Armenian Journal of Political Sciencearjps.org/cover/eng/ARJPS-2-2018.pdf6 Tigran Torosyan, Nane Khachatryan revolutions” 1.They shared a number of common features, i.e. external

ISSN 1829-4286

Armenian Journal of Political Science

2 2018

Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences

Center of Perspective Researches and Initiatives ARJPS published in the framework of Project “Center of Perspective Researches and Initiatives ” of the Scientific State Committee (Ministry of Education and Science, RA)

EDITORIAL BOARD Tigran Torosyan (Editor) Brusov State University of Languages and Social

Sciences (YSLSU), Armenia, [email protected] Grigor Arshakyan YSLSU, Armenia, [email protected] Jerzy Jaskiernia Jan Kochanowski University, Kielce, Poland,

[email protected] Vahe Davtyan YSLSU, Armenia, [email protected] Anna Khvorostyankina

National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”, Ukraine, YSLSU, Armenia, [email protected]

Malkhaz Matsaberidze Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia, [email protected]

Andrey Medushevsky National Research University -Higher School of Economics, Russia, [email protected]

Sergey Minasyan Caucasus Institute, Armenia, [email protected] Karlen Mirumyan YSLSU, Armenia, [email protected] Anna Ohanyan Stonehill College, USA, [email protected] Rainer Schulze University of Essex, United Kingdom,

[email protected] Levon Shirinyan Armenian State Pedagogical University,

[email protected] Albert Stepanyan Yerevan State University, Armenia,

[email protected] Irina Semenenko Institute of World Economy and International

Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia, [email protected]

Petra Stykow Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich, Germany, [email protected]

Talin Ter Minasian INALCO, France, [email protected] Aram Terzyan Eurasian Research and Analysis Institute, USA,

YSLSU, Armenia, [email protected] Levon Zekiyan Venetian Institute of Oriental Studies, Italy,

[email protected] ISSN 1829-4286

© Center of Perspective Researches and Initiatives, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TO THE AUTHORS OF ARJPS 4 POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATION Tigran Torosyan, Nane Khachatryan Peculiarities of Political Culture in Post-Soviet Transformation States: The Case of Armenia 5

Gagik Minasyan The Possibilities of Post-Legislative Scrutiny in Post-Soviet Transformation States: The Cases of Moldova and Armenia 31

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Margarit Petrosyan The Classification of Variables in Comparative Study of Conflicts 59

Abu Zaid Ali Mussa Conflict between Fatah and Hamas Movements: Clash of Ideologies and Interests 79

Karo Galoyan The Issue of the Meskhetian Turks at the Crossroads of Interests of Georgia and its Neighbouring Countries 95

TO THE AUTHORS OF ARJPS The Armenian Journal of Political Science (ARJPS) strives to publish scholarly research of exceptional merit, focusing on important issues (in particular, Post-Soviet Transformation, State-Building, Democratisation and Human Rights, Conflict Resolution, Recon-ciliation Processes, National Identity and International Integration, New World Order, South Caucasus in the Geopolitical Struggle etc.) and demonstrating the highest standards of excellence in conceptualisation, exposition and methodology. Authors must demonstrate how their analysis illuminates a significant research problem, or answer an important research question, of general interest on political science. Authors must strive for a presentation that will be understandable to as many scholars as possible, consistent with the nature of their material.

The ARJPS publishes original works. Therefore, authors should not submit articles containing tables, figures, or substantial amounts of text that have already been published or are forthcoming in other places, or that have been included in other manuscripts submitted for review to book publishers or periodical (including on-line journals).

All submitted articles are subject to a rigorous peer review process, based on initial editor screening and double-blind refereeing by a minimum of two referees. Address: Yerevan, Toumanyan 42, YSULS, Room 202 Tel: 010 530272-208, 091402731 E-mail: [email protected] www.arjps.org

Armenian Journal of Political Science 2(9) 2018, 5-30 5

POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATION DOI: 10.19266/1829-4286-2018-02-05-30

Peculiarities of Political Culture in Post-Soviet Transformation States: The Case of Armenia

TIGRAN TOROSYAN

Yerevan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences, Armenia

NANE KHACHATRYAN Halle University, Germany,

Yerevan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences, Armenia The article discusses the possibility of forecasting some political processes through the data obtained from sociological surveys conducted by the reputable organizations in Armenia during the post-Soviet transformation. The analysis of the data shows that during the post-Soviet transformation one can distinguish between three stages of significant changes in political culture, that coincide with the period of office of the first three presidents. The skepticism over the higher authorities in the first and third stages deepened in such an extent that it has led to a change of power by non-constitutional mechanisms (revolution). Though the term of the second president was favorable for “color revolutions”, this did not take place in Armenia due to a significant difference of trust between the preceding and following stages. The analysis demonstrates that although the post-Soviet transformation has duration of less than three decades and there could be no talk of political culture in Soviet times, its nature is not static, as is sometimes considered. The results also prove that although public trust has drastically changed in some stages, changes in social consciousness during this period are taking place at a very slow pace.

Keywords Political culture, post-Soviet transformation, revolution, power, political parties Introduction Though post-Soviet transformation has been going on for almost 30 years, a number of phenomena have not yet received a full theoretical justification and interpretation due to the unique and extremely complex nature of that process. This also refers to revolutions (those made by non-constitutional mechanisms are examined in this article). Such events, taken place in 2003-2005, were labeled “color

6 Tigran Torosyan, Nane Khachatryan

revolutions”1. They shared a number of common features, i.e. external interference from the same source, post-election follow-up, youth movements, internal divisions, etc2. Their study focused mainly on seeking answers to the following questions: do they have a general nature and external origin, what changes in domestic and foreign political stance of those countries took place; are they manifestations of geopolitical rivalry in the post-Soviet space; what impact will they have on that competition, and so on. Further developments have come to show that these revolutions are not simply post-election processes, and there are some other differences as compared to “color revolutions”. They also bring forth new questions, the most important of which is probably the following: Are there any domestic political preconditions under which the change of power (revolution) takes place?, and if so, what are they?. Among all the other factors, the change of power occurs when there is a split between the power and the active part of society. This obviously depends on two main factors: the results of the activities exercised by state authorities and the public attitude towards the authorities. These two factors are of different nature. The former is objective and measurable, while in case of the latter a decisive role is attached to the component of trust, which is somewhat subjective in that it is dependent not only on measurable values (social and economic indicators) but also on political culture. Therefore, it can be assumed that the break-up of state authorities and the active part of the society, i.e. the revolution, can be characterized by these factors. This article attempts to identify and evaluate the impact of political culture on the revolutionary processes in post-Soviet states. The case of Armenia is under review.

According to experts in the study of political culture and transformation processes, the stability of the political system is possible if people support the functioning institutions by democratic

1 Lincoln A. Mitchell, The Colour Revolutions, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 2 Torosyan T., Vardanyan A., "Color Revolutions": antecedents and consequences, Public Governance, 2005, 3, pp. 90-101. (in Armenian)


rules3. To reveal whether or not such support exists, since the 1990s political culture has been included in the studies on transformation, which were generally limited to changes in political culture in Central and Eastern European post communist states. The former Soviet republics partly (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, the South Caucasus states) or entirely (Kazakhstan and Central Asia) have been excluded from the social surveys conducted by the experienced and trusted companies (“World Values Survey”4 or “European Value Study”5) which academic researches mostly draw upon. One of the specialized regional agencies, the Caucasus Research Resource Center-Armenia Barometer, provides the data for 2004-2017, which combined with the data of the aforementioned international organizations, allows assessing the impact of political culture in Armenia on the process of post-Soviet transformation. The Role of Political Culture in Political Studies According to Almond and Verba, the classical definition of political culture is based on the “specific political orientations of citizens - attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system”6. Their joint work was devoted to the study of five cases of Western democracy. One of the main conclusions was that the long-term stability of democratic political system is highly related to its perception by the public. This means that only if citizens accept the basic premises of democracy and

3 Pollack D., Jacobs J., Müller O., Pickel G., Introduction, Pollack et al, Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe. Attitudes in new democracies, Burlington 2003, p. xiv. 4 Armenia 1997, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV3.jsp, social surveys were conducted in Armenia in 1997. 5 Public Opinion analysis - Central and Eastern Eurobarometer archives, social surveys conducted in Armenia in 1993-1997. 6 Almond G., Verba S., The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes in Five Western Democracies, Princeton, NJ 1963, p. 12.


its rules could the democracy’s long-term survival be assured7. Due to this, the idea became narrowly understood and became a target of criticism. Sometimes, the concept of “meaning and nonsense” is being even questioned8. The most frequent criticism herein is that the concept of political culture only comprises a purely superficial phenomenon, which can be changed in the short term and is hardly able to explain anything9. So the question hereby is, to what extent political attitudes and political behaviour are linked with each other and how political orientations can be empirically recorded according to rules10. According to Gabriel, because of the data problem [...] the empirical investigation of the impact of political culture on the stability and performance of political systems is not feasible11, since political culture is a manifestation of Anglo-American democracy, and is therefore intended for the study of fully-fledged democracies. Almond opposed to this, stating that “Political culture should not be misunderstood either as the sole or deterministic explanatory variable for the emergence and functioning of political structures. Rather, it is the current influences between institutions and orientations”12.

Of course, social surveys do not always ensure high reliability, and only the data based on highly professional approaches can be used in scientific researches. At the same time, the misunderstanding causes the opinion that political culture can only be used for the study 7 Pickel S., Pickel G., Politische Kultur- und Demokratieforschung. Grundbegriffe, Theorien, Methoden. Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden 2006, S. 51. 8 Kaase M., Sinn oder Unsinn des Konzepts ,,Politische Kultur" für die vergleichende Politikforschung, oder auch: Der Versuch, einen Pudding an die Wand zu nageln, Max Kaase, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Hrsg.), Wahlen und politisches System. Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl 1980, Opladen 1983. 9 Westle B., Rezeptionsgeschichte des Konzepts der Politischen Kultur, Bettina Westle, Oscar W. Gabriel (Hrsg.), Politische Kultur. Eine Einführung, Baden-Baden 2009, S. 29. 10 Pickel S., Pickel G., Politische Kultur- und Demokratieforschung. Grundbegriffe, Theorien, Methoden. Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden 2006, S. 19. 11 Gabriel Oscar W., Politische Kultur aus der Sicht der empirischen Sozialforschung, Oskar Niedermayer, Klaus von Beyme (Hrsg.), Politische Kultur in Ost- und Westdeutschland, Berlin 1994, S. 24. 12 Almond G., The Study of Political Culture, Almond Gabriel, Discipline Divided. Schools and Sects in Political Science, Thousand Oaks 1990, pp. 138-169.


of Western societies, as it is the birthplace of the Western world characterized by a fully-fledged democracy and a corresponding political culture. Under this approach, one might think that there is no sense in studying political culture with regard to social phenomena, since in a democratic world the perceptions of different societies are quite close to each other; the differences over time are not big and may affect non-key events. But the situation in transforming post-Soviet societies is much more complicated, and the study of political culture in some instances has no alternative. Meanwhile, in this case it is more evident that the word “culture” in the phrase “political culture” does not fully correspond to the traditional meaning of the word, but rather is a tribute to the formulation suggested by the founders of those studies. As for the application of the idea of “political culture” in the studies on transforming societies, its necessity is most evident in the observation of those phenomena in which public attitude toward the authorities are an important factor. In particular, such a phenomenon is the change of power through non-constitutional mechanisms, i.e. the revolution, when the most influential factor is the dissatisfaction of a significant part of the society over the activities of the government. It shows the major difference between traditional democratic societies and transforming societies. The perceptions of the former are closer to the theoretical notions of social phenomena and of different institutions, while in case of the latter even the perceptions of fundamental ideas (democracy, power, the rule of law, etc.) may differ greatly from the theoretically established definitions. Since the attitude of the active part of the society towards the government is formed on the basis of these perceptions, the use of the idea of “political culture” has no alternative when studying the phenomena that the attitude of the society have a significant impact on. The purpose and objectives of a particular study are surely important. Thus, the set of the factors to be examined in each study and the principles and paradigm of their analysis should be clearly stated. Since the 1980s, attempts have been made to clarify the structure and parameters of political culture. In


particular, Almond suggested the classification of political culture into three groups: system, process, and policy cultures. System culture consists of knowledge, feelings, and evaluations vis-a-vis the political authorities, the role incumbents; knowledges, feelings, and evaluations toward the nation. Process culture consists of the knowledge, feelings, and evaluations members of political system have toward the self as political actor, and toward other political actors. Policy culture consists of the knowledge, feelings, and evaluations members of political system have toward the outputs of the system – its internal policies and its external policies13. Fuchs and Klingemann have proposed the division of political culture into three, but slightly different (cultural, structural and process) groups or levels, with the aim to compare democratic societies in the West and the East14. They observed the problem both at the level of individual countries and that of groups of countries, assuming that the civilizational factor has a significant impact on the formation of political culture.

According to Huntington, the ability to adapt to a western model of politics and economics is greater in those post-communist countries that formerly belonged to the Catholic and Protestant states than to those dominated by Orthodox or Islamic culture15. For the Reisinger, the civilizational standard has a slightly different meaning; it is firstly important to clarify to what empire the country formerly belonged, namely the British, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman empires16. As far as the post-Soviet countries are concerned, Fuchs17 and

13 Almond G., Politische Kultur-Forschung - Rückblick und Ausblick, Dirk Bergschlosser, Jakob Schissler (Hrsg.), Politische Kultur in Deutschland, Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung, Opladen 1987, S. 37. 14 Fuchs D., Klingemann H.-D., Democratic communities in Europe. A comparison between East and West, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs, Jan Zielonka (ed.), Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, New York 2006, pp. 25-66. 15 Huntington S., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996. 16 Reisinger W., Reassessing Theories of Transition Away From Authoritarian Regimes: Regional Patterns among Postcommunist Countries, Chicago 1999. 17 Fuchs D., The Democratic Culture of Germany, Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, Oxford 1999.


Rohrschneider18 suggest that this impact varies depending on the length of time during which a country maintained a Leninist regime. One of the essential manifestations of the civilizational factor, especially in post-Soviet countries, is the existence of “informal institutions” that characterize a specific group of widespread societal norms and procedures19. Unlike formal institutions (constitution, laws, norms of governance, formal structures of political system), informal institutions are based on traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs, relationships, and other non-statutory norms. According to Merkel and Croissant, informal rules of politics exist both inside and outside the formal institutions, and these informal settings offer more effective forms of communication, advocacy, and policy implementation, thereby complementing the role of formal settings and institutions of authoritarian rule20. Most Soviet informal networks have continued their existence in the post-Soviet space, although in modified and reconfigured shapes and forms21.

Another classification of elements of political culture is proposed by Lucian Pye, who distinguishes two levels of it: thick and thin. Thick culture is deeply rooted, and accepted in the institutions and practices of a given society. Thin culture is not firm, it is more changeable and dynamic, based on cognitive perception and can be modified under certain conditions.Thick culture focuses on such fundamental values as family, religion, nationality. Thin culture covers such trade-off values as order and freedom, interpersonal and institutional trust22. Mishler and Pollack consider that the concept of

18 Rohrschneider R., Learning Democracy: Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany, Oxford 1999. 19 North D., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 1993. 20 Merkel W., Croissant A., Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 2000, S. 17. 21 Babajanian B. V., Social Capital and Community Participation in Post-Soviet Armenia: Implications for Policy and Practice, Europe-Asia Studies, 2008, p. 1304. 22 Lucian Pye W., Culture as Destiny, Detlef Pollack, Jörg Jacobs, Olaf Müller, Gert Pickel (ed.), Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe. Attitudes in new democracies, Burlington 2003, p. 8.


thick and thin culture could help us to explain the transformation processes of the former Communist societies23. Methodological Notes

The above observation has shown that in terms of achieving the goals of this article the partial implementation of the model suggested by Fuchs and Klingemann24 based on the data obtained through the Caucasus Research Resource Center-Armenia Barometer 2014-201725 can be rather effective. Of course, the authors used this model for different purpose, i.e. to assess the level of democracy in different countries. However, since all three levels of political culture - values, regulations, as well as institutions and processes - are considered, and the indicators used fully characterize public attitudes, the set of them is also applied to address the research problem of this article. As mentioned above, this model has two components: the results of three dimensions of political culture for each country under review and the civilizational prerequisite. In case of Armenia, only the former will be used, as the application of the latter will not be effective due to the particularities of the case. Armenia does not completely fit in any civilization distinguished by Huntington, since the core of that classification is the religious affiliation, while the creed of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Christianity is unique, and it is not identified with Protestantism, Catholicism, or Orthodoxy. Problems

23 Mishler W., Pollack D., On Culture, Thick and Thin: Toward a Neo-Cultural Synthesis, Detlef Pollack, Jörg Jacobs, Olaf Müller, Gert Pickel (ed.), Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe. Attitudes in new democracies. Burlington. 2003, p. 252. 24 Fuchs D., Klingemann H.-D., Democratic communities in Europe. A comparison between East and West, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Dieter Fuchs, Jan Zielonka (ed.), Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, New York 2006, pp. 25-66; Klingemann H.-D., Dissatisfied Democrats. Democratic Maturation in Old and New Democracies, in: Russel J. Dalton, Christian Welzel, The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant To Assertive Citizens, Cambridge. 2014, pp. 116-157. 25 Source Questionnaire, Caucasus Research Barometer, https://www.crrc.am/caucasusbarometer/documentation?lang=en [Stand: 2018-11-15]


arise with the classification of empires as well. A part of Armenia was under the Ottoman Empire, while the other part - first under the Russian Empire and further within the Soviet Union. This has had its impact on the distortion of political culture and identity. But only by primitive approach can Armenia’s prerequisites be assessed solely by those facts. Unlike some European countries, Armenia has centuries-old history and a long experience in shaping the classical Greek, Roman and European foundations of European civilization, as well as in the spread of Christianity throughout Europe. Therefore, in the studies of post-Soviet countries, the peculiarities of Armenia must be taken into account. Sometimes, in such surveys authors come to inexplicable conclusions26. It is also important to note that no link between civilization or imperial past and revolution has been discovered so far.

The survey below, aimed to identify the preconditions for revolutionary processes in Armenia following the collapse of the USSR, is based on the following statements:

- In the sense used in this article, the change of power in 1998 can be considered as a revolution; the president resigned due to the disagreements - between the president of the country on the one hand, and the prime minister and the defense minister on the other hand - over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. This was followed by the resignations of a number of other senior officials, and in the parliamentary elections, that took place a year later, the former ruling party did not enter the parliament.

- In the same sense, the change of power in 2018 can also be labeled a revolution; the prime minister resigned as a result of a mass uprising, a umber of high-ranking officials followed him, and in the parliamentary elections a year later, the former ruling party did not enter the parliament.

26 Delcour L., Wolchuk K., The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s Europeanisation, Journal of European Integration, 2015, 37 (4), 1-17.


-In 2003-2005, when “color revolutions” were taking place in the former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan), Armenia managed to escape it.

-A special table will be drawn up to fill in the missing data for the period of 1998-2003, considering the starting point for that period to be 1997, the concluding - 2004.

- To make the analytical picture more vivid, an integral index of distrust will be used, derived from the data in columns 1-3 “fully distrust” and “rather distrust”, and for the integral index of trust “fully trust” and “rather trust” columns. Analysis of Empirical Data The first change of power in post-Soviet Armenia. To overcome the moral and psychological complex situation due the mass protests following the presidential elections of 1996 and the suppression of them by force, the government has been dramatically changed twice in a short time. There were some positive developments in 1997, but at the end of the year, the President attempted to restore the political position he had lost during the previous year. First, by a press conference, then by the article “War or Peace”27 he sought to put forward new approaches to the issue of vital importance for the country, i.e. the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The basic idea was that “the status quo cannot be maintained for a long time, because neither the international community nor Armenia's economic capabilities will allow it”, “the war should be excluded, and the Karabakh issue should be resolved only through peaceful negotiations”, “the issue must be settled by compromise or by the defeat of one of the parties, and then who will be the loser?”. Not only was it incomprehensible to talk about compromise, when the other side made bellicose statements every single day, there was not even a hint of concession, and it was not publicly stated exactly what Ter-Petrosyan was going to concede,

27 Ter-Petrosyan L., War or Peace?. 1 november, 1997. https://www.aniarc.am/2017/11/01/levon-ter-petrosyan-article-war-or-peace-1997/


but also the fact that the President of the country questions the choice of his citizens with the question “war or peace?”.

Today, it is not only obvious that the former President's “predictions” did not come true, but also that he was going to hand over some of the territories adjacent to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, which were under the control of the NKR Defense Army. Ter-Petrosyan came up with this idea again in the campaign for parliamentary elections of 2012, insisting that after such a concession, the international community will appreciate this noble step and find a solution to the problem. Since there is not at least a single case of self-determination conflict settled through compromise, there was no reason to assume that after the concessions of the Armenian side the international community would resolve the issue. The proposals put forward by Ter-Petrosyan did not receive a positive feedback from the public. It caused the division of power, and the prime minister and the defense minister demanded the president's resignation. The latter had two options, either to resign or to dismiss from the post those who demanded his resignation and to address the people with the expectation of getting their support. However, the picture of Eurobarometer surveys conducted in Armenia in 1993-1997 (Figure 1) shows that the government, even after overcoming the post-election crisis in 1996, did not enjoy the public support to choose the second option.


Figure 1

0

20

40

60

80

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Direction of country - right or wrong?

right wrong

The same is true of the answers to another question presented in Figure 2. The problem is obviously about the development of democracy, but the establishment of democracy was perceived as a way out of a complex socio-economic situation. Figure 2

020406080

100

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Satisfaction with development of democracy

satisfied not satisfied

The World Value Survey conducted in Armenia in February 1997 also showed a low level of trust in a number of structures28, the results of which are presented in Table 1.

28 Armenia 1997, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV3.jsp


Table 1 Fully trust

Rather trust

Rather distrust

Fully distrust

Don’t know

Justice

6,6 23,8 37,6 29,1 2,9

Media 3,0 30,1 42,9 20,9 3,1 Executive government

7,9 33,3 31,0 25,0 2,8

Parties 0,8 14,3 40,4 39,9 4,7 Parliament 2,4 26,9 30,8 36,8 3,2 Police 6,6 24,8 35,6 31,4 1,6

The resignation of the President in the beginning of 1998 was

followed by those of other senior officials, by the rearrangements in the National Assembly, presidential elections, and, finally, parliamentary elections in May 1999 thereby completing the first process of non-constitutional change of power in Armenia. This was the result of the split of power which has been typical to the post-Soviet countries during the first 15 years of transformation. The data show that there has been deep dissatisfaction with the government for the past 6-7 years since the re-establishment of independence. However, Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the level of distrust was high enough in 1993 and that the crisis could not be overcome before the change of government. Meanwhile, during the 1991 referendum of independence and the first presidential elections, the public had unconditionally supported the state authorities. However, Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the level of distrust was high enough in 1993 and that the crisis could not be overcome before the change of power. The indicator of political parties is particularly prominent among the trust indicators of different structures listed in Table 1.

In the 1990s, this could be explained as an effect of the memory of the Soviet single-party system, but in reality the problem is much deeper. The lack of knowledge of a genuine multiparty system in the 1990s and the large inertia of the transformation of the public consciousness did not provide the basis on which the multiparty


system was to be established. It is enough to compare the agendas of political parties in Armenia and Poland and the issues discussed in that period29, and it will become clear that before the collapse of the USSR, the political organizations of the two societies in the communist camp started the processes free from the restrictions imposed by that camp with different degrees of preparedness and different problems.

Since the multi-party system shapes all the political institutions of the state30, the problem of the consolidation of that system is probably the most serious challenge during the post-Soviet transformation, given also the challenges of the transformation of public consciousness.

Surveys in the second decade of the 2000s show that the problem of the consolidation of multi-party system remains one of the most serious challenge to post-Soviet transformation and a major obstacle to development. In the next section of the article, the data in Table 1 will be analyzed in details as compared to that of 2000s. The second change of power in Armenia through unconstitutional mechanisms. There are no reliable data on the situation of the country in 1998-2003, and only since 2004 the data for each year (for some indices recorded since 2008 or 2011) can be found at the Caucasus Research Center-Armenia Barometer Database. The data will be analyzed on all three dimensions of political culture. The cultural level will help to determine how well the Armenian society meets democratic standards at the level of fundamental values. Obviously, one can not expect radical changes here; the transformation of social consciousness is the most difficult to carry out31. When analyzing the structural level, an attempt will be made to find out the distrust of 29 Biegasievicz P., The Gdańsk Liberals – an Exemplification of Polish Pragmatic Liberalism, Armenian Journal of Political Science, 2016, 2(5), 55-78; Hovsepyan N., Formation of Armenian Political Parties in the Context of Restoration of Independence, Armenian Journal of Political Science, 2017, 2(7), 57-76. 30 Torosyan T. Armenia’s transition to the parliamentary system: problems and prospects, Comparative Constitutional Review, 2016, 4, 29–40. (In Russian). 31Torosyan T., Post-Soviet Transformation of Social System, Yerevan, 2006, pp. 297-300. (in Armenian)


which structures and settings and to which degree may lead to the uprising. The process level can explain the public attitude towards the processes taking place. Cultural level. Trust is one of the most important elements of social cohesion. In the study of political culture, this phenomenon is related to Robert Putman's social capital, meaning “features of social life-networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared goals”32. As shown in Figure 3, personal trust is quite low in Armenia. Figure 3

020406080

There are many people I can trust completely

Describes more or less

Source of Data: Caucasus Research Resource Center-Armenia Barometer

It is noteworthy that during the period under review, the indicators have had a sharp downturn. In 2008, the high distrust rate of about 55 percent can be explained by the psychological consequences of the tragic events of March 1, in 2009-2011 the rate of 25-30 percent - by the return to stability, whereas the sharp rise in distrust since 2012, under the absence of a specific event, can be interpreted by the worsening of an overall situation. Of course, interpersonal trust is not equivalent to the trust in government, but it is clear that general distrust significantly affects interpersonal trust.

In 2012, the indicator of lawfulness is also dramatically changed, as shown in Figure 4.

32 Putnam R., Tuning In, Tuning out: the Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America, Political Science and Politics, 28, 1995.


Figure 4

0

20

40

60

80

2011 2012 2013 2015 2017

Important for a good citizen - always obey laws

Not important at all 2

3 4

Extremely important

Source of Data: Caucasus Research Resource Center-Armenia Barometer

By 2012, about 75 percent of those surveyed thought it is “very important for a citizen to always obey the laws”, whereas after 2012 less than 50 percent of respondents maintained that opinion. This sharp decline shows the serious morale and despair of a large number of people who are ready to solve problems through non-legislative mechanisms.

Given the fact that the politically active part of the society makes up 25-30% of the total, it can be stated that in 2017, the number of those prone to uprising could be decisive for a change of power, on a relevant occasion. Of course, it would be interesting to see the rates for the previous years to understand the reason for the high rate in 2011, since the “Soviet legacy” could not be displayed so late.

Yet another indicator of the role of power proves that some of the ideas and values of the Soviet era are quite “viable” even after a quarter century. As can be seen from Figure 5, even after 26 years, about 70 percent of the population believes that the government should have a parent role.


Figure 5

The preservation of perceptions and values specific to the Soviet times in wider society deepens distrust towards the authorities, increasing the likelihood of resolving issues through non-constitutional means. At the same time, of particular importance are the changes in public attitudes, both over time and toward different institutions, which are manifested at the structural level of political culture.

Structural level. The data on institutes, obtained through the Caucasus Research Resource Center-Armenia Barometer, can be divided into three groups: public administration, administrative and other institutions. These data are provided in Table 2-4 respectively. One can notice that since 2008 the data has been dramatically changed.

The data recorded at the end of the period under review are comparable to the data presented in Table 1. Therefore, after the revolution of 2018, the general negative statements of various political forces and figures on state government for the last two or three decades have pursued purely political goals, and are far from being substantiated. However, an in-depth analysis of the public opinion polls in Table 1-4 will allow to objectively assess the situation at different periods, to identify the reasons behind the deficiencies and find means to overcome them. To this end, a comparative analysis of


indicators of 1997 and 2015/2017, those of 1997 and 2004/2006, as well as 2017 and 2004/2006 will be presented below. Table 2. State Institutions

Year 1 2 3 4 5

6

2004/06 11,9 7,3 15,9 29,1 33,2 2,4 2008/09 18,5 9,5 19,5 31,5 18,5 4 2010/11 22,5 14,5 26,5 20,5 11 5 2012/13 34,5 14,5 24 17 6 4

President

2015/17 45 19 15,5 12,5 4 4

2004/06 21,8 17 30,2 22,3 5,6 3 2008/09 28,5 17 26,5 20 6 2 2010/11 28 19,5 27,5 14 5 7 2012/13 38,5 19,5 23,5 11 2,5 5

Parliament

2015/17 43 23 17,5 9 2,5 5

2004/06 18,2 17,2 31,7 23 6,3 3,5 2008/09 20 14,5 24 28,5 10 2,5 2010/11 25 19 27 17,5 6,5 6 2012/13 37 18 24,5 13,5 3,5 4,5

Executive government

2015/17 40,5 21 17 13 3,5 4,5 1 - Fully distrust, 2 - Somewhat distrust, 3 - Neither trust not distrust, 4 - Somewhat trust, 5 -Fully trust, 6 - DK/RA

According to the data in Table 1 and Table 2, the distrust of parliament was 38.8 percent in 2004/2006, 67.6 percent in 1997 and 66 percent in 2015/2017. The same is the case both with the government - 35.4 percent in 2004/2006, 56 percent in 1997, 61.5 percent in 2015/2017, and with the President - 19.2 percent in 2004/2006, 64 percent in 2015/2017. There are no data of distrust of the President in 1997, but as noted above, the first president had to resign at the beginning of 1998, and he did not attempt to apply for and receive the support of the society, which after the presidential elections of 1996, has consistently demonstrated deep distrust.


The results of the comparison of Table 1 and Table 3 are also interesting. Indicators on the two administrative institutions - the police and the judiciary - are also presented in Table 1. They show that the trends are the same as wit regarde to public authorities. In 2004/2006, 33.4 percent of respondents did not trust the police, in 2015/2017 it raised to 44 percent, in 1997 to 72 percent. In case of the judiciary, the picture is as follows: in 2004/2006 - 35.8 percent, in 2015/2017 - 51 percent, in 1997 - 66.7 percent. The attitude towards the other three state systems is different. The level of mistrust of healthcare and educational systems has not changed much since the 2000s. In the former case - 31.4 percent in 2004/2006, and 33 percent in 2015/2017, in the latter case - 26 percent in 2004/2006, and 27.5 percent in 2015/2017. The third system, to which trust has even grown, is the army - from 74.3 percent in 2004/2006 to 81 percent in 2015/2017. The reason for this change is obviously the dignified response by the Armenian Armed Forces to the Azerbaijani military aggression in April 2016, which further strengthened the already positive attitude towards the army. The trust in the other two institutions, healthcare and educational systems, has not changed much, as though they are state-run institutions, but have no political implications, unlike the police and judiciary, which are perceived as means of solving various domestic political issues for the government.


Table 3. Governmental Institutions Year 1 2. 3 4 5 6

2004/06 18,8 17 32,8 22,6 5,2 3,5 2008/09 23,5 19 26 20 7 4 2010/11 24 19 25,5 13,5 6 11,5 2012/13 30 18 25 12,5 3,5 10,5

Court system

2015/17 31 20 23,5 12,5 3 10

2004/06 15 16,4 25 30,2 11,5 2,1 2008/09 11,5 12,5 22,5 37 16,5 1 2010/11 15,5 13 38 28,5 13,5 1 2012/13 18,5 14,5 26 31 8 2

Healthcare system

2015/17 17 16 24,5 33 8,5 1

2004/06 11 15 25,4 31,4 14,8 2,4 2008/09 10,5 12 23,5 36,5 15,5 1 2010/11 9 11,5 31 30,5 15 2 2012/13 14 13 24,5 35 9 4

Educational system

2015/17 13 14,5 23 36,5 9,5 3,5

2004/06 16,7 15,7 25,1 30,8 9,2 2,5 2008/09 26,5 16,5 24 21 10,5 1,5 2010/11 24 20 27 16,5 7,5 5 2012/13 25,5 13,5 27,5 23,5 6,5 4

Police

2015/17 27 17 23 23 6,5 4

2004/06 3,9 4,9 14,6 35,9 38,4 2,2 2008/09 5,5 3 8,5 25 58 0,5 2010/11 12 8 12,5 32,5 32,5 2,5 2012/13 11 8 14,5 34 30 2

Army

2015/17 5,5 6,5 8,5 26 51 1 The data in Table 4 are also heterogeneous and need a further interpretation.


Table 4. Other Institutions Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 Political 2004/06 22.3 20 28.9 14.4 3 11.4 Parties 2012/13 35.5 21 27 9 2 6 2015/17 39.5 23 22 8 1,5 6

2004/06 6,8 10,4 27 41,1 12,4 2,2 2008/09 13,5 13,5 35 28,5 8,5 1,5 2010/11 16 14 37,5 24,5 4,5 3,5 2012/13 16,5 16,5 38 23,5 3 2,5

Media

2015/17 16,5 20 35,5 21,5 3 3,5

2004/06 13 10,3 39,1 20,3 8,3 9 2008/09 12 10,5 26,5 27,5 14,5 8,5 2010/11 11,5 9 25,5 22,5 11,5 20 2012/13 15 8,5 29,5 21 9 17,5

Ombudsman

2015/17 14 12 28 22,5 7,5 16,5

2004/06 8 7,8 27,5 23,8 28,5 3,7 2008/09 5 3,5 11,5 22,5 55,5 1,5 2010/11 8 5,5 14,5 28 39 5 2012/13 5,5 3,5 12,5 34 42 3

Religious institutions

2015/17 5,5 5 10,5 28,5 48 2,5

The data regarding the first two indicators for the year of 1997 are also presented in Table 1, which provides for a more complete conclusion. The first of the observed institutions is of systemic importance for the political system, and it is quite reasonable that public distrust of the political parties is the same as that of the state government institutions. In 1997, it exceeded 80 percent, in 2004/2006 it made up 42.3 percent, in 2015/2017 - 62.5 percent. The attitude towards the media is obviously milder, but as an institution directly related to political life and often serving for political purposes, it has the same trends of trust. In 1997, it was equal to 63.8 percent, in 2004/2006 to17.2 percent, in 2015/2017 to 36.5 percent.

The attitude towards the other two institutions in this group is also noteworthy. In the case of the Ombudsman, distrust was almost


unchanged in the 2000s (23.3 percent in 2004/2006, 26 percent in 2015/2017), while in case of religious institutions, it has been quite low (15.8 percent in 2004/2006), and decreased further (10.5 percent in 2015/2017). It is obvious that the public attitude towards the Armenian Apostolic Church is conditioned by its exceptional role as an important component of the Armenian identity, and the last hope under the increase in the general distrust of citizens. Trust in this important national institution is constantly growing (52,3 percent in 2004/2006, 76,5 percent in 2015/2017).

As mentioned above, no data for 1998-2003 is available. However, it is evident that for that period the attitude of the public to the institutions of the above three groups can be estimated by comparing the data of 1997 in Table 1 with those of 2004/2006 for the respective structures listed in Table 2-4.

Table 5 Institutions Don’t trust

1997—2004

Parliament 67,6—38,8

Government 56—35,4 President DK —19,2

Justice 66,7—35,8

Police 67—32,4

Political Parties 80,3—42,3 Media 63,8—17,2

The data in table 5 show that after the change of power in 1998 the distrust in the highest state bodies, the media and even political parties has decreased, whereas since 2008 it has started to grow. Process level: The attitude towards the state policy of Armenia has the same logic as the that towards the highest state bodies. While in 2004 it has a very high level - more than 50 percent of respondents


approved it, in 2008 it started to decline reaching to 30 percent, and in 2009 it was equal to the number of those who disapproved it. In the future, the percentage of the latter among the respondents is constantly increasing, in 2013-2017 it reached to 45-50 percent, whereas the number of those who approved continued to decline and in 2013-2017 reached a minimum of about 8 percent. Figure 6

At the process level, the results of the polls in Figure 7 are also interesting. About 80% of respondents claimed that they had participated in the last elections, but according to data of the Central Election Commission, only 60.9 percent of those voting had cast their ballots. This big difference could be the result of one of the two factors, i.e. either more active citizens who were also more active during the elections agreed to participate in the polls or some of the respondents did not want to report that they had not participated in the elections.


Figure 7

0

20

40

60

80

100

2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2017

Did you vote in the last presidential elections?

Yes No

The answers to the next question relating to elections are interesting as well. The data in Figure 8 present the opinion of the respondents on the fairness of the elections.

Figure 8

According to these data, more than 55 percent of respondents maintained that the elections were either completely fair or somewhat fair. The same opinion was expressed by about 55 percent of respondents after the parliamentary elections of 2012, slightly less than 50 percent of respondents after the presidential elections of 2013,


and 45 percent of respondents after the parliamentary elections of 2017. Meanwhile, after each election, the media, political forces and observers reported vote-buying, as well as pointed out that some political parties offer or promise money, food, gifts or other services and promises in exchange for their votes33.

The problem of democratic development in many countries of this region lies in the fact that many of the institutions formally exist but perform poorly34. The same is true of political processes, which are clearly manifested in Figure 7 and Figure 8 reflecting the process level characterizing civil culture. Conclusion The analysis of sociological surveys conducted in Armenia by several international and regional organizations in 1997-2017 provided an opportunity to identify certain patterns suggesting a possible link between political culture and political processes during the post-Soviet transformation:

1. During the post-Soviet transformation, there were two cases of the change of power/ revolution in Armenia through non-constitutional mechanisms. The first of them took place in 1998, the second - in 2017, and both have been preceded by a deepening distrust in the highest state authorities.

2. According to the results of sociological surveys, the process of post-Soviet transformation in Armenia in 1997-2017, is divided into three stages that overlap with terms of the office of the first three presidents of the country.

3. The absence of data for a certain period of the second phase (1998-2003) has no significant impact on the results of the

33 Parlamentswahl in Armenien. 20 Euro für eine Stimme. http://www.taz.de /5391968/ [Stand-2018-12-15]. 34 Bashkirova Elena, Political Participation in Central and Eastern Europe.Results of the 1999 European Values Surveys, in: Fuchs Dieter, Roller Edeltraud, Weßels Bernhard (Hrsg.), Bürger und Demokratie in Ost und West. Studien zur politischen Kultur und zum politischen Prozess, Wiesbaden. 2002, p. 322.


analysis, since the data for 1997 and 2004 are such that the integrity and validity of the analysis are fully ensured.

4. The study of political culture during the post-Soviet transformation of Armenia in 1997-2017 shows that when public distrust of higher state institutions exceeds 60 percent, public trust in the ability to improve the situation through constitutional mechanisms significantly diminishes, and the change of power through non-constitutional mechanisms becomes quite possible.

5. The results of the three levels of political culture prove that the structural level reflects the public moods and explains the developments, in particular the causes of the change of power/revolutions, while the results of the cultural and process levels, which are more related to democratic values and principles, demonstrate serious shortcomings of the democratization process.

6. To verify the eligibility of the preceding conclusions for other states of post-Soviet transformation, relevant data and analysis are needed for those states. At the same time, it is important to ensure that the surveys are conducted by organizations with reliable research methodology and experience.

7. The importance of conducting such a study with regard to the post-Soviet states is not only conditioned by the need to reveal the logic of what has happened, but also by the possibility of predicting future developments and halting undesirable developments.


DOI: 10.19266/1829-4286-2018-02-31-58 The Possibilities of Post-Legislative Scrutiny in Post-Soviet

Transformation States: The Cases of Moldova and Armenia

GAGIK MINASYAN

Centre of Perspective Researches and Initiatives, Armenia

The article analyzes the possibilities of applying the system of post-legislative scrutiny in the post-Soviet states, which is successfully used in the Western European countries for the improvement of legislation. In the post-Soviet states, the status of the parliament and the particular features of the states are important for the successful functioning of the system. It is shown that the failure of this system in Moldova is due to the fact that these features have been sidelined. The article also studies the prerequisites and possibilities of the application of this system in Armenia.

Keywords Post-legislative scrutiny, laws’ application scrutiny, parliament, Western Europe, Armenia, Moldova

Introduction

After the collapse of the USSR, post-Soviet transformation countries had to find solutions to a number of dilemmas: democracy or authoritarianism, free, competitive or planned economy under strict state control, international relations oriented to a complete integration or isolation?1. The first of them, the choice of the regime, is of crucial importance to those states. It is a long-lasting process and can ensure the effectiveness of the state's functioning in case it leads to the establishment of consolidated democracy. Linz J. and Stepan A. distinguish three dimensions of the process: behavioral, attitudinal and

* The author is grateful to Vahagn Minasyan and Hovhannes Margaryants for the valuable suggestions and comments on the preliminary version of the article. 1 Torosyan T., Post-Soviet Transformation of Social System, Yerevan, 2006, p. 21. (in Armenian)

32 Gagik Minasyan

constitutional (legislative)2. The existence of a consolidated democracy in this or that country can be ensured only by simultaneous provision of the conditions set for those three dimensions. The article studies the possibilities of increasing the effectiveness of the third dimension, i.e. the legislation, the experience in this field, the intermediate results of the suggested solutions, as well as the perspectives of this mechanism in Armenia. The effectiveness of the legislation obviously depends not only on its legal content and problems of application but also on its conformity with the behavioral and attitudinal dimensions within the society. The possibilities of the improvement of legislation and its application, regardless the reason for their incompleteness (technical shortcomings during the law drafting, the problems arising from the change of the situation or the inconsistency connected with the behavioral and attitudinal dimensions) will be observed below. Post-legislative scrutiny is being suggested as an opportunity to have better laws within which the law is considered either good or bad depending on the extent the law meets the defined purpose. Such an assessment is objective, and does not depend on the political assessments of the purpose of the law.

At the end of the 20th century, the main means to solve the problem of the improvement of the legislation was modeling. It implied that in drafting phase the regulating activities and the legislation should be formally and accurately described, deviations from the defined purposes should be found by the model's use and eliminating or preventing provisions should be included in the draft legislation3. In reality, this methodology does not often justify itself due to the complexity and resourcefulness of creating an accurate model4. Since the first decade of the 21st century, more countries are considering post-legislative scrutiny as an important means of solving

2 Linz J., Stepan A., Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 20-21. 3 Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Post-legislative scrutiny. Practices, experiences and recommendations. IPP and CESS, January 2017, pp. 9-10. 4 Ibid.


the problem5. This implies that a while after the legislation’s application the regulatory activity is being examined, the deviations from the defined purpose are detected and corrective formulations are added in the legislation. This approach requires less resources, is more practical, and more countries adopt it as a means of having better laws over time6. In many countries, post-legislative scrutiny is one of the most important functions of a state7. For instance, in France, Sweden and Switzerland, the responsibility of its implementation is fixed by the Constitution8. The scrutiny is a constitutional requirement for Armenia as well, and constitute one of the three functions of the Parliament9. According to the Constitutional Law of RA on the “Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly”, the scrutiny of the implementation process of the laws is the component of this function exercised by the parliament which is vested on standing committees10. Still, as in several post-Soviet transformation countries, this function is not yet formalized in Armenia. Due to the limited experience and imperfect culture of the elaboration and application of the legislation, there is a strong need of formalization and improvement of legislative scrutiny in these countries with the consideration of their peculiarities. The purpose of this article is to reveal and formulate those peculiarities, find out the manifestations they can have during post-legislative scrutiny, analyze the results of its application and perspectives of improvement in Moldova, as well as the possibilities for its implementation in Armenia. In professional literature, the general definition of post-legislative scrutiny is the following: “Post- legislative scrutiny is a systematic program of a legal framework 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 De Vrieze F., Hasson V., Post-Legislative Scrutiny. Comparative Study of Practices of Post-Legislative Scrutiny in Selected Parliaments and the Rationale for its Place in Democracy Assistance. WFD, 2017, pp. 14-40. 8 De Vrieze F., Ex-Post Evaluation of Legislation. How is ExPEL conducted in different European countries? WFD, Armenia Parliament - UK Study visit. September 2018, pp. 14-16. 9 Constitution of RA, article 88. 10 Constitutional Law of RA. “Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly”, article 122.

34 Gagik Minasyan

review against clearly defined political objectives, taking into consideration the costs and benefits, in order to ensure that the legal acts remain up to date, are cost-justified, cost-effective and match the needs. The evaluation includes analysis of economic, social and environmental impacts. It is based on both quantitative and qualitative analyses, including assessments, analyses and research, studies, reports and statistical data”11.

Post-legislative scrutiny, the implementation of which often reveals the necessity of establishment or revision of the legislation, is now considered to be one of the following five components of the legislative process:

1. necessity of the establishment or revision of legislation, 2. legislative proposal, 3. discussion and adoption in the parliament, 4. application by the government, 5. post-legislative scrutiny.12

The expressions “post-legislative scrutiny” and “ex-post evaluation of legislation”, accepted in English-language literature, have their Armenian translations, while in the Armenian legislation oversight over the process of implementation of laws is already a fixed wording for these functions (hereinafter, LIO)13. It should be noted that the LIO includes both post-legislative scrutiny and oversight over the unconditional application of laws and the fulfillment of law's requirements by state bodies and their officials. Still, staying close to the Armenian legislation, instead of the expressions "post-legislative scrutiny” and “ex-post evaluation of legislation”, the wording LIO will be used.

11 Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Op. cit., p. 24. 12 De Vrieze F., Ex-Post …, Op. cit., p. 4 13 Constitutional Law of RA. “Rules of…”.


Monitoring of the law application and the evaluation of results, the parliament's role in their realization, the perspectives of the law improvement through the LIO

Monitoring of the law application and the evaluation of results. The elaboration process of legislative initiative starts with defining the purpose. That is the vision of new reality which is expected to replace the regulated old reality through such an initiative. A new reality must be formed as a result of the application of laws, stemmed from the vision of a new reality, and, if necessary, sub-legislative acts towards the old reality. The comparison of a new reality and the vision of it are realized through the LIO (Figure 1). If there are contradictions, the LIO should enable to disclose their reasons and to formulate the proposals on their elimination.

By nature, the reasons for the discrepancy between the new reality and the vision of the new reality are divided into two groups:

1. the law and the sub-legislative acts are not appropriately applied,

2. the law and the sub-legislative acts do not provide the correspondence of a new reality to its vision.

36 Gagik Minasyan

Figure 1

The discrepancy between the vision of a new reality and the new reality itself is revealed successively by the LIO toolkit. First, the reasons for the inconsistency of the first group are disclosed and eliminated. If the inconsistency is still kept, the reasons for the discrepancy of the second group are disclosed and eliminated. The solution of the problems related to the disclosure and elimination of

Vision of a new reality

Elaboration and launching of a new legislation

Creation of a new reality

Comparison of the new reality and the vision of the new reality

Old reality

Vision of a new reality

Elaboration and launching of a new legislation

Creation of a new reality

Comparison of the new reality and the vision of the new reality

Old reality


the causes in the first and second groups, is carried out accordingly by means of monitoring the application of the law and evaluating the results of the law.

By means of monitoring the application of the law, the legal and technical problems related to the application of it are observed, detected and regulated14, the answers to the following questions are provided:

Is the legislation working out as intended? Are the provisions of the law valid? Has all the necessary sub-legislation been provided? Is the legislation in line with the Constitution, other laws, and

international commitments? Are there any court decisions or judicial procedure concerning

the legislation? Is there a body authorized to apply the legislation? Have the relevant target groups been informed about the

legislation?15 By means of evaluating the results of the law, the economic,

social, environmental and other issues, connected with the application of the law, are detected, the unexpected consequences are revealed as a result of the law application16, the answers to the following questions are provided:

Have the economic, social and environmental policy expectations been realized?

14 De Vrieze F., Hasson V.,Op. cit., p. 12.; UK Law Commission. Post legislative scrutiny (LAW COM No 303). UK Law Commission, September 2006, p. 7; De Vrieze F., Principles of Post-Legislative Scrutiny by Parliaments. WFD, January 2018, p. 6. 15 De Vrieze F., Ex-Post Evaluation of Legislation. Principles and Practical Steps for Parliament. WFD, Armenia Parliament - UK Study visit, September 2018. p. 2., De Vrieze F., Post-Legislative Scrutiny. Guide for Parliaments. WFD, November 2017, pp. 11-12 16 Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P.,Op. cit., p. 9-10; UK Law Commission. Post legislative scrunity. A consultation paper (Consultation Paper No 178). UK Law Commission, December 2005, p. 31.

38 Gagik Minasyan

Have the expenses, conditioned with law, been made effectively?

Is it possible to improve the application of law and the outcomes arising from it?

Is it possible to draw lessons and point out the best experience?17

The role of the parliament in the LIO process. Parliaments generally implement both the monitoring of the application of law and the evaluation of the results of law. During the monitoring of the law application, the fulfillment of the basic requirements, presented to the legislation, is studied for which relatively small capacities and resources are required as contrary to the evaluation of the results of law.

Three statuses of the parliament within the LIO implementation process are generally distinguished:

1. Passive supervisor: there is no parliamentary strong governance in the process, there is no monitoring of the application of the law or evaluation of the results of the law by the parliament, the conclusions of the oversight are based on the reports of the government or independent agencies. In Germany, Belgium, Estonia and Moldova, in particular, parliaments have such a status in the process of the LIO implementation.

2. Non-formal supervisor: the parliament plays a more active role in the process, there are special structures, research and assessment departments, but there is no systematic linkage of the process with the formal parliamentary procedures. Particularly, in Italy and Montenegro parliaments have such a status in the LIO implementation process.

3. Formal supervisor: the process is carried out by the parliamentary bodies in a formal and highly institutionalized

17 De Vrieze F., Post-Legislative…, Op. cit., pp. 11-12; De Vrieze F., Ex-Post Evaluation of Legislation. Principles, Op. cit., p. 2; Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Op. cit., pp. 9-10.


manner, is based on legal regulations, is supported by specific procedures and includes both the monitoring of the application of the law and the evaluation of the results of the law. Particularly in France, Sweden and Switzerland, parliaments have such a status in the LIO process18.

As contrary to the status of passive and non-formal supervisors, that of formal supervisor provides greater opportunities for the parliament to implement the LIO effectively. Meanwhile, this status supposes active participation of political bodies throughout the whole process of the LIO implementation19. This is a serious challenge, in the case of not overcoming which, discussions of political nature can distract the LIO from the realization of its objectives, and seriously undermine the entire process of oversight. In the light of this challenge, the inclusion of relevant regulations in the LIO methodology gains particular importance. However, it is obvious that the political culture of the country implementing the LIO is of crucial importance, which the choice of the parliament’s status in that process should be guided by. It is remarkable that the professional community has adopted an approach of the LIO process not serving the political goals and ignoring party interests in the LIO implementation20.

The LIO implementation is a complex process dealing with the functions and departmental interests of many state bodies. In that sense, it is obvious that the parliament should have a necessary status and responsibilities in the LIO process. It should be noted that while implementing the LIO, good results can be expected only in case there is coordinated and active participation of both the parliament and the other parties involved in the process, such as the government, independent commissions, experts, professional and civil society organizations, beneficiaries and citizens21. The more clearly and by the

18 De Vrieze F., Ex-Post …, Op. cit., pp. 7-17․ 19 De Vrieze F., Ex-Post …, Op. cit., p. 17. 20 De Vrieze F., Principles ..., Op. cit., p. 10; De Vrieze F., Ex-Post ..., Op. cit., p. 6; De Vrieze F., Hasson V., Op. cit., pp. 14-15. 21 De Vrieze F., Principles …, Op. cit., pp. 10-11; De Vrieze F., Ex-Post …, Op. cit., p. 8.

40 Gagik Minasyan

higher legal act is fixed the responsibility of the parliament to implement the LIO and the role of other state bodies in that process, the more realistic is the full-fledged implementation of the LIO. A clear establishment of the responsibilities of state bodies is particularly important in cases the law of the LIO process has sub-legislative acts. To effectively implement the LIO, they should also be included in the process, and therefore the parliament should have legal bases either to oversight over the application of sub-legislative acts on its own or to delegate it to the relevant body of the executive power22.

In terms of the LIO implementation, it is also important for the bases of the oversight to be described clearly in legal terms. In this respect, it is effective to fix the requirement for the oversight of the law in its text. Technically, this is usually done in one of the following two ways:

1. In the section of the transitional provisions of the law, it is fixed that the body, responsible for the application of the law, is obliged to submit to the parliament a reference on the application of the law or some of its provisions after the application of the law (three to five year-term is usually defined23). Such a reference becomes a basis for the parliament to implement the LIO in respect of that law. In case of a short timetable for submitting the reference, the information it provides may be insufficient to formulate a right conclusion on the application of the law24.

2. A certain deadline is set for the law or some of its provisions (sunset law25) after which they cease to function unless the parliament makes another decision26. In order to avoid the undesirable consequences, arisen from the cessation of these provisions' action, the government usually submits to the

22 De Vrieze F., Principles…, Op. cit., pp. 6-7. 23 De Vrieze F., Post-Legislative …, Op. cit., p. 8 24 De Vrieze F., Principles …, Op. cit., p. 12. 25 Sharma R., et al. Expert report on the implementation of ex-post evaluations. Good practice and experience in other countries. Progons, December 2013, p. 40 26 De Vrieze F., Principles …, Op. cit., p. 4.


parliament a legislative initiative either on maintaining the existing regulations of the law (sunset delay) or on changing of the specified provisions of the law. The discussion process of this legislative initiative allows the parliament to request and receive data on the application of the law or the corresponding provisions of the law from the government, on the basis of which to implement the LIO27 and to make a decision about the further action of the law28.

The LIO process can also start with the responsibility to monitor the application of the law and to evaluate the results of the law. This possibility may also be useful when there is not any above-mentioned mechanism for the launch of the LIO.

Another possibility of a launch is the scrutiny implementation as a result of the study of the received impulses from the law beneficiaries, deputies, professional and civil society organizations, citizens29.

For the LIO implementation, the parliaments either create special committees empowering them to exercise the monitoring of the application of laws and to evaluate the results30, or the relevant leading committees, that elaborated the given legislation, are vested with this responsibility31. The latter option has an obvious advantage: law scrutiny is implemented by a committee which is well aware of the course of action of the law and has made changes in that law32.

The monitoring of the application of law and the evaluation of its results require a substantial strengthening of the institutional and organizational capacities of the parliament. In particular, the requirements on the knowledge and skills of the parliamentary staff are considerably increasing to provide effective support to deputies. Therefore, the parliament should have an opportunity to involve the 27 UK Government. Sunsetting Regulations: Guidance. UK Government, March 2011, p. 9. 28 De Vrieze F., Post-Legislative …, Op. cit., p.15. 29 De Vrieze F., Principles…, Op. cit., p. 5. 30 De Vrieze F., Post-Legislative …,Op. cit., p. 18. 31 Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Op. cit., pp. 5-8. 32 Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Op. cit., pp. 12-15.

42 Gagik Minasyan

extra-parliamentarian professional capacities in the LIO implementation33. In some countries, a specialized subdivision is being established in the staff of the parliament to assist in the effective implementation of the functions related to the LIO34. It ensures the effective utilization of resources, as those, required for the standard functions of the LIO implementation, are not provided to each committee but are centralized in a specialized subdivision providing relevant services to all committees and substantially empowers their capacities35.

Such a specialized subdivision may have, among others, the following responsibilities in the LIO process:

to support the committees during the LIO planning and implementation,

to choose external experts and sign contracts, to implement preliminary analysis based on the commissions’

applications, to conduct researches within the LIO framework, to ensure the contact with the bodies applying legal acts, to evaluate the quality assurance, to process evaluation criteria of research and analysis, as well

as scrutiny methodology.36 The possibilities of law improvement through the LIO. The

LIO makes sure that the legislation functions out as intended, the beneficiaries are properly informed, the changes, envisaged by the legislation, have been made, the strategy objectives have been implemented. If any of these problems is not addressed, the causes are detected by the LIO and an opportunity is created for their elimination. Furthermore, the LIO has one more important mission - the improvement of the legislation under scrutiny by the use of the 33 De Vrieze F., Post-Legislative …, Op. cit., 8; Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Op. cit., pp. 12-15. 34 OECD, Evaluating Laws and Regulations. The Case of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. OECD, May 2012, p. 26. 35 OECD, …, Op. cit., p. 27. 36 Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Op. cit., pp. 12-15.


obtained information in the result of the implementation of scrutiny functions37. The main question concerning the monitoring of the application of law is whether legislation is working out as it was intended. The other six questions, describing the monitoring of the application of law, aim to discover the reason or the reasons as a result of which the law does not function the way it was intended to. The analysis of these questions may reveal that the problem is in the incorrect formulations that have been crept into the text of the law during its drafting process. In such instances, the LIO should regulate the problems of the law improvement.

However, even if the answers to the above-mentioned six questions of the monitoring of the law application are positive and there are no inaccuracies crept into the text of the law, the law may act not the way it was intended to. Moreover, in the field of the given law regulation, the monitoring of the application of law, held several years ago, may register, that the law acted as intended, while after some years it may register that it does not act as such. This can have both objective and subjective reasons. An objective reason can be the change of the realities in the field of the law regulation in the course of time, as a result of which the legal act may lose its modernity and may not ensure the regulatory role, with all the negative effects deriving from it. Obviously, after the loss of its modernity, even the most meticulous implementation of that legal act may not ensure the rise of the regulation effectiveness in the field of the legal act's function. In such instances, the effectiveness of public, including financial capacities will also be low. It is impossible to expect that the mentioned problem will be revealed and solved by implementing the LIO towards the changed laws, as the loss of the modernity of a legal act due to a change of reality, may also occur in the areas where the regulating laws have not been changed for a long time. In a course of time, the changing reality and the requirement for the legislation to comply with the reality, oblige a regular disclosure of the legal acts, which have lost their modernity, and elaboration and application of 37 De Vrieze F., Hasson V., Op. cit., p. 13.

44 Gagik Minasyan

moderate legal acts instead of them. An effective way to solve this problem may be the regular monitoring of the application of law and, if necessary, the improvement of law.

A subjective reason for the law not to operate the way it was intended may be the problems with those who apply the law. Their control is beyond the scope of the LIO field; the parliament deals with them using other instruments of control. However, it should be noted that the oversight by the parliament over the activities of those who apply the law, such as state bodies, officials, being beyond the scope of the LIO, often creates signals for the LIO implementation. The opposite is true as well: the LIO implementation may provide grounds for the scrutiny of activities of those who apply the law. It is also necessary to state that meeting the LIO requirements is a necessary but insufficient condition for the law to function as intended.

The Peculiarities of LIO in Post-Soviet Transformation Countries

The experience of different countries proves that there is no universal approach to the LIO implementation38. This is not only due to the LIO’s 20-year history but also the peculiarities of the countries applying this system. As it is presented in the observation of the status of parliaments in the LIO process, the approaches vary among different European countries. Apparently, in a series of post-Soviet transformation countries, the LIO implementation policy can not automatically repeat the experience of Western European countries.

The differences between the state of legislations in Western European and post-Soviet transformation countries. The legislation in Western European countries, which has consistently been formulated for decades and has periodically been adjusted by the imposing imperatives stemmed from reality, has been consistent with the existing realities, with some reservations. The strong democratic traditions in those countries have also played an important role in such

38 De Vrieze F., Victoria Hasson V., Op. cit., pp. 14-40; De Vrieze F., Post-Legislative…, Op. cit., pp. 7-11.


a harmony of reality and legislation. That is why no radical changes are made in the laws in force in those countries while implementing the LIO. The results of the studies devoted to the suggestions on the improvement of legislation by the UK House of Commons and House of Lords are remarkable. The researchers noted that the realization of suggestions by both houses does not require major legislative amendments and that most of them concern the review of sub-legislative acts39. Given the experience of post-Soviet transformation countries in lawmaking, which differs significantly from that of the Western European countries, it can be assumed that there will be a large number of suggestions on the improvement of legislation in these countries, most of which of significant importance. In this sense, it is obvious that the post-Soviet transformation countries have more and valid reasons to implement the LIO than the Western European countries.

The status of parliament in the LIO process and the legal regulations. The choice of the legal regulation of the LIO implementation and one of the three formats of parliament’s role (the status of passive, informal, or formal supervisor) in that process is largely conditioned by the culture of relationships between state bodies, as well as the tradition of parliamentary oversight in a given country. Given the fact that those traditions are not yet fully formed in post-Soviet transformation countries, it is evident that in order to have an effective LIO system, it is necessary for all the bodies to be involved in the LIO process, to have legally defined responsibilities, and for the parliament to have the status of formal supervisor in the LIO process. The choice of the other options may be problematic from the standpoint of the LIO’s effective implementation.

The issue of the capacities required for the LIO implementation. The proper implementation of LIO requires time, organizational and financial strong capacities, harmonious and 39 De Vrieze F., Ex-Post Evaluation of Legislation. Introduction to Ex-Post Evaluation of Legislation (ExPEL) in a national parliament. How is Post-Legislative Scrutiny conducted in the UK? WFD, Armenia Parliament - UK Study visit, September 2018, p. 22.

46 Gagik Minasyan

professional work of state bodies involved in the process, as well as conscious public demand for the process. The solution to these problems is not easy even for some Western European countries with strong capacities, developed legislation, established cooperation between state bodies and traditions of a consolidated democracy40. In post-Soviet transformation countries, the introduction of LIO system is obviously related to the complex problem of stronger capacities and efforts involvement.

Should the limited resources be used for the monitoring of the application of law or the evaluation of the results of law? The amount of the resources required for the LIO implementation depends on what the research covers. In case of limited resources, it is more effective to implement LIO for a small number of important laws (even only for a single code) rather than to oversight over a large number of laws41. This approach is quite justified for the countries with consolidated legislations, while it is problematic for post-Soviet transformation countries for the reasons below:

the problem of attracting necessary capacities and resources for the LIO implementation is more difficult in those countries;

there can be no guarantee in a country with consolidating legislation, that the only code, which has passed the LIO, will not undergo significant changes within a few years interrupting the work already done;

the monitoring of the application of a large number of laws will meet the expectations of more beneficiaries.

To summarize, it can be noted, that in post- Soviet transformation countries:

the effective implementation of the LIO over the legislation is a necessity;

the processes connected with the LIO implementation becomes essentially complicated due to the peculiarities of the formation of legislation and political culture;

40 De Vrieze F., p. 12; De Vrieze F., Principles…, Op. cit., p. 6. 41 De Vrieze F., Principles…, Op. cit., p. 6.


the responsibilities of all the bodies involved in the LIO process must be clearly defined in legal terms, and the parliament should have the status of formal supervisor;

Given the capacities of state bodies and their supporting structures involved in the process, the peculiarities of the methodology regulating the process and that of the formation of legislation as well as the untested situation, it would be effective to carry out the implementation of LIO in two stages, exercising only the monitoring of the implementation of law at the first stage,

the goal of the first stage should be not only the monitoring of the application of the law but also the capacity building for the evaluation of the results of the law, the formation of conscious demand of the beneficiaries for the LIO investment,

It would be effective to start the large-scale implementation of the evaluation of the results of law with the solutions of the problems in the first stage, at least once after the monitoring of the law application over all the legislation (with reasonable exceptions) and the reduction of elemental changes of legislation.

The Experience of Moldova in the Elaboration and Launching of the LIO System As already mentioned, the LIO system has been developed and applied in countries with consolidated democratic traditions. Consequently, this practice may not be sufficient for the introduction of this system in post-Soviet transformation countries having certain peculiarities. That is why the experience of states sharing more common features, is much more useful. In this sense, the experience of Moldova is more useful for post-Soviet transformation countries and, particularly, for Armenia, as there are a series of generalities of key importance with that country. Similar to Armenia, it has a parliamentary system of government, is a member of the Council of

48 Gagik Minasyan

Europe, is not a member of the EU but is involved in the Eastern Partnership program, is in the "third group" of post-Soviet transformation42, has equatable indicators in terms of political and economic reforms, etc. Meanwhile, there are also some differences the most obvious of which is the level of relations with the European Union. Armenia has signed the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in 201743, whereas Moldova has signed Association Agreement in 201444, which, among the other goals, envisages an adoption of a large number of legislative acts and their LIO implementation. Though, it should be noted that the comparative analysis with Georgia and Ukraine having signed such agreements in 2015 shows that Armenia does not concede in any essential question; in some cases it is even a step forward45.

Since 2016, the preparations for the introduction of the LIO system have started and the first results of its operation are already visible. According to the rules of procedure of the parliament, a special commission has been set up, which, with the support of the secretariat of the parliament and other standing committees, implements monitoring of the application of legal acts, determines its effectiveness, offers recommendations to the executive, and, if necessary, introduces a report to the parliament six months after the entry of the legal act into force46. In the process of the LIO implementation in Moldova, the parliament has the weakest status out

42 Torosyan T., Sukiasyan H., Three Stages, Three Groups and Three Paradigms of Post-Soviet Transformation, Armenian Journal of Political Science, 2014, 1, 51-61. 43 Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part (not yet in force), OJ L 23, 26.01.2018, pp. 4–466, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:22018A0126(01)&qid=1523193570030 (15.02.2018). 44 EU-Moldova Association Agreement, www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/moldova/pdf/quick_guide_eu_md_aa_en.pdf. 45 Delcour L., Wolchuk K., The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s Europeanisation, Journal of European Integration, 2015, 37 (4), 1-17. 46 Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Op. cit., p. 16.


of the three possible ones, i.e. the status of passive supervisor. The choice of the weaker status of the parliament is due to the most serious problem, specific to the post-Soviet transformation countries and preventing their development, namely the limited parliamentary capacity as a result of non-consolidated multiparty system. The study of the experience of Moldova in the implementation of LIO system proves the ineffectiveness of this status of the parliament. In particular, the following reasons preventing the effectiveness of the LIO are mentioned in the study47:

1. The Rules of Procedure do not envisage a mandatory assessment of the results of law. The six-month period is too short to evaluate the application effect of the law.

2. The standing committees of the parliament do not have a clear division of legislative and oversight activities. There is not any provision on the responsibility of the standing committees in the LIO process.

3. The provisions on the parliamentary oversight of the regulation are interpreted as voluntary but not mandatory authorization. The Rules of Procedure contain a number of provisions which extend the possibilities of the LIO implementation by the parliament, but are not used.

4. The practice in the legislative body keeps the parliamentarians back from the evaluation and revision processes of the adopted laws. After the adoption of the legislation, it does not return to the parliament's attention, the sectorial legal framework and implementation of legislation are not considered to be important.

5. The insufficient quality of the commissions’ specialists do not promote an effective LIO implementation.

6. Problems conditioned by the relationship between the parliament and the executive:

The existing laws, with some exceptions, do not contain special norms about submitting reports on the application of

47 Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Op. cit., pp. 21-22.

50 Gagik Minasyan

the law to the parliament by the government or other bodies. It leads to the factual absence of parliamentary oversight.

The parliamentary oversight is limited by the discussions of annual reports submitted by different authorities in line with the law's requirement. The reports, submitted by the executive, are not related to the application of the sectoral legislation and its consequences and are not discussed in details in standing committees of the parliament or plenary sessions.

The executive is not obliged to and is not interested in applying to the legislative with any issue other than the adoption of laws or budget.

This distorted situation does not contribute to the formation of mutual trust and favorable conditions of effective cooperation between the legislative and executive. Such relationships cannot contribute to the formation of the law supremacy system based on the actual application of the principles of democratic government.

In order to solve these problems, the authors of the study offer to:

replenish the Rules of Procedure and the Law on drafting the legislation with specific procedures on mandatory and periodic implementation of both the monitoring of the application of law and the evaluation of its results, as well as regularly evaluate the compliance of the sub-legislative acts with the legislation adopted by the parliament,

determine the assessment functions of the quality of legislative framework, concerning corresponding areas, as well as of the monitoring of the law application and the evaluation of results in the competence of the standing committees,

draft and approve a Parliamentary Action Plan on the parliamentary oversight which should include specific actions related to planning and making assessments on the effectiveness of the implementation of legislation, as well as


draft an annual report on the oversight by each standing committee,

set mandatory requirement for the rules of results’ assessment of the adopted laws,

elaborate and approve LIO methodology for the study and assessment of the impact of the legislation, the requirements on the assessment reports, as well as for the actions followed by the assessment,

include the organization and coordination of the LIO in the functions of the secretariat.48

Though the realization of these suggestions may improve the situation to some extent, the study reveals that the authors did not fully consider the peculiarities of Moldova. The suggestions should stem from the approach that the transplantation of the LIO system should be carried out taking into consideration the existing realities. In that sense, it would be right to complete the above-mentioned suggestions with the following ones:

1. The Association Agreement between Moldova and the EU conditioned the LIO introduction49, however, it was necessary to create a conscious demand on the application of the LIO system among the parliament, government, professional community and civil society before the drafting of the LIO system. The existence of such a demand would essentially promote the LIO introduction, elaboration, and launching.

2. Change the status of the parliament in the LIO process from the passive to the formal supervisor which will give the parliament additional legal bases for the efficient implementation of LIO. Such a change is also justified with the fact that Moldova is a country with a parliamentary system of government.

3. Within the framework of parliament-government relations, considering especially the difficulties of attracting the

48 Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Op. cit., pp. 22-23. 49 Pîntea I., Vanhoutte P., Op. cit., pp. 5-8.

52 Gagik Minasyan

capacities and resources necessary for the evaluation of the results of laws, it is not realistic to expect the effectiveness of the assessment of the law application results in the first stage of the LIO system transplantation. It will be effective to carry out the monitoring of the application of laws shortly after the introduction of the system. Under necessary conditions, the evaluation of the results of the law can be carried out as well.

The Possibilities of LIO Implementation in Armenia The legislation of Armenia has been shaped over the past three decades in accordance with the general patterns of the formation of legislation in post-Soviet transformation countries. Therefore, the creation of preconditions for the introduction, elaboration and operation of LIO system in Armenia is imperative. There is an important legislative background for the introduction of this system in Armenia. The article 122 of the “Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly” RA Constitutional Law states: "Standing committees implement parliamentary oversight over the process of implementation of laws". This formulation addresses two principal questions for the LIO implementation: first, LIO implementation in Armenia is a responsibility envisaged by the law; second, parliament is the subject implementing LIO through its standing committees.

Nine standing committees in the National Assembly of the sixth convocation of the Republic of Armenia operated up to 2018. There were 334 operating laws in Armenia at that time, not counting the laws which were not considered in the LIO implementation process (laws having limited significance in terms of time and effect50). Each of the laws has its own parliamentary head committee, which, in particular, is responsible for making amendments to the law. From the point of view of being the head, the laws were distributed between the standing committees according to Table 1.

50 De Vrieze F., Post-Legislative ..., Op. cit., p. 12.


Table 1

The Committee on Law

Economic Affairs 89

State and Legal Affairs and Protection of Human Rights. 84

Territorial Administration, Local Self-Government, Agriculture and Environment

53

Defense and Security 30

Financial-Credit and Budgetary Affairs 29

Science, Education, Culture, Youth and Sport 23

Health Care and Social Affairs 22

Foreign Relations 4

European Integration 0

Total 334

The Assembly of the seventh convocation, which has started its activity since January 2019, increased the number of standing committees with two additional ones: the Standing Committee on Regional and Eurasian Integration was separated from the Standing Committee on Economic Affairs, and the Standing Committee on

54 Gagik Minasyan

Protection of Human Rights and Public Affairs was separated from the Standing Committee on State and Legal Affairs and Protection of Human Rights. These changes, along with the solution of other problems, will somewhat mitigate the difference between the standing committees depending on how many laws the following committee is the head.

Before the large-scale implementation of the LIO in Armenia, a few preparatory issues need to be resolved:

organizing events in the parliament and government which will form a conscious demand for the LIO. Its formation is also important among the professional community and civil society;

forming the vision of the LIO system, elaborating and adopting the legislation stemming from this vision based on formal supervisor's status of the parliament in the LIO process and clearly fixing the responsibilities all the bodies involved in the process;

creating the LIO support subdivision in the stuff of the parliament;

elaborating and adopting a methodology for the implementation of the LIO;

elaborating and adopting a guide for the LIO implementation; implementing LIO pilot project, analyzing the project results,

making appropriate corrections, promulgating the positive experience, developing a conscious demand towards the system among different levels of society51.

Taking into consideration the above-mentioned justifications, it / The main provisions of the LIO implementation methodology: The introduction, elaboration, and application of the LIO system is coordinated by the National Assembly Council, which:

creates conditions for solving the preparatory issues of the LIO introduction;

51 De Vrieze F., Post-Legislative ..., Op. cit., p. 8.


determines the allotted time for the monitoring of the law application;

discusses the issues related to the LIO at least once in each session;

declares about the launch of the law application monitoring program, assesses the results of its implementation after the project is completed, creates conditions for the development of the LIO system.

The head standing committee of the National Assembly which implements the monitoring of the law application

establishes the timetable of the monitoring of the application of laws by sessions;

at the beginning of each session publishes the list of the laws subject to monitoring in the next session, expecting suggestions about the improvement of the application of those laws from the parliamentarians, law beneficiaries, executive power, professional and civil society representatives, citizens during that session;

discusses the suggestions, made in the previous session, about the monitoring of the application of laws during parliamentary hearings and summarizes their results in its session;

can apply to the body responsible for the law application, suggesting to ensure the necessary conditions for application of law;

if the received suggestion on the monitoring of the application of the laws concerns the issue of the compliance of sub-legislative act with the legislation, the suggestion is either passed to the executive or the representative of the executive is invited to the committee meeting when discussing the question;

establishes a working group if the monitoring of the application of a law reveals the necessity of making changes in the law;

56 Gagik Minasyan

at the end of each session submits a report to the NA Council about the work in the field of the laws application monitoring implemented during that session.

The LIO subdivision of the stuff supporting organizes the work.

The expected outcomes of the LIO system launching in Armenia are:

advanced detection and elimination of the imperfections of laws and sub-legislative acts,

advanced detection and elimination of the problems connected with the application of laws and sub-legislative acts,

increasing the effectiveness of the use of public resources, including financial ones,

strengthening the role of the parliament as the author of draft laws,

creation of a new culture and a new platform of decision making,

formation of an inclusive system of the legislative activity.

The chart of the law application monitoring by the parliament is shown in Figure 2.


Figure 2

Suggestions

Improvement of laws and sub-legislative acts

Parliament

LIO

Improvement of the application of the laws

Laws

58 Gagik Minasyan

Conclusion

1. The issue of increasing the effectiveness of legislation in post-Soviet transformation countries is of special importance as the difficulties of its implementation are due to the essential characteristics of those countries and are the main obstacles on the way of those states consolidation;

2. Like the solution of the other problems, the elaboration and implementation of the legislation and the system of its improvement (LIO system) requires taking into account the peculiarities of a given country, i.e. the formal distribution of the powers between the institutions of state government and the real experience, the existence of a conscious demand for the LIO implementation, knowledge and experience of drafting and application of legislation and so on;

3. As the case of Moldova shows, the peculiarities of post-Soviet transformation countries need not the mechanical replication of the western experience but special approaches while introducing the LIO system, since their absence may condemn the process to failure;

4. There are legal bases for the LIO system application in Armenia: the constitution defines the oversight as one of the functions of the parliament, and the “Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly” constitutional law provides the oversight over the law implementation to the relevant parliamentary head committee;

5. The application of the LIO system in Armenia may succeed in case of using the approaches and suggestions presented in the article, as they take into account the Western European practice, as well as the problems in Moldova and peculiarities of Armenia.


CONFLICT RESOLUTION DOI: 10.19266/1829-4286-2018-02-59-78

The Classification of Variables in Comparative Study of Conflicts

MARGARIT PETROSYAN Yerevan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences, Armenia

The article analyzes the problem of selection of a set of variables in comparative study of conflicts since it is important not only to clarify the methods used in the study, but also to select the set of variables which mostly depends on the research problem. The right choice of the variables is of crucial importance as the wrong choice may often lead to wrong conclusions and the wrong policy formulation; the research can present a completely different picture. For comparative analysis of conflicts, different sets of variables are distinguished each of which is applicable only to a particular case. The article attempts to form a set of variables applicable not only to a specific case, but also to a comparative analysis of conflicts in general by increasing the effectiveness of comparative studies of conflicts. Keywords variables, database, comparative analysis, model, conflicts The short-term optimism on the effectiveness of conflict resolution processes in the late 1980s and early 1990s was based on the belief that the end of controversies between superpowers will lead to the establishment of new world order simultaneously stimulating and initiating "economic globalization". There was an opinion1 that the establishment of free market relations, the elimination of economic barriers, and the process of privatization will strengthen the interconnection between states and will facilitate the process of interstate relations development. All this was expected to undermine the substantial basis of ethnic disputes, and these conflicts would no

1 Collier P., Elliot V., Hegre H., Hoeffler A., Reynal-Querol M., Sambanis N., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank, Oxford University Press, Washington, 2003.

60 Margarit Petrosyan

longer turn into civil wars2. However, further processes came to prove that the number of international conflicts will not be reduced in the near future, and will in some cases lead to the emergence of new clashes in the most active parts of the Eurasian Center, i.e. the Middle East, the South Caucasus, the Balkans, etc. The analysis of the conflict settlement processes and the forecasts based on it can have a serious impact on preventing further confrontations or at least the development of conflict towards the military stage. That is why more and more importance is being attached to the comparative analysis of conflicts to reveal the processes that have a positive or negative impact on the settlement process, the possibilities of raising the effectiveness of mediation, etc. Different mechanisms and models have been proposed for comparative studies of international conflicts, but it is not always possible to predict the rise and development of conflicts drawing upon these models. This is due to an inadequate formalization of the problem, and in particular, the formation of a non-complete range of variables used in the analysis. These models sometimes lack a series of factors, processes and events having a direct or indirect impact on conflict development. This distorts not only the real picture, but also the conclusions derived.

Changes in Conflict Regulation Field after Cold War The main goal of peaceful regulation of conflicts is to avoid violence and to prevent further clashes between parties to the conflict. Negotiations between parties are used as a tool serving not merely for the purpose of conflict resolution. It covers a range of other aspects, among which education, inter-agency meetings, intercultural contacts, etc3. The low level of confidence leads the regulation process to a deadlock. It brings forth the following dilemma: parties to the conflict

2 Tiryakian E., Introduction: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 2004, 45 (3–4), 147–159. 3 Babbit E., The Evolution of International Conflict Resolution: From Cold War to Peacebuilding, Negotiation Journal, Fall 2009, 539-549.


can not start the reconciliation process without certain degree of mutual trust, but they can not trust the other party before engaging in peace process4.

Geopolitical shifts after the Cold War require the "change and clarification" of the knowledge accumulated in conflict regulation field, as the "international conflict" is no longer an interstate conflict. Conflicts between states and non-state groups are more frequent nowadays, and these internal contradictions are viewed as a threat to global security. In addition, the international community starts to intervene in internal conflicts in which one or more parties to the conflict violate such "universal norms" as the right of people’s to self-determination, human rights, principles of democratic governance, etc5. In that case, international groups and committees interfere; they study the history of the conflict, i.e. the causes of the conflict, and the key factors affecting its development. Those groups can promote the conflict regulation process by establishing a peaceful atmosphere, mitigating contradictions through reconciliation, and raise the effectiveness of conflict settlement process. The work of such structures can only succeed in case the local authorities are willing to fulfill the agreements reached, civil society is well developed, and it supports the implementation of the decisions made. The support of international community to reconciliation group is also important, but, definitely, a key importance is attached to a "strong mandate" of that group and the availability of appropriate resources6. Sometimes, the biased stance of mediators, due to the geopolitical interests in the region, the lack of political will, the "indirect" statements, etc. may cause the failure of conflict regulation process. The conflict of

4 Kelman H., Building Trust Among Enemies: Building Central Challenge for International Conflict Resolution, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 2005, 5, 639-650. 5 Stern P., Druckman D., International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, Washington, DC, National Academy Press, 2000. 6 Ibid.


interests can also contribute to the intractability of conflicts7 (Middle East, Kashmir, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, etc.).

The beginning of key transformations in the field of international conflict regulation, which was marked by the end of the Cold War, brought about changes in three main directions:

1. The superpowers focused their attention on expanding the negotiating strategies to define a new agenda for the peace process.

2. The influence of non-governmental actors in international conflicts both as "conflicting parties" and as a third party (mediator) was significantly increased.

3. The issue of individual security appeared in parallel with the problems of national security, creating not only new opportunities for the cooperation between governmental and non-governmental bodies, but also great tension.8

To facilitate the solution of the problem, new theories have been introduced. The “Democratic peace theory9”, put forward by the end of the 20th century, was one of many theories that backs the empirical conclusions on the fact that states with a democratic system are rarely involved in conflicts with military outcome. The theory is based on two key ideas: 1) democratic states share common democratic values, and prevent the emergence of conflicts, 2) the existence of democratic institutions hampers leaders' involvement in conflicts.

Nevertheless, as further processes have shown, many criticisms of the theory are based on the conflicts that emerged in the 21st century (domestic, international, interregional, etc.), and undermined international political stability; moreover, they were often viewed as processes involving elements of the Third World War. The last stage of the formation of a new world order has seriously exacerbated the

7 Torosyan T., To the Resolution of Intractable Conflicts: Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo, Iran and Caucasus, 2013, 17, 427-441. 8 Babbit E., Op. cit. 9 Ray J., Does democracy cause peace?, Annual Review of Political Science, 1998, 1, 27–46.


situation, since even the "frozen" conflicts (five-day war of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, four-day war of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016) have turned to important leverages for the influential states.

The above-mentioned issues further complicate the process of conflict resolution. In this context, primary importance is attached to the comparative analysis of conflicts in terms of identifying the basic patterns and factors affecting the settlement process.

The Peculiarities of Comparative Studies of Conflicts The overwhelming majority of the analyses in social sciences are comparative. Comparative analysis is the main description and explanation of the similarities and differences between the social units (community, nation, society, culture), conditions and outcomes. Such definition of comparative analysis reflects the traditions that have been formed within anthropology (intercultural analysis), sociology (societies), history (comparative history) and psychology (comparative psychology)10. Several other sciences can also be included in this list and, in particular, political science, one of the three main subdivisions of which is comparative political science11.

In fact, all empirical social researches include some element of comparison since the cases under study are compared with the theoretically derived model cases, and they compare the case values with the reference values of the corresponding variables to evaluate the equivalence.

Despite large number of data collection and the existence of a variety of qualitative, quantitative, expert assessments and analysis, the disclosures on international conflicts are often insufficient in quantitative analytical literature. There are significant differences between statistical data in various scientific articles or reports. This is largely due to specific features, particularly in terms of indexing and

10 Smelser N., On Comparative Analysis, Interdisciplinarity and Internationalization in Sociology, International Sociology, 2003, 18(4), 643–657. 11 Caramani D., Comparative Politics, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 2.


data collection. Instead of uncovering new, durable, systematic patterns, as is the case in most other quantitative subfields of political science, specialists involved in international conflict research are facing a huge database, which, in its turn, complicates the process of revealing these patterns12. The main shortcomings in various models are conditioned by the incompleteness of large-scale data processing algorithms, sometimes by the political stance of experts, and, as a consequence, not accurate forecasting. Recently, an attempt has been made to ensure the reliability of research results through their reproducibility by publishing extensive appendices of database. But the credibility can not be increased in such a way.

Political scientists have long eschewed forecasting by focusing on causal relationship, and it is quite natural that any proposed new method must allow for causal interpretation as well as improved forecasting. But causal theories are considerably harder to verify than forecasts, and forecasts have the advantage of being observable implications of the same theories than as the causal hypotheses. This means that accurate forecasts can be used at least partly to verify claims about causal relationship13.

Within the study of international conflicts, many authors have touched upon the database, forecasting, selected variables and their impact on the results of the research, but the problem has been viewed from different perspectives. The most widely-accepted version is the "improvement" of database on international conflicts and the study of interconnection between data14. Others have modified the existing statistical models to take into account the peculiarities of the conflict15.

12 Beck N., King G., Zeng L., Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture, American Political Science Review, 2000, 94(1), 21-35. 13 Ibid. 14 Jones D., Bremer S., , Singer J., Mili tarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1996, № 15 (2), pp. 163-213. 15 Beck N., Tucker R., Democracy and Peace: General Law or Limited Phenomenon?, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1998, April; King G., Event Count Models for


There are also studies that have attempted to formulate statistical models drawing upon the theory of rational choice that is based on the motives of states, political leaders or other internal actors16. The method of case study is often used in the comparative studies of conflicts. The advantage of this method is that it allows ensuring a high level of accuracy or measuring the indexes for a specific case study, which in its turn best represents theoretical concept, the characteristics of which need be "measured". Many variables subject to research are quite difficult to make measurable, among them democracy, power, or political culture, etc17.

It is important to coordinate the context of comparisons within comparative analysis, while maintaining both the variables (indexes) and the principles of interpretation of similarities and differences. Coordination of context is not an end in itself. The attempts to reduce the problems of equivalence are based on two methodological principles: first, researchers in the field of social sciences rarely choose the same criteria in several comparative studies. However, there are cases when the same criteria are used, in particular, when the participation of people in the elections is monitored to make a general assessment of political participation. This is in case when the countries included in the survey are “similar” or “comparable”. Accordingly, the researcher can compare participation rate in different regions making part of the same constitutional system, to ensure the most effective outcome18. A similar approach can also be used when the subject of research are electoral and party systems, political

International Relations: Generalizations and Applications, International Studies Quarterly, 1989, 33 (2), 123-147; King G., Zeng L., Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999, September. 16 Signorino C., Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict., American Political Science Review, 1999, 93, 279-298, Smith A., A Summary of Political Selection: The Effect of Strategic Choice on the Escalation of International Crises, American Journal of Political Science, 1998, 42, 698-701. 17 Bennett A., Case Study Methods: Design, Use and Comparative Advantages, Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations, Ed. Nahmias-Wolinsky Y., Sprinz D., 2007, pp. 19-55. 18 Smelser N., Op. cit.


culture, etc. For instance, the above-mentioned approach can be used to study the peculiarities of the formation of political parties and multiparty systems in non-recognized states. In this case, the cases compared are quite close in terms of preceding processes; they have passed through the war, not all institutions of the political system function properly and one can speak of their institutionalization with great reservation. It is also advisable to take into account the previous political regime. For instance, while studying this issue, it would be effective to compare similar variables of states emerged on the basis of self-determination principle after the collapse of the communist regime.

According to the second principle, the process of searching for adequate indicators, in itself, should be independent from comparative research. The process of political participation, for instance, is the result of many complex political processes that differ significantly in their context. Thus, it is first necessary to clarify in theory and practice what is meant by political participation, then to determine what different forms the process of political participation can take, participation in voting, civilian impact on political life, informal forms of influence, etc. Additionally, a comprehensive survey of political participation should be carried out for systematic research and development. The paradox is that the equivalence of indices on the same phenomenon is achieved more efficiently in the process of selecting them under different conditions. Again referring to the case of multi-party system formation in non-recognized states, one can definitely state that during the analysis of multi-party system formation, the processes of recognition and the peculiarities conditioned by them, as well as the path of stateness are quite different. Thus, the factors affecting political participation may vary as well. In this case, it is possible to reach a more complete and effective level of indices equivalence.

According to Smelser19, the identification and harmonization of the context of both outcomes and determinants might yield more 19 Smelser N., Op. cit.


adequate comparative classifications than those with which the researchers currently work. Based on the running example of political participation, one line of classifying would be to produce a multidimensional grid of types according to the level of repressiveness of political regimes in the context of which political participation occurs – ranging from extremely totalitarian to extremely democratic, with a variety of intermediate types; stability of political regime; and organizational context of participation – elections, institutionalized parties, informal parties, open social movements, clandestine social movements, informal influence, etc. Types of Variables and the Evaluation of Their Interconnection The variable (index) is an important concept in the methods used in social sciences. It is a superordinated feature, characteristic or product. Cases (in some instances, individuals) may differ depending on the category of variables they belong to. Very often, these cases are individuals, members of this or that organization, region, nation, etc.; in some cases they can be conceptualized20. The examples are presented in Table 1. Table 1. Types of cases and groups21

Case (=individual)

Examples for specific cases

Possible population

Person Ramil Safarov All participants of NATO's “Partnership

for Peace” programme (2006)

Country Hungary, Romania World population Software program

SPSS, Stata All statistical package

20 Baur N., Lamnek S., Variables, The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2007, pp. 1-7. 21 The table was drawn up on the example of that presented in the work of Baur N. and S. Lamnek.


Article Scientific article in the “Armenian

Journal of Political Science”

All articles of the Armenian scientific

journals

Conflict situation

Conflict in Ukraine/ 2013

Behavior, conflict situation in post-

Soviet space Film Interstellar Scientific films

Organization Freedom House, Transparency International

Non-governmental organizations

In general, variables are considered as units of analysis that have different interpretations. In the field of social sciences, variables are of enormous significance in terms of hypothesis formulation; they provide the clarity of research problem by the accurate choice, as well as facilitate the selection of measurement scale. Variables help to avoid subjectivity and present the real picture of events, phenomena and behaviors. Sometimes, the wrong choice of variables may lead to wrong conclusion, wrong policy formation and implementation; survey may present a completely different picture that does not correspond to that society (case)22.

Variables can take different values, can be speculated, measured and monitored23. Accurate measurement is of key importance since every statistical process implies that the data are not distorted. Valid data can be obtained only if that assumption is true. Typically, three types of variables are distinguished in statistical analysis, namely dependent, independent, and intervening variables.

Independent variables: Variables that explain and justify other variables and are antecedent to dependent variables. Thus, they are explanatory, predictor or manipulated variables. The explanatory

22 Raiphea Y., Variable: Classification, Measurement and Importance in Social Science Research, Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research, 2015, 4, 6, 435-438. 23 Kerlinger F., Foundations of Behavioral Research, (3rd Edition), New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1986.


variable is, in its turn, divided into “key causal variable” also called “cause” and the “control variables”24. Depending on the research problem, the researcher has control over the independent variable and can choose to alter or change them thereby affecting dependent variables25.

Dependent variables: Variable that bears the influence of independent variables. It is the variable explained by other variables. The outcome or changes are brought by the introduction of an independent variable. It shows the effect of manipulating or introducing the independent variable. Dependent variable changes or reacts to the state of the independent variable.

Intervening variable: Variable that is not directly observable but links the independent and dependent variable is called intervening variable. In some instances, the relationship between an independent and a dependent variable cannot be established without the intervention of another variable, which is achieved by intervening variable.

Given the above-mentioned, there is a need to address the differences between concepts and variables. Measurability is the main difference between a concept and a variable. Concepts are mental image or perception and therefore they are highly subjective. On the other hand, variable is a value which varies. A concept cannot be measured whereas a variable can be measured. In order to measure it, a concept has to be converted into variable. For instance ‘Democracy’ is a concept. In order to measure it, democracy has to be converted into variables like elections, voting, etc26.

Variables may vary according to the level of case analysis. If the above-mentioned is viewed for individuals, then the following characteristics can be singled out:

1. Variables can describe individuals’ “genuine characteristics”;

24 King G., Keohane R., Verba S., Designing Social Inquiry- Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp 77. 25 Raiphea Y., Op. cit. 26 Ibid.


2. Relational variables describe a case’s interrelationship to other cases;

3. Contextual variables capture a case’s embeddedness in a collective.27

In distinguishing the problem according to the level of case analysis within the comparative analysis of conflicts, the following can be stated:

1. Variables cover the whole information on conflicts, and therefore, are genuine characteristics.

2. The analysis based on relational variables allows comparing a particular case with similar cases, make parallels, check out the relationship and possible links with other cases.

3. Contextual variables represent a more complete picture, in particular with regard to regional conflict analysis, since the place of a particular case in a particular group (region) is specified.

Numerous researchers involved in comparative studies, especially those focusing on qualitative research, are interested in specific historical consequences, results, and the reasons behind them within the context of other similar cases. Historical outcomes often require complicated explanations, and it is rather difficult to prove how well these explanations comply with the prevailing quantitative norms of social science. When the causal arguments are comparable, then the limited multitude rather than the number of case leads to strong restrictions28. In general, the quantitative/qualitative split in social sciences is clearly visible in comparative social science. In contrast to other subdisciplines, the basics of qualitative research are stronger here. Moreover, these studies tend to be case-oriented (as opposed to variable-oriented approach) and "historical" (as opposed to abstractly causal)29.

27 Baur N., Lamnek S., Op. cit., pp. 1-7. 28 Ragin Ch., The Comparative Method, Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, University of California Press, California, 2014, p. 44 29 Ragin Ch., Op. cit., p.8.


The popularity of the variable-oriented approach has been maintained over the last two and a half decades by the rise of interest in macro-social theory. In a variable-oriented study, the researcher examines relationships between general features of social structures conceived as variables. The model of causation central to this strategy is structural. Social units, such as states, have structural features which interact in the sense that changes in some features produce changes in other features, which in turn may produce changes in others. Features of social structure are viewed as more or less permanent attributes (elements) as they are very slow in changing30. Abbott31 strongly criticizes variable-oriented methods of analysis because researchers often forget that they deal not only with variables, but also with people and human lives. Moreover, the latter are formulated as "cases" in the study. The above-mentioned refers to the vast majority of comparative studies on conflicts where displaced persons, refugees, victims and injured persons, or the entire population of the area are considered as variables.

Within the study of Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization” (based on three empirical assumptions: 1) in the post–Cold War era, states of different civilizations have been more likely to fight each other; 2) during the Cold War era, the superpowers constrained intercivilizational conflict; 3) throughout history states of different civilizations have been more likely to fight each other than have those that share a common civilization), the researchers single out “non-civilization-based” factors or control variables, among which geographical location (geographically, the wars between non-neighboring countries are less likely to happen), regime-type (democracy decreases the possibility of harsh confrontation), and relative capability (military capabilities)32. The results of a

30 Ragin Ch., Op. cit., p. 85. 31 Abbott A., Time Matters. On Theory and Method, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2001, p. 296․ 32 Henderson E., Tucker R., Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict, International Studies Quarterly, 2001, 45, 317–338.


comparative analysis based on independent and dependent variables as well as those based on the ignorance of manipulated variables (geographical location, geopolitical significance of the region, regime-type, etc.) will represent a totally different picture and will limit the possibilities of obtaining complete data and explaining all causal relationships. Thus, the article focuses more on the problem of forming a set of independent, dependent, and intervening variables which will be free from objective perceptions, and will enable to identify all causal links, meanwhile not distorting the existing information model on the conflict.

Formation of a Set of Variables for the Comparative Analysis of Conflicts In the comparative analysis of ethno-political conflicts, based on a case study method with a small number of cases, i.e. a very important tool for studying complex macro-level phenomena (wars, revolutions, changes of the regime, including the collective units of analysis, such as cities, regions, organizations, states, etc.), one can observe two similar states different from each other on the level of ethnic pressure or conflict development. For instance, the two states may have the same political history, economic development, or demographic level, but different ethnic composition or different extent and depth of contradictions. In case of a small number of explanatory variables, researchers can easily explain different ethnic relations. Within the framework of addressing such problems, an attempt has been made to study the hostilities during the Chechen conflict, while the clashes in neighboring Dagestan were not so intense, despite the large number of similarities (even similarities of dissatisfaction and complaints)33. Almost the same has been registered in Georgia, when Ajaria avoided military actions, unlike South Ossetia and Abkhazia that chose

33 Zurcher Ch., Baev P., Koehler J., Civil war in the Caucasus, Understanding civil war: Evidence and analysis, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005, pp. 259–298.


secession. Moreover, the military confrontation took place in two stages, in the 1990s and in August 2008. In both cases, the existence or absence of a conflict (clashes, hostilities) has been chosen as dependent variable.

Alternatively, a researcher could select the independent variable, or look for two cases alike in many aspects but different in the value of the hypothesized explanatory variable. Any subsequent differences, observed in ethnic conflict, could perhaps be attributed to differences in the independent variable. For instance, we can observe two countries similar in terms of economic wealth, regime type, but one of them unlike the other has adopted electoral rules designed to ease ethnic tensions. Thus, if we observe the differences in the level of ethnic tensions, these may be due to the electoral rules34.

Not all the variables used in the research can be free of measurement errors. Sometimes, even the links between variables are being questioned. Lacking variables can affect both explanatory and dependent variables. Selectivity can generally lead to the ignorance of variable values, including their zeroing35. The dependent, independent, and intervening variables may constitute the formation basis of a set of variables used for the comparative conflict analysis. The ignorance of any of them may lead to the distortion of information about the conflict. Moreover, the selective or discretionary approach to the choice of variables is not a scientific approach, and it runs contrary to the principles of objective analysis and forecast.

In general, the choice of variables for the analysis is specific to a particular conflict, and in each case the choice of a set of variables depends on the research problem. At the same time, the outcome of each study depends not only on the research strategy and research problem, but also on the correct choice of the variables used. For

34 Barakso M., Sabet D., Schaffner B., Understanding Political Science Research Methods, The Challenge of Inference, Taylor & Francis, New York, 2014, pp. 180-181. 35 Bollen K., Instrumental Variables in Sociology and the Social Sciences, The Annual Review of Sociology, 2012, 38, 22-58.


comparative analysis of different cases, different sets of variables are distinguished, each of which is very often applicable to a particular case36. Therefore, in the comparative analysis of conflicts, it is important to form a set of variables, each of which applicable to the cases belonging to this or that class of variables. The set of variables of each class must meet the conditions of being necessary and sufficient. The first condition requires the existence of all variables necessary to prevent the distortion of the phenomenon under study. The second requires a minimum number of variables sufficient to exclude such distortion. Figure 1 below introduces the classes that are decisive in the comparative analysis of conflicts.

Figure 1

Combining the variables used in the comparative study of

conflicts, the following model has been drawn up. The included variables operate in different dimensions; therefore, the measurement is different. In particular, the variables show the presence or absence

36 Torosyan T., Petrosyan M., Comparative Analysis of Conflicts: Modeling Problems, Armenian Journal of Political Science, 2015, 2, 121-138.

Categories of variables of comparative analysis of conflicts

Pre-conflict stage

Conflict stage

Post-conflict stage

Applying to international

tribunals

Settlement principles

Involvement of mediators

Nature of conflict

Referendum

Refugee-related issues


of a phenomenon, the sequence, and eventually the number of it37. These variables have been grouped into classes (Table 1) first of all according to the stages of conflict development with an aim to clarify the key events of each stage, as well as to identify the factors that can have direct or indirect impact on conflict settlement process as well as in terms of identification and solution of the problems at the post-conflict stage. Subsequently, the model presents the nature of the conflict, the issues related to referendum, the principles of settlement (international law), mediators, international courts and the refugee-related variables. The variables included in the table are necessary to clarify the factors affecting the process of conflict development, and they are sufficient to identify the peculiarities and constraints of the settlement process.

Table 1

Classes of variables Variables

Status before conflict Dissolution of status Predominant nation Protests Initiator of the first manifestations of protests Asymmetrical use of force by the metropolis

Pre-conflict stage

Unilateral declaration of independence Hostilities Boundaries of conflict expansion Conflict stage Foreign military intervention

Special status

Involvement of peacekeeping forces

Post-conflict stage

International territorial administration/format

37 Caramani D., Introduction to the Comparative Method with Boolean Algebra, Sage Publications, 2009, p. 2.


Opportunities to hold democratic elections Declaration of independence after the failure of negotiations Recognition of independence

Membership in international organizations Choice of government system (democracy/authoritarianism) Resurgence of military clashes

Nature of conflict Self-determination/non self-determination conflict Referendum held Population’s participation in the referendum Conditions for holding a referendum

Referendum

The initiator of hostilities during the referendum Clarification of the principles of settlement (documents they are enshrined in) Holding of a (new) referendum

Principles of settlement /

international law The issue of independence on the agenda International organizations/states/individuals involved in the settlement process Formation of special structures/groups/coalitions dealing with settlement Involvement of superpowers in the settlement process Involvement of international non-governmental organizations Involvement of all parties to the conflict in the negotiations

Clarification of final status

Resolutions adopted by international organizations

Involvement of mediators

Involvement of civil society


International tribunals Opinion of International Court of Justice

Refugee-related problems International organizations dealing with refugee-related problems The problem of internally displaced persons

Refugee-related problems

Involvement of organizations engaged in the protection of refugee rights

The use of this model enables to define the nature of conflicts, the possibilities and the conditions for holding a referendum, the limits of the impact of hostilities on the final outcome of the referendum. It will become possible to clearly distinguish the use of the fundamental principles of international law in the process of peaceful settlement of conflicts. The study of resolutions adopted by international organizations that were the most active in the conflict settlement process will give the answer to the following question: How do the resolutions adopted by the international organizations affect the international community's opinion and the process of peaceful settlement of conflicts? The problems of the final determination of the status can also be resolved in the case of a clear and impartial interpretation of resolutions. The solution of refugee-related issues also becomes possible as the effectiveness of the activities of international organizations dealing with the protection of refugee rights and the range of key factors hindering this process are clarified. Comparative analysis of conflicts based on this set of variables will greatly increase the effectiveness of comparative studies of conflicts. It may enable to clarify the scope of the phenomena under study, combine events to conduct a comprehensive survey, identify the nature of factors directly or indirectly affecting the settlement process, as well as to predict the prospect of it.


Conclusion

Within the comparative analyses, it is important to coordinate the context of comparisons while maintaining both the variables and the principles of interpretation of similarities and differences.

The independent, dependent and intervening variables are in the core of the formation of a set of variables for the comparative analysis of conflicts. The ignorance of each of them may lead to the distortion of information on conflict, and consequently have negative implications for the conflict settlement process. The discretionary approach to the choice of variables contradicts the principles of objective analysis and forecasting.

Various variables, mechanisms for their analysis and models have been put forward for the study of international conflicts. Nevertheless, variables included in these models are not always necessary or sufficient to analyze the whole database related to every component of the conflict given the decisive factors in all stages of the conflict development as well as the additional challenges arising in the settlement process.

The analysis based on the classification of the variables and the set of variables proposed in the article allows not only to dramatically reduce the number of variables required for effective analysis of this or that component of the conflict, but also not to exclude those variables the lack of which could distort the real picture and question the accuracy of the conclusions.

The proposed classification of the variables and the formation of a set of variables based on these classes can be applied not only for a specific case, but within the study of conflicts in general, ensuring the bases for objective and comprehensive analysis.


DOI: 10.19266/1829-4286-2018-02-79-94 Conflict Between Fatah and Hamas Movements: Clash of

Ideologies and Interests

ABU ZAID ALI MUSSA Yerevan State University, Armenia

The article discusses one of the key issues in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict stemmed from the disagreement between Palestinian movements Fatah and Hamas, as well as the obstacles and opportunities to overcome them. The basis of these disagreements is the radical difference between Fatah and Hamas' approaches to the principles proposed by the international community for negotiations and settlement with Israel - the other party to the conflict. This has become more important since Hamas won the Legislative Council elections in 2006 and was entitled to form a government. While the purpose of these movements is the same from the point of view of conflict settlement, the overcoming of and disagreements between Fatah and Hamas is a necessary condition for achieving an outcome. Keywords Split, Hamas, Fatah, Palestine, Palestinian-Israeli conflict

Introduction As a result of the parliamentary elections, held in Palestine earlier in 2006, a drastic polarization occurred between the largest Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas movements. It grew into a general - geographic, political, social and institutional split. The roots of disagreements and the reasons for split should be sought in the differences of ideas, interests and agendas that led to disagreements over the methods of resistance, as well the relations with the neighboring countries and Israel. Fatah represents and guides the "Arab national" wing, whereas Hamas is a "modern" religious wing. Fatah, being one of the PLO factions, is waging its struggle more generally, as it is closer to secular mentality and shares the same view with the PLO’s other institutions, as opposed to Hamas, which has

80 Abu Zaid Ali Mussa

religious ideology, inconsistent with the approaches of other national groups. Hamas rejects the idea of peaceful settlement, refuses to negotiate with Israel, continuously rejects the resolutions on the Palestinian conflict, offered since 1948 till today. It sees the solutions only through armed struggle. The notions of the Fatah and Hamas movements on the peace process and Palestinian autonomy are fundamentally at odds. This has led to continuous political disagreements that have arisen with the formation of Hamas in 1987, since the Stone Intifada. The disagreement was deepened in 2006, when Hamas won in the Palestinian Legislative Council1 elections, but the movement was not allowed to take the lead in power. It is true that with the disagreement between the two Palestinian factions mentioned above, the Palestinian goal remains the same and unites all Palestinian groups, including Hamas. But will the unity of purpose stimulate the Palestinians to reach a reconciliation?

The Disagreements between two Movements Ideological disagreements. The political thought of the Fatah movement is based on the national essence of the conflict with Israel. It considers itself to be a national Palestinian movement without any clear ideological orientation. It gives the movement flexibility and allows for many changes to be made, depending on the requirements of the specific stage of the conflict and the circumstances surrounding the Palestinian issue. This is evident from the comparison of the principles and programs of the pre-Oslo Accords and the program adopted at the Sixth Conference in 20092.

1 The Legislative Council, according to the Oslo Accords, can only adopt laws with the consent of Israel. It is considered the Palestinian Authority's parliament and is elected by the Arab population of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the East Jerusalem. 132 deputies of the Legislative Council automatically become part of the Palestinian National Council, which consists of 600 deputies and is the representative body of all Palestinians, including those living in the diaspora and occupied territories.

ــــــلاميون. نــــافع صالح موسى بشــير - 2 ـــــــطينية والقضــــية الفلســـــــطينيون الإس الفلســطين مركز 1950-1980 .151- 149. ص 1999 ،غزة ،والبحــــوث للدراســـــات فلس


The political thought of the Hamas movement is based on the religious principles3, as reflected in the statute of the movement4. It also defines Palestine in purely religious terms: "The land of Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf throughout the generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or abandon it or part of it5". The movement sees the current situation in Palestine as the continuation of Crusades campaign in the Islamic territories6. Based on these principles, Hamas refused to accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 on recognition of the State of Israel, continued resistance and refused to participate in the negotiation process, insisting that the international congresses and peaceful solutions to the Palestinian conflict contradict to Hamas’ principles and they cannot lead to the results reflecting interests of the Palestinian people7.

The rejection of the Oslo Accords, the resulting treaties and the peace process further complicated the problems between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Hamas, on the one hand, opposes Israel, denying the existence of that state and expanding its military operations against it both in the Palestinian Authority and in Israel. On

النجاح جامعة الماجستیر درجة لنیل أطروحة. والتحدیات الإشكالیات فتح حركة. ناصر یمسل رشاد عمر -

.27-25. ص. 2015. الوطنیة 3 Brown Nathan J., The Hamas-Fatah Conflict: Shallow but Wide. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. 34, 2, summer 2010, 41-56. 4 The 11th Article of the Charter, http://palestine.paldf.net/Uploads/pdf/%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9- 5 Ibid. 6 Nüsse A, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas. Routledge Curzon. London. 2002, p. 3.

ــــــة حركة - 7 ــــــلامية المقاوم ــــر في دراســـات: حمــاس الإس ـــــةو الفك ــرير .التجرب محسن.د: تحــــة. صالح محمــد ـــــــة الطبع 528- 51 صفحة. 2015 ،الثاني

ــــاق - . 5-4. ص 13 المـــــادة -حمــاس ميثhttp://palestine.paldf.net/Uploads/pdf/%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AB%D8%A7%D

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.2017 حماس لحركة العامة والسیاسات المبادئ وثیقة -


the other hand, it opposes Palestinian Authority, its orientations, ideas and actions. Because of Hamas' position, a number of difficulties arose between the Movement and the Autonomy, which faced a unique challenge and deviation from the policies of the PLO and its groupings in the Movement's actions, especially in the armed struggle against Israel. It forced the Autonomy to declare Hamas as an outlaw organization in 1996. Widespread arrests were made within the movement, numerous institutions and unions belonging to the group were closed down, and their assets were frozen. Several leaders were arrested, and in 1998, even Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the founder of the Movement, was put under house arrest. As a result, the relationship between the Autonomy and the Movement has become increasingly tense and divisive. After the parliamentary elections, they had reached to an armed confrontation, resulting in the Palestinian split and the establishment of Hamas' power in Gaza, which led to the creation of a Palestinian state project on the West Bank and Gaza.

Conflict of Interests. There were many disagreements between the Fatah movement and the Muslim Brothers in Palestine even before the creation of Hamas, which is considered as a continuation of the Muslim Brothers8. In particular, in 1985, the Palestine Liberation Organization, seeking to establish control over the Palestinian institutions, attempted to form a board of trustees of the Islamic University, the base of Muslim Brotherhood at that time. Therefore, it proposed the presidency of Palestinian physician, public and political activist Haidar Abdel-Shafi, but it was rejected by the Islamic Council and the public front of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza.

Since the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987, the PLO has sought to concentrate on controlling the activities with the participation of all factions. In order to manage the intifada's public struggle, it created the United National Leadership and sought to involve in it Hamas as well. However, Hamas refused to get involved

8 Filiu J.-P., Origins of Hamas: Militant Legacy or Israeli Tool? Journal of Palestine Studies, 41, 3, Spring, 2012, 54-70.


and preferred to act separately. It attempted to become a new stream proposing an alternative program to the one of the PLO9.

The rivalry between Fatah and Hamas during the Intifada became dangerous. Therefore, the two movements had to resort to dialogue and coordination of actions. This agreement actually recognized Hamas's acceptance on the “Palestinian street”. However, the relations between the Fatah and Hamas movements were deteriorated after the PLO adopted Resolutions N 242 and 338 in 1988 and the independence document. Hamas perceived this as a deviation from the struggle. However, in July 1992, a "Document of Honor" was signed, which included the basis for establishing relations between two factions, the right of each one to ideological and political activity, and proclaimed the start of a constructive dialogue to resolve disagreements between Hamas and Fatah. Soon another step in solving the problem followed. In early 1993, in parallel with the Madrid public talks and the Oslo secret meetings, a Charter was convened in Khartoum under the auspices of prominent Sudanese intellectual and politician Hasan al-Turabi aiming at establishing dialogue between the PLO and Hamas leadership. It was an attempt by the PLO to establish the right of being the only representative of the Palestinian people. But that dialogue did not produce tangible results. Hamas movement urged the PLO to leave Madrid summit, secure 40% of seats in the National Assembly and make substantial changes to the PLO program. There was an apparent disagreement between the two movements over the representation of Hamas in the PLO structure10. But the confrontation did not end there. Hamas refused to accept the Oslo agreement signed in 1993, citing it as a concession to the Palestinian rights. It also refused to confirm the PLO's being the representative of the Palestinian people, which, according to Hamas, did not reflect the Palestinian reality. Although the movement adopted the principle of coexistence with the Palestinian Authority created by

9 Usher G., The Democratic Resistance: Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Elections. Journal of Palestine Studies, 35, 3, Spring, 2006, 19-36.

.137. ص... عواد جمیل عبد القادر عودة، اشكالیة العلاقة بین حركة فتح وحركة حماس 10


the Oslo Accord, it publicly declared that it disputed the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and considered its creation as violation of Palestinian rights. The response of the other side was not delayed. Fatah, assuming the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, exerted pressure on Hamas at various levels, leaving a limited scope of activity, which allowed it to use the latter as a tactical card in negotiations with Israel.

Following the failure of the Camp David Conference (1999-2000), the Israeli actions aimed at suppressing the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 and the intensification of Israeli operations, Hamas and Fatah had to forget about disagreements. The two movements united to resist Israeli forces. But that atmosphere has opened the way for foreign pressure on the Palestinian Authority to make it involved in the roadmap talks in 2003.

The death of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat on November 11, 2004 was a turning point. Because of his authority, even the organizations that had disagreements with Arafat were not largely opposed to him11. In order to strengthen the PLO's negotiating positions, President Yasser Arafat used the Hamas’s stance and avoided clashes between the latter and Fatah political platforms. Whereas, President Mahmoud Abbas's position was clearer on both the adoption of means and the refusal of hostilities against Israel. Although President Abu Mazen had sought to involve Hamas in the Palestinian Authority's political system and institutions, he failed to reach compromise with the organization. This situation subsequently reflected on the relationship of the two movements when Hamas entered into the Palestinian political system following the parliamentary elections.

العربي الغد مركز ،"السیاسي للنظام البنیویة لمشكلاتا "الفلسطینیة التجربة تحولات الزبن، سمیر 11

عمّان، للدراسات،.77-65. ص. 2005


Further Contradictions between Movements

Just two months after Abu Mazen's victory in the 2005 presidential elections, Hamas announced its decision to run in the legislative elections. During the election campaign, the movement called on political forces and factions to form one government and one legitimate way of struggle12. Soon after, on January 25, 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections, gaining 76 out of 132 seats to form a single government.

Conflicts between the two movements were further exacerbated when President Abu Mazen called on Hamas to announce in a government statement that it recognizes the authority of the PLO and adheres to all the agreements signed by the organization. In response, Hamas stressed the need for the PLO to be restructured so that it could include various Palestinian forces. Hamas declined to recognize the terms of the International Quadrilateral Commission, the Oslo Accords and the State of Israel. Israel, the USA and the international community had put the Hamas government in financial blockade.

The blockade of Hamas government has led to severe financial crisis as a result of which salaries of Hamas officials were not paid. Many Palestinian Authority officials, especially security services, refused to cooperate with Hamas government, mainly in forming a legislative body composed of its representatives13. This situation was further aggravated by the relationship between the three ruling powers of the Palestinian political system due to the ambiguity of the texts and the lack of clarity in the definition of authority14. However, few months later, in May 2006, the declaration of the "Document of National Accord" on Prisoners aimed at stopping tensions in the Palestinian political arena, calling for the formation of national united government with all parliamentary groups, establishment of

12 Bhasin T., Hallward M. C., Hamas as a Political Party: Democratization in the Palestinian Territories, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2013, 25, 1, 87-88. 13 Usher G., Op. cit.

، 5069، العدد صحیفة القدس العربي. سرائیل تزیل أعلامھا وتنسحب وأبناء القطاع یحتفلون بالمستوطنات 14 .1، ص 12/9/2005


cooperation between the government and the president, reform security services and limit the power to negotiate giving it to the PLO and the President of the Autonomy. The document called for national unity to withstand the blockade imposed by the United States and Israel15. Despite the Declaration of the Prisoners' Document, which became known as the "Document of National Accord" after its editing, it failed to achieve reconciliation, but it did affirm the principle of national unity government. Another step towards reconciliation was made few months later in January 2007, when Fatah and Hamas signed an agreement on forming a national unity government in Mecca, shortly after President Abu Mazen again instructed Ismail Haniyeh to form a national unity government. The Mecca Agreement also emphasized the need for Palestinian "sanctity of blood" and all possible measures and steps to prevent armed operations. Ministerial portfolios were distributed and ministers of government of national unity were appointed16. Although the Mecca Agreement added additional details to the previous agreements on the formation of a unified government, the main difficulty was its failure to accept its political program and the demands of the international community. This meant that the blockade of Gaza would continue. Hamas was mistaken in rejecting international decisions and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 33817.

Despite the formation of government of national unity under the Mecca Agreement, the scope of street clashes was expanded and included the whole Gaza strip. The Egyptian security delegation intervened several times to reach to cease-fire agreement, but Hamas asserted complete control over Gaza and set a deadline of 15 June 2007 for weapons to be delivered to security services. When President

دراسة. (غزة قطاع من الإسرائیلي للانسحاب والأمنیة السیاسیة الآثار .المشھراوي محمد خلیل الدین علاء 15

بحث تكمیلي للحصول على )2005اقع الانسحاب الإسرائیلي في أیلول تحلیلیة للنواحي السیاسیة والأمنیة لو .63-47 صفحة 2013درجة الماجستیر في العلوم السیاسیة

2005. إعلان القاھرة، مركز المعلومات الوطني الفلسطیني 16 https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2005/03/17/18737.html. 17 Price D., Sacred Terror: How Faith Becomes Lethal, Praeger, Santa Barbara, CA, 2012.


Abu Mazen declared state of emergency on July 14 and signed a decree to dissolve the unity government and create a new government under the leadership of Salam Fayyad on the West Bank, Hamas refused to accept the president's decision. However, Israeli military actions in Gaza in late 2008 prompted Fatah and Hamas to resume dialogue after more than a year of disruption. Palestinian groups held a meeting in Cairo on February 26, 2009 under the auspices of Egypt, and agreed to form five committees to discuss five sets of issues: security, elections, the PLO, transitional government and public reconciliation. During the dialogue, the Fatah movement focused on the need to form government capable of dealing with international demands to ensure the lifting of the blockade and the holding of Legislative Council and presidential elections. Whereas the Hamas movement was focused on reconciliation, resolving the aforementioned five issues, accomplishing all that would be agreed upon, releasing its members arrested by the Autonomy and rejecting the quadrilateral commission pressure. The discussions resulted in the "Egyptian Document", which was published on October 15, 2009, and offered details that were not included in any of the previous agreements. It was considered a breakthrough compared to the previous arrangements, as the six main articles addressed the process of implementing the general principles, resolving most of the disagreements between the two movements. At the same time, Fatah and Hamas movements were required to sign the document without making any changes.

The first article focused on the activation and development of the PLO, the second - on holding legislative, presidential and parliamentary elections, and the third article was on security, on the basis of a number of general principles that make the security authorities professional rather than militant. This article also addressed the mission and functions of those authorities. The fourth article was on the issue of national reconciliation in terms of defining the objectives and the mechanisms for achieving them. The fifth article concerned the establishment of a joint commission for the


implementation of the National Accord Agreement and the merging of autonomous institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. The sixth article prohibited arrests on political grounds and included mechanisms for dealing with prisoners on both sides18. The Hamas movement's reservations about the document hampered its signature, and Egypt organized a new round of dialogue to discuss them. The first session was convened in Damascus on September 24, 2010, during which an agreement was reached to form an electoral commission and electoral court and to form temporary governing body before the PLO would be reconstructed. Even the next meeting in Damascus did not agree on the issues of the committee responsible for security services and restructuring. In another series of meetings, which took place in March and April 2011, Hamas and Fatah signed the Egyptian document establishing committees, but the main disagreement over the Unity Government's political program remained unresolved.

In September 2011, the petition of the Autonomy to the United Nations for full membership of the Palestinian state, and the completion of the Hamas prisoner exchange deal, created a positive atmosphere for a resumption of dialogue. On November 23, a meeting was held in Cairo between President Abu Mazen and the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Khaled Mashal, in which the two parties announced about collaboration as partners19. The two movements also agreed to set up a Central Election Commission at the next meeting in Cairo. The next step was taken in February 2012, when two committees met, one on the West Bank and the other in Gaza, to address issues of public freedom and trust building, activation of the legislative council. However, the disagreement over the government's plan continued to hamper reconciliation, forcing Qatar's Emirate to hold a meeting in Abu Dhabi with President Abu Mazen and Khaled Mashal, the head of Hamas's political bureau, which reached an

الثالث السنوي المؤتمر تقریر الفلسطینیة، الوطنیة السلطة في المسؤولیات وغیاب الصلاحیات صراع 18

.25 ص ،4/3/2007 أمان، والمساءلة النزاھة أجل من للائتلاف .الفلسطیني الوطني لوماتالمع مركز ،2006 الوطني للوفاق الأسرى وثیقة 19

http://info.wafa.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=4937


agreement on forming a national consensus government led by Abu Mazen. This was seen as way out of the crisis of agreeing on a political program20. But that government was also not brought to life.

New problems arose during the Syrian crisis. Hamas refused to support the Syrian regime, the movement's leadership left Syria and closed its headquarters. In June 2013, after the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the new Egyptian authorities resorted to harsh measures against Hamas as they supported the Brotherhood. The blockade of Gaza became even tougher, the movement was in severe crisis, and the moderate forces seeking reconciliation intensified. As a result, Hamas lost many of its most important allies and supporters for many years, Syria and Egypt. And on April 23, 2014 the “al-Shati” agreement21 was signed between Fatah and Hamas22. The announcement on the agreement and the start of reconciliation was warmly accepted by both the people and the factions. Agreement was reached on many practical steps. In order to implement the al-Shati agreement23, President Abu Mazen took steps to form the government on which an agreement was reached. Musa Abu Marzook said that if the president made such a decision, Hamas would not be against anyone elected by mutual agreement, referring to Prime Minister Rami al-Hamdallah24. Finally, in June 2014, an announcement was made on the creation of national consensus government, the elimination of divisions between movements and the restoration of unity25. Israel strongly criticized the agreement and announced that it intended to take punitive measures against the 20 Sawafta A., Palestinian rivals agree to form unity government, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-government-idUSTRE8150KU20120206 21 The agreement has been called al-Shati because the negotiations took place at Ismayil Haniye’s house, located in the west of Gaza city, in the refugee camp “Al-Shati”

نص اتفاق مكة، مركز المعلومات الوطني 22 http://www.wafainfo.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=3654الفلسطیني

اعلان بنود المصالحة الفلسطینیة من قطاع غزة 23http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2014/04/140423_hamas_fatih_talks

الورقة المصریة للمصالحة، مركز المعلومات الوطني الفلسطیني 24 الفلسطیني الوطني المعلومات مركز للمصالحة، المصریة الورقة 25


Palestinian Authority. But the US administration confirmed that it would continue assisting the Palestinian consensus government26. Although the formation of that government had been agreed in advance, the reconciliation process continued to be hampered by lack of trust and conflict of interests, which led to a contradictory interpretation of the provisions of the agreement. The main disagreement at various stages of the split was over the government's political agenda. According to the Fatah movement's stance, any Palestinian government must adhere to the agreements and treaties signed by the PLO, given that the checkpoints are under Israeli control and that it manages the revenue of customs duties that are the part of Palestinian Authority Revenue. Hamas, meanwhile, refuses to recognize Israel, and that position is an integral part of the movement's adherence to the charter and ideological beliefs, though in its view, the intersection point of the Fatah and the PLO and the overall plan is the acceptance the Palestinian state along the borders of 1967.

The security issue and its underlying questions are the main reasons for the failure of previous conciliation agreements. The Egyptian document on reconciliation envisaged the creation of an Arab and Palestinian commission which would oversee the process of restructuring security services in the West Bank and Gaza after the forming the government. The complexity of the security problem arises in a number of issues, the most important of which is the definition of the powers and responsibilities of security services and lack of clarity in the form of management of those services. Gaza's security services are under Hamas control and run by the Abu Mazen-led government27. Western security services are under the control of the Fatah movement, they have broad powers and strictly monitor compliance with their obligations under the agreements with Israel. As for the future of the Palestinian military factions, President Abu Mazen has demanded to dismantle their combat brigades and armed

28/4/2014 صفا، وكالة للحكومة، توافقیة شخصیة أي ترؤس نعارض لن: مرزوق أبو 26 28/4/2014لن نعارض ترؤس أي شخصیة توافقیة للحكومة، وكالة صفا، : أبو مرزوق 27

http://www.wafa.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=KKddPUa642850142814aKKddPU


units, including al-Qassam brigades. Hamas insisted that they should remain independent, contrary to the international agreements and obligations.

The problem of new employees in Gaza has not yet been resolved, even in the most recent al-Shati agreement. Hamas had more than fifty thousand security personnel and civil servants after the split. The movement refuses to remove them and demands to include them in the Palestinian Authority's staff. Fatah has made no commitment to this during al-Shati talks. Hamas perceives this as compensation for marginalizing Palestinian movement representatives for many years and forfeiting government posts under the name of "security". Hamas pays the salaries of these employees from the Hamas government budget, which is its biggest financial burden28. Palestinian Authority suffers from a budget deficit and fears it will not be able to pay its employees if Israel refuses to transfer tax revenues.

The Hamas movement stresses the need for the National Assembly elections to be held simultaneously with the legislature and the presidential election, fearing of repeating the split, as Fatah movement controls the PLO and the Palestinian decision29. The decision of the PLO’s Executive Committee to ratify the National Assembly election bill has caused disagreement between Fatah and Hamas movements. Hamas considered that it violated the agreements signed by the Egyptian-backed Cairo factions, and that ratification was not the authority of the executive committee, but the interim governing body that had agreed on forming it and which included the secretaries of Palestinian factions30.

ــــة مع ســنعمل: واشـنطن 28 ــــطين الحكوم ــةالفلس ــــاعدات تقـــــديم وسنواصل الجديـــــدة ي المس

ــــة 2/6/2014 ،وفـــا وكالhttp://www.wafa.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=OHxbzra643112826642aOHxbzr

29 The term "Palestinian decision" means the sovereignty of the Palestinian people to their own destiny without any coercion or dictation by Arab countries, in particular Syria, Egypt, Jordan and the Arab League.

،2/6/2014 وفا، وكالة الوطن، وحدة واستعادة الانقسام إنھاء یعلن الرئیس 30 http://www.wafa.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=EHzKyxa643068094251aEHzKyx


The Future of Reconciliation

A number of regional and international factors have obviously contributed to the Palestinian split and its delay, which has had a negative impact on the resolution of the Palestinian problem. In particular, the American factor is the most important of the international factors, as the US administration seeks to dictate its approaches when dealing with the Palestinian issue. The US is pursuing policy that is in line with Israeli policy in this regard and is trying to resolve the issue in its favor. Trump's decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem is an obvious proof of it. The regional factors include the negative effects of the "Arab revolutions" and the wars that followed, as well as Qatar and Turkey's influence on Hamas, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan's influence on Fatah.

The reconciliation is the only way for the Palestinians to get the problem back on track. A real reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas can only happen if there is agreement on Palestinian political plan that will allow solving all the complex issues, such as security, the PLO, elections and other issues deriving from it. The success in completing number of issues by the Freedom Committee in the al-Shati agreement is simply a goodwill initiative. The agreement succeeded in permitting the exchange of banned Palestinian newspapers, resolving the issue of passports, giving Fatah staff freedom of movement, which was banned after the split in Gaza. After the formation of the government, an agreement was reached on release of nineteen Gaza prisoners and twenty-one political prisoners from the West Bank prisons; after the split, the victims of Israeli attacks in Gaza were recognized as martyrs.

At the meeting in Cairo in 2011, Palestinian groups agreed to set up committees to monitor freedom and public reconciliation issues. Under the control of Egypt, two committees were set up on the West Bank and Gaza in order to monitor freedom and trust building. However, after several meetings they suspended their sessions and resumed work only after signing of the al-Shati agreement. The Public


Reconciliation Committee follows up at the issue of families who lost their children during Hamas's infiltration of the Gaza Strip during the civil war. Since the start of the dialogue in Cairo, the issue has been brought to the forefront of monitoring the financial means for paying “blood price” to victims. The Committee has been active since the creation of the al-Shati agreement and the establishment of Compensation Fund of sixty million dollars.

Conclusion

The research of the contradictions, opposition and attempts to overcome the Palestinian movements of Hamas and Fatah shows that

The struggle between Hamas and Fatah is much deeper than just an ideological struggle over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hamas is a religious-political movement that has chosen religion as its lifeblood and constitution. His political program "rejects the idea of negotiation with Israel and peaceful settlement, whatever the cost would be. Because of all this, Hamas has refused to be part of the negotiation process because they were aimed at peaceful resolution of the Palestinian issue. The movement sees the solution of the problem through armed struggle. The movement considers itself responsible for defending Palestine, which contradicts the Fatah movement, as it is one of the PLO's formations and shares the PLO's policy on conflict resolution.

According to the Hamas essential documents, the movement sees the solution of the Palestinian issue not in peaceful settlement with Israel, but in non-recognition of Israel and military confrontation. Fatah, meanwhile, considers peaceful solution to the problem, peaceful resistance of the people and negotiation with Israel for the sake of creating a state along the borders of 1967.

Hamas believed that after the elections in 2006, a conciliation government headed by Hamas and Mahmoud Abbas should be formed in order to achieve reconciliation, end political persecution and establish concurrent and complete freedoms


throughout the Autonomy, while Fatah did not accept the election results and demanded new elections without preconditions.

Hamas is opposed to coordinating security issues between the Autonomy and Israel, which deals with the prevention of any armed aggression against Israel, the exchange of security information and the persecution of all supporters. It called for an end to it and support for the confrontation, while Fatah finds that the coordination is the part of the Oslo Accords, which cannot be stopped and must be continued under the agreement with Israel.

The parties are making mutual political arrests: Fatah on the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. The accusations made by the parties further deprive them of the possibility of dialogue.

Hamas demands to liberalize the West Bank by implementing reconciliation agreements, not obstructing its political activities and opening of social institutions, not harassing its members, and giving everyone the freedom of expression. The Fatah demands the same with Gaza, but the parties do not have enough will to do so.

Fatah considers Mahmoud Abbas as the leader of the PLO and the Autonomy as opposed to Hamas. This movement calls for the development of effective empowered leadership which would include everyone, unlike all other former bodies.

Efforts to eliminate the split and its consequences have not been long-lasting, although a multi-stage reconciliation process has been undertaken and various committees have been created. However, despite the disagreements between Fatah and Hamas, the Palestinian goal continues to be one, and it unites all Palestinian groups, including two abovementioned movements.


DOI: 10.19266/1829-4286-2018-02-95-122 The Issue of the Meskhetian Turks at the Crossroads of Interests

of Georgia and its Neighbouring Countries

KARO GALOYAN Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of RA, Armenia

The article represents the results of the multilateral study of the Meskhetian Turks’ issue. It analyzes the emergence of the issue, the movement of the Meskhetian Turks, the positions of the organizations and their effectiveness. The study reveals the multi-layered aspect of the issue, the components of which are the issues of self identity preservation, repatriation, integration into society in their current residence, as well as social-economic and legal problems. The analysis of the Georgian policy and of the interests of its neighboring countries in this issue allows to conclude that the issue poses a certain danger for Armenia, for the prevention of which the verges of cooperation with Georgia are presented within the framework of the subject under discussion. Keywords Meskhetian Turks, organizations, region, Samtskhe-Javakheti, Georgia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia Introduction

Meskhetian Turks have been formed in the historical Meskheti region1, located in the south of Georgia. The majority of them are Sunni Muslims, speaking on Eastern-Anatolian dialect of the Turkish language. There are two main theories on their origin, the first of which may be conditionally called “Turkic”, the second - “Georgian”. The supporters of the first theory are scholars of Turkish or Azeri

1The name “Meskheti” is used in two ways. In a narrow sense, it includes the places of Meskhetian settlements, the territory of historic Upper Kartli, the modern Samtskhe, and the adjacent territories within Turkey. In a broad sense, “Meskheti” is understood as the entire territory of one of the medieval Georgian state formations - the Samtskhe-Saatabago (Samtskhe atabegate), which also included some northern regions of historical Armenia.

96 Karo Galoyan

ethnicity2, while the second theory is widespread mainly among the Georgian researchers3. This ethno-religious community is known for various names, i.e. Meskhetian Turks, Turkish Meskhetis, Meskhs, Meskhetis, Ahiska (Akhaltsikhe) Turks. The abovementioned names have also political background. Thus, the Georgians are keen to call them “Meskhs” or “Meskhetians”, considering them as Islamized and Turkified Georgians. The majority of Meskhetian Turks as well as Turkish and Azeri researchers prefer using the terms “Turks” or “Ahiska Turks” (AhıskaTürkleri), which derives from the name of their previous homeland Eyalet of Akhaltsikhe. In the scientific literature, the term "Meskhetian Turks" is frequently used, and it is a compromise option4. The term first appeared in the 1970s and spread only in the 1980s. Many Meskhetian Turks do not use this name, which is indicated in the census conducted in the Russian Federation in 2010; only 48255 people from nearly 100,000 Meskhetian Turks living there were registered as "Meskhetian Turks", while most were registered as "Turks", thereby proving that most of them are of Turkish ethnicity.

Currently Meskhetian Turks are living in Georgia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,

2Zeyrek Y., Ahıska bölgesi ve Ahıska Türkleri, Ankara, 2001, s. 6-40; Юнусов А., Ахыскинские (месхетинские) турки: дважды депортированный народ - https://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-02-1999/st_20_junusov.shtml (09.01.2019). 3ლომსაძეშ.,სამცხე-ჯავახეთი (XVIII საუკუნისშუაწლებიდან XIX საუკუნისშუაწლებამდე), «მეცნიერება», თბილისი, 1975; Beridze M., Kobaidze M., An attempt to Create an Ethnic Group: Identity Change Dynamics of Muslimized Meskhetians, “Language, History and Cultural Identities in the Caucasus” conference, Malmö University, 2005., pp. 53-67; Мамулия Г., Концепция государственной политики Грузии в отношении депортированных и репатриированных в Грузию месхов. История и современность - https://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-02-1999/st_19_mamulija.shtml (09.01.2019). 4Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., Meskhetians Homeward Bound..., ECMI - Caucasus, Georgia, 2001, pp. 37-38. 5Ахметьева В., Карастелев В., Юдина Н., Жизнь без прав. Положение ахыска-турок на юге России в 2015 году, доклад центра «Сова» и Московской Хельсинкской группы, Москва, 2015, с. 6.


and the United States. Their total number is 425-450 thousand people6.

Meskhetian Turks consider Samtskhe-Javakheti administrative district in the Southern Georgia as their homeland, where they seek to return. Their aspirations are related to the interests of Georgia and its neighbours, as a result of which the issue of Meskhetian Turks automatically gains an emphasized geopolitical context. The problem remains unresolved, and the dynamic changes in the alignment or political situation in countries, where a compact group of Meskhetian Turks lives, may become a reason for a possible aggravation. Since historically Samtskhe-Javakheti has a large Armenian population, borders with Armenia, the multi-aspect study of the issue is important from the perspective of the Armenian people's security. For this purpose, it is necessary to study the formation of Meskhetian Turks' issue, attempts to solve it, the policy of Georgia in the process of repatriation as well as the interests of international actors involved in it.

The Origins of the Meskhetian Turks’ Issue

Until 1944, Meskhetian Turks were residing in more than 200 villages of Adigeni, Akhaltsikhe, Aspindza, Akhalkalaki and Bogdanovka regions7. On 15–18 November of the same year, the Meskhetian Turks and Kurds, living in the abovementioned regions, were deported from their settlements to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. On 25–26 November, Muslim Hemshin-Armenians and Turks, living in Ajaria, were deported to the same countries. According to the official

6Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 55. 7Панеш Э. Х., Ермолов Л. Б., Турки-месхетинцы (историко-этнографический анализ проблемы), Советская этнография, 1990, 1, с. 16; Swerdlov S., Reflections on Transitional Minorities and Human Rights Meskhetians and Hemshins in Georgia and Krasnodar, Anthropology, Minorities, Multiculturalism, 2004, 5, p. 6; Kurt S., Ahıska’nın Türkiye İçin Jeopolitik Önemi, Karadeniz Araştırmaları, 2018, 58, s. 203; Ersöz S., Ahıska’da iki büyük ağız grubu: terekeme ve yerli türk ağız, Uluslararası Türkçe Edebiyat Kültür Eğitim Dergisi, 2014, 2, s. 105.

98 Karo Galoyan

data, the total number of deportees was about 91,0958. The number of people reached to and settled in the Central-Asian Soviet countries, according to the official statistics, is 92,3079. The Azeri and Turkish researchers indicate a wider number of deportees10, including the ones who served in the army - approximately 145,000 people11. However, these numbers contradict the estimates of census, conducted in 1897, 1926 and 1939.

As stated in the first Russian Emperial census of 1897, in the provinces of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki, totally including the five regions mentioned above, 24,433 and 19,299 people were registered under “Turks” and “Tatars” names respectively12, 43,732 people in total. As reported in the First All-Union census of the Soviet Union calculations in 1926, they have submitted under collective “Tyurks”13 name, whose total number was 56,11014. As for the All-Union census calculations of 1939, 87,971 “Azerbaijanis” were residing in Adigeni, Akhaltsikhe, Aspindza, Akhalkalaki and Bogdanovka regions15, which was the collective name of Muslimized native population (Georgians and partly Armenians), Turks from various districts of the Ottoman Empire, as well as Terekeme and other small groups of Turkic-

8 Докладная записка наркома внутренних дел Л.П. Берии И.В. Сталину, В.М. Молотову, Г. М. Маленкову о проведении операции по переселению турок, курдов и хемшинов из пограничных районов Грузинской ССР, Архив Александра Н. Яковлева, http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1022541 (07.01.2019); Бугай Н. Ф., Турки из Месхетии: долгий путь к реабилитации (1944–1994), «РОСС», Москва, 1994, с. 76-77. 9Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 14. 10Aydıngün A., Harding C. B., Hoover M., Kuznetsov I., Swerdlow S., Meskhetian Turks An Introduction to their History, Culture and Resettlement Experiences, Culture Profile, 2006, 20, p. 6. 11Гаджиев А., Ахалцихские турки: история, этнография, фольклор, ИРС Наследие, 2007, 2, 26), с. 10. 12 Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской империи 1897 года, т. 69, 1905, с. 90-93. 13 In Russian the term “tyurks” (тюрки) is used to describe all Turkic peoples. 14Всесоюзная перепись населения 1926 г.,т. 14, Москва, 1929, сс. 84-91. 15Всесоюзная перепись населения 1939 года. Национальный состав населения районов, городов и крупных сел союзных республик СССР, http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/ussr_nac_39_ra.php?reg=777(05.01.2019).


speaking Muslims16. The number of Turks, living in Ajaria, was 2201.17 Thus, during 30 years their average birth rate did not exceed 2500. So before men are conscripted to military service their number should be estimated as far as 92,000 people. According to statistics of 1939, the number of Kurds was 385818. 120 Hamsheni-Armenian families or about 1000 people were deported19. The number of Meskhetian Turks, serving in army and deported to Central Asia, was about 10,00020. So, the official statistics are not too far from the reality, and the deported population along with the military servicemen form in total of 100,000 people.

The official reason for the deportation was that a large part of the local population, having kin relations with the inhabitants of regions bordering Turkey, wanted to emigrate to Turkey, engaged in smuggling and spying for the benefit of Turkey’s intelligence service.21. The deportation of Muslim population, living in border regions, was also justified with the risk of possible attack by Turkey22. It should be highlighted that the deportation of Meskhetian Turks, Kurds and Muslim Hamsheni-Armenians took place by the time there was a breakthrough in the war, as the allies were a step closer to victory, and there was no longer a danger of Turkish intervention.

16It is noteworthy that over the years, the overwhelming majority of people registered under names of "Turks", "Tatars", "Turks" and "Azeris", lived in the Adigen, Akhaltsikhe and Aspindza regions (former Akhaltsikhe province), as for census data estimated in Akhalkalaki and Bogdanovka regions (former Akhalkalaki 1897-1939), their number ranged from only around 5-7 thousand. 17Ibid. 18Ibid. 19Swerdlov S., op. cit., p. 9; მოდებაძევ.,მესხურიპრობლემისანალიზი, „კალმოსანი“, თბილისი, 2010, გვ. 77. 20Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 12. 21 Докладная записка наркома внутренних дел Л.П. Берии И.В. Сталину, В.М. Молотову, Г.М. Маленкову о проведении операции по переселению турок, курдов и хемшинов из пограничных районов Грузинской ССР, Архив Александра Н. Яковлева, http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1022541 (07.01.2019). 22Исраелян В., Дипломатия в годы войны (1941–1945), Москва, 1985, с. 137; История Великой Отечественной войны Советского Союза 1941– 1945гг., т. II, Москва, 1961, с. 193.

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That is the reason why some authors consider the preparation of an attack on Turkey by the USSR and the proposals on reviving the agriculture of underdeveloped Central-Asian provinces as the main motivation of those deportations23.

The authorities reinhabited 25-30,000 Georgians from different parts of the country in villages that were left off. Some of those people, taking into consideration the unfavourable circumstances, preferred to return to their initial places of residence24.

The data on the number of people, who died due to starvation, cold and diseases as a result of the deportation is controversial. The number of 30-50,000 victims25, provided by some Azerbaijani and Turkish researchers, is far from reality, and such unrealistic numbers come from exaggeration of the estimates of displaced people. The reports on victims of 15-17,000 people are considered as more realistic26.

The deported people were attached the status of "special settlers", were deprived of the right to abandon their residence and were under control27. The local population often treated them negatively, considering them as "betrayers"28.

The small Turkish-speaking community, deported to Central Asia, appeared in an environment where there were almost no cultural and language barriers, and had to be dissolved among the locals. However that did not happen. Among the reasons was the "native- 23მოდებაძევ., op. cit., გვ. 76-77. 24Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F.,op. cit.,pp. 12-13; Modebadze V., Historical Background of Meskhetian Turks' Problem and Major Obstacles to the Repatriation Process, IBSU Scientific Journal, 2009, 3, p. 115. 25Zeyrek Y., op. cit., s. 54; Гаджиев А., op. cit., с. 10. 26Swerdlov S., op. cit., p. 9; Юнусов А., op. cit.; მოდებაძევ.,op. cit.,გვ. 78; Շաքարյան Ա., Մեսխեթցի թուրքեր. Աշխարհաքաղաքական գործոն տարածաշրջանում, Թուրքագիտական և օսմանագիտական հետազոտություններ, «Ասողիկ», Երևան, 2006, էջ 74: 27Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 14; მოდებაძევ., op. cit., გვ. 78. 28მოდებაძევ., op. cit., გვ. 78-79; Swerdlow S., Understanding Post-Soviet Ethnic Discrimination and the Effective Use of U.S. Refugee Resettlement: The Case of the Meskhetian Turks of Krasnodar Krai, California Law Review, 2006, 6 (94), p. 1835.


newcomer" social-psychological contradiction, as well as anthropological differences29.

In 1956, after the Stalin's death, the status of "special settlers" was removed from the deported peoples, so many of them were allowed to repatriate to their homeland. However, Meskhetian Turks were not allowed to return to Georgia30. According to a number of authors, one of the reasons was that in 1952 Turkey became a NATO member-state, and as a result, the regions surrounding its borders (including Akhaltsikhe and its adjacent districts) automatically gained strategic importance31.

In 1968, by the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, the Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, Hemshins and Azerbaijanis, deported from the Southern Georgia and Ajaria during 1940s, were granted the right to live in the USSR territory32. However, in the second paragraph of the same resolution it was stated that these citizens had already been "settled" in the Central-Asian republics, the authorities of which were advised to create appropriate conditions for them. In fact, that point provided only a formal opportunity for repatriation. The system of permanent residence in the Soviet Union itself was also causing difficulties. Besides, the Georgian SSR leaders considered the Meskhetian Turks's repatriation as impossible, because these territories were already inhabited by Christian Georgians, so the

29Арис Казинян: Грузия и американо-турецкий проект по возвращению турок-месхетинцев: история и реальность, https://regnum.ru/news/671851.html (10.01.2019). 30Панеш Э. Х., Ермолов Л. Б., op. cit., с. 16; Aydıngün A., Harding C. B., Hoover M., Kuznetsov I., Swerdlow S., op. cit., p. 7; Zeyrek Y., op. cit., p. 59. 31Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 18; Pentikäinen O., Trier T., Between Integration and Resettlement: The Meskhetian Turks, ECMI Working Paper no 21, Flensburg, 2004, pp. 11-12; Swerdlow S., Understanding Post-Soviet Ethnic Discrimination…, p. 1836, Aydıngün A., Harding C.B., Hoover M., Kuznetsov I., Swerdlow S., op. cit., p. 7. 32Усманов А. О., К вопросу о конституционно-правовой реабилитации месхетинских турок: политико-правовой аспект, Гуманитарные и юридические исследования, 2017, 3, с. 160; Бугай Н. Ф., Проблемы возвращения «плановых переселенцев» в районы прежнего проживания до 1940-ых гг., Вестник Калмыцкого института гуманитарных исследований РАН, 2014, 4, с. 50.

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return of Muslims could destabilize the situation33. The return of the Meskhetian Turks was also hampered by the fact that the Georgian SSR authorities forced the returnees to accept their Georgian origin and to change their surnames into Georgian surnames, which wasn’t acceptable for many of them34.

In the 1950-1960's, small groups of Meskhetian Turks were relocated in the Azerbaijani SSR and in the North Caucasus. During that period, about 25-30,000 Meskhetian Turks moved to Azerbaijan, having documents with "Azerbaijani" inner note35. At the same time, the Meskhetian Turks also began the movement on the idea of returning to Georgia36. In the 1960-1970s, smaller groups of Meskhetian Turks were established in Western Georgia, but lately some of them left the country for discrimination abuses37. It is noteworthy that the Meskhetian Turks in Georgia found shelter in Abkhazia's autonomous republic. In 1969, around 250 families were settled in the Gali district, particularly in the Achigvara village38.

Before 1989, the Soviet authorities did not recognize the issue of the Meskhetian Turks as such. The situation changed in May-June 1989 as a result of the massacres in the Fergana region of Uzbekistan, the target of which were the Meskhetian Turks. The reasons for targeting the Meskhetian Turks have not been addressed appropriately so far. Some researchers point to the context of tense relations between Uzbeks and Tadjiks39. Others believe that these events were organized by the Soviet authorities to solve a number of issues: to promote the economic development of the Russian central provinces, to distract the Uzbek nationalists from the Slavs and to prevent 33Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 18. 34Панеш Э. Х., Ермолов Л. Б., op. cit., с. 19. 35Modebadze V., op. cit., p. 116; Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 19. 36Շաքարյան Ա., op. cit., էջ 74: 37Оганесян А., Политика Турции и Грузии в отношении проблем турок-месхетинцев, Kantegh, 2001, 3, p. 171։ 38Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 26. 39Панеш Э. Х., Ермолов Л. Б., op. cit., сс. 17-18; Арис Казинян: Грузия и американо-турецкий проект по возвращению турок-месхетинцев: история и реальность, https://regnum.ru/news/671851.html (10.01.2019).


separatist movements in the South Caucasus40. Besides the political motivation of the massacres, the low level of legal protection of the Meskhetian Turks, their "closed" communities, i.e. isolation from the locals, and the indifference of the Soviet authorities to the issue, were the factors contributing to it. As a result of the Fergana massacres, about 100 people were killed, more than 1000 people were injured, and many Meskhetian Turks living in Uzbekistan had to leave the country41.

In 1989, the Soviet authorities drived about 17,000 Meskhetian Turks from Fergana Valley to the central parts of the European part of Russia42. About 70,000 Meskhetian Turks, who left Uzbekistan, found shelter in Kazakhstan, Russia (mainly in the North Caucasus), Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine43.

After the Fergana events, the Meskhetian Turks' issue came to the attention of the USSR authorities and a number of resolutions were adopted, i.e. the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the "recognizing the discrimination against the deported peoples as illegal and criminal and guaranteeing their rights" (adopted on November 14, 1989); the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "on cancellation of the Statutes related to the Declaration of November 14, 1989 (announced on March 7, 1991); the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on “abolishing the decisions of the former USSR Defense Committee and USSR Government over the Soviet peoples subjected to pressure and forced displacement”

40ModebadzeV., op. cit., p. 118; Seferov R., Akış A., Sovyet Döneminden Günümüze Ahıska Türklerinin Yaşadıkları Cografyaya Göçlerle Birlikte Genel Bir Bakış, Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2008, 24, s. 400-401; Гаджиев А., op. cit., с. 11. 41Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 28; მოდებაძევ.,op. cit., გვ. 83; Zeyrek Y., op. cit., p. 71. 42Modebadze V., op. cit., p. 118; Aydıngün A., Harding C. B., Hoover M., Kuznetsov I., Swerdlow S., op. cit., p. 8. 43Pentikäinen O., Trier T., op. cit., pp. 11-12; Kurt S., op. cit., p. 205; მოდებაძევ., op. cit., გვ. 84-85; Ахметьева В., Карастелев В., Юдина Н.,op. cit., с. 5-6.

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(adopted on June 6, 1991)44. These documents did not have practical significance in the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks as the Soviet Union collapsed soon. Meanwhile, by adopting those legislative acts, the USSR authorities recognized the existence of the Meskhetian Turks’ issue. If previously it was ignored, now the issue started to be discussed on different platforms in order to look for solutions.

The Meskhetian Turks’ Movement, Organizations and their Positions

In the 1950-1960s, the idea of returning to homeland began to emerge among the Meskhetian Turks who had been deported to Central Asia. Initially, a number of underground organizations emerged, which, however, did not gain common recognition among the Meskhetian Turks. In 1962, the first founding congress of Meskhetian Turks was held in the Bukinski district of Tashkent region, where the issue of the repatriation national movement was the subject of discussion. To properly organize the movement, the "Temporary Organizing Committee" was elected45. The congress marked the beginning of the Meskhetian Turks' repatriation movement. Until 1989, ten congresses took place. The Committee has sent numerous requests to the official Moscow, as well as to the authorities of the Georgian SSR. Until 1989, there was no significant step was taken to address the issue

According to the Georgian authors, in the 1960s and 1980s the Meskhetian Turks, under the pressure of the Government, moved from their theory of Georgian origin to that of Turkish46. The supporters of the latter claim that the majority of Meskhetian Turks used to accept the Georgian origin theory only because of the hope to be granted the right to return to their homeland47. Regardless the reasons, the leaders of the Meskhetian Turks, as well as part of the people, have valued the issue of repatriation more than national identity, which could easily be 44Усманов А.О., op. cit., с. 160. 45Панеш Э. Х., Ермолов Л. Б., op. cit., сс. 18-19. 46მოდებაძევ., op. cit., გვ. 88-89. 47Zeyrek Y., op. cit., s. 58; Панеш Э.Х., Ермолов Л. Б., op. cit., с. 19.


adjusted based on the current situation. This resulted in the formation of two fractions of the Meskhetian Turks. The first group advocated the version of their Georgian origin and agreed to return to any region of Georgia, while the others had a Turkish identity and viewed the homeland as not the whole republic but the former Akhaltsikhe pashalik. Meanwhile, some of those who had Turkish identity, considered Turkey as their homeland48.

On July 28, 1988, the ninth congress of the Meskhetian Turks took place in Psikod district of the Autonomous Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, accompanied by a fierce struggle between two opposing fractions. After a long debate, most of the delegates assisted the supporters of the "Turkish origin", and the position of the Georgian-origin-supporters was labeled as "betrayal of national interests"49. As a result, the congress decided to reach the goal of repatriation with the condition of accepting their Turkish national identity. Several months after the congress, Fergana's events took place.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Meskhetian Turks' repatriation movement remained ununited. A number of organizations have been created with similar goals, but there are still disagreements on a number of issues.

In 1990, Meskhetian Turks’ International Association “Vatan” was founded50. In 1991, it was officially registered in Russia. The head office is located in Moscow and has branches in Krasnodar, several other Russian cities and in Azerbaijan. “Vatan” is considered to be one of the most influential organizations of Meskhetian Turks. The Association presents the interests of most Meskhetian Turks, although some communities are not even aware of its existence51. Representatives of the organization consider Meskhetian Turks as ethnic Turks, and they pursue two main goals - to recognize the 1944 48Modebadze V., op. cit., p. 120. 49Панеш Э. Х., Ермолов Л. Б., op. cit., сс. 19-20. 50The word “vatan” means “homeland” in Turkish and derives from the Arabicوطن (watan) with the same meaning. 51Pentikäinen O., Trier T., op. cit., p. 27; Շաքարյան Ա., op. cit., էջ 80։

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deportation as illegal and to allow the Meskhetian Turks to return to their homeland without preconditions. They view the territory of former Akhaltsikhe pashalik as a homeland rather than a whole of Georgia52. "Vatan" also demands from the Georgian authorities to provide Meskhetian Turks with cultural autonomy, including the right for education in their native language (i.e. Turkish) after their repatriation53. The social-economic difficulties in the Meskhetian Turks' residence, the integration in the society and similar issues are often sidelined54. The approach of “Vatan” to such important issues can be explained by ideological reasons (considering the Meskhetian Turks' temporary residence in Russia and other countries as the only solution to the repatriation problem)55; as well as the scarcity of the Organization's financial resources56, that makes the solution of socio-economic challenges harder to overcome. Consequently, the inability to solve these problems is the reason for the political orientation of the organization's goals and position.

As part of "Vatan" activities, regular meetings are held in Russia, in which the Meskhetian Turks demand the Georgian government to apply the Georgian law on repatriation57.

In 1992, the “Khsna” organization of Georgians and their descendants, exiled from Georgia in 1944, was established in Kabardino-Balkaria58. In the same year, it was registered by the Georgian Justice Ministry, and close ties with the Georgian authorities were established59. "Khsna" had a pro-Georgian stance. The members 52Modebadze V., op. cit., pp. 120-121. 53მოდებაძევ., op. cit., გვ. 90-91; Pentikäinen O., Trier T., op. cit., p. 28. 54Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 32; Pentikäinen O., Trier T., op. cit., p. 27. 55Бугай Н. Ф., Проблемы возвращения «плановых переселенцев»…, сс. 50-51. 56Мавашев Ю., Игры вокруг турок-месхетинцев, http://www.politrus.com/2015/11/14/ahiska-turks/ (14.01.2019). 57Турки-месхетинцы в годовщину депортации потребовали реабилитации своего народа, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/312488/ (13.01.2019); Турки-месхетинцы на юге России отметили 72-ю годовщину депортации, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/292637/(13.01.2019). 58“Khsna” (ხსნა)means “salvation” in Georgian. 59მოდებაძევ., op. cit., გვ. 91-92.


consider themselves as Muslimized Georgians, and consider the entire territory of Georgia as their homeland, refraining from the demand of cultural autonomy60. “Khsna” had fewer supporters among Meskhetian Turks than “Vatan”. In 1999, “Khsna” suspended its activities and instead rebranded itself into "Georgian Repatriates Union". Unlike “Khsna”, the aim of the "Georgian Repatriates Union" was not the solution of the Meskhetian Turks' repatriation issue, but the integration of Meskhetian Turks already settled in Georgia as well as the protection of their rights61.

There are also some other organizations of Meskhetian Turks in Georgia, among them “the Deported Meskhetian Youth Association “Meskheti”, “Meskheti” Latifshah Baratashvili Foundation”, and “Gurjistan” International Union of Muslim Georgians named after Khalil Gozalishvili”. All of them are supporters of the Georgian version of the Meskhetian Turks' origin.

In fact, the organizations operating in Georgia have a closer connection with the Georgian authorities than Meskhetian Turks. Therefore, it might be concluded that these organizations were established in contrast to "Vatan", and have a very underlined political stance. Though these organizations are also busy with the daily problems of Meskhetian Turks, living in Georgia, their number in the country is rather small (about 1,700)62.

In 1994, "Umit" organization was established in Krasnodar Krai of Russian Federation63. The organization operated only in the mentioned area. According to Akram Bairakhtarov, the founder of "Umit", Meskhetian Turks are ethnic Turks, and the issue will be solved as soon as they move to the Turkey64. In 1999, the organization suspended its operation. 60Pentikäinen O., Trier T., op. cit., p. 28. 61Ibid. 62 Written statement on repatriation of Meskhetian Turks to Georgia, submitted by the NGO Federal Union of European Nationalities , https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1236549/1930_1443084042_g1520228.pdf (12.01.2019). 63“Umit” (ümit) means “hope” in Turkish. 64Pentikäinen O., Trier T., op. cit., p. 29.

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Meskhetian Turks' organizations with similar position were also established in Kyrgyzstan (the "Union of Turks living in Kyrgyzstan" and "International Union of Ahiska Turks of the CIS countries"). "Meskhetian Turks Cultural Center" operates in Tashkent.

There are about 20 organizations of Meskhetian Turks in Turkey, 15 of which are active. Most of the organizations operate in the city of Bursa, where the majority of the Meskhetian Turks lives. In August 2003, nine of these organizations formed the Union of Ahiska Turks Organizations65, which is an important step towards unification and coordination of activities implemented by Turkey-based Meskhetian Turks’ organizations. The Union and many organizations from Turkey consider the fact of living in Turkey already a return to their homeland. The support for the newcoming Meskhetian Turks and contribution to the integration of Turkish society are included in the agenda of their activities. However, not every organization in Turkey shares the same position. The Istanbul-based "Educational, Cultural and Social Support Organization of the Ahiska Turks" considers the homeland of Samtskhe-Javakheti as their own homeland and strives for returning there66.

In November 2008, the "Union of the Ahiska Turks" (DATÜB) was established in Ankara, the aim of which was to unite the Meskhetian Turks living in different countries and solve common problems67. Despite the fact that the organization enjoys the support of the Turkish government, its effectiveness is not tangible.

In 2006-2007, the Meskhetian Turks, who moved to the United States from Krasnodar Krai, have established the “Ahiska Turkish-American Union”, which deals with their integration and other issues68. The Russians consider the activity of the organization as anti-

65Ibid. 66Modebadze V., op. cit., p. 122. 67 DATÜB, www.ahiska-gazeta.com/ru/pages/312.html (15.01.2019). 68Бугай Н. Ф., Мамаев М. И., Международное общественное объединение турок-месхетинцев «Ватан» как институт власти гражданского общества, Историческая и социально-образовательная мысль, 2015,7, 8, сс. 25-26.


Russian, and it included the Union in its list of prohibited organizations operating in Russia back in 201569.

Thus, Meskhetian Turks have a large number of organizations and associations, but their efficiency is low due to a number of objective and subjective factors. One of the factors hindering the unity of Meskhetian Turks is that they are spread across the territories of 9 countries. None of the organizations is represented in at least some of these countries, which does not allow any of them to lead the Meskhetian Turks’ movement. In this case, the compromise may be the cooperation between those organizations, but the controversies on a number of issues (for instance, the Meskhetian Turks' origin and homeland issue) does not allow to unite for addressing common problems. The political nature of the Meskhetian Turks' attitudes and goals plays a negative role, and many daily problems of the representatives of that ethnic group are ignored. That is why the organizations do not receive popular support, which limits their opportunities. The Meskhetian Turks' Issue in the International Structures

Since the collapse of the USSR to 1996, the issue of Meskhetian Turks has not received an international response because the international community's focus was on conflicts in territories of former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. Only after the end of the active phase of these conflicts, the issue started to be discussed in international platforms.

In May 1996, the declaration of the “Regional Conference addressing the problems of refugees, displaced persons, the other forms of involuntary displacement and returnees in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and relevant neighboring States” (also known as CIS Conference), taken place on the initiative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 69Мавашев Ю., op. cit.

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the International Organization for Migration (IOM), recognized the voluntary repatriation right of the deported peoples to their settlements70. Based on this document, the international community recognized the Meskhetian Turks' issue, which was a basis for raising it at the international level. The reports of the IOM, Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN) and Human Rights Watch have focused the international community’s attention on the issue.

On the initiative of the OSCE and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, discussions on the issue of the Meskhetian Turks were held from 7-10 September 1998 in Hague, which was attended by the representatives of Georgia, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and the Meskhetian Turks living in those countries and “Vatan” organization. The aim of the consultations was the discussion of the issue and the ways to address it. Among the issues discussed was the denomination of the Meskhetian Turks. The Georgian delegation suggested to use the terms “Meskhs” or “Meskheti’s expelled population”, which were unacceptable for the Meskhetian Turks. At the end, the parties agreed to use the term “Meskhetian Turks” in the final document71.

From 15-17 March 1999 another meeting was held in Vienna, with the participation of the same interested parties. This time the issues under discussion were the Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation conditions, the commitments of Georgia, as well as the issue of the status they had in the location at that moment. As a result of the discussions Geogia was obliged to create a legislative basis for the return of the Meskhetian Turks within two years of joining the

70 Regional Conference to address the problems of refugees, displaced persons, other forms of involuntary displacement and returnees in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and relevant neighbouring States (Geneva, 30-31 May, 1996), https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/rcps/cis-conference/CIS%20Declaration%20POA%20Regional%20Conference%201996.pdf (20.01.2019). 71Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., pp. 37-38.


Council of Europe, and carry out the repatriation up to 201172. Regarding the discussions on the violations of Meskhetian Turks rights in the RF Krasnodar region, they did not yield any result. The RF representative even mentioned that the Meskhetian Turks’ issue is limited only to the lack of the conditions of their return to Georgia, and in the RF they are simply temporary residents73.

In the following years, the Council of Europe adopted a number of resolutions criticizing the policy pursued by the Georgian authorities and urging them to accelerate the performance of the assumed commitments74.

Thus, during 1996-1999, the international record of the Meskhetian Turks’ issue and the steps taken for its solution were instrumental in developing a consistent and coordinated approach to the settlement of the issue.

Georgia's Policy and Repatriation Process

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, regardless of non-

favorable state policy, a part of the Meskhetian Turks had returned to Georgia. After gaining independence, the majority of them had to leave the country due to the atmosphere of national intolerance in the country, as well as the abrupt deterioration of social and economic conditions75.

After the change of the power in Georgia in 1992, “The Expatriation Commission of the deported Meskhetians” has been created, the members of which, together with the Krasnodar Krai 72Georgia's application for membership of the Council of Europe, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=16669&lang=en (17.01.2019). 73Симоненко В. А., Месхетинские турки: историческая судьба и проблемы культурной адаптации, дис. канд. ист. наук., Краснодар, 2002., с. 133. 74Pentikäinen O., Trier T., op. cit., pp. 37-38; Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 41. 75Swerdlow S., Understanding Post-Soviet Ethnic Discrimination…, p. 1838; Мамулия Г., op. cit.; Теймураз Ломсадзе: "80-85% месхетинцев – фактически этнические грузины", https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/25141402.html (09.01.2019).

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representatives, worked out the “Concept program on repatriation of the population deported from the Georgian SSR Meskheti and Javakheti in 1944”76. The document was of declarative nature, as it did not provide specific mechanisms for achieving its goals.

In 1993, with the decree of the President of Georgia E. Shevardnadze, the “Adaptation Center for Georgian and Georgia’s History” was established in Tbilisi, where the young Meskhetian Turks were given the opportunity to pass the necessary training for entering the country’s universities77. By that step the Georgian authorities were probably trying to promote the change of the ethnic identity of Meskhetian Turks in favor of the Georgian version.

In December 1996, E. Shevardnadze signed the decree “On approval of the state program on solving the legal and social issues of deported and repatriated Meskhetians in Georgia”, the objectives of which was the granting of citizenship, restoration of the nationality and surname, granting of economic privileges based on the current legislation, insurance of social protection and the assistance in integration into society. For the fulfillment of those objectives, a state committee was set up headed by the Minister of Refugees and Resettlement, V. Vashakidze. In the first phase of 1997-2000, 5000 people were supposed to return to Georgia78. Actually, the decree objectives show that only the people considering themselves as Ismalized Georgians were given the right of repatriation. However, even in that case, the decree did not produce any result, but rather created an illusion of repatriation.

The law “On the victims of political repressions and restoration of justice” adopted in December 1997, also bypassed the

76 Деловая Грузия. Экономика и связи с Россией в 1999-2001гг., т. 1, Москва, 2002, с. 25. 77Мамулия Г., op. cit. 78Ibid.


Meskhetian Turks’ issue, because it regarded only those citizens of Georgia who faced repressions in the territory of the republic79.

In 1999, after assuming the commitment of organizing the Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation in joining the Council of Europe, Georgia's policy on resolving the Meskhetian Turks issue has not undergone significant changes. In subsequent years, the creation of a legislative framework was much slower than it was planned. Immediately after assuming the commitment by joining the Council of Europe, a bill on repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks was drafted, which for 7 years have not been included in the agenda of parliamentary discussions.

The Georgian side explained its inactivity by the lack of measures and the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Given this, multilateral financial support from the European structures was expected80. The Georgian politicians also expressed concern that the return of Meskhetian Turks to Samtskhe-Javakheti could destabilize the region and even threaten the country's territorial integrity81.

As an obstacle for the Meskhetian Turks’ return, the Georgian politicians and researchers highlight the fact that a part of the Meskhetian Turks’ former villages are settled by the Javakhk-Armenians, and the Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation could cause a new conflict. The Javakhk-Armenians’ negative attitude towards that process is also mentioned among the obstacles82. However, it should be mentioned that the Armenians are settled only in a few villages out of Meskhetian Turks’ more than 200 former villages. Approximately two third of the villages is populated by ethnic Georgians, while the 79საქართველოსკანონისაქართველოსმოქალაქეთაპოლიტიკურირეპრესიებისმსხვერპლადაღიარებისადარეპრესირებულთასოციალურიდაცვისშესახებ, - https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/31408?publication=11 (09.01.2019). 80 Деловая Грузия. Экономика и связи с Россией в 1999-2001гг., с. 26; ხაინდრავამაჰმადიანიმესხებისრეპატრიაციისშესახებსაუბრობს - https://old.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=12432 (11.01.2019); Շաքարյան Ա.,op. cit., էջ 74։ 81Modebadze V., op. cit.,., p. 125. 82Modebadze V., op. cit., p. 122; Оганесян А., op. cit., с. 173.

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other part is abandoned83. Besides, Georgia’s authorities used the prospective of the Meskhetian Turks’ return as an additional factor to repress the local Armenians. The Javakhk-Armenians have even expressed their discontent against Georgia’s policy84. For the Javakhk-Armenians the Meskhetian Turks’ return to Samtskhe-Javakheti is undesirable. However, they are not against the repatriation, if the repatriates are settled in those places where they had been exiled from, namely in Samtskhe (Adigeni, Akhaltsikhe, Aspindza regions)85.

Despite all this, the official Tbilisi is well aware that a large population with Turkish identity may start a new separatist movement, or their existence may be used as an additional lever against Tbilisi by Ankara and Baku. Most likely, this is the reason why the Georgian side is trying to implicitly hamper the return of Meskhetian Turks to that region.

After 2003 Rose revolution in Georgia, a more constructive approach of the Meskhetian Turks’ issue was expected from the new government. Initially, these hopes seemed to be justified. After active discussions during 2005-2006, on 11 July 2007, the Georgian parliament adopted the law “On repatriation of persons forcefully resettled from Georgian SSR by the Soviet Union in the 40s of 20th century”86. The Georgian government also adopted the resolution “On simplified procedure of granting Georgian citizenship to those who have a status of a repatriated person”. The law allowed to start the Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation process, which was to begin in 2008 and end in 2011.

The repatriation law adopted by the parliament received sharp criticism for strict restrictions and the complicated requirements for the submission of the applications on repatriation. In addition, the 83Калишевский М., Турки-месхетинцы: из одного изгнания в другое, ч.2, https://www.fergananews.com/articles/6281 (11.01.2019). 84 Армяне Джавахети обвиняют власти Грузии в противоправных действиях, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/78636/ (16.01.2019). 85Калишевский М., op. cit. 86ყოფილისსრკ-ისმიერ XXსაუკუნის40-იანწლებშისაქართველოსსსრ-იდანიძულებითგადასახლებულპირთარეპატრიაციისშესახებ, - https://matsne.gov.ge/ru/document/view/22558?publication=7 (09.01.2019).


application was limited to one year only. The full package of documentation included about 14 different references, including the documents, proving the forcible displacement87. Such special document was not provided to exiled people by the Soviet authorities, and it is not clear which documents could be considered as “forcible displacement approval”. The application had to be completed in Georgian or English, while the majority of the people, populated in the Middle Asia, could not speak any of them. The law did not define the status of repatriate nor did it providefinancial support or privileges.

Though in December 2008, the Georgian parliament extended the deadline for the submission of the documents up to July 1, 2009, however it did not have any essential impact on the repatriation process. According to the Georgian side, 5841 applications88 (approximately 8900 people) were registered in Georgian embassies of different countries till 2011. 1700 people have received a status of a repatriated person. They were inhabited in different regions of the country89. The press of Russa, Azerbajan and most of the other interested countries, as well as separate researchers questioned the statistics, provided by the Georgian side, pointing out that the number of people, who wanted to return to Georgia was greater and the small number of applications was explained by an artificially complicated process90. The Georgian authorities were also accused in the international structures for avoiding to fulfill their commitments91. 87ყოფილისსრკ-ისმიერ XXსაუკუნის40-იანწლებშისაქართველოსსსრ-იდანიძულებითგადასახლებულპირთარეპატრიაციისშესახებ(მუხ. 4.2.ა), https://matsne.gov.ge/ru/document/view/22558?publication=7 (09.01.2019). 88Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 44. 89 Written statement on repatriation of Meskhetian Turks to Georgia, submitted by the NGO Federal Union of European Nationalities, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1236549/1930_1443084042_g1520228.pdf (12.01.2019); დეპორტირებულიმესხები: ფერგანამდედაუკან, http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/54490-deportirebuli-mesxebi-ferganamde-da-ukan (12.01.2019). 90Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., pp. 44-45; Теймураз Ломсадзе: "80-85% месхетинцев – фактически этнические грузины", https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/25141402.html (09.01.2019); Грузия отказалась

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Although the abovementioned proves that the Georgian authorities are not interested in the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks and they are creating additional obstacles for solving the issue, it should be mentioned that there are also a number of objective circumstances that also complicate the repatriation process. One of them is the unfavorable socio-economic conditions in Samtskhe-Javakheti. At the same time, the Meskhetian Turks, living in Turkic countries, are well integrated in society. Many Meskhetian Turks, living in Turkey, Kazakhstan, the United States, and somehow in Russia and Azerbaijan, are unlikely to leave their property and move to Samtskhe. Moreover, currently most Meskhetian Turks are descendants of exiles, who have never been in Samtskhe and their psychological attachment to that area is not so great.

The population of Georgia also has a negative stance on the return of Meskhetian Turks to Georgia92. According to the poll held in Akhaltsikhe and surrounding villages in 2009, 87% of the respondents was against the Meskhetian Turks’ return93. It means that in Georgia, particularly in Samtskhe, the Meskhetian Turks’ return is unacceptable at the level of public opinion as well.

Interests of Foreign Actors in the Issue Settlement The issue of Meskhetian Turks, though one of the internal problems of Georgia, is at the same time related to the geopolitical interests of states neighboring Georgia. возвращать турок-месхетинцев, https://rg.ru/2014/04/08/turki-site.html (11.01.2019). 91Written statement on repatriation of Meskhetian Turks to Georgia, submitted by the NGO Federal Union of European Nationalities, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1236549/1930_1443084042_g1520228.pdf (12.01.2019); Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution, “Honouring of Obligationsand commitments by Georgia”, http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2010/20100624_amondoc24rev_2010.pdf (12.01.2019). 92Теймураз Ломсадзе: "80-85% месхетинцев – фактически этнические грузины", https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/25141402.html (09.01.2019). 93მოდებაძევ., op. cit., გვ. 181-182.


Turkey and Azerbaijan are the most interested countries in the Meskhetian Turk’s repatriation to Georgia. It is also evidenced by the fact that the issue has appeared in the focus of international attention thanks to Turkey. It is notable that the Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation issue has been raised in the OSCE with the efforts of the spokespersons of Turkey and Latvia94. Though Latvia has no direct interest in this issue, the Latvians are too sensitive to the repression of the Stalin era since thousands of Latvians were exiled from the country. By raising the issue in the international arena, Latvia once again brought to light the lawlessness of USSR totalitarian regime. Perhaps Turkey could use those moods in favor of its political interests.

Turkey supports those organizations of the Meskhetian Turks, that express their willingness to move to Turkey or demand from the Georgian authorities to allow them to return to the Samtskhe-Javakheti region.

Back in June 1992, Turkey adopted a law facilitating the immigration of Meskhetian Turks from the former Soviet republics. Though the Turkish government was ready to finance 500 families, the initiative did not have a great success, and during 1993-1994 only 179 families have moved to Turkey, half of which were granted citizenship95. Most of them were inhabited in the eastern regions of the modern Turkey, in the territory of historical Western Armenia.

In subsequent years, Ankara continued to host the Meskhetian Turks. Those who have moved to Turkey in recent years are mainly from the territory of the Ukrainian conflict zone, and the Turkish authorities are trying to settle them in the eastern regions too96.

94Арис Казинян: Грузия и американо-турецкий проект по возвращению турок-месхетинцев: история и реальность, https://regnum.ru/news/671851.html (10.01.2019). 95Շաքարյան Ա., op. cit., էջ 78։ 96Ukrayna'daki çatışmalardan kaçan Ahıska Türkleri Erzincan'a getirildi, https://tr.euronews.com/2015/12/26/ukrayna-daki-catismalardan-kacan-ahiska-turkleri-erzincan-a-getirildi (24.01.2019); Ukrayna’dan Van Gölü kıyısına: Yeni Ahıska Ahlat, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/ukraynadan-van-golu-kiyisina-yeni-ahiska-ahlat-40116688 (24.01.2019).

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Nevertheless, the majority of the Meskhetian Turks ignores the policy of the Turkish authorities and settles in the western regions, centralizing in the cities of Bursa, Istanbul and Antalya. The number of the Meskhetian Turks living in Turkey is around 3500097. Considering the Meskhetian Turks, moved to Turkey in the XIX century and in the first half of the XX century, their number is big, however the majority of the early migrated people have already dissolved.

Although Turkey welcomes Meskhetian Turks, the existence of large population of Meskhetian Turks in Samtskhe is important for Turkey as well. Turkey has actively participated in the international discussions on that issue and has repeatedly raised it in relations with Georgia, putting pressure on the Georgian authorities along with OSCE98.

Turkey considers Georgia, and especially Samtskhe-Javakheti, as strategically important territories for the country. It seeks to compete with Russia pursuing geopolitical interests in the region, and the importance of Samtskhe-Javakheti in this issue is growing more and more. Samtskhe-Javakheti is getting important from the point of view of economy and energy security, as well as from political perspective. It is a transit zone for oil and gas pipelines, having significant importance for Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as the roads and railways, connecting Turkey to Azerbaijan and Central Asian states. At the same time, Samtskhe-Javakheti is the only region on this route, where the number of Turkic-speaking population is not great and, in fact, it divides the Turks from the Azerbaijanis.

Moreover, in case of Meskhetian Turks return to Samtskhe-Javakheti, the official Ankara and Baku can more effectively organize Armenia's blockade and put more pressure on Armenia in order to solve the Artsakh issue in their favor99. In essence, the interests of

97Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 55. 98Арис Казинян: Грузия и американо-турецкий проект по возвращению турок-месхетинцев: история и реальность, https://regnum.ru/news/671851.html (10.01.2019). 99Kurt S., op. cit., pp. 208-212.


Turkey and Azerbaijan in the Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation issue do coincide. It should be also noted that the huge Turkish community in the territories bordering Georgia will have pro-Turkish position in many questions which will allow Turkey to get additional levers and in case of necessity put pressure on Georgia’s authorities in favor of Turkish regional policy.

Azerbaijan tried to use the Meskhetian Turks in its anti-Armenian policy yet in the beginning of 1990s, when it sought to settle a part of the refugees, who had come to Azerbaijan after the events in Fergana, in the territory of NKAO, seeking to change the ethnic composition of the region100.

The total amount of the Meskhetian Turks, living in Azerbaijan is about 70-100 thousand101. The interest of Azerbaijan in Meskhetian Turks' repatriation is also evident from the fact that 5389 out of 5841 applications submitted to Georgian embassies for obtaining a repatriate status were only from Azerbaijan102. Taking into account the complexities of the application process, it becomes evident that the Meskhetian Turks, living in Azerbaijan, have been directed and supported, which could have been done by the Azerbaijani authorities.

The interests of Azerbaijan and Turkey contradict the interests of Meskhetian Turks in Samtskhe-Javakheti and those of Armenia and Artsakh directly threatening their security.

Though the official Yerevan does not express its opposition against the repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks, it is anxious about this issue. Samtskhe-Javakheti has strategic importance also for Armenia as it is the only region neighboring Armenia where no Turkic-speaking population lives, and it is the only safe way to Europe and Russia. In case of the Meskhetian Turks’ return to that region, 100Карабахские депутаты: Ходжалу стал жертвой политических интриг и борьбы за власть в Азербайджане,https://regnum.ru/news/962004.html (25.01.2019); Арис Казинян: Грузия и американо-турецкий проект по возвращению турок-месхетинцев: история и реальность, https://regnum.ru/news/671851.html (10.01.2019). 101Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 55. 102Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 44.

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Armenia will be caught in a complete Turkish-Azerbaijani ring, which will undoubtedly be used against Armenia in case of resumption of military actions. Its striking example is the periodic explosions of the only gas pipeline from Russia to Armenia in the Marneuli region having numerous Azerbaijani population in 1990s. Besides, the Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation to Samtskhe-Javakhetia may be accompanied by emptifying the Armenians of the region, or cause tense relations with the Armenians and Georgians of the region. The case has a historical precedent; in 1918 the Muslim population of Samtskhe has opposed Christian Armenians and Georgians103.

The Russian Federation is also interested in the Meskhetian Turks’ issue. The number of Meskhetian Turks, living there, is about 75-100 thousand people, who live mainly in the Northern Caucasus and partly in central regions104. In general, the Russian authorities consider the Meskhetian Turks as temporary residents, and the local authorities have a discriminatory attitude toward the people established in the Krasnodar Krai105. At the same time, the RF representatives, acting in favor of the Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation in Georgia, are trying to put pressure on the Georgian authorities. That pressure increased significantly after the war in August 2008. In October 2008, the law on the Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation, adopted a year earlier in Georgia, was criticized in the RF State Duma announcement, and the RF deputies called on the OSCE and the international community to put pressure on Georgia106. Such position of the RF may be aimed to the destabilization of the internal political

103Մելքոնյան Ա., Ջավախքը 19-րդ դարում և 20-րդ դարի առաջին քառորդին, «Զանգակ-97», Երևան, 2003, էջ 272-285; Маилян М., Между Грузией и Турцией: особенностиирредентизманапримереАджариииСамцхе-Месхетии (1918-1921 гг.), Историческоепространство. Проблемы истории стран СНГ, Москва, 2015, сс. 137-142. 104Trier T., Tarkhan-Mouravi G., Kilimnik F., op. cit., p. 55; Ахметьева В., Карастелев В., Юдина Н., op. cit., с. 6. 105Swerdlow S., Understanding Post-Soviet Ethnic Discrimination…, pp. 1838-1849. 106 ГД призвала надавить на Грузию в вопросе репатриации турок-месхетинцев, https://ria.ru/20081017/153397643.html (17.01.2019).


situation of Georgia, creating tension in the settlements of the Meskhetian Turks. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation will strengthen the positions of Turkey and NATO, which is not desirable for Russia.

Conclusion Thus, the multilateral study and analysis of Meskhetian Turks’ issue shows that it is a multilayered problem with a number of important components: the clarification and preservation of the Meskhetian Turks’ national identity; the danger of assimilation; repatriation, the social integration in the current settlements as well as the solution of socio-economic and legal problems. One more factor is the impact of geopolitical competition in the region on possible developments. The deportation of the Meskhetian Turks, living in the south of Georgia, by the USSR authorities gave rise to this issue. The USSR authorities recognized the legal aspect of the problem only after the Fergana events in 1989, and on international platforms it was discussed only in 1996-1999. The record of this issue by the international bodies was followed by an attempt to resolve it. It includes the period of 1999-2011, during which the issue had no positive solution, and till now it remains in the agenda of international diplomacy and inter-ethnic relations.

None of the Meskhetian Turks' organizations, established to solve the issue, have enough influence and resources to lead the movement. They are not united either in the achievement of their common objective, which is the consequence of the prominent politicization of those organizations or the support of countries with contradictory interests - Georgia or Turkey.

The solution of Meskhetian Turks’ issue is forced to Georgia by the foreign countries, particularly by Turkey. Though Georgia may change the demographical situation of Samtskhe-Javakheti by settling the Meskhetian Turks there, however it tries to avoid settling them near the border with Turkey. Georgia tries to moderate the social-

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economic situation of Javakhk-Armenians and their demand for cultural autonomy. Georgia is ready to accept only those Meskhetian Turks who admit their Georgian origin and allocates them in different regions. Tbilisi avoids the increase of Turkey's influence in the country.

Turkey and Azerbaijan use the Meskhetian Turks’ issue for the fulfillment of their geopolitical interests. By resettling the Meskhetian Turks in Samtskhe-Javakheti, Turkey will gain a significant privilege in strengthening its domination in the region. Azerbaijan is interested in the issue primarily in the context of the anti-Armenian policy. Baku hopes in this way to make the Turkish-Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia more complete, and to use this situation to provide a favorable solution to the issue of Artsakh. Russia also uses the Meskhetian Turks' issue to repress Georgia. At the same time, its geopolitical interests contradict those of Turkey. It can be assumed that in case of aggravation of the issue, Russia's position will be mainly related to the nature of relations with Georgia and Turkey at that time.

For Armenia, the Meskhetian Turks' return to Samtskhe-Javakheti may be a serious threat to the country's security. At the same time, the interests of Armenia and Georgia in Meskhetian Turks issue mostly coincide. This can be another political platform, which may further strengthen the Armenian-Georgian cooperation and face the rise of Turkish-Azerbaijani influence in the region.

Documents

Armenian Journal of Political Sciencearjps.org/cover/eng/ARJPS-2-2018.pdf6 Tigran Torosyan, Nane Khachatryan revolutions” 1.They shared a number of common features, i.e. external