue to advance technologieswhich offer STAW countermeasures.Countermeasures may range from coat-ings to reduce our emitted and reflectedsignatures, to decoys which can drawthe STAW’s fire, to active countermea-sure technologies which can impair orkill the STAWs before they hit our ve-

hicles. These approaches need to befound, nurtured and then fielded. Be-cause the foreign STAWs are in theprocess of being fielded, we need tomove forward very rapidly in these en-deavors.

There must be a renewed level of in-terest in the emerging STAW threat,and rapid development, especially ofdoctrine and training programs, to re-duce the effects of STAWs on the bat-tlefield. I emphasize the first step (doc-trine, tactics, and training) becausethese are areas that can be addressednow, versus the materiel developmentcycle, which usually takes many yearsto deliver countermeasures. Those ofyou at the service schools, battle labs,and within TRADOC must become ac-tive players in the early assessment ofthe STAW threat.

The development community needsto review the progress of foreignSTAWs, and then establish prioritieswhich will provide our forces with thebest countermeasures technology canyield. Do it soon; otherwise, the re-quirement may be accentuated inAmerican blood after the next battle.

If we, the soldiers, scientists, and Armymanagers, can agree on the STAW dan-ger, prioritize its importance, and movetogether to develop doctrine, tactics,training, and technology, our forces canovercome this new threat. We can thenadvance into the new century with theknowledge that our front line troopshave all the tools needed for survivaland effectiveness in combat, and thatour combat power is second to none.

Typical STAW attack scenario.

ARMOR ---- September-October 1996 9

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.)James H. Boschma departedactive duty with the U.S. Armyin 1988. During his military ca-reer, he served as a cavalrytroop commander with the 3rdArmored Cavalry, a staff officeron an armored brigade staff,two combat tours in Vietnam asan aviator, and then ten yearsin weapons R&D assignments.He is currently the technical di-rector for BOSCH Aerospace,Inc., a defense research firm in-volved in weapons testing andthe development of unmannedreconnaissance systems, lo-cated in Huntsville, Ala.

As a result of the Russian Army’smauling at the hands of the Chechenrebels — particularly the disastrous as-sault on Grozny on 31 December 1994,the Kremlin made a shocking admis-sion of shortcomings at a televised sci-entific-technical conference at Kubinkaon 20 February 1995.

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ad-mitted that unnecessary casualties weresustained due to the T-80Y’s vulner-abilities: short range, flammable fueland ammunition stowage, thin uppersurface armor.

Bitten by their own RPGs, the Rus-sians have developed a defensive coun-termeasure that solves some of thetechnological problems addressed atKubinka.

The Arena Active Protection System,developed at the Kolomna-based Engi-neering Design Bureau, is designed toprovide protection from antitank gre-nades and ATGMs, including thosewith top-attack warheads. Arena isforeseen as useful, both on battlefieldswhere the latest generation of 3-8 kmATGMs prevail and during peacekeep-ing operations and LICs, where thegreatest threats are from light antitankweapons.

Arena includes three major subassem-blies. Inside the turret, and taking upabout 30m3, is the target detection andtracking equipment (computer, TC’scontrol panel, command signals con-vertor unit).

The radar itself is fitted to a‘Kladivo’-style folding radar mast,mounted on the centerline at the rear ofthe turret roof. The octagonal radarpanel assembly is fairly large, approxi-mately 1.5m3.

Launchers, which the makers call ‘si-los,’ are mounted around the turret,

reminiscent of the BDD ‘Horse Shoe’armor. They provide a 110-degree arcof protection, centered on the gun tube(Russian reactive armor kits weigh thesame as an active kit, but only cover a35-40 degree arc). The system has 22to 26 rounds, depending upon the typeof tank, which are mounted so that theyprovide overlapping ‘fields of fire.’ Un-like reactive armor, an expended roundwill not leave a hole in the defensivecurtain.

The silos are armored against splin-ters and bullets to prevent accidentaldetonation of the rounds. The whole 27V system weighs 1,000-1,100 kg andconsumes 1 kW of power.

The description of the system in usesounds fairly simple. Prior to entering ahostile area, the TC turns the systemon. Arena automatically tracks incom-ing rounds, ignoring incoming roundsuntil they’re within 50m, then engaginganything approaching at speeds of 70-700 m/s. False targets, such as outgo-ing rounds, near misses, birds, smallprojectiles (like bullets or splinters)would be ignored.

When fired, the round detonates thewarhead at a stand-off distance of afew meters, so that the double-chargeATGM warheads designed to defeat re-active armor are rendered impotent.Time to detect and destroy a threat is.07 sec, with .2 to .4 sec for the systemto reset. The danger zone for accompa-nying infantry is 20-30m.

If necessary, the TC can manuallyoverride and fire the system. The num-ber of remaining rounds are displayedon the TC’s control panel. The roundsare rectangular and reloadable by thecrew.

The Arena system, which can be fit-ted to new production tanks as well as

existing ones scheduled for rebuilds, isexpected to double the tanks’ surviv-ability during assaults and reducelosses from 1.5 to 1.7 times.

Arena-fitted tanks are not supposed tocreate electromagnetic interferencewhile working with other tanks. Themanufacturers also claim that the sys-tem is extremely immune to ECM.

Support for the system has also beenaddressed by the manufacturer. Subsys-tems are modular and can be pulled forfast replacement. Test and controlequipment is mounted on a cross-coun-try capable truck, for forward mainte-nance.

Like the T-90, this system may not befielded in substantial numbers withRussian forces for some time, due tobudgetary constraints.

References:

“ARENA: Active Protection System ForTanks,” V. Kashin, Military Parade, May-June1996, pp. 32-35.

Learning From Their Mistakes:

Russia’s Arena Active Protection Systemby First Lieutenant Adam Geibel

10 ARMOR — September-October 1996

First Lieutenant Adam Geibelis a tank platoon leader with5/117th Cav, 42d ID, NJARNG.He is also the Assistant Editorof Journal of Military Ordnanceand a journalism graduate stu-dent at Temple University. Hislast contribution to ARMORwas a chronicle of the Che-chen Revolution (January-Feb-ruary 1995).

As the U.S. Army rapidly transformsitself into the decisive force of the 21stcentury, the requirement for speciallyorganized, trained, and equipped cav-alry forces must be re-evaluated andstated. While some suggest that cavalryforces are no longer needed in an eraof electronic sensors and battlefield in-formation technologies, our Force XXIdevelopmental efforts to date indicatethe opposite — a dedicated, specializedcavalry force, enabled by new systems,is paramount to fighting and operatingwithin this new strategic environment.This article lays the foundation for thecontinued evolution of cavalry as the“eyes and ears” of the combined armsteam.

A Fundamental Role

As a start point, the role of cavalryneeds to be restated, given the new op-erational conditions within which wewill fight in the 21st century. We be-lieve that the importance of cavalry op-erations to provide security and con-duct reconnaissance in Force XXI willdramatically increase. Cavalry isuniquely capable of providing the deci-sive force commander the assuredmeans to gain information, secure theforce, and control battlefield temponecessary to concentrate overwhelmingcombat power against the enemy at de-cisive times and places.

As an enabling capability of theArmy’s new capstone doctrine on in-formation operations (FM 100-6), cav-alry forces will be tasked to signifi-cantly enhance the decisive force com-mander’s ability to set conditions forsuccess.

The ability for the combined armsforce of Force XXI to achieve simulta-

neity and depth will be based on thesuccess of cavalry operations. Cavalryprovides a critical maneuver capabilityto larger forces conducting deep and si-multaneous attacks. To rapidly defeatthe enemy, commanders will employcavalry to set favorable conditions formaneuver by gathering information andshaping the battle space. In this con-text, maneuver is used to attack the en-emy’s vulnerabilities, such as flanks,rear, lines of communication, logistics,and combat support capabilities. Tacti-cal commanders in the future will needan unprecedented, high degree of situ-ational awareness to protect their forcesand successfully maneuver. This aware-ness is acquired by reducing uncertain-ties on the battlefield through aggres-sive security and reconnaissance opera-tions by digitally equipped cavalryunits.

Information Age Warfare:Key Assumptions

The Armor Center, in concert withour TRADOC partners and the Experi-mental Force (EXFOR), have per-formed extensive work to define futureoperating conditions and concepts forForce XXI and beyond. From this ef-fort, key assumptions relevant to therole of Cavalry in Force XXI haveemerged that shape our thinking:

• Reconnaissance and security tasksrequire specialized organizations,equipment, and training.

• Battlefield information collectionand force protection are assured ca-pabilities that tactical commandersmust possess organic to their force.

• Tactical commanders require inde-pendent maneuver forces to shape

the battlespace and facilitate move-ment of the striking force.

• Tactical commanders will requireaccurate, manned, real-time infor-mation that can be gained in allweather, terrain, and varying de-grees of enemy threat to supple-ment and verify information gainedby other sources.

• Tactical units will be required tofight for information and expandthe battlespace in space, time, andpurpose without the expenditure ofcombat power from the decisiveforce.

Future Battlefield Requirements

Success in Force XXl operations willrequire unique capabilities which onlycavalry units possess and can employfor the decisive force commander. Withdigital systems, cavalry units will pro-vide information with unprecedentedlevels of timeliness, accuracy, and re-dundancy. Cavalry’s ability to provideconfirmation for other information sen-sors, as well as to provide security forthe decisive force, allows cavalryforces to fulfill vital battlefield require-ments for the commander.

Provide Time and Space to Regu-late Tempo. Tactical commanders willthink and plan in terms of battlespace.Cavalry units will operate to continu-ally expand the battlespace, which inturn provides more time and space forthe commander to assess the situation,determine courses of action, and takeaction. Security operations will delayenemy movements and deny or deceiveforce information to the enemy, ensur-ing reaction time for any necessary fol-low-up actions. Further, cavalry pos-sesses the lethality to destroy enemy

ARMOR — September-October 1996 11

Cavalry In Force XXI

by Major General Lon E. Maggart

Photo by Greg Stewart

reconnaissance and security elements,which is essential to setting the condi-tions to gain information dominanceprior to engaging the enemy.

Obtain Current Information. In thefuture, tactical commanders will have awide variety of digital information as-sets available. However, the ability touse these systems may decrease oncontact with the enemy. As a result, theforce commander relies primarily onhis cavalry to provide him the informa-tion that he needs to fight current en-gagements. Information gathering canthen be focused on collecting informa-tion the commander will need in sub-sequent actions, or in other physical ar-eas of the battlefield. Technical andprocedural connectivity between cav-alry forces and other units employingjoint and Army reconnaissance, surveil-lance, and target acquisition systems isimperative to the effective integrationof all information functions supportingthe commander. Thus, cavalry collects,confirms, and interprets real-time bat-tlefield information, wholly dedicatedto the tactical commander’s needs, andfills gaps left by other intelligence as-sets.

Preserve Combat Power. Sustainingand preserving the combat power of asmaller force will be critical to winningin the future. Cavalry units possess suf-ficient combat power to serve in aneconomy-of-force role. Cavalry units,when performing security operations(screen, guard, cover), protect the deci-sive force from prematurely engagingthe enemy, thus preserving combatpower and retaining freedom of ma-neuver. Furthermore, cavalry units ex-ponentially increase the effectivenessof their parent organizations. For exam-ple, in many instances, a divisionalcavalry squadron is the equivalent ofanother maneuver brigade to the divi-sion commander because it frees a bri-gade for use in other places, or relievesit of duties it would otherwise have toperform.

Facilitate Movement. We posit thefuture battlefield to possess non-linearor non-contiguous relationships amongfriendly and enemy forces. This condi-tion places a premium on the ability tocommand and control unit movements.Operating within such a fluid environ-ment will demand rapid establishment

and security of lines of communica-tions between widely dispersed units.Enabling the decisive force to executecontinuous movement will require se-curity and support of highly mobilecavalry forces.

Support Area Operations. The fluidnature of future combat also increasesthe criticality of locating and securingsupport areas. This requires allocatingassets to establish and retain their use.Future adversaries may also be capableof attacking throughout the depth of thebattlefield. Thus, support areas and ourdecisive force may be engaged simulta-neously. While other capabilities existto secure these areas, the versatile na-ture of cavalry units makes them suit-able to perform critical reconnaissanceand security tasks of support areaswhen required. These tasks may in-clude several of the base reconnais-sance missions (route, area, or zone),area damage control, restoring com-mand and control, guiding movementof forces, and combat escort.

Cavalry and Force XXI:Patterns of Operations

The Force XXI operational conceptcenters around six patterns of operationthat provide a conceptual frameworkthat enable us to think about and de-velop future warfighting capabilities.We firmly believe that cavalry forcesare fully suited to perform tasks andfunctions within all of these patterns. Abrief description of the versatile natureof cavalry follows.

Project the Force. Cavalry isuniquely organized as a self-contained,combined arms force suitable for earlyentry into a theater of operation to ex-pand lodgments, and set the stage forease of entry of the decisive force.Cavalry can also conduct combat op-erations directly from the port of debar-kation upon arrival, also setting favor-able conditions for the arrival and em-ployment of decisive forces.

Protect the Force. Cavalry will per-form critical force protection activitiesfor the decisive force. The performanceof security and reconnaissance mis-sions will be essential in providingearly warning of enemy dispositions,capabilities, and activities. Moreover,

cavalry units will be capable of physi-cally guarding friendly forces from en-emy contact, as well as providing thereal-time information needed to effec-tively employ passive security meas-ures to further protect the force.

Gain Information Dominance.Gaining and denying information hasbeen, and remains, cavalry’s core capa-bility. Cavalry forces are capable ofemploying active measures to gain in-formation in all weather, terrain, andvarying threat conditions. Whetherthrough raids or active security meas-ures, cavalry can seek out and destroythe enemy’s capability to gain informa-tion. Cavalry is a dedicated force thataugments, supplements, and verifies in-formation collected throughout the in-formation build-up period. It provideslarge-scale human intelligence that canonly be gained through close contactwith the enemy — validating the pre-dictive analysis of threat intentions andcapabilities. The performance of force-oriented reconnaissance will enable thedecisive force commander to focus hiscavalry on finding and staying withspecific enemy forces, wherever theymay maneuver on the battlefield. Thecavalry force performing force-orientedreconnaissance will provide the up-dated information needed to set condi-tions and conduct decisive attacks uponthe enemy from positions in depth. Thedynamic and fluid nature of this type ofoperation will rely minimally on ter-rain-oriented control measures andmaximize the use of situational aware-ness gained by digitization of the cav-alry force.

Additionally, cavalry performs terrainreconnaissance and verifies mobilitydata bases prior to the commitment ofthe decisive force. This allows thecommander to fill in the gaps in terraindata and to identify environmentalchanges due to natural and man-madefactors over time.

Shape the Battlespace. The cavalryforce will be operating to shape thecommander’s battlespace in order to setthe conditions for decisive operations.Cavalry can perform a multitude oftasks to alter the tempo and disposi-tions of the enemy, such as forcing theenemy to expend resources by havingto cope with multiple threats simultane-

12 ARMOR — September-October 1996

ously. Cavalry can identify the enemy’scapabilities and intentions in real-timeby observing enemy reactions tofriendly contact. Only an armed ma-neuver unit can delay a force and makeit show intent. Cavalry will operate todeceive the enemy as to the decisiveforce’s intentions.

Decisive Operations. Cavalry’s mainfunction is to support the maneuver ofthe decisive force. It accomplishes thisby controlling the tempo of operations— by destroying enemy information orsecurity forces and allowing the deci-sive force to attack the enemy unhin-dered. Cavalry is uniquely capable ofperforming real-time battle damage as-sessment that allows the decisive forcecommander to re-orient combat powerto finish the fight or exploit battlefieldopportunities. Cavalry must also locateand maintain contact with the enemy;as the decisive force attacks in depthsimultaneously, enemy forces will relo-cate to meet friendly forces. Cavalryprovides the commander with real-timeinformation on changing enemy dispo-sitions. Cavalry can also secure criticalfriendly assets, such as logistical units,command and control nodes, and intel-ligence facilities. Additionally, cavalrycan operate independently of the deci-sive force to perform economy-of-forceoperations that allow the commander toallocate more relative combat power atcritical and decisive points.

Sustain and Transition to FutureOperations. Cavalry provides securityso the decisive force can transition be-tween missions and reorganize for fu-ture operations unhindered by enemyforces. It can survey and secure lines ofcommunications and sustainment areaswhile the decisive force conducts re-supply. During post-conflict operations,cavalry units are ideally suited to per-form activities such as separatingforces and controlling buffer zones im-mediately upon cessation of hostilities.

Organizing the Cavalry ForceFor Force XXI

Clearly, for Cavalry to fulfill the rolesand missions described in this opera-tional concept will require changethrough modernization of current or-ganizations and equipment. To supportour efforts, we have established some

broad precepts that guide our future or-ganizational and materiel develop-ments.

Cavalry or reconnaissance forcesmust be organic to all major warfight-ing echelons, from battalion to corps— and must be organized as combinedarms teams. Cavalry units exponen-tially increase the effectiveness of theirparent organization.

Further, they must maneuver fasterthan the decisive force they support.This mobility differential is gained bythe synergistic effects of air and groundcavalry units working together.

Future cavalry units must also havegreater operational endurance than thedecisive force. Organized as self-con-tained units possessing organic combatsupport and logistics, cavalry unitsmust be capable of operating for 72 to96 hours without external support.

Lastly, cavalry units must be capableof performing multiple missions in a si-multaneous fashion in order to set con-

ditions desired by the decisive forcecommander. These characteristics aresome of the design principles for guid-ing the development of cavalry unitsfor the future.

ConclusionWhile much work remains to be per-

formed, it is clear that cavalry is an es-sential warfighting capability for ForceXXI. New operational conditionscaused by non-contiguous operations,new warfighting doctrine, new techni-cal capabilities, and diverse threats in-crease the value of cavalry. The sol-diers and leaders of cavalry units willoperate in the face of the enemy togain information, shape the battlespace,secure friendly forces, and set condi-tions for decisive maneuver throughoutthe depth of the battlefield. Armed withthe best equipment in the world,trained to fight, and led by aggressive,competent leaders, cavalry will con-tinue its long tradition of leadingAmerica’s Army into battle well intothe 21st Century.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 13

“Clearly, for Cavalry to fulfill the roles and missions described in thisoperational concept will require change through modernization of currentorganizations and equipment.”

Fort Knox Cavalry Branch Will Host Reconnaissance Symposium in October

Fort Knox Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (CavalryBranch) is hosting a Reconnaissance Symposium from 28-31 October 1996.The focus of the symposium is on the planning and execution of reconnais-sance operations at the tactical level. The purpose of the symposium is toassemble all organizations in one location and discuss issues pertinent toreconnaissance operations and to provide recommendations in accordanceto those issues. The tentative schedule is as follows:

Day One - In Processing (Gaffey Hall) and No Host Social (Brick Mess)

Day Two - Large Group Seminar (Gaffey Hall)

Day Three - Small Group Discussion (Boudinot Hall)

Day Four - Small Group Presentations (Gaffey Hall)

All TRADOC installations will be invited to participate as well as repre-sentatives from active duty and reserve component divisions and regiments.Fort Knox needs participation from outstanding professionals from the fieldand various organizations in order to have a successful and productive sym-posium.

Information regarding the symposium can be obtained on the internet viathe Cavalry Branch Web site at http://www.awwg.org/~dave/cavdiv.htm. TheFort Knox point of contact is CPT Vic Harris, DSN 464-3154/5576 or com-mercial (502) 624-3154/5576. PROFS: CAVBRANC@knox-emh1.army.mil.

The name “Custer” usually brings tomind a variety of images, ranging fromthe brave commander surrounded on ahill in southern Montana, fighting offhordes of Indians, to an egotistical mar-tinet leading his troops to disaster.Many people view Custer on the basisof Hollywood impressions. Unfortu-nately, this narrow perspective of theentire Indian Wars experience, and thatof the U.S. Army in the West, is basedupon the Little Bighorn battle foughton 25 June 1876.

There is much more to the Plains In-dians Wars than the short battle thattook place over the span of a couple ofhours on the Little Bighorn at LastStand Hill. Numerous parallels exist inthe small, regular Army of the IndianWars period to the “downsized” Armyof today as it searches for new roles ina post-Cold War environment. Thismakes the staff ride not only interest-ing, but applicable in a number of re-spects to situations currently facing theArmy.

The Combat Studies Institute of theU.S. Army’s Command and GeneralStaff College frequently conducts staffrides to Wyoming and Montana to putCuster and tactical actions at the LittleBighorn into their proper context.Originally developed by Dr. GlennRobertson and the Staff Ride Commit-tee, the Indian Wars staff ride coversseveral significant events leading to theLittle Bighorn battle. Additionally, Dr.Jerold Brown of the Combat StudiesInstitute teaches the elective, “IrregularWarfare” which uses the Indian Warsstaff ride as the basis of study. Dr.Brown has conducted about 20 IndianWars staff rides.

In terms of complexity, the IndianWars staff ride has been one of themost difficult to develop, due to thetime-distance factors and the coordina-

tion necessary with numerous agenciesand individuals to gain access to thelands over which the school conductsthe staff ride. Unlike some of its CivilWar counterpart rides, the Indian Warsstaff ride covers an area encompassinga couple of hundred square miles.Whereas the Civil War staff rides arenormally conducted on one major na-tional or state park and adjoining landaccessible to the public, the IndianWars staff ride covers locations that in-clude private and corporate lands, aswell as state and national parks. Theamount of coordination involved re-quires good relations between the land-owners and the staff ride committee inorder to maintain access.

The purpose of the staff ride is not toconduct battlefield tours, but to link“...a historical event, systematic pre-liminary study, and actual terrain toproduce battle analysis in three dimen-sions.”1 In this regard, staff ride partici-pants are prepared for the exercise byself study, classes, and briefings.

The overall importance of the exer-cise is the integration of the lessonslearned to current doctrine and opera-tions. Significantly, there are many les-sons involving the human dimensionsof war and the dynamics of battlewhich are timeless and can relate toconflicts today. In today’s strategic situ-ation, reduced force structure and non-conventional missions pose issues thatare analogous to those the U.S. Armyfaced on the western frontier from

1866-1890. These are just a few of thereasons for conducting the staff ride.

The Indians Wars staff ride is nor-mally conducted over a three-day pe-riod. It begins in Wyoming, along theold Bozeman Trail which runs fromWyoming into Montana. The BozemanTrail was developed during the CivilWar, and by 1865, there were enoughsettlers and miners using the trail towarrant Army protection, even thoughthe trail cut through designated Indianhunting lands confirmed by treaty. FortPhil Kearny was one of three forts builtalong the Bozeman Trail to protect set-tlers and miners attempting to shortcutthe route to the western Montana goldfields.

During the immediate post-Civil Warperiod, the large number of settlersmoving westward increasingly clashedwith the Indians. The U.S. Army wascaught in a dilemma of enforcing treatyland provisions granted to the Indiansand protecting the settlers who oftenviolated the treaty provisions.

Complicating the situation was the is-sue of the Indians, who also violatedthe treaty land provisions to hunt orraid outside artificial geographicboundaries they did not always recog-nize. Additionally, the Indians were nota monolithic entity with a centralizedgovernment. Even different clanswithin tribes did not feel compelled toobey treaties signed by fellow chiefs.This fact continuously caused conster-nation and confusion with Army com-

14 ARMOR — September-October 1996

The Indian Wars Staff Rideby Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr.

Students ride horses during parts of the three-day staff ride.

manders, who were used to fighting aconventional enemy with defined linesof authority and chains of command.

This was the situation brevet MajorGeneral and regular Army LieutenantColonel George A. Custer and hisnewly formed 7th Cavalry found them-selves in. Over a period of ten years,from 1866-76, the 7th Cavalry wasspread across the United States and In-dian territories trying to perform a vari-ety of missions, to include occupationduty in the South, as well as garrisonduties in the West. Within a short three-day period, the staff ride draws to-gether the issues facing the Army in itsconflict with the Plains Indians, show-ing how it adapted from conventionalwarfare to fighting irregular warfarewith varying results.

Beginning with the post-Civil WarArmy of 1866, the staff ride concen-trates on the background and eventswhich eventually led to the destructionof five companies of the Seventh Cav-alry under Custer’s command ten yearslater. Critical to the analysis of whathappened to Custer is the historicalcontext of the campaign of 1876. Un-derstanding the cause and effect rela-tionships is key to proper critical analy-sis of the conduct of the Indian Wars

by the U.S. Army, especially battlessuch as the Little Bighorn. Most impor-tant is an understanding of the individ-ual battles taken in respect to the entireconflict in an operational and strategiccontext, not in isolation.

Staff Ride Day 1

21 December 1866/2 August 1867

The first stop on the staff ride is FortPhil Kearny, now a state park. In 1866,Colonel Henry Carrington and the 18thInfantry Regiment were ordered to gar-rison posts along the Bozeman Trail,running northwest from central Wyo-ming along the base of the BighornMountains into Montana. During thesummer of 1866, Carrington moved hisregiment into Indian territory and builtthree posts running in a string northfrom Fort Laramie to a point west ofpresent day Billings, Montana.

Fort Reno (no relation to Major Mar-cus Reno, 7th Cavalry) was garrisonedwith companies of the 18th Infantry,while the balance of the regimentmoved on to establish Fort Phil Kearnyjust south of present day Sheridan,Wyoming. Carrington chose Fort PhilKearny for his regimental headquartersand sent another couple of companies

further north to establish Fort C.F.Smith.

The importance of Fort Phil Kearnyis evident in the events that occurredalong the Bozeman Trail in 1866 and1867. The staff ride uses these eventsto put into context further study of thePlains Indian conflicts for the next tenyears, leading to the battle at the LittleBighorn. The significant actions whichtook place in conjunction with FortPhil Kearny include the Fetterman“Massacre” on 21 December 1866 andthe Wagon Box Fight which took placeon 2 August 1867. The first was a dis-aster for the Army and the second avictory.2

After studying the establishment ofthe fort and its activities during the lat-ter part of 1866, the staff ride partici-pants move to a point along the Boze-man Trail about three miles north ofthe fort. It was here that Captain JamesFetterman and his 80-man command,consisting primarily of elements ofCompanies A, C, and H, 18th Infantry,and Company C, 2nd Cavalry, were an-nihilated by a force of about 1,200Cheyenne and Sioux Indians gatheredby Chief Red Cloud.2

Some of the issues examined includetroop training, leadership, the effects of

ARMOR — September-October 1996 15

technology, the effects of terrain, theIndians and their tactics, and the prob-lems with the tactical deployment ofthe force under Fetterman. Under-standing these factors helps understandwhy Fetterman’s force was wiped out.The staff riders then transition to thesurvivors of the disaster and their ac-tions seven months later.

The staff riders move to the locationof the “Pinery,” where trees were har-vested for use at the fort. Only a coupleof miles west of the Fetterman engage-ment site, and situated on the lowerslopes of the Bighorn Mountains, thePinery was the site of an engagementimmortalized on one of the “Army inAction” series prints commonly seen inmany barracks. In this action, CaptainJames Powell, with many of the samesoldiers remaining at Fort Phil Kearnyafter the Fetterman engagement, de-feated a greatly superior force of Indians.

During the interim between the Fet-terman engagement and the WagonBox Fight, the 18th Infantry units atFort Phil Kearny were reflagged andrearmed.3 Now the 27th Infantry, Pow-ell commanded a company armed withnewly issued Allin conversion, breech-loading rifles. Unlike Fetterman’s in-fantrymen, who were fighting withmuzzleloading Civil War leftovers,Powell’s soldiers were armed with ri-fles converted to fire metallic car-tridges.

The contrast between the two engage-ments is an outstanding lesson in howtechnology, organization, and the tacti-cal situation can radically alter battle-field outcomes in a very short period oftime. Both units were severely outnum-bered. The Fetterman fight was charac-terized, however, by an ad hoc unitcaught in the open with out-of-dateweapons, and destroyed in detail. Pow-ell’s fight was characterized by a rela-tively cohesive unit, armed withbreech-loading weapons and fightingfrom a protected defensive position.

The visit to the Wagon Box Fight siteconcludes the field portion of the firstday of the staff ride. During dinner, thestaff riders normally conduct prepara-tions for the next day. This includesbriefings and discussions to transitionthe group to the 1876 campaign. Thebriefings cover the intervening yearsbetween 1866 and 1876 and the con-cept of the campaign plan envisionedby General Philip H. Sheridan.

The second day of the staff ride isconducted in Montana, at the Rosebudbattlefield. This battle, which tookplace a week prior to the Little Big-horn, is put into its proper perspectiveby describing the forces involved, thecommand and control structure, and theconcept of the operations from GeneralGeorge Crook’s view. Because theRosebud battlefield is fairly compactand relatively accessible, units conduct-ing the staff ride may elect to bemounted on horseback. Local cavalryreenactors lease horses equipped withMcClellan saddles, which give anadded air of authenticity to what waslargely a cavalry and mounted infantrybattle.

Units under the command of GeneralCrook, the renowned Indian fighter,moved as one of three columns orderedby Sheridan to converge on the Indiansin the Unceded Territories in order toforce them back onto the reservationsin accordance with treaty provisions.Crook’s column was the southernmost,originating from Fort Fetterman in thespring of 1876. Two other columns,one under Colonel John Gibbon in thenorthwest, and one under General Al-fred H. Terry, in the east, were to oper-ate in cooperation with each other inorder to corner and subdue the hostiletribes.

Custer and the 7th Cavalry were themajor subordinate combat componentof General Terry’s column, and there-fore only one portion of a number ofunits participating in the campaign.Under Sheridan’s proposed concept, the

three major columns would convergesomewhere in the area between theirgarrisons in the Unceded Territories tocause the Indians to face one of thelargest Army forces fielded on thewestern plains to that date. The desiredresult would be the defeat of the hostiletribes and their return to the reserva-tions. The overwhelming Army forceswould assure compliance.

The Rosebud battle offers excellentlessons on synchronization, commandand control, reconnaissance, intelli-gence, and security. The battlefield ridecovers about 5.5 to 6 miles of the ter-rain and begins and ends near GeneralCrook’s first CP. Crook’s column con-

sisted of companies of the 2nd and 3rdCavalry and 4th and 9th Infantry Regi-ments.4 In terms of the number of par-ticipants, this battle was not very sig-nificant. For those veterans of the CivilWar, the battle would have been classi-fied as a minor engagement. To put itinto perspective, the battlefield coversapproximately the same area as the bat-tle of Chickamauga. But at Chicka-mauga, each side fielded more than60,000 men each. At the battle at theRosebud, each side numbered onlyabout 1,000 men and lasted only aboutsix hours, as opposed to several days.

16 ARMOR — September-October 1996

The Fetterman Monument, near Fort PhilKearny, Wyoming.

Retired Major Rod Cooley, dressed as a1876-era bugler, adds authenticity to theRosebud Battlefield visit. He is a memberof the U.S. Horse Cavalry Association.

The battle, which took place on June17, 1876, progressed in a northerly di-rection uphill from the Rosebud valleywhere Crook’s command had halted fora rest. Surprised in a position whichcould best be described as an adminis-trative halt, Crook had to deployquickly and attempt to regain the initia-tive. The infantry began to fight dis-mounted under their commander, Ma-jor Alexander Chambers, having beenmounted on mules the day before in or-der to increase their mobility. The cav-alry was ordered to resaddle, form, andtake the high ground.

Terrain played an important role inthe disposition of forces, and as Crook’selements advanced, they followed thenatural lines of the ridges and hillsleading out of the valley. By mid-morning, subordinate elements of thecommand had become separated. Lieu-tenant Colonel William Royall, Crook’ssecond-in-command, was separated fromthe main body by a large valley for adistance of about a mile as he pursuedwarriors to the northwest. In danger ofbeing defeated in detail, Crook at-tempted to consolidate his forces.

Misreading the Indian’s intentions,suffering from a lack of tactical infor-mation, and focusing on an Indian vil-lage thought to be in proximity to thebattlefield, Crook sent part of the cav-alry to threaten the lodges. Continuedhostile pressure forced the dispatchedcolumn to be recalled. Crook hopedthat he could envelop the Indians fac-ing him at the Rosebud. After severalhours of tough skirmishing, Crook’sforce held the field, the Indians left,and the village was not found byCrook’s column.

Riding over the battlefield on horse-back allows the staff riders to get asense of the time-distance factors, thedifficulties in controlling mounted units,and, for non-riders, a feel of how themounted infantry must have felt afterriding mules for the first time over 35miles to get to the battlefield the dayprior to the battle. An appreciation forthe terrain and the effects of cross-com-partmentalized country on intervisibil-ity is gained by traveling the width andbreadth of the battlefield.

Finally, students absorb the human di-mension of battle by traveling alongthe steep slopes of the ridgelines, nego-tiating the hills, and viewing the sameareas which the soldiers and Indianswould have seen. Unlike many easternbattlefields of the Civil War, the Rose-bud is in much the same state it was in1876. Very few trees obscure vision,

and the fields of fire are as they wereat the time the battle occurred. Even so,it is almost incomprehensible that thesoldiers in Crook’s column expendedabout 25,000 rounds and killed onlyabout 36 warriors.5 Naturally, thesenumbers indicate that marksmanship,or lack thereof, was a considerationwhich still impacts soldiers’ training to-day.

The second day’s staff ride is con-cluded with a brief integration period.Riding or walking all day in a warmsun helps the staff riders appreciatehow the weather and physical exertionmay have affected the participants ofthe battle, who were clothed in wooluniforms. Most riders are glad to getback to the vehicles for a cold drinkand the drive back to Sheridan to pre-pare for the third day of the ride.

Staff Ride Day 3

24/25 June 1876

Day three of the ride begins along theroute Custer followed the evening be-fore he rode to the Little Bighorn, nearcurrent day Busby, Montana. Usingfour-wheel drive vehicles, the staff ridefollows the approximate route that the7th Cavalry covered during its move tothe Little Bighorn. The most significantpart of the entire staff ride takes placethis last day for a number of reasons, toinclude the synthesis of the backgroundmaterials presented on the first twodays.

Important to the understanding of theevents at the battle are the backgroundsof the commanders making the deci-sions and the “doctrine” (if it can becalled that) under which the Army op-erated at the time. The analysis of thefinal events in the battle are driven by anumber of decision points along theline of march from the camp of the 7thCavalry on 24 June 1876 to the LittleBighorn. Several times along the route,the group halts where the 7th Cavalrydid, and the situation to that point is re-viewed. Each stop is important due tothe presentation of new informationmade available to Custer as he pro-gressed toward the Little Bighorn. Staffriders are reminded not to make judg-ments or assessments, despite theirknowing the final outcome of the bat-tle.

The first halt is used to orient thestaff riders to the ground and presentthe written order given to Custer byGeneral Terry on 21 June. The order,much debated during the years follow-

ing the battle, is a relevant point of de-parture for all following discussions.Ironically, the ride on the third day fol-lows the timeline of the 7th Cavalryfairly closely as the routes converge onDavis Creek, thereby allowing for con-sideration of visibility due to sunlight.

The ride participants then follow theroute parallel to Davis Creek to thewest out of the Rosebud valley, movingtowards the “Divide.” The second haltoccurs at the early morning rest stopastride Davis Creek, where Custer thenrode to the observation point on top ofa high hill known as the “Crow’sNest.” Custer’s initial plan, his past ex-periences combating the Indians, andhis orders from General Terry are top-ics normally debated.

The third halt is atop the Crow’sNest. This is where the scouts, underLieutenant Charles Varnum, firstclaimed to have seen the signs of thecamp on the Little Bighorn 15 miles inthe distance. Staff ride participantsmust dismount and walk up the hill dueto the steep slope. Custer ascended thehill but did not see the Indians’ camp.Returning to the regimental march col-umn, Custer received new informationregarding the Indians, which seemed toirrevocably change his concept for at-tacking the village. Key to the changesin the initial decision — to wait over-night, rest the regiment, and attack inthe morning — was the perception thatthe 7th Cavalry had been discovered.Based on the soldiers’ previous experi-ences, and the actions of the Indianswhen their camps were discovered,Custer’s decisions are analyzed withinthe context of the specific situationwhich faced him.

Custer felt pressured to move quicklyin order to maintain operational secu-rity and establish contact with the In-dian village. The regiment was orderedto attack, rather than rest, and wait forfurther reconnaissance of the objective.Custer’s dilemma was whether to allowthe Indians to follow the pattern nor-mally established when they felt theircamps were threatened; that is, disperseand run. Failing to hit the Indians intheir camp would have been tanta-mount to failure since tracking thesmall bands would have been very dif-ficult and resource-intensive.

The fourth halt is conducted on the“Divide,” the geographic division be-tween the drainage to the Rosebud inthe east and the Little Bighorn in thewest. It is here that Custer task-organ-ized the regiment into four separateelements. Custer’s experience at the

ARMOR — September-October 1996 17

Washita battle in December 1868 pro-vides an excellent background to un-derstand why he formed a strong guardto accompany the trains and split theregiment into two wings to envelop theIndian camp.

A discussion of personalities, and thepart they played in the organization ofthe force, makes for interesting specu-lation. It is just past the “Divide” thatCaptain Frederick Benteen was sent withone of the ad hoc battalions to sweepthe adjoining ridgelines on the left flankand prevent the escape of the Indiansto the south, thus saving him from thefate awaiting the main body. By nowthe staff riders have begun to formtheir opinions of whether or not Custerwas acting within the parameters of hisorders, and whether or not his decisionswere logical given the circumstances.

The ride then follows what is nowknown as Reno Creek. This creekflowed westerly from the “Divide” tothe Little Bighorn and provided a natu-ral feature on which to orient the col-umn. The fifth stop is made at a placeknown as the “morass,” a place wherethe packs and Benteen’s battalion stopenroute to water their horses. Time-dis-tance and movement rate considera-tions are normally discussed, alongwith human and animal fitness dimen-sions. Of significance is the distance

traveled by both the animals and menduring the previous four days, the lackof water, and the time since eating theirlast full meal. These factors may haveimpacted on the unit’s performance asit neared the objective. Sleep depriva-tion is also considered in relation to theleaders’ performance.

The sixth stop is made at the siteknown as the “Lone Teepee.” Theteepee held the body of a warrior slainthe week before during the fight withCrook’s column. Unbeknownst to Cus-ter, the Indians he attacked were largelythe very same ones that fought Crookto a standstill on the Rosebud. At thispoint in the ride, Custer begins to ap-pear to be more harried. He has nowbeen awake for over 30 hours and rid-ing hard. This point provides an excel-lent discussion of a problem whichfaces the Army today when considering“continuous operations.” Staff ride par-ticipants are asked to analyze Custer’sactions and determine whether or notthey are logical, given the circum-stances.

The final stop before reaching thebattlefield sites is at the Reno Creekfork, where Custer orders Reno’s bat-talion into the attack. Using the post-battle inquiry results, the discussion fo-cuses on whether or not Benteen’s bat-talion could have joined the main body.

Many of the discussion points are takenfrom Gray’s book, Custer’s Last Cam-paign, which presents an excellenttimeline analysis of the actions duringthe 25th of June. Reno’s orders alwaysbring up interesting arguments as to themeaning and intent Custer wished toconvey.

Crossing the Little Bighorn begins thefinal phase of the staff ride. From anobservation point on the western sideof the valley, the staff riders are ori-ented to the advance by Reno’s battal-ion towards the Indian camp. Reno’sdeployment into line, his charge, andsubsequent skirmish lines are from avantage point which allows the ob-server to determine how the action pro-gressed. Reno’s fighting withdrawal,back over the river and up the bluffs tohis final defensive positions, can beeasily viewed.

The final move to the battlefield ismade by driving the length of the for-mer Indian camp, now dissected by In-terstate Highway 90 and a frontageroad. Because the actions of the sepa-rate battalions were occurring concur-rently, this portion of the staff ridesometimes becomes more difficult tocomprehend for those unfamiliar withthe details of the actions. The staff ridemoves to the Reno-Benteen defensesite on the far end of the ridgeline to

18 ARMOR — September-October 1996

begin discussions about actions on theobjective. Reno was joined in his de-fense by Benteen’s battalion and thepacks in the middle of the afternoon.By this time, Reno’s battalion had suf-fered a significant setback, beingchased back up the bluffs by over-whelming Indian forces. A walk alongthe perimeter of the defensive site pro-vides an excellent understanding of theproblems facing the surrounded survi-vors in the seven remaining companiesof the 7th Cavalry. Much like theWagon Box Fight, the discussion fo-cuses on the ability of the Army unitsto defend from prepared positions, asopposed to being caught in the open,moving.

Concentrating on the actions of thebattalion led by Custer, the staff ridersmove parallel to Custer’s route northapproximately four miles. Poignantlylocated along the route of march aremarkers indicating where troopers werecut down individually, or in smallgroups. A short stop is made at WeirPoint, enroute to Last Stand Hill for anexcellent view of the hill, about threemiles in the distance. Four majorevents are discussed at Weir Point, thedispatch of Trumpeter Martini to Ben-teen, Custer’s view of the entire Indiancamp, Custer’s further division of hisfive companies into two battalions, andthe move by Captain Weir out of theReno-Benteen defense to join Custer.

The staff ride progresses to the next-to-last site, Calhoun Hill, to discuss thepossible scenario confronting the com-panies of James Calhoun’s and GeorgeYates’ battalions. Enroute to CalhounHill, the staff riders pass through theconfluence of Medicine Tail Couleeand Deep Coulee. Also located there isMiniconjou Ford, the site at whichYates’ provisional battalion was re-pulsed and forced back up theridgeline.

From Calhoun Hill to Last Stand Hill,the fight is pure speculation based onTrumpeter Martini’s account, Indianscout Curley’s account, and extensivearcheological findings. Martini was thelast surviving soldier to have contactwith Custer, and Curley was the lastsurviving Indian scout to speak to Cus-ter. Marker stones along the ridgelinefrom Calhoun Hill to Last Stand Hillindicate that the fight was probably dis-jointed and conducted in a highly mo-bile fashion. A number of theories havebeen posited, but no one will ever besure, nor is it central to the under-standing of the staff ride how the fightactually went. What is fact is that every

soldier accompanying Custer fromCompanies C, E, F, I, and L were lostto a man.

The final stop is on Last Stand Hill atthe 7th Cavalry monument. The battleis normally summarized and everyoneis allowed to leave with their ownmental picture of the final minutes ofthe fight as the soldiers were over-whelmed in hand-to-hand combat. Gib-bon’s column’s actions are reviewedand the post-battle affairs on the battle-field are discussed. Prior to leaving theNational Park, the most importantphase of the staff ride is conducted, theintegration phase.

The integration phase results in thesynthesis of all the materials studiedand observed during the entire threedays.6 It provides the unit commander achance to tie all the issues covered intolessons that he desires subordinates totake away from the ride. Most notably,the human dimension factors and dy-namics of battle offer many examplesof timeless lessons which are useful forstudy on the modern battlefield. In theera of “military operations other thanwar” (MOOTW), many applicable les-sons can be applied from the frontierArmy’s conflict with the tribes of theplains. Important lessons are derived inthe Army’s dealings with the many dif-ferent Indian tribes in a low-intensitywarfare setting. While a direct analogyto the current situation the Army nowfaces would be stretching the compari-sons, there are too many similarities tobe overlooked.

Leaders who conduct the Indian Warsstaff ride usually come away with adifferent appreciation for how the fron-tier Army was able to deal with situ-ations which were not prescribed inany formal doctrine. Whether a Custerfan or not, most participants changetheir perceptions of what happened onthat hot afternoon of 25 June 1876 atthe Little Bighorn. If they do changetheir perceptions, then the staff ride hasaccomplished part of its purpose ofmaking them think critically about howthe 7th Cavalry got to the Little Big-horn and why five of the twelve com-panies were destroyed. At the end ofthe three-day staff ride, most partici-pants agree that the real Custer prob-ably lies somewhere between the heroand the villian.

NOTE: Indian Wars staff rides may bearranged by contacting the Combat Stud-ies Institute, USACGSC, Fort Leaven-worth, Kansas. Telephone DSN 552-3904,commercial (913) 684-3904.

Notes1Dr. William G. Robertson, “The Staff Ride,”

Center of Military History, United States ArmyWashington, D.C., 1987, p. 5.

2“Massacre” is the description that is nor-mally associated to the fight conducted by Fet-terman’s command by historians. The word“massacre” however, generally connotes thelack of resistance. A number of Indians werekilled by Fetterman’s soldiers, indicating thatthere was an attempt to resist. The number ofIndians killed by the members of Fetterman’sorganization, which included civilians armedwith modern Henry rifles, will never be knownexactly. However, the pools of blood surround-ing the soldier’s position, and Indian accountscombine to indicate that about thirty warriorswere probably killed and a number wounded.

3John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infan-try, Part I: Regular Army, Center of MilitaryHistory, United States Army, Washington,D.C., 1972, p. 31. The increase in the size ofthe Regular Army in 1866 included reorganiza-tion of the 19 established regiments. The sec-ond battalions of the 11th through the 19th In-fantries formed the basis for the new 20ththrough 28th Infantry Regiments. As part ofthis planned reorganization, the 2nd Battalion,18th Infantry, located at Fort Phil Kearny, wasredesignated as the new 1st Battalion, 27th In-fantry.

4Dr. William G. Robertson, Dr. Jerold E.Brown, Major William M. Campsey, and MajorScott R. McMeen, ed., Atlas of the Sioux Wars,Combat Studies Insitute, USACGSC, FortLeavenworth, Kan., 1993, Maps 4-5.

5Douglas C. McChristian, An Army of Marks-men, The Old Army Press, Ft. Collins, Colo.,1981, p. 32.

6Robertson, pp. 17-18.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 19

Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L.Kennedy has served as com-mander, C Company, 1-18 In-fantry (Mech), 1st ID; G3 opera-tions officer, 3AD; S3, 1-36 In-fantry (M2 Bradley), 3AD; a tac-tics instructor, CGSC; in theTactics/Doctrine Department,U.S. Army Infantry School; andas XO, Battlefield CoordinationElement, CFC, Korea. He at-tended the Israeli ArmoredCorps Commanders Coursewhile assigned to the InfantrySchool in 1981. He is currentlyassigned to the Combat StudiesInstitute as an instructor at theCGSC. LTC Kennedy has hadarticles published by ARMOR,Army, The Australian LighthorseAssociation journal SPUR, andInfantry magazines.

Several years ago, I read with greatenthusiasm RAID, a book by RichardBaron, Abraham Baum, and RichardGoldhurst. It is a true story about aWWII U.S. Army raid 40-plus milesbehind German lines, covering the dis-tance from Aschaffenburg to Hammel-burg. This raid was conceived and or-dered by GEN George S. Patton Jr.,then commanding the U.S. 3rd Army.

Although the reason for this raid wasconcealed from the task force and itscommander until H-hour, it was an at-tempt to liberate some 1,200 U.S.Army POWs, one of whom was LTCJohn Waters, General Patton’s son-in-law.

When the raid failed, speculationabout LTC Waters’ relationship to thearmy commander entered into criti-cisms that the operation was ill-timed,poorly planned, undermanned, anddoomed to failure from the beginning.

It was not until the operation by“Task Force Baum” had begun, thatCPT Abraham Baum, leading the raid,learned from MAJ Stiller, GEN Pat-ton’s aide, that LTC Waters was be-lieved to be in the camp and that hewas GEN Patton’s son-in-law. At thispoint, CPT Baum wondered if his mis-sion had any chance of success.

The task force included 300 men and53 vehicles, including tanks, tank de-stroyers, and halftracks.

I thought that it would be good tocommemorate the 50th anniversary ofthis famous 4th Armored Division raid,

and proceeded to call the authors andsome of the key participants regardinga 50th reunion in Hammelburg, Ger-many. In a later telephone call, MAJAbe Baum, the leader of the raid, wasdelighted to hear that he had not beenforgotten and wished he had been noti-fied earlier so he could have planned toattend. There were no funds providedby the military for this purpose.

MAJ Baum sent me a list of 29 offi-cers and men who received the SilverStar for this action, and I would guessthat there were five times as manyBronze Stars awarded, in addition toprobably 150-200 Purple Hearts tothose wounded and killed in action.Baum got three.

Baum also was personally awardedthe Distinguished Service Cross byGEN Patton himself. His certificationreads: “For the brilliant leadership hedisplayed while in command of TaskForce Baum. The mission of this taskforce had led them far behind enemylines with only a small force. The dar-ing of this movement threw the enemyinto a panic, believing that all this terri-tory was being overrun by our troops.Communications were disrupted andlarge enemy forces were needlesslyshifted from more important strong-points, facilitating a later drive by an-other combat command of this divisionthrough Hanau and to Hernfeld.”

I spoke with the book’s co-author,MAJ Richard Baron, via telephone,and he informed me that as far as heknew there would be no reunion, as it

was too late to plan one. It seemedironic since the original mission wasplanned in less than 24 hours! Baronwas awarded the Bronze Star for hisefforts during the escape.

T/SGT Charles O. Graham, who ledthe antitank platoon, also did not wishto participate, even if there was a reun-ion. He was awarded five Silver Starsand two Bronze Stars during his Armycareer. LT Nutto, who commanded aplatoon of tanks, also elected not toparticipate.

By March 26, 1945, units of Patton’s3rd Army, in particular the 4th Ar-mored Division, arrived near Schwein-heim after four days of hard fightinginside Nazi Germany. They paused inthe hills overlooking the German-heldtowns of Aschaffenberg and Schwein-heim. This was to be the opening sceneof Patton’s biggest military blunder.

Patton ordered the raid after havingbeen ordered to the north by GENOmar Bradley. He knew that his son-in-law, LTC John Waters, was beingheld approximately 70 kilometers tothe east, in Oflag XIIIB, a prisoner ofwar camp for officers overlooking theold Frankish town of Hammelburg.LTC Waters had been captured by ele-ments of GEN Erwin Rommel’s AfrikaKorps during the battle for the Kasser-ine Pass two years earlier. Military in-telligence had been tracking his intern-ment and had informed Patton that hewas in the Hammelburg lager, a fewmiles east of Frankfurt.

Major Abraham Baum, at left, in April1945, shortly after the ill-fated raid on aGerman prisoner-of-war camp 40 milesbehind enemy lines.Above, Baum with the author in October1995.

TASK FORCE BAUMand the

HAMMELBURG RAID

Reliving the Incredible Adventureof a Young CaptainOrdered to RescueGeneral Patton’s Son-in-Law

by Richard Whitaker

20 ARMOR — September-October 1996

This proved to be too tempting forGEN Patton, and he immediately is-sued verbal orders for the now-infa-mous raid, despite the fact that he hadbeen ordered to turn 3rd Army northand vacate his former positions to GENPatch, whose 7th Army was to thesouth, on Patton’s right. GEN Pattonclaims he received verbal permissionfrom GEN Omar Bradley prior to or-dering the mission, but in Bradley’sbook, A Soldier’s Story, he does not re-member it that way.

The raid took place in spite of imme-diate protests by two of Patton’s subor-dinates, MG William M. Hoge, com-manding 4th Armored Division, andGeneral Manton Eddy, both of whomthought this mission was ill-timed,poorly conceived, and undermanned —ill-timed in that it came following sev-eral days of hard fighting by the samegroup of men who had just been giventhe orders to liberate the camp. Thesemen had crossed the Rhine River onMarch 24th, and had just arrived at theMain River on the 26th after continu-ous fighting and going without sleepfor days.

The men selected for the missionwere from units of the famed 4th Ar-mored Division, Patton’s favorite, oneof only two divisions in Europe inWWII to have been awarded a Presi-dential Unit Citation by PresidentFranklin Roosevelt. The man selectedto plan and choose the units sent on theraid was LTC Creighton Abrams, thenthirty years old and in command ofCombat Command B. LTC Abrams se-

lected his old friend, LTC Harold Co-hen, a battle-hardened veteran com-manding the 10th Armored InfantryBattalion, to lead the raid, and orderedhim to hand-pick his own men. How-ever, Cohen was to be medically ex-cused from the mission.

(Apparently, LTC Cohen had a severecase of hemorrhoids. He was removedfrom the assignment by GEN Pattonhimself who, after personally inspect-ing the inflamed area, remarked, “Thatis some sorry ass!”1)

Cohen then immediately selected hisown replacement with Abrams’ ap-proval.

He was 24-year-old CPT Abraham“Abe” Baum. At this point, Patton mo-tioned for the young captain to stepaside and stated to him, “Listen, Abe,you pull this off and I’ll see to it thatyou get the Congressional Medal ofHonor!”1 CPT Baum was a tough,scrappy, hands-on officer from NewYork City with questionable qualifica-tions to be heading a raid this far be-hind enemy lines. For one thing, hewas Jewish, and capture meant uncer-tainty when the letter ‘H,’ signifyingHebrew, was discovered on a soldier’sdogtags. He had been a patternmakerby trade and, because of this, had beenassigned to the Army engineers uponhis enlistment. Army enlistment per-sonnel apparently did not know he wasa patternmaker of clothing; he was as-signed to the engineers because theythought he was a metal patternmaker.This stroke of luck eventually got him

assigned to the Army’s Officer Candi-date School at Fort Benning, Georgia.

CPT Baum was far from being under-qualified, however. At this point in thewar, he had been one of the first to ar-rive at Bastogne. Baum had earned twoBronze and two Silver Stars.

The units assigned to accompany himon the mission were C Company of the37th Tank Battalion, commanded by2LT William J. Nutto, consisting of 10Sherman tanks, and a platoon of fivelight tanks from D Company, com-manded by 2LT William Weaver. Therewas also a platoon of three self-pro-pelled assault guns, under the com-mand of T/SGT Charles O. Graham.These were Shermans adapted to carrya 105-mm gun that could be used as anantitank weapon or as an artillerypiece. The balance of “Task ForceBaum, as it later became known, con-sisted of 27 halftracks carrying Com-pany A of the 10th Armored Infantry,under the command of CPT RobertLange, together with a recon platoon ofnine men and three jeeps, and medicaland maintainance personnel with an in-terpretor, PFC Irving Solotoff. Also as-signed to the column was an additionaljeep carrying MAJ Alexander Stiller,one of Patton’s most trusted aides, whohad served with Patton as a tanker inWWI.

Back in the hills overlooking Schwein-heim, an artillery barrage ended at2100 hours, and the platoon selected byCohen to lead the breakout through themain street of town began moving. Af-

ARMOR — September-October 1996 21

ter proceeding only 200 yards, theycame under fire, and a Panzerfaust (ba-zooka) stopped the lead Sherman in itstracks and blocked the street. CPLLester Powell drove his jeep forward,entered the burning tank, and drove itout of the way, also rescuing the sur-viving tankers. During this action, hewas hit by enemy fire, and when heawakened in a hospital in England, hewas told he had been awarded the Sil-ver Star for his bravery and a PurpleHeart for his wounds.

At 2300, the situation grew worse.Another tank was hit and abandoned,causing further delay. At this pointMAJ Stiller joined CPT Baum andsaid, “We’re late.”

Baum replied, “I might not be able toreach Hammelburg before dawn... Weneed the cover of darkness.”

“Is there another way to Hammel-burg?” Stiller asked. Baum shook hishead no, and stared at the major, stillwondering why he was included in themission.1 Abrams and Cohen had beentold the reason, but they had not passedit on to Baum. Both had thought themission very risky and foolish.

The assignment of MAJ Stiller hadcaused CPT Baum to question whowas actually in command, and to won-der what the aide to a famous generalwas doing on a combat mission aboutto proceed over 40 miles behind enemylines. The answer to Baum’s questioncaused him to turn cold. “It’s importantto General Patton,” said Stiller, whoexplained that LTC Waters was in thecamp.

“Who’s Colonel Waters?” askedBaum.

“He’s Patton’s son-in-law. Didn’t youknow that?”

After hearing this, and knowing that300 men were about to risk their livesfor one man, he considered pulling theplug and aborting the mission. How-ever, after collecting himself, Baumhoped that the rest of the men wouldsee it as he did, a job to be done. Atthis point, he ordered his men to pro-ceed through the town of Schweinheimwithout pausing. Thus began one of themost daring sagas in U.S. military his-tory.

After clearing the town, the columnstretched out over a mile. Baum’s nexttask was to find the main east-westhighway, Route 26. After passingthrough the small villages of Haibach-

Grünmorsbach, they soon passedthrough Bessenbach, and then Keil-berg. After reviewing the order ofmarch as the column passed by, Baumthen sped ahead, and after several turnson the narrow, winding road out ofKeilberg, came to his first objective,the main road to Hammelburg.

It was now 0230 hours. Now onRoute 26, Baum had just accomplisheda very difficult leadership test. Leadingan armored column in daylight is diffi-cult enough; leading one at night in un-familiar territory, over a complicatedroute, is even more challenging. Asthey proceeded to their next objective,the town of Laufach, Baum ordered thetanks to run over several telephonepoles along the highway. He also or-dered some lines cut by hand for addedprotection. Then one of his men no-ticed that, in several of the towns alongthe route, white sheets were hangingfrom the windows as a sign that theyhad surrendered. At this point, the taskforce leaders realized that the lines hadnot been cut soon enough.

As they sped on in the early dawnhours outside of Laufach, the roadpassed by a military parade ground. Alarge contingent of German troopswere taking morning exercise. Afterspraying these troops with a hail ofmachine gun fire, it again became ap-parent that the mission was no longer asecret and worse yet, their exact posi-tion was now known to the enemy sur-vivors. They next came upon a detach-ment of troops marching along the roadwho immediately surrendered to thelead tank unit, headed by LT Weaver.They were ordered to throw down their

weapons so that the tanks could driveover them, rendering them useless. Thisscene was repeated again a short dis-tance further along and the Germanswere told to march toward the ap-proaching American Army in the west.

Baum’s task force raced through Hainand Rechtenbach, then approachedLohr, the largest town since leavingSchweinheim, and also the mid-waypoint on the route. Baum decided tomove Nutto’s Shermans, with their75mm guns, to the front of the columnin case the city had been warned andfortified. This proved a prescient deci-sion. As the column approached theoutskirts in the early morning light,they spotted an overturned heavy truckwith telephone poles piled around it,blocking the main road ahead. At thisroadblock, another Panzerfaust struckthe lead tank and disabled it, but thecrew escaped and scrambled to therear. A second Sherman then used itsmain gun and machine guns against theroadblock, scattering the soldiers man-ning it. The Shermans proceeded intothe roadblock, clearing a path for thetask force and scattering the defendersafter bulldozing the truck aside. Aftercontinuing a short distance and scan-ning the town with his binoculars,Baum decided to try to bypass the city,thus avoiding further resistance. Afterdoing this, he ran head-on into a truckconvoy coming from the opposite di-rection and hauling 88mm antiaircraftguns. With LT Weaver back on point,he ordered his crew to “let them haveit!” As Weaver swept by in his tank,“Conquering Hero,” he was shocked tosee that the 88s were manned by young

LTC John K. Waters, seen at left in 1961 as a LTG, was in the Hammelburg prisoner-of-war camp in March 1945. Captured at Kasserine Pass in North Africa two years earlier,he was the son-in-law of General George S. Patton, Jr., then commanding the U.S. 3rdArmy. Patton’s troops were approaching within 40 miles of the camp when Patton orderedCPT Abraham Baum to lead a raid on the camp.

22 ARMOR — September-October 1996

girls. They had been trained for thisduty because all the available menwere at the various fronts.1

On March 26th, 1995, as I approachthe town of Lohr down the scenic roadwhich slopes rather steeply into this“Hansel and Gretel” town, I can envi-sion the roadblock and am surprised tofind yet another roadblock of a differ-ent sort. It is a full-blown street fair,and it turns out to be a nice treat as theold strasse through the village is filledwith the bright colors of spring and thewonderful odor of many locally pro-duced cheeses and smoked meats. It ishere that I mail my first postcard tomyself. It will bear the postmark ofLohr and a 50th Anniversary date ofthe day when Task Force Baum washere. The route Baum selected aroundthe town was located just above thetown, and was just visible from below.It was in Lohr that General Hans vonObstfelder, responsible for all Germanground forces in the southern region,was summoned from his office by anaide who said the Americans were onthe upper road. Seeing that they werebypassing Lohr and heading towardGemünden, he immediately called forreconnaissance planes to follow thecolumn and instructed his troops inGemünden to prepare to dynamite abridge to block the route.

As LT Weaver was leaving the Lohrarea, he began to overtake a Germantrain on his left. The train consisted ofboth freight and passenger cars. Somesoldiers were waving at him! Theystopped waving as the 75mm guns andmachine guns of “Conquering Hero”began to point toward them. At thismoment, the doors to the boxcars slidback to reveal small antiaircraft gunsaimed at the tanks. Luck again was onthe American side as the road droppedsuddenly below the railroad bed. Thetanks were now able to fire on thetrain, but the reverse was not possible.The fire from the task force struck afreight car loaded with ammunition,which blew up, and after firing addi-tional rounds into the engine, two engi-neers jumped out, leaving the damagedtrain to its own demise.

A short while later, a train approach-ing from Gemünden appeared to have achance to cross the tracks in front ofthe column and block the task force,but another Sherman fired two 75mmrounds into the engine and derailed thetrain just short of the crossing.

As Weaver and thecolumn nearedGemünden, anotherjuicy target appeared.This time it was atugboat hauling fivebarges through thelocks on the riverMain. After firinghigh explosive and in-cendiary rounds intothem, the barges ex-ploded. Continuingfurther, another vitaltarget appeared along-side the road, thehuge railroad mar-shalling yards on theoutskirts of Gemün-den. Baum ordered allof his tanks to fire onthis bonus target.They destroyed twomore trains, unknow-ingly disrupting theunloading of the Ger-man 7th Division, whowere trying to get tothe front. In addition,they destroyed severalmore locomotives andthen followed up byordering a nearbyAmerican spotter plane to call in an airstrike on this valuable target.

Approaching Gemünden, Baum againhalted to survey the bridge across theriver and into town. He sent the reconplatoon down the hill to verify that thebridge was intact. As LT Hofner ap-proached the old bridge, he spotted a

pile of dozens of land mines which theGermans had just started to bury in theroad. After throwing out smoke gre-nades, Hofner and his men began toss-ing the stacked mines off the road andbegan firing across the bridge into tar-gets in the town. For this effort, Hofnerearned a Silver Star.

As soon as the road was cleared,Baum put Nutto’s medium tanks in thelead, and they started across with LTHofner’s platoon of infantry. From histurret, Nutto heard the fire from thefirst Panzerfaust, then another and an-other. There was also 75mm antitankfire coming from an old castle over theriver and above the town. At this point,the lead tank was hit and rolled to astop just five yards from the bridge,blocking the column. Nutto watched asthe stunned platoon leader, LT Ray-mond Keil, helped his badly burnedcrew out of the tank. At this point,panic ensued and the lead tank’s ser-geant broke and ran for the rear, yell-ing, “I’ve had it, I’ve had it!”

At this point, Baum ran up as Nuttoheard another “whoomp” from apanzerfaust. Looking up he saw it wob-ble and strike the asphalt in front ofthem before exploding and showering

LT Nutto, whocommandedBaum’s mediumtanks.

Above right,the Romanbridge atGemünden,and the castlewhere the Ger-mans had sitedtheir 75mm an-titank guns.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 23

them with steel fragments and searingphosphorus. He also felt the fragmentspierce his body, and then watched asBaum went down. Baum struggled tostand up while bleeding from his rightknee and hand. As the two menmoved back to receive first aid, Baumwatched as Elmer Sutton, leading theinfantry platoon, made it across thebridge with two more men running af-ter him. Suddenly, the Germans blewthe bridge and the two men vanishedforever.

It is March 26th, 1995. While stand-ing above the roadside overlookingthe bridge, which has long since beenrebuilt, it is starting to rain and again Iam reminded of what must have beengoing through the minds of the menwho watched as their comrades died.The bridge still has the original foun-dation erected by the Roman army al-most 2000 years ago. The bombed-outcastle also survived and is still stand-ing in the mist above the city.

The town is strangely quiet, with noone in sight on this lazy Sunday after-noon. Then a policeman drives up tosee why we are stopped here. Realityreturns, and we press on along Baum’spath.

On March 27th, 1945, at 1100 hours,Baum is also backing out of the town.He has sent a recon probe to look foranother road out of the village. AfterBaum consulted his map, Stiller askedhim if he wanted to go back.

“We don’t quit,” Baum said, addingthat the enemy had no idea of wherehis unit was heading.

After turning north on a back road,Baum sent his second message back to10th Armored: “Two tanks lost, two of-ficers and eighteen men wounded orkilled. Proceeding.”1

A short while later, at a fork in theroad, another tank was lost after throw-ing a track. At this point, the woundedwere lifted out of the halftracks andplaced on the side of the road, wherethey would be found and given medicalaid. They were in no condition to con-tinue.

The unit had moved ahead only ashort distance when a lost Americanjeep from the 7th Division, carrying acombat propaganda team with a loud-speaker, wandered across Baum’s path.The team had seen the smoke from thebattle in Gemünden and, upon discov-

ering the tank tracks leading out of thecity, proceeded to catch up with thecolumn, thinking it to be one of theirown. They then began broadcasting inGerman, directing the message into thewoods towards some enemy soldierswho had outrun the column fromGemünden. The broadcast messagewas simple: it would be better to sur-render to the 7th U.S. Army than to theRussians, who were coming from theeast. About 100 of them walked out ofthe woods and began laying down theirweapons. Then one of Baum’s men in-formed the team that the task force wasnot part of 7th Army. The propagandateam immediately left to find their owntroops.

With Baum leaving in the oppositedirection, the abandoned Germans musthave thought the American rules forfighting a war a bit odd.

Moving to the north, the column cap-tured a lone paratrooper who was ab-sent without leave from his unit andheading for home. After finding outthat he was originally from Hammel-burg, Baum and the interpreter, PrivateSolotoff, convinced him to lead themto a bridge in Burgsinn. The para-trooper proved to be a valuable asset.Several times along the route he con-vinced other smaller groups of Germansoldiers to surrender and walk towardsthe oncoming U.S. Army. The lastgroup to follow his instructions weremanning two camouflaged antitankguns. Further along the road to

Burgsinn, the task force chanced upona staff car containing a high-rankingGerman general, Oriel Lotz. Afterforcing him to mount the front of oneof the lead tanks to quell possible hos-tile fire, they proceeded through Re-ineck and then across the narrow butintact Burgsinn bridge.

The town of Burgsinn is an olderwalled city and, had they been for-warned of Baum’s arrival, they couldhave easily blocked the main gate intotown, forcing another costly delay.Even after passing through the maingate, the streets are so narrow that anystalled vehicle would have created ad-ditional problems and further delay.Upon leaving Burgsinn, there is arather steep incline to negotiate on theroad to Gräfendorf. Somewhere in thewooded region between the two vil-lages, another unexpected event oc-curred. The task force encounteredseveral hundred conscripted Russianswho were working on the constructionof an autobahn bridge, guarded by agroup of German soldiers. Again, thecaptured paratrooper ordered them tothrow down their arms. Upon seeingthis, the Russians mobbed Baum’s jeep,shouting, “Amerikanski, Amerikanski.”The Russians wanted to do somethingfurther to help their liberators, and hav-ing armed themselves with the Germanrifles, they wanted to take the town.Baum approved of this, but on onecondition — they were to wait until af-ter the task force had passed through.In addition, the Russians wanted thegeneral. Baum again complied.1

On March 27th, 1995, driving out ofthe woods, which were spectacular tosee, the road again turns steeply down-hill and offers a splendid view of thetown of Gräfendorf. As the main streetwound through the town, I was amazedto see how narrow the roadway was,and how easily it could have beenblocked. About halfway through thevillage, we spotted a cafe and stoppedfor coffee and cake. Since the owner ofthe cafe was in his late fifties, I askedhim if he remembered the panzer raidof Task Force Baum. He became ex-cited, and immediately produced hiscopy of the RAID, the book by Baron,Baum, and Goldhurst. He told me thathe was a small boy, hiding in the base-ment below where we were standing,when the American tanks came rum-bling through. He watched them fromthe basement window, and it was asight he will never forget. Another man

The narrow city gate of Burgsinn, the only routethrough the town, remains much like Baum’s taskforce found it in 1945.

24 ARMOR — September-October 1996

who had been sitting nearby got up totell me that he had also been a youngman in the town of Burgsinn when thecolumn passed by, and he recalledsimilar memories. After saying good-bye and thanking them for their time, Ithen asked them if they would send mea postcard from their towns with ashort story of what they had seen, andthey both have complied. (I sent themeach a 4th Armored shoulder patch anda thank you card.)

Outside, as we were getting into ourcar, the cafe owner pointed to somesecond floor windows above the shopnext door, and explained that his neigh-

bors had draped a white sheet over thewindow sill in order to keep the Ameri-cans from firing on them. This workedfine until some SS troops came throughthe village later and, upon seeing thewhite sheets of surrender, proceeded toshoot the townspeople who had hungthem up! This proved to be a very so-bering experience, and at this point Iwished I had not eaten such a largepiece of cake.

After we crossed yet another tinybridge in the middle of town, the valleynarrowed as the road followed the rail-road and the river up out of town to-ward Weickersgrüben. This was the siteof another crucial incident for TaskForce Baum.

As the task force left Gräfendorf, asingle-engine German spotter aircraftflew up the valley behind them. Afterthe column had fired several hundredrounds at the aircraft, unsuccessfully,the pilot managed to fly out of range,

tipping his wings in defiance. As itturned out, the small plane had posi-tively identified and counted the re-maining vehicles — 13 tanks, three as-sault guns, and 27 halftracks. Mean-while and unknown to Baum, GeneralLotz had gotten free of the Russiansand phoned Gräfendorf, passing on theinformation that the Americans hadtalked about nothing but Hammelburg.Among those forewarned of the col-umn’s destination was the camp com-mandant at Oflag XIIIB, General VonGoeckel, and other commanders in thearea, including Oberst (Colonel) CordVan Hoepple, area commander, andGeneral Bernhard Weisenberger at

Schweinfurt, positioned just east ofHammelburg.

At 1200 hours on March 27th, thecolumn had just passed throughMichelau and then over another smallbridge across the Saale River and northof Weickersgrüben, their next destina-tion. At this point, the guide, who wasunfamiliar with this region, becameuseless, and after turning the columnup a dead-end road, needed to be re-placed. Baum’s next move was to sendhis driver, with Solotoff the translator,back to Weickersgrüben with instruc-tions to find somebody who could getthem to Hammelburg. After speedingback into the town, they arrived at aninn.

Solotoff found the owner, Karl Stür-zenberger. After telling Solotoff that hiswife was due to give birth this verynight and he was the only one to helpher, he asked to be excused from actingas a guide. This request fell on deaf

ears. The situation was now desperateand the task force was stalled and waybehind schedule.

After leading the column back up thecorrect road to Highway 27, and afterarriving at the intersection to Hammel-burg, the innkeeper again asked to beexcused to return to his wife, and thistime he was allowed to go home. Afterseeing the entire column pass by, he re-alized the consequences he faced if theSS found out about his involvementwith the Americans. So, after returningand aiding in the birth of a new son, hewent into the woods, where he re-mained until the end of the war.

It was raining again as we passed bya covered bus stop in Weickersgrüben,where my friend John Dirks noticedthree men standing and smoking, seek-ing shelter from the rain. We wonderedif they knew of the raid and Herr Stür-zenberger? The answer was an excitedyes! One of the men was among theRussians freed by CPT Baum and hismen. He had elected to remain in thearea after the war. He said we wereonly 50 meters from the home of HerrStürzenberger. A few minutes later,ringing the innkeeper’s doorbell, I feltmuch the same anticipation as Solotoffmust have felt. A member of the familyanswered; not Karl, but his grandson,who invited us in to meet the family —Karl’s sons, Herbert and Edgar. Afterexplaining the reason for my pre-viously unannounced visit, (Abe Baumhad told me to look up his friend Karlwhen I passed through), we were im-mediately escorted into the familyroom where we were given a glass oflocal wine and treated like royalty.

It was at this point that we learned ofKarl’s passing. We were saddened, butalso delighted to meet Klara, hiswidow and the mother of Herbert,Edgar, and Walter, the son who wasborn on this day 50 years earlier. Karlhad died in 1991. The family told methat Walter would be coming later ifwe wanted to stay and meet him, butour schedule depended on availablelight for additional photographs, so wethanked them for their hospitality and,after presenting them with 4th Armoredpatches, moved on towards Hammel-burg.

Task Force Baum is now in the hillsoverlooking Hammelburg and at the in-tersection of a road that led south overthe Reussenberg hills and toward thelager. It was not far from this point that

At left, the bridge at the village of Gräfen-dorf , where SS men shot civilians who dis-played white flags. Above, the author withFrau Stürzenburger, widow of Karl, andtheir son Edgar.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 25

Hauptmann Richard Koehl, leading acompany of eight panzerjaegers (tankhunters), had positioned himself. Hehad been alerted by one of the phonecalls that General Lotz had placed afterescaping from the Russians. He set uphis guns near the railroad station, about1,000 yards from the road that CPTBaum would have to pass on his wayinto the camp. He seemed to be in anideal location for an ambush, but thetask force was traveling at high speedwhen it reached this point, and all therounds fired by Koehl’s 75mm gunsmissed their targets.

Baum sent T/SGT Graham’s assaultguns 500 yards up the hill to fire onKoehl and protect the rear of the col-umn. Unfortunately, this section of theroad turned up rather steeply toward asaddle at the top on the ridge, and be-fore all of the column had passed by,they took casualties from Koehl’s anti-tank guns. Slowed by the incline, twomore tanks were knocked out and thehalftrack carrying CPT Lange was hit.He was seriously wounded. Three ofhis men placed him on another vehicleand headed up over the ridge to safety.

While Koehl was firing on the col-umn, Baum was racing up and downthe road in his jeep, trying to getstalled vehicles off the road and tryingto restore order. Now Graham’s gunswere in position on the ridge andstarted to return fire. Capable of firing8-10 rounds per minute, Graham’s gunsscored three knockouts on Koehl’spanzerjaegers and also wiped out a fueland ammunition column of six trucksmoving toward Koehl. Unfortunately,Baum’s unit had been shot up badly,losing two mediums and one light tank,five halftracks, and two jeeps. Now outof range and over the hill’s crest, thetask force regrouped at the sight of alarge French memorial cross, erectedby the French government after WWIto commemorate the French soldierswho had perished in Hammelburg.Baum now had his first view of OflagXIIIB. It lay on the reverse slope about1,700 yards away.

As remaining light was growingshort, Baum left Graham’s assault gunsand a rifle platoon behind to protect therear and to provide covering fire fromabove and into the German positionsoutside the camp. He arranged the re-maining 11 tanks into a “desert forma-tion” (spread out side by side), with the

infantry following close behind. Withthe final goal in sight, they headeddownhill towards the camp. When theywere about 200 yards from the wirefence, the Germans began firing.

We were met at the Schloss HotelSaalach by Herr Oberstleutnant (LTC)Taube of the Hammelburg InfantryTraining School, and drove to his of-fice. The Infantry Training School wascelebrating its 100th year in Hammel-burg. In Colonel Taube’s office, we hadcoffee and were introduced to LTCBradford, the U.S. Army liaison officerassigned to the school; Hans Schnebel,the school’s librarian and historian; andPeter Martin, a history instructor, whoacted as our translator and guide. Ashort time later, we found ourselves atthe saddle, standing in the road next tothe French cross monument where wehad our first view into the compoundfrom the point at which CPT Baum andhis men first saw it.

Standing at the location of Graham’ssupport position near the cross, welooked back down the panzerstrasse

(tank road) and saw an overview of thesteep winding route the task force tookcoming up from the base of the moun-tain.

We returned to our van and pro-ceeded to the first camp buildings thatBaum’s men approached. They are stillin use as Infantry School support andsupply buildings. During the time ofthe raid, these buildings were adminis-trative buildings, located just inside thecompound fence.

Baum’s unit responded to the enemyfire which commenced about 200 yardsout from the wire fence. Then the tanksbroke through the wire. General VonGoeckel, the officer in charge, surren-dered his entire command to a sur-prised POW, Colonel Paul R. Goode.During the initial melee, LTC Waters,the primary objective of the raid, wasseverely wounded by a German soldier,carried back into the compound, andhidden by a Serbian medical officer.He later learned that the bullet hadmissed his lower spine by a fraction ofan inch. During all the confusion that

26 ARMOR — September-October 1996

began with the American entrance intothe compound, MAJ Stiller had beenrunning from building to building,searching for LTC Waters. When hefound him, he was already in the oper-ating room, fighting for his life, and inno shape to travel. After speaking withhim, and verifying his condition, he leftin search of Baum.

The camp was in pandemonium, withprisoners running around everywhere.They were jumping on all the vehiclesand some were kissing Baum’s men.Others were asking for cigarettes, stillnot realizing that they were over 40miles from the American front lines!

Meanwhile, Baum was making a fewdiscoveries of his own. First, therewere far more men here than he hadplanned on rescuing, and he was nowseverely short of transport vehicles.Even if his original column had sur-vived the 16 hours of fighting andtravel it had taken to get there, theywould have still been far short of trans-portation vehicles. There were morethan 1,500 prisoners, and he would

only be able to accommodate and res-cue 200 or less. Far worse was the factthat no one seemed to be in charge ofthis unruly bunch! It was like TimesSquare on New Year’s Eve, Baum re-called later.

LT Richard Baron, one of the prison-ers and a co-author of RAID, came outof the compound and realized thatBaum had only a small task force.Since it was not supported by any addi-tional American forces, they wouldhave to fight their way out and back tothe west. Baron had been captured inAlsace-Lorraine while fighting with hismachine gun platoon, a part of the 45thDivision. While he realized the di-lemma the task force faced, he decidedthat leaving was still a better optionthan remaining at Hammelburg.

At about that time, Baum and Goodefound each other and were discussingwhose duty it was to inform the menthat only 200 or so would be able to goout with the column. Baum mountedthe hood of one of the vehicles and be-gan to shout for quiet. This was as dif-

ficult a task as he had faced up to thispoint, and it was only with extreme dif-ficulty that he was able to explain tothe excited crowd that only a few hun-dred of them could leave with him. Atthis point, many of the stunned andconfused men stood paralyzed in frontof him. Slowly they began to move intwo directions, most back into thecamp from which they had just come,and several hundred onto the tanks andinto the halftracks. Among these wasLT Baron, who was one of the mensearching for a spot on one of thetanks.

As it was now dark, Baum thoughtperhaps this would provide cover forhis exit from the compound. He sentLT Nutto out with three tanks and threehalftracks to probe the roads for an es-cape route. After Nutto left, Baum reor-ganized the remaining task force withfive light tanks in the front, then fivehalftracks, and the assault guns withthe recon jeep and the remaininghalftracks in the rear. This was accom-plished just prior to moving to anotherassembly area to await the results ofNutto’s probes.

Upon finishing the latest order of bat-tle and just prior to moving out, disas-ter struck again. An explosion occurredin the last tank in the column and blewit up. The tank had been struck by apanzerfaust fired by an infiltrating Ger-man combat engineer who had gottenclose under cover of darkness.

In the time it took for Baum to reachthe new assembly area, the Germanswere also moving quickly. The officersand senior enlisted men quickly dis-patched soldiers and cadets to the vari-ous exit roads. They immediately sentmen to the south, to the small villagesof “Hundsfeld” and “Bonnland.”These small villages had been appro-priated by the German government tobe used in house-to-house infantrytraining. The villages had been vacantof civilians since 1895, but to Nuttothey looked just like any other sleepingGerman village. After passing“Hundsfeld,” the first small village onhis right on the route south, he soonspotted a roadblock of felled treesacross the road, difficult to bypass inthe darkness. Shortly after Baum ar-rived to survey the situation, he orderedNutto back to the intersection in“Hundsfeld” and then out toward the

ARMOR — September-October 1996 27

Reussenberg Woods, which were abovethe small valley they were in.

By now, the Germans were reacting.They had spotted Nutto’s change in di-rection, and a team of combat engi-neers was sent ahead, to the areaknown as Hill 340, near the Reussen-berg, to intercept them. As soon asthese engineers began firing on Nutto’sunit, Baum heard them and raced to thetrouble spot in his jeep. It was anotherroadblock with supporting fire comingfrom the woods above. This forced yetanother change in direction for theprobe, this time to the west toward themain road at “Hollrich.”

This route passed Hill 427 on theirright flank and continued about fourmiles into town. After passing throughthe town and with the main highway insight, Nutto radioed Baum with thenews. He was elated, replying, “We aremoving up... We should be there intwenty minutes.”1

LT Baron, who was riding on one ofthe probe tanks, recalls what happenednext. With Nutto back in his tank andon the main road just out of town, twopanzerfausts lit up the night, revealingGerman tanks, in addition to infantry!

One of the German rounds slammedinto Nutto’s tank and knocked himsemiconscious. Then the second tankwas also hit. After waking up, Nuttofound himself on the road and a pris-oner of war.

The remaining halftracks and the sur-viving tanks made their way back to-ward the task force. This was a seriousblow to Baum, as he had just lost theirreplaceable Nutto and two moremuch-needed tanks.

At 0030 hours, Baum’s jeep ap-proached the town, where he ran into

the survivors coming back. He immedi-ately sent two tanks about a mile toprobe the next town of “Hessdorf,”which was also situated along the mainroad, Highway 27. At this point, he or-dered the remaining former POWs offand told them to wait with thehalftracks. In addition, he ordered themain column to continue on the routehe had just traveled and to wait for fur-ther instructions at a road crossingabout midway between him and the lat-est probe. Some of the POWs had con-sidered returning to the safety of the la-ger and were discussing this optionamong themselves.

At 0230 hours, as Baum and the twoprobe tanks were approaching the townof Hessdorf, he glanced at the odome-ter in his jeep. It revealed that with allof the diversions, he had already trav-eled 52 miles since leaving Schwein-heim, and had been without sleep forover 100 hours. Then, suddenly, fromout of the darkness, a panzerfaust tookout another of his tanks. The survivingmen scrambled up on the remainingtank and headed for the intersection be-low the Reussenberg Woods.

After joining up with the main bodyonce more, Baum decided to retire un-til daylight when they would be able toforce their way out across country andaround any roadblocks. It would be fu-tile to attempt any more this night; thelosses had already been too high. Hethen ordered his men up to Hill 427and onto a semi-flat area adjacent tothe woods. Using the woods as coverto the rear, he fanned the assault gunsand the remaining tanks out toward thevalley below and toward the lager.Next, he ordered the men to refuelprior to dawn and prepare to destroythe remaining empty and damaged ve-hicles.

While his men were followingBaum’s latest orders, he summonedMoses, Graham, Weaver, and Stiller toa final pre-breakout conference andwas informed by Stiller that more ofthe POWs wanted to return to the lager.About this time, a group gatheredaround Colonel Goode as he stood onone of the tanks. In short order, he ex-plained that, due to the additional vehi-cle losses, there were still too many ofthem and they would be a burden tothe remaining task force trying to breakout and fight their way back to the U.S.lines. After this sober news, about 70of them elected to return with ColonelGoode and left at 0500 hours. This leftonly a dozen of the original POWs, in-cluding Richard Baron and a few of theofficers of the 45th that Baum then as-signed to replace the vacant slotsamong his own remaining infantry.

Colonel Bradford unlocks the gate atthe intersection where Baum lead thetask force up the road to Hill 427. Thegate is locked because this is a live fir-ing day and an artillery training exer-cise is scheduled to begin in an hour. Iam feeling a bit uneasy now, as I havebeen in this kind of situation early inmy Marine Corps training at CampPendleton and have heard of the acci-dents that can occur due to short orlong rounds. It is also raining, and acold winter wind is blowing up thehillside towards the ReussenbergWoods. We saw the exact spot wherethe task force was deployed and the ap-proximate position of the panzerjagerswaiting hidden about 1,500 yards downthe hillside. About 100 yards away,there was a burned-out personnel car-rier and additional target vehicles forthe artillery training school.

The panorama of the battlefield fromthe plateau is breathtaking. The sceneis also quite sobering, and I feel a sud-den sense of awareness toward the menof Task Force Baum.

It is almost as if I have stepped backin time 50 years and the drama is aboutto reach its final climax.

At 0500 hours on March 28th, 1945,the column of men returning to the la-ger is barely half a mile from the taskforce when they hear a familiar sound.It is the sound of tanks and men dig-ging in and preparing for battle. Unfor-tunately, the sounds are not comingfrom the task force, but from Koehl’spanzerjager platoon! After waiting 10

The old cobblestone road that Baum’s task force took, looking back toward Hammelburg.

28 ARMOR — September-October 1996

hours for fuel and ammunition, theyare now maneuvering into position,waiting for daylight. Ironically, none ofColonel Goode’s men returning to thesafety of the lager thought to send arunner back to warn CPT Baum oftheir discovery. Could they have allbeen so dispirited and exhausted fromthe last 12 hours of emotional ups anddowns that they overlooked this criticalpoint? In the meantime, even more ac-tivity was occurring in the Germanranks. A team of 20 officers and cadetswere quietly positioning themselves inthe woods just above the plateau and tothe rear of where Baum’s men weremaking final preparations for thebreakout. These men had followed thetask force during the confusion andwere armed with panzerfausts. Justprior to daybreak, they were in theReussenberg Woods and were wideawake with anticipation of the comingdawn. In the task force, however, someof the men had finally fallen asleep af-ter days of having none. Their sleepwould be short-lived.

The seriously wounded men whowere still with Baum, and who were inno condition to endure the journeyback to the front lines, were taken onstretchers to a nearby barn and made ascomfortable as possible with extrablankets. A large cloth red cross wasthen fashioned on the roof, visible indaylight. Baum gave the order tomount up at about 0800 hours.

In the German headquarters, OberstHoepple’s aide awakened him at 0730hours and told him that the Americantanks were visible on the hillside justabove Koehl’s position and below theReussenberg Woods. At this point,Hoepple radioed coordinated instruc-tions to the various units surroundingthe task force. No one was to fire untilKoehl’s antitank guns opened up, andthen everyone was to fire at will!

At 0810 hours, CPT Baum was stillissuing the final commands to his menbefore the breakout. His radioman wastransmitting a situation report to theAmerican lines and advising them theymight require air support later. As thetanks roared to life and began movingtowards their preassigned positions,and with many of the men still on footand hurrying to mount vehicles, it hap-pened! “A sheet of Hell engulfed theclearing... The ground shook with con-cussion after concussion... Geysers ofdirt and steel were thrown up... Trees

were falling over, and branches wereflying through the air and floating tothe earth... To Baum it seemed asthough a single enemy salvo had ut-terly destroyed his task force... Tankswere ablaze... Halftracks stopped sud-denly... and men were spilled out overthe ground. From his jeep and using hisfield glasses, he saw Koehl’s five anti-tank guns moving up the hillside to-ward him and firing faster than he hadever seen them fire before. They were,he thought, firing like semi-automaticrifles... Scanning across the slope in an-other direction, he saw five tanks firingtheir main guns as well as their ma-chine guns. All of the units were sup-ported by infantry, also firing and mov-ing up rapidly. The fire was so intensethat Baum never had a chance to dealwith the panzerfaust fire coming fromhis rear. The one bright spot occurredwhen he saw many of his tankers re-turning fire... The attack was so over-whelming... and unremitting... and un-commonly accurate.1

Within three minutes of Baum’s orderto move, “the entire clearing seemed tobe one single sheet of flame, every ve-hicle was hit... It was then he knew hehad lost his task force.”1

Sidles was still on the radio, tappingout the final message from Task ForceBaum in Morse code: “Task ForceBaum surrounded. Under heavy fire.Request air support.” Sadly, severalrounds struck the barn sheltering thewounded and the stone walls support-ing it collapsed in on the men. It wasdoubtful that any had survived.

“Every man for himself,” Baumshouted as he leapt from his jeep andheaded into the woods. He soon foundcover with Sidles and Stiller. He

guessed that fewer than a hundred menhad made it to the woods. The last or-der shouted to his men was, “Fanout...make your way west in groups oftwos and threes, and go your own wayso you won’t be visible. Get as muchdistance between you and them beforethey get here. Get going!”1

With these last hurried orders, TaskForce Baum had effectively disinte-grated. It was a great effort, and notwithout many successes. Although theprimary mission failed, the havoc cre-ated this far behind enemy lines hadoccupied the Germans for the betterpart of two days as they ran around incircles trying to figure out what wasgoing on. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army’s3rd and 7th Armies were making rapidprogress.

In addition, there were so many actsof bravery and heroism that everyoneshould have gotten a medal. As itturned out, I am not sure that they didnot. I know of at least fifty SilverStars, one Distinguished Service Cross(Baum’s), and more than one hundredPurple Hearts, (Baum got three), aswell as Bronze Stars for everyone.(Baum got one also.)

As I walk into the dense woods be-hind the plateau, I envision the may-hem that had taken place here that fate-ful morning. Men running in all direc-tions, trying to remain alive and alsoattempting to escape. T/SGT Grahamwas one of a few who accomplishedthis feat. He eventually made it back tothe 7th U.S. Army sector after severaldays of close encounters with the en-emy. CPT Baum and LT Baron werenot as fortunate, however, and endedup back in the lager, thrown togetherby fate and still 25 years away from

The Hammelburg camp’s hospital, where Waters, and later Baum, were treated after the fail-ure of the raid and capture of members of Baum’s force.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 29

telling the world in writing of this ad-venture.

As I take one last look around thefloor of the woods for a souvenir ofthis moment in history, I remember thatCPT Baum was still thinking clearlyenough at this stage to throw his dogtags into the forest as he ran. He didthis because they were imprinted withthe letter ‘H,’ for Hebrew, and he waswell aware of the many atrocity storiesthat had been told about Jews in Nazicaptivity. As it turned out later, he wasnever identified nor discovered by theGermans in the lager as the leader ofthe mission. It was not conceivable tothem that all this havoc had been cre-ated by a 24-year-old captain; they hadbeen searching for a much higher-rank-ing officer. It is unclear what happenedto Stiller after his capture and he is notmentioned again in any of the manu-scripts at my disposal.

About one hundred yards from theedge of the woods, I began to look inearnest for the dogtags which AbeBaum discarded 50 years ago in hopesof the ultimate treasure find, but it wasnot to be. As I walked out of thewoods, the others were waiting, and aglance at my watch told me that wehad only 15 minutes until the live-fir-ing began. Not wishing to reliveBaum’s encounter to the fullest, I has-ten my pace. As we are driving out ofthe area, we are aware of German sol-diers in “camo” cover with radios and,yes, Panzerfausts too! The soldiers arepart of the training cadre and are wait-ing in foxholes for the artillery fire tobegin. Again, I am reminded of thetask force and how real this 50th Anni-versary tour had become.

Shortly after closing and locking thegate behind us, I hear the sounds of theguns firing in the distance, but my mis-sion has been completed.

In trying to establish a complete pic-ture of what happened, the followingcomments are of note:

Patton died denying publicly anyknowledge of his son-in-law being inHammelburg when he ordered the mis-sion. But on March 23rd, shortly beforeordering the raid, Patton had written aletter to his wife Beatrice: “We areheaded straight for John’s place andmay get there before he is moved.”Patton stated in his journal, publishedafter his death, “I can say this — thatthroughout the campaign in Europe, I

know of no error I made except that offailing to send a combat command toHammelburg.” Additionally, in hisbook, War As I Knew It, after realizingthat the raid had failed, Patton states, “Imade arrangements to reconstitute thetwo companies of the 4th Armored Di-vision, which we now knew was defi-nitely captured. After forcing a crossingover the Main east of Frankfurt, inwhich the captain in command wasslightly wounded, they continued theattack and reached the outskirts ofHammelburg (interesting that he refersto it as an attack). Here they ran intoelements of three German divisionswhich, as we had hoped, had beendrawn by their attack. (At this point, Ithink the general was “stretching it”somewhat.) While some of the tanks...and armored infantry engaged these di-visions, other tanks went to the prisoncamp, some six miles to the north, andreleased the prisoners. [Again, Pattondoes not mention Colonel Waters.]These tanks, accompanied by some1200 prisoners, rejoined the rest of theforce in the vicinity of Hammelburgand started back over the road they hadtaken. The following report was madeby my aide, MAJ Stiller, who was withthem but not in command [again nomention of Waters.] He suggested thatinstead of returning over the road al-ready used, the column strike north.The officer in charge declined that ad-vice and the column stopped to refuel.While engaged in this refueling, theywere attacked by three regiments ofGerman infantry from three differentdirections and scattered. When the con-fusion had cleared, MAJ Stiller, thecaptain in command of the force, andfive enlisted men continued to fight un-til they had used up all their ammuni-tion and had their vehicles destroyed,when they surrendered.”

This is the only mention of the raidthat the general saw fit to include in hisonly book on the war.

Because the mission was labeled TopSecret (GEN Patton’s influence contin-ued until 24 years after his death in1946), it was 25 years before MAJBaum and MAJ Baron told their storiesin book form.

I am indebted to both of them fortheir help and information. Withoutthem I could never have made thisjourney back in time. I also believethat, although many of the men of 4thArmored died and suffered in vain, the

story of the individual heroism andcourage of these men remains as one ofthe great military feats of all time.

Endnotes1RAID, Baron, Baum, and Goldhurst, N.Y.,

Putnam and Sons, 1981.2Personal Interview, Richard Baron, 5 Jan 95.3Personal interview, Charles Graham, 7 Jan

95.4Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,

Pa., 1703-5008.5“The Hammelburg Affair,” Martin Blumen-

son, Army, 15 Oct 65.6Personal interview, Abe Baum, February

1995.7War As I Knew It, George S, Patton, Jr.,

Houghton Mifflin, 1947, pp. 280-281.8Patton’s Best, Frankel and Smith, Hawthorn,

1978, pp. 140-170.9Baum, A.J., “Notes on Task Force Baum,”

4th Armored Division report, 10 Apr 45.10The Mighty Endeavor, Charles MacDonald,

Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 460-461.1148 Hours to Hammelburg, Charles Whiting,

Ballantine Books, 1970.12The Last 100 Days, John Toland, Random

House, 1966.13Telephone interview and materials sent by

COL James Leach, DSC, 4th Armored Histo-rian.

14Telephone interview and materials sent bySGT Sam Schenker, Secretary, 4th ArmoredDivision Association.

30 ARMOR — September-October 1996

Richard Whitaker, A.A./B.S.University of California atSan Jose, is a 55-year-oldformer U.S. Marine Air Re-servist and ardent collectorand writer of military history.He has written articles onsmall and unusual battles forthe Medal Collector, the jour-nal published by the Ordersand Medals Society of Amer-ica. He lives in Los Gatoswith his wife, Christine. Hewould be happy to hear fromany of the other survivors ofthe raid on Hammelburg.

“It’s against anyone’s nature to rushheadlong into gunfire. But, for the com-mander, it’s pride that pushes him. Andfor his men, it’s the sight of the com-mander in front of them. At such mo-ments you cannot hesitate.”

(CPT Francois Lecointre, FrenchArmy in NYT Times Fax, p. 2, June 6,1995)

The history of the profession of armsis filled with the exploits of leaderswho led from the front. Young Lieuten-ant Rommel led the bulk of the Würt-temburg Mountain Battalion in the sei-zure of Mount Matajur during the Ital-ian campaigns of World War I. Hewrote of these feats of arms in InfantryAttacks. He inspired his soldiers byplacing himself at the decisive point ofaction and led from the front.Guderian, when serving as a corpscommander in the Battle for France in1940, led his corps from the front.When Guderian’s lead infantry regi-ments were crossing the Meuse underFrench fire, he was at this decisivepoint to better direct the actions of allother arms and fires in support of thecrossing effort. Lieutenant ColonelCreighton Abrams led his battalionfrom the front throughout World WarII. General Patton led from the front asa brigade commander in World War Iand as an army commander in WorldWar II. He directed efforts on thebeachhead at Gela, Sicily, during Op-eration Husky, and was present whenthe Hermann Goering division counter-attacked the beachhead.

The trait these great leaders sharedwas leading from the front, as a visibleexample to the soldiers they led intobattle.

The Armor School, during the ArmorOfficer Basic Course (in 1977), taughtthree means of reinforcing the main ef-

fort. These were: priority of fires,placement of the reserve, and the pres-ence of the commander. The advanceof technology has made this practiceless and less likely, the higher in thechain of command an officer goes.Conceivably, we will end up like theplatoon leader in the movie Aliens,where the lieutenant stayed in the land-ing craft to be in a position to over-watch his platoon’s monitors.

Rapidly advancing command andcontrol technology is forcing com-manders at nearly every level to remainin the command post to be near themonitors that give them the situationalawareness to “see” the entire battle andremain in contact with higher head-quarters. Indeed, we have found a Na-poleonic “hill” from which to see theentire field. Yet this capability removesa key morale factor from the fight, thepresence of the commander.

The recent experience of 3d Squad-ron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment inHaiti is a prime example. During itsdeployment, the squadron was outfittedwith cameras that mounted on the bar-rels of the scouts’ rifles. These camerasconnected to the squadron tactical op-erations center through the radio,thence to the Pentagon. The Army Staffcan now watch squad fights from theultimate in foxholes. This experimentin technology raises the specter ofMoltke the Elder, sitting in his railroadcar, sending telegraph messages to hisfar-flung armies during the battle ofKoeniggratz. Moltke never saw the bat-tlefield, rather remaining aloof from thefight and sending and receiving reports.What is wrong with this picture?

John Keegan wrote of “post-heroic”leadership in his work, The Mask ofCommand. His conclusion: that in the

nuclear age a leader should not, indeedcould not, be heroic — especially atthe national level. This was unquestion-ably true when the threat of mutuallyassured destruction hung over theplanet. But the extension of this con-clusion into the tactical and operationalrealm is incorrect. Keegan also pointsout the imperatives of command thatdefined leadership in the past: kinshipwith common soldiers, sanction of re-wards and punishments according tocommon values, leadership by exam-ple, prescription of risk-taking to sub-ordinates, and direct action in puttingthese principles into effect (p. 343ff,The Mask of Command). These impera-tives still have a place in the militaryart, and we cannot let technologyeliminate these imperatives of com-mand.

Keegan also briefly touched on thevelocity of events, both in their report-ing and response. We have seen manyexamples of this in the past five years,from Kuwait to Haiti. The need for in-formation is such that, for example,everywhere the XVIII Airborne Corpsmain headquarters goes, CNN follows,both within the headquarters as ameans of receiving information, andoutside as reporters. The world of op-erations other than war (OOTW) placesthe rings of strategic, operational, andtactical arenas within each other, as op-posed to the traditional concept ofmerely overlapping. The pace of eventsdemands that a leader remain abreast ofevents on the world stage.

There are times when the properplace for the commander IS in theheadquarters. Here, he can detach him-self from the mundane and think. Thereare also times, even in the world of op-erations other than war, when the placefor the commander is at the decisivepoint or the point of danger. The com-

ARMOR — September-October 1996 31

Leadership...And Command and Control

by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson

mander and his staff must retain thebond with the soldiers who daily takethe risk of executing the orders of thehigher commander. Kinship is still avalid imperative. As Keegan wrote,“Those who impose risk must be seento share it...” (p. 329, The Mask ofCommand). Our technology for com-mand and control increasingly puts themeans of control in the headquarters.

Consider the following hypotheticalscenario: An Army corps is selected asthe nucleus for a JTF, which will planand lead a forcible entry of an islandnation. When the corps commandertakes the first briefing on the operation,his planners recommend that he com-mand from the USS Mount Whitney,where he’ll be able to control the entireJTF fight, while maintaining contactwith the regional commander-in-chief(CINC). Stating that a visit to the frontis worth one thousand reports, thecorps commander states he will take asmall assault headquarters in with thelater assault echelons of the forcibleentry. When this intention becomesknown, the CINC worries that he willnot be able to talk to the corps/JTFcommander while in transit. As theplanning proceeds, it becomes apparentthat the commander of the JTF needsto be in a position to respond to theCINC and national leaders, the media,and the requirements of the battlefield,simultaneously and in real time. TheUSS Mount Whitney provides such amedium, allowing the commander ac-cess to the electronic high ground andthe ability to visit the front.

The command ship provides securityand no drain on shore facilities, whichare at a premium during the initialphases of the operation. The availabil-ity of a U.S. Navy helicopter allows theCJTF to quickly speed to the decisivepoint when necessary. Indeed, the heli-copter in this operation becomes thecommander’s “horse” carrying him toand from the place on the field requir-ing his presence. The technology to en-sure instant voice and video communi-cation contact is currently available at

higher headquarters and on specificplatforms such as the USS Mount Whit-ney. While this appears to be a reason-able compromise, it does remove anoption from the commander’s range ofdecisions. The commander CANNOTdecide that he will accompany the in-itial assault, even if that is the right de-cision. This concentration of technol-ogy makes the apparent risk of thecommander at the decisive pointgreater; he may not be in communica-tion with the command and controlmeans necessary to direct a far-flungtask force. This is a mistake.

We must give the commander thefreedom to go to the point of action,while retaining contact with the meansof control and the situational awarenessafforded by the electronic “highground.” Doctrine remains the engineof change. FM 100-5, Operations, re-tains the essence of military leadershipby stressing the art of command andthe science of control. Commanderscommand, staffs control. The thrust ofour drive for technology, especially inthe area of information management,must afford us this means. Technologymust allow the JTF commander the ca-pability to lead at the decisive point —whether the mission is a parachute as-sault, amphibious raid, or maritime in-terdiction operation — while simulta-neously controlling the entire JTF fight.

The emerging new world order (ordisorder, as it appears) brings with itnew missions for the armed forces. Themissions themselves are strange, andsome are even distasteful. The require-ments range from winning a “DesertStorm” type war to UN operations inHaiti and Macedonia. The definition ofthe vital national interest of the UnitedStates will undoubtedly change as thenew powers within the world jockeyfor position. We may even face the de-mise of the influence of the nation-state, as Martin van Creveld spoke ofin The Transformation of War. Never-theless, the requirements of the com-mander will remain the same: lead byexample, share danger, and take deci-

sions based upon the best informationavailable. Call it coup d’oeil, finger-spitzengefuehl, or situational aware-ness, but the commander requires tech-nology that gives him the freedom togo to the decisive point and retain theadvantages of the technological “Napo-leonic hill.”

The changing world is unpredictable.The changes in vital national interests,as well as the increasing frequency ofOOTW-type operations, will increasethe demands on our entire force. Thenature of the combined arms team willchange, although the concept remainsthe same: the effects of all arms underthe command of one commander, sup-ported by one staff.

The constant in this changing world,even in the era of “post-heroic” war-fare, is the commander. As GeneralPatton said, “Staff systems and me-chanical communications are valuable,but above and beyond them must bethe commander; not as a disembodiedbrain linked to his men by lines of wireand waves of ether, but as a livingpresence, an all-pervading, visible per-sonality. The unleavened bread ofknowledge will sustain life, but it isdull fare unless seasoned by the yeastof personality” (p. 56, Leadership,Cavalry & Armor Heritage series).

32 ARMOR — September-October 1996

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M.Benson is the executive officerof the 2d Armored Cavalry Regi-ment. He has served in armorbattalions and cavalry squad-rons in the U.S. and Europe. Healso served on the staff of XVIIIAirborne Corps. Most recentlyhe served as the Chief of Staff,U.S. Forces Haiti. He has beenpublished in Military Review,ARMOR, Infantry, and SpecialOperations magazines.

“The world of operations other than war (OOTW)places the rings of strategic, operational, and tac-tical arenas within each other, as opposed to thetraditional concept of merely overlapping. Thepace of events demands that a leader remainabreast of events on the world stage....”

History, heraldry, and heroes. The Ar-mor and Cavalry Regimental Systemkeeps all three of these alive in ourmounted force. Every battalion orsquadron carries before it the colors ofa particular regiment. Emblazoned onthose colors are the crest and motto ofthe regiment, framed in the campaignstreamers of past battles which adornits staff — battles which made ourforefathers and their comrades heroes.They fought, bled, and often made theultimate sacrifice for their brothers-in-arms, unit, and country.

The regiment and its traditions pro-vide a vital link to that past and an im-portant tool in building unit cohesion,pride, and esprit de corps.

Most soldiers affiliate with regimentsfor a variety of reasons: it was theirfirst active duty assignment; they as-sumed command within that regiment;they have combat experience with theunit, or they want an assignment to apost that is home to a battalion of thatregiment. Whatever the reason, it isusually with some amount of pride thata soldier wears his chosen regiment’screst on his uniform and barks theunit’s motto when challenged.

The Armor and Cavalry force is cur-rently finishing a massive series of re-designations as a result of the draw-down and restructuring of Army forcesworldwide. The dizzying rearrange-ment of unit designations in the last 12months has caused a degree of conster-nation among the mounted force —new patches to sew on, crests to buy,and new mottoes, songs, and historiesto learn. What was once a dependableelement in the unit has now departed,like so many soldiers who PCS. Withthe new set of colors comes a couple ofdedicated spokesmen and champions of

the regiment: the Honorary Coloneland Honorary Sergeant Major.

An example of such a champion isMG(R) Ronald Fairfield, Jr., HonoraryColonel of the 69th Armored Regi-ment. A combat veteran of three warsand former battalion commander of 1-69 Armor, MG Fairfield was appointedthe Honorary Colonel of the 69th Ar-mor Regiment by the Secretary of theArmy in 1987. During his tours asHCOR, he was the guest of honor at 10of 11 battalion changes of commandwith the two battalions of the 69th sta-tioned in CONUS — 2-69 and 3-69 re-spectively. He also conducted annualprofessional development seminars forboth officers and NCOs, and wrote anaverage of 25 flag letters a month rec-ognizing achievements by soldiers ofthe battalions. MG(R) Fairfield encour-ages units to, “Invite their HonoraryColonels for a visit so they can contactand get to know the soldiers.” Themost important thing the HonoraryColonel can contribute to the membersof his regiment, according to MG(R)Fairfield, is heritage. “They can com-bine that past with the heritage they aremaking today, every day, and carryboth with them into the future. Heri-tage is what the regiment is all about,the heritage that was, is today, and willbe tomorrow.”

As the Army force structure stabilizesand we become a CONUS-based con-tingency force, the esprit, teamwork,and sense of belonging afforded by theRegimental System takes on evengreater importance. The best tool in acommander’s bag for energizing pridein his battalion or squadron’s regimentis the Honorary Program of Colonelsand Sergeants Major of the Regiment.The purpose of the honorary programis to provide a link with historythrough the Honorary Colonel of theRegiment (HCOR) and the HonorarySergeant Major of the Regiment(HSGMOR). The primary mission ofthe soldiers holding these honorary po-sitions is to perpetuate the history andtraditions of the regiment, thereby en-hancing unit morale and esprit. This, inturn, helps the commander develoployalty and commitment in his troops,fosters a sense of belonging, and insti-tutionalizes the warfighting ethos. TheHCOR and HSGMOR are crediblesources who have lived through ourArmy’s brilliant history and can relaytheir feelings and experiences about

their respective regiments in times ofpeace and conflict.

All Honorary Colonels are retiredcommissioned officers in the rank ofcolonel or above with former service inthe regiment. The Honorary Colonel’sduties include: service as a liaison be-tween the regiment and regimental as-sociations, attending regimental func-tions and command ceremonies, par-ticipating in award ceremonies, speak-ing on the regiment’s history and tradi-tions at dining-ins and similar func-tions, assisting in historical professionaldevelopment programs for officers andNCOs, and presiding over regimentalcommittees. The Honorary SergeantMajor is a retired NCO in the rank ofsergeant first class or above who hasformer service with the regiment. TheHSGMOR’s duties are to assist theHCOR in perpetuating the history andlineage of the regiment and assist inmaintaining an honorary program andits many aspects as listed for theHCOR.

Incorporating these helpful and im-portant members into a unit’s activitiesis a matter of commitment on the partof battalion and brigade commanders.Nothing is free in the military and thisunfortunately applies to the HonoraryColonels and Sergeants Major program.Travel to both OCONUS/CONUS regi-mental functions is done by invitationaltravel orders funded by the installationor activity requesting the HCOR’s orHSGMOR’s presence. Reimbursementof incidental costs is not authorized,but regimental associations may be es-tablished to support honorary positions.

The Honorary Colonel and SergeantMajor can be a tremendous addition toa unit’s regimental association, provid-ing valuable role models for both offi-cers and NCOs. A list containing names,locations, and biographies of the cur-rent HCORs and HSGMORs is main-tained by the Armor Proponency Divi-sion of the Office, Chief of Armor(OCOA). The OCOA pamphlet, ArmorRegimental System, 1996 contains com-plete information on the Armor Regi-mental System, including current activeregiments and HCORs/HSGMORs.This Fort Knox publication can be ob-tained by calling OCOA directly atDSN 464-3188/1368, Commercial (502)624-3188/1368, or by calling ArmorWide Training Support (AWTS) atDSN 464-2987, 24-Hr FAX 464-7554.

Honorary ColonelsCan Re-energize Your Unit

by Captain Dave Clark

ARMOR — September-October 1996 33

Based on my experiences in Panamaas the commander of Company C, 3rdBattalion (Airborne), 73rd ArmoredRegiment, I would like to highlight theversatility of the M551A1 Sheridanlight tank. Its 152mm main gun, and its.50 caliber and coax machine guns,coupled with the modified M60A3 tankthermal sight (TTS) — arguably thebest tank-mounted thermal sight in theforce — produce an awesome amountof firepower, while its armor affordsthe crew a moderate level of protec-tion. Because of the vehicle’s compactdesign, light weight, parachute deploy-ability, and modest support require-ments, Sheridans deploy and maneuverwhere other heavier vehicles wouldbog down or be restricted. In short, theSheridan remains the only armored, di-rect-fire weapon that can accompanythe Airborne Infantry, beginning on thedrop zone at P-hour.

Strategic Forcible Entry

On two separate occasions during thePanama operation, the Sheridan dem-onstrated its ability to strategically de-ploy. The first involved secretly air-landing one platoon of four Sheridans,two pallets of ammunition, twoHMMWVs, a trailer, and 25 personnelon a single C5 Galaxy transport intoHoward AFB, Panama. Once on theground, four HETs quickly moved tothe rear of the aircraft, and the Sheri-dans were off-loaded, covered, andmoving out the front gate, on their wayto their hide position — all before day-light. The second and larger deploy-ment of ten Sheridans attached to 1stBrigade, 82d Airborne Division con-ducted history’s first combat heavydrop of armored vehicles from six C-141 aircraft, into enemy territory, with

eight surviving the drop. As the Sheri-dans were readied for combat andcrewed, they formed the nucleus of thebrigade’s firepower. Initial missionswere to deter counterattack and supportthe infantry’s simultaneous assault onfour D-day objectives.

Striking the D-day Targets Forcing Roadblocks

Our first encounter with the Panama-nian Defense Force (PDF) occurred asthe infantrymen of 1st Battalion, 504Parachute Infantry Regiment, were es-tablishing a supply route from Tocu-men International Airport to their initialobjective of Tinajitas. The convoy hadonly moved a few kilometers when itstopped to clear a roadblock located ona bridge. As the Sheridans moved tothe edge of the highway to support theinfantry, SSG Troxell, the lead tankcommander, called me on the radio andstated, “This is a hell of a place for anobstacle, buildings all around and nocover. It looks like swamps on bothsides of the road.” As the infantry dis-mounted and began to execute their ob-stacle drill, they began receiving auto-matic weapons fire from the buildingsno more than 50 meters away. The leadtank commander opened up with .50caliber fire as the wing tank com-mander screamed to his gunner to iden-tify the threat. A moment later, SFCFreeman, 1st Platoon sergeant, yelled,“I got ’em, concrete building, secondfloor, fourth window from the right.”He fired a 152mm heat round at thetarget, ripping through the room, col-lapsing the right side of the building.The enemy fire stopped and the infan-try finished clearing the roadblock.

Later that day, along the same route,we encountered another roadblock.

This barrier was well made, with carswired together and what appeared to bepropane tanks inside. Quickly analyz-ing the situation, we decided againstthe normal obstacle drill and opted toclear the roadblock with a 152mm heatround instead. The TC identified themiddle red car, and the gunner engagedthe target. We had to wait a few min-utes for the fire to subside, and smoketo clear, then a Sheridan moved for-ward, pushing its way through thewreckage. There was no enemy re-sponse to our obstacle reduction, eventhough we were exposed for over fiveminutes. Maybe they had heard abouttheir buddies guarding the other road-block?

Urban Fighting at the Comandancia

At about the same time, fighting inand around La Comandancia was heat-ing up. The remaining PDF defenderswere going to stay and fight, so U.S.forces were preparing to go in afterthem. The 3rd Platoon leader, LTKozar, knew from the radio traffic thatfighting on the south wall of the Co-mandancia was intense. He was notsurprised to be ordered to move therewith a tank section and assist in theevacuation of wounded personnel.What did surprise him when he turnedthe corner was to see a burning M113and PDF soldiers using the Comandan-cia’s 10-foot-high wall as cover, shoot-ing in all directions. LT Kozar orderedhis gunner to, “take the wall out,” andwith one round make a hole largeenough to drive his tank into the build-ing’s courtyard. As the Sheridanclimbed what was left of the wall andbegan to enter, a bus attempting toblock its advance was halted by the152mm battlecarry HEAT round. With

34 ARMOR — September-October 1996

Operation Just Cause:The Armor-Infantry Team In the Close Fight

by Major Frank Sherman

enemy fire subdued, LT Kozar backedhis tank out, and the wounded wereevacuated without incident.

APERS Engagements

The next day, LT Jennings, 2d Pla-toon leader, and his wingman movedslowly through the jungle and over alight bridge guided by an infantrysquad from 4th Battalion, 325 AirborneInfantry Regiment. The battalion waspreparing to assault the PDF’s Ranger,Airborne, and Air Assault training base.LT Jennings was tasked to support byfire.

When the order was given to assault,the infantry commander used the Sheri-dan’s rear deck telephone to lift andshift the tank’s fire, helping to preventfratricide. The wingman overwatched aroad that was obscured by dense forest,which the AC-130 (SPECTRE) couldnot cover. During this assault, enemypersonnel were identified moving alongthis road, and the Sheridan respondedby firing a flechette round.

No enemy personnel attempted tocounterattack down that route.

The rules of engagement specifiedthat we identify a PDF soldier with aweapon or a combatant about to com-mit a hostile act before we could en-gage; hence, most of our engagementswere directed at stationary targets at arange of 50-400 meters. Only once didwe engage a moving target which oc-curred immediately after shooting two

rounds into a building and the infantrymoved forward to sort out the EPWs.The tanks were in the process of repo-sitioning when, from around the build-ing, came a yellow Toyota Corolla car-rying PDF members attempting to es-cape. SGT Pennington, the tank’s gun-ner, identified, fired, and hit the car be-fore it could enter the highway...at arange of 100 meters.

Uniquely Suited to Armor-Infantry Close Battles

While the M551A1 General Sheridanhas served the Army longer than anymount since the horse, it remains a le-thal and versatile weapon system. De-spite its age, Sheridan OR rates remainin the high 90s. Its unique ability to bedelivered by parachute during the cru-cial airborne assault phase of a forcedentry operation provides planners enor-mous flexibility — and the commanderon the ground an enormous advantage.In contingency operations whereMETT-T often will not require a sys-tem capable of defeating massed for-mations of state-of-the-art main battletanks, where airframes are alwaysscarce, and where the in-country roadnet frequently limits the utility of ournear 70-ton MBT, the M551A1 Sheri-dans of the Army’s parachute tank bat-talion continue to offer the commanderthe decisive edge.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 35

Major Frank Sherman is theoperations officer of 3/73 Armor,Fort Bragg, N.C.

Above, a 152-mm HEAT round from a Sheridan impacts on theComandancia, military headquarters of the Panamanian de-fense forces.

Above left, the concrete wall surrounding the Comandancia af-ter being penetrated by a 152-mm HEAT round.

At left, the remains of the bus that attempted to block LTKozar’s move into the Comandancia.

“During this assault, enemypersonnel were identified mov-ing along this road, and theSheridan responded by firing aflechette round.

No enemy personnel at-tempted to counterattack downthat route.”

The three-Bradley scout sectionmoves through the narrow back roadsconnecting the many Bosnian villagesthat line the Zone of Separation (ZOS).It is mid-afternoon, and the mountedpatrol is about to link up with the Ser-bian engineers who will provide secu-rity and ensure the destruction of theSerb bunkers along the confrontationline. The morning had been spent withelements of the Bosnian Army as theyremoved mines and marked minefields.The section would return to “Ft.Apache” (Lodgment Area Walker)around 1700, with enough time to grabchow, ensure the other section’s readi-ness for its night patrol, and prepare forthe nightly mission brief.

The evening would be spent execut-ing the necessary troop leading proce-dures and pre-combat inspections, en-suring their readiness for the next day’smission. Once that was complete, thenwould come the showers, a little AFN,maybe a movie, exercise, and the otheramenities provided by the 1st ArmoredDivision.

Scout Platoon

The many differing missions of Op-eration Joint Endeavor make a six-Bradley scout platoon a valuable asset.There has been much discussion onwhich vehicle is the best for use in apeacekeeping environment. [See AR-MOR, July/August 96 for one such dis-cusion. - Ed.] In making this decision,we must take into account the task or-ganization of the vehicles. This issuecan be examined by focusing on thethree main missions that ground forcesexecute in the other than war environ-ment in which we are currently de-ployed. They are mounted patrols,

lodgment area security, and checkpointoperations.

Mounted Patrols

The peacekeepers conduct daily dayand night patrols in and around theZOS. The M3A2 is well suited for thismission for a number of different rea-sons, but one of the most important isits maneuverability. The narrow roadsof Bosnia act as very restrictive terrain.The width of the M3A2 CFV (3.61meters) allows it to move through thecountry much more easily than anM1A1 (3.65 meters width). When com-pared to the M113 series, the CFV’sability to pivot steer makes it more ag-ile in areas where it is important to stayon the cleared route. Another formida-ble obstacle is the country’s great num-ber of reckless drivers. The M3A2 isnarrow enough to allow traffic to movein both directions and safely pass. Thisaids the M3A2 in performing its neigh-borhood patrols while displaying alarge, visible deterrent.

The M3A2, more so than aHMMWV or an M113, is a very im-posing fighting machine. In an environ-ment where only force is respected, theM3A2 easily fits the role. One of thefactors that makes the CFV such an in-timidating vehicle is visibility of itsthree turret-mounted weapons systems.The easily seen 25mm, TOW launcher,and coax provide a much more visibledeterrent than the single crew-servedweapons mounted on both theHMMWV and M113.

The size of the unit also makes thescout platoon a valuable asset. Sincephysical work is often done with thefactional elements, dismounted securityis vital. This characteristic makes the

scout platoon more able to conductthese missions, unlike the tank platoon,which is unable to provide both suffi-cient dismounted security and the abil-ity to fight their vehicles at the sametime. Also, one cannot overlook the sur-vivability advantage, both for the crewand the vehicle. The amount of armorprotection provided by the M3A2 pro-vides enhanced crew protection, andacts as a visible deterrent, especially tothose who are quicker to throw rocks atHMMWVs than Bradleys when deniedcandy or an MRE.

A good example of the CFV’s dura-bility was shown when the platoonleader’s Bradley in 3/B/1-1 Cavalry ranover an AP mine. The mine, whichwould have ruined the mobility of aHMMWV, inflicted no damage to theBradley.

Lodgment Area Security

The size of the unit, in both soldiersand vehicles, allows the six-Bradleyscout platoon to execute a number ofdifferent missions at once. For exam-ple, the platoon is able to run an effi-cient guard roster while conducting in-tensive vehicle maintenance. The pla-toon is also able to make good use ofthe time back at the lodgment area bymaximizing personnel recovery whileconducting concurrent training.

The lodgment areas in theater aresmall and restrictive in regard to motorpool space. This requires a vehicle thatnot only can move quickly, but onenarrow enough to maneuver throughthe lodgment areas. This gives thecommander the flexibility to eithermove one or all of his Bradleys tocover any disturbance. The biggest ad-vantage of having an M3A2 comes in

BALKAN REPORT III

The Six-BradleyScout Platoon In Bosnia

by First Lieutenant Frank Lozano

This article is the third to appear in the last three issuesdiscussing mobility in Bosnia. - Ed.

Bradleys at a Bosnia checkpoint.

36 ARMOR — September-October 1996

the form of available weapons systems.Since most lodgment areas are in built-up areas, there are a number of differ-ent threats. The M240 coax machinegun is excellent for taking care of anyclose dismounted or POV-mountedthreat, while the 25mm HE or AP dealswith any medium range threat. The25mm chain gun is an outstandingweapon for built-up areas. It is both ac-curate and destructive. The ability tominimize collateral damage is a keyfactor in peacekeeping operations. TheTOW, able to make the long range kill,is great for covering the many roadsthat are near the lodgment areas. Usedproperly, the M3A2 becomes an effec-tively lethal weapon for lodgment areasecurity.

Checkpoint Operations

Here again, the number of people andvehicles available in the six-Bradleyplatoon aid in the efficient manning ofcheckpoints. There are enough peopleto conduct vehicle and weapons main-tenance, concurrent training, andcheckpoint improvement, as well as al-lowing for a quick reaction force. Thepreferred approach is to occupy acheckpoint with an entire platoon, butthat is not always possible. With thesix-Bradley scout platoon, the com-mander has the flexibility to man twocheckpoints at the same time.

The M3A2 proves its worth duringcheckpoint operations by superbly ful-filling all of the necessary require-ments. The restrictive terrain, coupledwith the small areas of land that arecleared of mines, creates crampedcheckpoints with little room to maneu-ver vehicles. The CFV is narrow andquick enough to react to any distur-bance. Since most checkpoints are setup in the center of the ZOS, it is im-portant that they portray a formidable,as well as intimidating, presence. TheM3A2 is again preferable in this role toeither the HMMWV or M113. Asnoted previously, the weapons systemsand armor protection play a large factoras a visible deterrent.

Along with these characteristics, an-other important factor is the optics ofthe M3A2. On a checkpoint where 24-hour observation is key, good optics arevital. Since checkpoints are generally

set up in open areas, with good obser-vation and fields of fire, the platoon’sability to defend itself is important. Theoptics of the M3A2 allow for continualobservation of the surrounding domi-nating terrain and built-up areas. Al-though HMMWVs and M113-seriesvehicles can be outfitted with good op-tical systems, they are not standard onthese vehicles.

There are many characteristics of theM3A2 CFV that make it well-suitedfor peacekeeping operations. There isno vehicle that is completely suited forall aspects of peacekeeping, and itdoes, of course, take the proper integra-tion of all available assets to success-fully accomplish the many missions ofOperation Joint Endeavor. I do notdoubt that even though the M3A2alone is an intimidating factor in theZOS, the local factions as well as thelurking troublemakers are also wellaware of the M1A1 QRF platoon posi-tioned a few miles down the road.They are also aware of the artillery bat-tery prepositioned a few more milesaway. It is my opinion that the M3A2’sability to integrate maneuverability andsurvivability, its visible array of lethalweapons, and its superior optics makeit a superb vehicle for peacekeepingoperations. When the Bradley is organ-ized into a six-vehicle scout platoonconfiguration, it becomes a very valu-able asset to the commander who mustexecute a variety of peacekeeping mis-sions. It has proven its worth travelingthousands of patrol miles over the nar-row roads of Bosnia-Herzegovina andwill continue to do so for the durationof our mission.

“Since most checkpoints are set up in the center of the ZOS, it isimportant that they portray a formidable, as well as intimidating,presence. The M3A2 is again preferable in this role than either theHMMWV or M113.”

ARMOR — September-October 1996 37

First Lieutenant Frank Lozanowas commissioned in Armor in1993 as a Distinguished Mili-tary Graduate from Texas A&MUniversity. A graduate of AOBCand SPLC, he has served as atank platoon leader and scoutplatoon leader. He is currentlyexecutive officer of Troop A, 1-1 Cavalry, at Lodgment AreaWalker, Sebrenik, Bosnia-Her-zegovina.

Kentucky WindageDear Sirs:

Reading in the May-June issue aboutthe increased “lethality and fightability” ofthe enhanced M1A2, with its extensiveuse of digital electronics for target acqui-sition and target tracking, made me won-der if any younger readers knew how tar-get acquisition and target tracking wasdone fifty-odd years ago. I would like toquote a paragraph from the combat his-tory of the 704th Tank Destroyer Battal-ion, Fourth Armored Division, of GeneralPatton’s Third Army.

The time was September, 1944, theweapon was the 76mm, high-velocity an-titank rifle that armed the M-18 “Hellcat.”The gunner was SSG Phillip Hosey. Iquote from Phil Hosey.

“Near Nancy, France, betweenLuneville and Arracourt, we faced agroup of German tanks that had taken aposition one mile away, across a shallowopen valley. Our M-18s were in defilade,facing out over a small hill. Infantry ledthe way across the valley with three M-4sintermingled. The Krauts let them gethalfway across, then opened up with anti-tank fire from woods on the right. Theyimmediately KO’d two M-4s and drovethe infantry to the ground. Two Panthers,a Mark IV, and an assault gun came outof the woods and moved across our lineof fire at the distance of about a mile. Inhis position in our open turret, the tankcommander, SSG Hicklin, watched theirprogression through his glasses andcalled out the range: “Two thousandyards, moving at about ten mph.” Our ri-fle, with AP, had a muzzle velocity of2,700 fps, so it would take two secondsto arrive on target. The Krauts were mov-ing at fifteen feet per second, which letthem travel thirty feet in two seconds.Their lead tank was twenty feet long(from the book), so we led him a goodlength for a center shot. We laid on andfired. Voila, a hit! It struck two feet in frontof his rear drive idler. We then picked thelast tank and scored — he began toburn. The two intervening tanks were de-stroyed by two fast AP shots. So we gottwo Panthers, a Mark 4, and an assaultgun. Our 76mm rifle packed a goodpunch, even at two thousand yards. Wefelt that we had the best self-propelledantitank gun in the ETO.”

In spite of his Purple Hearts and contin-ued combat-related disabilities, Phil Hoseyhas provided many important first-handaccounts of his experiences for our com-bat history of the 704th Tank DestroyerBattalion.

CPT Richard R. Buchanan, MC (Ret.)Bn. Surgeon, 704th Tank Destroyer Bn.

Secretary/Historian, 704 TD Bn Assn.Wilmington, Ohio

The M-18 “Hellcat” Tank Destroyer.

Standing around the “deadpool”waiting for the platoon observer/con-troller to start his after-action review,the commander of A-11 looks around atthe blinking yellow lights. He finds ithard to believe that the entire platoonwas destroyed by one T-80 tank. Afterall, his platoon averaged 921 on TankTable VIII. His was the low score, andhe still ended with 897 points. At thetime, he was a little disappointed thathe didn’t get a distinguished score, buta superior score is pretty good, isn’t it?After all, the crew qualification table ischallenging, if not stressful and, ac-cording to FM 17-12-1-2, the tableshould be realistic within the safety andresource constraints of live fire tankranges.

After thinking some more, maybe heshould have ‘performed reconnaissanceby fire’ on the woodline. Maybe thatwould have drawn the T-80 out. And,what about “Actions on Contact”? Af-ter initial contact, the platoon didn’t re-spond. Nobody returned fire, and hedidn’t receive a contact report in timeto develop the situation. At least thiswas just a training experience, one hewouldn’t forget, and one he was surethe platoon observer/controller wouldn’tlet him forget.

The training program hadn’t been acomplete waste of time. At least gun-nery went well.

Comparing tank gunnery scores withresults at the Combat Training Centers,a clear-cut problem surfaces; platoonleaders need a combined leader andtactical training program. The Armorforce does not offer platoon leaders anadequate chance to transition from pre-cision gunnery to combat training.Moreover, our tank combat trainingprogram does not accurately depictwhat platoon leaders might encounterat a CTC or in combat. If the platoonfails, the company fails, and so,shouldn’t we at least consider changinga training program developed some 30-odd years ago?

The reason to change is to focus tankplatoon proficiency on warfightingskills and platoon leader proficiency infighting a platoon. Changes in environ-

ment no longer allow gunnery to be acrew-focused event, and as a platoon-focused event, the focus must be on theplatoon leader. Current tank and tacti-cal tables fail to provide a realisticchallenge to Force XXI tankers. Thetraining of the tank platoon via qualifi-cation of Tank Table XII, and achievingthe optimum training experience of-fered at the CTCs, should become thefocal point in development of a Tacti-cal Tank Table VIII which fully inte-grates the platoon leader, thus optimiz-ing the training of the platoon. As TTVIII currently stands, the platoonleader participates only as a tank com-mander. The platoon leader is not in-volved in tactical decisions, or much inthe development of his crews. Considerthe two primary training events in thedevelopment of a tank platoon leader:semi-annual gunnery and a CTC rota-tion. How does TT VIII help in prepar-ing the platoon leader for TT XII?More importantly, how, in the overallreadiness and training of a platoon,does TT VIII prepare a platoon leaderfor combat? Truthfully, TT VIII doesn’t;in essence, the Armor Corps is missingan excellent opportunity to train theplatoon leader, who is quite often oneof the youngest, most inexperiencedmembers of the platoon. Yet the pla-toon leader is responsible for the safety,welfare, and training of the platoon.

Gunnery tables should support ma-neuver through more tactically soundexecution with direct involvement ofthe platoon leader, especially given theconditions our gunnery manuals depict,“the tank platoon is the smallest ma-neuver element within a tank companyand the tank platoon is organized tofight as a unified element....” The train-ing of the platoon, and thus the platoonleader, clearly becomes the purpose ofrevising current tank gunnery tables.

Chapter 2, FM 17-15, further states“the command and control of combatelements are the biggest challengesfaced by combat leaders on the modernbattlefield... command has two vitalcomponents: decision-making and lead-ership.” Control at platoon level is de-fined further by the wingman concept.“Under battlefield conditions, the wing-

man concept facilitates control... tank 2orients on the platoon leader’s tank,while tank 3 orients on the platoon ser-geant’s (PSG) tank. The PSG orients onthe platoon leader’s tank.” Again, theplatoon leader is the focus.

Situational awareness is another criti-cal factor in understanding and master-ing control. Situational awareness isdescribed as “the ability to maintain aconstant clear mental picture of the tac-tical situation... For platoon leaders andPSGs... the key to making sound, quicktactical decisions. It allows them toform logical conclusions and to makedecisions that anticipate future eventsand information.” FM 17-15, Chapter2, section II. Developing situationalawareness as a skill is difficult, butparamount to success as a combatleader.

Seeing the battlefield, based on re-ports from the platoon, is critical tosuccess and the development of platoonleaders. Too often, platoons and pla-toon leaders who are successful in gun-nery fail to achieve similar results dur-ing CTC rotations. Primarily, this is adirect reflection of the platoon leader’sability to react and act in unfamiliarsituations. All gunnery tables are rote.Learn the fire commands, G2 thecourse, and you’re guaranteed somelevel of success. The problem is thatthe OPFOR doesn’t react the sameway; it doesn’t deploy on a given pieceof terrain the same every time. Is it re-alistic to expect the platoon leader togeneralize those skills from TTVII tothe fluid battlefield? So, why are wetraining precision gunnery to an ex-pected, unrealistic opposing force?Train proficiency in battlefield aware-ness, and success in gunnery and CTCrotations should increase. Only thenwill a platoon be able to accomplishwhat FM 17-15 says it can, “At themost fundamental level, battle space isthe three dimensional area in which theplatoon can acquire enemy forces andinfluence them with effective fires.”

The first major maneuver training ex-perience for a platoon leader is a CTCrotation. The learning curve is often toosteep, and doesn’t afford the platoon an

38 ARMOR — September-October 1996

Tank Combat Training: Tactical Tank Table VIII

by Captain Pat White and Lieutenant Colonel Karl Gunzelman

opportunity to digest and learn, becauseimmediately after CTC rotations, it’sback to garrison for three to fourmonths of gunnery prep (again, thatprecision training broken-up by weeksof duty company). With shrinkingtraining funds and downsizing almostcomplete, the Armor community needsto rethink the focus of tank combattraining. The Gunnery and Tactical De-partments at Ft. Knox should combineefforts in development of a trainingconcept which complies with advancedtechnology, limited funds, advancedsimulations, and audacious leaders inthe Armor Corps. More challenging ta-bles, combining leader and tactical de-velopment with precision gunnery tech-niques, would be more applicable.

With the focus on training platoonleaders, the time has come to rethinkour training strategy. Chapter 16 of FM17-12-1-2 states that, “tank gunnery ta-bles are designed to develop and testthe proficiency of individual, crew, andplatoon gunnery techniques at the ba-sic, intermediate, and advanced levelsfor both the active and reserve compo-nents.” Chapter 16 further states that“the series of engagements on each isintended to duplicate.... typical battle-field tasks under realistic firing condi-tions and against likely enemy targetarrays. Thirty years ago or more,when the tank tables were developed,Unit Conduct of Fire Trainers, platoongunnery trainers, and numerous gun-nery training devices did not exist.Knowledge and technology have ad-vanced greatly, and changes should beconsidered for tank combat training.The changes need not effect the ‘gate’system, but merely reemphasize thatthe ‘gates’ will be based on training theplatoon leader.

Currently, the Armor Corps is pre-sented with a double standard. FM 17-12-1-2, Chapter 14 states, “The tanktactical tables parallel the gunnery ta-bles; together these tables overcomethe deficiencies inherent to range train-ing. Preferably, the tactical tables areconducted in concert with the gunnerytables.” Honestly, how often does thathappen? How often does a unit traintactical tables in conjunction with thegunnery tables? According to our doc-trine, together the tables overcome thedeficiencies! Great! Of course, now wehave to refer to two separate FMs inorder to train Abrams tank gunnery andtactical proficiency through platoonlevel. How can we combine the tacticaltables and gunnery tables, providing arealistic training experience for the pla-toon leader and the platoon? First, the

Armor Corps must link gunnery todoctrine, tactics, techniques, and proce-dures of the developing Force XXI. Wemust link gunnery to FM 17-15 andARTEP 17-237-10-MTP, and, as men-tioned, refocus the ‘gate’ system to ac-commodate a Tactical VIII. The im-proved gate system would still containindividual qualification, crew qualifica-tion, and platoon qualification.

Individual qualification consists of theTank Crew Gunnery Skills Test(TCGST), but all crewmembers wouldbe required to pass all stations. The fo-cus of individual qualification wouldbecome familiarization and proficiencywith all aspects of the tank, possiblythrough a written test as well. Once theindividual effectively qualifies theTCGST and proficiency exam, Gate 1is complete.

Gate 2 would begin with crew certifi-cation, and be completed upon crewqualification. The platoon leader (PL)would begin training by fully partici-pating in the crew certification pro-gram. All PLs would have to be In-structor Operator (IO) certified. Thisserves two purposes. First, it fully inte-grates the PL into understanding thefunctions and use of the Unit Conductof Fire Trainer. Second, the PL wouldbegin his training in the tactical portionof Tactical VIII. As the IO, the PL be-gins tactical reporting, command andcontrol, and decision-making. As tar-gets appear, the scenario is relayed assuch, “A12, this is A11, enemy tanksvicinity TRP 2, engage and report,over.” The tank commander then takesaction, but must also report tacticallythrough contact reports and spot re-ports. Of course, the tank commandermust also issue a fire command. Usingthe advanced matrix, commanders canalso utilize the current TT VIII scenarioto train crew technical proficiency. TheUCOFT is a great tool for trainingcrew proficiency in fire control mal-functions. The ability to induce subsys-tem failures greatly enhances the levelof preparedness of crews prior to firingany main gun ammunition; however,the battalion and company command-ers must stress proper IO feedback.And, again, the platoon leader wouldbe the primary trainer, the quality con-trol manager, of the training of hiscrews. Thus would begin the tacticaltraining, reinforced by the technical as-pects of UCOFT.

Crew certification also consists of TTIV (Tank Crew Proficiency Course).This is the first time the platoon leaderwould begin training from his fighting

platform. Stress must be placed on theplatoon leader in reporting, directing,and moving his tank during TT IV. FM17-15 designates the platoon as thelowest level of a tank company. FieldManual 100-25 directs that we trainone level down, and evaluate two lev-els down; therefore, the platoon leaderwould initiate engagements for his tankcommanders on TT IV similar toUCOFT; however, during TT IV, theplatoon leader would report battlefieldinformation to the company com-mander. This training would reinforceUCOFT and prepare the platoon leaderfor Tactical VIII, and TT XII.

Crew qualification would begin withtraining intermediate tank gunnery ta-bles consistent with current standards;however, the platoon leader wouldagain be involved with reporting, dis-seminating information, controlling histanks, and moving on his tank. Crewqualification is complete upon qualifi-cation of the second gate, Tactical VIII.

Platoon certification focuses on theuse the Platoon Gunnery Trainer(PGT), Simulations Network (SIM-NET), and a Platoon Tactical Profi-ciency Course (PTPC). The PTPCwould be a combination of platoonMTPs and current tank tactical tables Gand H. The tanks would be equippedwith the Multiple Integrated Laser En-gagement System II. Platoon qualifica-tion would be qualification of TT XII.

Use of simulations, such as the UnitConduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT), Pla-toon Gunnery Trainer (PGT), and SIM-NET, in conjunction with home stationcertification programs, would ensuremaximum training for platoon leadersand bring crew proficiency levels up toa standard where the gunnery experi-ence more fully focuses on the platoonleader. Simulations are excellent forteaching the technical aspects of gun-nery. Leaders can induce errors andmalfunctions into the fire control sys-tem, and help the crew learn to dealroutinely with those malfunctions.

The proposed qualification courseconsists of any of a number of varyingscenarios; scenarios based on guidancefrom the company commander, recom-mended by the battalion commander,and approved by the division com-mander; scenarios driven by the tacticaldecisions of the tank commander andplatoon leader; scenarios which offer astandard, but challenge the tank crewand platoon leader and are based onany variety of “threat” doctrinal tem-plates.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 39

Development and execution of Tacti-cal VIII scenarios focuses on the pla-toon leader. Scenarios for Tactical VIIIare developed by combining FM 17-15and ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Focusingon the leader tasks in ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP, and applying these tasks todoctrinal concepts in FM 17-15 in-creases the proficiency of our platoonleadership. Reconnaissance by Fire isan example of an engagement in a pro-posed scenario. Perform Reconnais-sance by Fire, (17-3-0218) is an un-common task which is often not ap-plied in a tactical environment, often tothe detriment of the platoon, but is aneasy task to rehearse and practice.

The conditions for Recon by Firestate, “The platoon is operating in atactical environment, as part of a com-pany team attack where Threat contactis expected. The commander gives theplatoon permission to develop the situ-ation through reconnaissance by fire toflush the threat out of a suspected posi-tion. The threat consists of no morethan a platoon in hasty defensive posi-tions.” Task standard is “The platoonflushes the Threat from its position ordetermines that there is no Threat inthe position, with minimal expenditureof ammunition and time. No friendlylosses are incurred.” By studying theTask Condition and Standard, Reconby Fire could be the initial engagementfor Tactical VIII scenarios involvingAttack or Defense — the two primarymissions of a tank platoon.

There are five leader tasks under Re-con by Fire, 1) The platoon leader (PL)identifies the expected location(s) ofThreat contact, 2) The PL identifiesoverwatch position(s), 3) The PL issuesa FRAGO to the platoon to occupy theoverwatch position and to prepare toconduct reconnaissance by fire, 4) ThePL or PSG utilizes indirect fires, and 5)If indirect fires are not available or theindirect fires do not flush the Threat,the PL orders the platoon to conductreconnaissance by fire. The scenariowould be constructed in the followingmanner. The commander issues aFRAGO to the PL via FM, while theplatoon occupies an attack position.The PL determines likely Threat posi-tions and issues a FRAGO to the firingtank to occupy an overwatch positionon the course. The firing tank moves toidentified position, reports set, and pre-pares to engage. The PL issues the or-der, and the firing tank begins Reconby Fire of designated areas — firstwith crew served weapons. The towerthen presents Threat targets for the fir-

ing tank to destroy with main gun andmachine gun. The PL leader sends ap-propriate reports to the commander andTactical VIII continues based on deci-sions by the company commander.

Execute Actions on contact (17-3-0221) is a very necessary drill thatmust be practiced to perfection, andshould be included within the TacticalVIII scenarios. Again, Actions on Con-tact is an easy scenario to develop.Conditions are “the platoon is conduct-ing offensive operations in a tacticalenvironment, is moving, and encoun-ters a moving or stationary Threat tankor motorized rifle platoon. The Threatforce engages the platoon.” Task Stand-ard is “ the platoon returns fire, and theplatoon leader orders a contact drillwithin 15 seconds. No more than onetank is lost to hostile fire.” Leader tasksfor this scenario include, PL directs aplatoon battle drill; PL informs thecommander of Threat contact; and thePL sends a complete spot report to thecompany team commander.

Following Recon by Fire, the PLcould issue FRAGO for the firing tankto begin movement to a designatedPhase Line. The firing tank reportsREDCON 1 and begins movement. Asthe firing tank moves, the tower pre-sents Threat targets which present sig-natures representing enemy fire. Thefiring tank returns or initiates fires todestroy or suppress the enemy, seekscover or concealment, and alerts theplatoon leader with a contact report.The PL then directs a battle drill, andthe firing tank completes destruction ofthe enemy with direct fire.

Meanwhile, the PL informs the com-mander of Threat contact. Upon de-struction or suppression of the enemy,the PL sends a complete spot report tothe commander, and Tactical VIII con-tinues.

Scoring and evaluation would besimilar to current standards. Thechanges to scoring would involve tar-get exposure time, engagement range,and incorporation of tactical scoring.Qualification standards would onlyvary based on scenarios, 70% targetdestruction or suppression within allo-cated times still being a standard forqualification. The scoring still involvescrew cuts to include correct reportingprocedures (SALT format). Considera-tion to target presents may alter, but notthe 70%. How often in war do we get achance to pull off the range, conductdiagnostics, and continue when we areready?

Integrating FM 17-15 and ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP into Tactical VIII offersArmor the much needed combinationof Tactical Tables with Gunnery Tables.The integration allows home stationtraining to focus on one training event,and the result will be more competent,aggressive platoon leaders. TacticalVIII will also provide the base for suc-cess on TT XII, and CTC rotations.Development of a Tactical VIII wouldbe more challenging, realistic, andwould better prepare crews, platoons,and the platoon leader for combat thanour current gunnery models. Similar toany new concept, there are plenty ofbugs to be worked out, but with currentsimulations, the advances in technol-ogy, and the quality of armor/cavalrycrewmen, let’s present a challenging,gratifying training experience based onthe M1A1/M1A2 series tank, not a se-ries of tables — tactical and gunnery— based on the M48/M60 fleet.

40 ARMOR — September-October 1996

Captain Pat White is agraduate of the ClaremontColleges, California. He wascommissioned in Armor in1986. He has attended AOB,the Scout Platoon LeaderCourse, AOAC, and FAOAC.His former jobs include tankplatoon leader, scout platoonleader, and company XO with1-33 Armor, Ft. Lewis, Wash;tank company commanderwith the 2-32 Armor, Kirch-goens, Germany; and Oppos-ing Force Tank CompanyCommander, Combat Maneu-ver Training Center (CMTC),Hohenfels, Germany. He iscurrently an Armor com-pany/team observer controllerwith the Grizzly O/C Team,CMTC, Hohenfels, Germany.

Lieutenant Colonel Karl Gun-zelman was commissioned in1975. He has served in a vari-ety of command and staff po-sitions with the 2d Armored Di-vision, 3d Armored CavalryRegiment, and the 11th ACR.He is currently the Senior TaskForce O/C at CMTC, followingthe command of 3/3 ACR.

Today’s emphasis on achieving un-precedented levels of situational aware-ness by digitization of the battlefieldand visualization skills of battle com-mand requires a greater knowledge ofterrain than in the past. New and so-phisticated weapons, sensors, and com-mand and control methods demand de-tailed information for employment. Theability to gather and understand infor-mation about the terrain is critical toour success.

ST 71-3, Tactics Techniques and Pro-cedures for the Digitized Brigade out-lines the importance of more preciseterrain products to a digitized force,given the nature of its operations: “Thebrigade must integrate its combatpower at the right time and place toachieve the effects required to accom-plish the mission and protect theforce.” Listed as a capability critical tothe integration of the force is a “move-ment rate program” able to predictrates of movement of subordinate unitsalong independent approaches.

During the 1995 Armor Conference,the Army Corps of Engineers Water-ways Experiment Station displayedautomated mobility prediction softwarethat can provide this information; it iscalled Risk Based Mobility Modeling.The focus of this model is on groundmobility. It examines how various fac-tors, such as soil composition, slope,and precipitation, relate to terrain datafor any given area. Risk Based Mobil-ity Modeling can provide mobility esti-mates with a level of accuracy, detail,and precision impossible to achievethrough manual terrain analysis. Theprogram can be applied to movementof enemy forces or planning the move-ment of friendly forces.

At brigade and task force levels, theformal process of terrain analysis tradi-tionally belongs to the S2. It is a famil-iar sight to see S2s bent over a map,circling terrain features and making aneducated guess about the trafficabilityof terrain. Through a map analysis, theS2 seeks to define if the terrain is traf-ficable at all, where vehicles are likelyto be able to go, and how long it willtake to move through certain areas. Anautomated mobility prediction capabil-ity, such as Risk Based Mobility Mod-eling, will increase the quality and

quantity of terrain information andspeed its production. By reducing timeused to classify terrain (severely re-stricted, restricted, or unrestricted),more time is available to analyze thesignificance of terrain relative to en-emy and friendly force tactical situ-ations.

Currently, an automated terrain analy-sis capability is available to command-ers at division level. This resides at theDivision Topographic Engineer Detach-ment. The Topographic Engineer De-tachment supports the entire division,and has adequate conventional systemsto aid in terrain visualization. There areseveral factors that limit the adequacyof this support to meet future needs.

Operations other than war, force pro-tection operations, and other diverse re-quirements generated by the end of thecold war increased the burden on divi-sion topographic teams. With this in-creased workload, the Division Topo-graphic Detachment cannot adequatelyanswer the brigade commander’s re-quirements in a timely fashion whilestill responding to the needs of the di-vision commander.

The Topographic Engineer Detach-ment supports the entire division. Atbrigade or task force level, gettingtopographic support involves making arequest through intelligence channels tothe G2. Once a request is in the queue,the G2 sets the detachment’s priorities.The increased operational tempo ofdigitized forces requires that terrainanalysis be responsive and timely. Ifyour request is not high on the prioritylist, the support you get will be late incoming, probably too late for your pur-pose. Once again, the S2 will be left inthe corner drawing lines on a map andmaking a guess on terrain. A solution isgiving the brigade S2 an automated ter-rain analysis capability that addressesone of his, and his commander’s, prin-cipal concerns — mobility.

The All Source Analysis System(ASAS) WARLORD, projected to befielded to brigades, has limited terrainanalysis capabilities. The map and ter-rain tools currently resident on ASASWARLORD are Digital Feature Analy-sis Data (DFAD) and Digital TerrainElevation Data (DTED). DFAD pro-vides information on natural and man-

made features, such as vegetation, soilcomposition, roads, drainage, and ur-ban areas. DTED provides elevationdata. Both are good tools to aid a com-mander in terrain visualization and pro-vide some baseline information neededto perform mobility analysis. However,these applications cannot integrate thisinformation into mobility predictions.To adequately meet the needs of thecommander, the brigade requires a mo-bility prediction tool, like Risk BasedMobility Modeling, that can merge allvariables that affect mobility.

The Risk Based Mobility Model is aUNIX-based system potentially com-patible with the ASAS, being fieldedto divisions, and ASAS WARLORD,projected to be fielded at the brigadelevel. It complements the capabilitiesof DFAD and DTED. With DFAD andDTED, the S2 has information on thecharacteristics of the area. Risk BasedMobility merges the type of informa-tion found on DFAD and DTED withinformation on soil composition, pre-cipitation, etc., into predictions usefulfor intelligence, tactical maneuver, fireplanning, and battlefield logistics.

The capabilities of Risk Based Mobil-ity Modeling include standard IPBproducts, such as identification of unre-stricted, restricted, or severely restrictedterrain. These are principal considera-tions for Phase II of the IPB process,“Describe the Battlefield’s Effects,”and a major element in the develop-ment of the Modified Combined Obsta-cle Overlay (MCOO). Risk Based Mo-bility Modeling can further define traf-ficability based on the type of vehicle,(i.e., areas where tracked vehicles canmove).

Risk Based Mobility can take this astep further. Mobility analysis can betailored to specific characteristics ofenemy and friendly vehicles and for-mations (see Figure 1). In addition toidentification of unrestricted, restricted,or severely restricted terrain, RiskBased Mobility Modeling can render aprediction of the speed at which spe-cific vehicles can traverse an area. Fig-ure 2 illustrates cross country speed foran M1A1.

Other mobility studies analyze terrainbased on homogeneous soil composi-tion. The Risk Based Model compen-

ARMOR — September-October 1996 41

Mobility Analysis for the Digitized Brigadeby Captain Robert S. Mikaloff

42 ARMOR — September-October 1996

Figure 1

Figure 3Figure 2

These illustrations are intended to give readers afeel for the screen formats of the mapping system.Many of the fine details visible in the actual colorversions are not apparent in these black-and-whiterenderings.

Even in the black and white versions here, the ca-pability of the system to quickly reveal go and no-go areas can be appreciated. In the lower left illus-tration, the heavier lines show the optimum routesselected by the system.

sates for heterogeneous soil composi-tion as part of the mobility predictionalgorithm. Through a series of testscomparing actual movement rates ofvehicles and the predicted rate ofmovement, the differences are factoredinto the mobility predictions renderedby Risk Based Modeling. In addition,recent precipitation is accounted for inmobility predictions. The model addsfurther accuracy by allowing the userto consider subjective variables effect-ing mobility, such as the level of main-tenance of the vehicle and the profi-ciency of the driver. If levels of main-tenance and driver training can be gen-eralized to a unit, an adjustment forunit movement times is possible. Forexample, we know that enemy vehiclesare well maintained, but the training ofenemy drivers is generally poor. RiskBased Mobility accounts for these con-ditions and allows differences in move-ment time based on variance in drivertraining and vehicle maintenance. Fig-ure 3 identifies two routes from point Ato B. The time of travel between theseroutes is given in minimum, maximum,and average time. A good driver in awell maintained vehicle will take theminimum time, an average driver willtake the average time, and a poordriver the maximum time.

The most unique capability of RiskBased Modeling is its ability to predictrandom movement. This means themodel can identify a range of possibleroutes for vehicles. Using Risk BasedModeling, a start point and an endpoint are selected for analysis. Themodel identifies possible routes be-tween selected points for the type ofvehicle indicated and specifies the timeit will take for each route giving a bestcase, worst case, and average time. Theroutes identified in Figure 3 were iden-tified by picking a start point and anend point. The model identifies routesand the minimum, maximum, and aver-age time needed to traverse the routes.

To illustrate the utility of a mobilityprediction tool at brigade, consider thefollowing scenario. (Borrowed fromVirtual Kyrgyzstan III, a JANUS exer-cise held at Ft. Knox to validate theconcepts of ST 71-3, Tactics, Tech-niques, and Procedures for The Digit-ized Brigade.) The brigade was to at-tack an enemy mechanized division.The enemy division defended with twounderstrength brigades forward and atank brigade situated to their rear (seeFigure 4). The enemy tank brigade haddual missions of division reserve and

being lead element of a follow-on forcewhen the enemy division resumed theoffensive. The friendly brigade com-mander’s plan called for destroying theenemy tank brigade and the divisionartillery group simultaneously. By at-tacking them simultaneously he coulddefeat both the enemy defense and thecoming offensive operations. Thefriendly brigade commander’s schemeof maneuver called for infiltrating sub-ordinate mounted task forces throughthe enemy main defensive belt, thenconducting a near simultaneous attackagainst the enemy tank brigade and theenemy division artillery group. An airassault task force would be inserted tothe north between the enemy tank bri-gade and an artillery group present tosupport the future enemy offensive (seeFigure 5). Due to the non-linear natureof the battlefield, the friendly brigade

commander directed his S2 to developa graphic showing where and in whattime frame the enemy tank brigadecould move in any direction. Normally,the short time given to an S2 to de-velop this product demands that it bedone in the TOC and involves the S2guessing about the trafficability of theterrain, applying normal movementspeeds for that type unit, and develop-ing time phase lines to illustrate move-ment times (see Figure 6). The preci-sion and reliability of this product islow. With a mobility prediction tool,like Risk Based Mobility Modeling,this product is at the S2’s fingertips. Bypicking a series of start points and endpoints, as shown in Figure 3, the S2can develop a product that provides amobility estimate with much greaterprecision and speed than any manualproduct.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 43

DAG

AAGENEMY SITUATIONOPERATION VKIII

TANK BRIGADE

DAG

AAG

ROUTES OF ADVANCEOPERATION VKIII

TF 1-41 TF 1-70

TF 2-33

TF 1-327

PD

1 PD

2

PD

3

TANK BRIGADE

Figure 4

Figure 5

The application of mobility predictionsoftware is not limited to intelligence.As part of the same scenario, thescheme of maneuver called for all thesubordinate task forces to be in posi-tion to attack the enemy tank brigadeand division artillery group in a near-si-multaneous manner. During execution,the subordinate units crossed multiplepoints of departure at the same time.Resulting from inaccurate mobility pre-dictions, the unit with the shortest dis-tance to travel, TF 1-41, took the long-est to get in position (see Figure 6).This was due to the nature of the ter-rain along his route. The soil was soft,resulting in slower movement. Becausehis movement lagged behind the other

task forces, the brigade plan had to bealtered. Other units had to slow theirmovement and go into concealed posi-tions to wait for the slow task force toget into position. This gave the enemycommander time to react. He dispersedthe tank brigade into battalions andused them to counterattack (see Figure7).

Using an automated mobility predic-tion tool with the capabilities of RiskBased Modeling, movement times areindicated on routes selected by the taskforces. If a certain route is identified asunsuitable during analysis, an alternatecan be chosen. With more precision inplanning routes, and a better estimate

on movement times, the commandercan sequence departure times for sub-ordinate units allowing for the plannednear-simultaneous attack against theenemy tank brigade and division artil-lery group.

This scenario highlights the utilityand need for an automated mobilityprediction tool, at least at the brigadelevel. The information requirementsand high tempo of Force XXI opera-tions demand a terrain visualization aidthat can provide the commander accu-rate and useful mobility predictions. Ifresident at brigade level, this capabilitywould provide the commander an in-valuable decision-making aid with util-ity in both operations and intelligence,responsive to his needs before and dur-ing the battle.

During the Army’s transition from anindustrial age force to an informationage force, we are providing brigadecommanders the means to gain un-precedented situational awareness ofthe enemy and his own forces. To com-plete this, the commander needs a pre-cision tool to help him understand theterrain on which he will fight. An auto-mated mobility prediction applicationsuch as Risk Based Mobility Modelingprovides this tool.

DAG

AAGDOTTED LINES INDICATE5 MINUTE INTERVALS

ROUTES OF ADVANCEOPERATION VKIII

TF 1-41 TF 1-70

TF 2-33

TF 1-327

PD

1 PD

2

PD

3

TANK BRIGADE

44 ARMOR — September-October 1996

DAG

AAG

ROUTES OF ADVANCEOPERATION VKIII

TF 1-41 TF 1-70

TF 2-33

TF 1-327

PD

1 PD

2

PD

3

Captain Robert S. Mikaloffearned his commission in1985 through Officer Candi-date School. His previous as-signments include assistant S3,311th MI Battalion, 101st Air-borne (AASLT); S2, 2/327th In-fantry, 101st Airborne (AASLT);G2 ASPS Chief, 6th ID (L);company commander, HHSC,106th MI Battalion; and instruc-tor, Armor School. Recently, heserved as the S2 Trainer atthe Virtual Training Program,Ft. Knox. Currently, he is theUSAARMC Threat manager anda member of the AdvancedWarfighting Working Group.

The author would like tothank Dr. Niki C. Deliman ofthe U.S. Army Corps of Engi-neers Waterways ExperimentStation for technical advice inthe writing of this article.

Figure 7

Figure 6

One of the trends reinforced with thetransition to brigade operations at theNational Training Center is the inabil-ity to synchronize indirect fires andmaneuver to achieve the effects desiredfrom combined arms operations. Thetask force commander is not gettingtimely, accurate indirect fires. Therehave been a number of reasons identi-fied, some of which are related to thetraining level of the field artillery bat-talion staffs and firing units. However,it has become more and more evidentthat part of the problem is the task

force commander’s inability to under-stand his role in fire support planningas well as the role of the task force asan executor of the brigade scheme offires during brigade operations.

This article attempts to explain whatthe task force should expect from bri-gade as the ‘provider’ of indirect firesand clarify the role of the task forceand task force commander in fire sup-port planning. Although some of whatis contained in this article introducesnew terminology and may be consid-ered ‘emerging’ tactics, techniques andprocedures, there is a basis for thismethodology in FM 6-71, Tactics,Techniques and Procedures for FireSupport for Combined Arms Com-manders. These observations are alsobased on lessons learned during thefirst six brigade-level rotations at theNational Training Center. This articlealso offers a step-by-step approach totask force fire support planning.

Brigade’s Role: The brigade plays avital role in task force fire supportplanning and execution. With the ex-ception of the task force mortars, thebrigade is the ‘provider’ of indirectfires. Therefore, before we can accu-rately clarify the task force role in exe-cuting the brigade scheme of fires, it isnecessary to quickly review brigade’srole. The brigade develops a synchro-nized brigade scheme of maneuver andbrigade concept of fires, translating thatconcept into a scheme of fires.

There is no clear doctrinal definitionfor either concept of fires or scheme offires. For the purpose of this article,concept of fires, expressed in terms oftask, purpose, method, and endstate, isthe allocation of fire support assets toachieve a specific effect on an enemyformation with a visualized purposeand endstate to support the scheme of

maneuver. The scheme of fires is thedetailed sequencing of fire supportevents that must occur in order toachieve the endstate articulated in theconcept of fires.

The brigade concept usually assignsfire support tasks to subordinates. Aspart of the concept, it is brigade’s re-sponsibility to provide indirect fires tothe task force close/direct firefight.These fires are for a specific period oftime and a specific purpose. The bri-gade must clearly specify when fireswill transition to the task force andwhen the task force will lose them. Re-finements to the brigade scheme offires from subordinate units must alsobe integrated. Finally, the brigade inte-grates the movement of artillery unitswith the scheme of maneuver.

Brigade Role in Fire Support Planning

• Synchronize the brigade concept offires with brigade maneuver

• Develop brigade scheme of firesand assign tasks to subordinates

• Provide indirect fires for task forceclose/direct firefight (specified pe-riod of time and purpose - clearlydefining when fires transition to theTF close/direct firefight and whenthe task force will lose fires)

• Integrate refinements from subordi-nates

• Integrate movement of artilleryunits with scheme of maneuver

The Task Force Role: The task forceis the ‘executor’ of their portion of thebrigade scheme of fires. With the ex-ception of the task force mortars, thebrigade commander ‘owns’ the indirectfire assets. The artillery is normally in

ARMOR — September-October 1996 45

The Task Force Commander’s Role In Fire Support Planning

by Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Leiferman

“Army forces prefer to fightas a combined arms team...producing effects that aregreater than the sum of theindividual parts. The com-bined arms team strives toconduct fully integrated op-erations in the dimensions oftime, space, purpose and re-sources.... The goal is to con-fuse, demoralize and destroythe enemy with the coordi-nated impact of combatpower.... The sudden and dev-astating impact of combinedarms paralyzes the enemy’sresponse, leaving him ripe fordefeat.... The application ofcombined arms in this man-ner is complex and demand-ing. It requires detailed plan-ning and violent execution byhighly trained soldiers andunits who have been thor-oughly trained.”

FM 100-5

direct support (DS) of the brigade.Therefore, the task force must clearlyunderstand not only the brigade con-cept of fires, and how it is synchro-nized to support brigade maneuver, butthe task force’s role in the brigadescheme of fires so that the task forcecan execute its portion. Understandingthis, the task force must develop itsown concept of fires. This concept nor-mally involves assigned tasks from thebrigade scheme of fires along with tar-gets to support the task force close/di-rect firefight. This may require only therefinement of a brigade target or mayrequire the task force to submit newtargets to support the task force com-mander’s scheme of maneuver. Addi-tionally, the task force must plan tosynchronize mortar fires with thescheme of maneuver, integrate the mor-tars into the scheme of fires, and syn-chronize their movement with thescheme of maneuver. The task forcethen develops a scheme of fire thatsupports those tasks assigned by bri-gade and the targets developed by thetask force. It then issues the fire sup-port plan to its subordinates. Bottom-uprefinement to support the company/team commander’s scheme of maneu-ver will also be incorporated. The taskforce forwards a concept of fires andtarget refinements to brigade as soon aspossible to ensure it is fully integratedwith, and does not desynchronize, thebrigade scheme of fires. Finally, theplan must be rehearsed to ensure it isclearly understood. This process is theessence of the step-by-step approachthat will be discussed in more detaillater.

Task Force Role in Fire Support Planning

• Understand the integration of bri-gade maneuver and fires

• Understand task force role in bri-gade scheme of fires/maneuver

• Act as ‘executor’ of their portion ofbrigade scheme of fires

• Develop task force concept andscheme of fires

• Integrate/refine brigade targets forclose/direct fire fight

• Plan for the synchronization of TFmortars with the scheme of firesand their movement with thescheme of maneuver

• Bottom-up refinement from com-pany/teams

• Forward TF concept of fires andtarget refinements to brigade

• Rehearsals

Task Force Commander’s Role:Much of the following relates directlyto work being done at the NationalTraining Center on the abbreviatedplanning process. One lesson we havelearned with brigade operations is thattime for planning at the task force levelis very limited. A task force cannotplan to have sufficient time for the de-liberate planning process. This isequally true for planning indirect fires.

The key role of the task force com-mander in indirect fire planning is syn-chronization of indirect fires with thescheme of maneuver. Fires and maneu-ver must be considered together. Com-manders must first decide preciselywhat they want their fires to accom-plish. If the commander thinks maneu-ver first, and then tries to add fireslater, he will have difficulty.

Once he has decided what he wantsfires to accomplish, the commandermust take an active role in developingthe task force Concept of Fire Support.He must clearly articulate to his staff,not just his fire support officer, the ‘se-quenced’ critical fire support tasks interms of the desired effects for eachtarget; the purpose of each target as itrelates to the scheme of maneuver; themethod he would like to use to achievethe desired effects; and the endstate hewants for each target. This will be ex-plained in more detail later.

TF Commander’s Role in Fire Support Planning

• Synchronization of indirect fireswith maneuver

• Clearly articulate the task forceconcept of fires

• Articulate for each target the ‘se-quenced’

- Task in terms of desired effects- Purpose for each target (as it re-

lates to maneuver)- Method- Endstate

• Synchronization of mortars withconcept of fires and the scheme ofmaneuver

• Ensure the brigade commander/staffunderstand the importance of taskforce fires to the scheme of maneu-ver

It is worth noting here that once thetask force commander approves thescheme of fires, he must clearly articu-late to the brigade commander and bri-gade staff the importance of those firesto the task force scheme of maneuverand the impact on mission success ifthose fires are not received. If a taskforce critical fire support task is notalso included as a brigade critical firesupport task, the likelihood of gettingthe target fired by artillery or CAS isgreatly diminished.

Observations at the National TrainingCenter indicate that many commandersare unable to clearly define what theywant their fires to do, and cannot visu-alize their synchronization with maneu-ver. Of those that can, many cannot ar-ticulate their intent for fires to theirstaff. If they can, the level of trainingand experience of their staff and par-ticularly their fire support officer is notsufficient to translate that guidance intoa concept of fires. It is clear that, untiltime permits more deliberate planning,or until the staff and FSO become bet-ter trained, the task force commandermust take a more active role in devel-oping the concept of fires. He cannotafford to divorce himself from thisprocess.

Now that we have discussed the roleof the commander, as well as the roleof the brigade and task force in firesupport planning, what follows is onemethod of indirect fire planning at thetask force level. Again, it is important

46 ARMOR — September-October 1996

“Synchronization is arrang-ing activities in time andspace to mass at the decisivepoint.... Synchronization thustakes place first in the mindsof commanders and then inthe actual planning and coor-dination of movement, firesand support activities.”

FM 100-5

to note that this methodology is tied di-rectly to the abbreviated planning proc-ess and the commander’s role in abbre-viated planning.

Step 1: Mission Analysis Brief: Inorder to make the right decision aboutthe employment of his indirect fires,the commander must get certain infor-mation from his fire support officer.This is normally done during the Mis-sion Analysis Brief. The key informa-tion he must receive includes a clearunderstanding of the brigade scheme offires as those fires relate to the maneu-ver plan, a clear understanding of thetask force role as an ‘executor’ of itsportion of the brigade scheme of fires,and a clear picture of available indirectfire assets.

Step 2: Specify the Concept of FireSupport: (Note: One could argue thatthis step should be the ‘Commander’sIntent for Fire Support’ as part of thecommander’s planning guidance to hisstaff. This is probably true above thetask force level, where you have aplanning staff and a FSCOORD andcan effectively plan and execute simul-taneously. However, at the task forcelevel you do not have a planning cell,and most FSOs do not have the experi-ence of fire support planners at higherlevels and are unable to translate com-mander’s intent for fire support into aneffective, synchronized concept offires. Couple this with limited planningtime, and the result is a requirement forthe commander to specify the ‘conceptof fires’ as the next step rather thansimply provide his intent for fires.Time and training permitting, the ‘com-mander’s intent for fire support’ couldbe the second step at the task forcelevel.)

At the conclusion of the missionanalysis brief to the task force com-mander, the commander gives his plan-ning guidance to the staff. The com-mander specifies his maneuver courseof action, assigning maneuver task andpurpose to subordinate units. To ensuresynchronization of indirect fires withmaneuver, rather than giving only hisintent for fires, he must specify his con-cept of fire support. He does this byclearly articulating his ‘sequenced’critical fire support tasks. There is noclear definition of a critical fire supporttask. However, from a maneuver com-mander’s perspective, it is a fire sup-port task that, if not properly executed,

will have a severe impact on the abilityto accomplish the maneuver task itsupports. It is imperative that the com-mander personally establish the taskand purpose for each target. The FSOcan assist the commander in estab-lishing the method and endstate. Criti-cal fire support tasks should be ex-pressed in terms of...

The Task ...Although FM 6-20-10,The Targeting Process discusses taskand purpose in terms of disrupt, limit,and delay, at the maneuver task forcelevel it is more appropriate for the taskforce commander to state his tasks interms of the effects he desires... Sup-press, Destroy, Obscure, Screen. Theseeffects should be related to a specificenemy formation and/or function.

The Purpose ...of the fires as they re-late to the scheme of maneuver. This ishow the commander synchronizes indi-rect fires with maneuver.

The Method ...to achieve the desiredeffects (FA, mortars, CAS). At thispoint, the commander may have a pref-erence for delivery of indirect fires. Hemay specify that he wants to use hismortars; he may specify that his desireis to use artillery or CAS; he can leavedeveloping the method to his FSO.However, with the exception of speci-fying mortars, he must ‘negotiate’ withbrigade for artillery or CAS. Themethod may also be refined during thewargame.

The Endstate ...as it relates to the en-emy or friendly formation/function.Endstate at the task force level is oftenthe accomplishment of the task. How-ever, a statement of the endstate is stilldesired and can be developed by theFSO.

and Sequenced ...to clearly prioritizethe order the targets should be firedbased on the scheme of maneuver.Commanders must ensure that artilleryis available when required to supportthe scheme of maneuver. If the schemeof maneuver requires firing of morethan one critical fire support task at atime, the commander may have to ‘ap-portion ’ his assets to meet all theneeds. This ‘apportionment’ normallyoccurs at brigade level.

It may be worth noting here that notall critical fire support tasks have to befiring tasks. For example, the insertionof an observer to have eyes on a targetmay be so important that the com-mander specifies it as a critical firesupport task. Another example may bethe use of CAS or nonlethal EW fires.

Step 3: Wargame - Develop theScheme of Fires: The sequenced criti-cal fire support tasks specified by thecommander are a key component of thewargame. Proper wargaming will en-hance synchronization with maneuver.When time is limited, as it is for abbre-viated planning, the commander shouldparticipate in wargaming with his staff.During the wargame, the commanderand fire support officer may need tomake minor adjustments to the conceptof fires. What the wargame should ac-complish is flushing out the method ofachieving the desired effects — thescheme of fires. This scheme of firesmust be ‘nested’ in the brigade schemeof fires, focused on a few key tar-gets/critical fire support tasks, and linkobservers to firing tasks, firing unitsand an established schedule of fires.The wargame will refine the target lo-cations, means of delivery, target trig-gers, observer locations, movement and

ARMOR — September-October 1996 47

Mission Analysis Brief(FSO Input)

• Brigade Scheme of Fires • Assets Available/When- Higher Commander’s Concept of Fires - FIST status- Allocation of FPFs/priority TGTs - Mortar status/location- Current and on order FSCMs - CAS allocation- Specified and implied tasks - COLT allocation/location- Limitations- Priority of fires • Current Ammunition Status

- Number of killing missions• FA Organization For Combat Available (FA/MTR)

- Location - Smoke (length/duration)- When in position - FASCAM (# of disrupt, fix,

turn, block/releaseauthority)

- Number of Copperhead

positioning for the mortars, CFZs,NFAs, and Fire Support CoordinationMeasures (FSCMs). The fire supportofficer produces two key products dur-ing the wargame, the target overlay andthe fire support execution matrix. Thetarget overlay is often incorporatedwith the maneuver overlay. The schemeof fires must be forwarded to brigadeto ensure they incorporate the taskforce fires into the brigade concept.The fire support plan must also be dis-seminated to the task force.

Step 4: Rehearsals: Rehearsal of thefire support plan is the next criticalevent. The bottom line to all this plan-ning is ensuring that it is clearly under-stood by those who must execute it(subordinate co/tms, observers, etc.)and those who must support with fires(brigade, firing units, mortars). Themost important task force rehearsal isthe combined arms maneuver rehearsal.This rehearsal must integrate fully thefire support plan. Task force personnelshould also participate in the brigadefire support ‘technical’ rehearsal to en-sure the task force targets are incorpo-rated and synchronized in the brigadescheme of fires. Time permitting, thetask force should also conduct a firesupport rehearsal.

Step 5: Refinement: A plan is justthat — a plan. As new information isgained on the enemy, the fire supportplan must be updated. The staff mustensure that changes are coordinatedand disseminated. It is also a proventechnique to establish a ‘target cut-offtime.’ This is a time after which anychange to the fire support plan requiresapproval by the commander responsi-ble for the target. If a refined target lo-cation is determined after the targetcut-off time, shoot a grid mission. Thetask and desired effects, purpose andendstate should not change.

Before concluding this paper, thereare a few other important issues thatimpact on task force fire support plan-ning and execution.

High Value Targets/High PayoffTargets: (High Value Target (HVT) - atarget whose loss to the enemy can beexpected to contribute to substantialdegradation of an important battlefieldfunction; High Payoff Target (HPT) - atarget that, if successfully attacked, willcontribute to the success of our plan.)At the task force level, there seems tobe very little utility in identifying

HVTs or HPTs. Normally, they are des-ignated by the brigade commander andincorporated into his concept andscheme of fires. The issue with HVTsand HPTs is their synchronization withthe ‘sequenced’ critical fire supporttasks. Oftentimes, at the exact point inthe battle when the commander wants acritical fire support task fired to supporthis scheme of maneuver, someone callsan HVT/HPT, and because so desig-nated, the guns shift off the target in

order to fire somewhere else. If thecommander is going to designate andfire at HPTs and HVTs, they have to becarefully synchronized with critical firesupport tasks, and all observers mustclearly understand that the target mayonly be an HVT/HPT during a speci-fied time or phase in the battle. For ex-ample, AT-5s may be a HPT, but whenthe first echelon battalion is in yourface, the payoff is less than if the AT-5sare identified and destroyed earlier.

48 ARMOR — September-October 1996

“How To”Commander’s Critical Fire Support Tasks

Scenario: Your task force is the lead element in a brigade deliberate attackto destroy an MRB-size enemy. The enemy is defending with three MRCsabreast. You are the supporting effort. Your task is to breach the enemynorthern MRC, which cannot be supported with direct fires from the twosouthern MRCs. Your purpose is to allow the trail task force to pass throughthe breach you create in the enemy position and complete the destruction ofthe two remaining MRCs.

Maneuver Course of Action: Because planning time is short, part of yourcommander’s planning guidance to your staff, specifies a maneuver course ofaction that calls for a task force deliberate breach of the northern MRP. Youassign maneuver task and purpose to subordinate units: two company/teamswill suppress the two southern MRPs from support by fire positions to pro-tect the breach and assault forces; one company/team will breach the enemyobstacles and northern MRP to allow the assault force to pass through thebreach; and one company/team will pass through the breach and destroy theremainder of the northern MRC to allow the trail task force to pass throughthe breach and destroy the two southern MRCs.

Concept of Fires: To ensure synchronization of indirect fires with maneu-ver, you also specify your concept of fires. You develop three “Sequenced”Critical Fire Support Tasks (CFST) to support your scheme of maneuver.

CFST #1: First, I want to continuously suppress the northern MRC forapproximately 12 minutes — the time I estimate it will take to occupy thetwo SBFs. The purpose is to allow both company/teams to occupy their sup-port by fire positions without taking effective enemy direct fire. The methodI prefer to use is FA fires on a group target by one battalion of artillery. Theendstate is both co/tms in their SBFs without losses to enemy direct fire.

CFST #2: Next, I want to screen the point of penetration from the twosouthern MRPs of the northern MRC. The purpose is to prevent the enemyfrom engaging the breach force with direct fires until the breach is complete(approx. 30 minutes). I want to use our 20 minutes of mortar smoke initially— followed by generated smoke if wind conditions permit. This will free upFA fires for my last CFST. It is critical, however, that FA smoke be availableif wind conditions are not blowing in our favor. The endstate is both southernMRPs unable to bring effective direct fires on the breach force until thebreach is complete.

CFST #3: Finally, as the smoke builds, I want to shift FA fires and sup-press the two southern MRPs of the northern MRC. The purpose of thesefires is to allow the assault force to pass through the breach and build combatpower on the far side without taking effective direct fire from the two south-ern enemy platoons. Again, the method I prefer is FA fires on a group targetby one battalion of artillery. We should need the suppressive fires for ap-proximately 30 minutes. The endstate has the assault force through thebreach and postured on the far side to complete the destruction of the re-mainder of the MRC.

HPTs are only high in payoff relativeto the time they are identified duringthe fight. HVTs/HPTs must not under-mine the sequenced critical fire supporttasks.

Priority of Fires: (The organizationand employment of fire support meansaccording to the importance of the sup-ported unit’s mission.) Worthy of dis-cussion is its relationship with the com-mander’s sequenced fire support tasks.If indirect fires are properly synchro-nized with maneuver, and the com-mander has sequenced those criticalfire support tasks to support maneuver,then it seems priority should go to fir-ing those targets regardless of who haspriority of fires. One could argue that,if the commander has developed ascheme of fires properly, then the rightobserver will have priority when thecommander wants to fire the criticaltask. The key has to be every observerand leader understanding the conceptof fires — the sequenced critical firesupport tasks — and sticking to thatconcept. It is especially important forthe various artillery FDC and fire con-trol officers to understand this and notdeviate from what the commanderwants. However, priority of fires re-mains a valid concept that should allowanyone to receive fires as long as nocritical fire support task is being fired.

Observer Planning: The issue at thetask force level is who owns and posi-

tions the FISTs, the task force or com-pany/team commander. The com-pany/team commander needs them toassist in his fire support planning andto trigger targets assigned to him fromthe task force scheme of fires. The taskforce commander wants to positionthem to ensure they are in the properpositions to call the targets he wants.Observations at the National TrainingCenter offer this — the amount ofcertainty or uncertainty will dictatethe level of control of the FISTs. In amovement to contact, the task force ismore likely to leave control of theFIST with the company/team becausethe situation is unclear.

In the defense, where the targets arefully synchronized with the task forcescheme, the task force is more likely todictate where the observers are posi-tioned. In a deliberate attack, the taskforce may take the observer away fromthe breach force company/team to pro-vide redundancy at the point of pene-tration but leave the FISTs with the restof the teams.

Close Air Support: Simply stated,CAS is another means of indirect firesupport available to the brigade andtask force. The commander, first under-standing the capabilities and limitationsof close air support, must synchronizeit with the fire plan to support thescheme of maneuver. The capabilities

and limitations (windows for use/tar-gets/observers) have some unique chal-lenges that must be considered, but thecommander must plan his CAS to-gether with maneuver the same way ashis other indirect fires. It is conceivableat the task force level that CAS may beallocated or a CAS target assignedfrom brigade as part of the scheme offires. More likely, however, CAS willbe ‘handed-off’ to the task force whenbrigade has no viable target. If thishappens, the task force must have aplan that synchronizes it with maneu-ver and their concept and scheme offires.

Conclusion

This paper is not designed to solve allthe challenges of getting timely and ac-curate indirect fires at the task forcelevel. Hopefully, it has addressed someof the issues that are encountered at theNational Training Center and high-lighted the emerging observations frombrigade operations. The step-by-stepapproach to fire support planning isone way to approach the challenge ofgetting the effects of combined armsoperations. Whatever method used, thekey is synchronization with maneuver,commander involvement in planningand refinement, and well rehearsedplans understood by every observer,leader, and firing unit.

ARMOR — September-October 1996 49

Lieutenant Colonel (P) HarryL. Leiferman is a 1974 gradu-ate of Gonzaga University. Histroop experience includes twocompany commands, battalionS3 in 9ID, battalion XO in 1AD,and commander, 2d Battalion,5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Divi-sion. He has served on the DAstaff and on the staff of ArmedForces Central Europe. Hismost recent assignment wasSenior Mechanized InfantryTask Force Trainer (Scorpion07) at the National TrainingCenter. He is currently attend-ing the Naval War College.

LETTERS (Continued from Page 5)

ever slowly it may move, than well into the 21 st century.

CPT MICHAEL l. PRYOR Co C, 1-156 Armor

louisiana ARNG

PIRs Are Not Focused Enough For Scouts' Reconnaissance

Dear Sir:

After reading the article, "Training the Task Force Scout Platoon," by lTC lynch and CPT Cichocki in the July-August issue of ARMOR, I need to clarify a fine point on tasking R&S assets. In the article, the authors use Priority Intelligence Require­ments (PIR) to task the scout platoon, stat­ing these "provide focus for the actual con­duct of reconnaissance." This is not entirely true.

According to FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance, PIRs provide the initial focus for R&S. In essence, they get you started. The real focus comes from translating those PIRs into indicators of a particular enemy activity. The S2 takes the indicators and develops Specific Informa­tion Requirements (SIR). SIRs are nothing more than indicators put in the form of a question. It is from these SIRs that the Specific Orders or Requests (SOR) that tasks the scouts are issued.

The key to successful R&S planning and tasking is to give the scouts a mission they can accomplish. Even the most focused PIR is often too large a requirement for scouts. By breaking PIRs down into spe­cific pieces of information, you give scouts requirements they can satisfy. Through all of this, the S2 and the rest of the staff need to understand the logical ties be­tween the SORs that the scouts are collect­ing against and the PIRs that the specific requirements are focused on.

ROBERT S. MIKAlOFF CPT, MI

USAARMC Threat Manager

Army's Users, Not Ordnance, Delayed Sherman Upgunning

Dear Sir:

With some interest, I read MAJ Man­soor's book review about the M4 Sherman tank (May-June 1996), especially where he wrote: " ... The Ordnance Department could

50

have done more to correct the greatest weakness of the Sherman - the low muz­zle velocity of its main gun - but the Army did not realize the changing nature of tank combat until the huge losses in Normandy forced the Army's leadership to face the stark reality of modem armored wariare ... " and other comments about the M4's defi­ciencies.

Not entirely so, MAJ Mansoor! I refer you to my letter to ARMOR in the March-April 1974 issue, pages 3 and 51. I'll quote only a portion of that letter on the matter of the controversy surrounding the 75mm gun on the Sherman: "It was the Ordnance Depart­ment's position that this gun was inade­quate, but this viewpoint was overruled by the Army Ground Forces. After the combat experiences in North Africa highlighted the discontent with the Sherman, it was the Ordnance Department, ironically, that ac­crued the 'blame.' At the time when Gen­eral Patton was supposedly incognito in England, just prior to the Normandy inva­sion, he and my father (then Colonel George G. Eddy) got embroiled in a very loud and public argument about the source of the tank's deficiencies. The dispute was broken up in a large officer's mess in lon­don by Major General E.S. Hughes, later Chief of Ordnance when General Eisen­hower was Chief of Staff, who pulled Gen­eral Patton away, reminding him of General Eisenhower's concern about any publicity of Patton's whereabouts."

It should be remembered that the using service determines what it wants in outlin­ing key specifications, not Ordnance. Cer­tainly Ordnance is expected to point out consequences and alternatives. This was done with the Sherman, and the using service got what it requested.

While I hope I've got your attention, may I use this opportunity to recommend to your readers the article, "Planning For Kwa­jalein" by my father, BG George G. Eddy, in the July 1996 issue of ARMY. After he re­tired in the 1960s, I prevailed upon him to describe some of his most significant WWII experiences in a number of tapes. Years later, I transcribed and edited some of the events he related, and this article was the result. During WWII, he was the Director of the Ordnance Research Center at Aber­deen Proving Ground, Maryland, and be­came intimately familiar with a great variety of weapons, armaments and ammunition, and especially terminal ballistics. As a re­sult of General Marshall's first-hand knowl­edge of my father's competence, he sent him on several special missions overseas to demonstrate new weapons and equip­ment, as well as to review upcoming inva­sion plans for the proper deSignation and employment of Ordnance materiel.

COL (Ret.) GEORGE G. EDDY, PH.D.

Author's Queries

For a study of women's experiences dur­ing the Vietnam War, I would appreciate hearing from the mothers, wives, and girl­friends of men who fought in the Vietnam conflict. Please include memories about the period your loved ones served overseas, including (but not restricted to) strategies for coping, networks of support, and atti­tudes of the population at large. Please also include a brief description of your background, including age, race, ethnicity, and the area of the military with which your loved one served. Send responses to:

VIRGINIA LAFFEY P.O. Box 2052

Jamaica Plain, MA 02130

* * * I am researching the U.S. Armed Forces

stationed in and around Stroud, Glouces­tershire, England, prior to the Normandy landings, June 1944. I would like to obtain enough information on the units camped around Stroud, who were here for training and practice before going into battle, for a publication in memory of the men and also for a part of Stroud's history.

I need additional information on the fol­lowing unit that was camped on Minchin­hampton Common on a hill above Stroud. I think it to be a tank destroyer force, for the shoulder flash (patch) was a Tiger with a tank in its jaws; a Collar Dog that I have here belongs to the Quartermaster Corps. This was given to a boy at that time by one of the men. Also, they were Black Ameri­cans. lastly, I have one name and possible address: Andrew (Andy) Dodson, North June Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

I would like to hear from some of the guys who were here for their memories, and any photographs, including themselves in uniform, that I may purchase.

PAUL F. ASTON 15 Hillclose

Lightpill Stroud

Gloucestershire Gl5 3PG England

* * *

For a book on the Maginot Line, I would like to hear from anyone with personal reminiscences or family papers, military or civilian, from the period August 1939 through July 1940.

John J. Gallagher c/o Sarpedon Publishers

166 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10010

ARMOR - September-October 1996

Confessions of an Observer/Controller

Dear Sir:

Now that I have concluded a year as an observer controller (OC) in the Battle Com­mand Training Program at Fort Leaven­worth, , believe I have some experiences and opinions worth sharing. And since I am no longer an OC, I won't have to eat my words at a later date. The opinions and ob­servations expressed in this letter are mine alone and DO NOT represent the opinions or pOlicies of the Battle Command Training Program or its leadership.

I was a brigade OC for Division Warfight­ing Exercises (WFXs). As an OC, I always emphasized the TOC operations and not the results of the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) or the game. The game can become a great distracter from the learning experi­ence. It simply does not have the fidelity necessary to determine the combat suc­cess of a unit. It is not an analytical model. The key for an OC and a unit is to look at what the commander and staff did, based on the information the game provided, the commander's guidance, and the techniques and procedures the unit wanted to exer­cise. No one should believe they will be successful in a future battle based on win­ning at a WFX. A WFX is only one of many contributors to the future success or failure of a staff.

I realize that everyone wants to win. I also believe we do not want personnel in the Army who are not competitive. Compe­tition and the will to win keeps us motivated and sharp; just be careful of the conclu­sions you draw from a computer simulation. Try to draw conclusions about the staff process and what needs to be done to im­prove the performance of the staff.

I am proud to say that I never once went into a TOC where I was considered a threat, and it was not necessarily because I was a great OC. Today's soldiers and lead­ers want to learn, and will take every ad­vantage offered. The members of today's Army are true professionals who believe they must be tactically and technically profi­cient and believe in the individual's respon­sibility to improve himself.

Because of the learning attitude of to­day's soldier, the informal AAAs are easy and very rewarding. Commanders and their soldiers are willing to listen, willing to ana­lyze the successes and the failures, and make appropriate changes. The MAs are great learning experiences and an opportu­nity to hear someone else's ideas (for both the staff and the OC). But, I truly believe I had the greatest impact on the captains, lieutenants. and sergeants I had a chance to talk with one-on-one. These conversa­tions were truly non-threatening and pri­vate. I really felt I had an impact because

of their willingness to listen and learn. How­ever, if I recommended a soldier do some­thing differently, I would also strongly rec­ommend he first get the approval of the chain of command. This kept me from step­ping on toes, and I did not want to give the impression that I was the judge of success or failure.

In today's Army, everyone believes he or she is being evaluated all the time. We have almost a zero-defects mentality that has made some soldiers fearful of making mistakes and taking chances. Many of us believe that one screw-up can potentially differentiate us on the next rating. AU of this may be true, but I believe commanders still want soldiers who are imaginative, knowl­edgeable, and willing to take chances to get the job done.

Don't misunderstand; you are being evaluated, just not by us. Most BCTP OCs believe strongly that they are not evalua­tors. Most of us believe outsiders should never evaluate a unit. It is the chain of command's responsibility. The chain of command wants to do it; they just cannot be everywhere all the time. That is where the OC comes in. We observe and provide information to the chain of command to as­sist in assessment of individuals and staffs. The unit commander decides what he wants the OC to focus on.

The bottom line is that all of us are get­ting evaluated every time we do our job. This is true in everyday life, as it is true during a Warfighter.

My greatest recommendation to any staff officer is: know what capabilities your Bat­tlefield Operating System (BOS) brings to the battiefield; how to adapt those capabili­ties to the ever-changing plan, but staying within the commander's intent; and a cur­rent status of those capabilities. Too often I have seen some assets go unused be­cause the person responsible for integrat­ing those assets into the fight was just not paying attention, or was Sitting back waiting for someone to tell him what to do.

Most of the brigade commanders, XOs, and S3s I have observed do have an ex­cellent understanding of the BOSs and how to integrate those into the fight. However, these key personnel often get over­whelmed about the same time the plan goes awry. Therefore, such critical assets as artillery, GSRs, UAVs, helicopters, volca­noes, and transportation go unused. Every staff officer and NCO in the TOC must keep abreast of the current tactical situ­ation and be willing and able to suggest how his battlefield operating system can assist in the fight.

A division WFX is an excellent opportunity for a new staff to get to know how the com­mander operates. The pace usually allows the brigade commander and XO to do lots of mentoring of the staff. There is time for the staff to discuss their operations and make improvements during the WFX. A di-

ARMOR - September-October 1996

vision WFX is an excellent new staff team building exercise.

Several times I have been asked if the brigade should operate with a TOC only, or operate both a TAC and a TOC during a division WFX. A brigade can provide the di­vision all the radio traffic and staff interac­tion they can handle from a single TOC. However, I have seen units exercise both very well during division WFXs. Everyone believes we must train as we would fight, but the brigade really needs to address where they are in the development of the staff to determine if they want to operate a TAC. The brigade should ensure it will not detract from the focus of the exercise, which is the division commander and his staff.

I have had the opportunity to observe a brigade operate both a TAC and TOC just before they deployed to the National Train­ing Center. This brigade had spent consid­erable time training as a coherent staff and used the WFX as an opportunity to fine tune their SOPs. They were more prepared after the WFX. Another brigade had just re­turned from a different CTC and used the division WFX as an opportunity to exercise the changes recommended there. The WFX gave them an opportunity to assess the changes and continue to improve.

As most can tell you, TOC operations are basically information management. The right person, usually the commander, needs to know the right information at the right time so he can make the right deci­sion. There is little well-written doctrine on how to operate a TOC efficiently. Being effi­cient is a matter of practice, practice, and practice. Unfortunately in today's Army, there is not much time for practice. In each WFX I observed, two-thirds to one-quarter of the staff was new.

Because of the great turnover, many staff officers look to the OC for an approved so­lution. There aren't any. An OC can tell the staff what he has seen work, or not work, but usually cannot explain why a technique is successful for one staff and not another. I have tried. I believe group dynamics is the only real reason for these inconsisten­cies. The staff's experience, the length of time the staff has worked together, the wants and needs of the commander, and the staff officer's ability to fully understand how his battlefield operating system can af­fect the mission are all keys to success. The relative importance of these keys are different for every staff.

I will truly miss being an OC. My greatest reward in the Army has been knowing that I was having an impact. I hope my com­ments will be helpful to someone some­where.

MAJ EDWARD W. PAYNE Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

51

An Exciting Combat History... ...But with a Hidden Agenda

Grenadiers by Kurt Meyer, translatedby Michael Mende, J.J. FedorowiczPublishing, 106 Browning Blvd., Win-nepeg, Manitoba, Canada R3K 0L7(PH: 204-837-6080), 1994, 254 pages.$45.00.

One might say that Grenadiers, an inter-esting combat narrative by a key leader inWWII Germany’s panzer forces, is for ar-mor officers what Rommel’s Infantry At-tacks is for infantry officers.

Told in the first person, from an enemyperspective, it is a personal account of Kurt“Panzer” Meyer’s experiences in World WarII, beginning in 1939, when Meyer was areconnaissance battalion commander in the1st SS Panzer Division, fighting in Poland,Holland, France, Greece, Russia, andeventually in France. By that time, he wasdivision commander of the 12th SS PanzerDivision. Meyer provides an intense de-scription of his experiences in mechanizedwarfare; one can almost feel the wind andsmell the gunpowder. The translation is ex-cellent, and little is lost in Meyer’s count-less stories of men gallantly chargingagainst foes no less so vigorous and bold,if less successful. Meyer paints himself asa fair-fighting, gracious victor, never cuttingdown foes in cold-blood, offering cigarettesto captured officers, a man caught up in histimes, doing deeds he could not conceiveof as criminal.

He describes the attitude of the men inhis unit as outstanding, and is often movedby their camaraderie, especially when en-emy fire takes several of his drivers outfrom under him.

There are tense moments. Meyers de-scribes the assault on a hill in Greece ashis most “dire situation” as an officer, whenhe had to toss a grenade behind his cower-ing men (and himself) to get them to as-sault. In Russia, he outruns his reconnais-sance battalion and finds himself in themiddle of a Russian assembly area. Hepromptly exchanges cigarettes with theranking Russian and waits for his men toarrive and rescue him on cue. Countlessstories of such bravery and leadershipabound. Meyer is the leader every soldierdreams of being led by. He joins his newtroops as a comrade and rides with the re-connaissance battalion in their first battle

when he becomes their regimental com-mander. His units never break, from Nor-mandy to the Falaise Pocket, even thoughthey never receive reinforcements and areat below 20% strength when he is cap-tured. They never break international lawsof warfare, either, according to Meyer.

Only near the end of the book doesMeyer’s hidden agenda emerge. It be-comes clear that he is writing to convincereaders that the members of the 1st and12th SS Panzer Divisions were soldierswho did their duty to their country, andwere not war criminals. He skillfully avoidsany discussions of a political nature, focus-ing instead on battlefield vignettes. The tar-get audience is the future military historianwhom Meyer must have pictured as a well-educated doubting Thomas. He knows thatafter time, there will be those who doubtthe judgment of history, those who want toknow details of life in the Waffen SS. Hebluntly states this near the end of his story.

Meyer was convicted of war crimes be-cause he was in command when a mem-ber of his unit executed 37 Canadian sol-diers within rifle shot of their comrades onthe Normandy beachhead. Though Meyerdoes not dispute that the event occurred,he despises the men who convicted him.While he admits that war crimes occurredin his command, he insists they were notunpunished and not without cause. At histrial, he tries rather unsuccessfully to con-vince his judges that the Canadians hadcommitted exactly the same crimes on thesame day. He makes little headway be-cause the commander who had faced himon the beaches of Normandy happened tobe the chairman of the tribunal which even-tually sentences him to death.

(Editor’s Note: Soldiers of the 12th SSPanzer Division murdered 19 soldiers ofCanada’s Royal Winnipeg Rifles on 7 June1944, near Authie. The bodies of the pris-oners were thrown down in a roadway andcrushed by trucks and tank treads, accord-ing to one Canadian historical study.)

The reader who believes Meyer’s one-sided argument might be convinced thatMeyer was wronged, and that possiblymany more like him were also falsely ac-cused. The most convincing piece of evi-dence that Meyer presents is that, on hisbirthday in prison, on death row, company

and field grade officers who had foughtagainst the 12th SS Panzer Division atNormandy threw Meyer a secret birthdayparty. He was allowed to see his wife, andwas promised that his execution would becommuted by their efforts. This happened,as promised.

Shortly after writing this book, Meyerwould die of a heart attack. To the end, hespent his days trying to raise support forformer members of the SS, who receivedno pensions and were treated as outcasts.He died trying to rewrite history, and in thisbook, he has.

The book was never translated into Eng-lish until 1994, and most of the evidence isso convoluted it is hard to prove or dis-prove. One thing is certain: Kurt “Panzer”Meyer was a great warrior whose story iswell worth reading. Whether or not his con-viction on charges of war crimes was just isa question for great debate. If his side ofthe story is not true, why was Meyer freed?And, at what level is a war crime an indi-vidual decision or a command climate prob-lem? This is the puzzle which Meyerframes in his well-told story. Meyer cleverlyconvinces the audience that he is a gra-cious war hero and then paints the pictureof vindictive Allied war tribunals acting outof victor’s anger. Clearly, there are othersides to the story of Meyer’s part in the warcrimes; it is very much worth investigatingmore deeply.

The amount of “political correctness” in-volved in writing or translating a book ofthis nature cannot be overestimated. Meyernever mentions the Jewish question and,for all intents and purposes, plays ignorantof the Final Solution. In not addressing theactions of the Allgemeine (General) SS,Meyer has limited the topic to somethingfor which only few can answer — the con-duct of Waffen SS units in combat. He isvery careful not to bruise his enemies’egos. He often praises their bravery, a sub-liminal method to gain their support andmake himself look more humble and he-roic.

But overall, Meyer has created a master-piece in combat documentary. The book ispacked full of adventure and pictures. Itdoes lack maps, which makes followingMeyer’s path difficult at best. However, anyleader of mechanized forces should armhimself with maps and read this book.

BOOKS

52 ARMOR — September-October 1996

More adventurous historians could travelto Normandy, where, at the Abbey of theArdenne, near Caen, Meyer had his regi-mental headquarters. This is where the 37Canadians were executed and buried.There is a gardener in the abbey who wasa child when Meyer was there. He holdskeys to the towers where Meyer could seeall the way to the beaches at Juno andGold. This man gave insight into Meyer theman. He said to me, “No we did not hatethis man. He was very charismatic. Hecame here in peace after his release fromprison, and some people were afraid. Itwas a bad time for our people and his.Maybe he was angry with us. But no, Pan-zer Meyer said he only wanted to see thebattlefield again. He said a great warriormust always return to his battlefield.”

In the end, Meyer’s book is an attempt toreturn to the battlefield and separate him-self from the record revealed at his trial. Hehonestly believes he was wronged, andwants a chance to set the record straight.Despite the author’s bias, and the book’slack of maps, it is a must-read account ofarmored warfare from an enemy perspec-tive. Whether or not you agree with it,Meyer’s story is a compelling one.

JOHN R. STARKCPT, Armor

1st Armor Training BrigadeFt. Knox, Ky.

The Rise of U.S. Grant by ColonelArthur L. Conger (1872-1951), new in-troduction by Brooks D. Simpson, DaCapo Press, New York. Originally pub-lished 1931, republished 1996. 362pages (includes 12 maps and 8 illustra-tions), plus 25 pages of appendices,bibliography, and index. $15.95.

You’ve got to be a big U.S. Grant fan toreally appreciate the full content of this me-ticulously detailed book. The new introduc-tion, by a noted Civil War historian, updatesthe relevance of the text, yet with everypage, I was waiting for something to hap-pen as I plodded through verbatim ordersand counter-orders between Grant and hissubordinates at Cairo, Illinois; Forts Henryand Donelson; Shiloh; and Vicksburg. COLConger’s formal, dry writing style, althoughappropriate for the early 1930s, fails to holdthe 21st century reader’s full interest.

However, select parts of the book arequite interesting. Specifically, COL Congerdetails how Grant rose, in 1861, from anobscure civilian clerk in Galena, Illinois, tocommand the Union armies by 1864. Thereare several interesting leadership pointsconcerning Grant’s rapid rise. Foremost,COL Conger highlights Grant’s commonsense. Without the flash and charisma as-sociated with many Civil War generals,

Grant relied on his ability to chop complexproblems down into simple segments. Forexample, when dealing with strategy, Granthad no need for multiple intelligence an-nexes, detailed orders of battle, or studiesof the enemy commander’s personality. ToGrant, who boiled down information to itsnecessary essence, all questions about theenemy could be answered by under-standing strength, disposition, and inten-tion.

Most historians focus on Grant’s leader-ship and strategic record from Vicksburgthrough Appomattox. In contrast, The Riseof U.S. Grant provides a detailed analysisof Grant’s tactical and logistical skills at theregimental and division level. If you arewilling to sift through a cumbersome text,then you will enjoy linking together the dailyevents in Grant’s early commands thatshaped the eventual leader of the UnionArmy.

COURT R. HORNCASTLECPT, Armor

USARMandeville, La.

From Battlefield to Boardroom: TheLeadership Lessons of Robert E. Leeby Bil Holton, Ph.D., Presidio Press,Calif., 1995. 158 pages. $9.95.

For over one hundred and thirty years,Robert E. Lee has been an inspiration tomilitary leaders. Bold and audacious in theattack; firm and resolute in the defense;magnanimous and charitable in victory; dig-nified and courageous in defeat, can Leealso be an inspiration to civilian leaders?As military leaders, we understand thetimeless universality of leaders and sol-diers. What inspired and motivated the Ro-man legionnaire still inspires and motivatesthe modern soldier; it is only updated to ac-count for era and social circumstances.From battlefield to boardroom is an attemptto show civilian leaders that they, too, canlearn from past military leaders, and whobetter to study than Robert E. Lee? Unfor-tunately, the transition from battlefield toboardroom is not very smooth.

Dr. Holton is a management and leader-ship consultant who, rightly, believes thereare qualities essential for good leadershipregardless of profession. To illustrate hispoint, he uses a series of brief sketches ofRobert E. Lee’s leadership and severalvignettes of Civil War battles. Drawn fromnumerous sources, each sketch is titledwith a leadership trait or quality and ar-ranged alphabetically. Following eachsketch is Dr. Holton’s interpretation andbusiness application for that trait.

Under the headings of the basic leader-ship competencies, Dr. Holton is on firmground. The traits of honesty, integrity, loy-

alty, and courage are essential for any suc-cessful leader. Dr. Holton’s civilian interpre-tation and analysis of Lee’s actions underthese headings ring true and are useful forall leaders. However, some of his analysismisses the mark completely for militaryreaders. The most striking was a very mov-ing description of the desperate fighting atthe “Bloody Angle.” During a critical point inthe battle, a group of Confederate soldierswere attempting to surrender when anotherConfederate soldier shouted, “Shoot themfellows! Shoot them fellows!” The soldierstrying to surrender were gunned down bytheir own. Soldiers fight for each other;their highest loyalty is to their buddy next tothem. It is a very intense loyalty that whenbetrayed results in incidents like at the“Bloody Angle.” That would be a military in-terpretation. Dr. Holton, however, uses thisextreme act as an example of “Groupthink”warning, “...in their intense desire to beteam players and collaborators... groupmembers censor the kind of independent,critical thinking that produces more objec-tive and discriminating results.” The con-nection to the example is a stretch. In an-other, Dr. Holton uses Lee’s last words,“Strike the tent,” as the starting point to listsimilar words a civilian leader might uttersuch as, “Balance the budget” or “Decoupleold electronics networks.” Perhaps, thesewords carry the same significance to aplant manager as Lee’s to a soldier, butnext to Lee’s, these phrases seem incon-gruous.

It has become fashionable to read andstudy civilian management methods andtheories in the name of breaking old para-digms and moving the Army into the 21stcentury. It is imperative that we maintain anopen mind and accept leadership lessonsfrom any source. However, From Battlefieldto Boardroom illustrates the gulf in the “bot-tom line” between the Profession of Armsand all other professions. Few, if any,CEO’s have had to make decisions theyknew would cause the death of their subor-dinates or, like Lee, have had the fate of anation placed on their shoulders. Yet, a 22-year-old platoon leader may be called uponto make life and death decisions daily. Wemust also remember that we do not have“customers” or “products,” rather we leadand command soldiers and units of theUnited States Army.

Dr. Holton is to be commended for histhorough and extensive research. The pas-sages he chose for the sketches provideconcise insight into Robert E. Lee’s person-ality. He is to be further commended for hisnoble attempt to teach leadership principlesto civilian managers by interpreting militaryhistory into business language. However, asoldier may find some of his interpretationsdisconcerting.

M.R. PIERCEMAJ, Armor

Austin, Texas

ARMOR — September-October 1996 53

In all operations conductedby M1A1 forces, to includeOperations Other Than War(OOTW), logistical reportingmust be clear, concise, andaccurate. These reports, whentabulated correctly, may savehours wasted in unnecessaryresupply or missent fuelers. Toaid the tank commander, pla-toon sergeant, and platoonleader, each vehicle com-mander can use this simplechart, which allows the tankcrew to quickly compute anaccurate Class III report.

The tank commander re-quests fuel status from thedriver, who reads fuel levelsfrom his instrument panel inthis order: Right Front first, fol-lowed by Left Front and finallythe Rear tank.

The driver states each tank’slevel: “Right Front.... 1/2 ....Left Front .... 3/4 ... Rear....1/2”

The tank commander, follow-ing the driver’s response,moves down the “RIGHT” col-umn to 1/2. While staying inthat block, he moves to the3/4 mark for the “LEFT” Col-umn. Once there, he moveshis finger right to the “REAR”columns where he continuesto go to the right until hereaches the 1/2 section.

The fuel remaining is 277gallons.

SSG Krivitsky has served asan armor crewman and battalionmaster gunner. He is currently acompany master gunner andtank commander with C/1-68 Ar-mor at Ft. Carson, Colo.

“ Driver, how much fuel do we have?”Here’s an easy way to report accurately...

by SSG Stephen A. Krivitsky

0265278

107386490

11614575

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248274300326355286312338364393323349375401430360386412438467398424450476505

E 1/4 1/2 3/4 F

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1/41/23/4

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GREENAMBER

REDBLACK

401-505301-400

201-3000-200

(IAW FM 101-5-1)

PIN: 074832-000