Armor, January-February 1997 Edition - The United States Army€¦ · craft regularly make the short list of ... by Lieutenant Colonel Eugene J. Palka and Colonel Fred A ... COL David

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 02748

In case you missed it, vehicle identification trainingrecently took on an added emphasis. It used to bethat during the “good old days” of the Cold War, ourtrigger-pulling gunners and pilots relied mostly onthe shape of things to guide their decisions to fire ornot to fire. If the turret looked like a frying pan andthe vehicle were over on the other side of theFEBA, it was fair game. Target ID was easier inthose days because there were basically two setsof equipment, NATO stuff (no kill), and Warsaw pactstuff (kill), and everything was shaped differently —those weird-shaped French vehicles notwithstanding.

That was then. Now, it is not so easy to discrimi-nate good and bad, and it is getting more difficult bythe day. Despite thermal and passive sights, decid-ing who is inside that shape your high velocity can-non is pointing at — a good guy or a bad guy — isthe rub. Fratricide and near-fratricide incidents inDesert Storm certainly helped us relearn that targetidentification is a tough task. Complicating the iden-tification task was the fact that, in this coalition war,some of our coalition partners’ equipment wasshaped the same as that of our enemy. All T-72swere not alike. We probably will never again seethe Cold War battlefields, where almost everyonewas on the correct side of the line and pointing inthe proper direction.

A recent addition to this battlefield complication isSouth Korea’s apparent decision to accept Russianmilitary hardware, 30 or so T-80U tanks, as partialpayment for development loans. One is hard-pressed to think of a more staunch ally in our re-cent history than the South Koreans. However, eventhey are going to have some equipment that looksan awful lot like what our training usually tells us ismanned by the enemy. However, this isn’t the only

case of NATO and Russian equipment — once thestandard used to tell foes apart — now coexisting inthe same motor pools. Other potential coalition part-ners also are diversifying their equipment sources.Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates both fieldnumbers of BMP-3s. Again staunch allies withequipment resembling that of other less-friendlystates.

We have every reason to expect that, for bothbusiness and political reasons, some of the hugesurpluses of lethal, ex-Soviet military hardware, aswell as new-built equipment, will end up in the ar-mories of other friendly nations. Russian fighter air-craft regularly make the short list of potential planesin air forces on nearly every continent. Even ournext-door neighbor, Mexico, seriously consideredadopting MI-17s as their future transport helicopters.

Given these realities and our observations andlessons learned in the Gulf War, the necessity ofgetting spoof-proof IFF (identification friend or foe)materiel into the hands of our ground forces and ontheir vehicles takes on greater importance than be-fore. Look at John Sack’s book, Company C: TheReal War in Iraq, to see the extraordinary and dys-functional effort exerted at the lower unit level toavoid blue-on-blue engagement. The challengesposed by blue-on-gray engagements are even moreenormous. We need hardware that we can loan toour coalition partners. We need to stress exact ve-hicle ID. Gone forever are the days of kill/no kill an-swers. Situational awareness, coupled with soundknowledge of vehicle types, what they look like inday, at night, from the front, back, side, and throughthermal sights, is the only way to keep from killingourselves and our friends.

— TAB

Stand To

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-97-1

Editor-in-Chief LTC TERRY A. BLAKELY

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant MG GEORGE H. HARMEYER

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

January-February 1997, Vol. CVI No.1

Features

6 Combatant Arms vs. Combined Arms by Dr. George F. Hofmann

14 A Sheridan Memoir: The Early Days by Lieutenant Colonel Burton S. Boudinot (Retired)

16 Too Late the XM8, Alternatives to the Armored Gun System by Stanley C. Crist

20 Whither the 2d Cavalry? by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson

22 Japanese Armored Vehicle Development by Brigadier General Philip L. Bolte (Retired) and Iwao Hayashi

26 Tank Warfare During the Rif Rebellion, 1921-1927 by Dr. Jose E. Alvarez

29 A Framework for Peace Operations by Major Sean B. MacFarland

32 Training For Maneuver by Captain Robert Bateman

36 Software Review: TACOPS by Captain Jerry A. Hall

37 Making Killers, Imperatives for Tank Lane Training by Lieutenant Colonel James C. Crowley (Retired)

42 TALlK: Steel Division-Six Patton Museum Ceremony Honors MG Israel Tal (Ret.) by Major General Stan R. Sheridan (Retired)

44 Fielding the Armor Force of Tomorrow: Soldierization in the 1st Armor Training Brigade at Fort Knox by Lieutenant Colonel Eugene J. Palka and Colonel Fred A. Treyz III

47 1 st Armor Training Brigade Interactive Web Site

52 Comments Sought on Revisions to 71-1 FM and ARTEP

Back Mounted Water Ration Heater on the Way Cover For Tanks, Bradleys, M113s, and Howitzers

by Larry T. Hasty

Departments

2 Contacts 3 Letters 4 Commander's Hatch 5 Driver's Seat

53 Books

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U.S. Army Armor School

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U.S. Army Armor Center

Commanding General MG George Harmeyer E-Mail: [email protected]

Deputy Commanding General BG Clayton E. Melton E-Mail: [email protected]

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ARMOR - January-February 1997

There Was No RushTo Improve Sherman Armament

Dear Sir:

COL Eddy’s critique of MAJ Mansoor’sbook review in the September-October is-sue of ARMOR has spurred me to com-ment. Two of the points made by COLEddy — the discontent with the Shermanafter North Africa and the role of the user indetermining requirements — are inaccu-rate, as I documented in my book, FaintPraise: American Tanks and Tank Destroy-ers during World War II, Hamden, Con-necticut: Archon Press, 1983.

First, neither the records of Army ServiceForces, Army Ground Forces, nor the Ord-nance Department reflect an outcry of dis-content with the Sherman tank followingthe North African campaign. A query to alltheaters about future tanks by the War De-partment G4 in October 1943 resulted in amixed bag of responses, but no commonview of future tanks and no evident criti-cism of the Sherman (Faint Praise, pp. 92-93). There was support for mounting the76mm gun in the Sherman, but that deci-sion had already been taken by the Ar-mored Command in September 1943 (FP,pg. 84).

The lack of urgency from the field aboutany deficiency in penetrating German ar-mor was underlined by the decision inEurope to defer issuing Sherman tankswith the 76mm gun to the first waves oftroops invading Normandy because ofproblems with muzzle blast (FP, pg. 101).In large part, this lack of urgency was aresult of overestimating the penetration ca-pabilities of the 76mm and 3-inch guns,which had the same performance and werewidely available in tank destroyer units.Only after firing tests in Europe in July1944 did a common recognition of the defi-ciencies of U.S. firepower appear. GeneralEisenhower expressed the frustration of thetroops when he commented:

Why is it that I am always the last to hearabout this stuff. Ordnance told me this 76would take care of anything the Germanhad. Now I find out you can’t knock out adamn thing with it. (FP, pg. 106)

Secondly, the major developmental tankprogram of the U.S. Army during WorldWar II was very much an Ordnance project.A former member of the Armored Boardduring the war, MG (Ret.) Louis T. Heath,remembered very little input to the programfrom users until a prototype T26 arrived atFort Knox in the spring of 1944 (FP, pg.36). Glaring problems, such as a manifestlyunsatisfactory ammunition stowage system,demonstrated the lack of user involvementprior to development of the prototype (FP,pg. 122). Hopefully, lack of user input to

major armaments programs is now a thingof the past.

In sum, MAJ Mansoor’s comments aboutthe armament of the Sherman tank arecloser to the truth than COL Eddy’s.

LTC (RET.) CHARLES M. BAILY, Ph.D.Springfield, Va.

Abrams Himself ComplainedAbout Tank Gun Effectiveness

Dear Sir:

Dr. Eddy may be correct in stating (Let-ters, September-October) that it was Armyusers, not the Ordnance Department, whodelayed upgunning of the World War IISherman tank, but that was not necessarilythe case at the working (and fighting) level.

While Lieutenant Colonel CreightonAbrams was commanding the 37th TankBattalion in the drive across Europe, hewas paid a visit by an Ordnance staff offi-cer from a higher headquarters. That wor-thy observed that Abrams had mounted anAir Force .50 caliber machine gun, whichhad a very high rate of fire, as a coaxialgun on his tank. “But that uses up ammotoo fast,” objected the Ordnance fellow.

Then Abrams told the man that he wouldlike to have a higher velocity main gun onhis tank, because that would help himknock out German tanks better. “Thatwould wear out the gun tubes too fast,” ex-plained the Ordnance warrior. “Well, hell,”Abrams responded, “now we’re using uptanks!”

LEWIS SORLEYPotomac, Md.

“We Gave Away Our SeatOn a Planeload of Warriors...”

Dear Sir:

I agree with MAJ Sherman about thevalue of the Sheridan to the 82nd ABN DIVin Panama. The real shame is that “they”(the Army money handlers) have decidednot to replace the Sheridan with a new lighttank. Why? Not force structure. Not basedon demonstrated needs. But money. Nomoney. Spent it in Bosnia.

So, leaders, which soldiers of the 82ndwill we sacrifice to enemy fire because wedidn’t provide them what they needed? (re-fer back to MAJ Sherman’s article and theincident at the bridge) What leaves a nastytaste in my mouth is that the Armor com-munity let this happen. We gave it away.No guts. Parochial “them” vs. “us” trash.Too bad we (Armor officers) don’t have the

intestinal fortitude to admit that we sharethe battlefield with OUR infantry, and thatthere are many circumstances where weSUPPORT the infantry.

The Sheridan, with its 152mm main gun,was the near-perfect light infantry supportvehicle. It could swim. It had thermalsights. It had long range armor destructioncapability equal to or greater than a Hellfiremissile (check your PH/PK classified data!).The Shillelagh, with its 152mm HEATround, could blow a hole in a reinforcedconcrete wall large enough for infantry sol-diers to walk through side by side. An in-fantry leader could use the external phone,it boasted a fléchette round that could blast17,000 one-inch nails into enemy infantryas close support, and, oh by the way, youcould parachute it into combat for thosenasty “forced entry” missions typically laidat the feet of the paratroopers of the “Dev-ils in Baggy Pants,” “Panthers,” and “Fal-cons” of the 82nd.

Ironically, the new, better, all purpose “Ar-mored Gun System” that was to replacethe Sheridan wasn’t half as good. OK, itwasn’t old and out of repair parts, but itcouldn’t swim, blow holes big enough towalk through in walls, fire a devastatingmissile, or fléchette the enemy to death. Itcould be used in LVAD (low velocity air-drops) operations and it could fire 105mmantitank rounds at enemy armor. Great de-sign by tankers to be a light tank meant tokill tanks. Too bad that’s not what the 82ndneeded. The 82nd needed a tracked (noth-ing strikes fear into the hearts of the enemylike a tracked vehicle!) vehicle capable ofclose infantry support — like the Sheridan.Not a light tank designed to fight othertanks. Let’s face it, the 82nd should not(ever see A Bridge Too Far?) be droppingin to do battle with a tank-heavy force, if itis, it’s in the wrong fight. It will, however,drop into the dead of night to secure anunfriendly airfield!

Too bad the Sheridans of 3-73rd Armorgo away in January 1997, without even the

ARMOR — January-February 1997 3

CorrectionThe following safety disclosure was

omitted from “Enhanced Mine DetectionFor Limited Visibility Operations” in theNovember-December 1996 issue:

This modification is for emergencycombat use only. Other use must beapproved with a safety release throughTACOM. Permanent modification hasbeen submitted to the Army SuggestionProgram and, when approved, will pro-vide a kit for mounting the lights on apermanent mount with a wiring harness.

LETTERS (Continued on Page 48)

It is indeed a privilege for me to re-turn to Fort Knox as the 37th Chief ofArmor. Since my last assignment atFort Knox, our Army has undergonevast changes. We have successfully de-fended the frontiers of freedom inEurope, causing the Iron Curtain tofall, and deployed overseas to partici-pate in several differently demandingoperations, such as Operation JustCause, Operation Desert Shield/Storm,and Operation Joint Endeavor. Through-out this continuum of operational envi-ronments, the mounted force hasfielded and fought on six versions oftanks and five versions of personnelcarriers/fighting vehicles. Despite thediversity of operational environments,the mounted force continues to achievesuccess in all of its endeavors.

Our success comes from manysources, I will talk about three of thosesources — a triad of excellence —starting with our people. Soldiers, civil-ians, and their families are the founda-tion for all of our success in the past,and they will continue to be that foun-dation in the future. Our soldiers con-tinue to prove how smart they can be,regardless of the conditions or environ-ment. We are continuing to build theforce with the most intelligent recruitsin the history of the Army. Everyleader’s charter in the mounted forceshould be to provide the most challeng-ing environment available to these sol-diers — they deserve it! However, letus not forget that we must provide our

families a comfortable and just envi-ronment whether at home or abroad.

As trainers throughout the mountedforce, we owe our people only the bestpreparation for combat available. Theworld-class training at our CombatTraining Centers (CTCs) continues tobe the centerpiece of our preparationfor future wars and military operationsother than war. The National TrainingCenter, Combat Maneuver TrainingCenter, Joint Readiness Training Cen-ter, and Mounted Warfare SimulationTraining Centers throughout the worldprovide our soldiers and their leaderstraining that is unmatched anywhereelse on the face of the globe. The ob-server/controllers at these facilitiesshape our future achievements by pro-viding the best possible coaching andteaching, through candid feedback aftereach mission. We must continue to usethese training centers to provide thetoughest and most realistic trainingavailable to maintain an edge over allof our opponents. However, this triadof excellence is not complete withoutthe right equipment to provide themeans to achieve our goals.

Currently, the equipment available toour mounted warfare soldiers is secondto none. Continual developments inweapon system survivability, lethality,mobility, and digital capability arekeeping our soldiers out front on themodern battlefield. We are making un-precedented achievements in the devel-opment of these new weapon systems

and their complementary tactics, tech-niques, and procedures to fight effec-tively on future battlefields. Providingthe proper equipment for the mountedforce is clearly a priority!

Our opposition today has many faces.Unlike the monolithic threat we trainedto fight in the past, we face an enemywhose size, capabilities, and tactics areever-changing. We must be prepared tofight a large or small enemy, with eitherhigh or low technical capability, andbeat him regardless of his preference tofight a linear or non-linear conflict.Alongside this warfighting spectrumlies the environment of stability opera-tions, peace support operations, and op-erations other than war. In these typesof operations, the missions could rangefrom the challenges of separating mul-tiple warring factions, where the threatof combat is always present, to provid-ing disaster relief in Africa or to ourown citizens.

The challenges facing the mountedforce of the future are many. This isour force, and I’m taking a personalstake in its future. I challenge all sol-diers and civilians of our force to claimtheir own stake, whether it be provid-ing for the needs of our fine soldiersand their families, in finding ways toenhance our training, or in improvingour equipment. I want your ideas.

I am honored with this opportunity tolead the mounted force into the future.

FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT!

MG George H. Harmeyer Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

4 ARMOR — January-February 1997

Focus on the Triad of Excellence

The Excellence in Armor (EIA) pro-gram identif ies outstanding Ar-mor/Cavalry soldiers during One Sta-tion Unit Training (OSUT) and duringservice in Armor/Cavalry units. Thepurpose of the program is to fill thecommander’s hatches of tanks andBradleys with highly motivated, intelli-gent soldiers whose performance isconsistently outstanding.

Approved in October 1987, the pro-gram has grown into a model that otherbranches attempt to emulate. Soldiersfrom PV1 to SFC are eligible for selec-tion and enrollment, which can takeplace either in OSUT or at a permanentduty assignment. Presently, 3,190 Ac-tive Duty soldiers and 876 ReserveComponent soldiers are on the rolls.

The selection process in OSUT startswith the drill sergeant. He will recom-mend a soldier during the tenth weekof training, based on performance, mo-tivation, and leadership potential. Thesoldier’s eligibility is then confirmedby a battalion or squadron board. Uponconfirmation of eligibility, the soldierwill receive fifty hours of additionaltraining in Skill Level 1 and 2 tasks.Prior to graduation from OSUT, thesoldier must meet the following criteriato be enrolled in the EIA program:

•• Score 230 points or better on theAPFT

•• Qualify Sharpshooter or better withindividual weapon

•• Pass all end of block tests•• Pass all Armor Crewman Tests

(19K) ACT I, II, III, or the ScoutGunnery Test (19D) with no morethat one no-go per test

•• Pass all Armor Stakes•• Possess a high school or equivalent

diploma (this can be waived by thebattalion or squadron commander)Upon successful completion of all ar-

eas, the soldier is placed on the rolls of

EIA soldiers maintained by the Officeof the Chief of Armor, Fort Knox. HisDA Form 2-1 is annotated on line 19,reflecting his EIA enrollment and theeffective date. His PCS orders will in-dicate his membership in the EIA pro-gram, and a letter will accompany himto his gaining commander, announcinghis successful completion of the EIAprogram during OSUT. The impact isclear; the new soldier will arrive at hisfirst duty station with additional skillsthrough training that could prove vitalto the overall success of the unit’s mis-sion.

Not all soldiers become enrolled dur-ing OSUT. A soldier can earn enroll-ment anytime during his career throughthe recommendation of his commanderand the successful completion of thefollowing:

•• Receive a commander’s evaluationemphasizing his technical proficiencyand his potential for leadership

•• Score 260 points or higher on theAPFT

•• Pass all elements of the CTT•• Pass the Scout Commander’s Certifi-

cation Level I (19D SCCT I) test•• Pass the Tank Commander’s Certifi-

cation Level I (19K TCCT I) test- M1 Series Tank/FM 17-12-1-2/TCGST- M3 Bradley/FM 21-1/GST- M998 (HMMWV)/FM 17-12-8/GST

•• Qualify Sharpshooter or better withassigned weapon.

NOTE: OSUT soldiers have one yearto meet the above standards. Shouldthey fail to do so, they must bedropped from enrollment. Under spe-cial circumstances, the battalion com-mander may request a waiver for a de-serving soldier who fails to meet thestandards through no fault of his own,for example if the soldier has a tempo-rary profile which prohibits him fromtaking a record APFT. Once the soldier

is enrolled, his DA Form 2-1 is anno-tated to reflect this. The end result isthe identification of soldiers who repre-sent the elite of the Armor Force.

NOTE: Should a soldier fail to main-tain the required standards, the com-mander must remove him from the EIArolls, and the soldier may never be re-enrolled, regardless of his futureachievements.

EIA soldiers have the opportunity toreceive special incentives:

•• OSUT commanders have the author-ity to promote 10% of the class toPV2 upon the completion of the ba-sic training phase, and that 10% maybe promoted to PFC upon comple-tion of the MOS-specific phase.

•• A sergeant who is a BNCOC gradu-ate may request to take the SCCT/TCCT II test through the local educa-tion center. This is a comprehensivetwo-hour examination on Skill Level3 and 4 tasks. Upon achieving ascore of 70 points or higher, he is eli-gible to receive fifty points towardpromotion under the military educa-tion area for his staff sergeant pro-motion packet.

•• All senior NCO selection boards arebriefed about the EIA program andthat soldiers who are enrolled shouldbe considered a “cut above” the restof the soldiers of the same grade.

•• Identification of EIA soldiers im-proves their morale and allows themto be recognized as outstanding per-formers by their leaders, peers, andsubordinates.

Although, the program is barely tenyears old, a trend in the selection rateof EIA members is taking shape. Theselection rates on the last three promo-tion boards are listed at Figure 1.

DRIVER’S SEAT

A Reflection of Success:The Excellence in Armor Soldier


CSM Ronnie W. Davis, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

Continued on Page 50

The prevailing attitude between “light”infantry, “heavy” armor, and “can-do-all” field artillery needs to be seriouslyaddressed if the Army is to move intothe 21st century. The purpose of thispaper is to examine the post-World WarI conflict between the traditional com-batant arms concept, championed bythe branch chiefs, and a combined armsidea based upon mechanization anddeep offensive operations.

This paper will also explain why theArmy was unable to execute an opera-tional level of warfare (the theory oflarger unit operations) with a combinedarms mechanized force.2 The interwarhistorical model is relevant because ithas a contemporary analog in today’sdebate regarding doctrine and servicetraditions. Is the traditional decentral-ized organization of the combatantarms suitable for a modern modularcombined arms force in a technologi-cally driven army?

* * *

At the insistence of the Army GeneralStaff in 1928, the Army launched itsturbulent road to mechanization and theArmored Force. Shortly after he re-turned from viewing the British mecha-nized force, Secretary of War DwightD. Davis made two important deci-sions. First, he ordered the creation ofan experimental mechanized force dur-ing the summer of 1928. Second, he di-rected the Army Chief of Staff, MGCharles P. Summerall, to initiate a pre-liminary study of the employment of amechanized force on the future battle-field and determine how the UnitedStates could effectively be prepared forsuch an employment. During World

War I, Summerall had been a memberof a Board of Officers detailed toevaluate French and British tanks andtheir tactical deployment. InvestigatingBritish experiences, the Board quotedfrom a future proponent for armor war-fare, then Lieutenant Colonel J.F.C.Fuller, that the creation of a mecha-nized army would-be “one of the great-est epochs in the art of war.”3 Based onhis wartime experiences,Summerall became afirm believer in tanks.After the war, he sup-ported a separate statusfor the Tank Corps and,during the 1920s, was anenthusiastic supporter ofthe role tanks would playin a future war. Summer-all attempted to maketheir development hisfirst priority. He told stu-dents at the War Collegethat the United States al-ways entered a war un-prepared. He cautionedagainst viewing futuremilitary problems inlight of the Army’s World War I experi-ence and warned that the next warwould be different as the Army’s expe-rience was “a special case that cannotbe repeated.”4

Subsequently, Summerall delegatedthe study to the assistant chief of staff,G-3 (Training and Operations), BGFrank Parker, who directed members ofhis staff to execute the secretary’s or-der. However, the chief architect of thestudy, “A Mechanized Force,” was Ma-jor Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., who had beenassigned to the General Staff in June

1927. According to historian Dr. TimNenninger, Chaffee became interestedin mechanization shortly after he wasassigned to the G-3 staff. A friend serv-ing as a military attaché in Englandprovided the inquisitive Chaffee withdetails of British efforts in mechanizingits army.5 Chaffee, the loyal cavalry-man, initially wanted to revitalize thehorse cavalry, but in 1928, he realized

the part mechanization would play in afuture war. He admired the Civil Warcavalry officer, James Harrison Wilson.By the end of that war, Wilson hadused his Union cavalry en masse,fought mounted and dismounted, coop-erated with the infantry, and used thebest weapons available. He was astrong proponent of open warfare,combining fire and movement with amounted assault when feasible. Wil-son’s performance was a model of deepoffensive operations and battle; heknew how to use a combined armsteam. This was an example of what


Combatant Arms vs. Combined ArmsThe U.S. Army’s QuestFor Deep Offensive OperationsAnd an Operational Level of Warfare

by George F. Hofmann

Christie-based Combat Car T-4 climbs log ramp during tests in 1934.

BG Frank Parker, at left, as a colonel in WWI, and BG AdnaR. Chaffee, then a major, were key players in U.S. studies ofmechanization in the late 1920s and early ’30s.

“If the military persists in thinking out tacticalproblems in terms of cavalry, infantry, andartillery, then we shall render our minds rigidto all new ideas.” 1

Professor Schneider called distributedfree maneuver, the essence of opera-tional art.6

The most innovative conclusion fromthe G-3 study called for a tacticalevaluation of the role of tanks in deepoffensive operations. Fuller, one of themost creative proponents of armoredwarfare in the British Army, recalledmeeting with Parker in August 1917.Fuller claimed Parker held “ultramod-ern views” and called him a “veritablehe-man.” No doubt this was due toParker’s agreement with Fuller on theneed for mechanization and tank em-ployment to end the position warfarethat stalemated the Western Front. Atthe time, Parker shared with Fuller hisviews that a combined mechanizedforce, supported by aviation, couldwiden the breach after a breakthroughand then rapidly progress deep aroundthe German defenses in depth. Parkerbelieved this return to mobility wouldbreak the stalemate on the WesternFront because the Germans were notcapable of adopting such a plan. Fullergave credit to Parker’s views and indi-cated they were “not put into practiceuntil 1939, and then by the Germans inPoland, when it became known asBlitzkrieg.”7

The 1928 G-3 study called for a self-contained, highly mobile mechanizedforce capable of spearheading an attackand holding “distant key positions.”Regarding tactics and techniques, thestudy viewed the mechanized force re-flecting more the cavalry’s spirit ofmobility, rather than that of the arm ofclose combat, the infantry. The mostcontroversial part of “A MechanizedForce” was the plan for a balancedcombined arms force of light and me-dium tanks, self-propelled field artil-lery, mechanized infantry, engineers, airsupport, and a service detachment. Thisorganization differed from the predomi-nantly tank force assembled on theSalisbury Plain in England in 1927.The U.S. Army’s combatant arms at thetime were the infantry, cavalry, artil-lery, signal corps, engineers, and airservice — all autonomous and control-led by the their branch chiefs. “AMechanized Force” was the first ra-tional attempt to move the autonomy ofthe combatant chief of arms to a forcestructured upon a combined arms or-ganization. General Parker’s directedstudy met approval from the secretary

of war, the G-1, the G-2, the G-4, andthe chief of the war plans division. Inaddition, the branch chiefs concurred,except for the chief of infantry,8 MGRobert H. Allen, who was “heartily op-posed” to setting up another branchwith the tank as its focus. Instead, herecommended that tanks remain withthe infantry, and that armored cars andself-propelled artillery remain withtheir respective arms.9 He based hisopinion on the 1919 AEF SuperiorBoard, which was convened to con-sider the lessons of the war and howthey would affect tactics and organiza-tion of the combatant arms. TheBoard’s report noted that “tanks wereaccompanying weapons incapable ofindependent decisive action. There isno such thing as an independent tankattack.”10 Thus, the Superior Board es-tablished the tactical tone for thepeacetime army. General John J.Pershing supported the Board’s recom-mendations during the 1919 Congres-sional hearings. Subsequently, the 1920National Defense Act abolished theWorld War I Tank Corps and assignedall tanks to the infantry.11

General Parker responded to the chiefof infantry by noting that World War Itanks were used as auxiliaries to the in-fantry because they were slow, and thatnewer tanks allowed for a greater ra-dius of action and greater mobility.This situation, he reasoned, “forces theconsideration of [tanks] as a principalarm under certain circumstances, aswell as auxiliaries of the infantry.” Bycontinuing to acknowledge that thechief of infantry was better positionedto develop tanks, he concluded, tankdevelopment was tied to that branchand to the speed of the foot soldier.12

Limiting tanks to the role of adjunctsof the infantry also obstructed creationof a more efficient organizationalframework, a combined arms team,rather than a combatant arms policy,for the future Army.

Shortly after the G-3 study’s comple-tion, the War Department directed thata board of officers from the variousbranches be appointed “to make rec-ommendations for the development ofa mechanized force within the Armyand to study questions of defenseagainst such forces.” One of the elevenofficers detailed to the board was Ma-jor Chaffee, from the G-3 Troop Train-ing Section. The board summarized its

results by endorsing a combined force,with tanks forming the backbone of theattack. The board also proposed thatthe infantry mechanize and that artil-lery be self-propelled to furnish mobilefire support. In addition, it suggestedthat the mechanized force act “as a tac-tical laboratory for the determination ofthe proper tactics involved in the actionof fast tanks.” However, in an apparentcompromise with the chief of infantry,the board recommended “that a newand separate branch should not be setup.”13

At this time, J. Walter Christie dem-onstrated his new, fast tank chassis, M-1940 so named because he believed itrepresented a ten year advancement intank technology.

In September 1929, Chaffee deliveredhis famous lecture at the Army WarCollege, entitled “The Status of theMechanized Combat Organization andthe Desired Trend in the Future.” Thelecture was an elaboration on “AMechanized Force.” He held that futureoffensive operations in modern war re-quired a self-contained, highly mobile,mechanized corps with the ability toextend its striking power over greatdistances. For the first time, Chaffeediscussed the impact of French andBritish experiments with mechaniza-tion. The French, who had adopted adefensive and passive orientation,viewed the tank as an adjunct to the in-fantry, while the British preferred toeconomize their manpower by equip-ping their army with movable armor,he told the audience.14 He added thatthe situation was different in the U.S.,while the French and British were obli-gated allies under the Locarno agree-ments, “We have no ally who can bedepended upon to furnish either themanpower or the armored mobility.”15

Chaffee understood and analyzedFuller’s idea on a mechanized force,but questioned, as did Parker, its de-pendence on tanks, armored cars, mo-torized machine guns, artillery, and en-gineers at the expense of mechanizedinfantry or a balanced force.

The tactical principle of open warfareand the importance of fire and move-ment was critical to Chaffee’s thinkingabout developing a new doctrine. Thistraditional American doctrine was of-fensively oriented, the opposite of theposition warfare that characterized


combat on the WesternFront during World War I.To restore fire and move-ment, Parker agreed withChaffee that a logical doc-trine that would bring theArmy into the future in-volved rapid and deep at-tacks by fast moving tanks,supported by a balancedcombined arms team ofmechanized infantry andself-propelled field artillery.This would provide an op-portunity to move to an op-erational level of warfare, atheory of larger unit opera-tions with a mechanizedforce capable of deep inde-pendent maneuver. But thiscould only become a reality if the com-batant arms were willing to relinquishsome of their autonomy.

Major Chaffee also assessed the in-tangibles of the officers serving in theBritish mechanized force, suggesting asimilar profile for officers in ourmechanized or armored force. They“must be imbued with the spirit of mo-bility, rapidity of action, and simplicityof control.” Furthermore, he explained:“They must be of a progressive, crea-tive mind and not afraid of radicalchanges.” Apparently he was more im-pressed with psychological motivationthan with British tank doctrine.16

One book that impressed Chaffee andan officer who later served under him,Major Robert W. Grow, was the award-winning study by George T. Denison, AHistory of Cavalry (1877). Grow re-called one impressive sentence: “Acavalry general should be possessed ofa strong inventive genius, and be self-reliant to strike out a new line andadopt reforms where he sees them nec-essary.”17

Shortly before he left office in 1930,General Summerall had ordered thecreation of a permanent mechanizedforce to be established at Fort Eustis.Because of the new Christie tank chas-sis’ speed, the G-1, BG CampbellKing, visualized it as the basic maneu-ver weapon for this force.18 There wasconsiderable interest in the GeneralStaff in developing the Christie fordeep offensive operations. The Christiesystem, with its long helical spring sus-pension, provided greater compressionand extension amplitude for its largeroad wheels, which noticeably en-

hanced the firing platform and speed ofthe vehicle, and had the potential of in-creasing the operational mobility of ar-mored fighting vehicles. The chief ofstaff was so impressed with its possi-bilities that he ordered the InfantryTank Board to test the Christie tank.19

The chiefs of infantry and cavalry alsowanted to acquire the Christie for theirrespective branches. This competitionover the Christie system altered tankdevelopment during the 1930s, becauseeach arm had specific missions thatwere guarded with traditional rever-ence.

Meanwhile, the Red Army, throughthe Soviet Union’s purchasing agent inNew York City, the Amtorg Corpora-tion, contracted for two Christie tankchassis.

Though costs were a constraint increating a suitable mechanized force,the main obstruction came from thechief of infantry, MG Stephen O.Fuqua, who had succeeded General Al-len. The notion that the cavalry, be-cause of its mobility, was more suitablefor managing a mechanized force wasrejected. “There is no such animal as‘armored cavalry’ in these moderndays. Remove the ‘horse’ and there isno cavalry,” was the comment. GeneralFuqua, in a highly charged memoran-dum to the deputy chief of staff, stated:“I am trying to lead infantry thoughtinto the same doctrine of open warfare”that was adopted in France by GeneralPershing. Continuing, “the dehorsing ofthese units [due to mechanization] willmean an irretrievable loss to the Cav-alry.” General Fuqua believed fire andmovement was the infantry’s phase ofthe attack, with tanks supplying close

combat support for the at-tacking foot soldier.20

Thus, by the end of 1931,the American doctrine ofopen warfare conductedby fire and movementhad created a conflict be-tween the Army Staff inthe War Department andthe chief of infantry. Theinfantry believed openwarfare could be restoredby placing tanks with itsattacking force, while theArmy Staff concludedthat it could be restoredwith a combined armsmechanized force.

At the time, the eco-nomic pressures of the Depression anda strong pacifist tendency in Americanpolitics affected military policy, activi-ties, and technology. In addition, it im-periled doctrine and plans for a futureground war. Factors included the notionthat World War I was “the war to endall wars,” the naval limitation treaties,the Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawedwar, a strong pacifist element in Amer-ica, and the Great Depression. By thetime General Douglas MacArthur be-came chief of staff, Congress and thePresident were trying to restore eco-nomic stability by balancing spendingwith revenue, so the funds required tomodernize the Army were far fromadequate. As a result, the MechanizedForce created at Fort Eustis was short-lived.21 General Summerall’s successor,General MacArthur, ordered its termi-nation and directed all branches toadopt mechanization and motorizationto their traditional roles. This action,though based upon budget restraintsand the cost of fielding a mechanizedforce, kept the Army from developing acombined arms force for deep offen-sive operations. In addition, it deprivedthe Army from establishing an opera-tional level of warfare. As a result, thecombatant arms had retained their anti-quated tactical orientation as WorldWar II approached.

The army chief of staff’s decision todecentralize mechanization caused thebranch chiefs, especially the infantry, toreinforce their traditional missions andcombat tactics as outlined in the 1923Field Service Regulations: Operations.The regulation reflected the French in-fantry-dominated Instruction sur l’em-ploi tactique des grandes Unites that


MG Robert H. Allen, at left, and MG Stephen O. Fuqua, successive chiefs ofinfantry, opposed a new mechanized combat arm to be created from thehorsed cavalry. Later, chiefs of cavalry also opted to hold onto their horses.

defined combat missions within theseparate arms. The French doctrine hadbeen assimilated by the AEF during thewar, and was echoed in the SuperiorBoard report. Furthermore, the 1920National Defense Act fixed branchautonomy, which dampened inventive-ness during the interwar period. The1923 FSR, which remained in effectuntil World War II, stated that com-bined employment of all arms was es-sential to success. However, the “coor-dinating principle which underlines theemployment of the combined arms isthat the mission of the infantry is thegeneral mission of the entire force.”22

So Chaffee could not politic for an allarmy mechanized force at the time, buthad to settle for a decentralized effortto be determined by his branch chief.Consequently, his only road to further-ing a mechanized doctrine was throughhis branch, cavalry.

Years later, then-BG Chaffee gavecredit to General Summerall andParker’s G-3 Division for getting theArmy thinking about mechanization.23

The doctrine that emerged from theArmy General Staff in 1928, embracedby Chaffee, broke from the 1923 FSRthat gave primacy to the infantry overother branches. Instead, the GeneralStaff perceived that future armieswould be mechanized and organized onthe combined arms idea, and positionedfor deep offensive operations with thetank as the primary maneuver element.The propelling force behind this newdoctrine was the traditional principle ofopen warfare, shaped by fire andmovement. General Summerall’s stafffocused on this principle, rather thantotally accepting the dogma of armoredwarfare advanced by England, and later

Germany. Colonel Daniel Van Voorhis,the commander of the permanentmechanized force assembled at FortEustis in October 1930 and later thecommander of the mechanized cavalryat Fort Knox, added that the mecha-nized cavalry’s characteristic of fireand movement was its strength. Healso recalled German interest in devel-opments at Fort Knox in 1933: “Theywere not particularly interested in ourequipment....They were keenly inter-ested in our views on the proper tacti-cal and strategic employment ofmechanized forces.”24 General Grow— then a major — recalled eveningswith the German staff officers at theDoe Run Inn near Fort Knox. Theysaid that the U.S. mechanized cavalrywas ahead of them in tactical employ-ment “of self-contained fighting units,but that they were ahead of us in thedevelopment of vehicular equipment.”25

While the mechanized cavalry at FortKnox was developing an organizationand tactics based upon their mechanicalmounts, U.S. diplomats at the 1932 Ge-neva Disarmament Conference wereproposing “the total abolition of tanksand all heavy mobile land artillery over155mm in caliber.”26 General Mac-Arthur had concurred. He was ready togive up tanks, because they were con-sidered offensive weapons of war.27

MacArthur’s opinion undercut anymechanization policy, but another or-der, by the secretary of war in April1933, further impeded conditions forestablishing a balanced doctrine. Thisorder, spurred by a desire to controlcosts, limited the weight of tanks andcombat cars to 7.5-tons,28 so it was evi-dent the Army was being subjected notonly to budget restraints, but facing

limitations on the type of vehicles itcould develop. Finally, the drive to-ward mechanization was also hinderedby a strong pacifist element in theUnited States that still believed Amer-ica’s geographical isolation would insu-late it from the Japanese aggressionthen raging in Asia and the dangerousfascist regimes rising in Europe.

In spite of the mechanized cavalry’sadvanced thinking, branch tradition andbudget pressures smothered the Army’sability to revitalize its doctrine to meetthe demands of the future. An examplewas the main lesson drawn from the1934 Fort Riley maneuvers, whichdemonstrated the conflict between tra-dition and modernity caused by Gen-eral MacArthur’s directive. The maneu-vers were designed to determine howfar the cavalry had progressed withmechanization, motorization, and newweapons development. The 1st Cavalry(Mechanized), commanded by Chaffee,demonstrated its ability to extend its“sphere of action” within the cavalry’sprescribed mission. Generally his unitcarried out all normal cavalry missions,such as “reconnaissance and counterre-connaissance, seizing and holding posi-tions, flank cooperation, and delayingaction.”29 Before the Fort Riley maneu-vers, a new, convertible combat car, theCC T4, which was based upon theChristie helical suspension system, wastested at Fort Knox. The test committeerecommended standardization of thevehicle, with certain modifications, adecision Chaffee supported because ofthe vehicle’s operational mobility andspeed. During the maneuvers, theChristie-type CC T4 outperformed anOrdnance-designed CC T5, which dis-played an ominous profile and a less

The T-5 Combat Car, 1934 The T-4 Combat Car, 1934

Lower cost, in-house design, and the cantankerous personality of inventor J. Walter Christie led the Army to adopt the T-5, an Ordnance de-sign, over the superior Christie vehicle. The T-4 easily outclassed the Army’s candidate in head-on-head tests.


sophisticated volute spring suspensionsystem.30 By the end of the year, theArmy decided to acquire the CC T5 forthe cavalry because of the high unitcost of the convertible CC T4 and theconvenience of developing an Ord-nance Department vehicle to be manu-factured at Rock Island Arsenal.31 Bythat time, the stubborn Christie had soirritated the Ordnance Department offi-cers that they refused to deal withhim.32

After extensively evaluating the FortRiley maneuvers, the Cavalry School’sAcademic Division recommended fur-ther participation with both horsed andmechanized units.33 The chief of cav-alry, MG Leon B. Kromer, speakinglater before the students at the ArmyWar College, placated the horse sol-diers by reiterating the Academic Divi-sion’s recommendation.34 General Growlater claimed the chief of cavalry “pos-sibly could have made cavalry themechanized arm, had he been sup-ported by the General Staff and seniorofficers in his branch.”35

However, the Infantry Board observerat the maneuvers claimed the purposeof the exercise was to determine “firstand foremost, whether or not mecha-nized cavalry could entirely replacehorsed cavalry.” The observer con-cluded that the mechanized cavalry’sprincipal role was to supplement themission of horse cavalry, and furthernoted that “independent mission willonly occasionally be assigned.”36 Thisproved to be an unimaginative assess-ment of the future potential of mecha-nized operations.

In effect, the 1934 maneuvers deter-mined that combat cars, the cavalry’stanks, be harnessed to the horse unitsas the tank was anchored to the footsoldier. These developments fell in linewith the 1923 FSR and further stifledthe Army’s effort in developing a newdoctrine of deep offensive operationsdriven by a combined arms team. Nev-ertheless, the events at Fort Riley thatspring convinced the Fort Knox contin-gent that a self-contained unit, withnew equipment and organized as amechanized division, could carry outthe cavalry’s role and fight inde-pendently. When the mechanized cav-alry returned to Fort Knox, two mecha-nized field artillery firing batteries wereadded to the force. Years later, an at-tempt was made to establish a mecha-nized division. During 1936 and 1937,the Command and General StaffSchool published an instructional text

for the purpose of tactically employinga mechanized division and its table oforganization. It stated such a force beall arms and self-contained capable ofdeep independent operations with theability to exploit and consolidate ad-vantages gained. To assist in its mobil-ity, the text supported the use of avia-tion for control, reconnaissance, andtactical support. However BG WalterKrueger, chief of the War Plans Divi-sion, opposed efforts to establish amechanized division because “it wastoo big and too much of a fightingunit.”37

Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union, theRed Army had developed the Christiesystem into the BT (BystrokhodniiTahk/fast tank) series, the backbone ofits plans for deep offensive operationsand a modern operational level of war-fare. By 1935, the Red Army had es-


Colonel Daniel Van Voorhis, the com-mander of the permanent mecha-nized force assembled at Fort Eustis.

MG Leon B. Kromer, chief of cav-alry, opted to keep both horse andmechanized units.

The Ordnance-designed Combat Car T5 was selected over the Christie design.

MacArthur’s directive was for each branch to experimentwith mechanization. Above, a dual-tandem-wheeled cranetruck with tracked tires lifts a Signal Corps cable-laying car.

tablished an equilibrium between doc-trine, mechanization, and an opera-tional level with a combined armsforce.38 This allowed the Red Army todemonstrate the importance of opera-tional art. The Soviet milieu was morereceptive to arms development be-cause, in Stalin’s warfare state, themilitary budget was not controlled byelected officials and their constituents.In contrast, the U.S. Army — stressedby the reform liberalism of the NewDeal, budgetary limitations, four Neu-trality Acts, and an unimaginative tankpolicy — was unable to bring about asimilar equilibrium, which could haveestablished an operational level of war-fare. The Army during the 1930s failedto implement the doctrine of deep of-fensive operations imagined in 1928 bythe Army Staff and then elaborated byChaffee in 1929, because it was drivenby a flawed organization preserved bythe 1923 FSR, which entrenchedbranch conservatism and decentraliza-tion. By deferring to the traditionalautonomy of the infantry branch chief,the Army failed in any attempt to de-velop a doctrine of deep offensive op-erations with an armor-mechanizedforce.

The Spanish Civil War era (1936-1939) further reinforced the parochialattitude of the Army, especially that ofthe chief of staff, General Malin Craig,and the ground combatant armbranches. General Craig noted that abalanced army operating in any theaterof operations could never “dispensewith a proper proportion of mountedcavalry and horse-drawn artillery.”39

The chief of field artillery added that,despite tremendous improvements inmechanization and transportation,“horse-drawn is a little better than mo-

tor-drawn” artillery.40 On tank develop-ment, the chief of staff had recom-mended “a type suitable for close sup-port of [the] infantry.”41 The chief ofstaff summarized his feelings before acongressional subcommittee hearing onmilitary affairs. He believed futuremilitary operations “must be carriedout by the traditional arms; that well-trained infantry and artillery form thebulk of armies. Air and mechanizedtroops are valuable auxiliaries.” Re-garding military operations in Spain, heobserved that tanks were not successfuldue to antitank weapons, insufficientarmor, and mechanical defects, tacticalerrors in their employment especiallyen masse, and inadequate support fromartillery and tactical aviation.42 One ofthe officers influencing General Craigand the Army General Staff was theformer chief of infantry, GeneralFuqua, who was the U.S. military at-taché in Spain during that country’scivil war. It was his opinion, and theopinions of his peers in England andFrance, that tanks did not prove them-selves in separate offensive operationsbecause they were effectively chal-lenged by antitank guns. They con-cluded their only value was in supportof the attacking infantry.43

In April 1938, the War Department is-sued an important but reactive policygoverning mechanization and its tacti-cal employment. It noted that opera-tions abroad — as in Spain — haddemonstrated that “combatant armswill fight in their traditional roles.”Mechanized cavalry, in turn, adhered toits traditional mission in exploiting suc-cess.44 The chief of infantry, MGGeorge A. Lynch, ordained a board ofofficers to rewrite the Army’s tankmanual, taking into consideration that

the accepted use of tanks had beenlargely discredited.45 Army Ordnancenoted that “independent tank forces aredelusion,” and suggested they be heav-ily armored and function as mobilesupporting artillery or as accompanyingartillery for the attacking infantry.46

However, the Spanish Civil War pro-vided many misguided observations:tanks on both sides were not tacticallyor strategically employed en masse;most models were deficient in armorprotection; their handling was usuallyinadequate for a country that favoredthe defense.

Even before the German invasion ofPoland in September 1939, the chief ofcavalry, MG John K. Herr, madeknown his preference for the horse.The chief of infantry made no secretthat his first love was for the foot sol-dier. Later — before the ArmoredForce was created — he vetoed a pro-posal to convert foot troops to tankunits.47 The chief of cavalry, who hadinitially supported the establishment ofa mechanized cavalry division, changedhis mind and refused to mechanize hishorse units. Grow, who served in theOffice of the Chief of Cavalry duringGeneral Herr’s tour, claimed he “lost itall.”48 Shortly after the German blitz-krieg consumed Poland, Herr, whoseonly commitment to mechanizationwas its use with the horse cavalry, toldthe attendees at the War College it wasobvious “that the machine cannoteliminate the horse.”49 Ultimately,mechanization slipped away from Herr;Chaffee and the forces at Fort Knox fi-nally prevailed when the ArmoredForce was created. This, according toGrow, was not because a new combat-ant arm was necessary, but becauseGeneral Herr and the cavalry did not


Following the Spanish Civil War,General Malin Craig, the ArmyChief of Staff, believed tanks wouldbe too vulnerable to antitank guns.

The chief of infantry, MG George A.Lynch, also believed that the use oftanks had been largely discreditedin the Spanish Civil War.

MG John K. Herr, chief of cavalry inthe late 1930s, favored keepinghorse units. Ultimately, mechaniza-tion passed him by.

grasp the role of mechanization in thenext war.50

When the G-3, MG Frank M. An-drews, recommended to the chief ofstaff, General George C. Marshall, inNovember 1940 that the ArmoredForce created in June be legally estab-lished as a separate combatant arm, itwas strongly opposed by GeneralsLynch and Herr. The chief of infantryclaimed “the Armored Force had onlyasked for a field force headquarters, nota separate arm; that the infantry andtank battalions under the ArmoredForce were suffering from a lack ofcombined arms training.” He requestedthat his units be returned to infantrycontrol.51 The chief of cavalry claimedthe G-3’s recommendation was a “pettyeffort,” arguing that “the ArmoredForce had been violating the terms ofthe National Defense Act of 1920 increating non-infantry and non-cavalryarmored units.” He reasoned that theattainments of the Armored Force“could have been accomplished equallywell” in the established branches.52

Years later, after the war, a bitter Gen-eral Herr still lamented the loss of hishorse soldiers.53 It was evident the self-serving autonomy of the combatantarms branch chief organization fueled aregression in military thinking. Thechiefs of infantry and cavalry could notgrasp the difference between tradition-alism and modernity, and the role anindependent combined arms mecha-nized force played in deep offensiveoperations.

The most detrimental position regard-ing the formulation of a cohesive doc-trine guiding the Army on how it couldfight its next war was the traditionalcombatant arms view, mainly articu-lated by the infantry. General Mac-Arthur’s policy of decentralizing mech-anization had intensified the autonomyof the combatant arm branches, whichreinforced their concentric tactical ori-entation. This action, along with budgetrestraints, retarded any attempt to es-tablish a unified tank program. It alsodeprived the Army of gaining experi-ence in skillfully coordinating a mecha-nized combined arms force at the op-erational level. Chaffee blamed this oncosts, pacifist tendencies, differences ofopinion, and especially, a lack ofbranch chief awareness. He also agreedthat — as in England — the UnitedStates “failed to evaluate properly theimportance of combined arms in ar-mored units.”54 After General Summer-all left office, the General Staff was

driven by the austerity of the Depres-sion, maintaining a conservative atti-tude toward doctrine, organization,training, and research. This in turn wasreinforced by the autonomy of thecombatant arm branches. The Army’smission was fitted to an antiquated or-ganization controlled by the self-direc-tion of the branch chiefs and a GeneralStaff prone to parochialism.

During the 1930s, the U.S. Army alsolooked at military innovations in othercountries, especially in Germany andthe Soviet Union, but still adhered toits linear tactical doctrine of fire andmaneuver whose management wascontrolled by the infantry. This self-di-rected attitude among the combatantarms precluded any effort to establishthe viable combined arms force neces-sary to bring the Army into the nextdecade. The Army’s elite were unableto identify the relationship betweenstrategy and tactics and an operationallevel of warfare. Because of their fixa-tion on the traditional combatantbranch concept and the desire to de-fend their institutions, the chiefs be-came inflexible to significant ideas thatcould have moved the Army to change.Their military perception on how theArmy was to fight the impending warbecame archaic. Thus, the conservativeaction of the branch chiefs and their or-ganizations was inappropriate for pre-paring the United States for war. Evenafter the United States entered the war,they refused to rescind their autonomyuntil it was abolished in March 1942.

Conclusion

To summarize, the chief of infantry— as ordained by the 1923 FSR —

controlled the tactical level of engage-ment that was designed to force the lin-ear battle of annihilation with fire andmaneuver. This tactical dominance keptthe mechanized cavalry from develop-ing a large force capable of dislocatingthe enemy’s psychological and physicalequilibrium through deep battle. Only afew farsighted officers recommendedan emphasis on an operational level,beyond the realm of tactics, with alarge combined arms force capable ofdeep operations. This would have beenpossible only if the combatant armswere willing to relinquish some of theirautonomy to create a large, modern,mechanized maneuver force. But thiswas impossible due to the traditionalautonomy of branch chief organization.Furthermore, this organization pre-vented the establishment of an equilib-rium between doctrine and tank tech-nology, a necessary factor to achieve anoperational level. Added to this was alack of a national interest in militaryaffairs that financially affected theArmy, depriving it of the means neces-sary to prepare for and fight the nextwar.

During World War II, the tacticallyoriented army fought with infantry andarmored divisions. The infantry re-tained separate tank battalions to assistin their attack. The armored divisionsfought with a combined arms team,with the tank as the main maneuverelement. Pursuit and exploitation in thetradition of the cavalry were their pri-mary role. For antitank action, theArmy Ground Forces commander, LTGLesley J. McNair, who had once ques-tioned the cost of funding an armoredforce, prescribed a tank destroyer forceas a separate branch, but this concept


LTG Lesley J. McNair, who hadonce questioned the cost of fund-ing an armored force, instead pre-scribed a tank destroyer force, es-tablished as a separate branch.

Established as a separate branch in 1940, the newArmored Force practiced combined arms operationsas it rushed to prepare for war. Here, 1st Armored Di-vision troops maneuver in Louisiana in September1941 in the already-obsolete M2 medium tank.

soon proved invalid.55 Supported by theproductivity of American industry andan abundance of weapons and man-power, the Army was able to meet thechallenges of World War II. Thoughsuccessful in defeating the Germanforces in Western Europe, it is ques-tionable whether the Army’s organiza-tional arrangement would have beensuitable for the tank-versus-tank envi-ronment that existed on the EasternFront. There, the major engagementswere initially driven by the Wehr-macht’s blitzkrieg and then by the RedArmy’s reintroduction of deep offen-sive operations and battle with tanks enmasse providing the maneuver elementfor the combined arms mechanizedforce. The critical vehicle for executingdeep offensive operations and the RedArmy’s version of an operational levelof warfare was the medium tank, T34,which, through continued product im-provement, was the final developmentof the Christie BT. Recall that in 1930,before General Summerall left office,the general staff, especially the G-1,General King, was suggesting the fastChristie for deep offensive operationsas outlined in the G-3’s “A MechanizedForce.”

In the early 1980s, U.S. armed forcesadopted the nonlinear AirLand Battledoctrine that depended on speed anddepth, a concept worked out by a Viet-nam-era generation of officers, led byGeneral Donn Starry. The Abrams andBradley weapons systems were criticalto this doctrine. With the publication ofthe 1986 edition of FM 100-5: Opera-

tions, a stress on operational art beganto emerge, calling for the capability ofconducting an operational level of war-fare. This was finally demonstratedwith the remarkable success of LTGFrederick Franks’ VII Corps, and itslong left hook during Desert Storm.Thus, the realization of a mechanizedoperational level conceived by Chaffeeand the Army general staff in 1928,was finally achieved in 1991. This de-lay was caused, in part, by the Army’selite. It was their failure during the in-terwar period to establish a prerequisitefor operational art, an operational levelof warfare with a combined armsmechanized force.

The interwar period offers an interest-ing paradigm today, as the Army thinks

about its future. Budget restraints andforce reduction have always been achallenge, but this should not affect therevision of doctrine and warfightingconcepts as long as inspiration, innova-tion, and intellectual growth are nothampered by service conservatism.History feeds the imagination; moreawareness of it would be appropriate ina technologically driven Army. Unfor-tunately, the same kind of interwarbranch parochialism still exists. If theArmy is to embrace change with amixed organization and a modularforce, then it needs to go beyond thetraditional service arms. One move-ment in the direction of change wouldbe the creation of a combined arms of-ficer designation for the MountedForce rather then the traditional infan-try, armor, and field artillery option.The success of Full Dimensional Op-erations and modernization objectiveswill depend on identifying the vulner-abilities and deficiencies of the pastand present, and then making adjust-ments and corrections as the Armymoves to information-age technologyand Force XXI.

Notes1J.F.C. Fuller, “Tactics and Mechanization,”

Infantry Journal (May 1927), pp. 457-65.2Dr. James J. Schneider sees the first dis-

criminators of an operational level as a perqui-site for operational art during the Civil War.See Schneider, “Theoretical Implications of Op-erational Art” in Clayton R. Newell and Mi-chael D. Krause, eds., On Operational Art(Washington: GPO, 1994), and “The LooseMarble—and the Origins of Operational Art,”Parameters (March 1989).

3Board of Officers, Report on Tanks, “TanksTypes to be used by AEF,” Appendix 6, Fuller,“The Tactical Employment of Tanks in 1918,”8 August 1917, G-3 Report, AEF-GHQ, TankCorps Folder No. 1, Records of the AmericanExpeditionary Forces (World War I), 1917-23,Record Group 120, National Archives (NA), p.13. (Hereinafter cited by RG 120)

4Letter, Summerall to BG Samuel D. Rocken-bach, Chief of Tank Corps, AEF France, 13January 1919, “Tanks,” File No. 42-1, UnitedStates Army Military History Institute(USAMHI), p. 1; “Summerall Paints War of theFuture: It will conserve soldiers and use planesand tanks in attack,” New York Times, 2 Sep-tember 1927, p. 18; and R.H. Allen, “A Resumeof Tank Development in the United StatesArmy,” Lecture, Army War College, 27 Octo-ber 1927, USAMHI, pp. 1-2.

General George C. Marshall ordered thecreation of the Armored Force despite theopposition of the chiefs of infantry andcavalry. He is seen here in his postwarrole as Secretary of Defense.

Continued on Page 51

General Donn Starry, who developedthe AirLand Battle concept, an approachto an operational level of war.

Then-LTG Frederick Franks, who led VIICorps during Desert Storm, demonstrateda new U.S. approach to operational art.


“Good-Bye, Sheridan”

These were the headlines on the 23 Sep-tember 1996, Army Times. The Sheridanmay be gone from combat units, but itschassis will be around at the NationalTraining Center for many more years.

Considering that the M551 was a vehicleand weapons system nobody wanted, ithas spent more than 27 years in the Armyinventory. For a combat vehicle, that placesit among the immortals. Like General Sheri-dan himself, who was reported killed atleast five times during the Civil War, theM551 was dropped from the inventory atleast as many times, yet survived each cut.It served a three-year combat tour in Viet-nam, and was employed by U.S. Cavalryunits in Germany and Korea for nine years.

When I showed an old Army buddy a lo-cal paper, which included a photo of Sheri-dans being pushed off a barge into a bayoff the Virginia coast to become marine lifehabitats, he said, “They belong with thefish.” There seemed to be a love/hate rela-tionship between the soldier and the M551from Day One.

In 1960, while I was attending the ArmorAdvanced Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky,my class was shown a concept called theArmored Reconnaissance Airborne AssaultVehicle. We were told it was not a lighttank, but something the airborne wanted toprotect their troops from enemy tanks. Itwas to have a powerful missile/gun weap-ons systems that could meet numerousthreats. It would float and could be para-chuted or LAPESed. We were told ArmorBranch was in doubt about this thing forthe cavalry, so we forgot about it.

Well, time passes. In 1967, as a youngLTC with the Combat Developments Com-mand - Armor Agency, I found I was get-ting very involved with development of theShillelagh missile and the 152mm M409multipurpose round. Both of these werefired down the same tube on the XM551which, by the way, looked very much likean Armored Reconnaissance Airborne As-sault Vehicle. I wondered what Armor wasgoing to do with this system... why were wetesting it? That is a long story.

Earlier, we had taken the best light tankin the world, the M41, out of the inventory.

We all knew light tanks had not been a fa-vorite in the U.S. Army since the M41 waspulled out of cavalry units in Germany in1959. A friend in a high position on theArmy staff told me that Armor was nevergoing to buy the M551. It was too contro-versial and complicated. Then, at a “Com-bat Vehicle Review” held in Cleveland,Ohio in about 1965 or 1966, we learnedthe M551 was to be type-classified and en-ter the inventory as the “Sheridan.” Onegeneral asked why we were putting lighttanks back into armored cavalry units. An-other general said it was not a light tank,but a long-range weapons system tocounter the Soviet tank threat in Europe.Another general said the Army only namesits tanks after famous generals. Thisstarted the frequently repeated question:“The 551 Sheridan, what is it?” The Armorand Engineer Board at Fort Knox was notsatisfied with the progress of the Sheridan,and reported the M551 was not ready forissue to the troops.

By July 1968, times changed again. Ifound myself assigned to MACV J3 inSaigon. I had not even signed in when acolonel came to my hotel room to ask if Iknew anything about the M551. When Itold him “yes,” the colonel was ecstatic. Hesaid the theater commander, GeneralCreighton Abrams, was familiar with theSheridan, but nobody else was. The gen-eral wanted to know why the M551 shouldnot come to Vietnam. He knew there were1,500 of them parked on a ramp in Cleve-land, Ohio. He also thought the M409round would make a great bunker buster.The next morning, I explained to the J3that the Armor and Engineer Board did notthink the M551 was ready for issue. He or-dered me to do a study and have recom-mendations in one month. In a few days, Iasked the Armor School Sheridan projectofficer, the A&E Board M551 test officer,and the commanding officer of the 73rdTank Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Caro-lina, where the M551 was in operationalfield test, to be brought to Vietnam. Thethree LTCs arrived in about a week. After afew days of studying the proposal, we toldthe J3 we thought the M551 was not well-suited for Vietnam.

Well, said the J3, think again. GeneralAbrams wanted to know if the M551 would

be of any use at all in Vietnam. My col-leagues thanked me for their free trip toVietnam and returned home. I then briefedAbrams, with these recommendations: TheShillelagh missile and its guidance controlsystem should stay at home, and only 27vehicles should be brought into country, allwith added armor enhancement, especiallybelly armor.

General Abrams said, “Let’s do it.”

In early January 1969, the first Sheridansand their new equipment training teams ar-rived in Vietnam. The reception by the 11thArmored Cavalry was cool. Then, on Janu-ary 29, two Sheridans were on picket dutyalong the Long Binh highway. At about0230, the crewmen were alerted of move-ment to their front. The Sheridan search-lights were turned on, and enemy troopswere sighted crossing a dirt road. Two152mm rounds were fired, each sendinghundreds of small, arrow-like flechettesdown range. At daylight, 125 bodies werefound, along with dozens of blood trails.

In short order, the M409 round was soonblowing dirt, pieces of bamboo, and the en-emy thirty to forty feet into the air. TheM409 was a very effective bunker buster.With all of its shortcomings, the M551 hadgone to war.

During the next three years, over fivehundred Sheridans were issued in Vietnam.During that period, over three hundredwere damaged or destroyed by mines andRPGs, mostly by mines. Personnel casual-ties were high. A wounded crewman oncetold me that the Sheridan was the “devil’schariot.” Under Vietnam conditions, it ishard to measure the effectiveness of a sys-tem that was designed to fire a missile atlong range. Close-in combat was not theSheridan’s strong point. But even its great-est critics had to admire its reliable suspen-sion and power train. Its longevity is prob-ably a result of the Sheridan’s chassis.

In 1978, the M551 was retired from activeduty TO&E units, except for the 73rd TankBattalion of the 82nd Airborne Division.What was to be done with the rest? Thatdid not take long to figure out. The NationalTraining Center needed realistic-lookingSoviet vehicles, and these were adoptedon the M551’s chassis. T-72 and BMP VIS-


A Sheridan Memoir:The Early Days

by Lieutenant Colonel Burton S. Boudinot (Retired)More than 300 Sheridans were destroyedor damaged in Vietnam, mostly by minesand rocket-propelled grenades.

MODs were created with fiberglass moldedoverlays.

The Research & Development peoplealso tried putting different gun and missilesystems on the Sheridans over the years,and the M551 chassis was also used inmany experimental field tests of other de-velopmental items. Everyone seems tohave had ideas on what to do with theM551’s great chassis.

Most of us probably have no idea of allthe places the Sheridan has traveled withthe 73rd Tank Battalion. We do know itwent to Panama, Haiti, Desert Shield, andDesert Storm.

Eventually the Sheridan will go away.Many more may become homes for marinelife, but that is not all bad either. Then wecan really say, “Good-bye, Sheridan.”

Author’s Note: For those who are inter-ested in much greater detail on the devel-opment of the Sheridan, R.J. Hunnicutt in-cludes a very thorough and comprehensiveaccount in his book, Sheridan, A History ofthe American Light Tank, Vol. 2.

Lieutenant Colonel Burton S.Boudinot, a veteran of Viet-nam and Korea and a formerchief of testing at the Armor-Engineer Board, also servedas the 31st editor of ARMOR.He is retired and living in Rad-cliff, Kentucky. One experimental attempt to extend the Sheridan’s life was this 105-mm low-recoil turret

developed by Cadillac Gage.

At right, a C-130 delivers aSheridan using low-altitudeparachute extraction. The vehi-cle’s airmobility, and the needfor a rapidly-deployable firesupport vehicle for airbornetroops, kept the Sheridan inArmy service for a remarkablylong time.

Above, a very early prototypeSheridan launches a Shillelaghmissile in tests during the1960s. The Sheridan sharedthe Shillelagh missile systemwith the M60A3 MBT, butwhen it was sent to Vietnam,no need was seen for the mis-sile.


The cancellation in early 1996 of theXM8 Armored Gun System programdeprives the 82nd Airborne Division ofa state-of-the-art bunker buster/tankkiller. Although this action was a disap-pointment to many in the armor com-munity, the decision to terminate theXM8 was probably justifiable and ra-tional; the AGS was more sophisticatedand expensive (the XM8 costs roughlyas much as an M1A1 main battle tank!)than necessary for the mundane task ofdestroying bunkers and buildings, butwas considered by many to be toolightly armored for tank-versus-tankduels.

Where does that leave the paratroop-ers of the 82nd when they have an ex-ceptionally hard target to neutralize?Currently, they can call on theM551A1 Sheridans of 3/73rd Armorfor direct-fire support, but there is re-portedly no funding to keep the Sheri-dans in service beyond September,1997. The realities of modern warfaredictate a continuing requirement for alarge-caliber, direct-fire weapon system

to operate with parachute infantryforces, but the realities of the con-strained defense budgets anticipated forthe near future apparently rule out theacquisition of a new design like theXM8.

In order to be affordable, it wouldseem that any alternative to the AGSwill have to be an adaptation of equip-ment that is already in the system. In-deed, this is how the XM8 should haveoriginally been designed, instead of asa completely new, non-standard itemunique to one or two units. If airborneforces are to operate an armored vehi-cle, it should be — ideally — standardissue to the rest of the Army, althoughmodifications to create an airborne-spe-cific variant of the standard combat ve-hicle would be acceptable. Some AGSalternatives that can be easily imple-mented are:

•Deactivate 3/73 Armor, leaving 82ndAirborne with no direct-fire support.

•Deactivate 3/73 Armor; attachM1A1 tanks to 82nd Airborne.

•Keep 3/73 Armor; keep (and possi-bly upgrade) the M551A1.

•Keep 3/73 Armor; replace theM551A1 with the HMMWV.

•Keep 3/73 Armor; replace theM551A1 with the M113A3.

•Keep 3/73 Armor; replace theM551A1 with the M3A2.

Analysis

Option 1. No direct-fire support.Although this alternative generates

substantial cost savings, it does so bypreventing the 82nd Airborne from

conducting combined arms operations,except in conjunction with follow-onforces. The resulting negative impacton overall combat effectiveness makesthis option less than desirable.

Option 2. The M1A1 MBTThis would provide the paratroopers

with support by the most lethal, surviv-able “armored gun system” in theworld. Unfortunately, since the Abramscannot be parachuted into the dropzone, an airhead would have to beseized and secured to allow C-17 or C-5 transports to bring them in. Thismeans the airborne infantrymen wouldnot have tank support when it might bemost needed — during the initial at-tack.

Also of consequence is the voraciousappetite of the Abrams’ turbine engine.The enormous fuel consumption rate— twenty times as great as theHMMWV — makes this tank muchless than ideal for airborne operations,where the quantity of fuel available forresupply efforts is necessarily limited.


Too Late the XM8:Alternatives to The Armored Gun System

by Stanley C. CristThe XM-8 Armored Gun System: It’s gone. Now what?

XM8 Armored Gun System

Airdrop Capability: C-130, C-141, C-5,C-17

Armor Protection: Basic: 7.62mm, Bolt-on: 14.5mm, 30mm, RPG

Primary Armament: 105mm cannon

Effective Range: 3000+ meters

Number of Rounds: 21 in autoloader,plus 9 in hull stowage

Fuel Capacity/Cruising Range: 150 gal-lons/300 miles

M1A1 Main Battle Tank

Airdrop Capability: None

Armor Protection: 125mm APFSDS,HEAT

Primary Armament: 120mm cannon

Effective Range: 3000+ meters

Number of Rounds: 40

Fuel Capacity/Cruising Range: 505gallons/289 miles

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Option 3: The M551 SheridanCurrently in service with 3/73rd Ar-

mor, the M551A1 Sheridans are allabout 30 years old and, reportedly, re-quire excessive amounts of mainte-nance to stay in operation. Like all ar-mored vehicles developed in the 1960s,it is a low-survivability design, with noseparation between the crew compart-ment and ammunition stowage. Likethe XM8, the M551A1 is a non-stand-ard weapon system, on active service(for combat duty) only with the 82ndAirborne Division.

On the plus side, there are still suffi-cient numbers of Sheridans stored atAnniston Army Depot to make up for

any vehicles destroyed in training mis-haps or combat actions. Also, the de-structive power of the high explosiveround is second only to that of the155mm howitzer, enabling Sheridan gun-ners to make short work of enemy-oc-cupied bunkers and buildings.

Option 4: The HMMWVIn the breakthrough to Task Force

Ranger during 3-4 October 1993,40mm MK19 grenade machine guns— mounted on HMMWVs — wereused by 10th Mountain Division sol-diers to provide direct fire support dur-ing the movement through Moga-dishu’s streets.3 The minimal capabili-ties of the 40mm HEDP round seemunlikely to overcome a well-fortifiedbunker — let alone the steel hide ofany but the lightest of armored vehicles— but the effects on the buildings inSomalia were claimed to be quite dev-astating. Combining the MK19 withthe vastly increased protection of theM1109 up-armored HMMWV wouldimprove the survivability of this com-bination as a direct-fire support vehicle,but the small amount of explosive inthe 40mm projectile seriously limits itsusefulness against well-trained andwell-prepared foes.

A low budget platform that can de-molish bunkers and buildings could beassembled from surplus M40A2 106-mm recoilless rifles, by mounting themon open-top M998 cargo HMMWVs.4

As there is still a number of theseweapons — as well as a large quantityof 106mm ammunition — in storage, itwould enable a potent bunker-bustingcapability to be provided to the para-troopers for little more than the cost ofthe weapon mounts. The existingHEAT round is able to defeat most ofthe armored vehicles on any likely bat-tlefield; if greater lethality is desired,the Swedish 3A-HEAT-T ammo canpenetrate nearly twice as much steel ar-mor, even when fronted by explosivereactive armor.5 There are, however, atleast two significant disadvantages toaffixing the 106mm recoilless rifle onthe M998, complete lack of armor pro-tection for the vehicle crew and arather meager quantity of stowed am-munition. A possible solution is to usethe M1109 or XM1114 up-armoredHMMWV and develop a mount for the84mm M3 RAAWS (Ranger Antiar-mor, Antipersonnel Weapon System).6

The 84mm HEDP round does not havethe same destruction potential or effec-tive range as the 106mm HEP round,but it is still quite potent and requiresonly half as much stowage space.

There is a useful variety of 84mmammunition, too, including HE (withairburst fuzing), illumination, smoke,and two different types of HEATrounds.

Should it be necessary to do so, theRAAWS (also known as the Carl Gus-tav) is light enough for easy dis-mounted operation — a characteristic

that could come in handy in a numberof plausible scenarios.

The HMMWV, however, has no morethan bare minimum capabilities inclose combat. Mobility is inferior totracked vehicles,10 as is armor protec-tion and load-carrying capacity.


The HMMWV, shown here with TOW launch-er. Would a 106mm recoilless rifle be a bet-ter armament system?

The RAAWS: Potent and compact...

M551A1 Sheridan


Armor Protection: Basic: 7.62mm,Bolt-on: None

Primary Armament: 152mm gun/launcher

Effective Range: HEAT: 1800 metersATGM: 3000 meters

Number of Rounds: 29

Fuel Capacity/Cruising Range: 160gallons/370 miles

HMMWV: M998 & M1109


Armor Protection: M998: NoneM1109: 7.62mm

Primary Armament : M998: 106mm re-coilless rifle; M1109: 84mm RAAWS

Effective Range 1: M998/106mm: 1700meters; M1109/84mm: 800 meters

Number of Rounds: M998/106mm: 6M1109/84mm: 242


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Option 5: The M113A3 APC

There is only one tracked combat ve-hicle currently in the Army inventorythat meets the AGS requirements forboth air transportability and armor pro-tection: the venerable M113 APC.

Although the basic M113 design iseven older than the M551, the first ofthe A3 versions entered production in1987; the initial 1,600 M113A3s are allless than ten years old, so they are ableto serve for quite some time.11 Crewsurvivability and tactical mobility havebeen greatly improved,12 compared toearlier models, and the versatility of thedesign remains unmatched by newer,more complex infantry vehicles. 3/73rdArmor presently operates twoM113A3s — one as a battalion com-mand post, one for the maintenancesection — so the logistical and opera-tional base is already in place for thisvehicle.

During the Vietnam war, one route toincreasing the combat power of theM113 was to attach an M40A2 106mmrecoilless rifle to the right of the cargohatch, bolting the weapon to the rightrear antenna mount. This configurationis currently undergoing trials for antiar-mor use by the Australian Army, afterprolonged dissatisfaction with the mo-bility of M40A2-equipped Land Rov-ers.13 The same concept could providea parachute-deliverable, fire supportvehicle at virtually zero cost. The106mm HEP round has nearly thesame target effect as the 105mm HEPammo fired by the XM8, which shouldmake it a fairly capable bunker-buster.The addition of a AN/PSG-501 CLASSlaser sight, with its full-solution firecontrol characteristics, extends themaximum effective range well beyond

what was onceconsidered possi-ble for recoillessrifles.14

As might be ex-pected, this ideahas drawbacks,too. The rate offire of the APC-mounted recoil-less rifle is nobetter than thatachieved by theSheridan — twoto four roundsper minute, de-pending on the

strength and skill of the loader. Also,weapon traverse is extremely limitedwith the side mounting; a better — butslightly more costly (in both develop-ment time and money) — method

would be to develop a centerlinemounting for a modified M125 mortarcarrier, similar to the configuration ofthe Australian Milan ATGM carrier.

Another possible problem with theside-mounted M40A2 was pointed outby Major Hal Spurgeon, who — as ayoung soldier in the headquarters scoutsection of 2/47th Mech Infantry inearly 1970 — had personal experiencewith the M113/recoilless rifle combina-tion. According to Major Spurgeon, theright track of the “one-oh-six” APCregularly became stuck in muddy ter-rain that posed no obstacle to otherM113s.15 This was attributed to the un-balanced loading (all of the ammuni-tion — as well as the weapon — wasstowed on the right side of the vehicle)of the recoilless rifle carrier. It wouldbe interesting to learn if the Australian

Army is experiencing this problemwith their trials versions, too, or if thedifficulty was unique to the one par-ticular Vietnam-era APC.

Option 5: The Bradley M3A2 CFVWith the planned acquisition by the

Air Force of significant numbers of theC-17 transport, it becomes feasible toplan for parachute delivery of Bradleyfighting vehicles. As the M3A2 versionis, in essence, a light tank, it has somepotential for employment in the AGSrole. While the 25mm cannon is onlymarginally effective in defeating bun-kers and fortifications, it is fairly capa-ble at the task of knocking out light ar-mored vehicles and older modeltanks;16 newer main battle tanks can beengaged with TOW missiles.

Basic armor protection of the M3A2is actually superior to that of the XM8,and add-on tiles can be attached forprotection against hand-held HEATweapons like the RPG. The vehiclecommander and gunner — since theyoperate inside a fully-enclosed turret —have better survivability than the ex-posed gunners of HMMWVs andAPCs.

A definite logistical advantage wouldresult from having 100% parts com-monality with the Bradleys of follow-on forces. One disadvantage, however,is the rather high fuel consumptionrate, which is exceeded only by that ofthe Abrams. The other major drawbackis the inability to be airdropped by anytransport aircraft other than the C-17Globemaster III, limiting the optionsfor delivery during airborne missions.

One possible solution would be to de-velop an armored gun system variant


The M113-106mm RCLR solution: Unbalanced weight was a problem.

M113A3 APCAirdrop Capability: C-130, C-141, C-5,C-17

Armor Protection: Basic: 7.62mmBolt-on: 14.5mm, 30mm, RPG

Primary Armament: 106mm recoilless ri-fle or 84mm RAAWS

Effective Range 7: 106mm: 1700 meters;84mm: 800 meters

Number of Rounds: 106mm: 268;84mm: 1009


M3A3 CFV

Airdrop Capability: C-17 only

Armor Protection: Basic: 30mmBolt-on: RPG

Primary Armament: 25mm cannonand TOW ATGM

Effective Range: 25mm: 3000 me-ters; TOW: 3750 meters

Number of Rounds: 25mm: 1500;TOW: 12

Fuel Capacity and Cruising Range:175 gallons/250 miles

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of the M3A2, incorporating a low-pro-file turret mounting a recoilless rifle(for engaging bunkers, buildings, per-sonnel and light armor) and an ATGM(for engaging main battle tanks). Ifconsidered worth the increase in com-plexity, a dual or quad recoilless riflemount — similar to what was used onthe old M50 Ontos antitank vehicle —could be developed to provide a rapid-fire capability; this would overcomeone of the objections to the use of re-coilless rifles.

Another frequently-voiced criticismof this type of weapon centers on theprominent firing signature. Potentially,this could cause a problem when firedfrom an unarmored HMMWV, as theoccupants would be vulnerable to re-turn fire from enemy rifles and ma-chine guns, but it seems like a non-is-sue if the weapon is mounted on an ar-mored vehicle.

There is no appreciable difference be-tween the firing signatures of a 106mmrecoilless rifle and a 105mm tank gun— if one is visible to the enemy, sowill be the other. Survival then be-comes more a question of armor pro-tection.

To improve strategic mobility, utiliz-ing the XM8 bolt-on armor conceptwould allow the width of the Bradley-AGS to be reduced enough to enable itto fit in the cargo hold of the C-141. Aproperly designed low-profile turretought to reduce the height enough topermit parachute drop from both the C-141 and C-5, in addition to the C-17,thereby greatly increasing the numberof delivery aircraft.

ConclusionIt is unfortunate that the XM8 was

cancelled. Even though it was a non-standard weapon system, it had enor-mous potential to expand the warfight-ing capabilities of airborne forces. Ifthe AGS program is not to be revivedin the foreseeable future, and if theSheridans truly are to be withdrawnfrom combat duty by the end of 1997,the alternatives are few.

The M1A1 Abrams would seem to bea non-starter, due to its incompatibilitywith the parachute delivery require-ment. The standard Bradley fightingvehicle is just slightly better, as it canbe airdropped only from the C-17. TheHMMWV — even in up-armored form— has minimal armor protection, tacti-cal mobility, and payload capacity, al-though it has superior transportability;it can be carried by Blackhawk andChinook helicopters, as well as AirForce cargo planes.

The remaining option is the only full-tracked, armored vehicle small enoughfor airdrop from all four models ofUSAF transport aircraft: the M113A3.Armed with a recoilless rifle, a MK19grenade machine gun, and JavelinATGMs, a single “one-one-three”would possess rather significant com-bat power. In comparison, threeHMMWVs would have to be em-ployed in order to provide mountingsfor the same weapons. Undoubtedlysome will object to the use of theM113A3 as an interim armored gunsystem because “it is not a tank.” Thefact remains, however, that there is nomore viable option available for imme-

diate employment, and for virtually nocost.

Notes1When equipped with the CLASS laser rang-

ing sight; without CLASS, effective range is re-duced.

2Estimated quantities. Actual figures may dif-fer, depending on load plan and ammunitiontype.

3CPT Charles P. Ferry, “Mogadishu, October1993: Personal Account of a Rifle CompanyXO,” INFANTRY, September-October 1994, pp.28-29.

4Mike Sparks, “Improving Light Force Fire-power With HMMWV-Mounted Recoilless Ri-fles,” ARMOR, November-December 1995, pp.42-44.

5Bofors Weapon Systems information pam-phlet on the 3A-HEAT-T ammunition.

6“Infantry News,” INFANTRY, September-Oc-tober 1990, p. 6.

7When equipped with the CLASS laser rang-ing sight; without CLASS, effective range is re-duced.

8Estimated quantity, based on the 16-roundstowage of the Australian M113A1/106mm.

9Estimated quantity, based on 114-roundstowage of the M125A2 mortar carrier, andsimilar sizes of 81mm mortar rounds and 84mmHEDP ammunition. If HEAT rounds are em-ployed, total quantity will be reduced.

10CPT Kevin J. Hammond and CPT FrankSherman, “Sheridans In Panama,” ARMOR,March-April 1990, p. 15.

11“Infantry News,” INFANTRY, January-Feb-ruary 1992, p. 4.

12Ibid.13CPL Darren Booker, “Armor Hunters May

Get Mobility,” ARMY, November 3, 1994.14Letter to the author from Computing De-

vices Canada, maker of the CLASS Computer-ized Laser Sight (NSN 1220-21-912-2232Sight, Lead, Computing AN/PSG-501): “The106mm RR, for example, under test conditionsat CFB Gagetown, hit targets at 1,700m by dayand 1,400 by night. Likewise, the [84mm M3]with CLASS is capable of hitting both station-ary and moving tank targets at 800m by dayand 600m by night.”

15From a conversation with MAJ Hal Spur-geon, AUS (Ret.).

16Tom Carhart, Iron Soldiers, Pocket Books,1994, p. 224.


Stanley Crist is a former tankcommander, having served withthe 3d Battalion, 185th Armor.He is a previous contributor toARMOR.

The up-armored M113A3: A viable choice, perhaps the only choice...

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The Armored Gun System is gone.The senior Army leadership decided itwas an important but not vital program.The cold reality of money, or lack of it,couldn’t be ignored. Regardless of theArmy’s size, our current National Mili-tary Strategy remains based uponpower projection of forces from thecontinental United States to areas of vi-tal national interest. Strategic mobilityby both air and sea is therefore verycritical.

The Army and the Department of De-fense will thus require units which canoperate relatively independently at a re-duced cost, and without major rein-forcement along the operational contin-uum. Recent operations in Haiti andthe ongoing operation in Bosnia high-light this need. Based upon all of this,where does the 2d Armored CavalryRegiment need to go in terms of itsTO&E? With the demise of the AGS,what form should the 2d ACR take thatboth meets the needs of the regionalCINCs and is affordable?

The hallmark of Army operations isoperations in depth across the landforce battlespace. The requirement toexpand thinking to develop a visionthat both dominates the enemy andprotects the force across that bat-tlespace demands constant reconnais-sance, and that demands cavalry. The2d ACR’s combination of capabilities— three ground cavalry squadrons thatcan put 180 scout teams on the groundand an air cavalry squadron that canextend the vision of the battlefield tothe limit of the OH-58D’s FLIR range— is unbeatable and unmatched by anyother unit in the Army.

On the other end of the operationalcontinuum is the growing mission ofOperations Other Than War (OOTW).It is axiomatic that the toughest mis-sion facing any unit is combat. Themilitary exists to fight the nation’swars. Since war is an extension of pol-icy by other means, so too these opera-tions are an extension of policy throughother means. From January 1995 to thecompletion of the UN mission in Feb-ruary 1996, the 2d ACR implementednational policy by placing disciplined,trained troopers on the streets of Port-au-Prince, maintaining a secure andstable environment.

The thrust of this essay is to discusssome thoughts on the organization ofthe regiment and then propose a hybridorganization which, I believe, will meetthe Army’s needs.

The 2d ACR, in its current form —all wheeled with no cannon-equipped,tank-killing systems — can performpeace operations and fulfill the XVIIIAirborne Corps’ reconnaissance re-quirements. In accord with the missionessential task list, the regiment cannotperform guard or cover missionsagainst heavy forces without significantreinforcements.

The 2d ACR is a proven, deployableforce. The regiment also proved it canincorporate light infantry reinforce-ments, such as the two light/airborne ri-fle companies attached to regimentalsquadrons during the Haiti mission.The regiment, as an existing combinedarms team, has no problem adding tothe team.

The notion of adding light infantry asa permanent part of the regimentalMTOE was a favorite at the JointReadiness Training Center. Addinglight infantry as a permanent part of theregiment will detract from, not add to,the regiment’s flexibility. It is not a badidea to reinforce the regiment withlight infantry when the situation callsfor this type of reinforcement, such asoccurred during the Haiti mission. The

need for a dismount element exists, butthe addition of infantry without ameans to transport the riflemen doesnot address the dismount need. (Theaddition of infantry to a cavalry regi-ment has some historical basis. TheCavalry Reorganization Board of 1946recommended the addition of a “Dra-goon Troop” to the then-current cavalryTO&E. This troop was mounted inhalf-tracks and intended for town-clear-ing, obstacle reduction, and dismountedoverwatch missions. This was an addi-tion to a heavier cavalry organization.The means to transport the infantry wasprovided by the half-tracks.)

Other proposals for the future of theregiment range from a mix of squad-rons of long range recon, light cavalry,and heavy cavalry, to the most familiar— a return to the heavy cavalry we allgrew to love from the days of the inter-German border. None of these propos-als makes sense in light of ongoing andfuture Army missions. A mix of long-range recon, light, and heavy wouldamount to a bastard organization whichcould not fight as a regiment. Theheavy cavalry is oriented on the twomajor regional contingencies we mayface, but what else can it do? The solu-tion, in this cavalryman’s mind, is a hy-brid.

I believe that the most affordable fu-ture organization of the 2d ACR, in


Whither the 2d Cavalry?by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson

terms of both money and equipment, isthe replacement of the TOW-equippedHMMWVs in the antitank troops, andthe M198s in the howitzer battery withM1A1s and M109A6s, respectively.The squadrons of the 2d Cavalry willthen be organized with three cavalrytroops, a tank company, an SP howitzerbattery, and the HHT. The RegimentalSupport Squadron (RSS) would alsoreceive M88 recovery vehicles and tur-ret and hull maintenance personnel.

The regiment’s current and futurehome of Fort Polk and the JRTC makethis organization viable in terms oftraining. By FORSCOM regulation, theregiment must provide a squadron perJRTC training rotation as OPFOR aug-mentation. 2d ACR must also fit itsunit training in between the trainingunit rotations at the JRTC; this meansduring weekends and clean-up time atthe end of a rotation, as well as holi-days. The training of three tank compa-nies and three howitzer batteries is infi-nitely more manageable than coordinat-ing the gunnery of an entire heavyregiment. For the foreseeable future,Fort Polk’s primary reason for beingwill be the JRTC. The Multi-PurposeRange Complex at Fort Polk can easilyhandle the gunnery requirements of afew companies of armor. The tankcompanies can also fit into the BLUEFOR training rotations as augmentingforces. This step would save transporta-tion dollars for CONUS units.

The addition of tanks and self-pro-pelled artillery will require the replace-ment of some wheel mechanics by hulland turret maintenance personnel in thesquadron HHTs and the RSS. The sup-port platoons will need to exchangesome 5-ton trucks for fuel and cargoHEMMTs. The RSS Supply & Trans-port troop will also require PLS. TheRSS Maintenance Troop will also re-quire the addition of M88s and turretand hull mechanics. The regiment’sASL will need to reflect the addition oftanks and SP artillery. All of these ad-ditions to RSS will somewhat affect thetactical mobility of the unit, but notmaterially affect the strategic mobility.

The modifications to the 2d ACR’sMTOE, as stated above, allow the regi-ment to retain an element of strategicmobility via air while increasing the le-thality of the regiment to perform thecover and guard missions outlined inFM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. It willstrain, somewhat, the RSS, but no morethan the current level of support re-quired by the regiment across a broad

front. The Army also retains a unitwhich can operate, without major rein-forcement, across the entire continuumof conflict.

Let us theorize a regional contingencyin a desert environment. Corps-sizedcounterattacks and ripostes leave openflanks. The 2d Cavalry can guard theseflanks with its armored HMMWVs,tanks, self-propelled artillery, and OH-58Ds. The cavalry troops equippedwith armored HMMWVs can rangeacross the flank in screening observa-tion posts or a moving screen. The airand ground scouts can put eyes on tar-get, confirming or denying informationthe corps receives from airborne sen-sors. The scouts can also provide termi-nal guidance for precision munitionsdelivered by either the corps artillery,corps Apache battalions, or Air Forceaircraft. The addition of the SP artilleryensures the regiment has agile artillerywhich can maneuver and then massfires at the decisive point. There is alsocommonality between the howitzer bat-teries of the regiment and any reinforc-ing field artillery. The tank companiesprovide the squadron commanders aneffective means to strip away enemyreconnaissance and force the deploy-ment of enemy forces, all the whilebuying time for the corps commanderto respond to a threat to his flank, thetraditional role of cavalry.

A peacekeeping or enforcement com-mitment is also within the range ofmissions for the 2d Cavalry. The regi-ment does not now and will not put ex-clusive peacekeeping missions on itsMETL. The 2d ACR found that thediscipline required for combat makes iteasier to transition to the tasks and dis-cipline required in OOTW. In short, al-beit intense, training periods, the regi-ment can train to standard and then de-ploy on these missions, as it proved inHaiti. In the regiment’s experience,PEO and PKO missions require thepresence of overwhelming firepower,or the potential to mass such force asneeded. Potential bad actors need toknow the PEO/PKO force can crushthem, if required. A regiment armed asproposed can accomplish this mission.The armored HMMWVs can effec-tively patrol city streets or countrytrails with the tanks and air cavalryproviding the ultimate in quick reactionforces. The artillery provides an unmis-takable touch of menace, the steel handinside the velvet glove of the PEO/PKO force. The best way to keep thepeace on these missions is to ensure allpotential bad actors know the cost of

breaking the peace or attacking the en-forcers.

The Army will continue to downsize.The units the Army retains must beable to respond to missions across theoperational continuum. These unitsmust be able to deploy by air and landor use the prepositioned afloat stocksavailable. The primary warfighting fo-cus — our two potential major regionalcontingencies — require forces whichcan contribute to the fight. The 2dACR can conceivably be called on tofight in either region. The hybrid or-ganization I propose can significantlycontribute to the fight in either pro-spective theater and make use of thefull range of strategic deployment, in-cluding prepositioned stocks. It canalso, and just as importantly, effectivelyand efficiently train at the regiment’scurrent home station.

Corps commanders, Army command-ers, and CINCs all require informationobtained by reconnaissance units. The2d Cavalry with M1114 armoredHMMWVs, M1A1s, M109A6s, andOH-58Ds can fulfill this requirement.The regiment will also have the where-withal to fight for information throughterminal guidance of precision muni-tions, agile artillery fires, or the killingpunch of the best tank in the world.The Army and the Armor School havethe time now to evaluate this proposalquickly and then make a fielding deci-sion which will retain a strategicallymobile, operationally useful, and tacti-cally lethal force.

That is one cavalryman’s opinion.


LTC Kevin C.M. Benson iscurrently serving as a plan-ner on the Third U.S. Army/Army Forces Central Com-mand staff. Prior to this as-signment he served as theregimental executive officerof the 2d Armored CavalryRegiment. He also deployedwith the 2d Cavalry to Haition UN duty. He served in ar-mor and cavalry units in theU.S. and Germany, and as aplanner on the XVIII AirborneCorps staff. He is a graduateof the Army Command andStaff College and the Schoolof Advanced Military Studies.

The killing in Cambodia con-tinues. China threatens Taiwan.North Korea announces that itwill no longer respect the Ko-rean truce agreement andmoves combat elements intothe Demilitarized Zone. Oki-nawans object to the continuedpresence of U.S. troops. Presi-dent Clinton travels to Japanand renews the Japan-U.S. se-curity agreement and promisesto maintain 100,000 troops inthe Far East. Meanwhile, U.S.troop strength in Europe hasreached its lowest level sinceWorld War II.

In Germany for fifty years afterWorld War II, the U.S. armor commu-nity has known its German ally. Itwatched the post-war development of arenewed German Army and followedthe development of its armored vehi-cles: Leopard I and 2, Marder, and oth-ers. Now, with eyes turned more to theFar East, it behooves us to learn moreabout the armed forces of Japan, theJapanese Self Defense Force. FewAmericans realize, for example, thatthe U.S. and Japan together account for40 percent of the world’s defensespending and that Japan is third in theworld in allocating funds to defense.

HistoryThe start of Japanese military mecha-

nization can be traced to 1918, whenseveral Mark IV tanks were obtainedfrom England. A few other wartimetanks, such as the French Renault FT(called “Ko” or “A” in Japan) and theBritish Medium Mark A, were deliv-ered some time later. Little more wasaccomplished until 1925, when theJapanese formed two tank companiesto develop tactics and launched a do-mestic tank development program.

Japanese tank design began withcompletion at the Osaka Arsenal in1927 of a prototype vehicle known as“Experimental Heavy Tank 1,” a 19-tontank with a main turret mounting a57mm gun and two smaller turrets withmachine guns. After several additionalheavy tank prototypes were developed

in the 1930s, the Japanese dropped theheavy tank concept.

Continued development of both lightand medium tanks resulted ultimatelyin production of some 5,000 tanks dur-ing the war, making Japan sixth in war-time tank production, behind the U.S.,UK, France, Germany, and the USSR.The final Japanese medium tank of thewar was a 37-ton vehicle mounting a75mm gun of questionable value.

The major obstacle to Japanese tankdevelopment during the pre-war andwartime period was the philosophy thatthe primary role of tanks was infantrysupport. The major areas of progress inJapanese tank design were in the earlyadoption of diesel power and in devel-opment of amphibious tanks.

Little effort was devoted during theperiod to the development of otherfighting vehicles. The Japanese aban-doned the concept of wheeled armoredvehicles because most Far East terrainfavored tracked vehicles. A trackedcombat car mounting a machine gunwas dropped in favor of a light tank.

Post World War IIFrom the end of World War II until

formation of a security police force in1951, Japan had no armed forces ofany type. In 1954, the security policeforce, which had been under control ofthe U.S. occupying force, became theJapan Defense Agency (JDA). Becauseof the background of U.S. control, the

JDA was organized and operated in amanner similar to U.S. forces and wasgenerally supplied with U.S. equip-ment. The first armored vehicles wereM4A3, M24, and M41 tanks and half-tracks. Ground Self Defense Force(GSDF) officers, most of whom hadserved during the war in the JapaneseArmy, found U.S. equipment greatlysuperior in performance to Japanese ar-mored vehicles, all of which had beendestroyed anyway.

Equipping the GSDF with U.S. ar-mored vehicles quickly closed the tech-nology gap that resulted from lack ofJapanese post-war development. Thestandard caliber Japanese tank gun of57mm, with an 800 m/s muzzle veloc-ity, was now replaced by the U.S.90mm gun, with its 1,000 m/s muzzlevelocity. The U.S. 20 HP/ton replacedthe Japanese 15 HP/ton or less vehi-cles, providing significantly more mo-bility. The U.S. 100mm of armor pro-tection doubled that of earlier Japanesetanks.

The Japanese public attitude in 1950was a strong desire for peace, and therewas little enthusiasm for rearmament.However, the U.S., involved in the Ko-rean War and watching the growingSoviet threat in Europe, sought assis-tance in an Asian defense and began toencourage a Japanese rearmament pro-gram. In responding to this encourage-ment, Japan concluded that it shouldredevelop its own armament industry. Itwas a defense industry that had pre-


Japanese Armored Vehicle Developmentby Brigadier General Philip L. Bolté (Retired) and Iwao Hayashi

Japan is building about 20 of these Type 90 tanks each year.

viously been quite capable, having pro-duced such weapon systems as the bat-tleship Yamato, once the world’s larg-est, and the Zero fighter plane.

The Type 61 MBT

In the 1950s, the major military pow-ers were developing “second genera-tion” main battle tanks: AMX30 inFrance, Leopard 1 in Germany, Chief-tain in the UK, M60 in the U.S., andT62 in the USSR. Sweden and Swit-zerland were also developing newtanks, respectively known as the S-tankand the Pz58 (ultimately produced asthe Pz61).

The GSDF, though, was equippedwith only the M4A3 and the M24. Afew M47 tanks were supplied by theU.S. for test, but proved to be unsatis-factory. They were not designed withthe smaller stature of GSDF crewmenin mind, and their bulk and weightmade them unsuitable for transporta-tion in many parts of Japan. A decisionwas made for the GSDF to develop andproduce a national tank. The main ob-ject of the development was to producea 90mm gun tank suitable for Japanesebody size and topography. Develop-ment proceeded along the followinglines:

• 90mm gun and its fire control sys-tem.

• 500HP class diesel engine andtransmission

• Torsion bar suspension system• Hydraulic gun control system• Homogeneous armor and a welded

hull

The diesel engine and the optics ofthe fire control system used technologydeveloped during World War II. Othercomponents were based on M4A3 andM24 technology and the know-how ofJapanese industry. The first two proto-types were completed in 1957, and in1961, the tank was type classified asthe Type 61 MBT. Total production byMitsubishi Heavy Industries was morethan 500 tanks.

Although the Type 61 reestablishedJapan as a tank developer and manu-facturer, it was a first generation post-war tank and, by the time it wasfielded, most major countries hadfielded their second generation tanksand were already working on their thirdgeneration. The joint U.S.-German


The Type 61, above, wasJapan’s first postwar tankdesign. It mounted a90mm gun.

The Type 74, at left, wasupgunned to 105mm, witha modern fire control sys-tem and hydropneumaticsuspension. The suspen-sion and turret shape arereminiscent of the SovietT-62.

The tank recovery vehicleabove is a variant of Ja-pan’s new Type 90 MBT.There is also a bridgelayervariant.

At left, the Type 87wheeled armored recon-naissance vehicle was de-veloped to take advantageof Japan’s excellent roadnetwork. An 8-wheeled ve-hicle is also under develop-ment.

MBT-70, the UK Challenger, FrenchAMX40, and Soviet T72 programswere all underway. Thus, the GSDFfelt that to establish a more credibleand viable defense, it needed to initiatedevelopment of a second generationtank of its own that incorporated atleast some third generation level fea-tures.

The Type 74 MBT

The GSDF and Mitsubishi Heavy In-dustries initiated concept studies in1962 and test rigs were built and testedbetween 1964 and 1967. The first twoprototypes were completed by Mit-subishi in early 1968.

The tank’s main technical featureswere:

• A low silhouette and well-shapedhull to decrease vulnerability, some-what similar to the T62

• 105mm gun• 750HP multifuel engine capable of

operating submerged• Cross-drive type transmission• Hydro-pneumatic suspension with

hull attitude control• Modern fire control system incor-

porating a laser rangefinder, elec-tronic ballistic computer, gun stabi-lization system, and electric guncontrol system

The tank incorporated certain featuresof third generation tanks then in devel-opment in other countries, such as thehydro-pneumatic suspension similar tothat of MBT-70. Although the laserrangefinder was procured from NipponElectric and the computer from Mit-subishi Electric, continuing the trend ofrelying on Japanese industry, this wasnot exclusively the case. The 105mmgun was produced in Japan under li-cense from the UK. German track fromDiehl was tested at the productionstage, but was ultimately not accept-able. In general, though, there was littletechnology exchange between Japanand other countries.

The first production contract wasawarded in 1973 with the first tanksdelivered in 1975. A total of about 870were procured. Overall, the Type 74,even though it incorporated some verymodern features, was a second genera-tion equivalent, especially when con-sidering the main armament. Thus,while making progress in its efforts to

draw even with other tank-producingcountries, Japan was still behind.

Type 90 MBT

In the mid-1970s, the GSDF set aboutto correct the situation, laying out aprogram to develop a truly advancedMBT. The JDA soon encountered thesame challenges other countries werefacing in their tank development ef-forts. Among these were:

• The rapid progress in technology,particularly electronic technology,that tended to make componentsobsolete before development wascomplete

• Pressure from government manage-ment to achieve greater cost-effec-tiveness and reduce cost growth

• Pressure to focus on longer rangeoperational performance as time de-lays occur in the program

As a result of these factors, actual de-velopment of the Type 90 MBT tookapproximately 14 years, the tank notbeing type classified until 1991. Never-theless, the Type 90 incorporated anumber of advanced features, some ofthem not found in contemporary mod-els of the Abrams and Leopard 2. Someare found in the French Leclerc tank,developed generally in parallel with theType 90.

With the exception of the 120mmmain armament, licensed by Rheinmet-all for production in Japan, Japaneseindustry developed all of the compo-nents. Main features of the Type 90MBT are:

• 1500HP class compact diesel engine• Electronic-controlled full-automatic

transmission• Hybrid suspension with inde-

pendent hydropneumatic suspension• All-weather fire control system, in-

cluding automatic tracking• Automatic loading system• Composite armor

Several features in the tank are ofparticular interest. Although the turretis conventional in design, the automaticloader allowed reduction of the crew tothree. The liquid-cooled engine is thefirst Japanese tank engine not to be air-cooled, a feature driven by size of theengine and consequent cooling require-ment. The automatic tracking system isof unique design.

A major problem for the JDA hasbeen the procurement cost of the tank,which has resulted in a low rate of pro-duction. Whereas the Type 74 was pro-cured at a rate of about 60 per year,affordability has limited Type 90 pro-duction to about 20 per year. The resultis that reequipping the GSDF with amodern tank is progressing slowly.

Other Armored Fighting Vehicles

Other than the MBT, Japanese AFVsfall into three categories: APCs, self-propelled artillery, and support tanks.

In general, APC development, pro-curement, and fielding has paralleledthat of the tank. There have been threegenerations of APC:

• Type 60 APC: similar to the U.S.M75 APC

• Type 73 APC: similar to the U.S.M113 APC

• Type 89 APC: A vehicle similar inconcept to the German Marder andU.S. Bradley Fighting Vehicle

Each of these vehicles has also beenadapted for use as a family, includingvariants for mortars, observation,rocket launchers, chemical reconnais-sance, etc.

Since the mid-1970s, the GSDF hasconsidered that a wheeled armored ve-hicle might be more appropriate forJapanese use as an APC than a trackedvehicle, primarily because of the well-developed Japanese road network.Consequently, in 1975 the GSDF begandevelopment of a 6x6 wheeled armoredvehicle. More recently, emphasis hasbeen shifted to development of an 8x8vehicle, as well.

The main self-propelled artillery ofthe GSDF includes the 155mm howit-zer and the air-defense automaticweapon.

Initially, the 155mm SP howitzer wasmounted on the 25-ton class AFV chas-sis and designated the Type 75 155mmHowitzer, SP. This weapon was essen-tially similar to the U.S. M109. In1984, the GSDF began to introduce theU.S. M110 203mm SP Howitzer, builtin Japan under license. Part of the rea-son for introducing the U.S. systemwas to help correct the Japanese-U.S.trade imbalance.

For an SP antiaircraft system, theGSDF adapted the Type 74 tank chas-sis to mount dual Swiss Oerlikon L90


35mm automatic cannon. Except forthe weapon, all components of the sys-tem were developed in Japan. The sys-tem is designated Type 87 2x35 AWSP.

The support tank category includesprimarily the tank recovery vehicle andthe armored bridgelayer. These vehicleshave each used the concurrent tankchassis as the basis for development.

Future Development

As with the rest of the world, Japanfinds herself today living with an un-predictable future. The major potentialthreats to Japan are, of course, Chinaand North Korea, both of which couldcause Japan considerable problems.Consequently, Japan has concluded thatit must maintain a modern defenseforce while, at the same time, strength-ening mutual defense arrangementswith the U.S.

Maintaining a modern defense forcerequires both development and pro-curement efforts. For now, the Type 90MBT is adequate, matching or surpass-ing other modern tanks in capability.Thus, for the near term, efforts in thetank area will highlight component de-velopment. Component R&D effortsfor a future MBT will be conducted inthe following areas:

• Concept research for a twenty-firstcentury MBT, to include vetronicsresearch and manufacture of a testbed vehicle

• High-power diesel engine, includ-ing the use of ceramics

• Gas turbine research, especially toimprove thermal efficiency

• Electric drive system• Stepless hydromechanical full-auto-

matic tank transmission• Advanced suspension system, par-

ticularly active suspension• Advanced armor technology, in-

cluding composite armors, protec-tion against top attack, active andreactive armors, etc.

• Main gun, including improvementof AP ammunition performance, ad-vanced proximity fuze, and liquidpropellant, electromechanical, andelectrothermal technology

For other armored vehicles, for theimmediate future, the plan is to con-centrate efforts on upgrading equip-ment. Two specific programs are un-derway to field a new 155mm howitzerby replacing the Type 75 with the

European FH70 mounted on the Type89 chassis, and to replace the Type 73APC with an 8x8 wheeled armored ve-hicle.

Economic factors demand that JDAefforts in the coming years use simula-tion extensively and that there be em-phasis in the areas of cost effectivenessand generating savings in manpowerand material. Environmental considera-tions will also require greater emphasis.

Armored Vehicle Manufacturein Japan

The nature of armored vehicle manu-facture itself and the armament exportrestrictions of the Japanese constitutionmake the firms involved in the industryunique among Japanese companies. Onthe one hand, the particular expertiseand equipment involved virtually elimi-nate competition within Japan, while,on the other hand, there is little pros-pect for expanding markets through ex-port. Thus, the companies in the busi-ness have a strong relationship with theJapanese Government, but have littlepotential for expanding their armoredvehicle production beyond GSDFneeds.

There are essentially three armoredvehicle manufacturers and one cannonmanufacturer in Japan. MitsubishiHeavy Industries (MHI) is the Japanesetank manufacturer and manufacturestracked APC families of vehicles, aswell. Komatsu manufactures trackedand wheeled APC families. Hitachimanufactures small quantities of lightarmored vehicles. All of these compa-nies can produce many of the compo-nents of various armored combat vehi-cles, such as hulls, turrets, tracks, en-gines, transmissions, suspension sys-tems, and subcomponents. However,components such as armament, com-munications equipment, and optics areall procured from vendors.

Nippon Steel Manufacturer (NSM) iswell-known in the world as a gunmanufacturer and produces all of thecannons used on GSDF combat vehi-cles. Except for armament, componentsprocured from vendors are manufac-tured by domestic companies whosemain business is commercial.

In order to equip the GSDF more costeffectively, as well as to help overcomethe balance of trade problem existingwith many nations, the JDA has re-

cently begun giving more considerationto obtaining licenses for domesticmanufacture of foreign-developed weap-on systems and components, as well asthe procurement of foreign weaponsystems and components themselves.This tendency is further supported bythe general world-wide trend of inter-nationalization of military equipment.

Summary

After a post-war lapse of severalyears in the area of combat vehicle de-sign and manufacture, the creation ofthe JDA led to a reemergence of aJapanese military industry for the pur-pose of supporting the GSDF. Techno-logically behind the major armored ve-hicle manufacturers of the world for anumber of years, Japanese heavy in-dustry has responded to GSDF require-ments by steadily improving its combatvehicle design and manufacturing capa-bility. Meanwhile, the quality of Japa-nese commercial electronic and opticalproducts has been reflected in the pro-duction of superior combat vehiclecomponents. The result is that theGSDF is now receiving equipment on aquality par with the major militarycountries of the world, although budg-etary restrictions and the generally an-timilitary feeling within Japan are re-stricting the rate of modernization.


Brigadier General Philip L. Boltégraduated from USMA in 1950and retired in 1980 after a vari-ety of Armor and R&D assign-ments, including combat serv-ice in Korea and Vietnam. Hewas Assistant Project Managerfor Tank Main Armament, AbramsTank System, and ProgramManager, Bradley Fighting Ve-hicle Systems.

Iwao Hayashi graduated fromTokyo University in 1951 andworked as a tank designer atMitsubishi Heavy Industries(MHI) until 1983. He partici-pated in the design of almostall Japanese AFVs after WorldWar II. He now works inde-pendently in this field.

“Armored cars and tanks are greatlysuitable for this war. We shall see iftime proves me right.”1 Major Fran-cisco Franco Bahamonde, commanderof the Ist Bandera (battalion) of theSpanish Foreign Legion, wrote thesewords following the less than auspi-cious debut of Spanish armor duringthe battle of Ambar in northern Mo-rocco. Fought on March 18, 1922, Am-bar saw the first use of tanks by theSpanish Army, and their earliest de-ployment on the African continent.

In order to better understand theSpanish Army’s use of armor duringthe Rif Rebellion, a brief history of theconflict would be useful. Since 1909,Spanish forces in the eastern portion ofthe Spanish Protectorate in Moroccohad pushed outwards from Melilla to-wards the heartland of the Rif, and by1921 they had almost reached theshores of Alhucemas Bay. In a bid fornational independence, Mohamed benAbd-el-Krim, along with his youngerbrother Mhamed, had led fellow tribes-men against Spain.

Fighting was most intense in a regionthe Spanish Army called the coman-dancia de Melilla. In late July 1921,the Krim brothers led an harka (warparty) of tribesmen against Annual,Spain’s main outpost in the area. Thisattracted the attention of Manuel Fer-nandez Silvestre, an audacious and im-petuous cavalry general, commanding20,000 men, who was pushing deepinto rebel territory, hoping to reach Al-hucemas Bay without securing hisflank or rear. Krim counterattackedwith roughly 3,000 warriors. Sur-rounded, and cutoff from reinforce-ments, one outpost after another fell toKrim’s men.2 Instead of a fighting re-treat, Silvestre’s army fell apart, aspanic-stricken conscripts dropped theirweapons and ran for their lives. TheRiffians slaughtered those they caught,with soldiers and civilians alike beingput to the knife. In the end, Spanishcasualties numbered, at minimum,12,000, with another 600 taken pris-

oner and held for ransom. Silvestre alsoperished at Annual, although it wasnever fully established if by the enemy,or his own hand. What had taken Spaintwelve years of blood and treasure toconquer had been lost in only a fewdays. Spain’s ignominious rout at thehands of Riffian tribesmen was thegreatest defeat suffered by a Europeanpower in an African colonial conflict inthe twentieth century.

The Annual disaster had two seriousconsequences for Spanish officials: anarmy of 20,000 men had been renderedmilitarily ineffective, and the rebels —who up to that time had been armedsolely with antiquated rifles and dag-gers — were now in possession of avariety of modern artillery, small arms,and thousands of rounds of ammuni-tion. The herculean task of reconquer-ing the Melillan Command was givento the battle-tested Tercio de Extran-jeros (the Spanish Foreign Legion) andthe Regulares (native Moroccan troopscommanded by Spanish officers). Spainrushed these units from the WesternZone of the Protectorate to save the en-clave of Melilla from succumbing tothe Riffians. The going was tough, withhard-fought battles taking place nearlyevery day, and with the Legion andRegulares always comprising the van-guard of Spanish forces. The cost inmen and materiel, along with the diffi-culty of the terrain and the tenacity ofthe rebels, led to rumblings within theSpanish government to abandon itsProtectorate completely. Krim’s suc-cesses led to more and more tribesflocking to his side, which resulted inan open rebellion throughout the Pro-tectorate.

By early 1922, Spanish forces contin-ued with their drive to recover the areaSpain had lost the previous year. Themajor outposts of Nador, Tauima, andMonte Arruit were back in Spanishhands, while the push to cross the KertRiver was next on the agenda. Thiswas done on January 10 with the cap-ture of Dar Drius. Dar Drius served as

the HQ for Spanish operations duringthe spring offensives in the region.

The major drive of the year, againstthe Beni Said and Beni Ulixechkabyles (tribes), began in March whenthe weather became more favorable formilitary offensive operations. Mean-while, Lieutenant-Colonel Jose Millan-Astray, founder and commanding offi-cer of the Spanish Foreign Legion, hadreturned to the front on February 14 af-ter having been wounded for the sec-ond time during the campaign. GeneralFederico Berenguer Fuste, brother ofthe High Commissioner, led the maincolumn against the rebellious tribes-men. Millan-Astray led the Ist and IIndBanderas of the Legion (commandedby Majors Franco Bahamonde and Ro-driguez Fontanes, respectively) on theadvance which was scheduled to com-mence on March 18. Ambar/Anvar wasthe objective of that day’s operation.3

By the standards of 1922, this offen-sive employed very modern equipment.Following the Annual disaster, theSpanish military realized the impor-tance of utilizing the best weaponsavailable to crush the rebellion. A com-mission, directed by the then Chief ofStudies of the Infantry’s TestingGround (Escuela Central de Tiro), vis-ited several European countries in thehope of acquiring tanks. He consideredthe British Whippet, but financial andpolitical reasons led him to pass on it


Tank Warfare During the Rif Rebellion1921-1927

by José E. Alvarez

in favor of French equipment. France’sgeographic proximity to Spain, as wellas its shared interest in Morocco, con-tributed to the deal being consummatedbetween Paris and Madrid. Conse-quently, in August 1921, the Frenchprime minister authorized the sale oftanks, artillery, and airplanes to theSpanish Army. The tanks, known as“carros de combate/asalto” in Spain,arrived in January of the followingyear.4

The initial delivery to the Army num-bered twelve 6.5-ton Renault FT-17s;eleven were armed with a 7-mmHotchkiss machine gun, one served asa command tank (FT-17TSH). Thesetwelve tanks were delivered to the Es-cuela Central de Tiro. Six SchneiderCA1 tanks were also purchased andplaced at the disposal of the artillerybranch of the Army.

The FT-17s were incorporated into acompany (“Compañia de Carros deAsalto”), with a command staff usingthe TSH, two platoons of five tankseach, as well as a support and repairunit. The twelfth tank would remain atthe Testing Ground to be used in train-ing. The company equipment also in-cluded twelve Renault tank transporttrucks, two Hispano-Suiza tankertrucks, and a Ford light truck to trans-port stores. In addition, a repair truckwhich remained in Segovia, was neverdelivered. The staff consisted of a cap-

tain, two lieutenants, one sergeant-ma-jor, eight sergeants who would serve asTCs, and forty enlisted men (eleventank drivers, twenty truck drivers, andnine mechanics and service person-nel).5

King Alfonso XIII saw a demonstra-tion of the new tanks at a militarycamp outside Madrid soon after theirarrival. After a brief period of instruc-tion for the new unit, the General Staffordered that the tank company betransferred by rail to the port of Malagaon March 8, and from there by ship toMelilla. Once there, the unit was im-mediately sent to the encampment atDar Drius. However, suitable shelter forthe tanks from the inclement weather,as well as repair facilities, had not beenestablished. This led the company com-mander, Captain José de Alfaro, to pena terse report to Army HQ in Melilla.As a result, all tanks needing major re-pairs had to be sent from Dar Drius tothe artillery’s machine shop in Melilla.6

No more than two months had goneby since the tanks had arrived in Spainand they would now be pressed intoservice against the Beni Said tribe. OnMarch 17, the company joined GeneralF. Berenguer Fuste’s column at the for-ward outpost of Itihuen/Ichtiuen. Thefollowing morning, at 0600 hours, thetank company began its advance withthe infantry of the Foreign Legion de-ployed behind the FT-17s. The opera-

tion, which called for the capture ofTuguntz, succeeded in reaching and oc-cupying the houses of Ambar/Anvar.Once there, however, they began totake heavy fire from their left flank.The tanks had advanced, over brokenterrain, faster than their infantry, and adistance of some 800 meters separatedthem. The Riffians, undaunted by theappearance of these new war machines,surrounded the unprotected tanks andbegan hurling stones at them. Findingthe machine gun’s blind spots, theythrust their daggers (gumias) throughthe vision slits, injuring one machinegunner’s face. Many of the tank’s ma-chine guns, installed the day before,jammed during firing due to faulty am-munition.

The tanks had to withdraw to rejointhe Legionnaires, but during the with-drawal, fighting continued, forcingsome of the tankers to abandon theirdisabled or disarmed vehicles. The out-come of this less than auspicious eventin the history of Spanish armor left twosergeants and one enlisted driverwounded, and three tanks disabled.Lacking the necessary recovery equip-ment, two of the tanks had to be left onthe battlefield where the Riffians blewthem up with dynamite four days later.7

The Army’s General Staff examinedthe lackluster performance of the tanks,and concluded that the determining fac-tor in the fiasco was the lack of coop-


eration between the infantry and tanks.The gap which developed between thetwo elements, as well as the failure ofthe machine guns, were also importantcontributing factors. It was also notedthat the tanks had been rushed to thefront without the opportunity for coor-dinated training/exercises with the in-fantry.8

For the remainder of the campaign inthe Protectorate, tanks were used on asmaller scale, to provide support duringretreats, in punitive operations, inwheeled-vehicle recovery, and in re-connaissance operations with cavalryand infantry units. They would onceagain be used in a major operation dur-ing the amphibious landings at Alhuce-mas Bay in September, 1925, wherethe company of FT-17s were to disem-bark first in order to provide fire sup-port for the infantry who followedthem ashore. The landing craft, how-ever, struck a shoal, forcing the infan-try and artillery to disembark unas-sisted. The tanks were brought ashorethe following day, where they providedsupport for the left flank of the beach-head and, with the collaboration of theVIth and VIIth Banderas of the Le-gion, advanced to take the strategicheights/line of Malmusi Alto, MalmusiBajo, and Morro Viejo.9 With the suc-cessful landing at Alhucemas Bay bythe Spanish Army, the defeat of Krimand his “Rif Republic” was assured.The war would continue, with less in-tensity, until peace was declared inmid-1927.

In conclusion, Spain’s first use of ar-mor during the Rif rebellion in Mo-rocco resulted in a minor setback. Nev-ertheless, among the farsighted officersof the Army, the use of tanks in a colo-nial setting, where difficult terrainwould be encountered, was a reality. Inthis type of campaign, it was of the ut-most importance that armor and infan-try provide mutual support. If not,either could be easily cut off and de-stroyed.

This not only happened to Spanishtanks at Ambar, but to Italian armorduring the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36. Greater mechanical reliability, alongwith better ammunition, improved thefighting capability of Spanish tanksduring the rebellion, and even thoughthey did not play a major role duringthe Alhucemas Bay landings, they wereavailable to provide fire support ifcalled upon to do so.

Within the Spanish Army, there wasno turning back. Armor was here to stay.

Notes1Francisco Franco Bahamonde, Marruecos:

Diario De Una Bandera (Madrid: 1922), p.177. On pp. 177-179, Franco detailed his per-sonal opinions on the employment of tanks inthe Moroccan Campaign, as well as his numer-ous recommendations for improvement. Whileothers in the military declared that ‘The tankshave failed,’ or ‘Tanks are useless in Morocco;they are inappropriate in this terrain,’ he (alongwith Genereal Damaso Berenguer Fuste, HighCommissioner of the Spanish Protectorate inMorocco) believed otherwise. He boldly statedthat, “Los carros de asalto y tanques son degran aplication en esta guerra. Veremos si eltiempo me da la razon.”

2David S. Woolman, Rebels in the Rif: Abd elKrim and the Rif Rebellion (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 1968), p. 102.

3John Scurr, The Spanish Foreign Legion, Os-prey Men-At-Arms Series, no. 161 (London:Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1985), pp. 11-12.

4Defensa, no. 144, April 1990, “Los Carros deAsalto Españoles en la Campaña de Marreu-cos,” p. 62.

5Ibid., p. 63. TSH is the Spanish translation ofthe French TSF (i.e., Telegraph without wire orradio-equipped). Javier de Mazarrasa, BlindadosEn España, 1a Parte: La Guerra Civil 1936-1939, No.2 (Valladolid: Quiron Ediciones,1991), p. 18. This source recorded that onlyeleven FT-17s were purchased, including theTSH. For more on the FT-17 light tank, includ-ing specifications, see Kenneth Macksey andJohn H. Batchelor, Tank: A History of the Ar-mored Fighting Vehicle (New York: CharlesScribner’s Sons, 1970), pp. 38-39, and Christo-pher F. Foss, The Illustrated Encyclopedia ofthe World’s Tanks and Fighting Vehicles: Atechnical directory of major combat vehiclesfrom World War I to the present day, with aForeword by Richard M. Ogorkiewicz (NewYork: Chartwell Books, Inc.,), pp. 70-71.

6Defensa, p. 63.7Ibid., pp. 63-64. Franco, pp. 175-177. Wool-

man, p. 105. It is interesting to note that duringthe Italian-Ethiopian War of 1935-1936, theEthiopians fought the Italian CV-33/5 lighttanks in similar fashion. Major General J.F.C.Fuller, The First of the League Wars, its lessonsand omens (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode,1936), p. 68, (n. 1), described Ethiopian anti-tank methods thus:

They lay up for tanks when they attempt tocross difficult ground, rushed them from be-hind, scrambled on their backs, and then lean-ing over the roof of the cab smashed the muz-zles of the [2] machine guns with a rock. I alsoheard that sometimes they poured petrol over atank and set it alight.

For more on the role of the Legion, whichsuffered 86 casualties during this battle (one ofthem being Major Fontanes, CO of the IIndBandera, who was KIA), see José E. Alvarez,“The Betrothed of Death: The Spanish ForeignLegion during the Rif Rebellion, 1920-1927”(Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1995), pp.147-149.

8Defensa, p. 64. On page 9 of a manuscriptprovided to the writer by Colonel of Infantry(Legion) Ramón Moya Ruiz entitled “LosMedios Blindados y La Legion,” the authornoted the following causes for the failure of thetanks at the battle of Ambar and what needed tobe done to rectify the situation:

•It was necessary to install two machine gunsinstead of the single one provided.

•Improve the quality of the ammunition toavoid interruptions [jamming].

•Better trained personnel with combat experi-ence.

•Tanks, in this type of campaign, should beemployed with mutual support from infantry.

•The threat to tanks will come from: artillery,antitank rifles [i.e., the 13-mm Mauser T-Gewehr of 1918] and machine guns.

9Moya Ruiz, pp. 11-12. Defensa, p. 64. Scurr,pp. 16-17.

Renault FT-17—Technical Data

Crew: 2.

Armament: One Hotchkiss 7mm machinegun.

Armor: 22mm (0.87in) maximum; 6mm(0.24in) minimum.

Dimensions: Length (with tail) 16ft 5in (5m);width 5ft 9in (1.74m); height 6ft 7in(2.14m).

Weight: Combat 15,432 lbs (7,000kg).

Ground Pressure: 8.5lb/in2 (0.59kg/cm2).

Engine: Renault four-cylinder water-cooledgasoline engine developing 35bhpat 1,500 rpm.

Performance: Road speed 4.7mph(7.7km/h); road range 22 miles(35km); vertical obstacle 2ft (0.6m);trench crossing (with tail) 5ft 11in(1.8m), (without tail) 4ft 5in (1.35m);gradient 50 percent.

Adapted from Christopher F. Foss, The Il-lustrated Encyclopedia of the World’sTanks and Fighting Vehicles.


Dr. José E. Alvarez is an As-sistant Professor of History atThe University of Houston-Downtown, and an honorarymember of the Brotherhood ofFormer Gentlemen Legion-naires of the Spanish ForeignLegion (Ceuta chapter).

Square Pegs and Round Holes. De-spite their recognition of a new era ofpeace operations, neither FM 100-5,Operations, nor FM 100-23, Peace Op-erations, provides us with a frameworkfor conceptualizing this new form ofmilitary endeavor. This is an under-standable omission, given the complex-ity and variety that characterize peaceoperations. To be sure, the authors ofthe newest FM 100-5 admitted that thevenerable AirLand Battle (ALB) frame-work may no longer be the best choicefor every situation, but they stoppedshort of proposing a new one. This gapin our doctrine has left many of usmentally genuflecting to the old “close,deep, and rear” trinity despite its grow-ing irrelevance to some modern opera-tions.

While preparing to deploy to Bosnia-Herzegovina for Operation Joint En-deavor, the leadership of the 3rdSquadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry gave uptrying to pound the square peg of peaceoperations into the round hole of theALB framework. Instead, we devel-oped a peace operations framework(POF) that was tailored to implement-ing the Dayton Peace Accord in Bosniain January 1996. Naturally, this frame-work won’t work for every peace op-eration, but the thought process weused to develop it will.

The Right Tool for the Job. Wewanted to have a framework. Frame-works focus our thoughts when we aredeveloping operational concepts, sav-ing time and helping to bring order outof the chaos of war or its aftermath. Aninadequate or inappropriate frameworkcan constrain our thinking, blinding usto both danger and opportunity. Ouroptions were to use the ALB frame-work, some modification thereof, or tocreate our own framework from theground up. We chose the last option.

Linearity vs. Non-Linearity: Linearareas of operations are characterized byrelatively continuous lines of contact,separating well defined areas undereither friendly or enemy control. Linearconditions arise where high force den-sities and/or low levels of mobility ex-ist, even if only locally. Central Europeduring the Cold War, the Korean Pen-insula today, and Kuwait proper duringDESERT STORM are examples of es-sentially linear battlefield conditions.The familiar “deep, close, and rear” ar-eas are readily discernible in each ofthese cases, so the ALB framework fitsthem neatly. Of course, when we re-move the “enemy” from the equation,we can no longer orient ourselves withthese handy references to the line ofcontact. This makes Peace Operationsalmost automatically non-linear.

The Ole Gray Mare. During ourplanning for Operation Joint Endeavor,we quickly realized that the old ALBframework, which had been expresslydeveloped to suit the conditions of alarge scale, essentially linear, conflictin Central Europe, was probably notthe appropriate framework for a non-linear environment like Bosnia. Itwould be like trying to use Americanfootball plays to win a soccer game un-der soccer rules. Although we enteredBosnia on a combat footing and wereprepared for immediate combat opera-tions, the ALB framework just didn’tfit. First, we were neutral, so the con-flict’s final line of contact, the AgreedCease Fire Line (ACFL) was not to beour limit of advance. We intended tooperate freely on both sides of theACFL. That had the effect of removingthe basis of reference on the ground forclose, deep, and rear areas. Secondly,we fully intended to dominate the For-mer Warring Factions command, con-trol, communications, and information(C3I) systems had combat occurred. In

the early 1980s, the former Soviet Gen-eral Staff predicted that new informa-tion technologies would cause “frontli-nes to disappear and terms such as‘zones of combat’ will replace suchoutdated concepts as FEBA, FLOT,and FLET. No safe-havens or ‘deeprear’ will exist.”1 Any combat operationin Bosnia would have most closely re-sembled the nearly simultaneous “takedown” of the Panamanian DefenseForces in 1989. As one observer de-scribed that operation,

“Panama was not a neat linearbattlefield. Although, at the opera-tional level, boundaries were as-signed during the initial opera-tions, they were of little value. Thebattlefield more resembled a lethalmosaic of separate attacks con-ducted by land, sea, and air fromthe four points of the compass.”2

After discarding any FLOT-basedframework, we began to look for otheroptions. Regrettably, after acknow-ledging that new frameworks would beneeded to cope with the emergingtrends represented by those operations,the authors of FM 100-5 called it aday.3 They failed to provide any alter-native framework for non-linear opera-tions, in wars or in “other than wars.”So, we were on our own.

What’s in a Name? We had the op-tion of stretching the old ALB frame-work’s definitions to fit a new situ-ation. We could have redefined “rear”to mean support activities. “Close”could have meant current operations, orit could have referred to the zone ofseparation (ZOS). We might have used“deep” to describe future operations, orCA/PSYOPS activities, or operationsoutside of the ZOS. But then, why givenew, less accurate names to things? Itseemed that this would only confusematters. After all, Task Force Eagle


A Framework for Peace Operationsby Major Sean B. MacFarland

Muslim civilians approach as C Troop, 1-4 CAV mans Checkpoint Charlie, in the Zone of Separation.

BALKANREPORT

demonstrated its neutrality by placing“rear” type activities on both sides ofthe ZOS. There were brigade headquar-ters and base camps on each side.“Deep” also lost much of its meaningin Bosnia. Long term threats to theforce did not necessarily originate farfrom IFOR facilities; they were some-times as “close” as the local nationalsworking inside our own perimeters.IFOR units roamed across the entireAOR, conducting vast numbers of si-multaneous operations, linked by acommand and control architecturevastly superior to those of the formerwarring factions (FWFs). The use ofthe old ALB terms under such condi-tions would have been at best sub-opti-mal, at worst, downright misleading.When we began to throw around termslike “close, deep, and rear” or anotherfavorite, “center of gravity,” in ways inwhich they were not originally in-tended, those terms began to mean toomany things to too many people. As aresult, these terms, coined as the lan-guage of our warfighting doctrine, be-came dangerously and potentially fa-tally, imprecise. We decided to avoidthem when discussing non-combat op-erations.

The Peace Operations Framework:Because spatial references tend to ob-scure, rather than clarify, what is occur-ring under non-linear conditions, amore function-based reference systemseemed to be what we needed for ourPOF. After conducting our missionanalysis, it was clear that our missionessential task list (METL) could be re-duced to two categories: operations indirect support of the Dayton GeneralFramework Agreement for Peace(GFAP) and operations in support ofourselves. A task in either categorymight be designated the main effort un-der the appropriate conditions. The re-sult of this simple thought process ledus to design a framework based ontreaty operations, support operations,and a designated main effort within oneof these categories. These elements ofthe framework reside in the operationsspace, which is surrounded by an influ-ence space.

Influence Space: The outermost re-gion of the framework is the influencespace, which is based on the new doc-trinal term, “battlespace.” Battlespacelinks operations within an AO to rele-vant events and places far beyond itsboundaries, in the air, in space, at sea,and on land. It is three-dimensional,portable, and applicable at all levels ofcommand.4 Clearly though, battles are

not fought throughout the battlespace.Ideally, in peace operations, they arenot fought at all. This discrepancy canbe rectified by blending “battlespace”with an older (1982) doctrinal term,“area of influence,” yielding, “influ-ence space.” This term retains themulti-dimensional flavor of the 1993doctrine, but is more precise becauseinfluence, not battle, exists throughoutthe space. Also, and on a more practi-cal level, the abbreviation of influencespace (IS) is less unfortunate than thatof battlespace (BS). The IS is not as-signed by a higher headquarters, so ithas no boundary. It can extend back tothe ports of embarkation or the homestations of forces that are deployinginto the operations space. Our IS ex-tended back from Bosnia, throughHungary, where we occasionally had tosend helicopters for intermediate levelaviation maintenance, to our rear de-tachment in Schweinfurt, Germany.

Operations Space: Within the IS, isthe assigned operations space (OS).Unlike the IS, it has a defined bound-ary. The OS is merely a three-dimen-sional version of a traditional AO. For3-4 Cav, our OS extended beyond ourground sector to include the entire2BCT sector and the Russian brigadesector. This is because our groundtroops were initially dispersed acrossthe entire 2BCT sector until all taskforces closed into their respective sec-tors. We also conducted joint patrolswith the forces on our flanks, the Rus-sians in the north, and TF 4-12 to oursouth. Finally, our 16 OH58Ds were re-sponsible for conducting aerial patrolsover both the 2BCT and Russian bri-gade sectors. It was within the OS thatthe squadron conducted its treaty andsupport operations.

Treaty Operations: We assessed thefollowing tasks as directly supportingthe GFAP. The assessment was, ofcourse, subjective and as such, it isopen to reinterpretation. In fact, thetask list changed over the course of thesquadron’s deployment. The list wasreanalyzed at each milestone of theGFAP timeline. I strongly recommendthat METLs during any sort of peaceoperation be periodically reviewed. Thepresence of the peace operations forceshould and will affect the environmentit enters, causing initial facts and as-sumptions to change.

- Reconnaissance and Surveillanceto monitor GFAP compliance. This hada collateral benefit to force protection,and doubled as a force presence task.

- Force Presence Operations to se-cure areas of transfer and separateFWFs.

- Freedom of Movement Opera-tions to enforce the right of IFOR andcivilians to move freely in Bosnia. Ob-servation posts, checkpoints, and pa-trols were the most visible method ofconducting this task. PSYOPS teamstalking to civilians and CA teams talk-ing to police were just as important.

- Information Operations to explainGFAP provisions for area transfers andother issues. Our PSYOPS team was asource of two-way information flow.Their reports of how the latest IFORinformation products were receivedwere invaluable in calculating localmoods and attitudes.

- Mine Clearance Team Escort toallow FWFs to clear mines in the ZOS.This task eventually petered out as theFWFs deactivated their engineers fasterthan they deactivated or cleared theirold minefields.

- Civil Affairs Operations to ensureorderly area transfer and facilitate a re-turn to normalcy. This also encom-passed a wide range of other activities,to include assessments of various vil-lages throughout the squadron sector.We also occasionally did CA assess-ments in the Russian sector because ofthe tight linkage some villages in theSapna Thumb region to our north hadwith those in the Tuzla Valley in oursector.

- FWF Assessments to allow thesquadron to influence faction compli-ance with GFAP provisions. Ourcounter-intelligence team, along withtroop commanders, and others who hadfrequent contact with FWF officers,were our principal assets in this arena.

- Humanitarian Assistance Opera-tions to coordinate NGO and PVO ac-tivity within the squadron sector. TheCA team’s area assessments often iden-tified local needs that NGOs or PVOscould fill. The response of these or-ganizations built credibility for thesquadron among the local nationals. Anoccasional medevac also qualifies ashumanitarian assistance. Engineer workto improve key routes can also assistthe locals return to normalcy as a col-lateral benefit.

- Support to International CriminalTribunal, Yugoslavia (ICTY) Inspec-tors grew as a mission as thaws in thespring of 1996 revealed more and moreevidence of mass murders in the wake


of Srebrenica’s fall in July 1995. Thisgenerally required the positioning of aquick reaction force (QRF) and artil-lery to support it. The QRF remainedout of sight of the inspection team, butwithin radio range of a military liaisonofficer at the inspection site.

- Support to International PoliceTask Force (IPTF) increased alongwith the size of the IPTF. This includedcontingency plans to rescue IPTFmembers from hostage situations, co-operating in investigations, and otherwork with FWF police forces, and pro-viding some quality of life support.

Support Operations: These opera-tions enable the force to conduct itspeace operations tasks. The line be-tween peace operations and support op-erations is not always clear, but thatisn’t important. The key is to provideeveryone with a common frame of ref-erence to eliminate confusion duringdaily operations.

- Force Protection consisted of lodgment area security, convoy opera-tions, and the quick reaction force, bothaerial and ground.

- Communications Support was keyto maintaining the ability to synchro-nize operations and to concentrate sta-bilizing assets at the decisive pointquickly.

- Route Clearance to classify andclear key routes was essential to allother operations.

- CSS Operations included all thenormal elements of sustainment plus anew one: quality of life support. Asyou can imagine, this grew in impor-tance as the deployment progressed andwas critical to maintaining high morale.

The Main Effort: When developinga new framework, it is best to beginwith the fundamentals. As Jomini dis-covered, the “fundamental” principle ofwar is to concentrate and apply maxi-mum combat power at the decisivepoint.5 We believed that this principlecould be safely extended to peace op-erations. As a fundamental principle, itimmediately establishes a useful frameof reference. Because the main effort is(or should be) at the decisive point, itwas a logical choice for one of ourframework’s elements.

In combat operations, the main effortconsists of whichever elements of com-bat power (leadership, firepower, ma-neuverability, and protection) are con-centrated at the decisive point.6 The de-cisive point against which this combat

power is concentrated may not be asingle place, but a dispersed function,like command and control or air de-fense.

In peace operations, we concentrate“stabilizing assets” instead of combatpower at the decisive point. Certainly,combat power is a significant stabiliz-ing asset, but it is just one of many.Stabilizing assets can include, amongother things, civil affairs teams,PSYOPS teams, MPs, counter-intelli-gence teams, engineers, medics, trans-portation assets, interpreters, and keyleaders. As in non-linear combat opera-tions, the decisive point may be a dis-persed function, such as public opinionor force protection.

The main effort can be either a treatyoperations task or a support operationstask. It depends on the decisive point,which will shift over time. When thesquadron first entered Bosnia, theACFL was the decisive point, and theseparation of the FWFs was the maineffort, clearly a treaty operations task.Once the FWFs had been moved out ofthe ZOS, the decisive point shifted tothe area of transfer within the squad-ron’s sector.

Civil affairs efforts in this area be-came the main effort as the squadronworked to ensure a smooth transfer ofthis politically sensitive area from thecontrol of one FWF to another. Oncethe transfer was completed and the In-ter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) wasestablished, the decisive point shiftedto the credibility of the GFAP outsideof the ZOS. As a result, the main effortshifted to ensuring freedom of move-ment of both IFOR and civilians acrossthe IEBL. After all FWF forces hadmoved to their cantonment areas, thesecurity of IFOR elements in sector be-came the decisive point. A single casu-alty-producing incident against a vul-nerable convoy or installation couldundermine IFOR’s credibility amongthe FWFs, leading to renewed hostili-ties and demands from some in Wash-ington, D.C. to pull out of Bosnia. As aresult, the main effort shifted to forceprotection, which is a support opera-tion.

It’s the Thought Process thatCounts. The 3-4 Cav peace operationsframework has worked well for thesquadron’s operations in Bosnia as apart of Task Force Eagle. It’s probablyfar from perfect, but I don’t think thatmatters. The important thing is that wefound a system for organizing our plan-

ning under unique, and non-linear cir-cumstances.

This framework will probably notwork for other units in other types ofpeace operations for a host of reasonsthat I can’t even imagine. But, by un-derstanding the thought process weused to develop our framework, otherunits will be able to develop their owntailored framework whenever andwherever needed. That’s why I don’tadvocate adding this framework to ourdoctrine. Instead, I would rather seeour doctrine include a methodology fordeveloping frameworks for non-linear,peace-oriented operations, and I believethat 3-4 Cav’s methodology is a step inthat direction.

Notes

1Lester W. Grau, “Soviet Non-Linear Com-bat: The Challenge of the 90’s,” (Foreign Mili-tary Studies Office Study, September 1990), p.2.

2William C. Bennett, “JUST CAUSE and thePrinciples of War,” Military Review, 3 (March1991), p. 11-12.

3U.S. Department of the Army , Operations,Field Manual 100-5, (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 6-12.

4Field Manual 100-5, pp. 6-12-13.5Antoine-Henri de Jomini, “Summary of the

Art of War,” in Roots of Strategy: Book 2, ed.J. D. Hittle, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1987),p. 461.

6Field Manual 100-5, pp. 2-10-11.


Major Sean B. MacFarland isthe Deputy G3 of 1ID. Heserved as S3 and then XO of3-4 Cav in Schweinfurt, Ger-many and in Bosnia, where thesquadron was reflagged to 1-4Cav. He received a B.S. fromthe U.S. Military Academy andan M.S. from Georgia Tech. Heis a graduate of both the Com-mand and General Staff Col-lege and the School of Ad-vanced Military Studies. He hasserved as a G3 plans officer in3ID and has held a variety ofcommand and staff assign-ments in armored cavalry unitsin CONUS, Germany, andSouth West Asia.

Maneuver warfare: A controversialterm, continually redefined and arguedabout, but generally agreed to be “agood thing.” Involves concepts likespeed vs. synchronization and “ordi-nary” forces used in conjunction with“extraordinary” forces.1 Generallycited, but rarely practiced in peacetime,paid some service in most U.S. Armydoctrine, espouses the training of offi-cers in “operational art,” but claims ap-plicability to all echelons of warfare.Embraced by the United States MarineCorps as doctrine,2 has componentswhich are elements of U.S. Army doc-trine.

This is a “Perfect World” article. Up-front, it should be stated and acknow-ledged that the number one skill whichour tactical echelons must perfect ishow to DESTROY the enemy. Execu-tion of violence is the enabling skillwhich frees forces to maneuver in mostsituations. It is the basic skill withoutwhich the author readily concedes thatmaneuver cannot happen. That said,given the time and money, the materialand the men...

How do we train this generation ofofficers to execute maneuver warfare?Does the United States Army de factoembrace the concept of maneuver war-fare as opposed to attrition warfare? Dowe even acknowledge the possibilitythat the two might exist as separate en-tities, and should we? And what theheck is “maneuver warfare?” We allcan infer what attrition warfare mightbe — images of the stagnation on theWestern Front in WWI abound — butthat’s not how we fight, is it? These arethe questions that today’s senior leadersand doctrinal writers face, and whichthis essay plans to address.

Simply stated, “maneuver warfare” isthe embodiment of Sun Tzu’s para-phrased maxim that the essence of gen-eralship is not to win the war by win-ning a thousand battles, but to win thewar having never had to fight a battle.3

Through movement and positioning,put your opponent into a positionwhere he must cede what you desire,without firing a shot. This does not ne-gate the role of the direct fire fight intactical operations, but it does mini-mize the casualties taken by most tacti-

cal commanders and maximizes the op-tions available to the operational levelcommander.

And so the question becomes, how dowe train the current and successivegenerations of officers to conduct war-fare that emphasizes avoidance of con-tact at any level in favor of position-ing? And, at what level must we con-centrate our efforts? Training secondlieutenants in the planning and execu-tion of the direct fire fight is, in allcases, a requirement. Training captainsin the use of fire and movement to im-pose their will through an operationupon the enemy is also a necessarygoal. But how do we train our staffsand the commanders that own staffs?These staffs start at the battalion andbrigade, senior first lieutenants, cap-tains and majors, as well as the lieuten-ant colonels and colonels in command.Where do they learn the beginnings ofoperational art, and the possibilities, aswell as the risks, inherent in maneuver-style warfare? In what forum are theirideas validated?

Battalions and brigades participate inthe Battle Command Training Program(BCTP), utilizing the Corps BattleSimulation (CBS) computer simulation,but at that level, they are more trainingaids than anything else. During trainingevents of this size, battalion and bri-gade staffs generally do not even attendthe training seminars or after-action re-view discussions. Where are lowerechelon (tactical) headquarters trainedfor maneuver warfare and their creativeand inspired innovations on the art ofwar tested? Sadly, for the United StatesArmy, the answer would have to bethat this last goal is not being met; it isnot even being pursued. We are just notprepared, or currently equipped, to exe-cute this type of training at the tacticallevel, and one could even argue thatthis is true for the operational levelalso, in light of the built-in limitationsof the current generation of computersimulations.

We have thus far refused to train ma-neuver warfare-based tactics at ourhome stations or at the combat trainingcenters. For maneuver training of tacti-cal units, the question is, are we train-ing tactical units to attack at unex-

pected times, using unexpected direc-tions, or attacking dissimilar forces?No. These deficiencies might be cor-rected at our training centers in the fu-ture.

Our combat training centers (CTC),the Combat Maneuver Training Center(CMTC) at Hohenfels in Germany, theJoint Readiness Training Center(JRTC) at Fort Polk, La., and the Na-tional Training Center (NTC) at Fort Ir-win, in the Mojave Desert of Califor-nia, are not doctrinally or physicallyequipped to replicate anything but attri-tion warfare. Think back, those of youthat have been to these training sites.When was the last time that you evenheard of a battalion or brigade com-mander attacking 12 or 24 or 36 hoursearly and catching the Opposing Forces(OPFOR) before they were ready?“Never” will likely be your answer,and we’ve all served for commandersthat we knew had the initiative to doso, were they not constrained by thesystem. Can anyone remember a mis-sion, say for example a deliberate at-tack by a task force (TF), that had ano-later-than (NLT) tirne? In otherwords, where the commander wasgiven the freedom to attack when hesaw the conditions for success wereset? “No,” again. Or, how about theobjective? Invariably we set out to de-stroy the enemy’s main body. Why notattack his field trains and rear areas, hislogistical underbelly? Or specificallytarget his air defense for ground attackfrom our infantry so that we mightpunch through with attack helicopters?Or attack his artillery with our infan-try? The answer is because some ele-ments of the OPFOR are not “in play.”

We have established training centerswhich do a terrific job of training sec-ond lieutenants to fight a platoon andlive in the field, and captains how tocommand their companies in the swirl-ing maelstrom of a TF fight. Our train-ing centers, better than any other mili-tary in the world, replicate the “fric-tion” and the “fog of war.”4 But, dothey train initiative and audacity incommanders? Do they reward the inno-vative commander? We know thatthese centers reward the lethal com-mander, but can they be structured tocreate benefits for the commander thatwins via another route? The com-mander who, through the use of ma-neuver, renders his opponent’s actions


Training For Maneuverby Captain Robert Bateman

irrelevant? The answers to these ques-tions are unfortunately a resounding“No.” OK, then, why are we not train-ing as we say that we will fight? Afterall, ask any company grade or fieldgrade officer, “Would you prefer to at-tack into the enemy flank or soft spot,or would you like to attack into theteeth of his defense?” The answer youwill get is, “Into the flank, of course,you fool.” Then ask, “OK, have youever trained that? Would you recognizethe opportunity? Have you ever at-tacked on your own initiative whenyou saw the enemy wasn’t ready foryou? Have you ever trained to pursue?Or do you regularly stop on the far sideof the objective and wait for ENDEX?”You will not find many who can an-swer these questions in the affirmative.Pursuit, for example, is historically oneof the most difficult missions to ac-complish, yet it is never trained. Whatchanges must be effected in these areasto correct our current training deficien-cies?

How We Train

Among the three training areas notedabove, the National Training Center atFort Irwin is the largest and most com-plex CTC operated by the U.S. Army.Its state-of-the-art simulation devices,massive live-fire complex, and profes-sional observer controller (O/C) teamstrain tens of thousands of soldiersevery year. But what does it train thosecombat, combat support (CS), andcombat service support (CSS) soldiersto do and expect, when and if they everface true warfare?

To begin with, the NTC trains thecombat soldiers and officers to seek theenemy, to destroy the enemy throughdirect and indirect fires, and to face thefull brunt of his strength with all of ourstrength in a titanic struggle to deter-mine the strongest and most efficient.The mission might be a meeting en-gagement, deliberate attack, or deliber-ate defense; in all cases, the rotationalmaneuver battalions are given ordersthat dictate when and where they mightattack, and, in a few instances, evenhow they must structure their attack.Orders are deliberately sent, from thenotional 52nd Infantry Division, thatdetermine exactly why and when therotational unit may cross restrictivephase lines and limits of advance(LOAs). Unit boundaries, for the bat-talions and brigades, are inviolate, andit’s a rare occasion when one unit’s re-quest for an adjustment is granted bythe 52nd Division. These are inevitably

due to notional division-level opera-tions which the rotational unit supports.For example, the rotational units arelocked into a 0600 attack on D-Day asthe supporting effort to the divisionalmain effort. The main effort is an at-tack by the “other” brigade on theirflank (notional). This occurs from themoment of their receipt of the OPORDon D-3 and is generally inviolate. Inorder to properly synchronize the divi-sion’s notional maneuvers, the rota-

tional units must attack at the propertime in the proper place.

The “big picture” is used to restrictthe rotational unit, never mind that atactical breakthrough and attainment ofthe terrain desired might totally un-hinge the OPFOR “division” and creategreater opportunities for the 52nd Divi-sion. All is sacrificed in the name ofsynchronization. The maneuver trainingcenters currently exist solely to traintactical units in the synchronization oftheir available combat power. The tacti-cal unit that accomplishes this is moreoften successful in the firefights thatoccur at the preordained time. But noattention is given to other multipliers ofcombat force. For example, to borrowfrom LTC Robert Leonhard’s book,The Art of Maneuver,5 a simple physicsequation provides a convenient methodof understanding the dynamic of timewhen applied to combat power, F=MA.That is, Force (Combat Power) = Mass(Raw numbers of combat systems/units) times Acceleration. Simply put,you can attack at H-Hour with fourcompanies, and achieve less than if youhad attacked at H-48 with two compa-nies. This phenomena might be quanti-fied as Mass of 2 (companies) x 48(time factor, for this discussion 1=1) =relative combat power of 96, while 4x1= relative combat power of 4.

This aspect of warfare requires train-ing. Its component concepts are not in-violate doctrine. Yet the concept hasbeen valid throughout the history ofwar. But we do not train units to recog-nize these situations when they arise.Instead, we wait, we mass, we synchro-nize. In the end, the result of this re-striction is familiar and preordained:

the rotational unit attacks directly intothe teeth of a prepared defense, or de-fends against the entire OPFOR regi-ment at 95% strength. This is the epit-ome of attritional warfare, facingstrength with strength in a stand-up fairfight.

As for the logistics and supportingbranches of the Brigade Combat Team(BCT), they have a separate fight oftheir own. No, this is not an analogy

referring to the “fight” to move assets,fix, fuel and arm the combat elementsof the BCT. Though, were maneuver-based training instituted, this aspect ofthe training environment might take onan entirely new importance.

No, what is referred to here is thatthose soldiers and leaders in the bri-gade support areas and field trains ofthe BCT are often, quite literally, fight-ing an entirely different fight than thosecombat elements forward. They aredaily shelled by long range artillerywith devastating accuracy, hit withchemical attacks, and attacked from theair. All this despite the fact that theregenerally is not any OPFOR withinkilometers of the BSA. They undergothese attacks to “validate” that they canin fact react to these challenges, nomatter how well the combat units for-ward do in their destruction of the en-emy infiltration efforts. Regardless ofthe tactical defeats which the OPFORmight suffer, and how well the BSAtenants might be dispersed and con-cealed, these continue. Why? Becausethese attacks are directed and initiatedsolely by the observer/controllers(O/Cs). They rarely have any relationwhatsoever to the tactical play occur-ring between the combat units and theOPFOR at the FEBA. When a break-through of the main defensive belt doesoccur, the BSA is generally overrun, tobe sure, but this is more of an after-thought by the OPFOR, and not theirtrue tactical objective, as briefed by theS2s of the rotation, and the OPFORthemselves.

This occurs for two reasons; first, ifthe O/Cs don’t do it, then the OPFORlikely will not commit assets to it


“All is sacrificed in the name of synchronization.The maneuver training centers currently exist solely totrain tactical units in the synchronization of their avail-able combat power....”

themselves; there is no payoff withinthe scenario. And second, to imposeadditional strain on the combat unitsforward as they lose logistic assets. Ofthe two, the first reason might seem themore puzzling. Why wouldn’t the OP-FOR attack the soft BSA units? For thesame reason we are not allowed to at-tack their logistics: it would be tooeasy; it could destroy the rotation; andit’s damned tough to do when the lo-gistics assets do not have anything be-yond individual MILES.

How does maneuver warfare gettrained? At the current time, we do nottrain for this type of warfare. Maneu-ver, as defined by FM 101-5-1, Opera-tional Terms and Symbols is, “Themovement of forces supported by fireto achieve a position of advantage fromwhich to destroy or threaten the de-struction of the enemy.”6 This alone isa step in the correct direction, but itdoes not give the reader a true grasp ofwhat maneuver-based tactical and op-erational level training and doctrinemight create.

To truly train and inculcate today’sleaders in maneuver-based warfare, wemust create a training environmentwhere maneuver is rewarded, and thisrequires some restructuring at our train-ing centers and our home stations. Thistraining, following doctrinal precepts,must include both realistic field train-ing as well as computer-based simula-tion training. But, to conduct this train-ing and change how we currently train,we need to examine just how we trainfor war now, and the nature of theschism which has appeared betweenour doctrinal concepts and our trainingrealities.

Methods of Defeat

In today’s attrition-oriented trainingarena, defeat at the tactical level invari-ably equals destruction of the enemywithin the confines of the order — inother words, destruction of the wholeenemy attack, or destruction of the en-emy forces at the point of penetration,etc.

Nobody denies that tactical forma-tions must have the ability and skill tosynchronize their combat power. Attri-tion (i.e. the destruction of enemyground maneuver combat forces) at thetactical level is a required skill whichall tactical echelons must possess; it isa prerequisite to operational-level ma-neuver. However, little attention isgiven by the staffs of the maneuverunits during their military decision-

making process to interpretation oftheir basic mission. There is a mission(task and purpose), and a commander’sintent (purpose, method, endstate), butthe basic “why” of the whole operationis often forgotten in the mechanics offiguring out “how” to accomplish thetask.

For training purposes, we are repeat-edly given restrictive and specific mis-sions. “Penetrate Obstacle X at PK123456 and destroy all enemy direct-fire weapons which can influence thepassage of lines of the follow-on forcesthrough the breach.” Or, “Defend insector NLT 050600 DEC 95 from PLDOG to PL CAT allowing no penetra-tion of PL PIG to support...” Darnedlittle thought really goes into question-ing that assigned mission to determineWHY we are defending here. Suppos-edly, we got that from the com-mander’s intent, but the reality is some-what different.

How do we defeat an enemy tacticalformation? In three ways, by destruc-tion, incapacitation, and irrelevance.First, if you manage to destroy the en-emy, then obviously he cannot accom-plish his mission and you win. It maywell be a Phyrric victory (“One moresuch victory and we are lost.”), and themassive casualties taken during thecourse of, and in the name of, trainingmay dishearten your troops, but it willgo in the training books as a “win.”

Second, we may incapacitate the en-emy so that he is unwilling or unableto execute a plan to force his will uponus. This incapacitation may be in theform of passive measures we take thatwould make an attack or defense bythe enemy plainly a losing proposition.Or, it may be active measures, thingslike attacking the enemy’s critical vul-nerabilities which stop his current orprojected operations. In mechanizedwarfare, fuel is the normal short-termshow-stopper. No mechanized TF onearth can sustain heavy combat opera-tions for better than 36 hours withoutresupply of fuel. For light forces, wateror food are limiting factors, fuels forthe human body.

Finally, we might make the enemyactions irrelevant. Abandon and targetthat hill mass dominating the main sup-ply route (MSR) which we suspect isthe objective of the forward detach-ment (FD) battalion. Pre-plan and openwhen required an alternate MSR whichmakes that previously critical portionof terrain just one more hill/pass/cut,etc. Allow the enemy to occupy thehill; keep him isolated and occupied in

position; cut his supplies; watch himwither on the vine. These last twomethods of defeat represent movementas the key combat component to thesuccess of the mission. Neither posi-tively requires a direct-fire engage-ment, and neither is currently practicedor replicated anywhere in our trainingsystem.

Opponents of maneuver theory mightbalk at the idea of bypassing enemycombat units, regardless of their size.However, this has historically been themost successful method of defeatingenemy units. An examination of the37th Armor Battalion and its rampageacross France under the command ofthen-Lieutenant Colonel CreightonAbrams operating in Combat Com-mand “A” of the 4th Armored Divisionin WWII, finds that the tip of the spearin that most successful of divisionsregularly bypassed any prepared defen-sive position.7 Attacking into the teethof a prepared defense was anathema totheir concept of maneuver. Yet their at-tacks unhinged entire German divisionsduring the summer of ’44. Had Abramswaited to mass the combat power re-quired, to synchronize to the degree ex-pected at the National Training Centerinstead of using speed and terrain tobypass where possible, would Pattonhave been able to turn his Army north-ward, leading again with Abrams andthe 37th, to relieve Bastogne that De-cember? Our doctrine recognizes theseforms of defeat in concept. Where werun into trouble is the reality of ourtraining system, which does not accept“fear” or replicate logistics, or permittime to be the decisive factor for the“BLUEFOR.”

One cannot inspire fear, or causepanic in surrounded units, duringMILES training. Has anyone ever seenthe OPFOR surrender in anything likethe numbers that even the best of theRepublican Guard Divisions surren-dered? Of course not; the OPFOR (andour forces) cannot be scared, they willfight to the last man in training, andmove until killed. If surrounded, theywill attack; if isolated, they harass.Their sole (current) vulnerability istheir logistics, for even the OPFORcannot move without fuel. This is agreater vulnerability than we assign tothe opponent forces in our computersimulations, who never suffer logisti-cally and cannot run out of fuel, as fueland ammunition are “magically” resup-plied in all exercises, up to and includ-ing the CBS system used during BCTP.How then can we attack these softertargets, when they are not available to


attack? We must restructure the trainingsystem to replicate these aspects ofwarfare.

How We Might Train

Today, we are testing and validatingthe potential advantages of informa-tion-based warfare. Our force structureand weapons systems are coalescingaround the concept of using informa-tion as a combat multiplier. Increasedinformation availability and flowshould allow our forces to maneuvermore precisely and get inside the en-emy’s “Decision Cycle.” Thesechanges should amplify the potentialeffects of maneuver, as opposed to at-trition, training. We will better “know”ourselves and our enemy, and be ableto more accurately assess his strengthsand the locations of his strength, aswell as his weaknesses.

Near-perfect intelligence (a lofty goal,but one which we are striving to attain)may soon be available down to the bat-talion 1evel. What will we do with thatknowledge? What changes should weincorporate today in our training cen-ters and computer simulations to takeadvantage of these newfound abilities?Or will we continue fighting in thesame old style, only now knowing bet-ter the firestorm into which we arethrowing our forces in the name of“training.”

Three changes in our system of train-ing might start the ball rolling for aconceptual revolution in our methodsof training for war.

The first change would be at ourcombat training centers, NTC, CMTCand JRTC. This would be the introduc-tion of true “free play” in the maneuverbox. One caveat to the observationslisted below is that the recent move inNTC towards “brigade ops” is a greatstep forward. This brings greater flexi-bility, at least potentially, to the subor-dinate battalions. Brigade boundariesmay still be imposed by the 52nd ID,but how the battalions maneuver withinthose limits is now open to much moreinterpretation. The forward thinkers atthe NTC who implemented this changedeserve congratulations.

However, true “free play” remains agoal. To implement this change wouldbe costly, as it requires the OPFORmaneuver elements and their logisticsupport elements to enter and remain inthe maneuver box at all times. Oneforeseen future critical vulnerability ofthe BLUEFOR will be the addition of

the M109A6 Paladin to the maneuverbox as a maneuver element. Utilizingthe greatly increased dispersion andmovement abilities of the Paladin willlikely mean that these systems willmove in smaller groups, if not semi-autonomously. This greatly increasestheir survivability against indirectcounterbattery fire, yet now makesthem a high payoff target for the OP-FOR in the direct fire fight. If we aregoing to place the BLUEFOR artil-lery into the maneuver box, weshould do something similar to theOPFOR, creating a vulnerability oftheirs that we might aim to exploit.

Ideas like this double, if not triple,the OPFOR PERSTEMPO, takingsoldiers away from garrison andadding wear and tear to twice thenumber of vehicles as the currentsystem. This implies either an in-creased budget and increased num-ber of soldiers assigned to the OP-FOR of the training centers, or a reduc-tion in the number of rotations sched-uled yearly. Painful choices indeed,which can be avoided, if we just keeptraining in the same old way. But theadvantages might also be great. For thefirst time since inception, the OPFORwould have a critical vulnerabilitywhich it must protect. The OPFORwould also have to maintain contact, toguard against surprise attacks and buildits intelligence picture. Their soldierswill become tired at night, opening theway for infiltrations which are nearlyimpossible against troops that rotate tothe rear while contact is not imminent.They might be the ones paralyzed bydeadlined vehicles and reduced fuel asit’s their support elements attacked byour artillery. These are all realisticevents not replicated today.

The second change should occurwithin our computer simulations, add-ing those same vulnerabilities andmore. Commercially available com-puter simulations have been replicatinglogistics fatigue and the morale of unitsfor over a decade. Yet, today our mostsophisticated simulations allow friendlyand enemy units to fight to the lastpixel! Why, when we wargame againstan enemy with a strong artillery force,must we focus on the destruction of theartillery systems themselves? We throwour deep attack assets against his artil-lery “center of gravity” and come awaybattered by the resultant losses to hisair defense systems. Common sensetells us all that with huge artillery parkscome even larger logistical tails feedingammunition to the guns. These assetsare rarely adequately defended by tacti-

cal air defense in our own Army, letalone in the other armies. Wouldn’t si-lencing his guns be as effective as theirdestruction? Adding more realistic lo-gistics simulation to the enemy forcesin our wargames would acknowledgethis, and create more opportunities forour planners.

Finally, we must reintroduce wargam-ing skills to our leaders. Often cited as

“a lost art,” wargaming skills are notemphasized to our junior leaders earlyenough. It is through constant wargam-ing, in a variety of environments andsystems, that we might inculcate ma-neuver throughout our Army. There isno better teacher than experience, andwargaming at all echelons is a verycost-effective method of teaching. War-gaming means more than the deliberateprocess used during the military deci-sion-making process to arrive at a rec-ommended course of action for thecommander; it should be trained con-stantly. Our lieutenants should trainevery week, using tactical decisiongames or commercial computer simula-tions on moving forces, comparingforces, creating deceptions, and exploit-ing weaknesses. The advantages ofspeed and intelligence to maneuver, aswell as the technical aspects of creatingan efficient engagement area can all bereplicated in various commerciallyavailable computer simulations orboard games. Through the constant useof these tools, the mental flexibility re-quired by today’s, and more especiallytomorrow’s, leaders might be increasedand their personal information-process-ing speeds increased. We need fast,flexible leaders, and wargames are themost cost-efficient method to developthose leaders.

EndstateToday we fight toe-to-toe with the en-

emy when we train at the tactical level.This builds competence in our juniorleaders, our sergeants, lieutenants, andcaptains. Our tactical units must have


“The first change wouldbe at our combat trainingcenters, NTC, CMTC andJRTC. This would be the in-troduction of true “free play”in the maneuver box....”

the ability to synchronize their avail-able combat power to utterly destroyenemy units that face them. The prob-lem is that we train exclusively for thisability. At no tactical echelon does theUnited States Army currently rewardall three of the potential advantages ofmaneuver as a mechanism for defeat ofthe enemy. We all accept that attackingthe enemy in the flank is a good idea,yet we rarely practice this. Attackingthe enemy before he is ready is anotheragreed upon goal. But there are fewcombat leaders that have ever beengiven the chance to attack when theysaw the opportunity, and fewer still thathave consciously trained to recognizethat window of opportunity. Finally,hitting his logistics is universally iden-tified as a primary means of slowing,stopping, or at least changing the en-emy’s plan. Yet nowhere do we actu-ally train to attack his, or adequatelyattempt to protect ours.

To train in as identical a manner aswe say we are going to fight requireschange, and in this decade of changefor the United States Army, thesechanges can’t come soon enough.

Notes

1Sun Tzu, The Art of War.2Fleet Marine Force Manual-1, March 1989.3Ibid., Sun Tzu.4Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. M.

Howard and P. Paret [Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1976].

5Leonhard, Robert, The Art of Maneuver,Presidio Press, 1991.

6FM 101-5-1, June 1993.7Baldwin, Hanson, Tiger Jack, The Life of

“P” Wood, Old Army Press, 1979.


Captain Robert L. Bateman iscurrently attending graduateschool en route to the HistoryDepartment at USMA. He pre-viously served as commander,HHC/2-7, 1st Cavalry Division.He has served as BMO, 2-7Cav, S3 (Air), and platoonleader 4-87 Inf (L). He is agraduate of the Infantry OfficerBasic Course, Airborne, Air As-sault, and Ranger Courses aswell as the Armor Officer Ad-vanced Course.

SOFTWARE REVIEW: TACOPS

Play It for FunOr to Enrich Training

TACOPS by Major I.L. Holdridge(Ret.), Arsenal Publishing, Reston,Virginia, 1996, IBM 3.5” version 1.0.3for Windows. $44.95.

TACOPS is a detailed and accuratesimulation of contemporary ground com-bat. The player can assume the role of aU.S., Canadian, or “OPFOR” com-mander. There are 27 scenarios, includ-ing a “Basic Training” tutorial designedto familiarize you with game mechanics.Each scenario has up to a dozen com-puter opponent strategies. The TACOPSdatabase includes 150 unit types and100 weapons systems. You can accessunit and weapon information, includingeffective ranges, armor penetration, andphotos, via pull-down windows.

TACOPS is played in turns that repre-sent one minute of real time. There is anOrders Phase and a Combat Phase ineach turn. During the Orders Phase youuse point-and-click windows to issue or-ders. The unit orders window is the heartof the game. Some possible orders in-clude: establishing waypoints for move-ment, loading and unloading troops, fir-ing smoke grenades, establishing unitSOPs for actions on contact, settingweapons engagement ranges, setting di-rect-fire TRPs, setting engagement prior-ity by unit type, resupplying units, split-ting or joining units of the same type,and naming units.

Orders can be copied from unit to unitfor ease of play in larger scenarios. Youcan have the unit demonstrate its ordersto see if it’s going to do exactly what youintended.

After you issue orders to your units,click on “Begin Combat” to start theCombat Phase. Both sides carry out or-ders in four 15-second pulses. Thegraphics and sound effects during com-bat are realistic: ATGM launches providesignatures; artillery smoke lingers on thebattlefield; and each weapon has its ownunique sound, down to the M203 Gre-nade Launcher. The effects of combatare also realistic, ranging from suppres-sion, infantry casualties by soldier, near-miss, hit but not damaged, mobility orweapons damage, to vehicle or infantryunit destroyed.

TACOPS can be played solitaire oragainst the computer (only as the U.S.or Canada), “hotseat,” by e-mail, on anetwork, or by modem. Custom scenar-ios can be generated using the ten exist-ing maps. Nine of the maps are in awoodland setting, and one is repre-

sentative of Germany. Future expansionreleases will include terrain from the Na-tional Training Center, Bosnia, and otherpossible deployment areas.

Purely as a computer simulation, TA-COPS is great game. The user interfaceis intimidating at first, but the tutorial pro-vides a solid foundation of under-standing for future games. The 226-pageuser’s manual provides a wealth of infor-mation. Over 100 pages of the manualare devoted to designer’s notes, fre-quently asked questions, tables of or-ganization and equipment, and tacticalhints. Arsenal Publishing has its ownweb site for product information, soft-ware help, and comments and ques-tions. Responses are prompt, often an-swered by Major Holdridge himself. Alsoavailable on-line are maps, scenarios,and a TACOPS demo game.

As a military simulation, TACOPS hasunlimited training potential. As an Ad-vanced Course student, I have designedscenarios to support battalion staff exer-cises. Using only one computer, thecompany commanders are at the termi-nal, and the battalion commander andstaff are in a nearby “TOC.” The groupscommunicate via radios or land line. Thisseparation promotes reporting by thecompanies and battle-tracking by thestaff. A TACOPS scenario can be modi-fied to accommodate whatever task or-ganization you want to simulate. Usingthis method, the computer can play theOPFOR, or the game can be generatedfrom scratch, which requires a humanopponent to play the OPFOR. The com-plete tactical decision-making processcan be exercised, and the staff gets tosee how the plan fares in execution.

TACOPS is a realistic simulation that isan enjoyable game. If you purchase itand do nothing else but play it as agame, it will be money well spent. If youwant to apply some creativity to your unittraining program, TACOPS can easilyhelp. If I bought only one computergame this year, it would be TACOPS. Ihave a feeling my microarmor will begathering dust for a long time to come!

TACOPS is available direct from Arse-nal Publishing (703-742-3801.) You candownload the game demo from the Ar-senal home page on America Online atKeyword: Arsenal, or on the World WideWeb at http://www.arsenalpub.com.

JERRY A. HALLCPT, Armor

Ft. Knox, Ky.

Winning or losing heavy force battlesnormally depends on the fighting profi-ciency of tank crews. You need “kill-ers” to win. The fundamental standardsare simple and direct — be able to killand survive.

I have had the opportunity to observemany killer tank crews, but will citeone example — the crew of D-22 — ina defense of the Washboard at the NTCduring 1986. The OPFOR had achievedwhat looked like a breakthrough withtwo reduced strength motorized riflebattalions (MRB), and I was workingmy way around to follow this penetra-tion. The terrain was very broken, andit took a few minutes to move to agood position to observe and follow theclosest MRB.

When I arrived, I found a graveyardof blinking lights. A call to the TacticalAnalysis Facility at the Star Warsbuilding revealed that one tank, D-22,had accomplished this destruction. Inext saw a lone M60A3 movingquickly down a wadi, intermittentlymoving up to hull-down position for aquick look and then back to full coverfor continued movement. D-22 wasstalking the second MRB, a queststopped short by a change of mission.

On the surface, this crew was not un-usual. They had gone through the sametraining program as the rest of the bat-talion. Only the driver had been to theNTC previously. The tank commanderhad been in the battalion less than a

year, having had a previous recruitingtour. But this crew was special. Theycould shoot, use terrain, and had a tac-tical sense for the battlefield to a levelthat made them superstars.

Being a killer is far more than a mat-ter of knowing and being able to do thetasks outlined in various Soldier’sManuals, gunnery manuals, MTPs, anddrill books. Enemy acquisition, use ofterrain, and target engagement must bedone quickly and very well. “Well”means being better than your enemy.An analogy to boxing is appropriatehere. To win, the boxer must not onlyhave the basic skills, but he must bequicker, stronger, and have better tech-nique than his opponent. He must beable to find and take advantage of anyweakness in his opponent. Even afterbasic skills are second nature, endlesshours of practice are spent conditioningand training to make minor improve-ments, because the difference betweenlosing and winning is so small.

Based on observation and discussionwith many successful tank crews at theNTC, I wrote an article for ARMORoutlining some of their tactics, tech-niques, and procedures.1 While I feelthat this article reasonably outlinedmany important tank fighting skills, itdid not adequately address the equallyimportant issue of training those skills.Since then, observation of numeroustraining events and discussions withleaders with far more experience thanmine has only strengthened the hy-

pothesis that crew proficiency is funda-mental to winning battles. They havealso convinced me that, while there arenatural superstars, good training candevelop more of them, greatly improvethe average, and eliminate the tankcrews that are merely targets. The keyingredient is a direct focus on develop-ing crew fighting skills that is fre-quently missing from training exer-cises.

This article outlines some insights as“imperatives” for training tank crewsthrough effective platoon lanes training.None of the ideas in this article areoriginal.2 All are based on extensiveobservations of unit training, study, anddiscussions with many leaders aboutwhat works and what doesn’t. Al-though all are being practiced in theArmy today, they are often absent.Their absence marks the difference be-tween truly effective training and train-ing which looks and is somewhat effec-tive, but which could be much better.

This discussion of lanes events doesnot mean that lanes are the only com-ponent of a program to train battle-competent tank crews. Certainly thetank gunnery tables and the gunneryprograms outlined in the FM 17-12 se-ries are essential. Another type of crewtraining with proven merit includes di-rect crew training events like “King ofthe Hill”-type exercises where individ-ual crews or sections directly develop“dogfighting” skills in low cost, lowpreparation training events. Such

MAKING KILLERSImperatives for Tank Lane Trainingby Lieutenant Colonel James C. Crowley (Retired)


events are especially beneficial in thatthey allow a high number of repetitionsin a limited amount of time with smallOPTEMPO and preparation costs.

Lane Imperatives

Focus on training crews during pla-toon lanes. A central precept is thatplatoon lanes concentrate at least asmuch on training crews as the aggre-gate platoon. Although the concept ofmulti-echelon training is accepted, inpractice most platoon lanes are aimedmainly at the platoon and tend to focuson platoon leader planning and platoonleader decisions. Platoon lanes shouldfocus on full crew proficiency and alimited set of platoon tasks and skillsneeded for continued training in higherlevel events. Most platoon tasks canonly be truly trained to standard duringcompany-level training exercises thatfocus on training platoons in a more re-alistic environment.

This focus on crew training duringplatoon lanes makes a big difference inthe way a lane is planned, resourced,and executed. The most obvious differ-ence is in the trainer or O/C package.One O/C can track the platoon, but toobserve effective use of terrain, mainte-nance of security, and other importantcrew actions requires at least a secondO/C and assistance from the perspec-tive of the OPFOR. The remainder ofthe imperatives in this article supportachieving this central precept.

Design and conduct platoon lanesto train killing, surviving, reporting,and sustaining. This is a small expan-sion of “Move, Shoot, and Communi-cate.” In the most basic terms, tank pla-toons contribute to larger organizations,winning battles and engagements bybeing at the right places on the battle-field at the right times. They exert theirinfluence by killing the enemy and re-porting critical information.

I use the word “killing” rather than“shooting” deliberately. To kill youmust be able to shoot accurately andquickly, but shooting skills alone arenot enough. Killing requires acquisi-tion, which in turn requires constantsurveillance, a sense for terrain, and theability to anticipate enemy dispositionsand actions to focus these efforts. Italso requires that the platoon leader

have the skills to control and distributefires.

Survival is as necessary as being ableto kill; in fact, it is a prerequisite. Atank that can survive will do its shareof killing, which is a reason to stressbattle patience. Selection of routes andpositions to provide for the best possi-ble cover and concealment, use of ap-propriate rates of movement, earliestpossible acquisition of the enemy, aswell as killing him before he can killyou, all contribute to survival.

To survive, all-around security mustbe constant. While the concept of all-around security is easy to understand,developing the teamwork and crewskills to constantly maintain full battle-field surveillance and awareness re-quires structured practice, discipline,and tactical sense. A clear example is“target fixation,” where the crew is sointent on an enemy target to the frontthat an offset enemy engaging them isunnoticed until too late.

We must stress survival because theobjective of training is preparation forwar. Soldiers must be confident of theirability to survive a conflict, and train-ing events must create that confidenceby building survival skills.

Sustainment activities, including main-tenance, supply, and preventive medi-cine, are necessary to effectively enterand continue the fight. Moreover, train-ing must develop the self-discipline toperform this function continuously andautomatically, regardless of circum-stance. Reporting refers to the require-ment of continuously keeping the boss,subordinates, and other members of theteam informed of the enemy situation,the platoon’s status, necessary supportrequirements, and any other importantinformation in a timely manner.

Like the battlefield operating systemfunctions, these functions must be con-tinuously performed during combat op-erations. Platoon training exercisesshould have developing this level ofperformance as a primary objective, re-gardless of the specific MTP tasks be-ing trained. These functions are neces-sary complements of current MTP be-cause they are critical but not suffi-ciently highlighted in its current set oftasks.

Every platoon AAR should concen-trate on these functions and their im-

provement, as well as the specificARTEP-MTP tasks and drills includedin the exercise. Standards are not metwith an absolute “GO” or “NO GO”criteria, but by being as good as possi-ble.3 Each killed tank crew should beasked:

“Did the platoon accomplish its mis-sion and meet the commander’s in-tent?”

“Could we have done better?”

“How?”

“Why did you die?

“What could have been done to avoidgetting killed?”

The chain of command conductslanes. There are several reasons whythe most important imperative is active,direct conduct of lanes by the chain ofcommand.4 First, effective training re-quires experienced, expert trainers. Themost experienced platoon leader in thecompany is the company commander,and the most experienced soldier in thecompany is the first sergeant. Participa-tion of the company commander and1SG also develops effective communi-cations and operating procedures be-tween the company commander and hisplatoons — from orders developmentthrough reorganization and consolida-tion actions following an engagement.Additionally, participation of the com-pany team command group and trains(commander, 1SG, XO, FSO, withmedical and maintenance support ele-ments) performing their C2 and sus-tainment roles during platoon lanesprovides platoons realistic training on afull range of fighting, sustaining, andreporting tasks. Participation of thecompany command group and trainsfrom a tactical configuration is excel-lent preparation for their company-level operations. For these reasons, tac-tical road marches, assembly area, andpreparation for combat activities shouldbe conducted at company-level duringplatoon lanes training periods.

However, the main reason why activeparticipation by the battalion and com-pany chain of command is important isthat this is a clear signal that tacticalproficiency is important.

Planning lanes training to allow com-mander participation requires effort. Tobe conducted correctly, lanes requireextensive preparation and support, and


platoon lanes are normally planned,prepared, and conducted as a battalion-or even brigade-level effort. During aplatoon lanes training period, severaldifferent lanes are normally conductedto train a complete set of tasks anddrills, with platoons rotating betweenlanes. Planning the rotation of com-pany commanders and first sergeants tobe the primary trainers on each lanecan be difficult. However, this is criti-cally important, and should never beleft out, even if it increases the timeneeded to conduct the set of lanes.

Use of the “lanes meister” conceptcan help overcome this scheduling is-sue. The “lanes meister” is a battalionofficer with the responsibility to plan,set up, and conduct the lane. He con-trols the OPFOR, additional observercontrollers, and support personnel.Close cooperation and preparation ef-fort between the “lanes meister” andcompany commanders and first ser-geants is required, given the differentset of preparation and execution re-sponsibilities. It’s important to hold ajoint rehearsal of all trainers to finalizeexact responsibilities and procedures.

The best example I have seen of thisemphasis on chain of command in-volvement was the OPFOR “SpearStakes,” conducted during 1995.5 Thelanes were set up at brigade level andobserved by the brigade commanderand S3. The “lane meister” was the as-sistant battalion S3. These platoon-levelAARs were conducted by the battalioncommander or S3, and the companycommander. The chain of command’spriority on developing the warfightingskills of subordinates was clear.

Plan and prepare to conduct andwatch the exercise effectively. An ef-fective training event requires the sametype and level of planning and prepara-tion as a deliberate tactical operation.The terrain on which the lane is set up,the tactical situation, and enemy posi-tioning must force platoons to practiceall-round acquisition and allow use ofterrain for cover and concealment. Youwant to create a training situationwhere training weaknesses result in ob-vious performance shortfalls — dying,failing to kill the enemy, or not accom-plishing assigned tasks. The battalioncommander, staff, and CSM play acritical part in these preparations. Theirbreadth of tactical experience ensuresadequate preparation. The effectiveness

of lane preparation is more a functionof quality than quantity.

Trainer and OPFOR preparation in-cludes reconnaissance of the terrain,detailed instructions to each trainer andthe OPFOR, terrain walks, brief-backs,and rehearsals. Planning and prepara-tion to watch the engagement and col-lect data for the AAR is particularlyimportant. It is too late to put togetherthe events for an AAR after the exer-cise is completed, if key pieces havenot been collected beforehand. Similarto the tactical IPB process, needed in-formation requirements should be iden-tified, specific observation and collec-tion responsibilities assigned, and re-cording procedures established. Often,it is better to use enemy OPs ratherthan have all O/Cs accompany pla-toons. As an example, during the occu-pation of a battle position, an OP view-ing the battle position from the en-emy’s direction could determine if theoccupation was accomplished withminimum exposure far better than anO/C watching from the friendly side.6

Trainers must know the OPFOR planand dispositions, as well as that of theplatoon. During planning and rehears-als, trainers predict the exercise flowand identify specific observation re-quirements, with emphasis on survival,killing, and mission accomplishment.For example, the senior O/C should de-termine when the platoon should firstbe able to detect the OPFOR and makesure all the trainers, including the OP-FOR controller, are looking to see howlong detection and reaction actuallytake, which tanks should have beenable to detect the OPFOR and, if notadequately accomplished, how this per-formance could be improved. Duringthe event, the first trainer who sees thatthe platoon could detect the OPFORshould announce this over the control-ler net.

After the platoon’s OPORD and re-hearsal, the trainers should do an inter-nal debrief and refine the observationand control plan.

A net control station (NCS) should beset up to monitor company, platoon,OPFOR, and trainer control nets. Thenet control station plays the fire direc-tion net, if the company SOP calls forplatoons to call for fire over this typenet. It also directs fire marker actions ifthey are included in the lane. The net

control station tracks the battle, moni-tors and records OPFOR and friendlyevents, the information exchangedwithin the platoon, and the platoon’sreports. If possible, the net control sta-tion should be set up on an OP to ob-serve the lane, as well as monitor radiotraffic. An experienced NCO runningthe NCS is invaluable in assisting thesenior trainer prepare for the AAR.

Trainers, OPFOR, and the NCS mustbe sufficiently sized and prepared to re-cord details of the battle for the AAR.Because emphasis will be on killingand survival, an annotated “killer-vic-tim scoreboard” is important. Thismeans being able to record each killingevent with a killer, time, and locationsof killer and victim. Although most ofthe times the crews will know this in-formation, for the events over whichthere is confusion, it is particularly im-portant to have this data.

Trainers and OPFOR controllers mustensure a fair fight. That requires aknowledge of how to check MILES toensure it is operational and that sensorsare cleaned and not covered by camou-flage or improper use of fighting posi-tions. Rules of engagement must be de-fined, understood, and enforced. Mucheffort has gone into the rules of en-gagement used at the CTCs, whichshould be the basis for those used dur-ing home station lanes.

After execution, the chief lane trainerprepares for the AAR with a debriefingof his training team, to reconstructwhat happened and why, and to ensurehe has identified the key points thatshould be brought out during the AAR.The focus should be on the bottom line— tasks and critical sub-task standardsand the tactical functions, especiallykilling and survival. Who died and howcould it have been avoided? Whodidn’t engage, but could and shouldhave? Who engaged but didn’t hit?7

Repeat execution until high skilllevels — not just understanding —are obtained and ingrained. Althoughthe need to “train to standard and notto time” is universally accepted, inpractice there is a tendency to underes-timate the impact of frictions that al-ways accompany training and allocatetoo little time. This often means onlyone execution run. It is repetition of theexecution phase that builds crew profi-ciency — again, this is like sparring for


the boxer. When planning lane time-lines, three or four execution runs withan AAR should be the target. Althoughthe amount of time required for lanevaries by the unit’s proficiency andspecific tasks contained, two days perplatoon per lane is a good starting pointfor planning. If the platoon reachesstandards quickly, it is easy to increaselane difficulty; for example, adding apersistent agent event to the exercise.

When repeating execution, always putin a sufficient change in METT-T toprovide for actual practice of tacticalskills, rather than merely refighting thelast engagement. The objective is not tolearn to deal with a specific situationbut to perform functions and tasks wellin a variety of situations.

Train a tactical event — not an en-tire operation; but train all the tasksin that event. Too often, platoons aregiven company-type missions, particu-larly for offensive tasks. Platoons nor-mally perform tasks, (overwatch, as-sault, breach, etc.) as a part of a com-pany scheme of maneuver. Lanesshould be set up to train a narrow setof tactical tasks and the functions ofkilling, surviving, reporting, and sus-taining in a limited scope trainingevent.

Even though the platoon lane shouldtrain a single tactical event, all thetasks required during combat should beidentified by the trainer and included astraining objectives. Timely reporting,complete pre-combat checks, crosstalkwith other platoons, casualty evacu-ation and reporting, reaction to indirectfires, and the full range of reorganiza-tion and consolidation activities areoften left out of training events. Thisresults in negative training, in that theplatoon is practicing without perform-ing to the real combat standard. Thisdoes not properly prepare the platoonbecause, when forced to perform realis-tically with the full set of requirements,something drops. When all requiredtasks are consistently practiced duringtraining, they become automatic.

Crawl and walk to prepare for run-ning. To focus on platoon collectivetasks and crew proficiency, leader andsoldier training must be done first. Areview of principles, tactics, and proce-dures, including a detailed discussionof the tactics of execution — such asuse of terrain, likely enemy disposi-

tions and actions, appropriate reactions,and the benefits of alternative actions— should be a part of this preparation.

The platoon leader validates his orderbefore giving it to the platoon. Incom-pleteness in the order, a flawed con-cept, or other planning mistakes thatwould preclude success, should be ad-dressed before the platoon leader issuesthe order. While the platoon leader maylearn by seeing his flawed plan failduring execution, the platoon will notlearn.8

Likewise, critical soldier tasks andtraining, such as operation of a mineplow before a breach exercise, shouldbe trained and validated beforehand.An item that must be validated isMILES maintenance and proficiency.This type of preparation training can besuccessfully done, either in garrisonjust prior to the lane, or as a part of thefield lane. However, activities thatshould be normal preparations for com-bat operations, such as briefbacks,PMCS, pre-fire checks, rehearsals, andpre-combat inspections should be partof the field lane. These are structuredtraining events with the same emphasisas tactical tasks. These are not donejust to make the run phase successful,but to train time management, how todo these events properly, and to rein-force that these are routinely done dur-ing combat. As with the order, leadersare checked before conducting theseactivities and these events may havetheir own AAR and retraining if notdone to standard.

We must stress platoon rehearsals.Failing to rehearse when it is possibleand appropriate is a common problem.The OPORD can specify activities tobe rehearsed. One example could be re-hearsing going to MOPP4 if the enemysituation is one where use of chemicalagents is expected. At the same time,reconnaissance and rehearsal activitiesshould be tactically realistic. Rehears-als on the actual terrain on which thelane will be executed defeats the train-ing goal, because this teaches a solu-tion to a specific piece of terrain, ratherthan training how to apply tacticalskills. Reduced scale rehearsals, or re-hearsals on similar terrain, are appro-priate, just as they would be in an ac-tual tactical situation.

Ensure a competent OPFOR. AnOPFOR that cannot destroy exposed

BLUEFOR vehicles, that does not useterrain effectively, or that attacks byrote, using the obvious scheme, willnot stress the BLUEFOR to truly learnfighting skills. This means negativelearning and false confidence. The OP-FOR at the NTC has been criticized bysome for being too good, but the com-petency of the OPFOR, more than anyother factor, was the reason for therevolutionary improvement in heavyforce tactical competence in the 1980s.In the same way, OPFOR proficiencyis critical to effective platoon trainingexercises.

While the OPFOR element can re-ceive valuable training, its purpose is totrain the BLUEFOR. The “lane meis-ter” must ensure that the OPFOR isthoroughly prepared, that their tacticaldispositions are sound, and that OP-FOR mistakes do not compromise thetraining. This includes backbriefs, re-hearsals, and pre-combat inspections.

An experienced controller should beassigned to the OPFOR to work withthe senior trainer to ensure an effectiveplan and preparation, to enforce rulesof engagement, and to observe and re-cord the events in the exercise. Heshould have specific observation tasksand responsibilities. The OPFOR andtheir controller take part in trainer re-hearsals, and he and the OPFOR aredebriefed to prepare for the AAR.

Make the OPFOR an active partici-pant in AARs. Unfortunately, the ma-jority of platoon AARs I have observeddo not include the OPFOR. This is un-fortunate because the best AARs I haveseen included extensive discussions be-tween the OPFOR and BLUEFORabout what each did right and wrong,and what the effect was for both. Forexample, “Your tank came right aroundthe one I hit first, and it was an easyshot. You should have moved along adifferent route.” Such interactions al-low leaders and soldiers to put them-selves in the enemy’s position and tothink of the problem as one of beatingan intelligent enemy, rather than fight-ing against an unthinking template.

Final Thoughts

The reason for this article is a beliefthat planning, preparing, and executingtraining events need better coverage incurrent training doctrine.9 Conducting


effective, efficient training events isdifficult but critical in today’s turbu-lent, constrained training environment.There is a constant requirement to de-velop leaders and maintain ready units.Most platoon training events I have ob-served have been generally effective,but most could have been better. Maxi-mum benefit must be made out of eachfield training event, and a more stand-ardized approach emphasizing killingand surviving, the essential fightingskills at crew and platoon level, is nec-essary to support this objective.

This article does not present a com-plete discussion of lanes training. Itdoes present some ideas, based on areasonably extensive set of observa-tions, about how training can be mademore effective. Coupled with other dis-cussion and dialogue, I hope that theseideas can add to the process of improv-ing an important training area.

Moreover, I believe that this approachis important in training all echelons.While some leaders have an instinct forfighting, a direct focus on protectingthe force and on beating your opponentduring training can develop a greatertactical sense in all leaders, one whichwill stand them in good stead regard-less of future METT-T, echelon, orgrade. Training can too easily focus atthe form and procedures level (check-lists) rather than on the winning anddeveloping winners level. Future con-flicts will occur, and each engagementwill be unique. While procedures andeven specific tactics needed to winchange with METT-T, the leader’s tac-tical sense, instincts, and passion to wintranscend METT-T. Effective trainingcan develop these skills and traits.

Notes1“Killer Tank Crews,” ARMOR, Septem-

ber-October 1984.2The ideas included in this article have

been borrowed from many such leaders.They include but are not limited to: Lieuten-ant Generals F.J. Brown and Wes Clark;Brigadier General Rusty Casey; Colonels BillJanes, Tom Grainey, Larry Word, MacJohnson, Fred Dibella, Pat Lamarr, TerryTucker and the late Will Densberger; Lieu-tenant Colonels Tony Cerrie, Chris Bagget,and Tom Wilson; Captains Brad Booth, WilGrimsley, and Tom Kelley; and Tom Lip-piatt. Providing direct input to this articlewere General Edwin Burba; Colonels Don

Appler, Bob Jordan, and Lee Barnes; Lieu-tenant Colonel Joe Moore; and Dr. MartyGoldsmith.

3For example, the task of “Assault an En-emy Position” in the tank platoon’s ARTEP17-237-10-MTP has a task standard of losingno more than one tank. While a useful begin-ning benchmark, depending on METT-T, thismay or may not mark a desirable level ofsurvival proficiency. If that one tank waskilled because of an avoidable mistake, im-provement is necessary.

4“Make commanders the primary trainers”is also a principle of training in FM 25-100and 25-101. However, the battalion andsquad exercise examples in Chapter 4 of FM25-101 dilute this principle. They showcounterpart and self-training rather than thechain of command setting up and conductingtraining for their subordinates. Training anorganization requires active effort of thechain of command. The platoon leader is re-sponsible for training his platoon, but thecompany and battalion commander are alsoresponsible. If anything, the primary respon-sibility is with the higher commander to trainhis subordinate organizations and leaders.

5These platoon lanes were actually Rein-forced Motorized Rifle Company (MRC(+))lanes. An OPFOR MRC(+) is composed of atank platoon and a mech infantry platoon (3BMPs), with one platoon leader acting asMRC commander and the other as his dep-uty. For clarity, I have called these platoonlanes.

6This is also an example of MTPs not al-ways directly emphasizing survival skills.The task “Conduct Hasty Occupation of aBattle Position” does not have direct stand-ards of avoiding exposure during the occupa-tion. Yet the conditions are of likely enemycontact.

7These and the other AAR techniques out-lined in TC 25-20, “A Leader’s Guide ToAfter-Action Reviews,” are sound but not al-ways fully applied.

8For an excellent discussion of this pointand others, see “Training in a Low BudgetEnvironment” by Majors Armor D. Brown,Clarence E. Taylor, and Robert R. Leonardin ARMOR, July-August 1995. Incidentally, akey point that these authors brought out wasthat the training program they described didnot, but should have, included platoon lanes.

9Based on review of FM 25-101, “Battle-Focused Training;” ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP,“Mission Training Plan for the Tank Pla-toon;” and TC 25-20, “A Leader’s Guide toAfter-Action Reviews.”

Lieutenant Colonel James C.Crowley (Retired) was com-missioned in Armor in 1967from the United States Mili-tary Academy and holds amasters degree from GeorgiaState University. While on ac-tive duty, he served in a vari-ety of assignments in cavalryand tank units in CONUS,USAEUR, and Vietnam, aswell as positions as chief ofthe NTC Observation Divi-sion, in the Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine at theUnited States Army InfantrySchool, and on the BOLDSHIFT Task Force at FOR-SCOM. He is presently em-ployed as a researcher withRAND in Santa Monica,Calif.


On the 10th of December 1996, thePatton Museum Development Fund-Cavalry/Armor Foundation and theUnited States Armor Association to-gether held a recognition ceremony inthe Patton Museum to honor MajorGeneral (Ret.) Israel Tal, the premierliving Israeli tanker and mounted forceleader of the Israeli Defence Forces.

It was fitting that General Tal be hon-ored at the home of U.S. Armor, withinthe Patton Museum, a building erectedin honor of one of the U.S. Army’sgreatest leaders, General George S.Patton, Jr., and in an auditorium namedfor General Creighton W. Abrams, thepremier U.S. mounted force leader andvisionary of the U.S. Army’s recentpast. Among the many dignitaries pre-sent in the audience were Major Gen-eral Yoram Yair, Israeli Defense Atta-che; Major General George H. Har-meyer, CG, USAARMC; General(Ret.) Donn A. Starry, former CG, USATRADOC and CINC RECDCOM; Mr.Hudson Drake, Corporate VP,Teledyne, Inc.; and Mr. Roger Tetrault,President, General Dynamics LandSystems, along with many of GeneralTal’s friends and admirers from boththe United States and Israel.

General (Ret.) Donn A. Starry, repre-senting the U.S. Armor Association andaccompanied by the artist, Mr. JodyHarmon, presented General Tal with anoriginal portrait, entitled TALIK, asGeneral Tal is affectionately known inIsrael, depicting him as the Com-mander of the Steel Division during theSix-Day War. Included with the portraitis the scene of a tank-vs-tank battletypical of actions of the Steel Division.The presentation of the portrait, and therecognition it represents, was the cul-mination of the efforts of many of Gen-eral Tal’s friends and admirers in theUnited States, past and present, in andout of uniform, from both the U.S.Army and U.S. industry. Following thepresentation of the portrait, the first of250 prints of the portrait, TALIK, was

unveiled on the “COMMANDERS’WALL” in the Patton Museum by themuseum’s director, Mr. John Purdy.The singular nature of this honor toGeneral Tal rests in the fact that hisportrait finds itself in the company ofGenerals Patton and Rommel as theonly other mounted warfare leaderswhose portraits are now displayed onthe Commanders’ Wall. Other portraitsby Mr. Harmon, including one of Gen-eral Abrams, are planned for future dis-play. The remaining numbered prints ofTALIK, all signed by the artist andsome signed by General Tal, will besold by the Patton Museum in its fund-raising efforts.

General Tal, a native Israeli Sabra,began his military service in the BritishArmy during World War II, rising tothe rank of sergeant in the Jewish Bri-gade. He saw combat in every one ofthe Arab-Israeli Wars, first as an infan-try commander, and later an armor andmounted force commander.

As an armored brigade commander,as an armored division commander inthe Six-Day War, as the commander ofthe Israeli Armour Corps, as the ViceChief of the General Staff, and as theCommander of the Southern Front,General Tal was a key figure in devel-oping and applying modern armor bat-tle tactics and techniques. In lateryears, he was the designer, developer,and producer of Israel’s world classMERKAVA Main Battle Tank. And ifthese were not enough for a lifetime ofaccomplishments and service to hiscountry, he found time to be a confi-dant and advisor to all of Israel’s PrimeMinisters from Ben Gurion and Meir inIsrael’s early days to Rabin, Peres, andNetanyahu in more recent times.

A true measure and spirit of the manthat has carried him so successfullythrough the years, both as a mountedforce commander and as one of hiscountry’s foremost government leaders,comes from his words to his troops just

before the Six-Day War, and quoted inpart:

“Now that the plan is clear to us all,and, with it, all the moves nicely drawnon our maps, — combat never developsquite in accordance with the arrows onthe map. However, one thing must beexecuted exactly as planned: (that is,)the principle and concept lying behindthese map markings. All will chargeforward to the assault and will pene-trate as deeply as possible without pay-ing concern to flanks and the rear.Whoever loses contact with our forcesmust continue to battle forward, know-ing that the rest of his comrades aredoing the same. —- The one who winsthe first battle will harbor the offensivespirit, the one who loses will feel re-treat in his soul. Thus the fate of theState is bound up with what we do now,how we act and how we fare. —- Therewill be no halt and no retreat. Therewill be only assault and advance.”

Had General Patton heard thesewords, surely he would have said —“L’audace, L’audace, L’audace!!”

Recently, on speaking of General Tal,General (Ret.) Donn Starry noted that:

“It need only be said in this regardthat it would be difficult, if not impossi-ble, to find, in any armed force of anycountry in this century, a single officerwho has had the dramatic influence onhis country’s armed forces doctrine,equipment, training and organization,that General Tal has had on Israel’sArmy and on that Army’s dramatic suc-cess in battle.”

And if these words were not enough,General (Ret.) Glenn Otis said itequally well when he said:

“TALIK is the only person I know inany country — including our own — ofwhom it can be said, he is the father ofhis nation’s tank. TALIK is to the Is-raeli tank what Admiral Rickover wasto the U.S. nuclear submarine. He istruly a man of his time.”


TALIK: Steel Division-SixPatton Museum Ceremony Honors Major General Israel Tal (Ret.)Mounted Leader of the Israeli Defence Forces

by Major General Stan R. Sheridan (Retired)

He is also a tough taskmaster whosemind, once made up, is difficult tochange. I remember accompanyinghim, over 25 years ago, on a visit toone of our tank fire control contractorsin California. This particular contractorwas pushing a wind sensor for ourtanks at the time and was looking forthe general’s endorsement of the con-cept. General Tal would have none of itbecause, in his mind, a wind sensoronly measured the wind and its direc-tion at the tank, and not at the targetor in between. When we went outside,we could see that the wind was blow-ing in one direction on the hillsideabout 1000 meters away. General Talpicked up some grass and threw it inthe air and it blew in the opposite di-rection. “See, I told you,” he said.

The U.S. Army, and in particular itsarmored forces, owe General Tal a spe-cial debt. He and his commanders, formore than 30 years have opened theirhearts and lessons learned to the U.S.Army and, in particular, to its armor of-ficers. Candid, forthcoming, honest,holding no secrets, TALIK shared withour army his and his commanders’ life-time experience in battle, and fromtheir experience, their sober, consideredjudgments about everything from com-bat vehicle design to strategy, tactics,training, and organization. Where intheir judgment, they had made mis-

takes, what those mistakes had costthem in succeeding battles, and howthey had changed quickly, adapting toearly recognition of where they hadgone wrong, they openly and freelyshared. What they shared brought revi-sion to M1 Tank and M2/M3 Infantryand Cavalry Fighting Vehicle require-ments, along with key design changes.

The technical and operational helpand advice given by TALIK and hiscolleagues after the 1973 Yom KippurWar was an invaluable assist in ensur-ing that the M1 and the M2/M3 wouldindeed be the best possible answer totheir roles in meeting the threat of thefuture. Desert Storm is our proof ofsuccess.

At the Armor Center, their sugges-tions became the baseline for develop-ment of the U.S. Army’s heavy forcedoctrine, including tactics and opera-tional concepts, and other equipmentrequirements, organization, and train-ing. As General Starry is quick to pointout, it was his visits to Israel in the’70s and ’80s, his walks on the GolanHeights, and his open and freewheelingexchanges with General Tal and hiscolleagues that gave birth to the Air-Land Battle concept and the winningdoctrine of Desert Storm.

In these professional exchanges, andin the personal relationships that have

grown over the years between the U.S.and Israeli armies, General Tal and hiscolleagues were always more forth-coming and supportive than were we.Inevitably what could be agreed uponbecame entangled by some element ofthe massive U.S. bureaucracy. But theimportant parts survived: doctrine,equipment performance requirements,organizational needs, training and edu-cation requirements, all drawn from thecrucible of the Arab-Israeli Wars andfrom the dedication of the remarkableArmor leaders of the Israeli DefenceForces, headed by Israel Tal.

Our Israeli friends have provided alarge and lasting contribution to theU.S. Army and its mounted force. Theportrait entitled TALIK, and presentedto General Tal by the Patton MuseumDevelopment Fund-Cavalry ArmorFoundation and the U.S. Armor Asso-ciation, is a recognition and “ThankYou” for the many contributions he andIsrael have made to our soldiers, theirequipment, and their ability to fight andwin as evidenced in Desert Storm.


ARMOR artist Jody Harmon presentedGeneral Tal with an original portrait, enti-tled TALIK, as General Tal is affection-ately known in Israel, depicting him as theCommander of the Steel Division duringthe Six-Day War.

“Soldierization” is the tough, compre-hensive process that transforms civil-ians into soldiers (TRADOC Reg 350-6). But soldierization is far more than atransition; it is a remarkable transfor-mation that has no parallel in the largersociety. Most impressive is the signifi-cant physical and mental developmentthat occurs in a relatively short periodof time. Proud parents attending initialentry training (IET) graduation ceremo-nies at Fort Knox frequently proclaim,“You drill sergeants have done morefor my son in eight weeks than wecould in 18 years!” Although such aclaim is difficult to substantiate, therecan be little doubt that the soldieriza-tion process does have a profound andenduring impact on new soldiers intraining. From the time they arrive atthe reception station, until their gradu-ation from IET, trainees are challengedmentally and physically, and are in-spired to adopt the Army’s core values.The process is at the heart of the 1stArmor Training Brigade’s mission, andit enables the brigade to fill Armorunits around the world with highly mo-tivated, disciplined, and physically fitsoldiers who are trained in basic andmilitary occupational specialty (MOS)skills and prepared to join their firstunits.

Soldierization is not a series of tasks,but the result of total immersion in apositive environment. The environmentis the IET arena, and includes the re-ception station and, either one-stationunit training (OSUT), or the combina-tion of basic combat training (BCT)and advanced individual training (AIT).High standards, discipline, teamwork,quality training, ethics, and values areall contributing features of the positiveenvironment. Active and involved lead-ers serve as role models for the soldiersin training, administer the training inaccordance with the program of in-struction (POI), and implement thesoldierization process.

Aspects of Soldierization

Critical aspects of soldierization in-clude teamwork, attitude building,tough training, good health habits, andphysical fitness. Capable leaders de-velop these aspects using a variety ofstrategies at the company level.

Teamwork is an absolute necessityfor any type of unit to successfully ac-complish its mission. To foster bondingand increase levels of performance,team building commences at the outsetof IET and sets the stage for the inte-gration of the IET graduate into hisfirst unit. In one respect, teamwork de-velops during specific training eventswithin the POI. A challenging physicalfitness program can facilitate teambuilding and enhance cohesion, as wellas improve stamina and muscular de-velopment. Assignment to details alsoprovide an excellent means to developteamwork. Regardless of whether thetask is to clean the platoon bay or la-trine, cut the grass, or maintain a vehi-cle, soldiers are detailed in teams(buddy team, fire teams, or squad) inorder to promote cooperation, commu-nication, and working toward a com-mon goal. Each detail is a team-build-ing opportunity.

Attitude building develops via effec-tive leadership from positive role mod-els. Drill sergeants and company cadrelead by example and seek to inspiresoldiers in training to develop a win-ning spirit and to adopt Army core val-ues. There is an emphasis on ethicalstandards, good order and discipline,initiative, and commitment. Individualcounseling occurs often, and formalclasses within the POI address topicssuch as: The Code of Conduct, equalopportunity, standards of conduct, etc.,in order to develop healthy attitudes.

Tough training is inherent in BCT,AIT, or OSUT and is the “keystone” ofsoldierization. Trainees develop self-

confidence, the warrior mentality, andphysical and technical competencethrough successful completion of pro-fessional and challenging training.Units ensure tough, quality, and realis-tic training by complying with the POI,conducting effective planning and co-ordination, and implementing a trainercertification program. The latter is aquality control measure that ensurescompetency among the drill sergeantsand enables the trainers to maintain the“cutting edge.”

Good health habits are a necessitythroughout the soldier’s career, yet formany soldiers in training, the develop-ment of good health habits represents asignificant change in lifestyle. Traineesmust be taught to value protectivehealth measures. A combination of car-ing leadership, quality medical anddental services, and formal classesfrom the POI educates and convincesthe trainees of the necessity to maintaintheir bodies, uniforms, and living areas.To ensure compliance, inspections arefrequent.

Physical fitness in the IET arenaequates to far more than passing theArmy Physical Fitness Test (APFT).The IET goal is to develop the soldier’s“total” fitness through a progressivephysical training (PT) program and for-mal classes on nutrition and injury pre-vention. In many cases, behavior modi-fication is necessary to rid the soldierin training of personal habits whichmay hinder his physical development.Tobacco cessation, and alcohol anddrug abuse prevention are integral partsof the IET total physical fitness pro-gram.

All of the above aspects are inter-woven into all phases of IET. Cadremembers take advantage of everyavailable opportunity to reinforce theabove aspects, since these are essentialfor the trainee’s personal and profes-sional development.


Fielding the Armor Force of Tomorrow:Soldierization in the 1st Armor Training Brigade at Fort Knox

by Lieutenant Colonel Eugene J. Palka and Colonel Fred A. Treyz III

Implementation Strategy

Soldierization is designed to help thesoldier in training understand the Armyway of life and willingly adhere to therules and regulations which govern be-havior. The “soldierization design” isalso geared toward helping individualsdevelop values and beliefs consistentwith those expected of the military pro-fessional. Moreover, the design instillsloyalty and commitment to the unit andto the Army.

There are several interrelated compo-nents which comprise the underlyingsoldierization implementation strategy.These components form pillars whichsupport the entire process.

• The IET cadre employ an insist/as-sist philosophy to develop soldiers intraining. The cadre “insist” that thetrainees achieve established standardsin the areas of training, physical fitness,and personal conduct. Yet, simultane-ously, the cadre employ effectivecoaching, mentoring, and reinforce-ment training to “assist” the trainees inachieving the standards. Assisting train-ees with goal-setting, and providingperformance counseling are fundamen-tal requirements to successfully imple-ment the philosophy.

• A positive leadership climate is es-sential throughout the IET arena. Thepractice of “tearing a trainee down andbuilding him back up again” has longbeen abandoned. Instead, the goal is toinspire the soldiers in training throughcompetency and leadership by exam-ple. All trainees are treated with respectand dignity. Moreover, the cadre recog-nizes the different backgrounds andlearning abilities of the trainees, and iswilling and able to communicate at dif-ferent levels during the training processfor a given subject.

• Management of stress is a funda-mental concern throughout the durationof IET. Stress should occur between thetrainee and the task, not between thetrainee and drill sergeant. In this way,stress provides the motivation to learn,and therefore serves as a positive influ-ence. Every private is assigned a “bat-tle-buddy” to facilitate teamwork, toenhance learning, and to assist eachother in handling stress. Drill sergeantsmust look out for each other in a simi-lar fashion. They must continually keepan eye out for fatigue, frustration, andanger among their colleagues, and pro-vide reinforcement or relief as neces-sary. Specific “stressors” identified dur-ing internal after-action reviews enable

cadre members to anticipate these lead-ership challenges.

• After-Action Reviews (AARs) oc-cur at each cycle’s end. Because eachtraining cycle has a different personal-ity, frequent, informal AARs are impor-tant throughout the cycle, “adjustingfire” as necessary. AARs must focusnot only on the soldiers in training, buton the cadre. In fact, the end-of-cycleformal AAR should focus largely onthe cadre in order to capture and sub-sequently apply the lessons learned,thereby improving the training’s overallquality.

• Phased training is the formalstructure applied in the IET arena to or-ganize and facilitate soldierization.There are five phases of IET; a soldierprogresses through phases I through IIIin BCT, and through phases IV and Vin AIT. OSUT includes all five phases,but in some OSUT courses, phases IIIand IV may be combined. Additionally,the authorization to determine actualphase lengths rests with the installationcommander. No matter which route thetrainee proceeds along, BCT/AIT orOSUT, drill sergeants have total controlover the soldiers during phase I. FromFirst Call until Taps, trainees are underconstant supervision and scrutiny. Con-trol gradually lessens during phase II,and continues decreasing until theamount of control near the end ofphase V is equal to the amount of con-trol the soldier will experience in hisfirst unit.

Phase Objectives (Soldierization Milestones)

TRADOC Reg 350-6 outlines spe-cific objectives for each of the fivephases (Fig. 1). Movement betweenphases is viewed as a “gate,” or rite of

passage, for the soldiers in training.Specific phase objectives serve as“soldierization milestones” and enablethe unit to focus efforts and to gaugethe progress of every trainee at anypoint in the cycle.

Phase I objectives include enablingthe trainee to pay attention to detail,conform to platoon standards, masterbasic skills, maintain self and platoonareas, and develop physical fitness.Trainees feel the greatest impact of thesoldierization process during phase Ibecause of the drastic change in life-style and environment. The emphasisduring phase I is on gaining the sol-dier’s attention, getting the soldier toconform, and developing teamwork.The trainee’s focus is on his immediateplatoon.

Training events during phase I pro-vide a solid foundation for all soldiers,regardless of MOS. Classes on soldierresponsibilities, customs and courtesies,equal opportunity, military justice, andthe Code of Conduct are reinforced byextensive counseling. The intent is toeducate trainees and inspire them toadopt the Army’s core values. Otherblocks of time are for communicationsand first aid training, which includeseveral of the basic skills that all sol-diers must master. The warrior ethos isalso developed during phase I viahand-to-hand combat, rifle bayonet andpugil stick training, foot marches, theconditioning obstacle course, and PT.

Phase II objectives challenge the sol-dier to conform to company standards,display self-discipline, qualify (or fa-miliarize in OSUT) with the M16A2,and develop physical fitness. Whereasdiscipline was imposed during phase I,the cadre begin to orient on developingthe trainees’ self-discipline duringphase II. The soldiers’ perspectives


broaden as they look beyond their pla-toons and begin to conform to com-pany standards.

Phase II training looks toward basicwarrior skills while supporting specificphase objectives. Basic rifle marksman-ship is the focus of phase II training.BCT soldiers qualify with the M16A2,whereas 19K and 19D OSUT traineesfamiliarize with the rifle and qualifywith the 9mm pistol. Other warfightertraining includes: hand grenades, footmarches, NBC equipment, individualtactical training (fire and maneuver),the bayonet assault course, and famili-arization with a variety of U.S. weap-ons, including the M60 machine gun,the M203 grenade launcher, the AT-4,and the claymore mine.

During phase III, soldiers must con-form to Army standards, by passing theAPFT (meet BCT standards), passingthe End of Cycle Test (EOCT), com-pleting all BCT POI requirements, andthinking, looking, and acting like sol-diers without detailed supervision. Bythe end of phase III, soldiers begin tonotice an increase in privileges. Thephase III graduate is trained in the ba-sic skills, has passed the basic trainingPT test and qualified with his rifle orpistol, and has participated in severalcapstone exercises which effectively in-tegrate the individual tasks taught ear-lier in the cycle.

Specific training highlights for BCTunits during phase III include a numberof live-fire exercises at the buddy teamand squad level, an end-of-cycle testcomprised of twenty “hands-on” tasks,a field training exercise, the confidencecourse, and additional foot marches.

Phase III during 19D OSUT is eightweeks long and contains the majorityof the MOS-specific training. Traininghighlights include driving, demolitions,mine training, Bradley gunnery, anFTX, a scout skills test, MK19 training,HMMWV familiarization, and a cav-alry focus exercise.

Phase III for 19K OSUT is threeweeks long, the same as for BCT, butthe training is MOS-intensive. Trainingconsists of advanced communications,inspecting and stowing ammunition,the .50 caliber machine gun, mines, anarmor crewman test, and maintainingthe 120mm main gun.

Phase IV objectives are to conformto Army standards, master commonskills learned in BCT (or phases I-III inOSUT) and continue to develop physi-cal fitness. Phase IV represents the firstexposure to MOS training if the soldier

has progressed along the BCT/AITtrack. Along the OSUT route, the sol-dier may have already encounteredMOS training, but it becomes the focusin phase IV.

Training highlights which occur inphase IV of 19K OSUT include tankmaintenance, driving, the M1 tank gun-ner’s station, stowing ammo on an M1,and maintaining the main gun. Tankgunnery, an armor crewman test, and asituational training exercise are thecapstone exercises.

Phase V requires the soldier to passthe APFT (meet DA standards), passthe EOCT, complete all POI require-ments, and think, look, and act like asoldier. The difference between the lastobjective in phase V, versus phase III,is that the soldier is now expected topersonally take full responsibility forhis actions at all times. Ethics, Armycore values, self-discipline, maturity,and a concept of duty are expected toguide the soldier, rather than an over-watching cadre member.

Throughout each of the five phases,soldiers in training are evaluatedagainst standards. Failure to meet thestandards may warrant remedial train-ing, a new start, a rehabilitative trans-fer, or, in the worst case, an entry levelseparation (ELS). The key to producingquality soldiers while combating attri-tion rests with the drill sergeants. Theyplace emphasis on the trainee complet-ing every task to standard, and theyprovide motivation, clearly defined ob-jectives, and constant feedback.

The training events contained withinthe respective POIs provide the neces-sary grounding in basic soldier skillsfor all trainees during phases I through

III, and produce specific MOS-qualify-ing skills in AIT or OSUT battalionsduring phases IV and V. Competentleaders, however, must also employ thetraining events as vehicles to help de-velop the trainee’s mental fitness andcharacter, in addition to the tactical,technical, and basic soldier skills.

Soldier Evolution in 1ATB

Civilian recruits who arrive at FortKnox for IET evolve along two basicroutes (Fig. 2). All receptees initiallyreport to the reception battalion and be-gin the soldierization process. After 3or 4 days of intense soldier indoctrina-tion and in-processing, trainees movealong one of the two routes. Theyeither proceed to basic combat trainingwith the 1-46th or 2-46th Infantry, andsubsequently to AIT with 1-81 AR, orto other installations for AIT; or, theyproceed along the OSUT route, with19D trainees proceeding to 5-15 CAV,and 19K soldiers reporting to 2-81 AR.From the Fort Knox perspective, thesoldierization process start point com-mences upon arrival at the receptionstation. Graduation from either AIT orOSUT completes the formal soldieriza-tion. When the graduate arrives at hisfirst unit, the process is subsequentlyvalidated. We submit, however, thatsoldierization is not complete until thesoldier retires or leaves the Army.There can be no doubt that professionalmilitary schooling, progressive dutypositions, and reassignments contributeimmensely to any soldier’s personaland professional growth.

Soldierization amounts to much morethan skills training. Whereas the civil-ian job may provide a “way of work,”


successful soldierization engendersservice to nation, commitment, pride inbelonging, loyalty, teamwork, and fam-ily indoctrination, to prepare the pro-fessional soldier for “a way of life.”

Tankers and scouts can take heart inknowing that soldierization is alive andwell within the 1st Armor Training Bri-gade at Fort Knox. The cadre’s com-mitment to filling Armor, Cavalry, andMechanized Infantry units around theworld with quality soldiers is evident inthe 1st ATB’s Training Creed.

“I am a Soldier of Steel. Myhallmarks are Pride, Motivation,Self-discipline, and Courage. Mycountry depends on me to provideArmy units around the world withtrained soldiers. These soldiersmust be physically fit, mentallyand morally tough, tactically andtechnically proficient, and highlymotivated. I accomplish thismission by setting high standards,respecting human dignity, andcontinually emphasizing the valuesof Duty, Honor, Country.

I am the inspirational leader andtrainer upon which my countryand the United States Armydepend. I never ask of anotherthat which I will not do myself. Itrain to standard and fight to win.No one else can do what I do aswell as I can. My reputation isrenowned throughout the world,and is championed by the soldiersI have trained, led, and inspired.

I will never lose sight of mymission, and I will always go theextra mile, seizing everyopportunity to train leaders for the

21st century. My legacy can befound in Army units around theglobe. I am a Soldier of Steel. Mylegacy will endure.”

More than just a mechanism to de-velop unit pride and cohesion, thecreed is our pledge to produce IETgraduates who are highly motivated,disciplined, physically fit, trained in ba-sic and MOS skills, and prepared tojoin the ranks. The 1st ATB will continueto aggressively pursue our soldierizationmission, and we take pride in conductingsuccessful battle handovers with unitsin the field as our IET graduates arrivein unit areas to validate and continuetheir soldierization.

Conclusion

Soldierization is not a by-product ofIET. Rather, it is inherent in the pur-pose of initial entry training. The proc-ess is carefully designed for, and im-plemented by, competent leaders andinstructors within the IET arena to pro-duce soldiers who can fight and win.The cadre themselves are products ofthe process, and yet continue to growand mature as professionals as theyperform their duties.

In the 1st Armor Training Brigade,one of the largest and most diverse bri-gades in the Army, soldierization repre-sents the thread of continuity whichlinks each of the seven battalions to thebrigade’s fundamental goal of trans-forming civilians into soldiers. Soldieri-zation is at the heart of every IETunit’s mission, regardless of whetherthe unit conducts basic combat training,advanced individual training, or one

station unit training. The process mustbe continually assessed in order to keeppace with changes in society, and toensure we in the 1st Armor TrainingBrigade meet the needs of Armor unitsin the field, now and in the 21st century.


1st Armor Training Brigade Interactive Web Siteby the 1st Armor Training Public Affairs Office

The 1st Armor Training Brigade is forging into the 21st Century with a new interactive website that furthers its Total Army Quality program initiative to capture customer satisfaction.

Designed by the 1st ATB Information Management Office and Entelechy Inc., of Radcliff,the web site fosters feedback from the Armor Force with an interactive home page.

The home page will be a key link by which the 1st ATB communicates with leaders andsoldiers in the Armor Force, according to 1st ATB leaders. The home page is currentlyactive on the world-wide computer web and is accessible by anyone.

It also features a “Hot Loop,” which allows for interactive discussion for selected respon-dents. There is also one all-users response page where anyone can respond to commentsentered by the commander on the Commander’s Bulletin Board. Responses are edited andthen posted on the web site. The home page also allows selected access to the latest 1stATB POIs.

The 1st ATB Home Page address is http://www.entelechy-inc.com/docs/1atb/

For more information on the 1st ATB Home Page, contact SFC Randy Jenkins at (502)624-6275.

Lieutenant Colonel GenePalka received a BS from theU.S. Military Academy andwas commissioned as a lieu-tenant in the Infantry. He alsoholds an MA from Ohio Uni-versity, and a Ph.D. from theUniversity of North Carolina.He spent nearly six years withthe 101st Airborne Division atFort Campbell, serving in suc-cessive positions as a platoonleader, aide de camp, com-pany executive officer, com-pany commander, and battal-ion S3. He has also been as-signed to the 6th ID (Light),Fort Wainwright, Alaska, serv-ing as the G3 Chief of Opera-tions, and as Executive Officerfor the 5th of the 9th Infantry.He is currently serving as thebattalion commander of 1stBattalion, 46th Infantry Regi-ment at Fort Knox.

Colonel Fred A. Treyz IIIgraduated from Arizona StateUniversity with a BS and re-ceived his commission in Ar-mor as an ROTC distin-guished military graduate. Healso earned an MS from TroyState University and attendedHarvard University on a Na-tional Security Fellowship. Hecommanded the 7th Sqdn, 7thCav at Ft. Carson; and alsoserved as the Executive Offi-cer of the 4th AVN Bde andthe 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav. Hehas also served as the ArmorBranch Chief at PERSCOM,as the Deputy Chief of Con-gressional Activities Divisionfor the CSA, and as the Direc-tor of the Armor School. Cur-rently, he is the commander ofthe 1st Armor Training Brigadeat Fort Knox.

wimpy replacement by the AGS, and toobad for the Armor community that we gaveaway our seat on a planeload of warriors.

LTC JOHN L. BARKERCDR, 2-63rd AR

Formerly Bn S3 and XO, 3-73 AR

Why Not Adopt PiranhaAs Sheridan Replacement?

Dear Sir:

Having read in the Army Times of thescheduled demise of the 82d Airborne Divi-sion’s 3/73 Armor on 1 July 1997, I can’thelp but wonder what will replace that unitin the airborne role. The Armored Gun Sys-tem (AGS) was canceled this past summer,so there is nothing in the pipeline or on thehorizon as a potential replacement. I alsoread in the same article that the 3d InfantryDivision (M) is being considered to supplya package of M1A1s and Bradleys, asneeded, to the 82d, but I have gravedoubts about the efficacy of that solution. Ifyou have a secure airfield to land heavyarmor, why send the 82d? It would bemore efficient to insert a mech-heavy teamfrom 3d Mech, providing speed, shock, andfirepower in a more impressive packagethan the 82d’s paratroopers and Humvees.

If it was merely a matter of firepower, theArmy could equip a battalion of armoredHumvees with recoilless rifles, MK-19HVGLs, and 7.62mm mini-guns. But an ar-mored presence is not a matter of appliquéarmor and weapons. It’s the vehicle itselfand what its presence means. As youstated about Bosnia, the 1st Armored isthere to make a serious statement aboutresolve and what the price of public stupid-ity will be.

What might be a solution to the needs ofthe 82d? Why not a 105mm-armedMOWAG Piranha? The vehicle exists, theMarines use the LAV variant now, and thefirepower is the same as the AGS. It hasthe plus of being amphibious and air-port-able/droppable, but the minus of not beingtracked and not having heavy armor. But,an appliqué package could be developedquickly and the system could be phasing inby early summer, replacing the Sheridanswhile converting their crews to the newsystem. Of course, if you get a little carriedaway, why not make this new battalion acombined arms unit by putting two LAVswith two Piranhas in each platoon?

The need for airborne armor isn’t going todisappear because a program is canceled,as MAJ Frank Sherman’s article on theSheridan’s during Operation Just Causegraphically showed. It’s incumbent on theArmy to get a replacement in the hands of

those troops who can use, and who need,what Armor brings to the battlefield.

SSG Steven A. Krivitsky’s fuel chart is abrilliant, simple solution to the “do we needfuel?” problem. My congratulations to himfor a job well done.

LARRY A. ALTERSITZLTC, FA, USAR

Commander, Det B (Marksmanship)1182d R.T.U., USAR

Kuwait Training Ain’t Broke,So Let’s Not Fix It!

Dear Sir:

I guess this has stewed within me longenough, and I will now try to express my-self on a “General Officer Good Idea”which is definitely not a good idea.

Intrinsic Action is a superb training oppor-tunity for a task force commander. Kuwaitis the only place an LTC can bring his outfitand train, as opposed to taking part in agraded event. If we are honest with our-selves, we all realize that our Army nolonger trains, we “leverage opportunitiesand maximize potential by evaluating andproviding feedback.” As I said, a gradedevent. This is not true in Kuwait.

Over here, an LTC and his CSM cantrain, really train to standard, without a 365-day experienced major telling them howfouled up they are. The TFs here now (Oct-Nov 96) have the opportunity to send pla-toons out and practice bounding over-watch, companies to train breaching tech-niques, all under the watchful eyes of theirown commanders. The higher (bde/div)command group is so far away it must an-nounce its visit. This is a great opportunityfor training.

Recently, TF-Kuwait had a visit by a sen-ior flag officer. This worthy was so excitedabout the potential here, he wants to “NTC-ize” the Intrinsic Action exercise. By God,we’ll have O/C packages come over hereand really “evaluate” the TF commanderand his companies. This would really lever-age the potential of the Intrinsic Action ex-perience. (I sometimes wonder how Ar-chimedes feels about how we turned hisnoun into a verb?)

My take is that adding a graded event towhat is an already really tough experiencewould detract rather than add to the Intrin-sic Action experience. Right now, three TFcommanders a year get to move, shoot,and communicate like we could in the early’80s. No O/C package will make this train-ing better. We select LTCs and CSMs forbattalions who are supposed to have anidea how to train and lead. In this cavalry-man’s view, Kuwait is the only place in theArmy right now where this can happen.The LTC can train his outfit. Intrinsic Actionis not broken, so let’s not fix it with O/Csand graded events. Sixty-five kilometersnorth of Udairi Range is a whole Iraqi mech

division; someday there will be enough of agraded event.

KEVIN C.M. BENSONLTC, Cavalry

G3 PlansTF-Kuwait

If M113s Don’t Work in Snow,Let’s Find Out Why

Dear Sir:

CPT Morton’s article (Jul-Aug 96) callingfor wheeled LAV-APCs seems to use selec-tive examples to justify his wish: a new toywheeled vehicle. What about the three U.S.ambassadors who died when their wheeledAPC slid off a Yugoslav road and burned?

When trashing the 11-ton M113A3, theauthor lumps it together with 33-ton M2sand 70-ton M1s. The question is, does theM113 acting alone destroy roads? If so,then that very same gripping action makesit ideal in terms of traction compared to awheeled vehicle... You can’t complain abouttearing up roads and not having traction atthe same time. In snow and ice, bothwheeled and tracked vehicles slip – is hesaying a wheel with snow chains can godown roads that a tracked M113A3 cannot,or that because of the desire to avoid de-stroying the roads, the M113A3 wasn’t al-lowed to go down them? How then is it thatthe Russian BMD, at 8 tons, is doing won-derfully in Bosnia when his wheeled APCsfalter and he turns to tracked SUSVs to getthrough deep snow? Perhaps the M113A3needs wider tracks for a lower ground pres-sure, or those driving the M113A3s werenot motivated or experienced with the vehi-cle in deep snow or ice. Regardless, inwarmer weather, tracks can go wherewheels can’t – if caught in an ambush, doyou want to be a dead duck, sitting on theroad with shredded tires, or be able to gooff-road or press on even if small arms firehits your tracks?

Wheeled LAVs are fine so long as no-body starts shooting at you. I’ve said thisbefore: if we’re going to “do wheels,” theyneed to be SOLID like the French AMX-10RC, so the pneumatic tire “mobility” killfollowed by “catastrophic” kill doesn’t hap-pen. Why not add BRDM-type “bellywheels” to fix the HMMWV’s weaknessesexposed in Bosnia? Basically, that’s whathis 6- or 8-wheeled LAV is doing – loweringground pressure for an armored box with asexy weapons turret. But the LAV has ahuge fuel tank in one side of the troopcompartment. This is why the Israelis cre-ated the external rear fuel cells for theM113. Wheeled LAVs do not , repeat not,have the same level of protection as anM113A3.

I’m not trying to be pig-headed here – ifroads are destroyed by tracked LAVs andthis is intolerable, we then must go towheels. But I believe much of the enthusi-


LETTERS

(Continued from Page 3)

asm for wheeled LAVs comes from trainingin peacetime where the allure of bigsweeping movements and operational ma-neuvers offer the big pay-off of ego-gratify-ing, maneuver team commander victory. Ifwe can harden the wheels, go for it – if not,we are sure to come to grief in the first realshooting war. Get the fuel cell(s) out of theLAVs and add the appliqué armor theUSMC has been promising for almost adecade, and ensure an assault gun variantwith XM-35 105mm low-recoil force gun isfielded to give our airborne/air assault/lightinfantry divisions/cav troops needed shockaction, and I’d support the wheeled APCconcept – I’m not a killjoy.

The M113A3 is paid for; if it’s bad insnow, let’s find out why and fix it. If wecannot afford M8 AGS (I don’t believe this),then let’s put 106mm recoilless rifles (sur-plus or new manufactured Israeli models)on M113A3s and HMMWVs (needs bellywheels, armor, solid tires) and get us anassault gun capability NOW before it’s toolate. We need the big gun more than tospend money on yet another automotivechassis. We can live with what we’ve got ifwe can get a big gun on an air-deployablevehicle.

MIKE SPARKSFt. Bragg, N.C.

The Digitization Revolution:Remember the Pluses

Dear Sir:

Over the past year, ARMOR Magazinehas run a series of articles and letters ad-dressing how digitization will impact futureArmy operation. It appears that companygrade officers are concerned with how digi-tization will affect initiative at the point ofthe spear. Will higher command reduce thecompany commanders into glorified platoonleaders?1 The view is that battalion and bri-gade commanders, with their superior infor-mation, will micromanage company com-manders in an effort to increase speed.While digitization could have this end re-sult, I believe it is an over-pessimistic view.

In a mid-intensity conflict with armorheavy forces, digitization and informationtechnologies will enhance the situationalawareness of the CINC to the divisionalcommander. Enhanced situational aware-ness will allow the senior commanders tomass ground maneuver forces at the deci-sive time and location. Long-range preci-sion fires will paralyze and disrupt the en-emy’s attempt to react to the surprise inser-tion of ground forces.

With the flood of information pouring intothe various command posts, a commanderwill have a real-time accurate picture of hisunits. By looking at his screen, a divisioncommander will know at a glance thestatus of his combat, combat support, and

combat service support battalions. The en-emy situation will also be clearer than everbefore, based on the real-time intelligenceinformation received from lower and higherheadquarters. He could display the individ-ual locations of his individual weapons andvehicles, but why would he do so? If heused the actual location of all of his individ-ual systems to make his operational andtactical decisions, he would overload hishuman brain. The vast amount of informa-tion flooding into the command post willnot, as company grade officers fear, createa scenario for over-supervision. It will cre-ate a situation where mission-type orderswill dominate.

The enhanced situational awareness willallow the commander to determine whetherto continue his battle plan, commit his re-serve, or shift his main effort. The time re-quired for the tactical decision process willbe compressed. During an operation, acompany commander will get a change ofmission and graphics over the radio/com-puter net. The combination of shifting direc-tions of attack, based upon current en-hanced situational awareness, will eventu-ally short circuit the enemy decision cycle.Ground maneuver will be tied to air-seacontinuous operations. Depth and simulta-neous attacks will enable the CINC to di-rectly influence the enemy throughout thewidth, height, and depth of his battlespace.The enemy’s attempt to redeploy his forcesto counter the U.S. ground force will beparalyzed.

Enhanced situational awareness may al-low CINCs and major ground maneuvercommanders to operate in a more dis-persed manner. Brigade and battalion com-manders will still be operating on more tra-ditional frontages. Digitization may allow in-dividual platoons and companies to operateon extended frontages during an Abrams-style tank raid into an enemy rear area.However, direct fire battle math will notchange. While information age technologiesmay give us enhanced situational aware-ness, it will still be mounted on 1990s tanksand infantry fighting vehicles. Battalionsarmed with tanks with effective ranges of3000 meters and ATGMs of 3700 meters(supported by DS artillery) will still requiretactical massing of weapons and soldiers.A formation of 1 kilometer wide attracts firefrom a frontage of 3 kilometers. A formationof 4 kilometers wide attracts fire from afrontage of 8 kilometers. The wider thefriendly formation, the harder it will be tomass combat power.

Terrain will also have a major effect on abattalion’s formation and frontage. Very fewareas of the world have direct-fire opportu-nities found at the NTC, Fort Hood, orSouthwest Asia. DS artillery fire support isimportant in the open desert. It is critical inall other terrain and environmental condi-tions. The combined arms team will still berequired for successful combat operations.Enhanced situational awareness will allowthe combined arms team to strike the en-emy where he is the weakest.

While a mid-intensity conflict is the worstcase, the most likely scenarios for militaryoperations in the next ten years are Opera-tions Other Than War.2 OOTW operations,by their very nature, require more initiativeand maturity of company grade officersthan a mid-intensity conflict. They will berequired to make decisions that may havemajor strategic consequences, while underthe scrutiny of the international media.OOTW operations are manpower-intensive.Information age technology will not be aseffective in determining who or where theenemy is located. The enhanced situationalawareness will allow isolated outposts tobe constantly monitored. An attack on anisolated outpost or convoy will be immedi-ately known and the appropriate counterac-tion quickly implemented.

In summation, the only way that digitiza-tion or information technologies will turncompany commanders into glorified platoonleaders is if today’s company commandersallow it to happen. The brigade and battal-ion commanders of 2005 are companycommanders today. If they train their juniorofficers in the same manner they weretrained, the situation will never develop.The task of incorporating digitization andinformation technology into the Americansystem of battle command for the future ison the shoulders of the company grade of-ficers of today.

1Bateman, Robert L. CPT, letter: “ForceXXI and the Death of Auftragstakik,” AR-MOR, January-February 1996.

2TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5, A Conceptfor the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Op-erations for the Strategic Army of the EarlyTwenty-First Century, August 1994.

JOHN S. HARRELLTC, AR, CA ARNGUSAWC Fellowship

Ohio State University

Fond Memories of “The Bat Man,”Ready, But Never Called to Lead

Dear Sir:

A March-April 1996 article, BG Khoi’s“Fighting to the Finish” included a Forewordby my former squadron commander, COLRaymond R. Battreall. Ah! The memoriescame flooding back. “Lieutenant, come withme,” as I felt a tug on my fatigue collar.Newly assigned and in the Baumholder O-Club for my first time, I dutifully followedthis pipe-smoking, scowling lieutenant colo-nel until we stopped in front of the 52ndColonel of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment. Yes,he is yours, I overheard, and we proceededto the bar to seal it with a drink.

Gin and tonic, I ordered, only to be ad-monished with, “Lieutenant, in this squad-ron we drink our whiskey neat.” Having justreturned from Vietnam, where we drankG&Ts to prevent malar ia (or so we


thought), this newly commissioned, formerWO-1 aviator, just graduated Armor OfficerBasic Course second lieutenant, rolled hiseyes and wondered, what have I gottenmyself into? The Bat Man, as we fondlycalled him, influenced, for the good, somany of us lieutenants, and I shall neverforget him.

While COL B told me right up front that Iwould never have a platoon, he wouldteach me what he could while flying to-gether during training, as I had the squad-ron aviation support section, which con-sisted of a crew chief, 49 Charlie (fueltanker) and the H-13 helicopter.

Some of those memories include pushingthe ladies of the squadron and their bus upBaumholder hill in a snow storm to attendthe regiment’s New Year’s Officers Call.Was there a lesson here? You bet, I triednever to miss a commitment in battle orpeacetime during my military career. Or thetime just COL B and myself walked out ofCamp Alfa, a Fulda Border camp with thenEast Germany, and relieved ourselves intoEast Germany as binocular lenses glintedfrom the tower directly in front of us. Thelesson here was, be bold in the face ofyour enemy.

We were the Bat Man’s lieutenants, allwith stories of our own, Dave, Teddy,Kerch, Rusty, et al. I don’t believe any ofus made general, but we were infused witha fine example of honesty, integrity, andprofessionalism that hopefully we passedon to those we served with. I rememberasking COL B why he stayed in the Army,then a turbulent, lowly profession, and hisanswer stayed with me all these years. Hesaid he prepared himself professionally to

step into a leadership role if the Armyneeded him, and when another student ofwarfare, General Franks, got to executeevery cavalryman’s dream on the field ofbattle, I finally understood what he reallymeant. COL Battreall was ready during hiswatch, he just never got the call; it went toanother great cavalryman...

BILL DILLONvia E-mail

Author Seeks ContributionsOn WWII Tank Experiences

Dear Sir:

I have been invited by Constable Publish-ers of London to compile an illustratedbook about tank warfare in World War II.The book will form part of their Oral Historyseries, which currently contains three otherbooks, viz: War at Sea, War in the Air, andWar on the Ground.

I want to cover all aspects of the wartimelife of tank crewmen both in and out of ac-tion, including training. I also need to coverall combatant nations, hence this letter.Could you please give the project as widea coverage as possible and invite anyonewho would like to help me to write for fulldetails to the address below.

I should explain that I served for 32 yearsas a regular officer in the Royal Tank Regi-ment from 1945-77, ran the world famousTank Museum from 1981-83, and have writ-ten many military books over the past 25years.

The book must be completed by October1997, for publication in June 1998, so Imust start to collect material as soon aspossible.

Any help you can give me will be muchappreciated.

LTC (RET.) GEORGE FORTY, OBE, FMABarn Cottage

BryantspuddleDorchester

DORSET DT2 7HSUNITED KINGDOM


Back Cover Correction

The article on the back coverof the November-December is-sue, “The Firing Pin Asembly— An Inside Look,” containedone error. It stated that “disas-sembly of the firing pin is 20level.”

This is incorrect. Page 3-189of TM 9-2350-264-10-2 directsthe crew to disassemble the fir-ing pin assembly. Thanks toSFC Stroh, an instructor atAOB, for pointing out this mis-information.

— Ed.

These statistics bear out the fact thatmembers of promotion boards do con-sider EIA membership a discriminatorfor promotion selection, all other fac-tors being equal.

Like any other program, EIA cannotsurvive and flourish without commandinvolvement. The master gunner of theorganization can be an integral part of

that involvement. He can administerthe program for the unit, and is in anideal position to advise the commanderabout soldiers who demonstrate theleadership potential, motivation, andtechnical expertise necessary to be anEIA soldier. Follow these guidelines toestablish and maintain a successful pro-gram:

•• Identify and challenge incoming sol-diers

•• Establish and sup-port a unit EIAprogram

•• Accelerate SPC/SGT/SSG promo-tions and attendanceat service schoolsfor EIA members

•• Maintain qualitysoldiers within theprogram

The EIA program is an effective wayto identify outstanding performers andat the same time enhance their chancesfor promotion. Properly administered, itwill demonstrate that good perform-ance will be rewarded, which can onlylead to increased morale and unit effec-tiveness. The long-term effect is the re-tention of quality NCOs within the Ar-mor Force.

If you have any questions about theprogram, please feel free to contact theOffice of the Chief of Armor at the fol-lowing address:

Commander U.S. Army Armor Center ATTN: ATZK-ARP Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000

Phone: DSN 464-1439/5155 or com-mercial (502) 624-1439/5155

Board/Year Considered Selected EIA Members

SFC/96 19D 496 11 2 (18.1%) 19K 808 111 62 (55.8%)

MSG/96 532 48 13 (28.3%)

SGM/95 155 64 4 ( 6.3%)

Figure 1

SEAT (Cont. from Page 5)

5Nenninger, “The Development of AmericanArmor 1917-1940. The Experimental Mecha-nized Force,” ARMOR (May-June 1969), pp.34-5.

6Dr. John T. Broom suggests Wilson’s opera-tions in Alabama and Georgia in 1865 formedthe basis of Chaffee’s vision. See Broom, “TheCommander’s Vision in Blue and Gray. TheRoles of Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., James H. Wilsonand the American Civil War in the Develop-ment of American Armor Doctrine,” (Ph.D. dis-sertation, Union Institute, Cincinnati, Ohio,1993), and Chaffee, “James Harrison Wilson,”Cavalry Journal (June 1925), p. 200. Also seeSchneider, “Theoretical Implications of Opera-tional Art,” pp. 18-9.

7Fuller, Decisive Battles of the U.S.A. (NewYork: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., 1942), p. 398 fn6; Tanks in the Great War (London: John Mur-ray, 1920), p. 277-8; and Memoirs of an Uncon-ventional Soldier (London: Ivor Nicholson andWatson, Ltd., 1936), p. 158. For additionalcomments on Parker’s observation on the use ofFrench and British tanks during World War I,see Report on Tanks, “Classes,” AEF GHQ, 17July 1917, G-3 Reports, RG 120, NA, pp. 1-7.

8Parker, “A Mechanized Force,” 20 March1928, AG 537-3 (3-20-28), Records of the Ad-jutant General’s Office, RG 407, NA, pp. 1-4.(Hereinafter cited by RG 407) The study wasvague on air support. It noted: “Appropriatesquadrons of air corps may assist in overcomingenemy resistance, both ground and aerial.” Seep. 8.

During the interwar period, ground support at-tack aviation did not develop as realized late inWorld War I. This was due to neglect, technicalproblems, and the controversy over mission andair tactics. By 1933, attack aviation emphasisgive way to high-speed, long range heavybombers. Earlier, Brigadier General WilliamMitchell had questioned the future applicationof attack aircraft because he believed air powershould focus on deep strategic operationsagainst the enemy’s supply concentrations andmanufacturing areas. See Mitchell, Winged De-fense. The Development and Possibilities ofModern Air Power—Economic and Military(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925), pp.188-9, and Thomas H. Greer, The Developmentof Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm 1917-1941(1955 reprint, Washington: GPO, 1985), pp. 12,66-7.

9Willey Howell, for the Chief of Infantry,Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff,G-3, 26 March 1928, RG 407, NA, p. 3.

10“Report of Superior Board on Organizationand Tactics,” General Orders 68, AEF-GHQ,Chaumont, France, 19 April 1919, Commandand General Staff College Library, FortLeavenworth, Kansas, pp. 64-77. Two otherboards were also established to deal with thelesson of the war. The AEF Lewis Board wasconvened also at Chaumont to study infantrytactical lessons. Rejecting position warfare, it

noted that “the training of our infantry [for thefuture] should be by all means in open warfareand designed to foster the offensive spirit. It isthe infantry which gives an army its character.Infantry normally requires strong support in theform of tanks, artillery, air services, supplies....”See “Proceedings of the Lewis Board 1919,”Special Order 98, AEF-GHQ, Chaumont, 18April 1919, Ibid., pp. 3-7.

The Westervelt or Caliber Board was estab-lished by the War Department to study andmake recommendations for future use of artil-lery. Of the three boards, it was the most fore-sighted. It declared that “mechanical transportis the prime mover of the future.” The boardrecommended a self-propelled field artillery ve-hicle “capable of operating as a caterpillar overcross country terrain [and], at a moments no-tice, capable of conversion...” to a wheel mode.This idea of a tracked self-propelled artilleryvehicle was the forerunner of the World War IIM 7 105mm Howitzer Gun Motor Carriage,which served in the combined arms role withthe armored divisions. However, in late 1922and 1923, the Field Artillery Board that testedthe Christie convertible and Holt gun carriagesconcluded they were “devoid of tactical useful-ness for light guns and howitzers.” See “Reportof Board of Special Officers,” Special Orders289, War Department, 5 May 1918, OrdnanceTechnical Intelligence Files 334.3/1.17, Recordsof the Chief of Ordnance, RG 156, NA, pp. 24,48. (Hereinafter cited by RG 156) Also seeWilliam I. Westervelt, “A Challenge to Ameri-can Engineers,” Army Ordnance, 1 (1920), pp.59-64, and “Horses, Tractors and Self-PropelledMounts,” Field Artillery Journal (November-December 1923), pp. 491-2.

11Historical Documents Relating to the Reor-ganization Plans of the War Department and tothe Present National Defense Act, 1 (Washing-ton: GPO, 1927), pp. 365, 366, 404-5.

12Parker, “A Mechanized Unit,” 2 April 1928,RG 407, NA, pp. 3-4.

13Proceedings of a Board of Officers, Subject:A Mechanized Force, 1 October 1928, AG537.3/7884-B, Records of the Chief of Arms,RG 177, NA, pp. 4, 7-10, 15-6, 18, 35. (Herein-after cited by RG 177) Unfortunately the Pro-ceedings and the G-3 study paid no attention totactical air other than observation and recon-naissance missions in support of a mechanizedforce.

14Chaffee, “The Status of the MechanizedCombat Organization,” Lecture, Army WarCollege, 19 September 1929, USAMHI, pp. 2,10.

15Ibid., p. 3.16Ibid., p. 10.17Denison, A History of Cavalry From the

Earliest Times with Lessons for the Future (2nded., London: Macmillan and Co., 1913), p. 447.The Cavalry School’s bible, R.M.P. Preston,The Desert Mounted Corps: An Account ofCavalry Operations in Palestine and Syria(London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1921)was rejected by Chaffee and Grow because itstated that the horse soldier would be morevaluable in a future war.

18Memorandum for General Mosely, Subject:Organization—Mechanized Force, 27 April1931, RG 177, NA, pp. 2-3, and Summerall,“New Developments in Warfare,” InfantryJournal (February 1931), pp. 91-2.

19For a history on Christie’s relationship withthe army, see George F. Hofmann, “The Trou-bled History of the Christie Tank,” ARMY (May1986), pp. 54-65.

20Fuqua, “An analysis on the chronologicalhistory of progress toward the formation of aMechanized Force in the United States Armyand the purpose of the organization,” 24 March1931, RG 177, NA, pp. 4-5.

21John W. Killigrew, “The Impact of theGreat Depression on the Army, 1929-1936,”(Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, Bloom-ington, Ind., 1960), pp. IV: 13-9.

22U.S. Army, 1923 Field Service Regulations:Operations, 1 (Washington: GPO, 1924), pp.11, 13, 88-9. The FSR directed that one of themissions of aviation units was to attack hostileground forces and their supporting units, includ-ing supply columns. No direction was given re-garding a tactical effort against enemy tanks orin support of an infantry assault with break-through and accompanying tanks. See pp. 21-3.

23Chaffee, “Mechanized Cavalry,” Lecture,Army War College, 19 September 1939,USAMHI, p. 1.

24Van Voorhis quoted in “Prelude to Armor”in Armored Force Command and Center, StudyNo. 27, Historical Section, Army GroundForces, 1946, RG 407, NA, p. 5.

25Grow, “Ten Lean Years. From the Mecha-nized Force (1930) to the Armored Force(1940),” (Manuscript, Falls Church, Va., 1969),pp. 55-6. Copy on file at the Patton Museum ofCavalry and Armor, Fort Knox, Ky. An editedversion of “Ten Lean Years” appeared in fourseries in ARMOR during 1987.

26U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relationsof the United States, 1932, 1 (Washington:GPO, 1948), pp. 65-7, 70, 180-2.

27Ibid., p. 65.28Directive for the Future Development of

Combat Cars and Tanks, 29 April 1933, Ord-nance Office, O. O. 451.24/622, RG 156, NA,p. 1.

29Chaffee, “Report of Maneuvers,” The Cav-alry School, Fort Riley, Kan., 1 October 1934,RG 407, NA, p. 419.

30Report of Technical Committee, 24 March,and Proceedings of Board of Officers, 25March 1934, HQ, 1st Cavalry. (Mechanized),Ordnance Office, O. O. 451.24/1789, RG 156,NA, pp. 1-5 and 1-4.

31Daniel Chase, “The Developmental Recordin Combat Vehicles” in “History of the Ord-nance Department in World War II. Researchand Development,” II (Unpublished manuscript,Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md., 1947), IcksCollection, Patton Museum, pp. 12-21.

32George F. Hofmann, “More on Christie’sBattles with Ordnance,” ARMOR (September-October 1990), pp. 3, 44.


COMBINED ARMS...Continued from Page 13

Comments Sought on Revisions to 71-1 FM and ARTEP As a result of the end of the Cold

War and various other factors, there have been many changes in Army doctrine, to include the revision of significant Army publications such as FM 100-5 Operations. FM 71-1, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team is under revision at this time, necessitating corresponding changes with ARTEP 71-1-MTP Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company and Company Team. The new editions of FM 71-1 and ARTEP 71-1-MTPwili incorporate the many lessons learned since 1988 at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and during recent conflicts.

Copies of the FM 71-1 initial draft were sent out to all divisions and bri-

52

gades, branch schools, and CTCs in December, and are available on the Internet on the Armor Center's Home Page. ARTEP 71-1-MTP will begin revision soon at the Armor Center. The Armor Center shares proponency with the Infantry School for these manuals, but has primary writing responsibility. We are looking for specific comments on the content of the FM 71-1 (Initial Draft) and the 3 October 1988 edition of ARTEP 71 +MTP, or suggestions for the future edition.

Send your comments by e-maiV PROFS or regular mail to this headquarters. Please include the name and telephone number of your POC with the comments.

The mailing address is:

Director, DTDD ATTN: ATZK-TDD-P U.S. Army Armor Center Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000

The e-mail address is:

[email protected]

The PROFS ID is:

WASHBURJ at KN01

For further information, or if you did not receive your copy. call CPT Washburn at DSN 464-3228 or commercial (502) 624-3228.

ARMOR - January-February 1997

33Academic Division, “Report on Maneu-vers,” The Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kan., 1October 1934, RG 407, p. 419.

34Kromer, “The Cavalry Maneuvers, FortRiley, Kan., May 1934,” Lecture, Army WarCollege, 22 June 1934, USAMHI, p. 27.

35Grow, “Ten Lean Years,” p. 93.36Jesse A. Ladd, “Report of Observations of

Fort Riley Maneuvers (May 14 to May 261936),” RG 407, NA, pp. 1, 10.

37Tables of Organization Mechanized Divi-sion (Tentative) (Fort Leavenworth: The Com-mand and General Staff School Press, 1936, pp.3-24; Tactical Employment of the MechanizedDivision (ibid., 1937), pp. 3-4, 6, 23-4, 31; andKrueger Memo quoted in Grow, “Ten LeanYears,” p. 88.

38A. Ryzhakov, ”K voprosy o stroitel’stvebronetankovykh voisk Krasnoi Armii v 30-egody” [Concerning the formation of the RedArmy Armored Forces in the 1930s], 8 Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal [Military History Journal](August 1968), p. 107; E. A. Kosyrev, E. Orek-hov and N.N. Fomin, TANKI [Tanks] (Moscow:Voenizdat [Military Publishing House], 1973),pp. 30-41; Fritz Heigl, Tashenbuch der Tanks, 2(Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1935), p. 456;Subject: Armament and Equipment — organi-zation (Mechanization); and Soviet Combat Ve-hicles, From: MA Riga, Latvia, 20 November1935, Report No. 7915, File No. MID 2281-D-85, Records of the Military Intelligence Divi-sion, G-2, RG 165, NA, pp. 1-2. (Hereinaftercited by RG 165)

39“Horse-Drawn Artillery,” Army and NavyRegister, 9 October 1937, p. 4.

40Upton Birnie, Jr., “Obsolescence of Horse-Drawn Artillery,” 16 May 1937, Ibid., p. 11.

41“Report of Chief of Staff,” Ibid., 11 Decem-ber 1937, pp. 1, 21.

42Craig, “Mechanization and Tanks,” SpecialStatement in “General Craig’s Hearing,” Ibid.,26 March 1938, p. 4. Earlier the Register pre-dicted “the horse may come back.” See 5March 1938, p. 9.

43“Fuqua, U.S. Mainstay in Spain, is Return-ing,” New York Times, 20 February 1938, p. 15;Subject: Employment of Troops in DomesticDisturbances. The Spanish Civil War, From:MA London, 25 January 1937, Report No.38512, RG 165, NA, p. 1; Subject: Foreign In-tervention in Spain, From: MA Valencia, 15April 1937, Report No. 6519, Ibid., pp. 2-3;Subject: Armament and Equipment — General.New Weapons in Spain — Value of Bombersand Tanks, From: MA London, 24 May 1937,Report No. 38776, Ibid., p. 1; and Cavalry inthe Foreign Press, “Lessons from the SpanishCivil War,” Cavalry Journal (January-February1938), p. 79.

44Subject: Polices governing mechanization,and tactical employment of mechanized units, 6April 1938, AG 537.3 (4-6-38), RG 407, NA,pp. 1-4.

45“Tank Tactics,” Army and Navy Journal, 4June 1938, p. 884.

46Henry J. Reilly, “Proving Ground in Spain.Armament Trends as Revealed by the SpanishWar,” Army Ordnance (May-June 1939), pp.333-6.

47“Prelude to Armor,” p. 5.48Grow, “Ten Lean Years,” pp. 94, 113, 116.49Herr, “The Cavalry,” Lecture, Army War

College, 19 September 1939, USAMHI, p. 13.50Grow, “Ten Lean Years,” p. 116.51“Redesignation of the Armored Force” in

Armored Command and Center, p. 108.52Ibid., and Herr, “Editorial Comment,” Cav-

alry Journal (May-June 1946), p. 38.

53Herr and Edward S. Wallace, The Story ofthe U.S. Cavalry (Boston: Little, Brown andCompany, 1953), pp. 248-61.

54Chaffee, “Statement of...,” Military Estab-lishment Appropriations Bill, 1942, 14 May1941 (Washington: GPO, 1941), pp. 552-5.

55For an excellent study on the flawed anti-tank doctrine, see Christopher R. Gabel, Seek,Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank DestroyerDoctrine in World War II, Leavenworth PaperNo. 12 (Washington: GPO, September 1985).

Dr. George F. Hofmann isan adjunct professor of his-tory at the University of Cin-cinnati who served in theU.S. Army (Armor). He spe-cializes in United States andEuropean military history andmilitary law and justice. Hismost recent publications in-clude “Doctrine, Tank Tech-nology, and Execution: I. A.Khalepskii and the RedArmy’s Fulfillment of DeepOffensive Operations,” Jour-nal of Slavic Military Studies(June 1996). Currently he isco-editing an anthology onthe history of U.S. Armor withGeneral Donn Starry.

Fighting By Minutes: Time and theArt of War by LTC Robert Leonhard,Praeger Publishers, Westport, Conn.179 pp. $47.

First, the bad news... this book costs $47at AAFES. This is unfortunate; it meansthat there will be a lot of money flowing outof professionals’ pockets because this isTHE premier theoretical work of the past40 years and is destined to become a clas-sic.

The author, LTC Robert Leonhard, is theU.S. Army’s most prolific and outspokentheoretician. His first book, The Art of Ma-neuver, established his reputation as anoriginal thinker. It did, however, begin byfollowing in some rather well-establishedfootprints. This book introduces not only anentirely new perspective about how weshould think about war – it also provides uswith the conceptual tools we will need to dothis.

The premise is deceptively simple: “Themost effective way to perceive, interpret,and plan military operations is in terms oftime, rather than space.” This, in and of it-self, is not a difficult concept for the aver-age professional to grasp. Yet, it is in hisrigorous analysis of the implications of thisshift, from a spatial to a temporal outlook,and how it might affect the conduct of war,that LTC Leonhard truly breaks newground.

Introducing concepts such as “LeveragingTemporal Asymmetry” and using terms bor-rowed from physics (e.g. operations withinwar have a “frequency” and an “ampli-tude”), this is not a “light read.” After almostevery page, the reader finds himself settingthe book down, digesting what he hasread, deciding whether he agrees or dis-agrees, and actually THINKING about thefiner nuances of our profession. This alonejustifies the cost.

Despite his newly coined terminology —or perhaps because he uses “borrowed”concepts from other disciplines — LTCLeonhard’s book allows the reader to openhis mind to the potential new methods ofexecuting war which he proposes. In thepast, LTC Leonhard has been accused ofusing history out of context as a justifica-tion for his theories. Yet in this book (whichis NOT a history) his use of historical ex-amples in support of his thesis rings trueand helps greatly in his explanation of anew method of understanding warfare.

Fighting By Minutes is expensive, nodoubt about that. But is IS important. To

read this book is to think HARD about ourprofession. Casual soldiers and leadersshould leave this on the shelf; professionalwarriors should go out and buy a copy to-day. Read it. Argue about it. Make notes inthe margins.

ROBERT L. BATEMANCaptain, InfantryWesterville, Ohio

Books in Brief

Jane’s Armour and Artillery Up-grades 1996-1997 (Ninth Edition), Ed-ited by Tony Cullen and ChristopherFoss. Jane’s Information Group, Alex-andria, Va., 665 pp., $290 ($795 onCD-ROM).

While few officers are well heeled enoughto afford these expensive directories fortheir personal libraries, the information inthem could be invaluable to the combat de-veloper or when deploying to a new theaterto face a force that may be an unknownquantity.

Given the astronomical cost of new tanks,many nations have opted for upgrades ofearlier equipment that bring capabilitiesclose to, if not equal to, newly developedweapons. More than 300 firms compete inthis field, the directory tells us, supplyingupgraded armament, ammunition, new en-gine packages, track and suspension up-grades, drop-in turrets, improved fire con-trols, and a host of devices to improve pro-tection.

In the tradition of the more familiar Jane’sArmour and Artillery, this encyclopedic di-rectory includes the development history,production status, manufacturer, and capa-bilities of each system. All of this is ar-ranged alphabetically by country of origin.

Useful and expensive, this directory isprobably more likely to find its way to li-brary shelves than private libraries, but it isgood to know it’s available.

Jane’s Tank Recognition Guide byChristopher F. Foss. Harper CollinsPublishers, Glasgow. 510 pp. $19.95.

The title here says “tanks,” but the con-tent covers all types of AFVs, from tanks to

APCs to self-propelled artillery to wheeledarmor. This is a useful armored vehicle ref-erence. The author sought to design a textthat helped in vehicle identification and pro-vided key recognition points, as well asuseful information, about each type of vehi-cle. He was successful. It is all in here,logically arranged and succinctly explained.If you ever wanted a copy of Jane’s Armorand Artillery, but were scared off by the$250 price, this is the book you wish theyhad designed for working guys. I see aplace for this book in every S2 shop andon the bookshelf of every armor aficionado.Its design allows it to fit inside a pantscargo pocket, although carrying it therewould produce a noticeable limp. Ofcourse, it doesn’t contain all of the datafound in its hardcover big brother, nor thesheer volume of pictures in the larger vol-ume, but the information it does containshould satisfy those who need it.

Tank Killing: Antitank Warfare byMen and Machines by Ian Hogg. Sar-pedon Publishers, New York, 288 pp.$22.95.

The author, an authority on small armsand the current editor of Jane’s InfantryWeapons and other similar directories, fo-cuses here on the history of tank killing,making this book a useful addition to thearmor soldier’s bookshelf.

The chapters are arranged to cover fami-lies of weapons — infantry tank killers, anti-tank guns, tank destroyers, tanks them-selves, air weapons directed at tanks,smart weapons, and the desperate meas-ures some defenders employed at the lowend of the technology curve, in a chapterentitled “Mines, Traps, and Bare Hands.”

Hogg provides a short and very readablehistory of the development of each ap-proach, explains clearly how each methodworks, and includes numerous statisticsand specifications, so that a reader cancompare the effectiveness of the methodversus others. Statistics are in metric andEnglish measurements, and include usefulfacts like ranges, muzzle velocity, andpenetration potential. Almost as interestingas the success stories are the fascinatingfailures, which point up the difficulty of thejob.

An interesting, useful book at a reason-able price.

ARMOR STAFF

BOOKS

Time: War’s New Strategic Frontier


In the near future, tankcrews will be able to pro-vide hot water and toheat rations on boardcombat and combat sup-port platforms.

Desert Storm estab-lished the unmistakableneed for this capability. Inresponse, the Directorateof Force Developmentdeveloped the necessaryrequirement documenta-tion and managed a pro-gram that led to the suc-cessful fielding of theMounted Water RationHeater (MWRH).

The MWRH will heatfive Meals Ready to Eat(MREs) and two pints ofwater at the same time. Ifthe insert that rations areheated in is removed,you can heat one gallonof water for coffee, hotchocolate, or hygienepurposes. This heaterhas two heat settings,low (150°F to 160°F) and high (180°F to 190°F). Be-cause of its low power rating (15 amps), this heater canbe left on for several hours in silent watch without start-ing the engine to recharge batteries. The MWRH isequipped with a low power monitor that monitors vehiclebattery power and automatically shuts the heater off toprevent drawing battery power below required startinglevel.

The program managers for Abrams, Paladin/FAASV,Bradley, and M113 have taken the lead with their inte-gration kit development, and their systems will be thefirst platforms equipped. PM-Abrams expects the M1A1MWRH fielding to start during the second quarter ofFY97 and to continue until approximately 1,440 tanks

receive the MWRH at nocost to the receiving units.M1A2 MWRH integration willbe done as a Pre-PlannedProduct Improvement.

PM-Bradley recently startedfielding the MWRH and willcontinue to FY01. A total of5,248 MWRHs will be fieldedduring this time to M2A2s,M3A2s, M2A3s, M3A3s, andC2Vs.

PM-Paladin and FAASVcurrently has fielded 180MWRHs (57 Paladins and123 FAASVs) through a ret-rofit program. The plan is tocontinue this program untilapproximately 1,604 MWRHshave been fielded (824 Pala-dins and 780 FAASVs) byFY98.

PM-113 plans to start field-ing the MWRH during thesecond quarter of FY97 andwill continue through 2003.Approximately 2,156 MWRHsshould be fielded during this

time to M113A3s, M577s, M1064s, and M1068s.

If you have any additional questions or need any otherinformation on the MWRH, call Mr. Larry T. Hasty at theDirectorate of Force Development, DSN 464-3662, orcommercial (502) 624-3662.

Larry Hasty is a Soldier Support Project Officer assigned tothe Directorate of Force Development, U.S. Army Armor Cen-ter, Ft. Knox, Ky. His area of responsibility includes Organiza-tional Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE), life support,and communication equipment programs for the combat vehi-cle crewman. He received the Colonel Rohland A. IskerAward for his work in fielding the Mounted Water RationHeater.

Mounted Water Ration Heater on the WayFor Tanks, Bradleys, M113s, and Howitzers

PIN: 075092-000

by Larry T. Hasty