ARISTOTLEIN TWENTY-THREE VOLUMES

VIII

O N T H E S O U L ¡

P A R V A N A T U R A L ! A

O N B R E A T H

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BYW. S. H E T T , M.A.

SOMETIME SCHOLAR OF WADHAM COLLEGE, OXFORD

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESSLONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTDMCMLXXXVI

ARISTOTLE: ON THE SOUL

BOOK I

I . W e regard all knowledge as beautiful and valu- The object able, but one kind more so than another, either in of th™eth0(1 virtue of its accuracy, or because it relates to higher inquiry, and more wonderful things. On both these counts it is reasonable to regard the inquiry concerning the soul as of the first importance. Moreover this in­vestigation seems likely to make a substantial con­tribution to the whole body of truth, and particularly to the study of nature ; for the soul is in a sense the principle of animal life. So we seek to examine and investigate first the nature and essence of the soul, and then its (essential) attributes. Of the latter some seem to be affections peculiar to the soul, and others seem to belong to living things also, by virtue of the soul. But to attain any sure belief on the subject is hedged with difficulties on every side.This inquiry, I mean tha t which treats of the essence or essential nature, is common to many other fields, and one might suppose tha t there is one method applicable to all the things whose real nature we wish to understand ; just as logical demonstration applies to all their (essential) attributes. If so, this method

9

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A

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15 &v ßovXofieda yvœvat, rrjv ovaiav, a>anep 1<al r&v Kara avfißeßrjKos ISiœv arroSei^i¡,1 w ore Z,r¡T7)Téov

1 d7T¿8e1£[.v SUWX, Bekkep־8

ON THE SOUL, I. i.

must be discovered ; but if there is no one common method of finding the essential nature, our handling of the subject becomes still more difficult. For we shall be obliged to establish the proper method in each individual case ; and even if it is patent whether syllogistic demonstration, or division,“ or some other method is the right one, there is still room for con­fusion and error as to the premisses from which we must start the inquiry ; for the premisses of all sub­jects are not the same ; for instance those of arith­metic and those of plane geometry are different.

Perhaps our first business is to determine to which To what of the genera the soul belongs, and what it is ; I does8the mean whether it is a particular thing, i.e., a sub- souibeiong? stance, or whether it is a quality, or quantity, or belongs to any other of our pre-established cate­gories, and furthermore, whether it has potential or actual existence. For this makes no small difference.In the second place we must inquire whether it has parts or not, and whether every soul is of the same kind or n o t ; and if not, whether the difference is one of species or of genus. For speakers and in­quirers about the soul seem to-day to confine their inquiries to the soul of man. But one must be care­ful not to evade the question whether one definition of “ soul ” is enough, as we can give one definition of “ living creature,” or whether there must be a different one in each case ; th a t is, one of the horse, one of the dog, one of man, and one of God, and whether the words “ living creature ” as a common term have no meaning, or logically come later. This question can of course be raised about any common term Further, supposing tha ־ t there are not several souls, but only parts of one, are we to inquire first

11

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1 fjisdoSos■ In 8¿ TUVW, Bekker.0 Division. Plato used and perhaps invented this method

of forming a concept. If, for instance, you divide the term “ living creature ” into “ footed ” and “ footless,” and s footed ” again into “ biped ” and “ quadruped,” and so־on, you will after many such divisions and subdivisions form a clear concept of the meaning of “ living creature.” A. objects (Post. A n . 11, e. 7,92 b 5) to the method on several grounds, one being that such division presupposes the existence of the concept.10

into the soul as a whole or the several parts ? Here and how again it is difficult to determine which parts differ approach in nature from one another, and whether we should ?inquire first into the parts of the soul, or their func­tions ; for example, into the thinking or into tha t which thinks, into sensation or into tha t which feels ; and a similar difficulty arises with all the other parts.If we are to take the functions first, a further problem may arise ; whether we should consider the objects corresponding to them before the parts themselves —I mean, the thing felt before the part of the soul which feels it, and the thing thought before the mind which thinks it. A knowledge of a thing’s essential nature is of course a valuable assistance towards the examination of the causes of its attributes ; for instance, in mathematics, to know the meaning of “ straight,” “ curved,” “ line,” and “ plane figure ” helps to determine the number of right-angles to which the angles of a triangle are equal. But the converse is also t r u e ; the attributes contribute materially to the knowledge of what a thing is. For when we are in a position to expound all or most of the attributes as presented to us, we shall also be best qualified to speak about the essence. For the starting-point of every demonstration is the state­ment of the subject’s essential nature, and definitions which do not enable us to know the attributes, or even to make a tolerable guess about them, are clearly laid down merely for argument’s sake and are utterly valueless.

The affections of the soul present a further diffi- Relations culty—Are they all shared also by tha t which con- £^°ul an<J tains the soul, or is any of them peculiar to the soul

IS

ON THE SOUL, I. i.

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ARISTOTLE

itself ? This question must be faced, but its solution is not easy. In most cases it seems tha t none of the affections, whether active or passive, can exist apart from the body־ This applies to anger, courage, desire and sensation generally, though possibly thinking is an exception. But if this too is a kind of imagination, or a t least is dependent upon imagination, even this cannot exist apart from the body. If then any function or affection of the soul is peculiar to it, it can be separated from the body ; but if there is nothing peculiar to the soul it cannot be separated. In the same way there are many attri­butes belonging to the straight, qua straight, as, for instance, th a t a straight line touches a bronze sphere at a point, yet if separated, the straightness will not so touch. I t is in fact inseparable, if it is always associated with some body. Probably all the affec­tions of the soul are associated with the body—anger5 gentleness, fear, pity, courage and joy, as well as loving and hating ; for when they appear the body is also affected. There is good evidence for this. Sometimes no irritation or fear is expressed, though the provocations are strong and obvious ; and con­versely, small and obscure causes produce movement, when the body is disposed to anger, and when it is in an angry mood. And here is a still more obvious proof. There are times when men show all the symptoms of fear without any cause of fear being present. If this is the case, then clearly the affections of the soul are formulae expressed in m atter. Their definitions therefore must be in harmony with this ; for instance, anger must be defined as a movement of a body, or of a part or faculty of a body, in a par­ticular state roused by such a cause, with such an

15

ON THE SOUL, I. i.

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ARISTOTLE

14

O' &

®ad in view. This a t once makes it the business of the natural philosopher to inquire into the soul, either generally, or a t least in this special aspect. But the natural philosopher and the logician will in every case offer different definitions, e.g., in answer to the question what is anger. The la tter will call It a craving for retaliation, or something of the s o r t ; the former will describe it as a surging of the blood and heat round the heart. The one is describing the m atter, the other the form or formula of the essence. For what he states is the formula of the thing, and if it is to exist, i t must appear in appropriate m atter. To illustrate this : the formula of a house is a covering to protect from damage by wind, rain and heat. But another will mean by a house stones, bricks and tim ber ; and another again will mean the form ex­pressed in these materials to achieve these objects. Now which of these is really the natural philosopher ? The man who ignores the formula and is only con­cerned with the m atter, or the man who is only concerned with the formula ? Probably the man who bases his concept on both. W hat then are we to say of the other two ? Surely there is no one who treats of the affections of m atter which are insepar­able, or regarded as inseparable.® The natural philosopher’s concern is with all the functions and affections of a given body, i.e., of m atter in a given state % any attribute not of this kind is the business of another ; in some subjects it is the business of the expert, the carpenter, it may be, or the physician ; but inseparables in so far as they are not affections of the body in such a state, tha t is, in the abstract¡,

0 Sc., from their matter.

ON THE SOUL, I. i.

17

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a oSe W s ó S¿ ESTV : e?So? UX, Bekker־2 oo־a Ej, Torstrik ; oTroaa.

ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL, I, i.—11.

are the province of the mathematician, and in so far as they are separable are the sphere of the First Philosopher.“

But we must now return to the point from which our digression started. We were saying th a t the affections of the soul, such as anger and fear, are in­separable from the m atter of living things in which their nature is manifested, and are not separable like a line or a plane.

II. In our inquiry about the soul we shall have to Previous raise problems for which we must find a solution, and ain our progress we must take with us for comparison nato^of the theories expounded by our predecessors, in order tha t we may adopt those which are well stated, and be on our guard against any which are unsatisfactory.But our inquiry must begin by laying down in advance those things which seem most certainly to belong to the soul by nature. There are two qualities in which tha t which has a soul seems to differ radically from that which has n o t ; these are movement and sensation. We have practically accepted these two distinguishing characteristics of the soul from our predecessors. Some say tha t capacity to produce movement is first and foremost the characteristic of the soul. But because they believe th a t nothing can produce movement which does not itself move, they have supposed th a t the soul is one of the things which move. On this supposition Democritus argues tha t the soul is a sort of fire or heat. For forms and atoms being countless, he calls the spherical ones fire and soul, and likens them to the (so-called) motes in the air, which can be seen in the sunbeams passing through our windows ; the aggregate of these par­ticles he calls the elements of which all nature is

19

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ARISTOTLE

® i.e. the Metaphysician־318

ON THE SOUL, I. n.

composed. And Leucippus adopts a similar position.I t is the spherical atoms which they call the soul, because such shapes can most readily pass through anything, and can move other things by virtue of their own motion ; for they suppose tha t the soul is tha t which imparts motion to living things. Hence they consider also th a t respiration is the essential condition of life ; for the surrounding atmosphere exerts pressure upon bodies and thus forces out the atoms which produce movement in living things, because they themselves are never a t rest. The resulting shortage is reinforced from outside, when other similar atoms enter in the act of breathing ; for they prevent the atoms which are in the bodies a t the time from escaping by checking the compressive and solidifying action of the surrounding atmosphere ; and animals can live just as long as they are competent to do this. The theory handed down from the Pyth­agoreans seems to entail the same view ; for some of them have declared tha t the soul is identical with the particles in the air, and others with what makes these particles move. These particles have found their place in the theory because they can be seen perpetually in motion even when the air is com­pletely calm. Those who say th a t the soul is tha t which moves itself tend towards the same view. For they all seem to assume that movement is the dis­tinctive characteristic of the soul, and tha t everything else owes its movement to the soul, which they suppose to be self-moved, because they see nothing producing movement which does not itself move.

In the same way Anaxagoras (and so too anyone Anaxagoras, else who has held tha t mind set everything in motion) says th a t the soul is the producer of movement.

21

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A eVKLTTTTOS. TOVTCÚV Sé T«Z G(f>atpoetSf¡ l¡fV)(r¡V, Std ro ptáXtara Std Travros Svvaodat StaSvvetv rovsTOIOVTOVS pVOjJLOVS, Kal KIV€LV TO, XotTTCL Ktvovfieva Kal a vrá , VTroXapfiávovres rrjv x¡fV)(7]V elvat ro Trapé^ov ro ts t,(jpois rr¡v Ktvrjotv. Stó Kal rov t,fjv

10 jpov e lva t rr¡v ávanvor¡v • avváyovros yáp rov TrepiéxovTos rá acopiara, Kal ¿k6Xl¡3ovtos rtov o’X'rjptárcov ra Trapéxovra fo ts £(pots rr¡v klvt¡oiv S ia ro fujS5 avra rjpeptelv ¡xrjSéTTore, fior¡6etav ytyvecrdat dvpadev ¿Tretatóvrcov aXXoov rotovroov ¿v río ávanveiv KcoXvetv yáp a vrá Kal ra evviráp-

15 %ovra ¿v t q l s '(,ojoís ¿KKpíveadat, avvavetpyovra ro avváyov icol Triqyvvov■ Kal t,r¡v Se ecos av Svvcovrat rovro TToieiv. eotKe Se Kal ro Trapo.í rcov U v6- ayopeicov Xeyóptevov rr¡v avrrjv e%eiv Stávotav €(f>aaav yáp n v e s avrcov ipvxrjv e lva t ra ¿v ría áépt ^ vafia r a , oí Se ro ra vra k lvo vv . irepl Sé rovrcov

20 etprjrai, S ió n avvexcos <f>aíverai Ktvovpteva, kcív fj vrjveptía TravreXrjS. ¿ni ravro Sé <f>épovrat Kal oaot Xéyovoi rr¡v ifrvxfjv ro avro k lv o v v • eotK aat y á p ovroi '¡rá.vres .V7retXrj<f>évai rr¡v icívr¡(jiv ohcetórarov elvat r fj iftv>xf¡, xa l ra ptév dXXa rrávra K tvetadat Stá rrjv ijjvxr¡v, ravrr¡v S־ vcf)’ eavrfjs, Stá ro ¡JtrjOév

25 opáv Kivovv o ptr¡ Kal avro K tvetra t.*Optoícos Se Kal 5A va^ayópas tpvxrjv elvat Xéyet

rr¡v Kivovaav, Kal e l r ts aAAos etpr¡Kev eos ro ■¡rdv

m

II

ON THE SOUL, I. n.

though not quite as Democritus taught. The la tter actually identified soul and mind ; for he believed tha t tru th is subjective. Hence he regards Homer’s description of Hector in his swooning as “ lying thinking other thoughts ” as accurate.® He does not then employ the term mind as denoting a faculty concerned with the truth, but identifies the soul and the mind.

Anaxagoras is less precise in his dealing with the su b jec t; for on many occasions he speaks of mind as responsible for what is right and correct, but at others he says th a t this is the soul : for mind he regards as existing in all living things, great and small, noble and base ; but mind in the sense of intelligence does not appear to belong to all living things alike, nor even to all men.

Those then who have interpreted the soul in terms of motion have regarded the soul as most capable of producing movement. But those who have referred it to cognition and perception regard the soul as the first beginning of all things—some regarding this first beginning as plural and some as singular. Em- Empedocles, pedocles, for instance, thought tha t the soul was composed of all the elements, and yet considered each of these to be a soul. He says :

By Earth we see Earth, by W ater Water,By Air the divine Air, by Fire destroying Fire, Love by Love, and Strife by bitter Strife.

In the same way, in the Timaeus, Plato constructs the soul out of the elements. For he maintains tha t “ like ” can only be known by “ like,” and tha t from these first beginnings grow the things which we perceive. A similar definition is laid down in his

23

404 a > ׳ A « * » \ ^ ׳etCLViqoe vo v s , ov ¡!■'¡)v TravreAojg y cdgttep i\rj[xo-K piros. hceivos ¡xev y a p o.7tXu>s r a v r o v ifjv)(r)vkcll v o v v t o y a p aArjOes e lva i t o (f>atvo[xevov Sto

so KaAcos TTOirjaai to v "Ojxrjpov cos “ -E/CTOjp Kelr aAAo״ (¡>povea)v.:’ ov hr¡ x p rjra i ra> v<3 cos Svvdjxei. n v i repi!׳ rrjv aXrjOetav, aAAa r a v r o Aeyet if/vxrjv Kai vovv.

401b ,Avatjayopas S’ rjrrov S iaaa^el irepl avrcov 7ToXXa~vov jxev yap to oItiov rod !caAtos Kai opocos tov vouv Aeyet, erepcoOi Se rovrov elvai rrjv ipvx^v• iv arraui yap inrap ^ e tv avrov roZs t,(i>ois, Kai

g ¡xeyaAois Kai ¡iiKpoZs, Kai ti/jllols Kai drtpLorepois. ov (¡)aiverai S־ o ye /cara cf>povr]cnv Aeyofxevos vovs -rrdcnv ojjioiojs imdpxeiv rocs ^mols, aAA־ ouSe to i?dvdp(imOlS TTO.OLV.

"Ocfol ¡xev ovv i n i to KiveZodai t o e/xif/v^ov ¿7r- ej3Aei/jav, oijtoi t o KLvrjriKcorarov im eAaftov rrjv ipvxrjv• o(tol 8s 673־t t o yiva>OKet,v ical t o a lo d a vea d a i

10 tcov ovtcdv, ovtoi Se A eyouot rrjv ipu%׳ v Tay a p y a s , o i ¡xev TrXeiovs rro iovvres, o i Se ¡xiav ra v r r jv , coairep 0!¿IJLiTeSoicArjs ¡xev ¿k tw v gtol^ llov Travraov, e tvat Se /cat eK aarov i[ivxrjv tovtojv, Aeycuv ovrco

yair¡ ¡xev y a p y a la v OTriimaixev, v S a n S’ v8cop,aW epi S’ aW epa S lav , d r dp v v p i irvp dt8r]Aov,

15 o ro p yfj Se o ro p yrjv , veiKos Se re vei/cet Avypco.

to v avrov Se rpdrrov Kai IIAaTOtiv ev tc3 T ijxaicp i[fv)(r]v ¿k to ׳7-771 jv aroLx^i-oov ■noiel• yivcouKeadai yap rqj ¿¡xoiu) t o o[Xolov, to . Se Trpdy/xara ¿k to jv dpxojv eivat. ¿¡xolws Se /cat ev ro ts vepi <f>iAocro<f>ias

a Because on D.’s theory the dying Hector’s delusions are true. For the reference ef. Iliad xxiii. 698־ and see note on Metaphysics 1009 b So­s a

ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL, I. n.

comments About Philosophy, where he maintains tha t the living universe is derived from the idea of the One and from the primary length, breadth and depth ; and everything else in the same way. But he also gives another account, tha t mind is One and knowledge Two (for there is only one straight line from one point to another) ; and the number of the plane (Three) is opinion, and the number of the cube (Four) is sensation. For numbers are alleged to be identical with the forms themselves and ultimate principles, but they are composed of the elements.® The sensible world is apprehended in some cases by mind, in others by knowledge, in others again by opinion, and in others by sensation; and these numbers are the forms of things.

But since the soul appears to contain an element which produces movement and one which produces knowledge, so some thinkers have constructed it from both, explaining the soul as a number moving itself. But men differ about the first principles of things, both as to their nature and quantity, especially those who make them corporeal from those who make them incorporeal, and from both these differ those who combine the two and explain the ultimate prin­ciples as compounded of both. They differ again about the number, some alleging th a t there is one, and others more than one. The account they give of the soul in each case follows their conclusions 5

of our concepts. One was not considered by the Greeks as a number, but only as the fountain of all numbers. So the three dimensions are derived from the numbers 2, 3, and 4 respectively. As “ like ” is known by “ like,” there are similarly in the soul faculties corresponding to these. So mind corresponds to One, Knowledge to Two, and so on.

ARISTOTLE£<94 5j

20 AeyopeVot? SiojpioBr¡, a v ro ¡xev t o t,&ov e | a vrrjs t f j s t o v ¿vos I8eas Kal t o v vpcbrov ¡xt^kovs K.ai rrXarovs Kal j3adovs, to . S' aAAa 0fX0i0Tp07T0>s. e n s ¿ «:at aAAit)?, vovv ¡xev t o ev, eTTLOTTjixrjv Se r a Svo ([iovax&>S y a p ¿ f t ev), to v Se ro u ¿TmreSov apiQfzov ho^av, a lodrjo iv Se to v t o v a re p e o v ״ 01

25 p-ev y a p api9p.ol t ¿ etS7j a!5ra «rat a t a p ^ a t eAeyovTO, e ta t S’ ¿k t w v OTOL^eicov. KpiveTai Se to . 7rpayp.aTa\ \ ~ \ OX /> \0 9to , fiev vo), r a o ZTnGTrjiJLr¡, r a 06 oogr¡^ r a o aloOrjoei,■ etSr) S’ o t aptQfiol ovtol tw v TrpayptaTcov.

5E-n-et Se /cat klvtjtlkov eSo/cet •j] ^ vXV ^ vaL ,<a yviopiUTiKov, ovtojs evtot awerrXe^av ¿£ a/Jttfrotv,

so a7ro^>Tjvapevot ׳n^v i/jv)(r)v aptdpLOv K ivovvd? ¿a vro v . Sta^epovTat Se 7rept tcov ap^tov, Ttve? /cat Trooai, [xaXiara p.ev ot aojfjLaTLKas ■notovvres tols 6.000-

405 a [xaTOVSj1 tovtols S’ ot fii^avTes Kal 077’ ap<£otv Tas ap^as׳ aTTO(f)rjvdfJL€VOL. 8ta<f>epovTat Se /cat irepl to ttXijOos״ o t p,ev y a p p Lav 01 Se TrXeiovs Xeyovcrtv. ¿voptevcas Se TOUTOt? /cat rrjv ifsvvrjV a vo S tS o a o tv״

1 tois acraifiarous comm. vett. : ra? aam/xdTovs X : ׳rots¿o-cjn!i(irois V u lgo.

E This difficult passage gives Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato’s theory of Ideas¡ as applied to the origin of the uni­verse. We know of no treatise of Plato About Philosophy, but tradition ascribes the reference to some lecture notes of Plato to which Aristotle had access. According to this theory Pure Knowledge has some object corresponding to i t ; this object is not the world of Sense, but the world of Ideas. All the sensible world is thus but an imperfect copy of this world of Ideas. There is, for instance, in the world of Ideas an Idea Beauty. Objects in the world of Sense are beautiful only in so far as they are copies of this. But the world of Ideas includes the Ideas of numbers and. according to the theory Aristotle is discussing, from these are derived some24

for they consider tha t which by its own nature pro­duces movement to be a primary reality ; which is not unreasonable. And so some have thought the soul to be fire ; for this is composed of the finest particles, and of all the elements is the nearest to incorporeal, and it also in a primary sense moves and causes movement in other things. Democritus has Democritus־ explained with greater precision why each of these two things is so i for he identifies the soul and the mind.This, he says, consists of primary and indivisible bodies, and its power of producing movement is due to the smallness of its parts, and its shape ; for he calls the spherical the most easily moved of all shapes 5 and this characteristic is shared by mind and fire.

Anaxagoras indeed seems to regard soul and mind Anaxagoras, as different, as we have said before, but he treats them both as of one nature, except th a t he regards mind as above all things the ultimate principle ; at any rate, he speaks of it as the only existing thing which is simple, unmixed, and pure. But he assigns both the power of knowing and of moving to the same principle when he says tha t mind set everything moving. Thales, too, to judge from what is recorded Thales, of his views, seems to suppose tha t the soul is in a sense the cause of movement, since he says tha t a stone 0 has a soul because it causes movement to iron. Diogenes and some others think th a t the soul Diogenes, is air, regarding this as composed of the finest par­ticles, and as an ultimate principle ; for this reason he believes tha t the soul both knows, and causes m ovem ent; it knows because it is primary and from it all else comes ; it causes movement because of its extreme tenuity. Heracleitus also calls the Heracleitus. first principle soul, as the emanation from which

ON THE SOUL, I. n .

27

405 a6 t o re yap KivrjriKOV rrjv <f>vaiv rcov jrpcoraiv im°

eiArjcfxxcriv, ovk aAoycoj. odev eSo^e n a i irvp elvai״ ical yap rovro Xeirro pie pear ar6v re Kal ¡idXiara ra>v arof)(eioiv ao־c6fiaroi׳, e n Se Kiveirai re Kal Kivei r d aAAa rrpcoTcos. l\r][jLOKpiTOS he Kal yXa- <f>vpa)repcos etprjKev aTro<f>r]vap.evos Sia n rovrcov ¿Karepov ifsvxty piev yap elvai ravro Kal vovv,

1© rovro o’ elvai rcov wpdoraav Kal aSiaipenov am- ¡idraiv, KivrjriKOV Se Sid fiiKpofiepeiav /cat t o

a^rjpca• row Se a״yjnidraiv evKiviqrorarov ro crfiaipo- ctSes Aeyet* roiovrov S’ elvai rov re vovv Kal t o

irvp.5Avatjayopas S־ eoiKe p.ev erepov Xeyeiv iffvxtfv

re Kal vovv, wanep eiTrofiev Kal 7TpSrepov, %pr}rai SS S’ d^(bolv u>$ ilia <f>vcrei, TrXrjv dpxrjv ye rov vovv

ridera i ¡xdXiura rrrdvrcov ¡xovov yovv (fnrjalv avrov t c o v ovrusv airXovv elvai Kal dpnyrj re Kal KaOapov. diToSiScoai S’ dpi(f>a> rfj avrfj dpxfj, ro re yiviooKeiv Kal ro KiveZv, Xeycav vovv Kivfjaai t o t t S . v , eoiKe

20 Se Kal QaXrjs e£ c5v diropivrnxovevovcji KivrjriKov n rrjv \pvxr\v VTroXafSeiv, ei-jrep rov XIOov e<pr) if/vx^jv eyeiv, o n rov aiSrjpov Kivei. Aioyevr]s S’ anarrep Kal erepol rives a epas rovrov olrjOels Travrcov XeTrrofxepeararov elvai Kal dpxrfv• Kal Sid rovro yivibcrKeiv re Kal Kiveiv rrjv ifrvxrfv, fj ¡x.ev rrpiorSv e o n , ical ¿k rovrov r d Xonrd, yivcocrKeiv, fj Se

25 Xenrorarov, KivrjriKov elvai. Kal 'Hpa/cAeiTos• Se rrjv a p x ty elvai <f>rjai tffvx'r!v, ei-nep rrjv avadvpiiacriv,

ARISTOTLE

° i.e. “ the Magnesian stone,” or, as we call it, the magnet®26

ON THE SOUL, I. n.

he constructs all other things ; it is most incorporeal and in ceaseless flux : he, like many others, supposed tha t a thing moving can only be known by some­thing which moves, and tha t all tha t exists is in motion. Alcmaeon’s suppositions about the soul are Alcmaeon. somewhat similar to these ; for he says it is immortal, because it resembles immortal things, and tha t this characteristic is due to its perpetual motion ; for things divine, the moon, the sun, the stars, and the whole heavens, are in a state of perpetual motion.Some of the less exact thinkers, like Hippo, have Hippo, declared the soul to be water. This belief seems to arise from the fact tha t the seed of all animals is moist.For he rebuts those who say th a t the soul is blood, on the ground that the seed is not blood ; and seed, he says, is primary soul. Others, like Critias, have Critias. imagined the soul to be blood, because they have supposed that sensation is the peculiar characteristic of the soul, and tha t this is due to the nature of blood. In fact each of the elements in turn has found a supporter, except earth ; but this no one has suggested except in so far as one ° has said tha t the soul is composed of, or is identical with, all the elements.

But all, or almost all, distinguish the soul by three of its attributes, movement, sensation, and incor­poreality ; and each of these is referred back to the first principles. So those who define it by the power of knowing describe it as an element, or as derived from the elements, all arguing with one 6 exception on similar lines ; for they say tha t “ like ” is known by “ like ” ; for since everything is known by the soul, they construct it of all the principles. Those, then, who allege tha t there is only one cause, and but one

29

ARISTOTLE

¿ i ^js raXXa avviarrjm v Kal dcroopLaTcoTaTov 8rj Kal peov del• t o Se Kivovpievov K i v o v p b e v a ) yivdo- crKeodat° iv Kiviqoei S’ eti'a.t ra ovra k o . k < z l v o s

o j s t o Kal ot ttoXXoi. TrapavXrjuiios Se t o v t o i s

so Kal ־AA/Cjiiaia>v eoiKev {moXafteiv irepl iLvx^js׳ (f>rjal yap axnr]v adavarov elvai Sta. t o eoiKevai t o i s

adavarois, t o v t o S’ inTdpxeiv avrfj ws del k l v o v -

pievr¡• KiveioOai yap Kal t o . Oela irdvra crvve^cos 405 b ael, oeXrjvrjv, rjXiov, t o v s dcrTepas Kal rov ovpavov

6Xov. t c o v 8e (f>op T L K c o T e p c o v Kal v8o i p Tives a - n -

e ( f > r jv a v T O , KaOairep ”Imrajv. Treiodrjvai S’ eot/caatv ¿ k Trjs yovfjs, o t i T r a v T U iv vypd’ Kal yap eXey%ei

5 t o v s atfia (paoKovTas t t j v iffvxrjv, o t i r¡ yovr¡ oi>x alpha׳ Tavrirjv S’ elvai t t j v vpioTrjV iffvxrjv. erepoi Ss alfia״ K a O d v e p KptTtas, t o aladaveadai if!v)(rjs o i K e i o T a T o v v r r o X a f x ^ d v o v T e s ¡, t o v t o S־ V T r d p j^ e iv

St a t t j v t o v al/xaTos (f>vaiv. irdvra yap rd g t o ixeia K p iT r jV eiXf]<f>e, t t X t j v Trjs yrjs׳ Tavrrjv S־ ovQels

10 d T T O T T € (f> a vT a L , t t X t j v el t l s a v T T jV eiprjKev ¿ k T rd v T O J V

elvai t c o v gtoi^eioov r¡ irdvTa.*0p l^ o vra i Se Travres t t j v iffvxrjv T piolv d>s ei7reiv¡,

Kivrjoei} a lodrjae i, Tip daoopbaTCp ־ to v tc o v 8° eKaoTOV d v a y e r a i n p o s Tas ap^a?. Sto teal ot t w yivdooKeiv opi^ofxevoi a vrrjv r¡ (jToixeiov r¡ ¿k tcov OTOi%eicov iro io va i, XeyovTes ,napaTrXrjoicos aXXrjXois, ttXtjp

15 ev o s j>aol y> ׳ a p yivaxiKeardai t o ojxoiov tco ¿¡.lolcp' eTrei8tj y a p r¡ if*v)(r¡ TrdjvTa yiyvdooK ei, avviO Taaiv avTTjv ¿k iracFLov to w dpveov. oa o i ¡xev ovv ¡xiav n v d X eyovo iv a iT iav Kal (TTOi)(eiov ev, Kal t t / v

b Anaxagoras.° Empedocles־

28

elem ent, also snake the soul one elem ent, such as fire or air ; bu t those who believe in more than one first principle, m ake the soul also plural. Anax­agoras is alone in his belief th a t mind cannot be acted upon, and th a t it has nothing in common with any­thing else. But how mind, being thus constructed, can ever recognize anything, and by what agency, he does not explain, nor is it clear from his expressed views. All those who assume pairs of contrary opposites among their first principles also construct th e soul from contraries ; while those who suppose the first principle to be one of a pair of contraries such as hot and cold or the like, similarly also suppose the soul to be one of these. Thus they appeal to etymology also ; those who identify the soul with heat derive {fjv (to live) from £eiv (to boil), bu t those who identify i t with cold maintains th a t soul (}pvxv) is so called after the cooling process (.׳<arai/׳D ts) as­sociated with respiration־ These, then, are the tradi­tional views about th e soul and the grounds upon which they are held.

III . In the first place we m ust investigate the Does the question of movement. For perhaps it is not m erely soui move ? untrue th a t th e essence of the soul is such as those describe i t to be who say th a t the soul moves or can move itself, bu t it may be quite impossible th a t move­m ent should be characteristic of the soul a t all. W e have said before th a t i t is not necessary th a t th a t which produces movement should itself move. But everything may be moved in two senses (directly and indirectly. W e call movement indirect, when a thing moves because i t is in something which moves ; for instance the passengers in a ship. For they do not move in the same sense as the ship moves ; for the ship moves directly־, bu t they move only by being in

3 1

ON THE SOUL, 1־ ix.—in.

ARISTOTLE

4*VXVV TiOeacriv¡ olov rrvp r¡ depa° o l S e rrXeiovs AiyovT es Tas dpxds KO-l TVV $v)(r]v TrXeiw n o io v a iv .

20 *Avatjayopas B e ¡jlovos diraOrj (jyrjolv etvai to v vovv, Kal kolvov ovOev ovBevl t w v aA A cdv e ^ e t v . to lo vto s S ’ w v Trios y v w p ie l Kal S t a t Iv 5 a t r i a v, q v t ¿ksZvos e’lprjKev o u t ’ e/c tu>v elprjfievdov avp,<f>aves i a n v . oaoi S ’ evavTidooeis n o io vo iv iv r a t s ' dpyals, Kal rr/v *fjvXlv ^!< T^ v evavricov avvioTaoiv• ol S¿

25 Odrepov raw ivavT to iv , o lov dep/xov rj fo x p o v n [<׳ ro io v ro v aA A o j Kal Trjv ifivyjjv o^olojs eV r t to vtm v Tideacrw. 8to Kal to ls ovdpuaaiv ixkoXovBovglv, o t fiev t o Oepfjiov Xeyovres, o r t S t a to v to Kal to L,rjv (!)vofiaaTai, o l S e t o ifwxpov S t a t j ] v dvanvor]v ical rrjv Kardifsv LV KaXeladai iftvxrfv, rd fiev ovv irapa-

so S e S o[zeva rrepl ifjvx'fjs, Kal S t5 as a ir t a s A eyo ־ va iv

405

ovtco s ra vT eanv.I I I . ’ E 77to-«re77T e o v S e T rp u iT o v [x e v v r e p l K L vn ja eo a s״

la c o s y a p o v p .o v o v i f te v S o s ¿ a m r o r r / v o v a i a v

a a v r r j s T o i a v r r j v e l v a i o l a v (f> a a lv o l A e y o v r e s iffvx jv e t v a i t o k i v o v v e a v r d r¡ h v v d jx e v o v K i v e i v , aA A5 e v

n r c o v d o v v d r w v r o U77a p ^ e t F a v T r j k l v t jo l v . o t l

fx e v o v v o v k a v a y K c u o v r o k i v o v v /c a t a v t o K i v e i o d a i ,

v p S r e p o v e lp r jT a i8 ״t ^ c 5? S e K iv o v p u e v o v 7ra v T O S {v¡©\ rt /}5 e / </ O* /־» 5(/ \ y a p /c a (7 zrepov r¡ s<au avro° Kau erepov oe

Xeyofiev5 o c ra K iveirai to» ev klvov¡nevip elvai, olov TrXwTrjpes״ ov yap ofiola>s KivovvTai t w rrXoicp• to ¡lev yap Ka02 ai5ro KivetTai, o t Se r a i ei-׳ Kivovfieva)

06

mEii;

B H i B M B

ON THE SOUL, I. h i .something which moves. And this becomes obvious if we consider the parts of the body. For the move­m ent proper to the feet is walking, tha t is the move­ment natural to human beings ; and at the moment the passengers are not exhibiting this kind of motion). Movement then having two different senses, we are at present inquiring whether the soul moves and has a share in direct movement.

Now there are four kinds of movem ent: (1) change Four kinds of position, (2) change of state, (3) decay and (4) meat°Ve" growth ; if then the soul moves, it must have one, or more than one, or all of these kinds of movement.And if the movement of the soul is not accidental, then movement must belong to it by nature ; if this is so, it must have position in space, for all the kinds of movement mentioned are in space. But if it is the essence of the soul to move itself, then movement will not belong to it by accident, as it does for instance to the quality of whiteness, or to a length of three cubits ; these are liable to be moved, but only acci­dentally, and merely because the body to which they belong is moved. For this reason they have no posi­tion in space. But the soul must have position in space, if of its own nature it participates in movement.

Again, if it moves naturally, it must also be mov- Difficulties able by force ; and conversely if it is movable by force, f g move-*" then it must also move naturally. And the same ment to the thing is true about its r e s t ; for it comes to rest by 0 ' nature at the point to which it is moved by nature ; and similarly it rests by force in the place to which it is moved by force. But what these enforced move­ments of the soul and enforced rests can be is not easy to explain, even if we are prepared to allow our

ARISTOTLEí a p p \ p

elvac. hrjXov S’ i v l rw v ftopta»׳ • oîiceia ftèv y dpàoTt KiVrjGlS •JToScÙV ßcihicris, aVTTj Sè Kai àv9pœTT1ûv°

10 oî>x virâpyei Sè to Îs 7rXcorrjpcn ró re ), Síy¿os Se Xeyofievov to v Kiveîcrdat, vvv imaK07T0v¡j,ev Trepl r r j s i p v y r j s e l /ca#’ a v T r jv K i v e ï r a i k o t ft e r é y e i

K iv r ja e c o s .

'Teacxàpcov Sè K1vr¡<7e0üv ovcrœv, <f>opdç àXXoiœcreous

<f>9i<jecos avÇrfaecos, rj f ttav rovrcov klvoîtכ av 77

nXeiovs r¡ rr acras. e׳ t Sè K iveîra i ¡xrj K a rà au f t-

15 ßeßrjK os, (f>v(J€L av VTrapypi k Ívt¡gís a v r f j״ e i Sè

TOVTO¡ Kal tottos' rrâuai y à p a t X e^ßelaai Kwqcreis

ev tot:co. e t 8’ e a r tv o ןו v a ia rr js ÿ v y r js t o KiveZv

ia v r q v , ov K a ra avpißeßrjKos a v rf j to Kivelcrdai

w ra p ^ e t, cooTrep tío XevKCp rj tco Tpnrryyei• /c tvetra t

20 y à p /cat r a v r a , aAÀà /c a ra avpbßeßrjKos׳ <S y à p

vrrá p yo va iv , ¿Keívo /c tv e tra t, t o acùfta. Sto /cat oú/c

eoTt tottos* a v r c o v Trjs Sé 1pV)(7js e a r a i, et-rrep (f>vaet

KLvrjcrecos f te re ^ e t.

״ E r t S’ et cf)va€í KtveÎTat, Kav ß ia K1vr¡9eivl • !cav

e t ß ia , Kai cfrvoeL. to v a v ro v Sè Tp¿7rov ey e i Kai

irepl r¡ pe púas ’ et? o y à p /c tvetra t (f>vcre1} Kai r¡pe¡j.el

25 i v TOVTtp cf>voe1• ¿[jloloüs Sé /cat e ts o K tveira i ß ia ,

Kai r¡pep,eí ¿v to v to j ß ia . 7rotat Sé ß ia io i rrjs

1¡jvyfjs Kivrjcreis eaovraL /cat rjpepúau, ovSe TrXárreiv

fancies free play. Again, if the soul moves upwards it will be fire, and if downwards, earth ; for these two movements belong respectively to these two bodies ; and the same argument will apply to movements intermediate between “ up ” and “ down.”

Moreover, since the soul can be seen to move the body, it is reasonable to suppose tha t it imparts to it the same movements that it has itself ; and if this is so, then it is true to assert conversely that the soul has the same movements as the body. Now the body moves by change of position ; and therefore the soul must change position in the same manner as the body, either as a complete whole or in respect of its parts. But, if this is possible, it would also be possible for a soul which has left the body to enter in again ; and upon this would follow the possibility of resurrection for animals which are dead.

Indirect movement of the soul may indeed be caused by something external to i t ; the living creature may be pushed by force. But that which has self­movement as part of its essence cannot be moved by anything else except incidentally : just as tha t which is good in itself is not good because of anything else, and tha t which is good for its own sake is not good for the sake of anything else.® But one would be inclined to assert tha t the soul, if it is moved at all, is most likely to be moved by sensible objects.

Moreover, if the soul moves itself, it is also itself moved, so that, if all movement is a displacement of that which is moved qua moved, then the soul must depart from its essential nature, if it does not move

for its own sake. Similarly the essential self-movement of the soul is not to be explained as imparted indirectly from without.

3 5

ON THE SOUL, I. in.

ARISTOTLE§03 a

fiovXo/xevots pa8 tov d-rroSovvat. e n S et ¿tier <xfoj K tvrjaerat, Trvp c a r a t , e l Se K a r a , y ^ • rovr<ov y a p r a w aa)[JtdroiV a t Ktvrjoets a v r a t . o S’ auros■ Aoyo?

80 /cat n e p l ra iv ¡xera^v.* E r i S’ ¿Tret (¡>atverat K tvovaa r o aa»[xas r a v r a s

evXoyov Ktvetv r d s K tvrjaets a s Kal avrr¡ K tve lra t. e l Se r o v r o , Kal dvrtarpdifraaiv eliretv dXrjOes o n

m h v jv t o aoopta Ktvelrat¡, r a v r t jv Kal avrr¡. r o Se o-cS/xa K tvelra t <j)opa• w a re Kal r¡ *frvxy perafidXXoL dv K ara t o ooofia fj SXr¡ rj K a ra ¡lop ta ¡xe6tara[xevr¡. e l Se r o y r ’ evSe^eTat, /cat e^eXOovoav e ta teva t

/ \ 5 0 t / 5 V f </ 5 « \ JTTaAiv evoe)(oir a v ° tovtco o €7toit av ro a v - s iaraadai rd reOvewra rw v l,a)Q)v.

Trjv Se KaTa ovptfiefirjKos Ktvrjatv Kav v f t erepov K tvotro ’ a>adetr¡ yap dv ¡3La ro £><pov. ov Set Se cS t o v i f ia v r o v KtveloOat ev rrj o v a ta , rovO w ־ r5 dXXov KtvetaOat, ttXrjv el ¡xr¡ K ara av/x^e^K os¡,

& ) O \ * / p ? * 5 A * i \ ^ 5 e / taxnrep ovoe ro Kau avro ayauov r¡ ot, avro , to' C« S' V \ \ 'S׳ 05 c / c/ ^

10 [lev o& aAAo elvai, ro o erepov eveKev. rrjv he *pvyrjV [xdXtara <halr¡ r t s d v vtto rGiv a iodrjriov K tvetada t, eiirep K tvelra t.

S A \ ' ' ' * -> ? 1 c/■ 1 5 »AAAa ¡xi]v K at et /civet ye avrr¡ avrrjv, /cat avrr¡ Kivolr av, <5<tt’ et Trdoa Ktvrjats eKaraais ¿art rov Ktvov/xevov fj Ktvelrat, Kal f¡ *pyx?¡ ¿(;taratr av e/c rrjs ovaias, el ¡xr¡ Kara avfx^e^rjKos avrrjv

a M any of the things we want we want for the sake of something e k e ; e.g. we may want money for the sake of health״ health for the sake of our work in the world, and so on. But ultimately we must reach a “ good ” which we want 84

1

ON THE SOUL, I. i ii .

itself accidentally, but movement is part of its very essence.

Some say tha t the soul moves its body exactly as it is moved itself. Such is the view of Democritus, arguing in the vein of Philippus the comic dram atist; for he tells us tha t Daedalus made his wooden Aphro­dite move by pouring in quicksilver.0 Democritus speaks in a similar strain ; for he says tha t the spherical atoms, as they move because it is their nature never to remain still, draw the whole body with them and so move it. But we shall ask whether these same atoms also produce rest. How they can do so, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say. In general the living creature does not appear to be moved by the soul in this way, but by some act of mind or will.

In the same way Plato’s Timaeus 6 also gives a Plato’s view physical account of how the soul moves the body ; causes he thinks tha t the soul moves the body by its own movement, owing to their intimate inter-connexion. ° e 0 y* For first the Creator fashioned it out of all the ele­ments, and divided it according to the harmonic ratios, in order th a t it might have innate perception of harmony and the universe might move by harmonic movements ; then he bent the straight line into the form of a circle, and, having divided the one circle into two, meeting a t two points, he again divided one of these into seven. Thus Plato identifies the move­ments of the soul with the spatial movements of the heavenly bodies.

(1) Now to say th a t the soul is a spatial magnitude Objections is unsound ; for he clearly means “ the soul of the viewlat°'S world ” to be some such thing as what is called mind ;

6 Plato, Timaeus, pp. 33 sqq.37

406 fe s d ; f> p 9 t 9 /־• ¡rp!5 kiveZ, aAAs e a n v r¡ K ivrjais rr js o v a la s a vrr js Kau

avrr¡v.Evtoí. Se koI KiveZv <f>acrl rr¡v i/jvx^v ro״ aa>¡xa ev

tb earlv eos avrr¡ KiveZrai, olov ¿krjfíÓKpiros, Trapa- TrXrjcjLüis Xéymv ^iX lttttíü tü¡> KíüiicühooSaaK<íXcú ״ <¡}7j(Á ydp rov AaíSaXov Kivovfiévr/v TTOir¡aai rr¡v ¡tjvXívrjv * A<f>pohíry¡v, ¿yx¿av r dpyvpov xpróv.

20 ¿¡¿oicus Se Kal Arj/JbÓKpiros Xéyei• kivov¡tévas yáp <f)T¡ai ra s aSiaipérovs apalpas 8 id ro vefivKevai jxrjSéirore piéveiv, ovvecfréXKeiv Kal KiveZv ro acopia •ndv. rj¡ieZs Ss epcorrjaopiev el Kal r¡pépnjaiv noieZ ra vrd ra vra . ttcos Se Troirjaei¡, ^aAeTroi¡׳ t) fcai áSvvarov elneZv. oXcos S’ oi)v ovtcü (f>aíverat

25 KiveZv 7] iffv)(r] ro tipoy¡, áXÁa 8id rrpoaipéaews tipos Kal vorjoecos.

T o f avróv Se rpórrov Kal o T ípLaios <¡>vat,oÁoyeZ rr¡v ifrvx*lv KlV€w ™ o-¿Dju.a“ tío yap KiveZaOai avrfjv Kal ro acopia KiveZv Sid ro avp,7T€7íXéx0ai irpós avró. crvveaTT]KvZav ydp ¿k rS>v aroixeíoov¡, Kal ¡xepiepiapiévrjv Kara rovs appioviKovs ápiOpiovs,

so ottíos aíadr¡aív re avp,cf>vrov áppiovías exü Ka'L T° ndv (fiéprjTai cwp,(f)(t)V0Vs <f)opás} rrjv evdvcopíav els kvkXov KaT¿Ka¡j,i/tev״ Kal BieXcov ¿k rov evos 8vo

407 a kvkXovs S iaaaxfj avvrjpipiévovs rráXiv rov evo. SieZXev els eirra kvkXovs, d>s ovaras ra s rov ovpavov ־fyopds ra s .rrjs ipv)(rjs Kivrjaeis ׳

Upcorov piév ovv ov KaXcos ro Xeyeiv rr¡v ifwxVv ¡léyedos elvai״ rr¡v ydp rov iravros 8f¡Xov orí, roíavrr¡v elvai fíovXerai oíóv rror ¿arlv o KaXov-

ARISTOTLE

a The point of the comparison is that both offer a purely external and mechanical explanation of movement.36

ON THE SOUL, I. m .

it is nothing like either the perceptive or desiderative faculty ; for their movements are not circular. But mind is one and continuous in the same sense as the process of thinking ; thinking consists of thoughts״ But the unity of these is one of succession, like tha t of numbers, whereas the unity of spatial magnitudes is not. So also the mind is not continuous in this sense, but it either has no parts, or at any rate is not continuous as a magnitude. For, if it is a magnitudes how can it think ? With any one of its parts indiffer­ently ? The parts must be regarded either as magni­tudes or as points, if one can call a point a part. In the latter case, since the points are infinite in number, the mind can obviously never exhaust them ; in the former, it will think the same thoughts very many or an infinite number of times. But it is clear tha t it is also capable of thinking a thought once only. (2) If it is sufficient for it to touch with any one of its parts, why should it move in a circle, or have magnitude at all ? But if it can only think when its whole circle is in contact, what does the contact of its parts mean ? (3) Again, how can it think tha t which has parts with tha t which has not, or th a t which has not with th a t which has ? The mind must be identical with this circle ; for the movement of the mind is thinking, and the movement of a circle is revolution. If then thinking is revolution, then the circle whose revolu­tion is of this kind must be mind. But what can it be which mind always thinks ?—as it must if the revolu­tion is eternal. All practical thinking has limits (for it always has an object in view), and speculation is bounded like the verbal formulae which express it״ Every such formula is a definition or a demonstration־

as Ixevos vovs״ ou yap Sr¡ olov y5 r¡ aladrjriKrj, ovd?

otov 7] ¿TTidvjJLiqTiic•/¡' rovrcov yap rj Kivrjois ov KVK\o<f>op¿a. o Se vovs els i<al ovvexr¡s, cocnrep seal rj vórjois׳ r¡ Se vórjais ra vor¡[xara״ ra vra Se rq> ¿«petjrjs ev, ws apiOjxós, aXX oi>x ws t o ¡iéyeGos. Sióirep ov S’ ó vovs ovreo ovvex'fjS, dX X rjroi a¡L€pr¡s

10 r¡ oi>x ws ¡JbéyeOós n avvexrfs״ ttcüs yap 8r¡ Kal vorjoei jiéyedos tóv; rrórepov1 otíoovv jiopi(¡) tcov avrov ; jiopíaiv S5 rjroi Kara ¡zéyedos r¡ Kara a n y - ¡JbrjV, el Sed real rovro ¡lópiov elireiv. eí ¡xev ovv Kara ony¡ir¡vs avrai S’ aneipoi, SrjXov eos ovSéirore 8ié£eiGLV} el Se Kara ¡xéyedos» TToXXaKis r¡ áneípaKis

1® vorjuei ro avró. <f>a¿verat. Se Kal aíra¿; evhexóp-evov. el S” íicavov Oiyelv otíoovv tíov /lopíüív, r í Set kvkXío KivelaOai r¡ Kal oAcus fieyeOos e^etv ; el S־ ávayicalov vorjorai rio oXíú kvkXío 0iy¿vra} r¿s eanv rj roXs ¡Jiopíois Oí$ts ; e n Se ticos• vor¡oei ro ¡uepiarov ajiepel Kal ro á¡xepes fxepiarcp ; avayKalov Se rov

20 vovv elvai rov kvkXov to v to v . vov ¡¿ev yap Kivrjais vórjOLs¡, kvkXov Se nepicfiopá. el ovv r¡ vórjois •nepi- <f>opá, Kal vovs av e’lrj o kvkXos, ov r¡ roiavrrj ■nepi- (¡>opa \yórj(jLs\.* del Se Sr¡ r í vor¡aei ;* Set yáp, eirrep átSios rj Trepujiqpá’ tíov ¡lev yap rrpaKTiKÍov vorjaecov

25 e a n Trepara (■ndoai yap érépov xápw ), a i Se Oeaspi]- T L K a l rols Xóyois ¿fAoícos ópl^ovrar Xóyos Se iras

1 ¿!>v ; rrórcoov ¿tc¡)ovv tcov ¡xopLiav E 1, B iehl! a>v otíoovv tíov ¡xoplcúv Bekker.

2 Torstrik.8 Sr¡ t í vor¡crei ; Simplicius, Torstrik, Biehl, Rodier ; fhj n

vo-qoer 88

ARISTOTLE

Demonstrations both start from a beginning, and have in a sense an end, viz., the inference or con­clusion. Even if they do not arrive a t a conclusion, a t least they do not return again to the beginning, but advance in a straight line by means of additional middle or extreme terms. But circular movement is for ever returning to its starting-point. Definitions, too, are all finite. Again, if the same revolution recurs frequently, the mind must frequently think the same thing. (4) Again, thinking seems more like a state of rest or a halting than a m ovem ent; and the same thing is true of the syllogism. (5) Furthermore, that which moves not easily but only by force cannot be happy ; and if the soul’s movement is not part of its essence, it will be moved unnaturally. (6) Again, the inescapable association of the mind with the body would be wearisome ; such a conception must be re­jected, if it is true tha t it is better for the mind to be without the body, as is usually said and widely ac­cepted. (7) Again, the reason why the heavens should move■ in a circle is obscure. For the essence of the soul is not the cause of this circular movement—it only moves in this way by accident; nor is the body | on the contrary, the soul causes the body’s move­ment. Nor is there any suggestion tha t this circular movement is better, and yet God should surely have made the soul move in a circle for this very reason, tha t movement is a better condition for it than rest, and this movement better than any other. But since this inquiry belongs more properly to another subject, let us leave it for the present.

But there is one absurd feature both in this argu- Relation of ment, and in most of those about the soul. Men |o^1yand associate the soul with and place it in the body, with-

41

ON THE SOUL, I. iii .

פ 407e « sa ף ׳/ <> > e Q. כ 5 c> p j s>opiG <גי 5 •¡ fioç i] a7T ooeiç iç ' a i o a7roà€Lçç1s K ai 077 o.px’fjs, Kal exoval 7rcos réXos rov avXÁoyiapbóv 7ין ro av¡17répaa¡1a• ei Sè ¡17] דreparovvrai, ¿AA’ oy/c avaKa/JLTrrovoL ye 7ráX1v ¿tt‘‘ apyrjv, 7rpoaXap,ßa- vovGai S־ ael ¡Jiéaov Kal aKpov evdvrropovaiv r¡

30 Sè 7rep1cf)0pá iráXiv eii* apxrjv ávaKá¡nrre1 . oí S־ ¿piapiol irávres 7re7repaa¡JLévo1. e n el r¡ ainrj 7rep1- (fropà TToÀÀaKis, Ser¡ae1 7roXÁát<1s voeív ro avré. e n S’ r¡ vórjais eoiKev 7¡pe¡xr¡ae1 n v l Kal ém araaei ¡xdÁÁov 7j Kívr¡(jeL״ rov avrov Se rpórrov Kal o avXXoy1ap,ós. aAAá ¡jl7¡v ovSe ¡xa 1<áp1óv ye ro ¡xr¡

401 & páSiov aAAá ßla iov״ el S’ earlv rj Kivrjais avrrjs ¡17]

ovala , 7rapá <f>vo1v av Kivoîro. eirlnovov Se 1<al ro ¡lepXxOai r¿o acó ¡zar 1 ¡lt¡ S vvá¡x,evov á-iroXvdrjvai, 1cal TTpoaéri (f>evKróv, eirrep ßeXnov rôt vâ> ¡ir¡ ¡lera

6 acoparos eîvai, Kadánep etcodé re X¿yeaOai Kal TToXXoís avvSoKeî. a8r¡Xos Se Kal rov kvkXíü (J>épea6ai rov ovpavov r¡ airla• ovre ya.p rrjs *jjvyfis r¡ ovala a lrla rov kvkXco (¡)épeaÔai, aAAá Kara av/j,ßeßr)K0s ovrw Kiveirai, ovre ro aco¡1a a’ln o v , ¿AA־ r¡ *pvXV P-S.XÁ0V ¿Kelva>. aAAá ¡xrjv ovS־ orí

10 ßeXnov X eyerar Kalroi y ¿xprjv Sta rovro rov Oeóv kvkXco TTOieZv <f>épeada1 rr¡v ipvx^v, orí ßeXnov avrfj ro Kiveíadai rov ¡zéveiv, KivelaOai S־ ovrcost\ >/\\ 5> \ o 3 s * e / / ¡ ç r7} aAAcOS€7 .־T€l O €<JTIV 7) TOiaVTT¡ GK€lplS €Tep(JúVXóycov oiKeiorépa, ravrrjv ¡lev atfióá¡zev ro vvv.

SE Keívo S I aroTTov avpißalvei Kal rovrai rw Xóyat-ts Kal ro îs rrXelarois rcov 7repl tftvxrjs״ avvárrrovai

yap Kal n d ea m v els aco¡xa rr¡v 1¡jvxr¡v} ovdev rrpoa-

ARISTOTLE

4 0

out specifying why this is so, and how the body is conditioned ; and yet this would seem to be essential.For it is by this association tha t the one acts and the other is acted upon, tha t the one moves and the other is moved ; and no such mutual relation is found in haphazard combinations. But these thinkers only try to explain what is the nature of the soul, without adding any details about the body which is to receive i t ; as though it were possible, as the Pythagorean stories suggest, for any soul to find its way into any body, (which is absurd,)for we can see tha t everybody has its own peculiar shape or form. Such a theory is like suggesting tha t carpentry can find its way into flutes ; each craft must employ its own tools, and each soul its own body.

IV. There is another traditional theory about the Is the soul soul, which many find the most credible of all current orhpropor? theories, and which has been approved by the verdict *׳ion ? of public opinion. I t is said tha t the soul is a harmony of some kind ; for, they argue, a harmony is a blend or composition of contraries, and the body is composed of contraries.

But (1) a harmony is a fixed proportion or com- Objections position of the ingredients blended, and the soul J^eor3 cannot be either of these things. (2) Again, it is no part of harmony to cause movement, ye t almost every­one ascribes this to the soul as its chief characteristic־,(3) I t seems more in accord with the facts to connect harmony with health or generally with good condi­tions of the body than with the soul. This will become quite obvious if one tries to attribute the soul’s exper- ences and actions to some sort of harmony ; for it is difficult to make them fit. (4<) Again, we use the word harmony in two different senses : most properly

43

ON THE SOUL, 1־ in .—xv.

407 Sí י׳/ ^810p ío a v r e s 81à rív* airLav Kal t tw s e'xpvros t o v«jcófiaros- KalroL Só^eiev av r o v r 3 avaytcaiov e lv a i• S ià y à p rrjv K oivow íav t o puèv iro ie í r o S i rraa^ei Kal r o ¡xev K ive íra i ro Sé Kiveí, t o v t w v 8 ovOev

20 v 7rápxe1 v p o s âXX7]Xa r o ts rv ^ o v a iv . o í Se ¡lóvov ¿TTixeipovat. Aéyeiv iroíóv t í r¡ ifrvxtf, rrepl Sé t o v 8 etjojievov critífiaTOS ovOev e n irpoubiopiQovaiv, wcnrep ¿v8 exópevov Kara t o v s IlvOayopiKovs ¡xvQovs Trjv r v x o v a a v iftvx'ïjv et s t o tv x o v ev8ve<10a 1 crwpa• Sok€Î yàp eK aarov iSiov exeLV ^8 0 s Kal p,op(f>r¡v, rrapavXrjcnov Se Aéyovuiv coa7rep et t ís

25 (f>a¿rj t 7]v t€ k to v ik 7]v e ls avX ovs ¿v8v e o d a 1° Seî yàp rr¡v fiky T¿xyrjv xPVa ®a1 TO¿? opyávois, t t¡ v Sé t/fvxrjv Tip aíú¡1 a r t.

IV . K a t aXXr¡ Se t l s 8¿£a 7 rap a8 eS o ra t 7repl iftvxíjs, mOavr¡ p è v ttoXXoîs o v8ep.1á s rjrTov rcov Xeyofzevw v, X oyovs S5 w oirep evOvvas 8ediü1<vîa Kal r o ís i v

30 K01V& y ivo jié v o is Xóyois° ap¡10v ía v y dp r iv a avrrjv X éyovui• Kal y à p rrjv ápfiovíav Kpácriv Kal avvO eaiv ¿vavrícov e lva i, Kal ro a copa crvyKeíodai ¿£ ¿vavrícov.

K atro t y e r¡ ¡1 ev a p p o v ia X óyos r í s e o n r& v ¡Mx8évTwv r¡ a vv d em s, t t¡ v Se ú v x t y o v8 irep o v oláv t e tva i t o v t iü v . Ir4 Se ro Kiveív o v k e a n v áp-

408 a ¡¡¿ovias, *Jjvxfj Sé 7rávres á irovéfiovo i tovto p á X ia d 71w s eirreîv. âp1x6 Z,e1 Sè fiáXXov Kad5 vyieías Xéyeiv âppoviav, Kal oXws riov ®<üûpaT1K(ï>v àperaiv¡, rj Kara i]ívxt¡S• (f>avepwrarov o'J et r is ¿770818óvai

5 weipadeír¡ r á rrád7] Kal r á epya T7js tffvx^s appovía n v i ' x aXe7rov yàp i(j)app,ól,e1v. e r t S־ el Xéyopev1 tt¡v apjuiovíav eis Svo ä7r0ßXe7T0vres, Kvpiwrara §1èv

a Àéyojxsv E1STVX 5 Aeyot/tet».

ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL, I. iv.

of spatial magnitudes, to mean compaction “ in the case of things which have movement and position, when they cohere in such a way tha t they do not admit the intrusion of anything homogeneous ; but in a derivative sense we also use the word to mean the ratio in which constituents are mixed.

In neither of these senses can harmony be reason­ably identified with soul, but the view that the soul is a composition of parts of the body is easily refuted» For the compositions of parts are many, and take place in many ways. Of which of the parts, then, are we to suppose tha t the mind or the perceptive or appetitive faculty is a composition, and how is such a composition effected ? But the view that the soul is a harmony in the sense of a ratio of mixture is equally absurd. For the mixture of the elements which go to make the flesh has not the same ratio as that which makes the bone. I t will follow, then, that there are many souls distributed all over the body, since every part of it is a mixture of the elements and the ratio of each mixture is a harmony, i.e. a soul. One might put this question to Empedocles (for he says th a t each part of the body owes its distinctive nature to the ratio of its mixture) : is this ratio the soul, or is the soul something distinct, which develops in the limbs ? Again, does his principle of Love 6 cause any random mixture, or only a mixture in the right ratio ? And is Love this ratio, or is it some other thing distinct from the ratio ? Such are the difficulties which these theories present. And if the soul is a different thing from the mixture, why is it destroyed a t the same time as tha t which constitutes the flesh and the other parts of the living animal ? Besides this, if each of the parts has not a separate

45

^ ^ ־¿ 5 P %r a > v ¡ x e y e B c o v e v r o i s e x o v a i K i v r ja i v K a i O ecriv r r j v

o v v Q e o i v a v r c H v , e7retSav o v r c o a v v a p p .o ^ c o c n v w a r e

¡jLTjSev a v y y e v e s T r a p a h e x e a O a i , e v r e v O e v Se /cat t o ^ r i o v [¿ e jju y iJ L eva iv A o y o v .

10 Ou8erepa>? fi iv odv evAoyov, r¡ 8e avvQeois rw v rov aojjjbaros ¡Jiepcov Aiav eve^eraaros׳ voAAai re yap a t avvdeaeis rGyv p,epow /ca t 7roAAa%£3 s • rlvos ovv r¡ tt&s vnoAapeZv rov vovv xpr¡ avvdeaiv elvai, r¡ /ca t t o alodrjriKov r¡ opeKriKiv ; ¿¡¿oicos Se aTOTTOv Kai rov A6yov rrjs [¿¿¿jeans elvai rrjv ijjvxrjv

!5 ov yap rov avrov e%et Aoyov rj /xt^t? rGiv aroixeicov KaQ7 rjv oap£ Kai KaO5 rjv oarovv. avp.f}rjoerai odv iroAAds T€ iftvxas e x e w /cat /caT a ■n־a ^ t o acopca, eirrep rrdvra piev et< rcov oroixeiiov fiepLLyfxeutov, o Se t■}]? fttfea)? Aoyos apjiovia /cat avraiTr¡-aete S’ dv Tts rovro ye Kai ■nap3 ’Eju.7reSo/cAeou?•

20 eKacFTOV yap avrcbv Aoycp n v i (/)tjctlv elvai״ Trorepov ofiv o Aoyo? earlv r¡ ifivx^¡, t¡ fiaAAov erepSv n ovaa eyyivera t Tot? /xeAeatv; eVt Se Trorepov r¡ <f>iAia rfjs rvxovarjs a tria ¡xi^ecos ;Q rrjs Kara rov Aoyov; Kai avrr¡ Trorepov 6 A6yos earlv f¡ rrapd rov Aoyov erepov n ; ra v ra [xev ofiv e^et ro lavras

25 a-rropias‘ el S־ eoTtv erepov r¡ ifrvx?) ttjs [¿i£ecos, r i rrore ajtxa t<3 crap/ct elvai dvaipeirai Kai rip

rots aAAots fxopiois rov t,a>ov; vpos Se TouTOt?

° Or “ composition.”& Love is Empedocles’ personification of the force of

attraction which accounts for the combination of elements into a whole, as its opposite repulsion (Strife) accounts for the separation of things into separate wholes.44

ARISTOTLE

soul of its own, and if the soul is not the ratio of the m ixture, w hat is it which perishes when the soul leaves the body ?

I t is clear from w hat has been said th a t the soul Summary, cannot be a harmony, nor can it revolve in a circle. I t is, however, possible, as we have said, th a t i t may be moved, and even move itself, incidentally (e.g., th a t which contains i t may be moved, and be moved by the soul) ; bu t in no other sense can it move in space־,

The following considerations suggest even more Further reasonable criticisms of the theory th a t the soul atout the moves. W e say th a t the soul grieves, rejoices, is soul’s move courageous, or afraid, and also grows angry, perceives and thinks ; all these seem to be movements ; hence one m ight suppose th a t the soul is moved ; bu t this is not a necessary inference. L e t us gran t th a t grief, joy and thinking are all movements, i.e., th a t each of them is a process of being moved ; le t us further adm it th a t the movement is caused by the soul—e.g., th a t anger and fear are particular movements of the heart, and th a t thinking is a movement of this or of something else, some of these processes involving change of place and others change of quality in certain parts (of w hat parts and under w hat conditions need not be considered now) : still to say th a t the soul gets angry is as if one were to say th a t the soul weaves or builds a house. Probably it is b e tte r not to say th a t the soul pities, or learns, or thinks, b u t to say ra ther th a t the soul is the instrum ent whereby man does these things ; th a t is to say, th a t the movement does not take place in the soul, bu t sometimes pene­tra tes to it, and sometimes starts from it, Eor instance perception starts from particular objects and reaches

47

ON THE SOUL, I. iv.

.■: f

¡1-08 31 s/ \ ty ^ f p \ >F í P€iiTsp ¡ir¡ eicaarov rtov ¡lopiwv ipvyijv exei> £i• ean v r¡ ijjv}(r) o Aóyos־ rrjs ¡linéeos, r i ean v o (¡}9eipero.iL rrjs ifjvyrjs arroXenTovaijs;

" O n ¡xév ovv ov9' áppiovLav olóv r e lva i r q v 3 0 !fjvxTjv o v re kvkXoj irepicfrepeoOai, SrjXov ei< rw v

eiprjfiéviov. K ara av¡i^¡e¡3r]Kos Sé K iveia9a i, icaO- Ó.TTep eliropiev, ecrn Kai Kiveiv eavriqv, oiov K iveia9ai f,iev év ip e a r í , r o v r o Sé K iveia9ai v ito rr js f a x e s ’ aXXcos S5 o vx olóv r e K iveia9ai K ara rórrov avrrjv .

EvXoycorepov Ss avopr/aeiev av n׳ s rrepl avrfjs cos 403 b Kivov¡iévr¡s, els ra ro iavra aTro^Xeijjas- <f>a¡iev yap

rr¡v ifsvxvjv Xvneia9ai xa V £íV Oappeiv (¡>ofteia9ais e n Sé opyít>ea9aí re Kai alo8áveo8ai Kai Siavoei- o9ai ’ ra vra Sé rrávra Kivrjaeis e'ívai S okovo iv .

5 o8ev olrjdeír¡ n s av avrrjv Kiveio9ai׳ t o S’ o vk ean v avayKaiov• el yap /cal orí ¡xáXiara ro Xvrreia8ai r¡ X aípeiv r¡ 8iavoeia9ai Kivr¡aeis elai, Kai eKaarov Kiveia9ai rovrcov, ro Sé Kiveia9aí ean v viro rrjs ifjuxrjs, olov ro opyLt¡ea9ai r¡ <f>o¡3eio9ai t o 1 rr¡v Kap- Síav (¿Si Kiveio9ai3 ro Sé SiavoeiaOai r¡ ro rovro2

10 law s r¡ erepóv n (rovrwv Sé avpijBaívei ra ¡lév Kara (j.>opav rivcüv Kii'ovpievwv, ra Sé Kar aX- Xoicoaiv. Trola Sé Kai ttcos, erepós é a n Aóyos). ro Sé Xéyeiv opyit,ea9ai rr¡v ijjvx^v o¡ioiov Kav el n s Aéyo& rrjv ifivx^jv vcpaíveiv r¡ oiKoSofielv ¡3éXnov y a p lacas ¡ir¡ Xéyeiv rr¡v if/vx ty éXeeiv r¡ ¡iav9áveiv rj

Í6 Siavoeia8ai} dXXa ro v av9pWTrov rfj if/vxfj- r o v r o Sé (ir¡ w s ev ¿Keívy rrjs Kivr¡aea>s ovarjs, aAA= OTé ¡lev ¡i¿xpi eiceívrjs, ore S5 ¿7!5 eKeívr¡s , o lov r¡ ¡uev

1 TO V, Bonitz Z TCOo 2 TO TOVTO BoXlítZ l TOíOVTOVo

ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL, I. iv.

the sou l; recollection starts from the soul and ex­tends to the movements or resting points in the sense organs.

But mind seems to be an independent substance Does the engendered in us, and to be imperishable. If it could soulperish? be destroyed the most probable cause would be the feebleness of old age, but, in fact, probably the same thing occurs as in the sense organs ; for if an old man could acquire the right kind of eye, he would see as a young man sees. Hence old age is due to an affection, not of the soul, but only of tha t in which the soul resides, as in the case in drunkenness and disease.Thus the power of thought and speculation decays because something else within perishes, but itself it is unaffected. Thinking, loving and hating, are affec­tions not of the mind, but rather of the individual which possesses the mind, in so far as it does so.Memory and love fail when this perishes ; for they were never part of the mind, but of the whole entity which has perished. Presumably the mind is some­thing more divine, and is unaffected. I t is then obvious from these considerations tha t the soul cannot be moved ; and, if it cannot be moved a t all, it is obviously not moved by itself.

But of all the unreasonable theories about the soul The soul as the most unreasonable is tha t which calls the soul a fn|enuSber- number which moves itself.“ In this theory there are inherent impossibilities, first those which are implied by the theory of the soul’s being moved, and also special ones which follow from calling the soul a number. For (1) how can one conceive of a unit moving ? by what is it moved, and in what way, being as it is without parts or differences? For if it can cause and suffer movement it must have differences.

49

! baíadrjOLs d v ó r io v 8 l , r¡ S־ ává[Á,vr¡a!.s a v* ¿Keívrjs e v l r a s ev tols a ladrjrrjp loL s K ivr¡aeis r¡ [xovás.

' 0 Se vovs eoiKev eyylveadai ovala n s overa, 20 Kal ov <f>9elpeadai. ¡láA tara yap ¿(¡)Qelper* av viro

rrjs ev rqi yrjpa á[j,avpa)aea>s} vvv S’ tacos ovep ev l rá)v aía9r¡rr¡pía>v avptfiaívet• el yap Áá¡3ot o vpeofivrrjs 6¡x[ia roiovSl, fiXévot av w avep t<al o veos. <3are ró yrjpas ov r¿) rrjv t¡¡v)(r¡v n vevov- Bévat, áAA’ ev S , Ka9ávep ev ¡xé9ats Kal vóaots.

25 Kal ro voetv 8r¡ Kal ro 9 eco pe tv ¡xapalverai dXXov n v ó s eaco <f>9eipo¡Jt,évov} avro Se avades eartv. ro Se Stavoeiadai Kal <j>tXetv r¡ ¡itaetv ovk ea n v ¿Kelvov vá9r¡, aAAá rov8l rov exovros eKelvo, fj ¿Kelvo Ip^et. Sto Kal rovrov (f>deipop,évov ovre ¡xvrjpLovevet ovre <f>i\ei' ov yap ¿Kelvov r¡v} aAAá rov kolvov , o dvóXooXev o Se vovs tacos 9etórepóv n Kal á va S is

so ea n v . o n fiev ovv o v x olóv re Ktveta9at rr¡v ifjvx>]v, <f>avepov ¿ k rovrcov' el S־ óXcos ¡ir¡ Ktvetrai,O ־׳>\ f KO C # 9 eorjAov c09 ovo vcp e a v rr js .

ÍIoA u Se tü » elpr¡¡xévüjv dXoycórarov r ׳ ó Xéyetv apiOfióv e ív a i rr¡v ifjvxty KtvovvO5 e a v r ó v ■!vvápxe ״ y á p a v r o ls dhvvara? vpeora ¡xev ra ¿k rov KiveZo9ai

)9 a ovfij3alvovTas 18la S־ ¿k r o v Ae y e tv a vrr¡v dpi9¡jtóv״ veos y d p XPV v o fjo a i ¡¿ová8a Ktvov¡iévr¡v¡, Kal vvó rlvos, Kal veos, áfieprj K a l d8iá(f>opov oSaav; el y á p e a r t KtvrjriKr¡ K a l Kivr¡rr¡, o ta ^ é p e tv S et. e n

ARISTOTLE

a This is the theory of Xenocratess a contemporary of Aristotle, who succeeded Speusippus as head of the “ Academy.”4.8

(2) Again, since they say tha t a moving line describes a surface, and a moving point a line, the movements of the soul’s units will be lines. For a point is a unit having position ; and the number of the soul is ipso facto somewhere, and has position. (3) Now, if one subtracts a number or unit from a number, another number is left. But plants and many animals con­tinue to live even when divided, and seem to retain in these fragments a soul specifically the same as before. I t would seem to make no difference whether we speak of units or of minute particles ; for if we suppose Democritus’s spherical atoms to be converted into points and to retain nothing but their quantita­tive nature, there will still be in each of them some­thing which moves and something which is moved, just as in a continuum. For what we have mentioned does not occur through any difference of size in the atoms, but because they possess quantity. There must, then, be something to give movement to the units. But if tha t which produces movement in the animal is the soul, then it is also so in the number, so tha t the soul is not both tha t which produces move­ment and tha t which is moved, but only th a t which produces movement. But how can this possibly be a unit ? Such a unit must differ inherently from the others. But what difference can a unit which is a point exhibit, except position ? If then the soul-units in the body are different from the points in the body, the former will be in the same place as the latter, for each will occupy the place of a point. And yet if two units can be in the same place, why not an infinite number ? for things which occupy an indivisible space are themselves indivisible. But if the bodily points are identical with the units of the soul number, or if the number of bodily points is the soul, why do not

ON THE SOUL, I. iv.

51

ARISTOTLE$09 a

§ e ־ rr e l cfxxcri K L v r jd e Z o a v y p a p ,p . r j v ¿TTLTreSov T r o ie iv ,

5 O T L yp ,f]v Se y p a p .p . r j v , K a i a i t G j v ¡ x o v a S c o v K i v f j o e i s

y p a p . f j .a i e a o v r a r f j y a p O T L yp.7) ¡ x o v d s ¿ c m d e o i v

e ^ o v a a • o 8s a p i d p - o s r r j s i p v x f j s rjSr¡ t t o v ¿ a n . /cat 6 e o i v e ^ e t. | eVt S’ d p i d j x o v ¡x e v ¿ a v d<f>eXr] t l s

d p i .6 p .o v f¡ p . o v a 8a , X e i n e T a i aAAo s d p i .9 p . o s ׳ t o Se <f>vrd K a i t c o v £a>nov v o X X d S ta tp o v p . e v a t ,f ¡ , K a i

10 So/cet r r j v a v r f j v i f tv x f jv e^etv r<? etSet. So^ete 8 ai•׳ o v O e v S i a ^ e p e i v ¡ x o v a S a s X e y e i v f j o t o f x a n a

p b iK p d - K a i y a p ¿ k t c o v /^ ] ¡ x o K p L r o v o<j>aiplcx>v ¿ a v

y e v c o v r a i o n y p , a i , ¡ x o v o v Se pi.evrj t o t t o o o v , e a r a t

n ¿ v a v r c o t o ¡x e v k l v o v v t o Se K i v o v j x e v o v , w a r r e p

¿ v r e p o v v e x e i o ׳ v y a p S ta t o ¡ x e y e d e i 8 ia < f> ep e iv f j

!5 ¡xiK poT T jT i. o v p i p a i v e i t o X e x 6 e v , aAA’ o r t t t o o o v .

Sto d v a y i c a l o v e l v a i n t o K L v f jo o v r d s ¡ x o v a S a s .

e l 8’ ev to > t o k l v o v v f] ip v ) (r ¡ , K a i ¿ v ra>

dpL O fxcp , c h o r e o v t o k l v o v v K a i t o K iv o v p - e v o v rj

ifru xr¡, aAAa t o k l v o v v ¡ x S v o v . e v S e ^ e T a t S e 1St)

v q j s ¡ x o v d S a r a v r r j v e t v a i ; 1 Set y a p i m d p x e w n v d

20 a v r f j Sta cf> o p a v rr p o s r a s aAAa?־ o n y p . f j s Se ¡ x o v a -

S iK r js t l s d v e ’ir¡ 8 ia< f> opa t tX t j v d e o L s ; e l /¿ev o v v

e l o i v e r e p a t a t ¿ v r a t o d ) [x a r L ¡ x o v d S e s K a i a i

a n y p , a l , e v r e p a v r a > e o o v r a i a l ¡ x o v d S e s K ״ a 6 e £ e i

y a p x ^ > p a v o n y f x r j s . K a i r o i r i K io X veL ¿ v ra >

a v r c o e l v a i , e l 8v o , K a i d i r e i p o v s ; c o v y a p o t o t t o s

25 a S ta tp e T O ? ca׳ , t a v r a . e l S ’ a t ¿ v r ai o d > [ x a n

O T L y p ,a i a d p t .6 p .o s 6 -rr js * f tv x f js , f¡ ¿1 o ¿ k r i o v e v

r i p o io /x a T L o n y p u o v a p L 9 p .o s f j i f tv x r f , ^ ta t £ o v

a Sr¡ 7ra>s o o o eti׳ai. Bekker,50

all bodies have a soul ? For there appear to be points —infinitely many, indeed—in all of them. And again how is it possible to separate the points and free them from the bodies, if lines cannot be resolved intopoints ?

V. In effect, as we have said, this theory in one Xeno- respect repeats the view of those who suppose the theory soul to be a body of fine particles, and in another, just further as when Democritus states tha t the body is moved by the soul, it has an absurdity of its own. For if the soul exists in every part of the sentient body then there must be two bodies in the same place, if the soul is a body. And those who say tha t the soul is a number must believe tha t there are many points in one point, or else tha t every body has a soul, unless the number engendered in the body is different and distinct from the points already present in the body. And it follows that the living creature is moved by the number, just as we have already said tha t Democritus accounted for its m ovem ent; for what difference does it make whether we call them small spheres, or large units, or generally moving units ? For in either case we can only account for the movement of the living creature by the movement of these particles.

These are some of the difficulties in the view which Conclusion, combines movement and number, and there are m an y others of a like nature ; for this combination, so far from being a definition of the soul, cannot even be one of its attributes. And this will become clear to anyone, if he tries on this theory to give an explana­tion of the affections and functions of the soul, such as calculations, perceptions, pleasures, pains, and so on ; for, as we have said before, on these lines it is not easy even to conjecture an explanation.

53

ON THE SOUL, I. iv.—'v.

409 S , , ״ \ r ? i sn d v r a fax?]V ex o v a i r d a co p a ra ; a n y p M y a p evdrraai hoicovaiv elvai Kai arreipoi. e n he ttcos olovre ■%iopit,eoQai ra s a n y p d s 1 Kai drroXveadai rcov

so acopidrcov, el ye p,r) htaipovvrai a i ypap.p,ai eisa n y puds;

V. HvfzjHlaivei Se, Kaddrrep eiTTOfJbev, rfj pev ravro Aéyeiv ro is acopia n Xerrropiepés avrr¡v n d e ia i, rfj

409b S’, iüonep ArjpoKpiros Kiveiadai (prjoiv viro rrjs fa x^ js , ihiov t o d ro v o v eirrep yáp éa n v r¡ fax?] ev Travn rep aladavopiévco acopian, dvayKaiov ev rep avrcp Svo elvai acocara, el acopa n r¡ f a x 7]' ro is S’ dpiOpiOV Xéyovoiv, év rfj puia anypufj ttoX-

& Xas a n y p d s r¡ rrdv acopa f a x t y exeLV> ei pit] 8ia<f>epcov n s dpiOpids eyyiverai Kai dXXos n s rcov vrrapxovawv ev reo acopian anypcov. avpfiaivei re Kiveiadai ro t,cpov vtto rov dpi6p.ov} Kaddrrep Kai ArjpioKpirov e<f>ap,ev avro Kiveiv r i yap Siaepépei a fa ip a s Xéyeiv apiiKpds ?! piovdhas pieyd-

10 Xas, r¡ oXcos puovdoas cpepopievas ; dpifarepcos yap dvayKaiov Kiveiv ro L,cpov rep Kiveiadai ravras-

T ots Sr¡ avpnrXe^aaiv els t o avro Kivrjaiv Kai dpidp-ov ra vrd re avpufiaivei Kai voXXa erepa ro ia vra ov yap pdvov opiapiov fa ״ x tfs dSvvarov roiovrov elvai, aAAa /cat ovp,fiefir¡KÓs. SfjXov S’

!5 el n s évixeipr¡aeiev e/c rod Xóyov rovrov r d ■ndBr¡ Kai r d epya rrjs fa x V s dnoSiSovai, olov Xoyia¡Mvs, aladr¡aeisy rjhovds»■ Xviras, oaa dXXa ro ia vra ״ojanep yap e’ivopiev Ttpórepov, ov Se ¡¿avrevaaadai pdhiov e£ avrebve

ARISTOTLE

1 >/>vxas STU־

ON THE SOUL, 1־ v.

Three methods of defining the soul have come down The soul to us ; some have regarded it as the principal cause of movement, because it moves itse lf; others have the eie- described the soul as composed of the finest particles, ments• or as the least corporeal of all bodies. We have pretty- well exhausted the difficulties and contradictions which these two definitions involve. But it remains to see what is meant by saying th a t the soul is com­posed of the elements. This theory is intended to account for the soul’s perception and cognition of everything that is, but the theory necessarily involves many impossibilities ; its supporters assume that like is recognized by like, as though they thus identi­fied the soul with the things it knows. But these elements are not the only things existing ; there are many—to be more exact, infinitely many—other things, composed of the elements. Granted tha t the soul might know and perceive the elements of which each of these things is composed ; yet by what will it perceive and know a composite whole : e.g., what god, man, flesh, or bone is ? and similarly any other compound whole ; for such wholes do not consist of the elements arranged a t random, but in a certain ratio and with some principle of composition, as Empedocles says in his description of bone :

“ The kindly earth in broad-bosomed crucibles got two of the eight parts from the gleam of moisture, and four from Hephaestus ; and bones come into being all white.”

I t is then no use for the elements to exist in the soul, unless the ratios and the principle of composition also exist in it ; for each element will recognize its like, but there will be nothing in the soul to recognize

400 b ׳ «T pcojv 86 rporrcov 7rapa8eS0[xéva)v k o .0 o vs

53® o p ít,ovra t rrjv i^v^r/v, o l [¿èv t o KLvrjrLKcóraTOV0¡.Trecf)r¡vavT0 t ío k lve Îv ia v r ó , o l S è oœ p,a t o A e -

TTTOfxepéaraTov r¡ t o à a co jia T œ ra ro v rcov aA A cuv.

r a v r a S è r iv a s arropías r e Kal VTrevavridjaeis 8ie\r¡\v9a[jL<zv a x686v . 'ke in er0.1 S ’ ê7n<J!<é1Jsao8a1 Tríos A eyera i t o ¿k to jv (jro1){eiwv a vrrjv e lva i.

s® Aé y o v o i ¡xev y á p , tv a ia d á vr jra í r e r œ v o vrœ v Kal eicaarov yvœ p i^r¡, à va yK a îo v 86 o v /iß a ive iv TToAAà Kal â S v v a ra r œ X ô y œ riO ׳ evra i y à p yvcopi^eiv r œ ôfJLoicp t o 0/10L0V, œorrep à v 61 rrjv i/jvvtju r à Trpáy¡xara n d é v r e s . o v k e o r t 86 [¿¿va r a v r a , 7roA A à S e Kal 6r6pa , puaXkov S ’ io œ s a n e ip a ro v

30 âp id fiôv , r à 6k r o v r œ v . 6£ œ v ¡jl6v ovv èa r lv 6K aarov r o v r œ v , ecrrœ y1vœGK61v rrjv iffvxrjv Kal aladáveadaL■ à AA à r o avvoXov r iv i y v œ p 16î 7)

a lo d rja era i, o lov r i 06os r¡ â v d p œ v o s rj a à p £ r¡ 410 a o o to v v ; ¿.¡¿oíais 8è Kal âXXo ô n o v v r œ v duvO ertov

ov y à p 0TTL000VV e x o v ra r à c r r o t ^ e Í a to v tc o v l« r a -

u ro v , àXXà A oyw t lv I Kal ovvdéaei¡ KaOàirep <f>r)<jl Kal ’E /.nreSoKÂrjs r o ô a r o v v

r¡ 86 x ^ v à ^ i ^ p o s ¿V e v a r é p v o i s x o c tv o tc r ii ׳

5 r à }1 8v o r œ v o k t ü j p .6p é œ v A<r^e v r ¡ a r 180s a ï y X r j s ,r י ה י c t t J ' \ ç o » / ■y / כ

r e o a a p a o t i c p a i a r o i o • r a o o a r e a A6v k

i y é v o v r o .

o v S è v o d v ocf)6X o s 6l v a c r à o r r o t ^ e îa è v r f j * f tv x f j , e t

[M7] K a l o í A o y o t è v é a o v r a i K a l r¡ o v v O e o i s y ׳ v c o p i e î

y à p 6K a a r o v r o o / i o i o v , t o S 5 o a r o v v r¡ r o v â v d p c o -

1 tcù Torstrik, Biehl1¡, Roàier, Diels ; t w v E1STUXy, comm. Fett.¡, B iehls s rà E 2V־ Bekker־־54

ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL, I. v.

bone, for instance, or man, unless they too exist in it.But it is unnecessary to say th a t this is impossible.For who could seriously ask whether there is a stone or a man in the soul ? The same argument applies to good and not-good ; and so with all the rest.

Again, the word “ being ” has many senses ; it is Difficulties applied to substance, quantity, quality, or any other theory, of the categories which we have distinguished. Will the soul consist of all of these or not ? The categories cannot surely all have common elements. Does the soul then consist only of those elements which com­pose substances ? How then is it to know each of the other categories ? Will they maintain th a t every genus has its peculiar elements and principles, and tha t the soul is composed of all of these ? a In that case it will be quantity, quality, and substance. But it is impossible tha t tha t which is composed of the elements of quantity should be a substance and not a quantity. Those who say tha t the soul is com­posed of all the elements are confronted with these and similar difficulties. I t is also unreasonable to say on the one hand th a t like is not acted on by like, and on the other tha t like perceives and recog­nizes like by like ; but they regard perceiving as a form of being acted upon and moved, and similarly with thinking and knowing.

There are many obscurities and difficulties in say- Problems ing, as Empedocles does, th a t each class of things ^™impe­ls known by its corporeal elements, and by reference docies’ to its like,6 as is further testified by this fresh argu- theory־ ment For in the bodies of living creatures all the parts which are composed simply of earth, such as bone, sinews, and hair, seem to have no perception a t all, and so cannot perceive their like ; and yet on this theory they should do so. Again, in each of these

57

ARISTOTLE

10 t t o v o v d é v , e l [j/t¡ K a l t < x v t é v é a r a i . t o v t o 8 o t i ¿ 8 v v a T o v , o v d e v Set A eyetv t l s y a p a v a i r o p r j G e i e v

e l e v e o T i v i v -r f j * p v x f j X í d o s r¡ a v d p o o r r o s ; o p i o l c o s Se i< a i t o á y a Q ó v /cat t o ¡xr¡ a y a d ó v . r o v a v T o v

Se TpÓTTOV K a l ■ n e p l t ó o v gAA(av.5,E t i Se TToAAavcD? Xeyoixévov t o v o v to s (cm uaivei\ \ \ /Cv ' £ ' \ ־* X ־»X !y a p t o [juev rooe t l , t o oe tto g o v rj tto iov 7] Kai

15 Tiva dXXrjv to w S ia ipedeia tov KaTr/yopicov) irórepov> > c / yf c i \ * a ?/ 5 \ \ 5 ’ 0 ־

eg arravrcov e o ra i rj ^ X 7? V o v > a /^ ov ° OK€i Koiva TrávTíüv e lva i a r o t^ e ía . a/>’ ouv ocra t¿ ü í ׳

ovaicov ¿ K t o v t o j v ¡lóvov ; 7t í o s o vv yivcóaKei Kal Ttbv aXXcov eKaaTOv; r¡ <f>iqoovoiv ¿KaoTov yévo vs e lva i o r o p e la K a l a p x d s I8 ias, e£ &v t t j v

20 avvecFTavai; e o r a t a p a t t o g o v K a l t t o i o v K a l o v a la . aAA’ ¿ 8 v v a T o v ¿k t c o v t o v t t o g o v aro t^eicov o va ia v e lva i K a l ¡ jltj t t o g o v . t o i s 8r¡ XéyovGiv ¿ k rrávTüov r a v r á Te K a l roiavO" ere p a gv¡ jl¡Baívei. o . t o t t o v Se K a l t o c f> á v a t ¡xev a v a d e s e lva i t o o¡xoiov v t t o t o v

o [ a o Í o v 3 a ia d á vea d a i Se t o o f i o l o v t o v ¿¡xoíov K a l

25 yivcoGKeiv tü j ¿[¿oleo t o ofjioiov. t o 8 ’ a la d á vea d a i •náaxeiv t i K a l K iveiadai T iO éa a iv ópioícos Se K a l

r o voeiv Te K a l yivaiaiceiv .ÍIoAAás 8’ a-noplas Kal Svaxepeías exovros tov

Aeyetv, KaOárrep ,EfnreSoKÁrjs, (Ls tois G0)¡xaTiK0is GTOixelois e/caora yvajpLL,€Tcu Kal Trpós to 6¡jioiovs

30 ¡jiapTVpei to vvv Xe^dev • ooa yap eveoTiv év tois 410 b tcov '(,wcúv GcófJiaaiv ¿.ttXms y íjs , olov Ógto, vevpa

Tpíxes, ovdevos alodáveadai SoKei, Íoot ov Se tcjv ofioíoov‘ KaiTOi TrpoorjKev. eti S־ €kcÍ gtt! tcov

a So that the soul can know other categories besides that of substance6 ־ Sc., in the soul«50

ON THE SOUL, I. v.

first principles there will be more ignorance than understanding ; for each will know one thing, but will be ignorant of many, in fact of everything else«On Empedocles’ view a t least it follows th a t God must be most unintelligent ־, for He alone will be ignorant of one of these elements, namely strife, whereas mortal creatures will know them a l l ; for each individual is composed of them all. In general also, why have not all existing things a soul, since everything is an element, or composed of an element, or of more than one, or of all ? For each of them must know one thing, or some things, or all things.There would be a further difficulty in deciding what is the unifying principle, for the elements correspond to m atter, and the force, whatever it is, which com­bines them is supreme ; but it is impossible that any­thing should be superior to and control the soul, or {a fortiori) the mind ; for it is reasonable to suppose that the mind is by nature original and dominant, but they say that the elements are the first of all existing things.

All those too who describe the soul as composed The definí- of the elements, because it knows and perceives cover existing things, and equally those who call it the allthefacts. chief cause of motion, fail to offer an explanation which will cover every soul. For not everything which has sensation has movement also ; for instance some living things seem to be stationary in space i and yet this seems to be the only kind of movement which the soul imparts to the living creature. The same difficulty arises for those who construct the mind and the perceptive faculty out of the elements ; for plants seem to live without sharing in locomotion or in perception, and many living animals have no power

59

^ ׳1 *■, 9 \ r n r c / ¿ /a p xa iv a y v o ia irAeiœ v rj avveais v׳ n a p ç e i’ y v (ocrerai ¡xkv y à p eu eKaarov, ?roÀÀà S’ a yvo rja e i' n a v r a

5 y à p ràXXa avpifia ivei S’ ’E/AireSo/cAet y e /cat â(f>povéararov e lva i ro v 8 e o v ¡¿¿vos y à p r œ v a r o i- X eiœ v ev ov y v œ p ie î, r o vet/co?, r à Sè Ovrjrà n a v ra • e/c n d v r œ v y à p eK aarov. oÀtüç r e S tà r iv ’ a îr ia v oi>x d n a v r a iffvyr]^׳ ¿X€l o v ra , êneiSr] n à v r¡ a ro ixe îo v r¡ e/c a ro iy e io v ¿vos r¡ nX eiovœ v r¡ n d v r œ v ;

S® avay /caîov y a p e a n v ev r i y ivœ o K eiv 7} n v à r¡ 7r à v ra . ânopr/aeie S’ av r t s «rat r i n o r è a r i ro èvono iovv a v rd • vXy y à p eot/ce r à y e a ro t^ e ia • K vp iœ ra ro v y à p ix e iv o ro a vvéxo v o r i rror e a r i v rrjs Sè ifw xfjs e iva i r i Kpeîrrov /cal d p xo v d S v v a ro v ״d S vva rœ rep o v S’ e r t r o v vo d ' evXoyov y à p ro v ro v

15 e tv a t trpoyeveararov Kai Kvpiov K arà <j>vaiv, r à Sè a r o ix ^ id (¡>aai n p œ r a r œ v o vrœ v e tva t.

H a vres Sè «rat o t S tà r o yvœpiÇeiv Kai a laddve- aOai r à ovra rrjv ifivx^jv ¿k rœ v aro ixe iœ v Xéyovres avrrjv, Kai o t t o KivrjriKœrarov, ov nepl ndarjs Xéyovai ipvxrjs״ ovre yà p r à aladav6p,eva ■navra

20 KivrjriKa• cj>aiverai yà p elva i r iva ¡xovi/xa rœ v t,œœv icarà ronov , Kairoi So/ceî y e ravrrjv fxovrjv rœ v Kivrjoeœv Kiveîv r¡ ,-JjvxV T° C vov• ôyioLœs Sè /cat oaoi rov vovv Kai ro aiadrjriKov ¿k rœ v oro ixeiœ v n o io v a iv <j>aiverai yà p r d re (f>vrà t,r\v ov [xer- ¿Xovra <j>opâs ov S’ aîadrjaeœ s, Kai rœ v t,œœv noXXà

58

ARISTOTLE

of thinking. But supposing one were to let this too pass, and assume that the mind is part of the soul, and similarly the perceptive faculty : not even so would their account hold good generally of every soul, or of the whole of any one soul. The theory in the so-called poems of Orpheus presents the same diffi­culty ; for this theory alleges tha t the soul, borne by the winds, enters from the universe into animals when they breathe. Now this cannot happen to plants, nor to some animals, since they do not all breathe : a point which has escaped those who sup­port this theory. And if we are to construct the soul out of the elements, it is quite unnecessary that it should be composed of all the elements ; for only one of a pair of contraries is needed to discern both itself and its opposite. For instance, by tha t which is straight we discern both straight and crooked ; for the carpenter’s rule is the test of both, but the crooked tests neither itself nor the straight. Some think tha t the soul pervades the whole universe, whence perhaps came Thales’ view that everything is full of gods. But this theory contains certain difficulties ; for why does not the soul make an animal when it is in air or in fire, but only when it is in a mixture of the elements, and tha t too though it seems to be in a purer form in the first case ? (One might also ask why the soul in the air is purer and less mortal than the soul in living creatures.) Either way the conclusion is absurd and irrational ; for to describe fire or air as living creatures is highly irrational, and yet to refuse to call them living creatures, if there is a soul in them, is absurd־ They appear to suppose tha t soul is found in these

ON THE SOUL, I. v.

61

410 b25 S i d v o t a v o v K e x e i v . e l S e t i s K a i t o v t o , T r a p a -

X ü i p r jo e ie , K a i Q eír) t o v v o v v [ ¿ e p o s t i t t ¡ s f o x ^ S ,

¿ fjb o ííü s S e K a i t o a la d r jT iK Ó v , 0758’ a v o v t c o X é y o i e v

K a d ó X o v T rep l 7 rá a 7 ]s tpv X V s o v S è 7 re p l o X r js o v S é

¡ ¿ l a s . t o v t o S e Tré7T0vde K a i o i v t o î s * O p ^ iK o í s

i r r e a l K a X o v p ié v o i s X ó y o s ' <j>r]01 y a p t t ¡ v i f s v x t y ¿ k

so t o v o X o v e l a i é v a i a v a n v e o v T c o v , (f>ep0f1ev7]v v t t o t c ü v

d v ip i c o v . oi>x o l ó v T e Sr¡ t o î s cf>VT0í s t o v t o a v j x ß a i -

411 a v e i v ovSé tc o v ^ to io v i v í o i s , eu rrep ¡xr¡ i r á v T a a v a -

T T v é o v a iV . TOVTO S é X ÍX 7 ]d e TOVS OVTÍOS V7re1\7)(f>Ó-

T a s . e l T e S e l t t j v i f i v x t y e /c t & v 0T 01¡x e í(0v T r o ie iv ,

o v d é v S e t ¿ £ á 7r á v r c o v t ״ K a v o v y a p d á r e p o v ¡ x é p o s

r r ¡ s e v a v T i i o a e c u s e a v T Ó r e K p í v e i v K a i t o a v r t / c e í -

5 ¡ x e v o v . K a i y a p t í o e v d e í K a i a v t o K a i t o K a p n r ú X o v

y iv c ú a K O j x e v K p i-r r js y a p a¡x(f>oív o K a v c ó v , t o S e

K a ¡x 7 rvX o v o v 8 ’ e a v T o v o v r e t o v e v O é o s . K a i ¿ v t &

0X0) S e T i v e s a v T T jv ( x e / x l x d a i <j>aa1v , o d e v t a c o s K a i

0 a A r j s tor¡Qr¡ r r á v T a 7rXr¡pr¡ d e œ v e l v a i . t o v t o S ־

e% et T i v a s a r r o p í a s ' S t á r í v a y a p a í r í a v e v ¡x é v t í o

10 á e p t r¡ t ó j 7 r v p l o v a a rj r r o i e í £ ,co o v , ¿ v S é

T o i s ¡x i k t o Í s , K a l r a ú r a ß e X r i c o v i v t o v t o i s e l v a i

S o K o v a a ; é m £ ,7 ]T r¡a e 1 e y à p a v r i s K a i S t á t w

a i T Í a v r¡ i v t í o â é p i T Í js i v t o î s Çw o i s

ß e X T i io v Í o t I K a l d ß a v a T C O T e p a . o v / x ß a i v e i 8 ’

afZ(f>0T e p c o s c l t o t t o v K a i v a p a X o y o v c/ ״ a t y à p t o

îr5 X é y e i v Z,á)0v t o 7 rv p r¡ t o v o Á p c i t í o v 7 r a p a X o y a j -

r é p c o v ¿ o t Í , K a i t o ¡xr¡ X é y e i v £ < 3 a tfrux 'fjs i v o v a r ^ s

0.T0TT0V . vT T o X a ß eZ v S i ־ o Í K a a i v e t v a i t t ¡ v t p v x f j v

60

ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL, I. v.

elements, on the ground th a t a whole is homogeneous with its parts ; so they are compelled to say th a t the soul also is homogeneous with its parts, if living creatures become possessed of soul because some part of the surrounding air is cut off and enclosed in them. But if the air detached is homogeneous, while the soul has parts of different kinds, then evidently although one part of the soul will be present in this air, another will not. So tha t either the soul must be of similar parts, or else it does not exist in any and every part of the universe.

From what has been said it is obvious tha t the Can the soul faculty of knowing does not belong to the soul be- parts cause i t is composed of the elements, nor is it right according or true to say th a t it is moved. But since knowing, functions ? perceiving, and the forming of opinions are opera­tions of the soul, besides desiring, wishing, and the appetites in general, and again since movement in space is induced in living creatures by the soul, besides growth, maturity, and decay, does each of these belong to the soul as a whole ? Do we think, perceive, and do or suffer everything else with the whole soul, or do some functions belong to one part and others to another ? Does life reside in one or several or all of these parts or is something else the cause of it ? Some say th a t the soul has parts, and thinks with one part, and desires with another. In this case what is it which holds the soul together, if it naturally consists of parts ? Certainly not the body : on the contrary the soul seems rather to hold the body together ; a t any rate when the soul is gone the body dissolves into air and decays. If then some other thing gives the soul unity, this would really be the soul. But we shall have to inquire again, whether

63

i l l a \ a / t r a ה »¿V TOVTOIS, OTL TO 0X0V TOLS ¡MOpLOLS 0¡X0€i0€S- OJCTT àvay1<aîov avTOÎs Aeyetv Kal rrjv ¡pvX*'lv ¿¡xoeihrj Toîs fJiopioLç e lva i, e t rœ ärroX apßaveadai r t t o v

20 Trepce'xovTos ev to Î s ^,cóots epufrvxa T a t,(pa y iv e r a i . et S’ o p è v àrjp èiaoTTWjxevos époeiSr¡s} י] Se */»^7ן àvopoiopuepr/s, t o ¡1év t i a vrr js vTráp^ei SrjXov ó r t , t o S5 0 ¿x {!Tráp^ei. àvayica îov ovv avrrjv r¡ o/xoto- fxeprj e lva i r¡ pr¡ ¿w rrápxecv ev o tcoovv /¿opta» ro í; 7t<xvtÓs.

® avepov ovv ¿k t lo v elprjpuévœv cl>S ovTe t o 25 y1vdo<JK€LV ¿7ráp^et rfj ijjvxf] S tá t o e/c tcov errot-

X^íctív e lva i, o t׳Ve r o K iveîadai avrrjv KaXcos o v S àXr)6œs A ey era t. e7ret Se r o ytvcócr/cetv t r js ^VXVS è a r t /cat r o a la d á vea d a l r e /caí t o S o£à£eu/, é r i Se t o ¿TnOvp.eÍv /cat ßovXeaQ ai Kal oXœs a i opéreos, y tv e ra t Sè /cat /c a ra to tto v KLvr¡a1s to î s £a>ot?

30 1577*0 Trjs *fjvxys* ^Tt S5 OLV rj T€ Kal a.Kp,r¡ kcu 4Í1 b ff>QÍ0 iS, 7TOTZpOV oXr¡ t t¡ *pvXÎÎ TOVTWV Ík c lo to v

VTrâpx^i, /cat 7ráor¡ vo o vp év r e /cat alaQ avópeda /cat tcov âXXiüv e/caorov Troiovpév Te /caí. Traerlo- [lev , r¡ p,0p í0Ls ¿TepoLS erep a ; Kal t o t,r¡v ér¡ 7rórepov ev r tv t to u tcü v ¿ a rlv ¿vi r¡ Kal ev irXeiooiv

5 7} naoLV, r¡ Kal aÀAo r t a t r to v ; X éyova i Sr¡ n v e s puepLOTrjv avrr¡v, /caí aXXtp ¡uév voelv aXXcp Se¿TTLdvjieív. r t ouv S7] 7T0T6 ow e^et Trjv ifrvxrjv, el pepiUTr¡ 7ré(f>VK€v; o v y á p 8r¡ t o y e acopa' So/cet yáp T0vvavTL0v paXXov r¡ !/עןז to ףו crá>/za aw e^etv. ¿¿¡eXdovorjs y o v v S1a7rveÎTa1 /caí ar¡TreTa1. el ovv

10 6Tepóv t i ¡Jbíav avrrjv Trote!, ¿KeÍvo p á X ia r a v elr¡ ipvx'r¡■ Se-íjcret Sè /coa 7ráX1v KaKelvo t,r¡Teív, 7r¿Tepov

ARISTOTLE

this is a unity or has many parts. If it is a unity, why should not the soul be directly described as a unit ? And if it has parts, the progress of the argument will again demand to know what is its combining prin­ciple, and thus we shall proceed ad infinitum. There may also be some doubt about the parts of the soul, as to what is the function of each in the body. For if the soul as a whole holds together the whole body¡¡ it is natural tha t each of the parts should hold together some part of the body. But this seems impossible ; for it is hard even to imagine what part the mind will hold together, or how it will do it. Moreover plants clearly live even when divided, and some of the insects also ; which implies tha t the parts have a soul specifically if not numerically the same as tha t of the whole ; a t any rate each of the two parts has sensa­tion and moves in space for some time. I t is not at all surprising tha t they do not continue to do so ; for they have not the organs necessary to maintain their natural state. But none the less all the parts of the soul are present in each of the two segments, and the two half-souls are homogeneous both with eaeh other and with the whole ; which implies tha t although the parts of the soul are inseparable from one another, the soul as a whole is divisible. The first principle in plants, too, seems to be a kind of sou l; for this principle alone is common to both animals and plants. I t can exist in separation from the sensitive principle, but nothing can have sensation without i t־

ON THE SOUL, I. v.

ARISTOTLE411 b

e v ^ -noXvp.epes. e l puev yap ev, Sid n ovk evQecus K a i r j fa x j j £ v ; e l Se p u e p i a r o v , irdXiv o Aoyos £rjTTqueL t L to arvvexov ¿Keivo, Kai ovrco Sr¡ TTpoeiatv €7A t o djreipov. aTropiqaeie S’ av n s Kai rrepl rcov

is ¡ j i o p l o w a v r r j s , r i v * e%et Svvafiiv e K a a r o v e v T ip

ocbpLan, el yap r¡ oXrj f a x 7) 'n®-v T® crvvexei,TTpoarjKei Kai rcov fiopicov e K a a r o v o w e ^ e w ' n r o v

acopuaros- r o v r o S’ eoiKev aSvvdrcp’ noiov yap ¡xopiov r¡ ttcos o vovs crvvetjei, ^aAc77oy Kai TrXd- aai. <f>aiverai Se Kai rd fa r d Slaipovpieva £vjv

20 K a i t w v £o)cov evia r c o v evro/xtov, d>s rrjv avrrjv exovra faxrjv rw eiSei, el K a i p ,r¡ dpidpbcp ־ e K a r e p o v

yovv rcov popicov aicr6r)<jiv e^ei K a i Kiveirai K a r a

to ttov ¿ttl n v a xpovov. el Se p,r¡ SiareXovoiv, o v d e v

aroTTov’ opyava yap o v k exovuiv ware aw^eiv rrjv fa a iv . aAA5 ovSev rjrrov ev e K a r e p c p rcov ¡xopicov

25 drravr ivmrdpxei rd p o p i a rrjs fa x rjs , Kai opboeiSets eicnv aXXiqXdis1 K a i rfj oXr¡, aXXrjXcov ¡xev cos ov Xiopiara ovra, rrjs S’ oXqs fa x tfs <*>S Siaiperrjs ovcnjs. e o i K e Se Kai r¡ iv rois fa ro ts d p x r ¡ fa xV n s elvai• ¡1ovtjs yap ravrrjs Koiviovel Kai £«3a K a i

so fa r d . Kai a v r r ¡ ¡lev ^a>pi£eTCu ,rrjs a l & d r jT iK r j s

apxfjs, alaO-qaiv S’ ovdev dvev ravnqs eve«.

a ¿¡ioeihrj elaiv aAA Aois E 2W״ Bekker.

BOOK II

I. The theories of the soul handed down by our Definition predecessors have been sufficiently discussed ; now of the soul" let us start afresh, as it were, and try to determine what the soul is, and what definition of it will be most comprehensive. We describe one class of existing things as substance ; and this we subdivide into three : (1) m atter, which in itself is not an individual thing ; (2) shape or form, in virtue of which in­dividuality is directly attributed, and (3) the com­pound of the two. M atter is potentiality, while form is realization or actuality, and the word actuality is used in two senses, illustrated by the possession of knowledge and the exercise of it.“ Bodies seem to be pre-eminently substances, and most particularly those which are of natural origin ; for these are the sources from which the rest are derived. But of natural bodies some have life and some have n o t ; by life we mean the capacity for self-sustenance, growth, and decay. Every natural body, then, which possesses life must be substance, and substance of the compound type. But since it is a body of a definite kind, viz., having life, the body cannot be soul, for the body is not something predicated of a subject, but rather is itself to be regarded as a sub-you possess knowledge which you are not using, it may be called potential, actual only when you are using it.

67

« 2 a I . T à ¡1èv S77 w to tcüv rrporepov napaSeSoftéva ■nepi 1fjv)(Yjs elpr¡adc¡}• náXiv S־ toanep ¿£ v n a p x q s e n -

5 avla>¡1ev, ne1pw¡1evo1 h iop laa i t I éoTi 1f*v)(rj /cat t Is a v elr¡ kolvototos X óyos a vrfjs - X éyofiev S r¡ y evos ev t í t Gív ovtcov tt¡v o v a ia v , TavTrjs Sé to ¡1ev d>sa>\ <£\ /T)3> e י % 5 9 / / C\ 0/vAr¡vy o Kau a v ro ju,ev o vk e a r 1 ro o e t i , erepov de pt,opcj>7]v /caí, ecSos, /ca0 ’ rjv ןד8ךר Xéyerai ró S e t i , /cat TpLTOV TO ¿K TOVTCOV. Í0TI S’ 7] flèv vX7j

10 Svvapus, t o 8 ’ eïSos evTeX e ^ e ta , /caí t o v t o St^cDs1, t o ¡xev d>s emaT'qfirj, t o 8 ’ (ós t o detopeîv. o v a la i Se ¡JbáXiGT e tva i hoKovcri r á crdS/xara, /cat to v to o v r á <¡)va1 K T ־¿ a vra y a p tó jv aXÁwv a p ^ a í. tcúv Se <j>vau<íüv r á pcev e^ e t £,tor¡v} r à S־ ou/c e^et• ^0>7 ן1׳ Sé Xéyofiev t t¡ v St’ avToß Tpo<j>r¡v re /cat av£r¡(nv

15 /cat <f>día1v. ¿ ja re aájfia ׳cù־77 tpvaiKov fieTe^ov t,(0r¡s o v a la a v e’iq , o v a la S’ ovtco s c5 ? o w O Itt¡ . èn el S’ eaTc a œ fia ro ióvS e , t,corjv y à p ¿xov¡ où/c av e%Tj t o acü[1a f o x V ’ Y^-P ¿a r í T&v /caö’ vnoK eijiévov t o aá>¡1a, [laXXov S’ c¿s vnoK eí/ievov

® I f you have the capacity to acquire knowledge of a subject, you may be said to have potential knowledge of it, which will become actual by study. In another sense, if66

ON THE SOUL, II. i.

The aoiiS as form.

ject, i.e., as m atter.0 So the soul must be substance in the sense of being the form of a natural body, which potentially has life. And substance in this sense is actuality. The soul, then, is the actuality of the kind of body we have described. But actuality has two senses, analogous to the possession of know­ledge and the exercise of it. Clearly actuality in our present sense is analogous to the possession of know­ledge ; for both sleep and waking depend upon the presence of soul, and waking is analogous to the exercise of knowledge, sleep to its possession but not its exercise. Now in one and the same person the possession of knowledge comes first. The soul may therefore be defined as the first actuality of a natural body potentially possessing life ; and such will be any body which possesses organs. (The parts of plants are organs too, though very simple ones : e.g., the leaf protects the pericarp, and the pericarp protects the seed ; the roots are analogous to the mouth, for both these absorb food.) I f then one is to find a definition which will apply to every soul, it will be “ the first actuality of a natural body possessed of organs.” So one need no more ask whether body and soul are one than whether the wax and the im­pression it receives are one, or in general whether the m atter of each thing is the same as tha t of which it is the m atter ; for admitting that the te rms unity and being are used in many senses, the paramount sense is tha t of actuality.

We h av e , th e n , g iv en a g e n e ra l d e fin itio n o f w h a t and form ; e.g. a billiard ball. Its matter is ivory, its form spherical. An animate body, then, as it is a substance, consists of matter and form. The body must be matter, for it is not itself an attribute, bu t has attributes. Therefore the soul is form־

69

A R I S T O T L E112 a _

20 Kal vXr¡. a vayK aiov a p a rrjv1 ipvx^v o v a la v e lva i

w s elSos uctifiaros <j>vcriKov Svvájjiei Iw rjv ,¿xovtos.rj 8"" ovala evreÁe^eta. toiovtov apa crwfxaros¿ V T € Á ¿ x s!-a■• a v r r ¡ Se A e'yerat S i x t o s , r¡ ¡x e v ( o s

¿TTMJTrjyLr¡, r¡ S’ <hs t o Oecopeiv. <j>avepov ovv oti

íos ém orraíT¡' ¿v y a p tío v v á p x e iv rr¡v «/׳ux^v Kal25 vttvos Kal éypr¡yopuís ¿ o n v , aváX oyov S’ r¡ ¡Jiév

¿ y p r j y o p a i s t í o O e o jp e l v , o S’ v t t v o s t í o e^eiv K a l

I ir j e v e p y e i v . T r p o r i p a Se r f j y e v é o e i e m t o v a v T o v

r¡ ¿TTioTrjjxr¡. Sio ¿ a n v evreAe'^eia r¡ mpcoTr)oa)¡xaros <f>vaiKov 8vv.djj.ei ^ioijv g'xovtos . toiovto

4tí2 b Se', o av fj opyaviK ov. (o p ya va Se /cat T a tcov

(¡>VTüjv ¡¿épv), aAAá vavTeXíos arrXá, otov to cpvXXovTrepiKapTríov «JKeTracrfia, t o Se 7rep iK apviov Kapirov.a i Se pí^ai tío arófJiaTi aváXoyov áfi(f>ío yap lA/cet

ttjv rpo(j>r¡v.) e l Sr¡ ti koivov ¿ttI ttáor¡s *frvxijs5 Set Aeyetv, ei.77 av evTeAe^eta r¡ rrpioTr¡ aio/xaTOs

cf>vcriKov opyav iK ov . Si0 Kal o v Set t,r¡Teiv e i ev r¡

fax?¡ Kal t o <iío¡Jbas a>ovep ov8e tov Krjpov Kal t oc r^ jtx a , ouS’ ־oXtos t rjv ¿KaaTov vXrjv Kal to ofivXr)• to y a p ev Kal t o e lva i eirel TrXeovax&S

XéyeTai, to KVpiios ■)7 evTeAe^eta e o n v .10 Ka0óAoi> ¡!ev odv eiprjra i t 1 éoTiv r¡ xjsvx^¡׳ o v a la

a t o v (sic) Bekker־

® Every “ substance ” is composed of two factors—matter

ON THE SOUL, II. i.

the soul is : it is substance in the sense of formula ; i.e., the essence of such-and-such a body. Suppose ° tha t an implement, e.g. an axe, were a natural body; the substance of the axe would be tha t which makes it an axe, and this would be its sou l; suppose this removed, and it would no longer be an axe, except equivocally. As it is, it remains an axe, because it is not of this kind of body tha t the soul is the essence or formula, but only of a certain kind of natural body which has in itself a principle of movement and rest. We must, however, investigate our definition in re­lation to the parts of the body. If the eye were a living creature, its soul would be its vision ; for this is the substance in the sense of formula of the eye. But the eye is the m atter of vision, and if vision fails there is no eye, except in an equivocal sense, as for instance a stone or painted eye. Now we must apply what we have found true of the part to the whole living body. For the same relation must hold good of the whole of sensation to the whole sentient body qua sentient as obtains between their re­spective parts. That which has the capacity to live is not the body which has lost its soul, but tha t which possesses its sou l; so seed and fruit are potentially bodies of this kind. The waking state is actuality in the same sense as the cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye, while the soul is actuality in the same sense as the faculty of the eye for seeing, or of the implement for doing its work. The body is tha t which exists potentially ; but just as the pupil and the faculty of seeing make an eye, so in the other case

which is its form. Take away the latter and the body perishes, so that the whole is no longer a living creature ; by removing the form of a living creature we destroy its identity.

71

ARISTOTLE

yàp 7] Karà rov X6yov. rovro Sè ro r¿ rjv eïvai rw roiœ Sl aco/xari, Kadairep et n row ôpydvœv (¡)VCJIKOV rjv craijjba, oîov rréXeKvs׳ rjv yàp àv ro 7reÀe/cet eîvai r¡ ouata avrov, Kal r¡ ipvxr] rovro • Xwpiodeiarjs yàp ravrrjs ovk àv e n rréXeKVS rjv,

15 aAA־ r¡ ¿[¿œvvpLCOs. vvv S’ e a r t néXeKvs׳ ov yàp roiovrov acnfiaros ro r i eîvat /cat o Àoyos ־ ׳ >? i/jVX'U> ¿AÀà (¡)VGLKOV TOLOvSl eXOVTOS a p x ty KLVTj- aea»s Kal ardaeojç êv ia v râ ). Oeœpeîv Sè «rat em tw v ¡xepâ)v Set ro XexOev. et yàp o ¿(¡)daXp-os £,â>ov, $vxv] àv rjv avrov r¡ oipis׳ avrrj yàp ouata

20 ¿(¡)OaXfiov r¡ Karà rov Xoyov. o S5 ocf)6aX[ios vXrj oifj€(jôs, rjs âiToXeiTTOVGrjs ovk ëo n v ô(f>0a\[i6s, 'nXrjv ¿fJLiovvjjLWs, Kaôdirep o Xtdivos Kal 6 yeypa[i[iévos. Set or¡ Xafieïv rô ¿ttI ¡¿épovs ¿ ft oXov rov ¿,tovros ad)[laros״ âvaXoyov yàp e^et tos ro [¿épos rrpos ro

25 [iépos, ovrœ s r¡ oXr¡ aicrdrjcns vpos ro ÔXov oai^-ta ro alodrjrcKov, f¡ roiovro. e a r t Sè ov rô d-no- fîefîXrjKos rrjv ifivxrjv t o Svvdfiei ov œ are Çrjv, àXXà ro e)(ov. ro Sè <jttép[ia Kal o Kaprros ro SvvdfJLei TotovSt o<7)[xa. d>s [iev ovv rj r[irjats Kal

413 s r¡ opaais, ovrco Kal r¡ eyprjyopois ¿vreXéx€ ia » ¿>s S’ rj ôifiLS Kal r¡ Svva/JLLS rov opyavov, r¡ *¡,VXV׳ T°ÇwX * o. / st î \ \ > f f ' << ׳ €3 <de dcofxa r o o w a /xe i ov* aAA ojarrep o ocpuaAfjios r¡

° A .’s argument in the rest of this chapter is not quite easy to follow. The introduction of the axe seems at first irrelevant, because, as A. afterwards explains, being inani­mate, it is not really parallel to the living creature. But his point is clear, the axe consists of the matter (wood and metal) of which it is composed, and its form (i.e. what makes it an axe—cutting edge, weight, and so forth). I f you take away (e.g.) its edge, what remains ? Still an axe, although one that will not cut. But this is not true of the living creature. I t has a body which is its matter, and a soul70

ON THE SOUL, II. i.—li­

the soul and body make a living creature. I t is quite clear, then, tha t neither the soul nor oertain parts of it, if it has parts, can be separated from the body ; for in some cases the actuality belongs to the parts themselves. Not but what there is nothing to prevent some parts being separated, because they are not actualities of any body. I t is also uncertain whether the soul as an actuality bears the same relation to the body as the sailor to the ship.“ This must suffice as an attem pt to determine in rough outline the nature of the soul.

II. But since the definite and logically more i n - True telligible conception arises from the vague but more deflnition• obvious data of sense, we must try to review the question of the soul in this l ig h t; for a definitive formula ought not merely to show the fact, as most definitions do, but to contain and exhibit the cause.But in practice the formulae of our definitions are like conclusions; for instance, what is squaring a rect­angle ? The construction of an equilateral rectangle equal to an oblong rectangle. Such a definition is merely a statem ent of the conclusion. But if a man says th a t squaring a rectangle is the finding of a mean proportional, he is giving the underlying cause of the thing to be defined.6

73

443 a \ ^KOpTj K o l V¡ O lfrlS, K(XK€l TJ IpVy^j KCLL TO CTiSjLta TO

l,a>ov. o n [xev ovv ovk ear tv r¡ ifivy7<׳ x a>PLarV ro ^6 CTai/xaTO?, ftep7j Tti>à avTrjSy el ¡xepiarr¡ •n¿(¡>vk€vs

ovk aSrjXov״ evicov yap r¡ ei'reAe'^eta t<w ¡xepwv ¿gtIv avrcjv. ov p.rjv àAA’ ëvid ye ovQev KcoXvei, S tà to [irjdevos elvai acLfiaros èvreXe^eias. e n S è abiqXov el o u t cos evre Acheta rod adS/xaros־ ^ iffvxr] ajOTTcp TrXcorrjp rrXolov. tvitco fiev ovv ravrrj io duopitjOw Kal vrroyeypd(j>8o) rrepi ifivxys.

II. ’E et S’ ¿k tw־77 v àcracjxjàv ¡iev (j>avepœTép(ov Se yiyvera i t o era(f>es K a l K a r a tov A o y o v y v c o p i/J b io -

repov¡, Treipareov rrdXtv ovtcos err eXdetv rrepl avrrjs' ov yàp [xovov to otl S e t top apioTiKov Xoyov orjAovv¡

15 a> a 7 rep ol vXeZaToi row opcnv Xéyovaiv, «xÀÀà /c a t

rrjv alriav ¿vwrrdpxeiv Kal ¿¡¿(ftaiveuQai. vvv S ’

t o a i r e p a u|X7r־ e p a o jU,a$5’ o־ t A o y o t t o w opcov e lo iv olov T t ¿ a n TeTpayioVLO/JLOs ; t o tcrov erepofjLrjKei opOoycovLov etvai loojrXevpov. o Sè toiovtos o p o s

X o y o s tov GVfjLTrepdo'fiaToç. a S e A e y c o i׳ oti e a n v 20 o TeTpayioviapLOs fieorjs evpeais3 tov v p d y f i a T o s

A e y e t t o a’in o v .

ARISTOTLE

° For a discussion of this difficult sentence see Hicks ed loc. a N o t e . —The reference is to the figure opposite.

AB is a straight line divided into two parts a t C. On AB a semicircle ADB is described. CD is drawn at right angles to AB to meet the circumference in D. Two conclusions can be proved. (1) The square on CD is equal to the rectangle AC.CB. (2) CD is the mean proportional between AC and CB, or in other words AC : CD : : CD : CB. For the proofs of these two propositions cf. Euclid ii. 14 and vi. 18־ 72

ON THE SOUL, II. n.

We say then, assuming a fresh starting-point for our inquiry, tha t th a t which has soul is distinguished from th a t which has not by living. But the word living is used in many senses, and we say th a t a thing lives if any one of the following is present in it— mind, sensation, movement or rest in space, besides the movement implied in nutrition and decay or growth. Consequently all plants are considered to live, for they evidently have in themselves a capacity and first principle by means of which they exhibit both growth and decay in opposite directions ; for they do not grow up and not down, but equally in both directions, and in every direction, and they are nourished and continue to live, as long as they are able to absorb food. This capacity to absorb food may exist apart from all other powers, but the others cannot exist apart from this in mortal beings. This is evident in the case of plants ; for they have no other capacity of the soul.

This, then, is the principle through which all living Sensation things have life, but the first characteristic of an essential animal is sensation ; for even those which do not of life. - move or change their place, but have sensation, we call living creatures, and do not merely say th a t they live. The first essential factor of sensation, which we all share, is a sense of touch. Just as the merely nutritive faculty may exist apart from touch and from all sensation, so touch may exist apart from all other senses. (By “ nutritive faculty " I mean tha t part of the soul which even the plants share ; all ani­mals obviously possess the sense of touch.) Why each of these two facts is so, we shall explain later on.a

But for the moment le t us be satisfied with saying ° In Book III. ch. xii.

75

ARISTOTLE

A eyo jiev o vv aPXVV Aafiovres rrjs aKeipeats¡, Suopiada i to epajjvxov r o v aipvxov TV ^Vv ° ,nXeo- vax<os Se ro d t,r¡v Xeyop-evov, kolv ev n ro v r io v ivvTrapxXl fiovov, l/qv o t to <f> ap.ev} o lov vovs, a ’iodrjcris, Kivrjcris Kai a r d a is r¡ K a ra to t to v , er t

25 Kivrjais r¡ K a ra rpo<f>r]v Kai (j>6 ia is r e Kai avtjrjois- Slo Kai r d <f>vop,eva ird vra SoKel t,r jv <f>aiverai y a p ev avT ois ex o v ra Svvapiiv ical dpxrjv ro ia v rr jv , Si qs av^rjaiv׳ re Kai <f)dicriv Xa.p,fidvov<Ji K a ra ro v s evavrLovs to tto v s° o v y a p a vo i [lev a v^ e ra i, Kara}

8 » }/ 5 \ \ 5 e / 5 3 3 / f f ^ 'ov, aAA o[xoia>s err ajxcbiD Kai rravroae Kai so rpe<f>erai Kai t,fj Sta reXovs, ecus dv Svvrjrai Xap.-

fidveiv rpocjyrjv. x L0P ^ €<J ai 8e rovro fzev rw v aXXcov Svvarov, ra. S’ dXXa rovrov dSvvarov ev ro ls Ovi]rols. (j>avepov S־ errl rw v <fivof,levojv

413 b ovSep.ia yap avr ols vrrdpxet Svvapiis dXXr] iffvx^S• To ¡Lev ovv £,rjv Sia rr/v d p x ty ravrrjv vird.pxei

roils t/aa i, to Se t,wov Sid rrjv aiadrjaiv TTpwrnos׳ Kai yap rd [jt,7j Kivovpieva ¡xr]S> dXXdrrovra tottov, exovra S’ a loOrjcnv £<3a Xeyofiev Kai ov t,rjv (jlovov.

6 alodiqaeios Se TTpGirov virdpxei rrdaiv d<f>r¡. uyoTcep Be to dpenriKov Svvarai ^a>/>t£eo0־cu rrjs arf>rjs Kai Trdarjs aiadrjaeais, ovtcds r¡ acprj rdov aXAiov aiodiqaeiov. dpeirriKov Se Xeyofiev to toiovtov p,opiov rrjs fa x V s °v Ka'L r °L <f>vrd ¡xerexei׳ r d Se £<Sa rrdvra <j>aiverai rrjv dirriKrjv a ’icrOrjoiv exovra•

10 St’ rjv S’ alriav eKarepov rovratv crvpbfieftrjKev, varepov ipovpbev.

N w S’ erri r o o o v ro v elptjodco /lovov, o n e o r iv r¡ 74>

ON THE SOUL, II. n .

th a t the soul is the origin of the characteristics we have mentioned, and is defined by them, tha t is by the faculties of nutrition, sensation, thought and movement. The further questions, whether each of these faculties is a soul, or part of a soul, and, if a part, whether a part in the sense tha t it is only separ­able in thought or also in space, are in some cases easy of solution, but others involve difficulty. For just &s in the case of plants some parts clearly live when divided and separated from each other, so th a t the soul in them appears to be one in actuality in each whole plant, but potentially more than one, so we can see th a t in other varieties of the soul the same thing happens, e.g., in insects which are divided ; for each of the parts has sensation and movement in space ; and, if it has sensation, it must also have imagination ° and appetite ; for, where sensation is, there is also pain and pleasure, and where these are there must also be desire. But in the case of the mind and the thinking faculty nothing is yet clear ; it seems to be a distinct kind of soul, and it alone admits of being separated, as the immortal from the perishable. But it is quite clear from what we have said th a t the other parts of the soul are not separable; as some say ; though it is obvious tha t they are theoretically different; for there is a difference between the abstract faculties of sensation and opinion, just as feeling is different from opining. The same is true of all the other faculties we have mentioned. Again, some animals have all these faculties, some only some of them, and others again only one. I t is this which constitutes the differences between animals ; the reason for it must be con­sidered later6־ I t is much the same with the senses ;

77

ARISTOTLES48b

ifivxV rw v elprjixei’wv rovrw v dpx^j Kal rovrois w piarai, dpe-7TTLK(x>, ala9r]TiKw, 8iavorjriKw, KLvqaei. TTorepov Se rovrw v eKaarov ¿ a n ipvx'r) ?! ¡xopiov i^vx'fJS, ical el ¡xSpiov, irorepov ovrw s war" etvai

15 x^ptaTov Aoyo) ¡xovov r¡ Kal to tto j, irepl ¡xev n vw v rovrw v ov xaXerrov I8eiv, evia s¿ a/2Top lav eet. warrep yap em rw v <f)vrwv evia 8iaipov[xeva <j>ai- verai Z,wvra Kal x a}PLi° lJ'eva ®■7r־ dXXriXwv, ws ovoTjs rrjs iv rovrois ifsvxrjs evreXexeia ¡lev pads iv ¿Kaarw (¡)vru), Svvdfiei Se TrXeiovwv, ovrcos

20 opwfxev /cat ire pi erepas 8iacj)opds rrjs ipvxrjs avjx- {Saivov em tG)v evrdjxwv ev to is Siarefxvofxevois‘ Kal yap alaOiqoiv ¿Karepov rw v ¡xepwv e^et /cat Kivrjaiv rfjv Kara roirov, el K aiaOrjaiv, Kal 4>av- raa lav Kal 6pe£iv ottov ¡xev yap aiadrjois, Kal Xvtttj re Kal rjSovrj, ottov Se ra vra , e f dvayKrjs

25 Kal ¿TTidvfxia. Trepl Se rod vov Kal rrjs׳ OewprjriKV]s 8vvd[xews ovSev ttw <f>avepov, aAA’ eot/ce *ftvxrjs yevos erepov etvai, /cat rovro ¡xovov evSexerai X<opit,eo9ai, Kaddvep to aiStov ro d (f>9aprov־ to. Se AOLird ¡xopia rrjs ifsvxrjs (j>avepov e/c rovrw v o n o vk e o n x ^ p ia r d , KaOdrrep rives (f>aaiv״ r w Se

so Xoyw o n e re p a , (f>avepov• aia9r]riKw y a p elvai Kal ho^aanK W erepov, e’irrep Kal to ala8dveo9ai rov So£a£etv. opuoLws Se /cat rw v dXXwv eKaarov rw v eipTjfxevwv. e n S3 ¿vio ts ¡xev rw v t,wwv a-nav9׳‘ vrrdpxei ra vra , n a l Se n v a rovrw v, ¿repots Se ev

414 a ¡xovov. rovro Se iroiel 8ia<f>opav rw v £,wwv• Sia r iv a S’ a lr ia v , varepov ¿TTioKenreov* Tro.paTrXrjaiov Se Kal ,nep l rd s aioQrjoeis avjxj3e^rji<ev’ r d ¡xev y a p

6 iiio 12, 13־Cf, Introduction־76

ON THE SOUL, II. n.

for some animals have all, some only some, and some again one only—the most indispensable—touch.

The phrase “ th a t whereby we live and perceive has two senses, as has “ tha t whereby we know ” (in the one sense we mean knowledge and in the other the son l; for we can say tha t we know by each of these) ; similarly we are healthy either by health of by part or the whole of the body. Now of these, knowledge and health are a kind of shape or form, or notion ; an actuality, as it were, of the recipient, i.e. of tha t which is capable of knowledge or health (for the actualization of active processes appears to reside in the patient upon which the effect is produced), and the soul is tha t whereby we live and perceive and think in the primary sense ; so tha t the soul would be the notion or form, and not the m atter or sub­strate. As we have already said,a substance is used in three senses, form, m atter, and a compound of the two. O f these m atter is potentiality, and form actuality ; and since the compound is an animate thing, the body cannot be the actuality of a soul, but the soul is the actuality of some body. For this reason those are right in their view who maintain that the soul cannot exist without the body, but is not itself in any sense a body. I t is not a body, it is associated with a body, and therefore resides in a body, and in a body of a particular kind ; not at all as our predecessors supposed, who fitted it to any body, without adding any limitations as to what body or what kind of body, although it is unknown for any chance thing to admit any other chance thing. But

70

eyei Traoas, t«x 8e Tivds, r a Se ¡xiav tyjv a v a y - KaioraTrjv, a<j>rjv.

5 ’Ew ei Se a¡ £a}p,ev Kal alaOavopieda oiy'CJS Ae'yerat, KadaTrep w emora/xe^a (Xeyofiev Se to /xev stti- aTrjpLrjv to Se tpv}{rjv e/caTepcp ya p t o v t u )v <f>ap,ev ¿TricFTaaOai)' opioitos Se !<al [iS ]1 vyiaivofiev to fiev wyteta,2 to Se ¡Jbopico tl v I t o v awfiaTos r¡ Kal oAai. rovTiov S' r¡ ¡Lev emcrr^/ATj Te /cat vyle ia pLop(f>r¡

10 *cat eiSo? Tt /cat Aoyosr /cat otoi׳ evepyeia rod Se- k t l k o v , r¡ p,ev rod ¿TTLCTTrjpLOVLKOv, Se tou u y ta - u t ik o v (So/cet yap ev tco n'dayovTL /cat Startdepievq) r¡ tcov TTOLTjTLKtbv virdpx^w evepyeia), r¡ i^vyjj Se to u to <3 ¿,ojfxev Kal aioOavSpieOa Kal Stavoovpueda TTpcorMS, w are Xoyos Tt? av ea/ ׳cat etSo?, aAA5

15 ouv yAi] /cat to {moKelpbevov. Tpivoos yap Aeyo- fievrjs rrjs ovaias, Kaddirep eiiropiev, cov t o ¡levCtOOS’j! TO 06 vAt¡, TO 06 <£g a[JL<f)OLV TOVTCOV O 7]fiev vXr¡ Svvapus, t o Se elSos evreXeyeia- errel Se to e£ djjL(polv epjpvyov; ov t o aco/xd eoTiv evreAe^eta iftvxf¡?, aAA’ avTTj Gix»pLaTOS tl v o s . Kal St a to u to

20 KaXcos vTToXapufidvovoiv ots So/cet ft^ T3 aveu ctm- flottos etvai pt/rjTe o־co/i,ci tl r¡ f a x 1! pta piev yap^® ׳ o v k ean¡, uwjJLaTOS Se t l , Kal Sta to u to ev ocopLaTt vn d p x^i, /cat ev acopLaTL to lovtco , Kal ovx couvep ol rrpoTepov els atop,a ¿viqpp,o{,ov a vrrjv , ovdev TrpodSiopi'Covres ev tlvl Kal ttouo , Kairrep ovSe

25 fiaivopievov t o v t v x o v t o s Sexeadai to t v x o v . o v t w

1 Bywater.s vyieia Sophonias, Torstrik, Hicks : vyUia vel vyieiav codd.

15 412 a 6.78

ARISTOTLE

our view explains the facts quite reasonably ° ; for the actuality of each thing is naturally inherent in its potentiality, tha t is in its own proper m atter.From all this it is clear tha t the soul is a kind of actuality or notion of tha t which has the capacity of having a soul.

III. Now of the faculties of the soul which we have ah living mentioned, some living things, as we have said, have have xfot all all, others only some, and others again only one. faculties. Those which we have mentioned are the faculties for nourishment, for appetite,6 for sensation, for move­ment in space, and for thought. Plants have the nu­tritive faculty only, but other living things have the faculty for sensation too. But if for sensation then also for appetite ; for appetite consists of desire, inclina­tion, and wish, and all animals have at least one of the senses, th a t of touch ; and tha t which has sensa­tion knows pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the painful, and th a t which knows these has also desire ; for desire is an appetite for what is pleasant. Again, they have a sense which perce-ives food ; for touch is the sense which does this. All animals feed on what is dry or wet, hot or cold, and touch is the sense which apprehends these ; the other objects of sense are only indirectly apprehended by touch. Neither sound, nor colour, nor smell contributes anything to nourishm ent; but flavour is one of the things appre­hended by touch. Hunger and thirst are desire, the former for what is dry and hot, the latter for what is cold and w e t; flavour is a kind of seasoning of these. We must be precise about these subjects later, but for the moment let it suffice to say tha t those animals which have a sense of touch have also appetite. The question of imagination is obscure,

b Appetite Is mot included in the list in 413 b ־13

ON THE SOUL, II. n.—in.

ARISTOTLE414 a

Se y iv e ra t Kal K ara Aó y o v ¿Kaorov ya p rj evreAe- XSLa T(P hvvájiei VTrapxpvTi /cat rrfj ot/ceta vXrj 7r4(f>vKev eyyiveadac. o n /xev ovv évreXéxeiá r t? e o r t /cal Aóyo? ro u S w a p e^ o v ro s e?vat t o i o v t o v ,

<j>avepóv ¿K t o v t c o v .

I I I . Tcov Se (¡)wá/xecov r fjs *¡fvxrjs a t A e ^ e to m ro ts ' 30 ¡xev VTrápxovoi rraaai, Kadárrep e’Lirojxev, to is Se

Tives avrcov, eviois sé /x ta fjbóvr). 8vvá¡xeLS S’et7TOjxev OpennKov, opeKTCKov, aladr/nicov , Kivrj- t lk o v K ara tottoVj StavoTjrtKov. v v á p xe i Se ro ts

4Í4 b p,év <f>VTOLS TO dpCTTTLKOV ¡XOVOV y £T€pOLS Se TOUTO r e /cal ro aiadrjnK ov. el Sé ro aiadrjnK ov, /cal ró opeKTLKÓv opeáis ¡xev ya p ¿iridv[x¿a /cal Ovfxós Kal povÁrjois, r á Sé £<3a ttcxvt ’¿xovai ¡xíav ye rtov alo'dr¡0£ajv, rq v ácf>r¡V' co S־ a ’íadrjais vwápxec,

5 tovtcü rjbovr¡ r e /cal Aü7t^ Kal ro Su r[(׳ e Kal Xvrrrjpóv, o ís Sé r a ú r a , Kal 17 ¿mOv/xia״ tov yap rj8éos opeáis avrrj. e n Sé r íjs Tpocf>rjs atoOrjaiv exovcriv rj y a p á<f>rj Trjs Tpoc¡>r¡s a ’íaOrjcris' t;r¡poZs ya p Kal vypo ls Kal depjxols Kal ipvxpois rpe<£erat r á £<3a rrávTa, tovtiov S’ alaOrjais á<j>r¡’ tcov S’

io aXXwv alaOrjTcov K a rá avjx^e^rjKÓs׳ ovOev y a p els Tpo(f>r]v ovjxfiáXÁeTai ifióc¡)os ovSe xp¿Dp,a ouSé oujxrj. ó Sé vy^x¿? ev r t ra>v ¿ tttójv e a rtv . neiva Sé Kal S t0 a - iiridvfjiLa, Kal rj ¡xev rrelva ¿;rjpov Kal Oepfxov, r¡ Sé Sú/׳a ipvxpov Kal v y p o v ■ o Sé XUfto?o tov r¡8va¡xá t i tovtcov éoTÍv. 8iaaa<j>r¡T€ov Sé

15 rrepl avTcov varepov, vvv S’ ern Toaovrov eíprjada), oti tcov £cócov to is exova iv á(j)rjv Kal opeáis vtt- ápxe t. 7?epl Sé <J>avraaías áSrjXov, varepov S’ e m -

° i.e. on general grounds we should expect a particular soul to belong to a particular body־80

ON THE SOUL, II. m .

and must be considered later. In addition to these senses some also possess the power of movement in space, and others again—viz., man, and any other being similar or superior to him—have the power of thinking and intelligence.

Thus it is clear tha t there must be a single definition Definition of soul, just as there is of rectilinear figure ; for as of 3001 in the la tter case there is no figure besides the triangle and those tha t follow it (i.e., quadrilateral, pentagon, etc.), so there is no soul besides those we have mentioned. I t would be possible in the case of figures to frame a common definition, which would fit them all, but would be descriptive of no particular figure ; and similarly in the case of the kinds of soul we have mentioned. Hence it would be ridiculous, in this case as in others, to look for the common definition, which is the particular definition of no existing thing, and has no reference to any special or individual species, while we neglect such a par­ticular definition.0

The facts regarding the soul are much the same similar to as those relating to figures ; for both in figures and in things which possess soul, the earlier type always tion. exists potentially in tha t which follows ; e.g., the triangle is implied by the quadrilateral, and the nutritive faculty by the sensitive. We must then inquire in each several case, what is the soul of each individual, for instance of the plant, the man, and the beast. But we must also consider why they are thus arranged in a series. For without the nutritive faculty the sensitive does not exist, but in plants the nutritive is divorced from the sensitive faculty.Again, without the sense of touch none of the other senses exists, but touch may exist without any

83

ARISTOTLE/ S / C - ' ' / í /(JK€TTTeOV. eVLOLS 0€ TTpOS TOVTOLÇ VITO-p Zl KO.I TO

Kara tottov klvtjtlkov, irépoiç Sè Kal to huxvor¡- tlkov re K a l vovs, oiov dv6pœTrois Kal et t í toiovtov erepóv i o n v r¡ Kal TifiLœrepov.

20 l\rjXov ovv o n ro v a v ro v rpoirov eis d v elrj Xoyos i[*v XVs r e Ka'L < XVÍJiaTOS' ° v Te y&p Ík £ Í oyfj^La n a pa t o rp ly œ v ô v i o n Kal r à i(f>e£rjs, o v r iv r a v d a i>X'17 n׳/» a p a r à s elpr)p,évas ■ y ¿ v o lt o S’ av /cat em r œ v o xV ^ú rco v X óyos k o ivo s , o s e(f>app,ooei ¡xev rraoiv, t'Sto? S’ ovSevos e o r a i o x ^ p -a ro s ’ o¡ioiœ s

25 Sé Kal ¿ttI r a ls elpr¡p.évats ifjvxa ís. Sio yeXotov t,r]T€iv ro v Koivov X óyov Kal ¿ttI r o v r œ v Kal €<¡> erép œ v , o s ovéevós ,¿ o ra t r œ v o vrœ v ÏSlos X óyos , ovSé K ara ró oítceiov Kal aro¡iov elSos, d<f>évras ro v t o io v to v .

UapaTrXrjoícüs S־ e^et t û rrepl rœ v a^7jju.ára>v Kal r à Kara ifrvxtfv■ del y à p êv reo i(f>e£fjs

30 VTrápxet■ S w á fte t to rrporepov ¿irí r e rœ v c r ^ p a - r œ v Kal ¿ttI r œ v èfiifjvxœv, o tov i v re rp a y œ vœ ¡xev rpiyœ vov¡, ¿v aiodrjrcKœ Sè to ópeirrircóv a tore KaO* I Kaurov ^-rrjreov, ris eKaorov if>vXV> otov ris (f>vrov Kal ris dvdpœ irov r¡ Orjpiov. S tà r iv a

*15 a S’ a ir ia v rœ ¿<j>e¿jr¡s ovrœs exovaL! OKerrreov. dvev [lev y à p rov dperrriKov to alodrjrLKOv ovk e o T iv t o v S’ ■ alodrjTLKov x tüP*-teTal T° O pem iKov i v rots (bvroís. rrdXiv S’ dvev p,ev ro d dirriK ov r œ v dXXœv alodiqoeœ v ovoep.ia v v dpx^i, à<f>rj S’

° The argument of this paragraph is as follows : Ju st as figure has a definition applicable to all varieties of figures, so soul has a similar ־s common 59 definition ; bu t to under­stand individual types of soul, e.g., of man, animal, and plant, we must study these types themselves.82

־■׳ ־■־־ «§BÉÍÍ|i

ON THE SOUL, II. in .—iv.

others ; for many of the animals have neither vision nor hearing nor any sense of smell a t all. Again, of those which have sensation, some have the locomotive faculty, and some have not. And lastly, and most rarely, living creatures have power of reasoning and thought. For those perishable creatures which have reasoning power have all the other powers as well, but not all those which have any one of them have reasoning power ; some have not even imagination, while others live in virtue of this alone. The con­sideration of the speculative faculty is another ques­tion. I t is clear, then, tha t the account of each of these faculties is also the most relevant account that can be given of the soul.

IV. If one intends to investigate these faculties, The method one must first grasp what each of them is, and then of mquiry־ proceed to inquire into secondary matters, and so on.But if one is to state what each of them —e.g., the thinking, sensitive, or nutritive faculty—is, one must again first explain what thinking and perceiving are ; for logically 0 the exercise of their functions comes before the faculties themselves. And if this is so, and if one should have examined, even before these functions, the objects corresponding to them, then for the same reason one must first of all determine the facts about those objects, e.g., about food or the object of perception or thought. First, then, we must speak of food and reproduction ; for the nutritive soul belongs to all other living creatures besides man, and is the first and most widely shared faculty of the soul, in virtue of which they all have life. Its functions are reproduction and the assimila­tion of food. For this is the most natural of all func-

ARISTOTLE

6 dvev rcov aXXcov in rd p ye i' rroXXd y a p rcov t^cpcov>/ 9 s t n j / 3 3 \ ‘ tr 2 / 3 3 tr \OVT OlfSLV OVT aKOTjV €)(OVGLV OVT OGjJLrjS OACOS

a’icrdrjoiv. Kal rcov aladrjnKtov Se t<x fiev e^et ro K a ra rorrov k ivt)tik o v, ra S’ ovk e"xei • reXevralov Se Kal eAa^tora Xoyiop-ov Kal Siavoiav• ols ¡.Lev yap vrrdpxei Xoyiopios rcov cf)0aprcdv, to v to ls Kai

ra Xoirrd rrdvra, ols S’ ¿Keivcov '¿Kaurov, ov rrdai׳ 10Xoyiafxos, aAAa ro ts p-ev owSe <f>avraoia, r a Se ravrrj p,ovy £,cocnv. rrepl Se rod decoprjnKov vov erepos Xoyos• o n p,ev ovv 6 rrepl rovroov ¿Kaurov A¿yos ovros oiKetoraros Kal rrepl ipvxfjs, 8fjXov.

IV. 5A vayK alov Se rov ¡leXXovra rrepl to v tio v is GKeiffiv TroLeladai XafSeiv ׳¿Kaurov avrcov r i ¿ u n v ,

eld’ ovrcos -rrepl row e’ ojuevcdv rj Kal rrepl rw v dX- Xcov ¿TTL^rjreiv. el Se ׳xprj Xeyeiv r i ¿Kaurov avrcov, olov r i to vorjnKov r¡ to aiuOrjriKOV r¡ to dperrn- k6v, rrporepov e n XeKreov r i to voeiv Kal r i ro aluQdveuOai״ rrporepov ya p elai rdov 8vvapuecov at

20 ¿vepyeiai Kal at rrpd^eis K ara rov Xoyov. el 8 ovrcos j rovraiv S־ eVt rrporepa r d dvnK eifieva Set reOecoprjKevai, rrepl ¿Keivcov rrpcorov dv Seot St­op i era, t Sta rr]v avrrjv a lr ia v , olov rrepl rpo^rjs Kai aluOrjrov Kal vor/rov. toure rrpdorov rrepl rpofirjs Kal yevvyuecos XeKreov• r¡ y a p dperrnKr¡ ijsvxV Ka'L ro ls dXXots - vrrdpxei, Kal rrpcorr¡ Kal Koivordrr¡

25 8vvapuis e o n ^ v x ^ s , Kad’ rjv vrrdpxei ro L,rjv arrauiv . rjs ¿ u n v epya yevvrjuai Kal rpocffj XpfjaOat• ¿)VfjiKfitraroy ya p rcov epycov to ls ^coulv,

a We proceed from the exercise of the functions, which we know and see, to assume the existence of the faculty 5 nature proceeds in the opposite order־

ON THE SOUL, II. iv.

tions among living creatures, provided tha t they are perfect and not maimed, and do not have spontaneous generation : viz., to reproduce one’s kind, an animal producing an animal, and a plant a plant, in order tha t they may have a share in the immortal and divine in the only way they can ; for every creature strives for this, and for the sake of this performs all its natural functions. “ That for sake of which ” has two meanings : (1) tha t for the purpose of which, and (2) tha t for the benefit of which. Since, then, they cannot share in the immortal and divine by continuity of existence, because no perishable thing can remain numerically one and the same, they share in these in the only way they can, some to a greater and some to a lesser extent ; what persists is not the individual itself, but something in .its image, identical not numerically but specifically.

The soul is the cause and first principle of the The nature living body. The words cause and first principle are of the sou1■ used in several separate senses. But the soul is equally the cause in each of the three senses which we have distinguished a ; for it is the cause in the sense of being tha t from which motion is derived, in the sense of the purpose or final cause, and as being the substance of all bodies tha t have souls. (1) That the soul is the cause in the sense of substance is obvious ; for substance is the cause of existence in all things, and for living creatures existence is life, and of these 6 the soul is the cause and first principle.Also the actuality of tha t which exists potentially is its essential formula.0 (2) Clearly the soul is also the cause in the final sense־ For just as mind acts with

87

ARISTOTLE

oca reXeia Kai purj ־mjpajju.aTa, 7<׳ t t ) f yeveaiv avro- fidrrjv e^et, to rroirjaai erepov olov avr¿, L,qjov Ilev t,a>ov, <f>vrov Se <j>vr6v, iva rod del Kai rov

415 b 0etou ¡iere)(a>aiv f¡ Svvavra r rrdvra yap eKeivov opeyerai, Kaneivov eveKa -npdrrei oaa rrpdrrei Kara (f>vaiv. ro S5 o5 eveKa S in ¿v, to fiev ov, to Se cS. eTTel got׳ KoivwveZv dSvvarei rov del ical rod Oeiov rf¡ avvexeia, Sta to ¡irjSev evSex^odai r&v

5 (¡)daprcbv ravro Kai ev dpidfiw Siafieveiv, fj Svvarai fiere^eiv '¿Kadrov, Koivtovei ravrr¡, ro ¡lev ¡laXAov to Ss rjrrov' Kai Stajievei ovk avro aAA־ olov avro,

S A \ » f/ »/£ O 5 crapiufjbo) ¡xev ov% <ev9 ecoei o e v a *Ea n Se r¡ ifivxV rov t^owros aw fiaros a lr ia Kai

lo dpxr¡• ra vra Se •״ oAAa^ojc■ Aeyerat. ofioicos S’ r¡ f a x i Kard rovs Sicopiafievovs rpoirovs rpeZs a lr ia ״Kai yap odev r¡ Kivrjais avrr¡, Kai ov eveKa, Kai as*s f¡ ovaia rw v ep,ipvxwv acopuarcov rj f a x ! aLria. o n ¡lev odv ws ovaia, SrjXov° t o yap a ’in o v rov elvai rrdaiv r¡ ovaia, t o Se tpqv roZs C,wai ro elval ea n v , a lr ia Se K a i dpx^J rovrcov r¡ iftvxV• ^ n rov

is Svvdfiei ovros Xoyos r¡ evreAe^eta. <f>avepov S’ ats Kai od eveKev r¡ ipvxV a Ir ia • ojairep yap o vovs

° Cf. Metaph. 983 a 26 “ the word cause is used . . . (1) as the essential nature, (2) as the source of movement, (3) as the final cause.5’

6 i.e., existence and life.c e.g., a sphere exists potentially in any lump of matter,

bu t the sphere is not actualized until in that m atter there is induced the form or essential formula of sphericity־86

415 a

ON THE SOUL, II. iv.

some purpose in view, so too does nature, and this purpose is its end. In living creatures the soul sup­plies such a purpose, and this is in accordance with nature, for all natural bodies are instruments of the sou l; and just as is the case with the bodies of animals, so with those of plants. This shows tha t they exist for the sake of the soul. (“ That for the sake of which ” has two meanings—“ th a t for the purpose of which ” and “ tha t for the benefit of which.”) (3) Lastly, the soul is the primary source of locomotion ; but this capacity does not belong to all living creatures. Change of state and growth are also due to the sou l; for sensation is held to be change of state, and nothing feels which has not a soul. The same is true about growth and decay ; for nothing decays or grows in nature without nourishment, and nothing has nourishment which does not share in life.

Empedocles is mistaken in his account of this, when he adds tha t the growth in plants, when their roots spread downwards, is due to the fact tha t earth naturally tends in this direction, and that when they grow upwards, it is due to the natural movement of fire. His theory of “ upwards ” and “ downwards ” is wrong ; for up and down are not the same for all individuals as for the universe, but the bead in animals corresponds to the roots in plants, if we are to identify and distinguish organs by their functions. But in addition to this, what is it tha t holds fire and earth together when they tend to move in contrary direc­tions ? For they will be torn apart, unless there is something to prevent this ; but if there is anything of the sort this will be the soul, and the cause of growth and nourishment.

89

W / / * י 9 י י z JL revena rov 770161, tov avTov rponov /cat 7) cpvais,Kal ro vr ea n v avrfj réXos• roiovrov S’ ev ro ts ־1,(001? r¡ tyv^r¡ /caí. K a ra <f>va1v״ irdvra •yàp r à(¡ivaiKa ad)piara rrjs *pvxïjs opyava, /cat KaOd-nep

20 r à rítív tcíjojv, ovroi /cat rà rœ v <j>vrœv, chs ¿Ve/carrjs ipü/CÎS ovra. Sirrcos Se to ov IVe/ca, to t<sou /cat to œ . aÀÀà p,r¡v /cat odev Trpœrov rj Kararórrov K¿vr¡a1s , ipvxtf' ov 7râcrt S5 inrapy'ßi ro îçIcoaiv r¡ Svvapas avrrj. ear 1 Sé /cat dXÄoiwais KaiavtjrjoLS Kara ifjvxtfv rj ¡xèv yàp aïoOrjaLs dXXoíwaís

25 rts• e tv a t So/cet, a la d d v e ra t 8’ ov9èv o ¡jlt¡ e^etifivxtfv. ¿¡jLOLcas Sé /caí rrepl avÇiqoeœs r e /caí(f>9¿aews £%et־ oùSèv yàp cf>dlvet ov S5 aviserai<f>va1K¿tis p-7¡ rpe(f>ópL6vov, rpé<j>era1 S־ ovdev o ¡j,r¡Koivcúvei Z,(x)r¡s•

E¡.¿rreSoKXrjs S5 où /caÀcDç e’lpr¡Ke r־, o v r o , Trpoa-n d e ls rr¡v av^rjaiv avpußalveLv r o is <f>vroîs Karco

416 a jxèv avppi'CovfzévoLS Stà ro rr¡v yrjv ovroj (¡)épeadaiKara (¡)vow, avco Sè Stà ro 77vp (Laavrcos. ovrey à p ro àvœ Kal Kara) KaXœs Xapußdvei״ ov y à pravro nâa i ro dvœ Kal Karo) Kal rœ 77avTt, aAA’1■ J

a>s r¡ K€(f>aXr) rû>v t,œa)v, ovrœ s a t ptÇat rcov (¡)vrœv, 5 et xpr] rà opyava Xéyetv ërepa Kal ra vrà rois

ë p y o L Ç7 rpos Sè rovroLS r¿ ro auvé^ov els rdvavria־ <pep0[jL€va ro 77vp Kal rrjv yrjv ; Stao77־aa07}o־era t yap , el pur¡ n earai ro kw X voov el S’ ear a 1, rovr earlv r¡ tpvXV Ka%l ™ olriov to£> av^dveadai /cat rpé<j>eada1 .

I

ARISTOTLE

88

ON THE SOULs II. iv.

To some the nature of fire seems by itself to be the Fire in cause of nutrition and growth ; for it alone of all bodies and elements seems to be nourished and grow of itself. Hence one might suppose tha t it is the operating principle in both plants and animals. I t is in a sense a contributory cause, but not absolutely the cause, which is much more properly the sou l; for the growth of fire is without limit, so long as there is something to be burned, but of all things naturally composed there is a limit or proportion of size and growth ; this is due to the soul, not to fire, and to the essential formula rather than to matter.

Since the same faculty of the soul is at once mitri- The natnr® tive and generative, we must first define nutriment offoo<i־ carefully ; for the nutritive faculty is distinguished from the others by its function of nutrition. There is a general opinion that contrary is nutriment to contrary ; not of course in every case, but among such contraries as have not merely their birth from each other, but their growth as w ell; for many things arise from each other, but they are not all quantities ; e.g., a healthy from a diseased thing.But not even the things mentioned seem to be food for each other in the same way ; water feeds fire,® but fire does not feed water. I t seems, then, tha t in simple bodies especially the food and the thing fed are contraries. But this presents a difficulty ; for some say that like is fed, as also it grows, by like, but others, as we have said, hold the opposite view, tha t contrary is fed by contrary, on the ground tha t like is unaffected by like, but tha t food changes and is digested. But all change is to the opposite, or to an

0 I t was supposed that wood, when perfectly dry, would not keep a fire alight.

91

ARISTOTLE

10 A oksi Be Ttxjiv r¡ tov rrvpo$ <f)vais arrXdjs a t r i a rr js rpo(f>fjs Kal rr js av^iqmems etvai• Kal y a p avTO (¡>aiverai ¡xovov tcov croifxarcov r! roov a r o i- Xeicov rpe^opievov K a l av£o[xevov. Sto /cat ev r o t s <f>VTot$ ¡<aI ev r o t? £a>ots vTroXdfioi n s dv touto e tva i to ¿pya'Coftevov. to Se a v v a in o v ¡¿ev Trots

!5 IcrrtJ׳ ;, ou ¡J.7jv drrXcos y e a ’ir io v , aAA a ¡xdXXov r¡ tlw xn7 p to®׳ 17 u Trvpos av£rja is e ls direipov¡, ecos a v fj to K avarS v, tqjv Se <f>vaei avviarafxevasv vravTOiv e o r l rrepas Kal X oyos ¡xeyeOovs r e Kal a v£t¡- aecos״ r a v r a Se iffvyyjs, aAA' ou rrvpos, Kal Xoyov /¡laXAov r¡ vXtjs■

3E 7ret S5 avrr¡ Bvvafus rrjs iffvyijs OperrriKr¡ 20 Kal yewTjTiKrj, irepl rpoSrjs dvayKaiov SuoplaOai

rrpooTov° a<j&opt£erat yap TTpos rd s aAAa? Svvdfxeis T(p epyq! to v to ). So/ce? B5 etvai r¡ rpofyr¡ to ¿vavriov Tip evavrlcp, ov ,¡rdv Se Travri, aAA5 oaa tcov ¿vavricov ¡xr¡ ¡xovov yeveoiv e^ dXXr/Xcov eyovoiv aAAa /cat avtjrjoiv״ yivera i yap 7roXXa e£ dXXrjXcov,

25 aAA־ ov TrdvTa mad¡, oiov vyies ¿k Kap-vovros. (f>aiverai S5 ovS* ¿Keiva rov avrov rpoTrov dXXrjXois etvai Tpofirj, aAAa to ¡xev vScop ra> itvpl Tpo<f)rj, to Se Trvp ov rpecpei to vS cop. iv ¡xev odv ro t? dirXols awfxaai ra v r etvai So/cet ¡xdXiOTa to ¡xev Tpocfrj to Se rpe^opievov. dnoplav S e^et* ^ a a t yap 61

30 fiev to o/xoiov rip ¿¡xoicp rpe<f>eo6ai} Kaddrrep Kal av^dveoOa 1, ro is S’ toairep eiTTO/xev TovpnraXiv So/cet> TO ¿vavriov rip evavrico, ¿)S diraOovs ovros to v ¿[xolov mto to v o¡.wiov, rr/v s¿ rpo(f>rjv [xerafidXXeiv Kal 7Terreadai״ v¡ Se ¡xeraftoXr¡ rrdoiv els to a v n -

90

416 a

intermediate state. Again, the food is affected by the thing fed, and not vice versa, just as the carpenter is not affected by his material, but the material by the carpenter ; the carpenter merely changes from idleness to activity.

Now it makes a difference whether <־ food ” means Solution of the last or the first form of what is added. If both are food, the one being undigested and the other digested, we might speak of food in both the ways referred to above ; for when the food is undigested, contrary feeds on contrary, but when it is digested־, like feeds on like. Thus clearly both views are, in a sense, both right and wrong. But since nothing is fed which does not share in life, th a t which is fed must be the body which has a soul, qua having a soul, so that food is related to tha t which has a soul and that not accidentally. But nutrivity and the promotion of growth are not the same ; for it is qua quantitative that that which has soul has its growth promoted by food, and qua individual and substance th a t it is nourished by it ; for it preserves its substance and continues to exist, so long as it is nourished, and it causes the generation not of tha t which is nourished, but of another like it ; for its actual substance already exists, and a thing cannot generate but only preserves itself. Thus the soul-principle in question is a power of preserving what possesses it as an individual, while food prepares it for work. For this reason it cannot continue to exist when deprived of food. Now there are three separate factors : the thing fed, the means by which it is fed, and the feeding agent. The feeding agent is soul in the primary sense ; the thing fed is the body which contains the soul, and the means by which it is fed is the food. But since everything

93

ON THE SOUL, II. iv.

ARISTOTLE4 1 6 :

35 Keíjxevov rj t o p e ra^ 'u . e n irá-oyet t i r¡ rpofir¡ v n o

416 b ro v Tpe<f>o¡xévov, áÁ A 5 ov t o v t o vno Trjs rpo(f>rjs,c; s o 5 e / e \ * c r \ 5 > \ 9 e 5 ? > ׳

o j a n e p o v o o r e K T ío v i m o ttjs* v A r j s , a A A v r r e K e t -

v o v a v T r j o ״ S é r e i c r o j v ju,eraj8c£AAei ¡ x ó v o v e l s ¿ v -

é p y e i a v é¿j á p y ¿ a s .

I T ó r e p o v S ’ ¿o rlv r¡ rpo<f>r¡ t o TeXevraiov n p o o - yivó¡xevov r¡ t o npciúTOV, ¿Xei Siaóopáv,. el S ־

5 a p ,c f )o , ¿XX* r¡ ¡x é v á n e n r o s r¡ S é n e n e ¡ x ¡ x é v r ¡ ,

a¡JL(f)OT€pü)s a v ¿ v S ¿ x p iT O TTjv rp o c frr jv X é y e i v f j ¡x ev

y á p á n e n r o s , t o e v a v r í o v rq > ¿ v a v r í i p rpé< f> era i ,

f j S é n e n e ¡x ¡ x é v r ¡ , r o o ¡ x o io v r e o o ¡ x o ¿ w . a j a r e

( f> a v e p o v o t l X é y o v o ¿ T i v a r p ó n o v á¡x<j>órepoL K a l5 ñ ~ \ 5 5 5 \ 0 5 5 Q \ f j

OpUüJS K a i OVK o p a c o s* €7T€l O OVüeV Tp€<p€T a&

io p,■ ¡xer¿xov {,ajrjs, to £¡jj¡jvvov av elrj oto¡xa to rpe<f>ó¡xevov, fj eputpv^ov, atore Kal r¡ rpocj>rj npos €¡jupvx¿v ¿ o tl K a l ov K ara ov¡xfiefir¡KÓs. e c r r i S ’ erepov Tpocf>fj i< a l av^rjriKcp etvai • fj ¡xev yá p nooóv t i to e¡xt¡jvxov, av^rjriKÓv, fj S é r ó S e t í Kal ovo¿a, Tpofyrj• o r ó £ e i y á p rr¡v ovoíav, Kal

15 ¡iéxPl to v to v ¿o rlv ews áv Kal rp é firjra i״ Kal yevéoews noiT¡riKov ov ro v rpe<j)o¡xévov, ¿ÁÁ olov to Tpecjyófievov rjSr] yáp ¿ o tl v avrr¡ r¡ ovo ¿a, yevva83 5 n \ / 3 \ \ \ r y a׳ / p c \

o v u e v a v r o c a u r o , a A A a o c ú p e lo w c ru r¡ f i e v

ro iavrr¡ rrjs *pvxjjs ápxr¡ Svva¡xís ¿ o riv o la ow ^eiv t o ’¿xov avrrjv fj to lo v to v , r¡ Sé rpofir) n apaoK evá^ei

20 ¿vepyeTv. 8lo orepr¡8ev rpo<j>rjs ov S u v a ra i etva i. en el S5 ¿ o t l r p ía , r o rpecj)ó¡xevov Kai & Tpécperai Kal t o Tpé<j)ov, r o pév Tpé(f>ov ¿ o rlv r¡ npáirrj ipvx'i], t o Sé tpe<j)ó !xevov t o ex ov oá)¡xa, a»S \ / I e //* 5 \ 0 \ 5 ' 4 \/ s■׳׳

€ r p e c p e r o n s r¡ T po<pr¡0 e r r e i d e a r r o r o v r e A o v s

92

ON THE SOUL, II. nr.—v.

sense-organs

s h o u l d b e n a m e d i n v i e w o f i t s e n d , a n d i n t h i s c a s e t h e e n d i s t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e s p e c i e s , p r i m a r y s o u l w i l l b e t h a t w h ic h r e p r o d u c e s a n o t h e r l i k e i t s e l f .B u t “ t h e m e a n s b y w h i c h i t i s n o u r i s h e d ” i s a m b i g u ­o u s , j u s t l i k e t h e p h r a s e “ t h a t b y w h i c h t h e h e l m s ­m a n s t e e r s , ” m e a n i n g e i t h e r h i s h a n d o r t h e r u d d e r , t h e l a t t e r b o t h m o v i n g a n d b e i n g m o v e d , a n d t h e f o r m e r o n l y m o v i n g . N o w a l l f o o d r e q u i r e s d i g e s t i o n , a n d t h a t w h i c h p r o d u c e s d i g e s t i o n i s h e a t ; t h e r e f o r e e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h h a s a s o u l h a s h e a t . T h e n a t u r e o f f o o d h a s n o w b e e n d e s c r i b e d i n o u t l i n e ; l a t e r o n w e m u s t b e m o r e p r e c i s e a b o u t i t i n a t r e a t i s e o f i t s o w n .®

V . H a v i n g e s t a b l i s h e d t h e s e p o i n t s , l e t u s d i s - Sensation c u s s s e n s a t i o n i n g e n e r a l . S e n s a t i o n c o n s i s t s , a s h a s in ge3eia־־ b e e n s a i d , i n b e i n g m o v e d a n d a c t e d u p o n ; f o r i t i s h e l d t o b e s o r t o f c h a n g e o f s t a t e . N o w s o m e s a y t h a t l i k e i s a f f e c t e d o n l y b y l i k e . B u t t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h t h i s i s p o s s i b l e o r i m p o s s i b l e w e h a v e a l r e a d y s t a t e d i n o u r g e n e r a l a c c o u n t o f a c t i n g a n d b e i n g a c t e d u p o n . & T h e q u e s t i o n a r i s e s a s t o w h y w e h a v e n o s e n s a t i o n o f t h e s e n s e s 0 t h e m s e l v e s ; t h a t i s , w h y t h e y g i v e n o s e n s a t i o n a p a r t f r o m e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s , a l t h o u g h t h e y c o n t a i n f i r e a n d e a r t h a n d t h e o t h e r e l e m e n t s w h i c h ( e i t h e r i n t h e m s e l v e s , o r b y t h e i r a t t r i b u t e s ) e x c i t e s e n s a t i o n . I t i s c l e a r f r o m t h i s t h a t t h e f a c u l t y o f s e n s a t i o n h a s n o a c t u a l b u t o n l y p o t e n t i a l e x i s t e n c e . S o i t i s l i k e t h e c a s e o f f u e l , w h i c h d o e s n o t b u m b y i t s e l f w i t h o u t s o m e t h i n g t o s e t f i r e t o i t ; f o r o t h e r w i s e i t w o u l d b u r n i t s e l f , a n d w o u l d n o t n e e d a n y f i r e a c t u a l l y a t w o r k . B u t s i n c e w e s p e a k o f p e r c e i v i n g i n t w o s e n s e s ( f o r w e s a y t h a t t h a t w h i c h h a s t h e p o w e r o f h e a r i n g a n d

& Be Gen. et Corr. i. 7. 323 b 18 sqq.9 Or rather "

d r r a v r a r r p o a a y o p e v e t v S ú o o u o V j r e X o s S é r o y e v v r j a a t

25 o l o v a u r o , e t7 j á v i ) 7T p w r r ] i js v x r ¡ y e w r j n K r ¡ o l o v

a v r o . e a n S e <5 r p é f i e r a i S t r r ó v , w a r r e p K a l w

K v ß e p v a , r¡ X e 'LP K a 'L T ® v r j h á X i o v , r o ¡ z e v k i v o v v

K a l K L v o v f i e v o v , r o S e k i v o v v ¡j l o v o v . r r d a a v S ־

á v a y K a X o v r p o ^ T j v S v v a a d a i r r é r r e a d a i , i p y á t , e r a i

S é r r j v r r é i h i v t o d e p f i ó v • S t o r r a v i ß i j j v y c v e ^ e i O e p -

30 ¡ l ó r r j r a . r v m p f i é v o v v r¡ rpo< jyr¡ r l e a r l v e t p r j r a i •

8 ia o a < f> 7 )r é o v S s ¿ a r l v v a r e p o v T r e p l a v r r j g i v r o i s

o í ,K € l o t s Á ó y o i s .

V . A t a tpiapuévcov S é rovrw v Xéywpiev koivj¡ Trepl iráarjs aladiqaews. r¡ S 5 a’ladr¡ais ev ra) KiveioOai re Kal ■nda^eiv avp-ßaívei, KaOárrep e’lpr¡raf 8ok€l

35 yap áXXolwaís n s elvai. <f>aul S e nves !cal ro417 a ofioiov viro rov ¿¡jloÍov Tráo^eiv. rovro S e ttcos־

Svvarov r¡ áSvvarov, elpr¡Kap,ev ev ro ts ¡caOÓÁov Xóyois Trepl rov Trote iv Kal Traa^etv. e%ei S ’

¿7ropíav S t á r l Kal rwv aladr¡aewv avrwv ov y ¿ver at atadrjais, Kal S t á r l dvev rwv eíjco ov

5 m io va iv aíadrjcnv, ivóvros Trvpos Kal yrjs Kal rwv dXXwv aroi^elw v, wv ear lv r¡ ataOrjats Koffi avrá r¡ rá avfjußeßrjKora rovrois • orjÁov ovv o n ro aíaOrjnKov ovk ear iv évepyela, dXXd hvvájiet ¡jlovov. S t o KaOaTrep ro Kavarov ov Kaíerat avro Kad’ avro dvev rov KavonKov״ e /c a t e y dp dv ¿avrá, Kal ovOev

io e S e t T o r o v e v r e X e ^ e l a - r r v p o s o v r o s . e v e t S r ¡ S é r o

a l a d á v e a O a t X é y o p c e v S t ^ w s ( t o r e y a p 8 v v d ¡ J ,e i

a K o v o v K a l o p w v á i c o v e t v K a l o p d v X é y o ¡ x e v , i< d v

ARISTOTLE418 fe

° No such treatise has come down to us־

ON THE SOUL, II. v

seeing hears and sees, even if it happens to be asleep, as well as when the faculty is actually operative), so the term sensation must be used in two senses, as potential and as actual. Similarly to perceive means both to possess the faculty and to exercise it.

To begin with, le t us assume tha t being acted upon and moved is the same as exercising the function; for movement is a form of activity, though incom­plete, as has been said elsewhere.0 But everything is acted upon and moved by something which pro­duces an effect and actually exists. Therefore, as we have said, a thing is acted upon in one sense by like, in another by unlike ; for while it is being acted upon it is unlike, but when the action is complete, it is like.

But we must also distinguish certain senses of Potential potentiality and actuality ; for so far we have been and actua1• using these terms quite generally. One sense of “ instructed ” is tha t in which we might call a man instructed because he is one of a class of instructed persons who have knowledge ; but there is another sense in which we call instructed a person who knows (say) grammar. Each of these two has capacity, but in a different sense : the former, because the class to which he belongs, i.e., his matter, is of a certain kind, the latter, because he is capable of exercising his knowledge whenever he likes, provided tha t external causes do not prevent him. But there is a third kind of instructed person—the man who is already exercising his knowledge ; he is in actuality instructed and in the strict sense knows (e.g.') this particular A. The first two men are both only potenti­ally instructed ; but whereas the one becomes so in actuality through a qualitative alteration by means of learning, and after frequent changes from a con­trary state, the other passes by a different process

97

417 פTvxy KaOevSov, K a l t o r!brq ¿vepyovv), Sivœs av Ae y o iT O K a l r¡ aïadrjois, r¡ ¡xèv œs 8vvá¡xe1, r¡ Sé œs èvepyeia. ¿¡xoiœs Sè K a l t o aloOáveoOai, t o

re 8 vváfxei ov K a l t o èvepyela.15 H p0JT0v ¡xèv ovv œs rov avrov OVTOS t o v naoxew

K a l t o v Kiveîadai Kal t o v è v e p y e î v Xéya>¡xev K a l

y à p eoTiv rj KivrjGis é v é p y e i á t l s , ¿TeXrjs ¡xevroi, K a O á -n e p ¿v erépois e ïp r jT at. 7rá1n a Sè 7ráa^£t K a l

K i v e í r a i v i t o t o v t t o l t i t l k o v K a l ivepyet a o v t o s .

Sto eo n ¡xev œs v i t o t o v ojxoíov T rá u v e L , eoTi Sé 20 œs v i t o t o v ¿ .v o ¡ x o lo v , K a d á 7 r e p e’ínojxev werdet

¡x e v y à p t o dvófxoiov, n e r r o v d ó s S’ o¡xo1¿v ¿ g t í v .

Atatperéov Sé K a l 7 tepl S v v d ¡ x e a >s Kal i v r e Ae= vetas״ vvv y à p àrrXœs Xéyo¡xev 7repl avT&v. ëcrri ¡xev yàp o v t o j s €7n,0Tr¡1xóv t í œs a v e1no1¡xev àvdpCÜTTOV ÍmGTr¡¡lOVa, OTI O dvOpCÜTTOS TCtíV Í7TL-

25 GTrjixôvœv K a l ¿X¿VTCÚV €7TMJTr¡fXr¡V €(XTt S’ <ws yjSv¡ Xeyo¡xev eTT1G T r¡¡x o va t o v e^ovra T r¡v y p a ¡ x ¡ 1 a T 1 K r ¡ v .

eK a r e p o s Sé t o v t í o v o v t o v avrov r p ó v o v S v v a r ó s

ioTLVy ¿XX o ¡xev o t i t o yeVo? t o l o v t o v K a l r¡ vXr¡, o S’ o t i ßovXrjOels Svvarós O e œ p e lv , av ¡ir¡

t i K œ X v a r j t ü s v ëtjœdev o S־ rjS rj Gsojpojv é v r e X e ^ e t a

so œv K a l K v p ic o s ¿iriard/xevos r ó S e ro A . d¡.L <pórep01,

¡xev ovv 0 1 77pojTOí K a r á S v v a u i v ¿vLGT'qixoves, aAA’ o ¡xev Stá ¡xaO r¡G ea>s dXXocœdels K a l TroXXaKLS ê£ èvavrlas ¡xeraßaXœv eÇeœs, 6 S’ ¿ k t o v ë^eiv t rjv

ARISTOTLE

1 e.g., Phys. iii. 2, 201 b 31־96

f r o m t h e i n a c t i v e p o s s e s s i o n o f s e n s a t i o n o r g r a m m a r t o i t s a c t i v e e x e r c i s e . E v e n t h e t e r m “ b e i n g a c t e d u p o n ” i s n o t u s e d i n a s i n g l e s e n s e , b u t s o m e t i m e s i t m e a n s a f o r m o f d e s t r u c t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g b y i t s c o n t r a r y , a n d s o m e t i m e s r a t h e r a p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h a t w h ic h i s p o t e n t i a l b y s o m e t h i n g a c t u a l w h i c h is l i k e i t , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n o f p o t e n t i a l i t y t o a c t u a l i t y ; f o r t h a t w h i c h m e r e l y p o s s e s s e s k n o w ­l e d g e c o m e s t o e x e r c i s e i t b y a p r o c e s s w h i c h e i t h e r i s n o t a l t e r a t i o n a t a l l ( f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t i s i n t o i t s r e a l s e l f o r a c t u a l i t y ) , o r e l s e i s a u n i q u e k i n d o f a l t e r a t i o n S ־ o i t i s n o t s o u n d t o d e s c r i b e t h a t w h i c h t h i n k s a s b e i n g a l t e r e d w h e n i t t h i n k s , a n y m o r e t h a n i t i s t r u e t o s a y t h a t t h e b u i l d e r i s a l t e r e d w h e n h e b u i l d s . T h a t w h ic h p r o d u c e s d e v e l o p m e n t f r o m p o t e n t i a l t o a c t u a l i n t h e m a t t e r o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h o u g h t o u g h t n o t t o b e c a l l e d t e a c h i n g , b u t n e e d s s o m e o t h e r n a m e ; a n d t h a t w h i c h , s t a r t i n g w i t h a p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r k n o w l e d g e , l e a r n s a n d a c q u i r e s k n o w l e d g e f r o m w h a t i s a c t u a l a n d a b l e t o t e a c h , e i t h e r o u g h t n o t t o b e d e s c r i b e d a s “ b e i n g a c t e d u p o n , ” a s h a s b e e n s a i d , o r e l s e t h e r e a r e t w o s e n s e s o f a l t e r a t i o n , o n e a c h a n g e t o a n e g a t i v e c o n d i t i o n , a n d t h e o t h e r a c h a n g e t o a p o s i t i v e s t a t e , t h a t i s , a r e a l i z a t i o n o f i t s n a t u r e . I n s e n t i e n t c r e a t u r e s t h e f i r s t c h a n g e i s c a u s e d b y t h e m a l e p a r e n t , a n d a t b i r t h t h e s u b j e c t h a s s e n s a t i o n i n t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h w e s p o k e o f t h e m e r e p o s s e s s i o n o f k n o w l e d g e . A g a i n , a c t u a l s e n s a t i o n c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e e x e r c i s e o f k n o w l e d g e ; w i t h t h i s d i f f e r e n c e , t h a t t h e o b j e c t s o f s i g h t a n d h e a r i n g ( a n d s i m i l a r l y t h o s e o f t h e o t h e r s e n s e s ) , w h i c h p r o d u c e t h e a c t u a l i t y o f s e n s a t i o n , a r e e x t e r n a l . “ T h i s i s b e c a u s e a c t u a l s e n s a t i o n i s o f p a r t i c u l a r s , w h e r e a s k n o w l e d g e i s o f u n i v e r s a l s ;

99

ON THE SOUL, II. v.

ARISTOTLE

417 b atcrOrjOLV r¡ t t jv ypap,¡xaTLKr¡v, pur¡ iv e p y e iv SJ els t o ¿vepyelv dXÁov Tpoirov. o vk e a n S־ drrXovv ovSé t o Tráo^eiv, dXXa t o ¡iév <¡>8opá t l s v tto t o v evavT iov, t o Sé acoTrjpia ¡xdXXov t o v S vvd jie i o v to s v tto t o v evTeXej/eiq o v to s Kal o/jlolov, ov tco s cos

5 Svvafxis ex el 77p o s ¿vreX é^ eiav Qetopovv y a p y iy v e r a i t o e^ov t t jv eTriGTr¡¡ir¡v, oirep rj o vk eoTiv aAA oiovcrdcu (els avTO y a p r¡ eiriSocns Kal els ¿VTeXéxew.v) r¡ erepov yévo s áXÁotdooews* 8 lo ov KaXcbs ,¿Xs ’' X éyeiv t o <jypovovv» o tu v é p o v f , dXXoLov- a d a t, atarrep ov Sé to v oikoSojllov otg,v clK ocojifj.

io t o ¡xev o vv els evreAe^eia v d yo v ¿k S w d [ ie i o v to s K a ra t o vovv Kal Y povovv ov S tS aOKaXiav aAA’ érép a v eiratvvjjLÍav ’¿xeiv S lk c llo v t o S’ etc Sum /xet o v to s ¡lavQdvov Kal X apftávov ¿TTiaTr¡¡j,rjv v tto to v ivreX exe la o v to s Kal ScSaaKaXiKov tJ to l ovó¿ v d o x e iv (j)aTeov, axnrep e’lpr¡r a í , r¡ Svo rp ó n o vs

16 etvac dXXoicvoeoos, rr¡v r e e v l r a s arepr¡TU<ds SiaO eaeis ¡xeTafíoXrjv Kal rr¡v érrl Tas e£eis Kal ty jv <f>vmv. t o v S’ aladrjTLKod r¡ ¡xév TTpdoTr¡ pberafSoXr¡ y ív e r a i v tto t o v yevvcovTos, o ta v Sé yevvrjdfj, ex €l r¡Sr¡ w airep ¿TnoTr¡pt,r¡v Kal t o a laB d veo d a i. Kal t o K a t évépye ia v Sé ¿¡xoloos X eyera t tu> Qeoopeiv

20 Siatyepei Séj o t i t o v ¡xév t o TronqTucd Trjs evep ye ia s e^codev, t o op a ro v Kal t o a K o va ró v , ¿¡jlolcos Sé seal t o Xonrd t ¿ov a la 9r]Twv. aiT iov S’ o t i tcov c<aO’ eKaoTov r¡ K a t évépye iav a ’io drja is , r¡ S ’

“ When we see the colour red we see a particular object, which is red, at a particular time. But knowledge of “ red ” is not knowledge of any red object a t any one time but of the colour red detached from such objects¡, i.e. in A .’s phrase­ology as “ universal.”9 8

ON THE SOUL, II. v.—vi.

these in a sense exist in the soul itself. So it lies in man’s power to use his mind whenever he chooses, but it is not in his power to experience sensation ; for the presence of the sensible object is essential.The same thing is true of our knowledge of sensible objects, and for the same reason, viz., th a t sensible objects are particular and external.

But there will be a later opportunity to clear our Potential impressions about these things. For the moment it to sensation, will be enough to establish tha t the term “ potential ” is used with two meanings ; first as we might say of a boy tha t he is a potential general, and secondly as we might say it of an adult. These two meanings apply also to the potentially sentient. But since there is no name corresponding to this difference in meaning, and we have now explained th a t the mean­ings differ, and how they differ, we must continue to use the phrases “ to be acted upon ” and “ altered as though they were precise terms. The sentient subject, as we have said, is potentially such as the object of sense is actually. Thus during the process of being acted upon it is unlike, but a t the end of the process it has become like tha t object, and shares its quality.

VI. In discussing the several senses we must speak The objects first of their respective objects. The term “ object of of sense■ sense ” is used of three types ; two of them we say tha t we perceive directly, and one indirectly. Of the first two, one is an object proper to a given sense, and the other is an object perceptible by all the senses.By proper object I mean tha t which cannot be per­ceived by any other sense, and concerning which error is impossible ; e.g., sight is concerned with

101

i 7TLaTr¡¡Mr¡ tojv KaOóXov ravra S־ iv avrfj ttüjs

êcrn rrj fa x !¡• vo ׳0>§ rja a i [xèv e-n avrw , 07rérap 25 ßovXrjrai, a lo d á v e o d a i SJ o vk è7r־ avrœ• â v a y K a îo v

y à p v rrâ p x z iv to aicrdrjrov. ô /xoiœ ç Sè r o v r l^et Kav r a ï s ¿morr¡fiais raïs r to v aïadrjTcàv, K a l Stà rrjv avrrjv alriav, o n rà aluOiqrà rcov K a ff e /cacrra

fiai r œ v eÇooOev,’AAAà rrepl ¡xèv rovrœv S1aaa<f>7joa1 K a ip o s y ¿voit

av n a l eiaavdls. vvv 8e onopíoOto roaovrov, o n

80 01>x ànXov Ôvroç rov 8vvá¡xe1 Xeyo/xevov, âXXà tov ¡xèv œo7rep av eïvoifxev tov 77aîSa 8vva odai or pari¡- yeZv, rov 8è (hs rov ¿v 7)Àt/cta ovra, ovreos ’¿Xe1 ro

418 a a ia d iq n K o v . ¿7Tel S־ à v œ w jx o s avrœv r¡ 81a(J>opà, 81(¿p1ara1 Se vepl avrœv o n êrepa /cal ttùjs erepa, XprjcrOai àvayKaZov tío 7racrx€LV Ka'L oÀXoiovcrdai a>S K vp ío is ovôfjbaaiv' ro S’ a lo d r jn K o v 8vvá¡xe1 ¿erriv oiov ro alcrdr¡T0v 7 ן87ן ivreÀ e^eia¡, Kadávep

5 etprjrai. náaxeL °^v °^X ofxoiov ov, 7re7rov0os S5 ¿}¡xolwrai /cat ear iv otov eKeZvo־

V I . A €KT€OV 86 fCtt#’ ¿KaCJTTJV a t aOrjOlV TTepl TÜÔV

aloO tjT œ v Trpeb.Tov. À e y e ra t Sè to a laO r¡rov Tp1x&>s, S v 8 vo ¡xèv K a6' a v r á (¡>a¡xev a lo O áveaO ai, to Sè

10 ev K a r a avjxßeßrjKos. r œ v Sè 8 vo to ¡xèv 1816v eoTiv ¿KacTTrjs a lo d iq o e œ s , to Sè kolvov Traaojv.\ P o >.־ ז/ע > \ t \ \ י ה / c p פ / ר /A eye¡} o noiov ¡juev o [ir¡ evö€X€T(U zre p a a latfrjaei a íoO á veo O a i, K a l 7repl o fir¡ e v S e ^ e ra t aTranqOfjvai,

ARISTOTLE

100

c o l o u r , h e a r i n g w i t h s o u n d , a n d t a s t e w i t h f l a v o u r .T o u c h o f c o u r s e h a s m a n y v a r i e t i e s o f o b j e c t . E a c h s e n s e h a s i t s p r o p e r s p h e r e , n o r i s i t d e c e i v e d a s t o t h e f a c t o f c o l o u r o r s o u n d , b u t o n l y a s t o t h e n a t u r e a n d p o s i t i o n o f t h e c o l o u r e d o b j e c t o r t h e t h i n g w h i c h m a k e s t h e s o u n d . S u c h o b j e c t s w e c a l l p r o p e r t o a p a r t i c u l a r s e n s e , b u t p e r c e p t i o n o f m o v e m e n t , r e s t , n u m b e r , s h a p e a n d s i z e i s s h a r e d b y s e v e r a l s e n s e s .F o r t h i n g s o f t h i s k i n d a r e n o t p r o p e r t o a n y o n e s e n s e , b u t a r e c o m m o n t o a l l ; f o r i n s t a n c e , s o m e k i n d s o f m o v e m e n t a r e p e r c e p t i b l e b o t h b y t o u c h a n d b y s i g h t . I c a l l a n o b j e c t i n d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e d i f , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e w h i t e t h i n g s e e n i s t h e s o n o f D i a r e s ; t h i s i s a n i n d i r e c t p e r c e p t i o n , b e c a u s e t h a t w h i c h i s p e r c e i v e d ( t h e s o n o f D i a r e s ) o n l y b e l o n g s i n c i d e n ­t a l l y t o t h e w h i t e n e s s . H e n c e t h e p e r c i p i e n t i s n o t a c t e d u p o n b y t h e t h i n g p e r c e i v e d a s s u c h . B u t o f per se p e r c e p t i b l e s t h o s e a r e m o s t s t r i c t l y p e r c e p t i b l e w h i c h a r e p r o p e r t o a g i v e n s e n s e , a n d i t i s t o t h e s e t h a t t h e s p e c i a l n a t u r e o f t h e s e v e r a l s e n s e s is a d a p t e d .

V I I . T h e o b j e c t o f s i g h t i s t h e v i s i b l e . T h i s i s Vision, e i t h e r c o l o u r , o r s o m e t h i n g w h i c h c a n b e d e s c r i b e d i n w o r d s , b u t h a s i n f a c t n o n a m e ; w h a t w e m e a n b y t h i s w i l l b e c o m e q u i t e c l e a r a s w e p r o c e e d . T h e v i s i b l e , t h e n , i s c o l o u r , i.e. t h a t w h i c h o v e r l i e s w h a t is i n i t s e l f v i s i b l e ; b y “ i n i t s e l f ” w e m e a n n o t t h a t t h e o b j e c t i s b y i t s d e f i n i t i o n v i s i b l e b u t t h a t i t h a s i n i t s e l f t h e c a u s e o f i t s v i s i b i l i t y . E v e r y c o l o u r c a n p r o d u c e m o v e m e n t i n t h a t w h i c h i s a c t u a l l y t r a n s ­p a r e n t , a n d i t i s i t s v e r y n a t u r e t o d o s o . T h i s i s w h y i t i s n o t v i s i b l e w i t h o u t l i g h t , b u t i t i s o n l y i n l i g h t t h a t t h e c o l o u r o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g is s e e n ־

ON THE SOUL, II. vi.—vn.

103

A R I S T O T L E âls a , י יotov otpLS xpcófiaTO? xal aKor¡ 1ftó(¡>ov Kai yevois

XVfiov. r¡ S’ â(J)7] 7tÀ€lovs e^et 81a<f)0pás’ áAA’15 €K¿.arr¡ y e Kpivei rrepl to v tc d v , Kal o vk á u a r á r a i

o r í xpœpi(! ovS ’ o r í 1p¿<f>os, aAAà r i ro Keyptû- opievov 77 ןT0Vy r¡ r i t o ¡ fo ^ o w t ן7 to v . r à ¡xèv oùv r o ia v r a X éyera i 181a èKaorov , Koivà Sè K1vr¡01s, rjpefxia, â p id fiô s, axr¡¡xa, p é y e d o s r ׳ à y à p r o ia v r a ov8e¡uiâs èo r lv tS ta , aAAà k o ivà rrà o a is Kal y ׳ à p

20 àcftfj KiPTjois r i s è o n v aiodrjrrj Kal oijsei. K arà avjj,ßeß7)K0s S è X éyera i a io 9r¡róv, o îov el ro XevKov elr¡ A lá p o vs v lô s ’ K a rà ovpißeßrjKos y à p r o v r o v a io d á v e ra i, o n rœ Xev1«x> ovpßeßrjK e r o v r o ov a lo d á v e ra i. 81ô Kal ov8èv 77<xo־ e! fj ro io v ro v ¿ 7 7 0

r o v a lo d rjro v . rœ v Sè ica6 ’ a v r à a lodrjrœ v r à 25 18 ta Kvpícús io r lv a lo6r¡rá , /cat 77po? a o ן7 u a ta

77ecpvKev eK aorrjs alodrjcreœs.V I I . O u p , è v o v v è o r l v r¡ o i f / i s , rovr è o r l v

oparov. oparov S 5 ëonv ^ p c D ^ tà T e , / c a t ô A oya» ja è v ëonv eineïv, âvaivvfzov S è rvyxàvei ov 8rjXov S è ear ai o Xeyopcev rrpoeXdovoi paXiora. r o yàp oparov è o n X P ^ F r •■״0 o v r o S ’ è o r l r o è m r o v

30 /c a 0 / ־avro oparov ־ c a 0 a ־ u T O S è o ù rœ Xôyœ, áA A ’ 0T1 €V eavrâ) e ^ e i r o aïnov rov elvai oparov. 7râv

418 6 S è X P & P -a K i v r j r i K o v è o n rov / c a r ’ è v é p y e i a v

81a(f>avovs, K a l rovr ëonv avrov r¡ (pvois. 8167rep oi>x oparov âvev <j>tûrôs, a A A à 77â&׳ r o ¿ K a o r o v

XP¿L>¡1 a è v <£>œrl oparov 0

ON THE SOUL, II. vn.

Consequently we must explain in the first place Light, what light is. Transparency evidently exists. By transparent I mean tha t which is visible, only not absolutely and in itself, but owing to the colour of something else. This character is shared by air, water, and many solid objects ; it is not qua water or air th a t water or air is transparent, but because the same nature belongs to these two as to the everlasting upper firmament. Now light is the activity of this transparent substance qua transparen t; and, wher­ever it is present, darkness also is potentially present. Light is then in a sense the colour of the transparent, owing to fire or any such agency as the upper firma­ment ; for one and the same quality belongs to this also. We have thus described what the transparent is, and what light is : it is neither fire, nor in general any body, nor an emanation from any body (for in tha t case too it would be a body of some kind), but the presence of fire, or something of the kind, in the transparen t; for there cannot be two bodies in the same place at the same time. Light is considered to be the contrary of darkness ; but darkness is a removal from the transparent of the active condition described above, so tha t obviously light is the presence of this. Empedocles, and anyone else who has argued on similar lines, is wrong in saying tha t light travels, and arrives at a certain time between the earth and its envelope, without our noticing i t ; this is contrary both to the light of reason, and to observed facts ; it would be possible for it to escape our observation in a small intervening space, but tha t it does so all the way between east and west is too large a claim.

105

418,1 , » »A to irepl (¡)euros Trptürov X€k t€ov tl eoTiv. ecrri

8r¡ t í dia.(f>avés. 8 La(f>aves Sé Ae׳ya> o e o r t ¡xev5 ó p a ro v , ov Kad’ a v ró Sé ¿p a ro v d>s arrXcos ebneiv,

áXXd St־ ó.XXórpiov %pa)[ia. toiovtov Se ¿otlv arjp/cat v8cop Kal ttoXXo, rcov OTepecov״ ov yap fj v8copov S’ fj ár¡p, 8ia<f>avés, aAA’ o r t eaTt ({>vgis zvvtt-ápxovcra r¡ avrr¡ iv to v to ls d[X(f>0Tep0Ls /cat et׳ ™atSta> tío dvco oco¡xatl. (freos Se l a n v rj t o v t o v

io evépye ia tov Sta(f>avovs fj o ia S a v e s ■ 8vvá¡xei Se¿V <3 TOUT5 ¿GT¿, Kal TO G KOTOS. TO Sé (¿ó)? OtOVXpcofiá e o r t tov 8ia<f>avovs, oTav fj evreA e^eta8 ia(f>av€s viro Trvpos T) toiovtov otov to avco acó/xa•i<al y a p tovtco t i v v á p x e i ev Kal TavTov. tl ¡xevovv to 8iacf)aves Kal tl to <pcos, elpr¡Tai, otl ovt€

15 77Vp Ov9° SXCOS OCOfia Ol58’ aTTOppOT] GCOjXaTOSov8evós (etr¡ ya p av oco¡xá tl /cat ovtcos), áAAaTrvpos r¡ toiovtov tlvos ׳rrapovaia ev t ío SLacpavel״ouSé y a p 8vo adojxara d¡xa Svva ro v ev Ttp avrcpe tv a i־ So/cet Sé t o evavTLOV elvai t w ok6t €l.€GTL Sé TO OKOTOS (JT€pY]GLS T7]S TOiaVTTjS CREOOS ¿K

20 S ca ó a vo vs , ojcjte 8 f¡Xov otl Kal r¡ tovtov rrapovoiato (f)cos eotlv. Kal ovk opQcbs ’E/XTreSo/cA'ijs'j ouS’et Tts dXXoS ■OVTCOS €lpr¡K€V, (bs (f)€pO¡xévOV TOV(¡)cotos Kal yLyvo¡xevov ttotg. ¡xeratjv T r j s yrjs Kalto v Trepi€~)(0VT0s , r¡¡xds Sé AavdávovTOS' to v to y á p¿GTL Kal Trapa t t j v t o v A¿yov ¿vápyelav1 Kal rrapa

25 r a <j>aLv6/x€va' ev ¡xcKpat ¡xev y a p SiaoTrj/xaTL XádoLa v , a,7r’ ávaToXrjs 8 ' é■jtI Svo /xds to Xavdáv€LV ¡xéya

1 ¿vápyeLav TWy, Sophonias, Torstrik : ¿vépyeiav E % a\r¡- Oeiav vulgo.

104־

ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL, II. vxi.

I t is the colourless which is receptive of colour, as the soundless is of sound. The transparent is colourless, and so is the invisible or barely visible, such as the dark is held to be. This, then, is the nature of the transparent, when it is not actually, but potentially transparen t; the same underlying nature is some­times darkness and sometimes light. But not every­thing is visible in the light, but only the proper colour of each individual thing ; for some things are not seen in the light, but are only perceptible in the dark, such as those which appear fiery or luminous (there is no single name for these), like fungi, flesh, the heads, scales, and eyes of fishes ; but in none of these is the proper colour seen. Why such things are visible is another question ; but so much is now clear, tha t what is visible in light is colour. Hence too it is not seen without l ig h t; for, as we saw, it is the essence of colour to produce movement in the actually transparen t; and the actuality of the transparent is light. The evidence for this is clear ; for if one puts th a t which has colour right up to the eye, it will not be visible. Colour moves the transparent medium, e.g., the air, and this, being continuous, acts upon the sense organ. Democritus is mistaken in Themed!!™ thinking th a t if the intervening space were empty, of vision- even an ant in the sky would be clearly visible ; for this is impossible. For vision occurs when the sensitive faculty is acted upom ; as it cannot be acted upon by the actual colour which is seen, there only remains the medium to act on it, so tha t some medium must exist ; in fact, if the intervening space were void, not merely would accurate vision be impossible, but nothing would be seen at all. We

ARISTOTLE418 b x % ,

A ia v t o atrrjpta. e o T־ t Se ypdoptaros ftev Se/crt/cov\ v o ' \ >/ j / »/ 'to axpovv, ipocpov oe to aipcxpov. aypovv o eon to Sta<^aves /cat to a ¿parov r¡ to p,6Xts opcoptevov, otov So/ceT to cr/coretvov. rotovrov Se to Stacfiaves

so ftev־ aAA’ ou^ oVav f¡ evTeAe^eta 8ia<f>aves, aAA’ oTav Svvaptet׳ r¡ yap avrr¡ <f>v<Jt s ore ptev a ko tos

419 a ore Se <£¿0 ? ¿ortv. ov 7Tavra Se opara ev <j>cartecrnv, dXXd ptovov eicaorov to ot/ceiov ;/pcD/xa• evta yap ev ptev rep (fxori o v \ opara t, ev Se to) aKoret no iei aiodrjULV, otov r a rrvpcaSr¡ cfratvopteva /cat XdpiTTOvra (avcavvpta S’ earl r a v r a evt ovoptart),

6 otov pLVKTjs, Kpeas¡,1 K€(f)aXat l^Ovcov /cat AemSes /cat ¿cpdaXpbOL' aAA’ ouS evo? opara t to v tcov to ot/cetov Xpwp,a. St’ o]v p,ev ouv a irta v r a v ra opara t, dXXos Xoyos״ vvv S’ ern roaovrov cbavepov ea r tv, o n to ptev ev <j>(jt)Tt opaoptevov ^pco/.ta. Sto /cat ou^; oparat

10 avev (f>a>ros׳ ro vro ya p rjv avrcp to ^pco/xaTt etvat to KLvrjrtKtp etvat to u /caT־ evepyetav Sta fiavovs ׳j] S’ evreAe^eta toO 8ta<f>avovs (¡>£>s ¿oriv . arjpbetov Se ro vro v <f>avep6v eav yap n s Of¡ to e^ov ■^pcopta» 3 3 \ \ J/ i 3 J/i *■ * \ \ \ ' \€77־ avri]v rrjv oifjiv, ovk oijjerai° aM a to {¿ev

Xpoopta /ctvet to Sta^ave?, otov tov aepa, mto 15 rovrov Se ovveyovs ovros /ctvetTat to alodr^rrjptov.

ov yap tcaXcas rovro Aeyet ArjptoKptros oloptevos, et yevotro tcevov to pteratjv, opaadat dv dKpificos /cat et ptvpptr¡^ ev ra j ovpavcp etrj• rovro yap dhvvardv ear tv. vdo^ovros yap r t rod aiadiqnKov yivera i to o p a v inr avrov ¡.lev ovv rod opcoptevov

20 %paj/zaro? aSuvarov, AetVerat Se U7ro to u ptera^v, (bar dvayicaZov n etvat ptera^v׳ Kevov Se yevo- Iue'vov oi>x ort a/cpt^co?, aAA’ oAaj? ovdev ¿(¡)d-qcrerai.

1 K p ia s C handler ; i<ipas.

106

ON THE SOUL, II. v i i .— v m .

have then explained why colour can only be seen in the light. Now fire is visible in both darkness and light, and this is necessarily so ; for it is because of the fire tha t the transparent becomes transparent.

The same theory applies also to sound and sm ell; A medium no sound or smell provokes sensation because it necessary touches the sense organ, but movement is produced ^ 8scent in the medium by smell and sound, and in the appro­priate sense organ by the medium ; but, when one puts the sounding or smelling object in contact with the sense organ, no sensation is produced. The same thing is true of touch and taste, although it is not apparent ; why this is so will become clear later on.3 The medium in the case of sound is air, but in the case of smell has no name ; for air and water have certainly a common characteristic, which is present in both of them, and bears the same relation to tha t which emits smell as the transparent does to colour ; for even animals which five under water seem to have the sense of smell,6 whereas man, and all the land animals which breathe, cannot smell except when they are breathing. The reason for this will be discussed later . 0

VIII. Let us now first clear up certain points about The con- sound and hearing. There are two kinds of sound, wMchsound one actual, the other potential d ; for we say tha t « heard, some things have no sound, such as a sponge or wool, but tha t others have, such as bronze, and all things which are both solid and smooth, because they can give forth sound. That is to say, they can actually produce sound between the object itself and the organ

A. make any use of it. W hat he means is tha t bronze has “ potential ” sound because sound can be produced from it, whereas from wool no sound can be produced.

109

¡.19 x s ^ 3 9 ,1 'o t i]v ¡xev o v v ai.Tt.av to ^po>fta a v a y K a io v ev <ptoTLopaadai, e tp i jra t . irvp Se ev afufrolv opara t , /catev uk6t€L Kal ev <f>cor¿, Kal to v to dvdyKrjs׳ to

25 ya p 8ia<f>aves v t t o t o v t o v y lv e ra i 8 t a (f>aves.' 0 8 s a v T o s Ao y o s K a l i r e p l iff6cf>ov K a i o a jx r js

e o T L V o x )9 e v y a p a v T & v a T T r o [x e v o v t o v a l a d r j T r jp i o v

t t o l e l TTjv a ’l o d r j o i v , aA A ’ v t t o ¡x e v o a /x r j s K a l i j jo f io v t o ¡ x e r a ^ v K L v e iT a i , v t t o h e t o v t o v t c o v a io B r jT r jp M o v

30 e / c a r e p o v o r a v 8 s e j t ’ a v r o t l s e m O r¡ t o a l a d r ¡ - T T jp io v t o ifto(f>ovv t j t o o £ o v , o v S e / x i a v a l a d r j a i v

i r o i - q a e i . i r e p l S e d (f ) f js K a l y e v a e c o s e x e t ¡x ev o /x o ic o s , o v < j> a iv e r a i S e • 8 t ’ r jv S a ־ t r t a v , v o r e p o v e a r a t S 77Ao v . t o S e ¡ x e r a t j i ) i/j6(j>(ov ¡x e v d r / p , o a f x r js

8 ’ a v d ) W [ x o v k o i v o v y a p ■ 8 r j r t i r d d o s e rr a e p o s

K a l v S a r o s e a n v , a t a w e p t o S t a g a v e s x p w i x a n , ,

35 o v T c o to > e x o v T i o u fx r jv o e v d f x c p o r e p o i s v i r a p x e i t o v t o l s ’ < t> a lv e r a i y a p / c a t r a e v v 8 p a t & v £,(paov

«19 b e % € iv a t a d r j a i v o a [ x r js - aA A 5 o ¡x e v d v d p c o i r o s K a i t c o v ir e ^ c o v o a a d v a i r v e i , a S w a r e t o c r jx d a d a i fxr¡

d v a i r v e o v r a . r¡ S ’ a t r i a /c a t i r e p l t o v t c u v v o r e p o v

Xexdtfaerai.V III. N w Se TipaiTOV Trepl ifsScfrov Kal aKorjs

5 8topiaoo¡xev. e o n Se Sittos o ifjo<f>os׳ o ¡xev yap evepyeid tls, o Se Suva/Lit?• r a ¡xev yap ov <j>ajxev e^eiv i/j6cf>ov, olov airoyyov, epia, r a 8 ’ ey^eiv, olov XoXkov Kal oaa orepea Kal Xela, oti S w a ra t ipo(j)rjaaL• tovto 8 ’ ea n v avrov ¡xera^v Kal Trjs

ARISTOTLE

° 422 b 34 sgg.6 Fishes have certain olfactory apparatus, bu t it is very

doubtful whether they have a sense of smell.0 421 b 13 to 422 a 6.d There seems to be little point in this distinction, nor does

108

ON THE SOUL, II. vm.

of hearing. But the sound actually produced is of something striking against something else in a medium ; for tha t which produces the sound is a blow. So if there is only one condition present there can be no sound ; for the striker and the thing struck are two different things ; so tha t what produces the sound sounds against something else. And no blow occurs without movement. But, as we have said, sound is not caused by the collision of any two things ; for wool produces no sound when it is struck, but bronze and things which are hollow and smooth do ; bronze because it is smooth, and hollow things after the original blow produce a number of other sounds by reverberation, because tha t which is moved (i.e., the medium) cannot escape. Sound is heard also in water as well as in air, but less loudly. But neither the air nor the water is responsible for the sound ; but there must be a striking of solid objects against each other, and against the air. This occurs when the air remains in its place when struck, and is not dispersed. Hence it can only sound under a sudden and violent blow ; for it is necessary tha t the move­ment of the striker should forestallthe escape of air, just as it would be if one were to strike a t a heap or revolving column of sand in rapid motion.

Echo occurs when air rebounds, like a bouncing ball, from another body of air unified by the vessel which confines it, and prevents it from escaping. I t seems likely tha t there is always an echo,“ but it is not always noticeable, since the same thing happens with sound as with light ; for light is always reflected (otherwise there would not be light everywhere, but there would be darkness in every region outside th a t

ARISTOTLE419 b ^

¿.Korjs ¿/XTTOLrjaaL ipó<f>ov evepy e ta . y iveT at S־ o10 /cat évépyetav ipócfros á e t tívos •npós t í Kal év

Ttvt* TrXr¡yr¡ yáp eo r tv r¡ iroiovaa. Sto Kal áS waTOV¿vos ovtos yeveoQ a t ifjófiov erepov y a p t o tvtttov

Kal TO TV7TT¿¡xeVOV• COOTS TO lfjO(j)OVV TTpÓs Tí ijjoóet. 7rXr¡yq S’ ov y tV era t áveu cf>opás. cocnrep S־ etVoftev, ou t¿Dv T vyóvtcov 7rXr¡yr¡ o tj)¿<j>os’

15 ovdéva y á p ttoí€L ip¿(j:-ov ¿pía á v TrXr¡yfj, áXXá %aX k o s reat o era Acta ׳ca t KolXa, o p.év xoX kos, o t í X eios’ r a Sé /cotAa t t j ava/cAáa-et -noXXás tto ís í TrXr¡yás ¡xerá tt¡v TrpcÓTrjv, á S w a T 0VVT0s ¿^eXdeZv t o v Kívr¡dévTos. ¿ t í á /co u e ra t ev á e p t /cat uSaTt, aAA t¡ ttov . ou/c €OT6 ó€ ipoepov Kvpios o ar¡p ovoe

20 t o uSa>p־ áXXá Set orepeóov TrXr¡yr)v yeveoO aí rrpós áX\r]Xa /cat 7rpós־ to v á e p a . t o u to Se y tv e ra t5 o ra v VTTOjjíévrj TrXrjyels o á ^ p /cat p.r¡ 8ia%v0f¡. Sto eáv Taféeos Kal o׳<f>o8ptos 7rXr¡yfj, ipocj)€í• Set y á p cf>dáaa t rrjv kÍvt¡gív t o v pavi^ovTOS tr jv dpvi/jív t o v áépos, U)UTT€p áv et acó pop r¡ 6p¡xadov

25 lfíá¡Jb¡lOV TV7TTOÍ TÍS (f>€pÓ[X€l’OV TaftV.’H%á) Sé y tverat, orav ¿ tto roí? áépos ¿vos

yevo¡xévov Stá t o ayyetov t o Stopícrav Kal KtoXvaav 6pv(f)6rjvat TráXiv o a^p ¿7rcooOrj, ajarrep apalpa. €OiK€ o aei yweouai aAÁ ou aa<pr]s, eireiavfx¡Saívet ye €77־t rou ijjócfrov KaOávep /cat e77־t tov

80 (¡)Cotos׳ Kal yáp to (peos áet áva/cAarat (ouSé yáp áv eytveTO ttovtt¡ <¡>cos, aAAá a kotos e£co to u r¡Xiov-

° Sc., when sound occurs at all.110

ON THE SOUL, II. v i i i .

directly illuminated by the sun), but it is not always reflected as it is by water or bronze or any other smooth surface, in such a way as to cause a shadow, which is our test of light. I t is correct to say tha t “ void ” is essential to hearing ; for the air is com­monly thought to be void, and it is air, when moved as one continuous whole, which causes hearing. But owing to its fragility the air produces no sound unless the object which it strikes is smooth ; when this is so, the air forms a single continuous mass, because the surface of the smooth object is a continuous unity.

That, then, is sound-producing, which can produce The process movement in a body of air, which is single and con- of hearing־ tinuous as far as the organ of hearing, and the air is physically one with the organ of hearing ; and since this organ of hearing is in the air, when the air outside is moved, the air inside is moved too. So th a t the animal does not hear with every part of it, nor does the air penetrate everywhere ; for the part which will be affected and produce sound has not air every­where in it. The air itself is incapable of sound, because it is easily dissipated ; only when there is something to prevent its dissipation does its move­ment result in sound. The air in the ears is lodged deep, so as to be unmoved, in order th a t it may accurately perceive all differences of motion. That is why we can hear even in water, for the water does nor enter as far as the air which forms part of the ear ; nor even into the ear itself, because of the convolu­tions. When this does occur, there is no hearin g ; nor again if the membrane is damaged, ju st as when the membrane over the eye is damaged. A test of our hearing or not is the continual ringing in the ear

113

¡lévov), aA À ’ oi>x ovtcüs à v a /c À â 7 a־ t ¿jcr7rep à<fJ vS cltos r¡ xoÀ kov r¡ K al t lv o s âXÀov rœ v Xeiœv, UXJT6 GKiaV TTOieîv, fj TO (f)Ü)S Opí^OfieV. TO Sè Kevov ôpOiiùs X eyera i Kvpiov t o v aK oveiv. 8 oiceî y à p e îva t Kevov o àrjp,. o v to s S ’ ea r lv o ttoilûv

35 aK oveiv, o ra v Kivrjdfj e r w e i s koI eîs- a A A à Sià420 a t o ifiadvpos e tva i ov yeycoveî, àv fir¡ Xeîov fj t o

TrXrjyév. to t6 S è eîs yiveTac â fia S t à t o ¿7rí7reSov ev y à p t o t o v Xeîov ¿TrirreSov.

W0<j>r¡TlK0V fl€V OVV TO KIVrjTIKOV ¿VOS àépOSo w e ^ e ía ¡¿¿xpis àKorjs, aKor¡ S è (7vf1(j)vr¡s á¿p1 .

5 S 1à S è to ¿V àépi e tva i, K ivovfiévov t o v e£ü> t o e ïaœ KiveÎTai.1 Sióirep ov 7ràvTJ) t o Çœov aK ovei, ovSe TrávTTj Si¿pxeTai o ânjp• ov y à p 7ràvT7) e%e1 aep a t o K ivqaôjievov ןlép o s Kal e¡up0<¡)0v* a v r o s s

\ c י \ >< ' י ר//ג er r» \ן l e v 07) a 1 ¡J 0 (p 0 v o a r ¡ p ô t a t o e v a p v i r r o v o r a v d e

K œ X v Q f j d p v T T T e a d a i , r¡ t o v t o v k Í v t ¡ u i s 1f !ó ( f> o s . o

10 S ’ e v t o Î s ( b o i v e y K a T í p K o S ó f i r j T a i r r p o s t o ¿ k i v y j t o s

e l v a i , o i r o o s ¿ K p i ß c o s a l a d á v r j T a i r r á u a s r à ? S i a -

t p o p à s T 7 j s K 1 v r ¡ 0 € ( j j s ׳ S i à r a v r a S è K a l e v v S a T i

a K o v o / i e v , o t i o v k e l a e p y e T a i 7r p b s o . v t o v t o v

a v f1 ( f> v r j a e p a * àÀ À ' o v S ’ e l s t o o vs 8 1 à T a s e X i K a s -

O T a v S è T 0 V T 0 a v f i ß f j , o v k a K o v e i • 015S־ à v r¡

15 [ i r j v t y Ç K a p ir ¡ , œ u r r e p t o ¿ t t I t í } K o p r j S é p f i o 1 O T a v

K a f i r ¡ . d X X a K a l a r j f i e î o v t o v t i K o v e i v r¡ f i r ¡ t o

1 Kiveî STVW, Bekker. 2 £¡11p0(¡>ov Torstrik ; ê/njruxov.8 avros Torstrik : avro.

ARISTOTLE

p?gi

' יי ' י ׳ -1I

like a horn ; for the air in the ear always moves with a special movement of its own ; but sound is from an outside source, and not a property of the ear. This is why they say th a t we hear by something which is empty and resonant, because we hear by tha t which has the air enclosed in it. Now which makes the sound—the thing struck or the striker ? Surely both¡, but in different senses ; for sound is the movement of what can be moved, in the way th a t things rebound from a smooth surface when stx-uck against it. But, as has been said,“ not everything produces a sound, when it strikes or is struck, for instance, if one needle strikes another ; but tha t which is struck must be flat, so tha t the air may rebound and vibrate as one mass. But the differences in things which sound are shown in sound actually realized ; for just as colours cannot be seen without light, so sharp and heavy noises cannot be distinguished without sound. These terms are used by analogy from the sense of touch.The sharp sensation excites to a great extent in a short time, the heavy to a slight extent in a long time.I t is not tha t the sharp is itself quick, while the heavy is slow, but th a t their respective movements differ in quality because of their speed and slowness. There seems to be an analogy to the sharp and blunt in the sphere of touch ; for the sharp stabs, so to speak, but the blunt pushes its way in, because the former produces its effect in a short, the latter in a long time, so tha t the one is swift and the other slow. So much for our analysis of the properties of sound.

Voice is the sound produced by a creature posses- Voice, sing a soul; for inanimate things never have a voice ; they can only metaphorically be said to give voice, e.g.,

ON THE SOUL, II. vm.

“ 419 b 6־115

420 a , 3 , ״ ״ ,rjX€ v a ’ L to ovs œcr-nep to Kepag• aei yap oixeiavr iv à KÎvrjcriv o àrjp K iveîra i 6 iv r o ts d>olv aXX oifj6(f)os aXXorpios Kal ovk tStos’. Kal Stà rovro(¡>aaiv aK oveiv ra> Kev& Kal r jx o v v n , o r i ¿,Kovofzev

20 r ip ’¿ x o v n wpiafxévov ro v â ép a . vo re p o v Sè ifjo-<f>eî to rvTTTopuevov r¡ ro tvtttov; r¡ Kal àficf)casrpoTTQV S ’ ë r e p o v e a n y à p o iftôcj>o$ kIvt]o ls r o vSw a f i iv o v KiveiaOai ro v rporrov r o v r o v ovnep r àâ(j>aXA¿¡xeva o.tto rcov Xeiiov, orav tls Kpovor¡ . ovSrj tt&vs w a v e p e ïprjra i, ihocpei rvTrrofievov Kal

25 tv ttto v ¡ , o îov ià v Trara^r¡ fieXovrj fieX ovrjv aAAàSet t o t v t t to [ 1 €vov ¿}xaXov eîvat, cSare rov âépaâdpovv à<f)âXXeodai Kaï creieaOai. a¿ Sè Sia<f>opalr w v ifiocbovvrwv i v r w K ar iv é p y e ia v ipo<f)WSrjXovvrai• warrep yàp âvev <f>wros ovy ¿parai ràX pw ^iara, ovrcos o vS־ â vev ift6<f)ov r o o£v Kal ro¡3apv. ravra Sè Xéyerai K a rà ¡xeratpopàv ân o

so rœ v aTTTcbv t o ¡xèv y à p o£i) K iveî rrjv a ïadrja iv ivoAiyco \p o v œ 6776 TTOAVy ro de papv <zv 7toAAco evt

oXlyov. ov S r¡ T a p ro otjv, ro Sè fiapv fipaSv,aAAà y iv e r a i r o v ¡iev Stà r o ra-xos v¡ KÎvrjais

420 b roiavTTj, rov Sè Stà fipaSvrrjra. Kal ëoiKev â v d -Xoyov è'xecv rca rrepl rijv â(f)rjv o£et «rat âfjb^Xeî•r o p,èv y à p ô£i> oîov K evreî, ro S ’ a/xjSAù oîov»/)/•* O \ \ /־> \ \ » »W * O 3

w u e i o i a r o K i v e i v , t o f i e v e v o A i y c p , r o o e e v

ttoXXw, w a re avfifia ive i to ¡jl€v r a y v ro Sè ¡3paSv5 e îva i. irepl fièv ovv dià<pov ravrr¡ hiwpiaOo¡.

'H Sè <f>cov7] ipo(f)os ris ic rn v ifja ffvx °v r w v yàp dtpvxw v ovdèv (¡><jùveîs aAAà i<ra0 opboior'-qra Xeyerat ־114

ARISTOTLE

a flute or a lyre, and all the other inanimate things which have a musical compass, and tune, and modula­tion. The metaphor is due to the fact th a t the voice also has these, but many animals—e.g., those which are bloodless, and of animals which have blood, fish —have no voice. And this is quite reasonable, since sound is a kind of movement of the air. The fish, such as those in the Achelous,“ which are said to have a voice, only make a sound with their gills, or with some other such part. Voice, then, is a sound made by a living animal, and tha t not with any part of it indiscriminately. But, since sound only occurs when something strikes something else in a certain medium, and this medium is the air, it is natural tha t only those things should have voice which admit the air. As air is breathed in Nature makes use of it for two functions : just as she uses the tongue both for taste and for articulation, of which taste is an essential to life (and consequently belongs to more species), and articulate speech is an aid to living w ell; so in the same way she employs breath both to conserve in­ternal heat, as something essential (why it is so will be explained in another treatise ) , 6 and also for the voice, tha t life may be of good standard. The organ of respiration is the throat, and the part which this is designed to serve is the lung ; it is because of this part th a t the land animals have more heat than the rest. But the region about the heart also has a primary need of respiration. Hence it is necessary tha t in respiration the air should enter the body. Hence voice consists in the impact of the inspired air upon what is called the windpipe under the agency

ON THE SOUL, II. vm.

. 117

ARISTOTLE

(f>ojv€iP, olov avX os /cat Avp a Kal o o a aAAa rcov dipvxojv a v o r a o l v e^e t /cat p L e X o s Kal S td X eK ro v eot/ce y a p o r i /cat 77 cj>a)vr¡ T a v r e ^ e t, 77oAAa Se

10 tc5j> t,(i)(j}V ovk expvcTi (btov'qv} o tov r d r e a va ifia K al rcov evalpicov l^dves• Kal tovt evX¿ycos, elrrep depos Kivrjcrls tls ¿otlv o ifjO(j>os. aAA’ o t Aeyo- ¡xevoi <f>ct)veIv, o lov i v rep ,Ax^Xaxp, ifjo(f>ovcri ro ts f ip a yx io is rj tlvl irepcp tolovtco. (f>cov7] 8 ’ e o r t t , ip O V lflO<f)OS, Kal O V T i p t v ^ o v t l ¡xoplio. aAA’ ¿itel

15 77<XP׳ iflO(f>€l TVTTTOVTOS TLVOS Kal Tl Kal €V TW׳t, t o v t o S’ e o r lv dr/p, evXoycos av (¡)CDVoir¡ r a i r a p o v a 00a S e v e ra l r o t d ׳ ep a . rj8rj y a p r ip dvarrveo- jievqj /ca׳ rav p T jra t r¡ cf>voLS ¿ttI Svo e p y a , KaOdirep Tjj yX<X)TT7) ¿TTL T€ T^V yeVOLV Kal TTjV SidXeKTOV, a>v r¡ fjtev y e v o is d va yK a io v (8 1 0 /cat TrXelooLv

20 U77־a p ^ € t) , f¡ S’ ippLrjvela eve/ca rod ev, ovtcd Kal Tip TTVevpuaTL rrp6s T€ TTJV depp,OTr]Ta TTjV eVTOS cvs dvayKaiov ( t o 8’ diTiov ¿v ¿Tepois elpijoerai) Kal rrpos Trjv <f>u)vrjv, ottcos virdpxj] t o eu. opya- vov Be rrj dvarrvofj o <f>apvy£’ od 8s eveica Kal to¡ J M p lO V ¿ O T L T O V T O , irX e v p .C D V " T O V T C p y a p T i p p L O p lc p

25 rrXelorov ex €l T° deppiov r d -net,d rcov dXXcov. S e tra i 8e t t } s d va vvo rjs Kal o v e p l rrjv KapSiav to t to s TTpLOTOS. Sto a va yK a lo v e t0 0 dvarrveop-evov eloievaL to v d ep a . w o re r¡ TrXrjyf¡ t o v dvanveopbivov d ep o s V7ro r fjs ev t o v t o l s t o l s ¡xopiois 1/*vxyjs -rrpos

e Hist. Ariim. iv. 9, 535 b 14• “ the boar in the Achelous.” A cat-fish has been found in the Achelous of which this is true.

6 Cf. Be Resp. ch. viiL 116

ON THE SOUL, I I v ־ i i i .— i s ־

of the soul in those parts־ For, as we have said, not every sound made by a living creature is a voice (for one can make a sound even with the tongue, or as in coughing), but th a t which even causes the impact, must have a soul, and use some imagination ; for the voice is a sound which means something, and is not merely indicative of air inhaled, as a cough is ; in uttering voice the agent uses the respired air to strike the air in the windpipe against the windpipe itself.Proof of this lies in the fact tha t it is impossible to speak either when inhaling or exhaling, but only when holding the breath ; for it is only in holding the breath that one can make this movement. I t is clear also why fish are dumb ; it is because they have no throat.They have not this organ because they do not take in air or breathe. The reason for this is another question.®

IX. Concerning sense of smell and objects smelt, Smell־ it is less easy to give a precise account than in the subjects we have already discussed, for the character of smell is not so obvious as tha t of sound and colour.The reason is th a t this sense with us is not highly discriminating, far less so indeed than with many animals ; for man’s sense of smell is inferior, and it is also incapable of apprehending the object smelt without a consciousness of either pleasure or pain, which shows th a t the sense organ is not discrimi­nating. I t is probable tha t the hard-eyed animals perceive colours in a similar way, and tha t they are incapable of distinguishing colours except as to be feared or the reverse. The human race is in the same position towards smells ; it would seem th a t there is an analogy between smell and taste, and tha t the species of tastes correspond to those of smells, but tha t taste is with us more discriminating because it is

119

4 2 0 6 5 ,rrjv KaXov¡hévr¡v aprr¡píav (f>a>vrj eoTiv. o v y a p Trâs

30 t,(i>ov ipócj>os <f>covr¡, K adávep e’ÍTTO/xev [è a n y à p Kai rfj yXcÔTTTj ifjocf>eîv Kal œ s o i /3r¡TTOVTes), aAAà Set é¡ii¡tvx^v T€ e vaL tÔ TV7TTOV Kal [xerà (f>avTacias t l v o s or¡¡iavTLKos y ׳ à p S rj rts ipoÿos èa r lv rj <f>œvr¡, Kai ov t o v âvairveo/xévov à ép o s, œoirep r¡

421 a pr¡£• aAAà t o v t w t v t t t s l to v êv Tjj àpTrjpia TTpos avTr¡v. arjfieîov Sè t o ¡ir¡ S vva a d a i <f>œveîv â va - TtvéovTa ft7]SJ ¿KTTvéovTa, aAAà /care^ovra• klvcÎ y à p t o v t o o KaTévœ v. <f>avepov Sè Kai Stort ot ¿xdveç à(f>a>voi‘ ov y à p ex o v a i (f>àpvyya. t o v t o

5 SI t o ¡xóptov o vk k)(ovoiv, oTi ov Se^ovrat rov àép a ov S5 a va n vé o va iv . St rjv ¡xèv ovv a lr la v , erep ó s ¿OTL X óyos.

IX . î l e p ï Sè oa¡xrjs Kal oacbpavrov t¡ttov ev - SiópiGTÓv è a n Ttîjv elprjfxévœ v ov y à p SrjXov ttqÎovTt 6C7TIV 7? OO/XT], OVTCOS VOS O ljjO(f)OS Tj TO X ptü/m .

10 atrio*׳ s 5 o n TTjV a ïadrja iv TavTrjv o vk ëxojxev aKpifîr], àXXà )(€Lpcü ttoXXcôv Çcüojv״ cf>avXœs y à p àvQ pam os OCT/xârat, /cat ovdevos a la d â vsT a t tcov oac^pavTCÔv âvev t o v XvTrrjpov r¡ t o v rjSéos, coç o vk o v to s a.KpcjSovs t o v alod'í]Tr¡p¿ov, evXoyov S5 ovtco Kal r à aKXr]pô(f)daX[xa tcov xpùOfxâTajv a la d á - vea d a i, Kai ¡xrj 8 ia 8r¡Xovs avTOÎs e tva i rà? Sta-

15 (f>opàs tcov xpíú¡xaTíúV •rrXrjV tco (fiofiepqj Kai <x<f>ó¡3a). ovtco Sè /cat rà ? ôafxàs t o tcov avOpcorrcov y é v o s ’ lot/ce ¡xèv y à p dvdX oyov l^etv 777509 t t j v y e v a iv Kal ¿fxoíws r à ei'S^ tcüî> x vF ^ v T°fc T??S' oafirjs, aAA’ à/cptjSearepav ’¿xo[xev tt¡ v y e v a iv Stà ro etrat avTrjv

ARISTOTLE

a Cf. Part. Anim . 669 a 2־118

ON THE SOUL, II. ix.

itself a form of touch, and this sense in man is highly- discriminating ; in the other senses he is behind many kinds of animal, but in touch he is much more dis­criminating than the other animals. This is why he is of all living creatures the most intelligent. Proof of this lies in the fact th a t among the human race men are well or poorly endowed with intelligence in proportion to their sense of touch, and no other sense ; for men of hard skin and flesh are poorly, and men of soft flesh well endowed with intelligence.

Just as flavours are sweet and bitter, so are smells. In some things the smell corresponds to the taste e.g., both smell and taste are sw ee t; in others they are contrasted. Smell, like flavour, may be pungent, rough, acid or oily. But, as we have said, smells being, unlike flavours, not easily differentiated, they have taken their names from flavours on the ground of a correspondence between them ; the smell of saffron or honey is called sweet, while tha t of thyme and similar herbs is called pungent ; and similarly in other cases. Just as hearing or any other given sense has for its object both the audible and the inaudible, or both the visible and the invisible, so smell has both the odorous and the odourless. “ Odourless ” means both th a t which has no smell at all and th a t which has a very small and slight smell. The sense of smell also operates through a medium, such as air or water ; for the water animals too, whether they have blood or not, seem to have a sense of smell, just like those

121

20 âifirjv riva , ravrrjv S e ־ ^ e t t rr¡v atodrjaiv to ׳ v ävdpojTTOv aKpißecrTaTTjV’ iv ¡xev yàp to ls âXXais XsÎttstcu ttoXXcov1 tcüv t,(ócov, Kara S é rr¡v âcfyrjv TToXXáj2 tcüv âXXœv 81a<f>epóvTC0s aKpißol. 8 to /cat «f>p0VL¡j,a)TaT¿v ¿cm tw v Çwœv. arjfieîov S è t o Kai ¿v T& ye'vei tcov âvdpœnœv rrapà t o aiadr¡rr¡p10v

25 T 0 V T 0 elvai ev(f>v€LS K a i à<f>veîs, Trap* äXXo 8è p,r¡Sev° ol [Aèv yàp (jKÁrjpóaapKoi âtpveîs tt¡v Siàvoiav, oi S e ¡j,aXaK0(1apK0í ev(f>vet? .

5,T7 » \ e \ \ f fEjUTL O , OJGTrep XvfJLOS“ ° yAVKVS O 06 TUKpOÇ, ovtcü /cat ¿G¡xat. aAAà r à p.èv e^ovcrt t tjv àvdXoyov ocF/xrjv /cat )(v¡jlÓv (Xáyo) 8è o tov yXvKeîav ¿Gfirjv

30 /cat yXvKvv xvp,ov), Ta Sè TovvavTiov. opuoicos Sè /cat Spt/zeta /cat avarrjpà /cat o^eta /cat Xnrapá ¿cm v ocr[xrj. olXX’ couTTep et'770/xev, S tà t o ¡ir¡ cr<j)ó8pa 8 ta - 8rjXovs eîvai r a s oapás a>a77ep to v s p p ú s , ¿770

421 !» tovtcjjv €ÏXr)<f>e Ta ovófiaTa Kad* o/xotOTîjTa tcDf TTpayfiaTCDV’ r¡ fièv y à p yXvKsîa a 770 t o û KpoKov cat to׳ v /¿éXiToç, 7] 8è Spt^eta dv/xov /cal tcS f TOÍOVTCÜV" TOV airrov Sè Tponov Kal è77t TWV àÀÀüJV. ecm S5 UKJTrep r¡ aKor¡ «rat ¿Kaorij tcôv aiadrjaeœv,

5 7] [xèv to v aKovGTov Kal àvrjKovGTov, r¡ Sè to v oparov Kal âopaTov¡, Kal r¡ 0G<¡>pr]G1s to v 0G<f>pavT0v Kal âvoacbpdvTOV. àvôacf>pavT0v Sè t o ftèv 77apà t o ÔXcüs aS vvarov e%e1v oop!,r¡v, t o Sè pnKpàv ¿xov Kal éavXrjv. ojnotcoç Sè /cat t o ayevarov Xéyera t . eW t Sè /cat 1ן oa<f>p7)0LS S tà to û ¡JLera^v, oîov aepoç

10 V vo a ro s״ fcol yà p to.: evvhpa S okovg iv og[11]s modaveadat,. ôfxoLœs Sé /cat t ¿ evatjtta /cat t<x/ \ \ / < 0׳ י \ י י׳ «/a va ifia , axjrrep /cat r a 6v rep aepi• /cat y a p tovtcop

1 TroAAaV comm. vet. : 1roAA<3 ESU V 5 Bekker־. s CToAAtSy Bekker־

ARISTOTLE421 a

120

ON THE SOUL, II. ix.

which live in the air ; for some of them, guided by the scent, come from a great distance to find their food.

Hence a problem presents itself. All animals smell How the in the same way, while man only smells during in- ®“ I!® °peai־ halation ; when not inhaling, but either exhaling or ates• holding the breath, he cannot smell either a t a dis­tance or a t close range, not even if the object of smell is placed inside and in contact with the nostril. That what is placed on the sense organ should be imper­ceptible is common to all senses ; but to perceive no smell without inhaling seems to be peculiar to man. The fact, when tested, is obvious. So that bloodless animals, since they do not inhale, would seem to have another sense beyond the usually accepted ones. But this is impossible, if what they perceive is sm ell; for perception of the odorous, and of sweet or foul smell, is an act of smelling. Again־, we can observe th a t they are destroyed by the same strong smells, such as bitumen, sulphur and the like¡, which destroy man. So they must smell, but without inhaling.

Probably this sense organ in man differs from its Man differs counterpart in other living creatures, just as human aMmah8 eyes are different from those of hard-eyed animals ; for human eyes have lids as a covering, and a sheath as it were, without moving and raising which they cannot see ; but hard-eyed animals have nothing of the kind, but see directly what appears in the trans­parency. Similarly in some animals the organ of smell is uncovered like the eye, but others which admit the air have a veil which is lifted when they inhale, the veins and passages dilating. This is why animals which inhale do not smell in water ! for to

128

12a b :evia 'iróppooQev á7ravra vpos rr¡v Tpo<f>r¡v w7roapa y 1v¿¡xeva.

A lo Kal airopov (palveraL, el Trdvra ¡xev ¿¡!oíais SofidraL, o 8P av6pcoito s ávairvécov ¡xév, ¡xr¡ ava-

15 7Tvéttív Se aAA־ ¿Kirvécov r¡ reare^toí׳ t o 7rvev¡xa o vk oofidrai״ ovre rróppcodev o v t eyyvOev, ovo* av é7rl t o v ¡iVKTrjpos ¿ v to s Tedfj. Kal ro ¡xev err’ avTW ndéfievov ra> aíodrjrrjpla) dvaíodr¡rov elvai koivov 1rávT(üV' aAAa ro avev t o v dvavvetv ¡xr¡ alodáveodai ÍSiov 6771 t Gív dvOpónrcov• SrjXov Se

20 ■neipcújxévois• atore r á avaipua, e7re18r¡ o vk ava- irvéovoLv, erépav av t l v ’ a10dr¡01v e^oi Trapa ray Xeyo¡xévas. aAA’ áSvvarov, eirrep rrjs oo/xrjs ai- odáverai' r¡ yap t o v 00(f)pavT0v aX00r¡0LS icalO* / 0 י X ־ / Q• 9 / « / V כ \ovgojoovs Kai evcuoovg oacpprjGis e a n v . e n oe Kal (pdeipófieva <j>aíveTa1 vtto t& v ícrxvpajv oo¡1cov

25 v<j) Svirep avdpcúTTos, otov aaSdÁ rov ical Oeíov Kal row to lo v tíú v . 60<¡>paiveada1 ¡xev ovv á va y- ko ío v , aAA’’ o vk avarrveovTa.

E,־ oiKe Se to ls avBpojTtoLs SLa<f>épe1v t o aloOr¡- rr¡p10v t o v to TTpos ro ra>v dXÁcov £&>&»5 ׳ tóo7rep ra o¡l¡xa ra rrpos rן á tíü v 0KXr¡p0(f>6áX¡1a)V' r a ¡xev yap exei <f>páy¡xa Kal a>07rep eXvrpov r á /3Aé(f>apa3

30 a ¡xr¡ KLvrjoas ¡ir¡S־ avaonácras 015% opa• r á Sé 0KXr¡pó<f>9aX¡xa ovSev e^et to lo íjto v , áAA’ evdéais opa ra yLvó/jceva év tcü Sta^avet. ovtcos ovv Kai

422 s ro 00(f>pavTLK0v alodr¡Tr¡pL0v tols f.Lev á.KáÁV(f>eS e tva i, woTrep to o ¡¿¡xa, tols Sé tov dépa Se^o- ¡xévois exeiv ¿7TLKdXv¡x¡xa, o ¿va7rveóvrwv dito- KaXvTTTeoOaL, 81evpvvo¡xévwv tG iv <f>XefiLtüv Kal tw v rrópcav. Kal Siá tovto to, dvairvéovTQ. ovk oo¡xarca

ARISTOTLE

122

smell they must first inhale, and it is impossible to do this in water. Smell belongs to the dry, as flavour does to the wet ; and the organ of smell is potentially dry.

X. The tasteable is a kind of tangible ; and this Taste like is the reason why it is not perceptible through the quires no medium of any foreign body ; for the same thing is medium, true of touch. Further, the tasteable body in which flavour resides is in a liquid material medium ; and this is tangible. Hence if we lived in water, we should perceive sweetness injected into it, but our percep­tion would not come through any medium, but would be due to the mixing of the sweet stuff with the water, just as in a drink. But colour is not seen by being mixed, nor by an emanation. Taste has nothing, then, to act as a medium ; although as the object of sight is colour, so the object of taste is flavour. But but liquid nothing can produce a perception of flavour without ™r ent? liquid ; it must possess wetness actually or potenti­ally, like salt, which is both soluble itself and solvent of the tongue.

Now sight is concerned both with what can and with what cannot be seen (for darkness cannot be seen, and the power of sight distinguishes darkness), and also with tha t which is too bright (for this also cannot be seen, though in a different sense from darkness) ; and in the same way the power of hearing is concerned with both sound and silence, the former being tha t which is heard, and the la tter tha t which is not heard, and also with very loud noise, just as sight is concerned with the too b r ig h t; for as a slight sound is in a sense inaudible, so also is a loud and violent one. The word invisible is used in one sense quite generally, like other terms which deny a

125

ON THE SOUL, II. ix.—x.

S i v TW vypût״ dva yK a îo v y à p oacj^pavdrjvat âva7rvev- 17 a vra , t o v t o Sè TroieZv èv râ> v y p w ¿8vv a ro v . èo n S־ r¡ oafir) Tov Çrjpov, œ a v ep o yvjxoç r o v v y p o v ״t o Sè 0G(j>pavT1,K0v a.lodrj'nqpiov 8vvá¡1e1 ro io v ro v

X T ־ o 8 è y e v a r â v è a n v a n ró v t í ’ Kal t o v t aiT iov t o v fj/rj s tva i a lodrjrov 81a t o v ¡xera^v

10 aXXorpLov ovTos ocófxaros׳ ov Sè y à p à<f>rj. Kal ¡ד t o ow¡xa Sè i v œ o j/v/xós, ro y e v o r ó v , èv vypco

e f / \ ׳ י י o>5 c / O. X 5 י ל * f / o.ios vAr¡• tovto b aiTTov ri* bio Kav et ev vbar 1 eí¡x ev, aladavoijjLed" av ifxßXrjOevros tov yXvKeos, OVK r¡v S’ av r¡ aío6r¡G1s rjpûv Stà tov ¡xera^v, âXXà Tip [xixOrjvai, Tip vypcp, KaOárrep im tov

15 ttotov. to Sé xpœ fxa oi>x ovTcos opdrai tlü ¡jxíyvvadai, ovSè raïs ànoppoiais. c¿? fxèv ovv to ¡xera^v ovdév ia r tv ojs Sè xp¿>p,a ™ oparov, ovtco ro yevGTOv ó yvP'ós׳ ovdèv Sè 7rotet %u/xoy aïadrj- giv aveu vypoTTqros, ¿AA5 e^et ivepyeLa r¡ 8vvá¡1e1 vypónyra¡ olov to âA¡xvpév evrrjKróv re yàp avro Kal aVVTTjKTiKOV yXc!)TTT]S.

20 c'Q.a7rep 86 Kal 'ף׳ oiftLç Í g tI tov re oparov Kal tov áopáróv (ro yàp gkotos a oparov, Kplvei Sé «ai tovto r¡ oif/ts), e n roû Atav Xa¡x7rpov («rat yàp tovto a oparov, âXXov Sè rpoirov tov gkotovs) , Of,xoLas Sè «rat ןו aKor¡ ajjócfiov re «:ai aiyrjs, &v ro ¡xèv aKovarov ro 8'J ovk à kovgtov, Kal ¡xeyáXov

25 ¡Jjoÿov, KaOárrep r¡ oifjcs rod Xa¡nrpov' atavep yàp6 /XLKpOS lpÓ<f>OS aVr¡KOVGTOS TpOTTOV TLvá, Kal O¡xéyas r e Kal o ßL aios’ â ô p a ro v Sè r o ¡xèv oXa>s\ / t f \ י ע y / \ \ י י ה / x ç\5Aeyerai, œa77ep Kai €77 aÀAiûv ro advvarov, r o o , 124

ARISTOTLE

capacity, and also in the sense of not having the quality or having it to a very small extent, though by nature qualified to possess it, like the words footless or stoneless. In just the same way the sense of taste is concerned with both th a t which is tasted and that which is not ; the la tter being tha t which has little or poor taste, or which is destructive of taste. The ultimate distinction seems to lie in the drinkable and undrinkable ; for each implies a tasting, but the latter is bad and destructive of taste, while the former is natural. The drinkable is an object common to both touch and taste.

Since what is tasted is wet, the organ which per­ceives it must be neither actually liquid nor incapable of liquefaction ; for taste is affected by the object of taste, in so far as it is tasted. Hence there must be liquefaction of the organ of taste, which must be liquefiable without loss of identity, but not liquid.This is proved by the fact th a t the tongue is as insen­sitive when too wet as when quite dry ; what happens is a contact with the moisture already in the tongue, as when a man having first tasted a strong flavour then tastes another ; or as when a man is ill everything tastes bitter, because he perceives it with a tongue filled with b itter fluid. The types of flavours, just as in the case of colours, in their simplest form are contraries, sweet and bitter ; next to these respec­tively are oily and saline ; between these la tter come pungent, rough, astringent and acid. These seem to be nearly all the differences in flavours. Hence what is capable of tasting is th a t which potentially has these qualities ; and the tasteable is th a t which actualizes this potentiality.

X I־ The same account applies to the tangible and Touch.127

ON THE SOUL, II. x.—xi.

êàv 7re<f>VK0s ¡xt] exjj י} cf>avXws, toarrep t o a rro w Kal ro arrvpyjvov o v tw 8 r¡ Kal rj y evens to v

30 yevo T o v r e Kal a y e v a r o v • t o v t o 86 t o ¡xiKpov r¡ <f>avXov eyo v yy¡10 v rj (¡)dapriKov t t } s yevaecus• S oKeî 8 s e tva i àpxh r ® '/to tov Kal a r ro ro v y everts y á p t l s afic^QTepa״ aXXà t o ¡lev (f>avXrj Kal ¿)dap- T1K7) Trjs yevaecos, t o 86 fe a rà <f>vmv1 ־c m 86 K0LV0V ¿(fñjs Kal yevaecos t o t to to v .

422 b 5E7764 8 s vy p o v TO y e v a r ó v , áváyKT¡ K al TO aladr¡Tr¡p10v a v to v fxrjTe vy p o v e tva i iv r e A e^e/a [xr¡T€ âS vva ro v vy p a iveo Q a r rráax^i y á p t i r¡ y e v - a is vrro t o v yevo T o v , 7} y e v a r ó v à ־ va yK a ïo v a pa vypavO fjvai t o 8w á fie v o v ¡xkv v y p a ív e a d a i aoot,¿-

5 ¡xevov, [xrj vyp o v S é , t o yevoT iK ov aiadr¡Tr¡pt,ov. arjfxeîov 86 r o ¡xrjre Kard^rjpov o d a a v t t j v yX corrav a ia d d vea d a t fxr¡T€ Xíav vyp á v• avrr¡ y à p aifcrj y¿- v e ra i t o v rrpcüTov v y p o v , warrep o ra v rrpoyevfxa- r ía a s t l s la x vp o v xv/jlov y e v r jra i i r é p o v ‘ Kal 0L0V TOLS KájxvovoL iTLKpá rrávTa (¡)aíverai 8 tá t o

10 rfj yXwTTj¡ rrXrjpei T o iavrrjs vypoTijTos a la d ave- a9a1־ Ta S e ־ ï8r¡ tw v x v^¿ov} warrep Kal érrl tw v XpcofxáTcov, ârrXâ /xiv TavavT ia , t o yXvKv Kal t o TTLKpóv, ixó¡xeya 86 t o v ¡xev r ó Xirrapóv, t o v 86 t o áXfxvpóv״ ¡xera^v 86 to v tc o v t o Te hpifiv Kal t o a va rrjp o v Kal arpvcbvov Kal ô^v• 0 ^ 6 8 0 1 y ׳ à p a u r a i

15 SoKovaiv e tva i 81a<f>opaí x v lx^>v• w a r e t o y e v - o tlk Ó v eoTL t o S w á /xe i to lo v to v s y e v a r o v 86 ro Trotr¡TLK0v evreXex^ía avT ov.

V T T T * £ \ / י ׳ . » : «. \ C J ** e V \ \ /AI» i Lepe oe tov a7ttov Kai acprjs o a utos A oyos. 126

ARISTOTLE422 a

ON THE SOUL, II. xi.

the sense of touch. For if touch is not one sense, but several, there must be several kinds of tangibles.I t is difficult to say whether touch is one sense or more than one, and also what the organ is which is perceptive of the object of touch ; whether it is flesh, and whatever is analogous to this in creatures without flesh, or whether this is only the medium, and the primary sense organ is something distinct and in­ternal. For every sensation appears to be concerned with one pair of contraries, e.g., vision is of white and black, hearing of high and low pitch, and taste of bitter and sw ee t; font in the tangible there are many pairs of contraries, hot and cold, dry and wet, hard and soft, and all other like qualities. Some solution may be found to this difficulty in the fact th a t the other senses too are conscious of more than one pair of contraries : so in sound there is not merely high and low pitch, but also loud and soft, smooth and rough, and so on. There are similarly other differ­ences in colour. But what in the case of touch is the single substrate corresponding to sound in hearing is not obvious.

W hether the sense organ is within, or whether the What is the flesh feels directly, is not decided by the fact tha t ®!Touch'?11 sensation occurs instantly upon contact. For even as it is, if the flesh is surrounded with a closely fitting fabric, as soon as this is touched sensation is registered as before ; yet it is quite clear th a t the sense organ is not in the fabric. And ii the fabric actually grew on the flesh, the sensation would traverse it even more quickly. So this part of the body seems to have much the same effect as tha t of a natural envelope of air ; for in tha t case we should suppose tha t our

et y à p 7] afir¡ [¿r¡ ¡xía ¿g tIv aïcrdrjais áAAá 7rÁeíov$s d vayK aîov Kal r à á7 rrá alad7]Ta 7rXeíco elva i.

20 é^ e i 8 S d v o p ía v irórepov rrXeíovs e ía lv r¡ ¡xía, Kal r i t o aladr¡Tr¡pi0v to to v arrrov arrrtKov, tto tepov 7} o á p £ Kal i v to Í s dXXots to dváX oyov, r¡ o v , dXXá T0VT0 ptév Í g t i to ¡iGTajjv, to Sé 7rp¿úT0v alaQ7] - TTjpiov dXXo t Í ¿ g tiv €vtÓs. 7ráaá re y à p aXoQyjGis ¡jiias ¿vavTiá>aeœs etvai Soicet, o tov oiftts XevKov

25 Kal jiéXavos Kal <XK0r¡ o feos Kal ßapeos Kal yeva ts TTtKpov Kal y Au «reos•־ ¿v Se to j a77T<3 7roXÁal eveta iv e v a vT id a e is , 6ep¡xov ifivxpóv, £7)pov vy p ó v , GKXrjpov ¡jtaXaKÓv, Kal tcov aXXcov ocra r o ta v r a . ej¿et Sé Tiva X vaiv 7rpós ye TavTTjv t t jv d v o p ía v , orí, tcal ¿ v i t í ov dXXojv aío6r¡Geú>v e ia iv ¿vavTiwoeis

80 vX eio vs, o lov ¿v <j>tovfj o v ptóvov o£vtt¡s Kal ßapvrrjs¡, àAAà Kal ¡jJyedos Kal ¡11KpÓT7js Kal XeiÓTTjs Kal TpaxvTTjs (¡>a>vrjs Kal roiavd* e re p a . elcrl Sé K al 7repl xpcôfia Sia<f>opal t o i a v r a i eTepai. aAÀà Ti TO iv TO VVOK€i¡XeVOV, ¿OOTTep ¿.KOT¡ l/j¿(f>OS, OVTÜÍ Tfj ac¡)fj, OVK €OTiV €vS7jX0V.

n / 9* י / ׳ /orepov o earn, to a1G0r¡Tr¡p10v <evtos> r¡ ou* «38 a ¿A A 5 evdéúiS 7] aáptj ; ovSèv Sofceî er7]/ueîov eivai

to y iveada i t t jv a1ad7]01v apta 61 yyavo jiiv iov . Kal yà p vvv e l t l s vep l t t iv gápKa vepiTeíveiev olovc /׳ / ' ? “ / \ it n י / ו / c ; /vfjieva TroirjGaç, o/jlolcüç rrjv cuGurjcrw evveœs aya-

¡Jtevos ivoTjjjtalvet• /cairoi è7jXov w s o vk Î g t lv èv 5 to v tco t o alo67¡Tr¡ptov et Sè Kal avpb(f)vès yévotTO,

6& ttov e n SiÏKvotT âv r¡ aX097]0ts. Sto to to io v to ptôpiov to v aœpiaTOS €0u<ev o v to js exeLV w a vep dv <sî kvkXü) rjjjiîv 7rept€7r£(j)VKe1 o dr¡p• èhoKovptev

ARISTOTLE422 b

128

ON THE SOUL, II. xi.

perception of sound, colour, and smell were all due to the one thing, and tha t vision, hearing, and smell were all one and the same sense. But, as it is, since the medium through which the movements occur is detached, it is obvious tha t the sense organs in ques­tion are different. But in the case of touch the fact is still obscure. The animate body cannot be made of water or air ; it must be something solid. The alternative is tha t it is a mixture of these elements with earth, as flesh and its equivalent tend to be ; so tha t the tactual medium through which the several sensations are felt must be an organically attached body. That they are several is clear from a considera­tion of touch in the case of the tongue ; for the tongue perceives all tangible objects with the same part with which it perceives flavour. If then the rest of the flesh also could perceive flavour, taste and touch would seem to be one and the same sense. But, as it is, they are proved two, because they are not conver­tible.

But here a difficulty arises. Every body has depth. The medium i.e., the third dimension; and when two bodies have of touch86 a third between them, they cannot touch each other.But the liquid or wet cannot exist without a body, and must either be, or contain, water. Those things, then, which touch each other in water, as their ex­tremities are not dry, must have water between them, of which their extremities are full. If this is true, then it is impossible for one thing to touch another in water. The same thing will be true of air, for air has the same relation to things in it, as water has to things in water. But we tend to over­look this point, just as animals living in water do not notice if the surfaces of things which touch are wet.

131

yàp av êvl n v i alaOáveciQai Kal 1¡jó<foov Kal %paj״¡xaros Kal oa/xijs, Kal fxla n s atodrjais etvai oifcis

10 aKor¡ oo<f)pr¡a1s. vvv Sè Sià ro Sicopladai 81’ ovyivovrai a t Kivqaeig, (¡>avepà rà elprj/xéva alaOr¡-Trjpia tr e p a ô v r a e ־ m Se rrjç â<j>rjs r o v r o vvvaSrjXov âépos ¡xèv yàp r¡ vSaros dSvvarov av-srrrjvai ro ejxiftvj'ov crcù/xa־ oeî y à p n arepeovelvai. Xel77era1 8r¡ ¡xiktov sk yrjs Kal rcvrcov

25 eîvai, oîov ßovXerat r¡ aàp(j Kal ro dvdXoyov a>aredvayK aîov Kal ro acofxa eivai ¡xera^v ro v ànriK ovTrpoo7T€<j>VKÓs, Sí.5 ov yívovrai a i aio0r¡ae1s rrXeiovsovaai. SrjXoî S’ o n 77Xelovs r¡ è77l rr¡s yXœrryjs¿.(¡)Tj■ à'iravrcôv yap rœv arrrcûv aloOâverai Karàr o a v ro !xôpiov Kal ;¡;u/xot». e î ¡xèv o vv Kal r¡

20 âXX7] o à p £ rjaddvero r o v x v fio v , èSoKei âv r¡ a vrrjKal ¡xía elvai aïadrjaiç v¡ yevais Kal r¡¡ d(j>rj° vvv

י \ י / j d e o v o o í a t o f i r ¡ a v T 1G T p e < p e 1v .

5Arropriaeie S’ a v t i ? , el 7rdv awtxa ßados ey e i,׳•v Ç.5 ל t / / ר ? £9 י \ £ /rovro o eo n ro rpirov ¡xeyeoos’ oav o e a n ovo aw[xáríúv ¡xeraJjv awfiá n , ovk ivSéyerai ravra áXX7¡X(jü>v dirreoQai. ro S־ vypov o v k ëonv dvev

25 acopiaros p ov Sé r o Siepóv, aXX’ d va yK a îo v vScop eîvai rj ë%eiv vSa)p. rà Sè a7rró¡xeva dXXr¡Xo!}v èv rw vSan¡ ¡ir¡ í;r¡pcúv rwv aKptov ovrcov, dvayK aîov vSojp eyeiv ¡xera^v, 0 3 dvá7rXea rà eoyara. el Sé rovr dXr¡déss dSvvarov dipaaOai dXXo dXXov ev ¿׳Sari, rov avrov Sé rpó7rov Kal èv rôt dépi• so Ô/Jboiœs yàp e%e1 o drjp ■jrpos rà èv avrœ Kal ro vSojp 77pos r à èv r â vSa n . Xavddvei Sè fiaXXov ê2s b ׳qP'S.s, atoirep Kal rà iv reo vS a n £<Sa, el Siepov

ARISTOTLE

130

Is then the perception of all things one only, or is it different of different things, just as i t is now gener­ally supposed th a t taste and touch both act by contact, but th a t the other senses act at a distance ? This is not the tru th ; we perceive hard and soft through a medium, just as we apprehend what sounds, or is seen, or sm elt; but since we perceive the latter from a distance, and the former only from near by, the facts escape us. We perceive all things through a medium ; but in this case the medium is not obvious. Still, as we have said before, if we were to perceive all tangible things through a fabric, without noticing the separation caused by it, we should react exactly in the same way as we do now in water and in air ; for we seem to touch them directly without the intervention of any medium. But there is a difference between tangible things, and visible or audible things. We perceive the latter because some medium acts on us, but we per­ceive tangible things not by a medium, but a t the same time as the medium, like a man wounded through his shield ; for it is not the stricken shield tha t struck him, but both he and the shield were struck simultaneously. In a general sense we may say tha t as air and water are related to vision, hearing and smell, so is the relation of the flesh and the tongue to the sense organ in the case of touch. In neither class of case mentioned would sensation result from touching the sense organ ; for instance, if one were to put a white body on the surface of the eye. From this it is clear tha t tha t which is perceptive of what is touched is within. Thus would occur what is true in the other cases ; for when objects are placed on the other sense organs no sensation occurs, but when

ON THE SOUL, II. xi.

133

-2Sb ״ / ״ ״ , BtepoS anreraí. ■nórepov ovv 7rávrwv o¡.loíws earivaïadyjcns, r¡ aXXwv aAAoos, KaOarrep vvv So/cet ¡ד7¡ ¡j,€V yevais Kal 7) acfrr) tío a-nrecrétat, a i 8’ aAAatd7ro0ev; ro où/c Í ־8 otlv, aAAà /cat t o aKXrjpov

5 /cat t¿ [laXaKov oí irépwv aladavó¡xeda, wa77epKal to 1ft0(f>r]TíK0v Kal t o oparóv Kal t o oacßpavTovaAAà Ta ¡xev 7r¿ppwdev, r à S5 ¿yyvdev. Sto Aav-dávei, èirel aladavófxeOd ye rrávTWV 8 tà r o ö ¡léaovaAA’ em tovtíov XavOávei. /catVot KaOánep elirapíevKal TTpórepov, kov el St’ v¡nevos aladavoifießa t Lou

10 ¿ tttwv anávTW v XavdávovTos o n hieípyei, ¿¡xoíwsav ¿)(Oí/iev warrep Kal vvv ev t w v 8 a n Kal ev twa épi• hoKOVjJuev yà p a vtw v arrreadai Kal ovSevetvai 81 à ¡léaov. aAAà Sta^epet ro airrov tw vo p a T W V Kal tw v i f j o f t r j T i K w v , o n eKeívwv ¡ 1 e v

aladavó¡1eda t w to ¡lera^v rroíeív t í r¡¡1ás, tw v18 Se o s n T W V o v x V7T0 t o v ¡ l e T a ^ v aAA־ a/xa t w ¡ z e T a ^ v ,

wavep 6 8t5 àaniSos TrXqyeis' ov yap r¡ dam s7rXr¡yeÍaa ¿rrára^ev, aAA־ a¡¿ dp,(¡)w1 avveßr¡ 77X7] -yrjvat aàp£ /cat r¡ yXwTra, ws ןל oAa>? 8’ eot/cev ־6 arjp K a l to vSwp rrpos ttjv oiftív Kal ttjv o.kot¡vKal TTjv 6a<j>pr¡a1v e^ovaív, ovtw s eyeiv rrpos to

20 aladrjTrjpiov warrep eKeívwv eKaaTov. a vro v 86tov aladrjTrjpiov á7TT0¡1év0v ovt ¿Keî ovt ivTavdayévoíT av oXadrjais, olov et n s aw¡xa to XevKovè m t o v O fJifM aT O S deir¡ t o e a y a T O V . fj Kal SrjXovOTL evrds t o t o v c l t t t o v a l a d r j T i K o v . ovt w yàpav avfißaivoi, orrep Kal ¿771 tw v dXXwv 6 ״m -

25 TiOefievwv ya p ¿7rl to aladrjTrjpiov ovk a ladávera i,

1 <£AA־ a¡jJ âfjujxo E, Themistius, Sophonias״ vet. trans.״ Torstrik s aAA’ vulgo.132

ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL, II. xi.

they are placed on the flesh it does ; hence the medium of the tangible is flesh.

The distinguishing characteristics of the body, qua The sense body, are tangible ; by distinguishing character- 13 a mean- istics I mean those which differentiate the elements hot and cold, dry and wet, about which we have spoken before in our discussion of the elements.“The tactual organ which perceives them, i.e., that in which the sense of touch, as it is called, primarily resides, is a part which has potentially the qualities of the objects touched. For perception is a form of being acted upon. Hence that which an obj ect makes actually like itself is potentially such already. This is why we have no sensation of what is as hot, cold, hard, or soft as we are, but only of what is more so, which implies that the sense is a sort of mean between the relevant sensible extremes. That is how it can discern sensible objects. I t is the mean that has the power of discernment; for it becomes an extreme in relation to each of the extremes in turn ; and just as that which is to perceive white and black must be actually neither, but potentially both (and similarly with the other senses), so in the case of touch it must be neither hot nor cold. And just as we saw 6 that sight is in a sense concerned with both visible and invisible, and the other senses similarly with opposite objects, so touch is concerned with both tangible and intangible ; by intangible we mean what has the quality of the tangible to an extremely small extent, as is the case with air, and also those tangibles which show excess, such as those which are destructive.Now we have described in outline each of the senses.

• De Gen. et Corr. cc. ii. and iii.6 422 a 20.

155

423 b€771 Sè T7jv a á p K a im T id e p é v c ü v a i a d á v e r a r œ o T e

TO fjL€Ta£v TOV â77TlK0V Tj 0 á p £ .

' A 7rr a t fièv ovv eiorïv a¿ 81<1(f>opal t o v acodaros f! U0J/J.0.■ Xéyu) Sè 81a<f>opàç a l r à o-rot^eta SiopiÇovGi, deppov ifivxpóv, ér¡pov vyp ó v , 77epl cov elpr¡Ka¡x<ív TTpÓTepov èv to î s 77epl aroiy^elojv. t o Sè a ladrj-

so Tijpiov avrcüv t o ¿ tttikÓ v , Kal ¿v qj r¡ xaXovjxlvr¡ à<f>r¡ vTrápxei 77porreo, t o Svvàfxei to io v to v ¿ g tl

424 a p L o p io v t o y à p a ía d á v e o d a i 7rácrxeLV Tt €Gt l v .¿¡gts. t o tto îovv o lov a v ro èvepyelq , to io v to v èiceivo Troiel 8vvàp,e1 ov. 810 t o v ¿¡iolojs dep/xov Kal 1/jvxpov r¡ gkXt¡pov Kal ¡laXaKov o v k a ía 9avóp,eda, aÀÀà r œ v v7rspßoXö)v, eos t7)s a lod 'qaeœ s olov

5 fj,€G¿rr¡T¿s t í vos ovarjs rrjs ¿v ro ts alad-qTOÎs evav- Ticôaeiüs• Kal S tà to v t o Kpivzi Ta atcrô^ra. t o y à p ¡xéoov KpiriKov• y tv e ra i y à p ■npos ¿Karepov (XVTüw doLTepov to w aKpcov Kal Set a>077ep to /xe'AAov alGdr¡G€08a1 XevKOÛ Kal fiéX avos /x^SeVepov avrô jv eîva i ¿vepyeía, Sw á/xet S’ ä u io j (ovtcü S r¡

10 Kal €771 tô jv âXXœv)1 Kal è7rl r fjs á<j>r¡s p/r¡T€ Oepfióv ¡i'qre ijivxpóv. e n S’ a)07rep ¿ p a ro v Kal à opdrov r¡v 77cos r¡ oipcs, ¿¡loicos Sè Kal a i X o m a l tô jv àvT i- Keipévcov, ovTco Kal r¡ á<f>7¡ t o v ¿ 77to v Kal â v à i t to v aVaTTTOV S ’ ¿ g tI TO T€ p-LKpàv ’¿Xov 77àpL77aV S ta- <f>0pàv TOJV ¿ 77TCOV, OLOV 17€77Ovdev O à/qp, Kal TU)V

16 0L77TC0V a l vrrepßoXai, coo77ep Ta <f>9apTLK¿. Kad’ ¿KaoTrjv fièv ovv tô jv alo8r!Geajv eïpr/Tai tv t to k

1 ovTco . ־ ־ ôAÀuiv in parenthesi Torstrik.

ARISTOTLE

134

ON THE SOUL, II. xn.

XII. We must understand as true generally of Definition every sense (1) that sense is that which is receptive sensation of the form of sensible objects without the matter, just as the wax receives the impression of the signet- ring without the iron or the gold, and receives the impression of the gold or bronze, but not as gold or bronze ; so in every case sense is affected by that which has colour, or flavour, or sound, but by it, not qua having a particular identity, but qua having a certain quality, and in virtue of its formula ; (2) the sense organ in its primary meaning is that in which this potentiality “ lies. The organ and the potentiality are identified, but their essential nature is not the same. The sentient subject must be extended, but sensitivity and sense cannot be extended ; they are a kind of ratio and potentiality of the said subject.From this it is also clear why excess in the percepti­bility of objects destroys the sense organs ; for if the excitement of the sense organ is too strong, the ratio of its adjustment (which, as we saw, constitutes the sense) is destroyed ; just as the adjustment and pitch of a lyre is destroyed when the strings are struck hard. It is also clear why plants do not feel, though they have one part of the soul, and are affected to some extent by objects touched, for they show both cold and h e a t ; the reason is that they have no mean, i.e., no first principle such as to receive the form of sensible objects, but are affected by the matter at the same time as the form. One might wonder whether anything that cannot smell is affected at all by smell, or that which cannot see by colour ; and in the same way with all other sensible objects.But if the object of smell is smell, if anything affects the sense of smell, it must be smell, so that it is

137

424 aX II . K.adoXov Se v e p l Trdarjs alaOrjcrecos Set

Aa/3etv o t i r¡ p,ev a l a d r j u L s ¿ o n r o S s k t ik o v t o j v

aludrjrcov elbow avev rrjs uXrjs, o tov o KTjpos ro v 20 BaKTvXlov avev ro v oLSr/pov Kal r o v xpvcrov Se-

Xerac t o arjfielov, Xapifiavei Se t o xP v<j° v v r¡ T° X o X k o V V G7)pL€LOV, ¿AA’ O V)( fj X p V G O S Tj J/aA/CO?, op.oi.cos Se ;cat r! aLadtqais ¿ K a d r o v int o t o v ex°v ro s X p& lta r¡ x vfjL° v V 4>o<j)Ov v raa^et, aAA’ oi>x fj cK aorov ¿Keivojv X eyeTai, aAA’ fj ro io vS l, Kal K ara

25 t o v X oyov. alodr]TrjpLov Se n p c o r o v ¿ v a¡ r¡ r o i a v r r ¡

8vvap,is. io T i fjikv ovv r a v r iv , t o S’ etva i e re p o v ¡xeyedos p.ev y a p av t i eir¡ t o alo9avop.evov- oi¡ [Jirjv t o y e alcrOrjTLKcp e lva i, o!3S’ r¡ a ’iadrjoLS fieyed o s e c m v , aAAa A oyoj Tt? Kal Svvapus ¿Kelvov. cf>avepov S’ ¿ k rourcov Kal S ta r t tt ore t o j v

80 aiadrjTw v a t {mepfioXal <f>6eipovai r a aicrdrjTrjpia• eav y a p fj la xvp o rep a t o v alcrdrjrrjplov r¡ icivrjois, X vera i o Aoyos״ (ro vro S’ rjv r¡ a ’iodrjens), ojorrep teat r¡ av[i(f>aivia Kal 6 t o v o s Kpovopuevcuv ocj>68pa t o j v x ° P & £ > v . Kal S ta Tt i Tore r a <f>VTa o v k a l- a d a vera i, e x o v rd Tt fiop iov ipvx<-Kov Kal ■naoxovra

424 b Tt v t t o t o j v a T T T w v Kal y a p t p v x e r a i Kal dep- [JLaiverai• a tr io v y a p t o p.r¡ e^etv fj-eoorrjra, p.7]8e ro ia vrrjv a p y jjv o iav r a e’iSr¡ 8exeo9a i ■t o j v a l- a d r jT c o v , aAAa n a a x e c v [ ¿ e r a rr js vXrjs. a T T o p r jo e L e

S’ av Tt? el TradoL av Tt int ocrp,rjs ro aSvvarov5 oacf>pav8rjvai, r¡ v t t o x p ^ ^ r o s r o pur] Sw ap.svov

IS e lv ouo io js Se /cat ¿rrl t o j v aXXojv. el Se t o outppavrov oap.r¡, e l n n o ie i rrjv oo<f>p7]cnv, r¡

ARISTOTLE

a Sc., for receiving the impression.186

impossible for anything which cannot smell to be affected by a sm ell; and the same argument applies to the other senses ; nor can any of those things which can be acted upon be affected, except in so far as each has the sense in question. And the point is equally clear from the following argument. For neither light and darkness, nor sound, nor smell affects bodies at a l l : it is the objects in which they reside that produce the effect, just as it is the air with the thunderbolt that splits the timber. But it may be said that tangible objects and flavours do affect bodies; otherwise, by what could inanimate obj ects be affected and altered ? Will then the objects of other senses affect things ? Perhaps it is not every body that is affected by smell and sound : the things affected are indefinable and impermanent, such as air ; for it smells as though affected somehow. What, then, is smelling apart from being affected in some way ? Probably the act of smelling is an act of perception, whereas the air, being only temporarily affected, merely becomes perceptible.

ON THE SOUL, II. xn.

139

424 b ־oa[j,r¡ 7T0L€i. (L o r e t u >v dSvvarcuv oa<f>pav6rjvai o v d e v olov r e Traa^eiv vtt’ ¿ Sp -rjs ׳ o S ’ avros Aoyos Kal e m tcov aXXcov ov§e to jv Svvarcov, oAA5 fj aiadTjTLKOv ¡¡K a u ro v , a/xa 8e SrjXov Kal

10 o v t c o s• ovre yap (f>ws Kal a k o t o s ovre ift6cj>os o v r e ocrfj,7] ov8ev 770le t r a a c o f ia r a , aAA’ ev ols early, olov a rjp o jie ra ¡3povrfjg Sucrrqm t o £ v A o v .

aAAa r a airra Kal o i ^;u/xot Troiovmv e l ya p fir¡, vtto rivos av ■nda^oi r a difjvva Kal aA A oto tro ;

ap’ ovv KaKelva TroLrjuei; fj ov n a v a a ijx a ttadr¡- 15 t l k o v xrn ocjfirjs Kal ifiocf>ov• Kal ra Traa^ovra

a o p iG T a , Kal ov [level, olov diqp• o£ei yap wairep Tradcov rt. rt oi?v earl t o oa/Mxo0ai tta p a to irdaveiv r t; ■i) to /xev oa/xaa0at alcrdaveoOai., o 85 ar/p Tradcjv Taddeos alarOrjros ylverai.

ARISTOTLE

BOOK III

I . O n e may be satisfied that there are no senses There are apart from the five (I mean vision, hearing, smell, senses.'6 taste and touch) from the following arguments. We may assume that we actually have perception of everything which is apprehended by touch (for by touch we perceive all those things which are qualities of the tangible object, qua tangible). Again, if we lack some sense, we must lack some sense organ ; and, again, all the things which we perceive by direct contact are perceptible by touch, a sense which we in fact possess ; but all those things which are per­ceived through media, and not by direct contact, are perceptible by means of the elements, viz., air and water. Again, the facts are such that, if objects of more than one kind are perceived through one medium, the possessor of the appropriate sense organ will apprehend both (for instance, if the sense organ is composed of air, and air is the medium both of sound and of colour), but if there is more than one medium of the same thing, as for instance both air and water are media of colour (for both are trans­parent), then he that has either of these will perceive what is perceptible through both. But sense organs are composed of only two of these elements, air and water (for the pupil of the eye is composed of water,

141

T424 b t &r\ $ יה י ,, * Q e ' \ 1י . U t í o ׳ ou /c €<j t l v aL(J07)G 1s e r e p a 7 r a p a r a s

irevre (Aeya) Sè ravras oifiiv, ¿.K07jv, oa<f>pr¡cnv,yevoLV, á(f>1r¡v), I k rcovSe m oTevoeiev av T t s. e t

25 y á p ■ n a r r o s 0 3 ¿ c t t I v a ío d r¡c r1 s a<fyr¡, ׳cat vvvo l o d r j o i v ¡¡xofjLev {■ návTa yàp r à t o v ¿ t t t o v f j

aiTTOV vddr¡ rfj à(j>rj rjfjûv aloOrjTa èo n v ) , àvàyK7]t , ecTrep e /cÀ e t7 ret n s a ï o d r j o i s , K a l a lo d r ¡ T r ¡ p ió v

T t r¡¡jLZv è/cÀ€t77et1׳ • Kal oaojv ¡xè v a v r œ v 0 .ttt¿¡j.< ívo i

a l a d a v ó f i e d a , r f j àcp fj a l o ö r j r d è c r r iv , r¡v r v y x á -

vofiev ë x o v T e s ׳ ocra Sè S ià t ü j v p . e r a ^ v , K a l p.r¡

30 avTüjv âvTÔjxevoi, ׳r o t ? aitÀoÎs, Aeyaj 8 ’ olov àépi\ ״ ה if o.> tt a \ o. > c \ < ל

K a i v o a r r 6 ^ 6 6 o ovrcos־, c o a r €6 /xev 06 evos־ irÀeiœ aladrjrà erepa o v r a aÀ À^À aJV rà) yévei, à v à y K r ¡ t o v e ^ o v r a ro t o l o v t o v a lo d r ¡T r¡ p 1 0 v a j a -

<f>oîv a la d rp -L K O v elvai (olov el è£ ¿épos icrrl t o

aladr¡Tr!p10v, Kal é o T tv ó a ^ p /c a t 1f1ó(f>ov Kal425 a xpoas), el Sè rrXelœ tov avrov, olov yjjoaç Kal

àrjp Kal 1ISœp (âfJL<f>co yàp Statfiavf¡), Kal ó to erepov avrœv êvojv ¡j.6vov aladrjoiTai à/juf>oîv• twv Sè drrAwv è/c Svo tovtüjv alo9rj-njp1.a ¡xóvov ¿OTLVy ¿£ âépos Kal vSaros (r¡ ¡xèv yàp Kopr¡140

and the hearing organ of air, while the organ of smell is composed of one or other of these). But fire is the medium of no perception, or else is common to them all (for there is no possibility of perception without heat), and earth is the medium of no sense percep­tion, or else is connected in a special way with the sense of touch. So we are left to suppose that there is no sense organ apart from water and air ; and some animals actually have organs composed of these.“The conclusion is that all the senses are possessed by all such animals as are neither undeveloped nor maimed ; even the mole, we find, has eyes under the skin. If then there is no other body, and no property other than those which belong to the bodies of this world, there can be no sense perception omitted from our list.

But, again, it is impossible that there should be a The per- special sense organ to perceive common sensibles, common* which we perceive incidentally by each sense, such, sensibles. I mean, as motion, rest, shape, magnitude, number and unity ; for we perceive all these things by move­ment b ; for instance we perceive magnitude by move­ment, and shape also ; for shape is a form of magni­tude. What is at rest is perceived by absence of movement; number by the negation of continuity,® and by the special sensibles ; for each sense perceives one kind of object. Thus it is clearly impossible for there to be a special sense of any of these common sensibles, e.g., movement; if there were, we should perceive them in the same way as we now perceive what is sweet by sight. But we do this because we happen to have a sense for each of these qualities, and so recognize them when they occur together ; otherwise we should never perceive them except

143

ON THE SOUL, III. i.ARISTOTLE425 a

s vSaTos, r¡ S ’ <xkot] âépos, 17 S’ oacpprjcns darépov tovtojv), to Sè TTvp r¡ ovdevos r¡ kowov vavTCüv (ovdèv y à p aveu Oepp.oT'qTOS aladrjTiKov), yfj Sè r) ovdevos, r) èv Tfj d(j)fj ju,aÀtara jU.é/xifcrai ISicos׳ S10 XeiiTOLT àv fjLrjdèv eîva i alodrjrfjpiov ê£co vS aros Kal à ép o s׳ r a v r a Sè Kal vvv ’¿)(ovalv ’¿via £<3a ’

10 7râaai ap a a l a lod ijoe is eyovTai vtto rœ v prq areÀcDv ju/ijSè veTTTjptofievuiv ¡fiaivera 1 y à p Kal r¡e \ \ yf » / n \ / ft •>G T T a A a ç v t t o t o o e p f i a e ^ o v G a o ( p U a A [ j ,o v s . c o g t

et ¡jbr¡ r i ê r e p o v ear 1 crâ>/xa, K a l i r d O o s o p .r jd e v o s

€o tl tü jv i v r a v d a a a > p ,d r i o v , o v S e p i i a d v ¿kÀlttol a l o d r j o i s .

’ÂÀÀà ¡¿?¡v ov Sè Ttov kolvcüv oîôv t eïvai a i­ls adrjrrjpiôv t i i'Stov, aiv eKaarr/ aiodrjaei. alaOavo-

fjieda Karà avj-L^e^rjKOS, olov Kivrjaecos, ordcjecjs, ax^p-CLTOs, p-eyédovs, àpcdp,ov, . évos• ra v ra yap n a vra KLvrjoti alodavop-eda, olov peyeffos Kivrjaec ¿jare Kal ayjuxa■ p,éyedos yap t i to a ^ /x a . to S’ rjpep.ovv tô> p.r¡ KiveîadaL• o S’ àpiQp,os Tfj o.tto-

20 (jxiaei to v crvve)(pvs Kal to Îs 18lo is Kaarr¡ yàp¿ ׳ ev aladdverai aïadrjois. cocrre SrjXov o ti dSvvarov otovovv I8iav aïadrjcriv eïvai tovtcov, olov Kt,vr¡- aecos׳ ovtcd yàp éarat ¿jcrnep vvv Tfj otftei to yXvKV alcrdav6p,e6a. to v to S’ o ti àp,<j>oZv e^ovre? Tvyxdvop-ev a'ioOrjoLV, fj Kal o ta v avfJLTréoojcnv âva- yvu)ptt,opÆV et Sè ¡xr¡, ovSa/iœ s àv aÀÀ’ rj /carà

“ This is the conclusion to which all the preceding argu­ments lead.

b i.e., when and because they move. When a thing is “ continuous ” it is “ one,” which in the ־

Greek mind was not a number.142

ON THE SOUL, III. n.

incidentally, as, e.g., we perceive of Cleon’s son, not that he is Cleon’s son, but that he is white ; and this white object is incidentally Cleon’s son. But we have already a common faculty which apprehends common sensibles directly. Therefore there is no special sense for them. If there were, we should have no perception of them, except as we said that we saw Cleon’s son. The senses perceive each other’s proper objects incidentally, not in their own identity, but acting together as one, when sensation occurs simulta­neously in the case of the same object, as for instance of bile, that it is bitter and yellow ; for it is not the part of any single sense to state that both objects are one. Thus sense may be deceived, and, if an object is yellow, may think that it is bile. One might ask why we have several senses and not one only. I t may be in order that the accompanying common sensibles, such as movement, size and number, may escape us less ; for if vision were our only sense, and it per­ceived mere whiteness, they would be less apparent; indeed all sensibles would be indistinguishable, be­cause of the concomitance of, e.g., colour and size.As it is, the fact that common sensibles inhere in the objects of more than one sense shows that each of them is something distinct.

II. Since we can perceive that we see and hear, How do we

it must be either by sight itself, or by some other we'see*? sense. But then the same sense must perceive both sight and colour, the object of sight. So that either two senses perceive the same object, or sight per­ceives itself. Again, if there is a separate sense per­ceiving sight, either the process will go on ad infinitum,

145

ARISTOTLE425 a ^ ey

25 cru[i^e^rjKOS rj<jdavofj,e9a, olov rov KAect>vos viov ovx o t i KAecovos vcos, aAA’ o r i XevKos׳ rovrcp Se crviJLpePrjKev via¡ KAeawo? elvcu. rcov Se kolvujv yjSr¡ exofiev atcrdrjcnv Koiviqv, ov Kara crvpiflefi-qKos׳ ovk ap* ¿arlv tSta• ovSa/xcos yap av fjadavofzeda aAA’

so f¡ ovrais atuTrep etprjrai rov KXeatvos viov rjfids opav. ra 8’ aAAijAiov iSia Kara ov^eP rjK os alodavovra t a l aiadrjoeis, ovx V o.vral,1 aAA’ fj

425 b ¡xla, orav a/xa yevrjrai r¡ atadr¡ais eirl rov avrov, olov x°Xrj’v ori m Kpd Kal ¿javdr¡• ov yap 8r¡ erepas ye t o elveZv ort a[xcf>oj ev• S to Kal dnardrac , Kal eav f! £av9ov, \oXrjv o ierai elvai. ^,rjrrjaeie S ’ a.v t l s r¿vos eveKa rrXelovs exopev alodiqcreLs, aAA’ ov ¡xlav ¡xovt]v. r¡ ottcos fjrrov \av6avr¡ ra, ¿koXov- Oovvra Kal Koiva, olov Kivrjais Kal ¡xeyedos Kal apid[j,os־ el ya p rjv r¡ otfus [xovrj, Kal a v r r f Xsvkov, eXavdavev av ¡xdXXov Kal eSo/cet ra v ro ecvai rravra Sia ro ¿.KoXovdelv aAAijAot? a/xa xpto/xa Kal

10 !¿eyedos. vvv S’ errel Kal ev erepcp alo9׳qrqj r a KOiva. inrdpxei, SrjXov 7i־o iei ori aAAo Tt eKacrrov avrajv.

II. , K r re l S’ a la d a v o p -e O a o r t opch/xev K a l a k o v o -

fxev, a v a y K r¡ r¡ r f j o ip e i a lo d a v e a d a i o n opa, r¡ e r e p a . aAA’ r¡ a v r r ¡ e a r a i r f j s o ipecos K a l r o v

15 vTTOKeifjLevov xPc*>fJ-aT°S • w a r e r¡ S vo ro v a v r o v e o o v r at r¡ a v r r ] a v r r j s • e n S’ e l K a l e r e p a e"r] r f

r f j s oifiea>s c lo d r jo i s , r¡ e l s d rre ip o v e lm v r¡ a v r r¡

1 al avral Bekker. 2 avrr¡ Jackson : ainr¡.3 7¡ om. Bekker.

ON THE SOUL, III. n.

or a sense must perceive itself.® So we may assume that this occurs with the first sense. But here is a difficulty ; for if perception by vision is seeing, and that which is seen either is colour or has colour, then if one is to see that which sees, it follows that what primarily sees will possess colour. I t is therefore obvious that the phrase “ perceiving by vision ” has not merely one meaning ; for, even when we do not see, we discern darkness and light by vision, but not in the same way.6 Moreover that which sees does in a sense possess colour ; for each sense organ is receptive of the perceived object, but without its matter. This is why, even when the objects of per­ception are gone, sensations and mental images are still present in the sense organ.

The activity of the sensible object and of the sensa- What is tion is one and the same,0 though their essence is sensation f not the same ; in saying that they are the same, I mean the actual sound and the actual hearing ; for it is possible for one who possesses hearing not to hear, and that which has sound is not always sound­ing. But when that which has the power of hearing is exercising its power, and that which can sound is sounding, then the active hearing and the active sound occur together ; we may call them respectively audition and sonance.

If then the movement, that is, the acting and being acted upon, takes place in that which is acted upon, then the sound and the hearing in a state of activity must reside in the potential hearing ; for the activity of what is moving and active takes place in what is being acted upon. Hence that which causes motion need not be moved. The activity, then, of the object producing sound is sound, or sonance, and of that

147

r t s e o r a i a v r r j g . w a r e m T r js •n p a )T r js t o v t o

TTOi r j r e o v . e y e i ^ d i r o p i a v • e l • y a p t o r f j o if ie i

a l a d a v e a d a i e a r i v o p d v , o p d r a i S e x p ^ i 1 0 ■ V t o e x o v , e l o t f t e r a l r i s t o o p u i v , K a l x P ^ p - a e £ e i t o

20 o p c o v -rrpojT O V . c f> a v e p o v t o Iw v o n o i> x e v t o r f j

o if i e i a l o d a v e a d a r K a l y a p o r a v p ,r j 6 p a > p .e v , r f j

o tp e i Kplvop,ev K a l t o o k o t o s K a l t o <pcHs, aAA o v x o i a a v T o i s . e n S e K a l t o o p c o v e o T i v cos K e -

X p o j p d r i G T a i • t o y a p a l a d r j T r i p i o v S e K T i K o v t o v

a la d r jT G V d v e v Trjs v X r /g e /ca o T o v . S io K a l d i r -

25 e X d o v T c o v T u iv a l a d r i T u i v e v e i o i v a i a l a d - q c e i s K a l

< j > a v r a a la i e v t o l s a lo O r ^ T - q p io is .

eH Se t o v a io d r jT O V e v e p y e i a K a l T r j s a l a d r j a e a j s

r¡ a v r r ¡ p ,e v e o n K a l p , l a , t o S’ e t v a i o v r a v r o v

a v r a l s ' Ae y a i S’ o l o v ijjo(f>os 6 K a r e v e p y e i a v K a i

¿KO T] r¡ K a r ' e v e p y e l a v e a n y a p a K o r j v e y o v r a

p ,r¡ a K o v e i v , K a l t o e x o v '<ft6<f>ov o v k a e l if!o<f>ei.

so o t o i> S’ e v e p y f j t o S v v d p e v o v a K o v e i v K a l >fio<f>fj t o

S v v d p . e v o v ip o t j i e i v , Tore r¡ k o t e v e p y e i a v a K o r ¡

426 a a p , a y l v e r a i K a l o K a r e v e p y e i a v tp o < p o s , & v

e i r r e i e v a v n s t o p . e v e t v a i a K o v o i v t o Se i p o f i r j o i v .

E i S ’ e a T i v r j K i v r j a i s K a l r¡ T r o ir jc r is K a l t o • n d d o s

e v t o ) 7 r o io v p ,e v ( ¡ } , a v d y K r ¡ K a l t o v t p o f i o v K a i r q v

a K o r j v T T jv K a T e v e p y e i a v e v r f j K a r a 8 v v a p . i v

5 e t v a i • r¡ y a p t o v i r o i r ] T i K o v K a l K iv r j T iK o v e v e p y e i a

e v t & T t d u x o v r i ¿ y y l v e T a i . S io o v k a v a y K r ¡ t o K i v o v v K i v e i a O a i . r¡ f i e v o v v t o v i f t o f i r jT iK o v e v e p -

y e i d e t i T i )p6(f>os r¡ </so(prjG is> r j S e t o v ¿ .k o v g t i k o v

ARISTOTLE42$!»

a If we suppose a special sense to apprehend that we see, we must suppose another to apprehend this and so on.

6 Sc., as we discern colours. 0 Cf. ch. viii.146

ON THE SOUL, III. n.

producing hearing is hearing or audition, for hearing is used in two senses, and so is sound. The same argument applies to all other senses and sensible objects. For just as acting and being acted upon reside in that which is acted upon, and not in the agent, so also the activity of the sensible object and that of the sensitive subject lie in the latter. In some cases we have names for both, such as sonance and audition, but in others one of the terms has no name ; for the activity of vision is called seeing, but that of colour has no name ; the activity of taste is called tasting, but that of flavour has no name. But since the activity of the sensible and of the sensitive is the same, though their essence is different, it follows that hearing in the active sense must cease or con­tinue simultaneously with the sound, and so with flavour and taste and the r e s t ; but this does not ap­ply to their potentialities. The earlier natural philo­sophers were at fault in this, supposing that white and black have no existence without vision, nor flavour without taste.® In one sense they were right, but in another wrong ; for the terms sensation and sen­sible being used in two senses, that is potentially and actually, their statements apply to the latter class, but not to the former. These thinkers did not dis­tinguish the meanings of terms which have more than one meaning.

If harmony is a species of voice, and voice and Sensation hearing are in one sense one and the same, and if S^nony. harmony is a ratio, then it follows that hearing must be in some sense a ratio. That is why both high and

“ red ” has no existence except when we see it. A. argues that such an object is “ potentially ” red, because, given the right conditions, it will appear red.

149

aKor¡ rj a K o va is hl ׳ t t o v y a p r¡ aKor¡, Kal 8 l t t o v o ijj6 (f> os . o S’ a v r o s Ao yo s Kal e m t w v aAAw v aladrjcrewv K a l a l a d r j r w v. wcnrep y a p r¡ TToi'qais

10 K a l r¡ TrddrjarLS i v r e p tta o y p v n aAA’ o v k e v rip t t o l o v v t l , o v t t o K a l r¡ t o v a ladrjrov evepyeia K a l

r¡ t o v a ia d ' Q T iK o v e v t o ¡ a la r O r jr iK c p . aAA’ i n ’

evlow ¡xev ( L v o j i a O T a i , olov r j ipo<f>r]ois Kal r¡ a K o v m s , e m S’ eviw v dva iw fio v Q arepov opam s y a p AeyeraL r¡ r f js oipews evepye ia , r j he t o v

15 x p c o / ia T O S d vw vv jio s , K a l yevcris r¡ t o v yevo riK o v , r j he t o v x vp-ov dvw vvp,os. i v e l Se ¡xla p,ev e o n v

evepye ta r¡ t o v a ladrjrov K a l r¡ t o v a la d r jT L K o v ,

t o S’ e t v a i erepov, a v a y K r ¡ ap,a (¡¡OeipeaOaL K a l

m o^eadai t t jv o v t w Xeyojxevrjv ¿ k o t / v K a l ifjo</>ov, K a l v!)|UOi׳ hr) Kal yevcriv K a l r a aAA a ¿¡xoiws'

20 r a he K a r a h v v a p . i v AeySfieva o v k a v a y K r ¡ , aAA’o l TTporepov <f>vcrio\6y o i t o v t o o v k o A o j s eXeyov, ovdev olojxevoi o vre Xev k o v o vre fieXav e l v a i avev oifjews, ovhe x v f■tov avev yeverea>s. rf¡ ¡xev y a p eXeyov opdw s, t t ¡ S’ o v k o p d w s׳ St^cSs y a p Aeyo - p.ev7]s r f js alodr'joecos K a l t o v a la O r jT O V , t o j v ¡lev

25 fcara h v v a p .L V t w v he ¿car’ e v e p y e i a v , e m t o v t o j v

¡lev avfifiaiveL t o X e ^ d e v , e m §e t o j v e r e p w v ov o v p . j 3 a i v e i . aAA’ ¿KeZvoL avX w s eXeyov •nepl t w v

X e y o p - e v w v o v x arrXws.E i S’ r j o v j i< f > w v ia < bw vr¡ t l s ¿ o t l v , r¡ h e cf>wvr¡

K a l r j a K o r j e a n v w s e v ¿ a n [«:at e a r i v w s o v .x i v

t o a v T ¿ ] , 1 A o y o s S’ r j o v p .< j> w v ia , a v a y K r ¡ K a l r r j v

so a K o r jv Aoyov n v a e t v a i . K a l h i d t o v t o K a l (f>9eipei.

1 inel. Torstrik.

ARISTOTLE

“ If a red object is in the dark it does not appear red. Some philosophers maintained that it is not red, and that148

ON THE SOUL, III. n.

low pitch, if excessive, destroy hearing ; in the same way in flavours excess destroys taste, and in colours the over-brilliant or over-dark destroys vision, and in smelling the strong scent, whether sweet or bitter, destroys sm ell; which implies that sense is some kind of ratio. That is also why things are pleasant when they enter pure and unmixed into the ratio,“ e.g., acid, sweet or s a lt ; for in that case they are pleasant. But generally speaking a mixed constitu­tion produces a better harmony than the high or low pitch, and to the touch that is more pleasant which can be warmed or cooled ; the sense is the ratio, and excess hurts or destroys.

Each sense then relates to its sensible subject-How do we matter ; it resides in the sense organ as such, and thedfffer■? discerns differences in the said subject-matter ; e.g., ^ ® eenthe vision discriminates between white and black, and objects of taste between sweet and bitter ; and similarly in all senses”1 other cases. But, since we also distinguish white and sweet, and compare all objects perceived with each other, by what sense do we perceive that they differ ? I t must evidently be by some sense that we perceive the difference ; for they are objects of sense. Incidentally it becomes clear that flesh is not the ultimate sense organ ; for, if it were, judgement would depend on being in contact. Nor, again, is it possible to judge that sweet and white are different by separate senses, but both must be clearly pre­sented to a single sense. For, in the other case, if you perceived one thing and I another, it would be obvious that they differed from each other. That which asserts the difference must be one ; for sweet differs from white. I t is the same faculty, then, that asserts this ; hence as it asserts, so it thinks and

“ i.e., the ratio which constitutes the sense-organ.151

€ K aurov VTrepfidXXov, Kal to o£i> Kal to fia p v , rr/v b a Korjv• opbolcos Se Kal ev xvfj,o ls tvjv y e v o w , Kal

e v xpdjfLacri r i j v oifiLV t o o<f)68pa XapLnpov fj £,o<f>ep6v, Kal iv oocfiprjoeL r¡ lo x y p d oapir] Kal yXvKela Kal m /cp a , cos X dyov t l v o s o v t o s t rjs alaOriaecos. Sto Kal ■fjSea p-ev, o ra v elXiKpivfj Kal

5 a p a y r j a y r j r a L els t o v X oyov, oiov to o £ u r¡ yXvKv« c\ / f / \ / </\ 5 ' 'rj a A p v p o v r jo e a y a p r o r e . oAcos d e ¡jLaAAov t o

pitKTOv avfj,(f>covia r¡ t o o£v fj j3apv, a(j>f¡ Se to depp^avrov fj iJjvktov‘ fj S’ a ’ladrja is o A oyoy vnepfiaX Xovra Se Xvrret fj (f>delpeL.

'E Kaarr¡ fj,ev ovv aXoQrjais to v vvoKeipievov atcrOrjrov eorlv, xiTrdpyovaa ¿v raj aladr/TTjpicp fj

10 alodrjrrjpLov, Kal Kplvei ra s rov VTroKeifxevov a l- o8t]tov §i.a(j)opds, olov XevKov [lev Kal ¡xeXav oifiLS, yXvKv Se Kal nLKpov yevoLS■ ¿¡¿olios S’ ’¿X€i to v to Kal em tcuv aXXojv. ¿ttsI Se Kal to XevKov Kal to yXvKv Kal eKaarov row aladijrajv rrpos eKacrrov Kpivofiev, t lv l1 Kal alodavojieda o t i Stac^epet;

15 avayKTj Sr¡ alcrOrjoei• alodrjra yap e o n v . fj Kal SfjXov oni rj oap£ ovk e o n to Zaharov alodrjTTjpiov■ avayKTj yap rjv arrrdpLevov avrov Kplveiv to KpZvov. ovre St) /ce^iopi.o’/xevots׳ eVSe-yeraL Kplveiv o n erepov to yXvKv rov XevKov, aXXa Set iv i t lv l dp.<f>u> hfjXa etvai. ovrcu piev ya p Kav el ro v puev eyd> rov Se

20 <yij aiadoLO, SfjXov dv etij o t i erepa aAAijAaw. Set Se to ev Xeyeiv o n erep o v erepov yap to yXvKv rov XevKov. Aeyet dpa t o a ino , o'jare, <Ls Aeyet,

1 tl v l . . . Sta(f/epzi; T r e n d e le n b u r g : t l v l .Sia<j>epei . ״ .

150

ARISTOTLEa

ON THE SOUL, III. n.

perceives. Evidently, therefore, it is impossible tc pass judgement on separate objects by separate faculties ; and it is also obvious from the following considerations that they are not judged at separate times. For just as the same faculty declares tha! good and evil are different, so also when it declare! that one is different and the other different, th< “ time when ” is not merely incidental (as when e.g., I now say that there is a difference, but do no say that there is now a difference). The faculty say; now, and also that the difference is now ; hence botl are different at once. So the judging sense must bf undivided, and also must judge without an interval But, again, it is impossible that the same faculty should be moved at the same time with contrary movements, in so far as it is indivisible, and in in divisible time. For if the object is sweet it excite sensation or thought in one way, but if bitter, in th< contrary way, and if white, in a different way alto gether. Are we, then, to suppose that the judging faculty is numerically indivisible and inseparable, bu is divided in essence ? Then in one sense it is wha is divided that perceives divided things, but ii sense it does this qua indivisible. For it is divisibl in essence, but indivisible spatially and numericallj Or is this impossible ? For although the same in divisible thing may be both contraries potentiallj it is not so in essence, but it becomes divisible i: actualization ; the same thing cannot be at one white and black, and so the same thing cannot b acted upon by the forms of these, if this is wha happens in perception and thought. The fact is tha just as what some thinkers describe as a point is, s being both one and two, in this sense divisible, s too in so far as the judging faculty is indivisible, it i

15

426 b י a xo v rc o K a i v o e i K a i a i f f d a v e r a i . o n f i e v o v v ov%

olóv re Kex(i)p1cr¡xévo1,s Kplveiv r à Keycap tor¡¿éva, SfjXov o n S’ ovS’ kv Kexcopt,0 [j,éva) xpóvio, ¿vrevdev.

25 6jOTTep yàp to avro Áéyei o n erepov to dyadóv Kai to KaKov, 0 VT0) Kai ore Gárepov Xéyei o n erepov, Kai ddrepov 015 K a r a ovfJißeßrjKos to ore (Xéyœ S’, olov vvv Xéya> o n erepov, ov ¡1 ¿vtol o n vvv erepov). dX?’ ovrœ Xéye 1, Kai vvv, Kai o tl v v v a/za apa. aterre dxœpicrrov Kal ¿v dycoplaTip

80 xpóvip. dXXà fJL'qv dSvvarov a¡j,a ra s ivavría s KLvqaeis Kiveiadai ró avro f¡ dScalpeTOV Kai ¿v dSiaipérqj xpóvw . el yàp ro yXvKV (¿81 KiveZ tt¡v

427 s a ïa d r ja iv r¡ t t ¡ v vórjcriv , t o Sé m K p o v ¿ v a vT L W s,

Kai r o X evK o v irép eo s■ d p ’ o v v a /x a p Á v 1<al

dp18¡x(¡) a á ia íp e r o v Kai d x o jp ia r o v r o K p ív o v , t ú

e tv a i Sé Kex0}pLcrfJ1.évov; e a n Sr¡ 770)? (Ls r o Si- a t peTO v t ú ')v 81rjpr¡¡jL€va)v a ladáverai, e a n S’ (Ls fj

5 d S i a l p e r o v râ> e tv a i [xèv y à p S ia ip e T o v , to t tc o Sé Kai àptdjjLÔ) d Z ia íp e r o v . r¡ o v \ o ló v r e ; 8 vvá¡j,e1

¡u è v y à p r o a v r o Kai d S ia íp e r o v r à v a v r l a , ra> S־ e lv a i o v , aXXá r<3 ¿ v e p y e ío d a i S ia ip e r ó v , Kai 01>x

o ló v r e a ¡xa X evK o v K a i ¡jA Xav e l v a i ai or’ o ־ v à è

r à e'íhr¡ 7rd<JXe lv a -v r ío v , e l t o l o v t o v a ן7 ïaO rjcris

10 Kat r¡ vór¡cr1s, áAA’ a io n e p r¡v K a X o v a l n v e s (JT1y¡xr¡v, f¡ jLtta Kai f¡ S v o , T a v T 7j Kai S ia ip e r r ¡ . f¡ ¡1ev o v v

d S i a lp e r o v , e v r o K p Ívó v e a n Kai a / x a , f j Se

ARISTOTLE

152

ON THE SOUL, III. n .—in.

one and instantaneous in action ; but in so far as it is divisible, it uses the same symbol twice at the same time. In so far, then, as it treats the limit as two, it passes judgement on two distinct things, as being itself in a sense distinct; but in so far as it judges of it as only one, it judges by one faculty and at one time.

Concerning the principle in virtue of which we call a living creature sentient, let this account suffice.

III. Now there are two special characteristics which Relation distinguish soul, viz., (1) movement in space, and sensation (2) thinking, judging and perceiving. Thinking, both speculative and practical, is regarded as a form of perceiving ; for in both cases the soul judges and has cognizance of something which is. Indeed the older philosophers assert that thinking and perceiving are identical. For instance Empedocles has said“ Under­standing grows with a man according to what appears to him,” and in another passage “ whence it befalls them ever to think different thoughts.” Homer’s phrase, again, “ Such is the nature of man’s mind ” ° implies the same thing. For all these authors sup­pose the process of thinking to be a bodily function like perceiving, and that men both perceive and recognize like by like, as we have explained at the beginning of this treatise.6 And yet they ought to have made some mention of error at the same time ; for error seems to be more natural to living creatures, and the soul spends more time in it. From this belief it must follow either that, as some say, all appearances are true, or that error is contact with the unlike ; for this is the opposite to recognizing like by like. But it appears that in the case of contraries error, like

155

t27» , f , s ״ , ~ ,d ia ip e r o v v7 7 a p x e i> ° LS T V clvtco x P V TaLa fia . f j [ lè v o v v 8vc7l X P V ™ T V T r e p a n , S v oK p iv e i, K a l K€Xcopi<JfJ,eva io r r lv d is /ce^aipiap.eFaj1•Î■ 9 C \ \ Cf

.O €V, €VL KCLl afJLOL (ל 15Ilept ¡xèv oSv Tfjs âpXVs V fa p e v to £a>ov alodr¡-

TIKOV etvai, 8íCüpÍ09ú) TOV TpOTTOV TOVTOV.III. ’E77e1 S è Svo S 1a<f>opaZs ¿pi^ovrai ¡xdXiara

TTjv ifax-qv, Kivrjoei re r fj Kara r 0770p Kai to j voeZv Kal r<3 Kpiveiv Kal aloddveoOai, SoKeî S è /cat to

20 voelv Kal to <f>poveZv aiorrep alcr8dveo9ai t i elvai• ¿v ¿/j.<¡>orépo1s yà p T0VT0LS Kpivei. t i r¡ tpvxr¡ Kal yvw pi^ei Tojv ovrcov, Kai oi ye apxaZoi to (f>povelv Kal t o aladdveadai ra vro v elval (baatv, ojorrep Kal 'K[jL77eS0KXrjs elpr¡Ke “ 77pos 77apeov yá p [xrjris a id e ra i dv9pd17701ULV ” Kal ¿v âXXois “ 09ev <j<f>iar1v

55 alel Kal to (bpoveîv aA A ota r7a.piaT0.Ta1.” to S’ avro T0 VT0 LS ßovXerai Kal to 0 ¡J1r¡pov “ roZos yàp vóos ¿crriv.” navres ya p ovroi ro voeZv acufia- t ik o v d)077ep to alo9dveo9a1 v776Xap.ßdvovo1v, Kal alo9dveo9a.i Te Kal </>pove1v rw ôp-oiip ro op-oiov, ü>ar7ep Kal ¿v roZs Kar âpxàs Xoyoïs S1œpioap,ev.

427! b Kairoi ê S e ï â f i a K a l 77e p l t o v r¡77a r f ¡ a 9a 1 a v r o v s X é y e i v o iK e iô r e p o v y à p to Z s o i s , K a l 77Xeia> X p ô v o v è v r o v r c p S ia re X e Z r¡ ^n>XV• 810 d v d y x r j TjTOL 0)077ep ë v io i X é y o v o i , 77d v r a r à (fia iv ó f ie v a e l v a i à X r j9 fj, r¡ r r jv t o v â v o f io io v 9ii;1v à 77dr~qv

5 e lva i■ t o v t o y à p è v a v r io v r œ r ô t 6/J.oicp r o o p a ïo v y v w p i Ç e i v hoKeZ S è K a l ■ ף ¿77(1ןי־ד K a l r¡ 67710 .//ןד־ד7ן

1 Kexojpt-afzévœ ELT, Torstrik, Beiger ; K^xwpiaiiévüiv ve] Ke cüpíGj.1>r.׳a vulgo.

ARISTOTLE

6 Bk. I. ch. 2.• Od. xviii. 136.1541

ON THE SOUL, III. m.

knowledge, is one and the same. Now it is quite clear that perceiving and practical thinking are not the same ; for all living creatures have a share in the former, but only a few in the latter. Nor again is speculative thinking, which involves being right or wrong—“ being right ” corresponding to intelli­gence and knowledge and true opinion, and “ being wrong ” to their contraries—the same thing as per­ceiving ; for the perception of proper objects is always true,“ and is a characteristic of all living creatures, but it is possible to think falsely, and thought belongs to no animal which has not reasoning power ; for imagination is different from both per­ception and thought ; imagination always implies perception, and is itself implied by judgement. But clearly imagination and judgement are different modes of thought. For the former is an affection which lies in our power whenever we choose (for it is possible to call up mental pictures, as those do who employ images in arranging their ideas under a mnemonic system), but it is not in our power to form opinions as we will; for we must either hold a false opinion or a true one. Again, when we form an opinion that something is threatening or frighten­ing, we are immediately affected by it, and the same is true of our opinion of something that inspires courage ; but in imagination we are like spectators looking at something dreadful or encouraging in a picture. Judgement itself, too, has various forms— knowledge, opinion, prudence, and their opposites, but their differences must be the subject of another discussion.6

As for thought, since it is distinct from perception, imagina- and is held to comprise imagination and judgem ent,tion•

157

Tciiv ¿vavTLCüv r¡ avrr¡ e lva i. orí, ¡xev ovv ov r a v - ró v ¿cm ro a lo d á veo d a i Kal t o cfjpoveív, <f>avepov t o ó [JL6v y à p TracTL /Aerear(., r o v Se ¿Á íyois t & v

£<Úcüv. aAA־ oóSé t o voeiv , ¿v a¡ ¿ a rl t o opdw s 10 Kal t o ¡xr¡ opQœs, t o pÀv opSojç <f>p¿vr¡GLS Kal

¿mcrTr¡fj.7) Kal Soêa ¿A r]6r¡s, t o Sè p,r¡ ¿pdœ s TavavTÍa r o v t c ú v ov Sè t o v t o 1 ¿ c t t I T a v - r o r â aícrdáveaOai• r¡ ¡lev y à p a ïoQrjois t c ô v iS iœ v ael áÁ7]d7js, Kal Tracytv v n a p y e i toís L,á101s, hiavoeZadai

S י ה 5 / ' / £ ~ \ % C /€P׳oe^€Tat Kai ijsevoœsy Kai ovoevi v7rap^e1 co15 f ir ¡ K a l À o y o j• ( f i a v T a o i a y a p k r e p o v K a i a l o d i q o e œ s

K a l S ia v o ta ? • a v r r ] r e o v y [ y v e r a i â v e v a îa O r ¡ -

o e œ s , K a l â v e v T a v T r j s o v k e o T i v vttó Á r j ip i s . o t l

S’ o v k ê o T i v 7] a v T 7 ] v ó r jc r i s K a l VTT¿Ár]1f11s , ( ¡ ) a v e p ó v .

t o v t o f i è v y à p t o r r á d o s ècfS ■ q p lv è o T i v , o ra vß o v X œ [ x e d a (7 r p o o f¿ ¡l a T œ v y à p ecrri ■ n o i /q o a o d a i ,

20 u > a 7 rep 0 1 è v t o i s fJ .v r ]¡1 0 v 1 K 0 ís T L d é /x e v o ( , K a l etScoAo-T T O L O vvT es), S o Ç à Ç e w S ’ o v k e t jS r ] ] û v à v à y K T ] y à p

r j x jjevSécrétai r¡ à X r j d e v e c v . ’¿ t í Sè OTav [ ¿ è v So£à-o c o /x e v S e L v o v t i r j t f r o ß e p o v , e v d i i s o v ¡jL7r á a -)(0¡J.ev,

o f i o i œ s Sè K a v d a p p a X é o v • fca rà Sè t t j v ( b a v r a o i a v

(1)oavT C üs e ^o p -e v a io rrep a v o l d eœ fxevo i. è v ypacj>f¡ יי מ ' \ f י \ י-׳ל \ £ \ «25 7 a 0€iva r¡ VappaAea. é tat oe /cat avrr¡s r ijç

VTT0Xr¡>¡se0JS 8 1 a c ¡ > o p a í , é 7Tí0Tr¡¡j.r] K a l 8 ¿ £ a K a l

c f ) p o v r ] 0 ís K a i. T a v a v T i a t o v t ü j v , i r e p l S v T r j s S ta -< f> opâs e r e p o s ecrra» Aó y o s .

I le p l Sè T o v v o e Z v , h T e l e r e p o v t o v a l o 6 á v e o 8 a 1 ,

TOVTOV Sé t o ¡x k v < f> a v T a o la S o K e í e l v a i t o Sè

1 8’ post t o v t o in plerisque codd. repertum delendum censuit Vahlen.

° In normal cases if a man sees a red object, it is red.5 ? Etk. Nie. 1139 b 15.

ARISTOTLE

156

ON THE SOUL, III. h i .

it will be best to discuss it after having completed our analysis of imagination. If imagination is (apart from any metaphorical sense of the word) the process by which we say that an image is presented to us, it is one of those faculties or states of mind by which we judge and are either right or wrong. Such are sensation, opinion, knowledge and intelligence. It is clear from the following considerations that imagination is not sensation. Sensation is either potential or actual, e.g., either sight or seeing, but imagination occurs when neither of these is present, as when objects are seen in dreams. Secondly, sen­sation is always present but imagination is not. If sensation and imagination were identical in actuality, then imagination would be possible for all creatures ; but this appears not to be the case ; for instance it is not true of the ant, the bee, or the grub. Again, all sensations are true, but most imaginations are false. Nor do we say “ I imagine that it is a man ” when our sense is functioning accurately with regard to its object, but only when we do not perceive distinctly. And, as we have said before, visions are seen by men even with their eyes shut. Nor is imagination any one of the faculties which are always right, such as knowledge or intelligence ; for imagina­tion may be false. I t remains, then, to consider whether it is opinion ; for opinion may be either true or false. But opinion implies belief (for one cannot hold opinions in which one does not believe) ; and no animal has belief, but many have imagination. Again, every opinion is accompanied by belief, belief by conviction, and conviction by rational discourse ; but although some creatures have imagination, they

159

ARISTOTLE427 b (

VTToXrjtfjis, ir e p l <f>avTaolas S io p lc ra v T a s o v t o j rrepi428 a darepov XeKreov. el hr¡ ¿ o t l v r j (fjavraala K a O

rjv X e y o /x e v (f> dvT aafid t l r/jjuv y l y v e o B a i K a l fir¡

e i t l K a r a ¡xeTacf>opdv X e y o /x e v , ¡¿ la t l s ¿<j t l t o v ­to jv 8 vvajXLS fj e^L S , KaO ’ r/v K p lvo[xev K a l aXr¡- O evo fxev r¡ i f ie v h o f ie d a . tolo.v t o x S’ e la l v aiadrjcrLS,

5 8 o £ a , em cTTTj/xq, v o v s . o tl ¡xev o v v o v k ¿ o tlv a ’ia d r jo i s , 8 rjX ov ¿k T w v S e . a ’loOrjoLS ¡xev y a p rot[«׳ h v v a fx is r¡ e v e p y e L a , o lo v oifsis K a l o p a c n s , cftaiveraL

Se t l K a l fx r jS e re p o v v 7 T a p y o v T o s t o v t o jv , olov to. e v rot? vttvo ls . e lr a aiaOrjOLS ¡xev d e l Tra.peoTL, ( f ja v r a a la S’ o v . e l Se r f¡ e v e p y e ia t o a v r o , r rd o iv

10 a v evSexoLTO t o l s O rjp lo is <j>avTaalav x m d p x w hoKeZ S’ o v , o lo v ¡xvpfxrjKL rj ¡xeXtTTr¡ rj oK ojX rjK i. e l r a at ¡xev d X r f ie i s a l e l , a t Se ^ avraa ta t y lv o v r a L

at rrX e io v s ifievheZ s. erre iT o v Se X e y o fx e v , orav ¿ v e p y u jfx e v a:<pij3a>s -nep l t o a lu O rjT o v , o tl cf>aiveTaL

t o v t o rjfxZv dvdpcjTTOS ' aAAa ¡xdXX ov o t o v ¡xr¡ e v - 15 a p y to s a la d a v w fx e d a .1 K a l o ire p Se e X e y o /x e v rrp o -

T e p o v , ( f j a lv e T a L K a l ¡ x v o v o l v o p d jx a r a . aAAa ¡x rjv

o v Se to jv d e l aXrjdevovTU>v o v Se/xta eo ra t, o lo v

erTLdTifjixrj rj v o v s ¿’ ־ o t l y a p <f>avTa<jia K a l ipevB rjs . Aet7rerat d p a IheZv e l 8 6£a■ ytVerat y a p 8 o £ a K a l

20 a X rjd rjs K a l if!ev8rjS■ aAAa 8 o £ rj ¡ x e v ¿Verat t t I o t l s

( o v k evSe^erat y a p S o£a£ovra o l s hoK eZ ¡xr¡

T T L O T eveL v), t o j v Se O rjplojv o v 9 e v l im d p x e L t t I c t t l s ,

<f>avTaola Se ttoXXo l s . e t l n d a r ¡ ¡xev ho^r¡ a k o -

X o v d e l t t I o t l s , T r l o T e i Se t o n e T T e Z o d a L , ■¡reidoZ Se Aoyo?־ t w v Se d rjp lo jv ¿ v lo is c p a v r a a la ¡xev V Trd p xe i,

1 quae hie vulgo sequuntur rare r! aXrjB tjs rj tfrt-vS-qs une. inclusit Torstrik.

have no reasoning power. I t is clear, then, that imagination cannot be either opinion in conjunction with sensation, or opinion based on sensation, or a blend of opinion and sensation, both for the reasons given, and because the opinion relates to nothing else but the object of sensation : I mean that imagination is the blend of the perception of white with the opinion that it is white—not, surely, of the perception of white with the opinion that it is good. To imagine, then, is to form an opinion exactly corresponding to a direct perception. But things about which we have at the same time a true belief may have a false appearance ; for instance the sun appears to measure a foot across, but we are convinced that it is greater than the inhabited globe ; it follows, then, that either the percipient, without any alteration in the thing itself, and without forgetting or changing his mind, has rejected the true opinion which he had, or, if he still holds that opinion, it must be at once true and false. But a true opinion only becomes false when the fact changes unnoticed. Imagination, then, is not one of these things, nor a compound of them.

But since when a particular thing is moved another The i thing may be moved by it, and since imagination of ־rl seems to be some kind of movement, and not to occur apart from sensation, but only to men when perceiv­ing, and in connexion with what is perceptible, and since movement may be caused by actual sensation, and this movement must be similar to the sensation, this movement cannot exist without sensation, or when we are not perceiving ; in virtue of it the pos­sessor may act and be acted upon in various ways ; and the movement may be true or false. The reason

ON THE SOUL, III. m.

161

25 Ao y o s S’ o v . (fiavepov r o l w v o n o v S e So¿;a ¡ ie r *

aloO r^ oecos, o ilSe St’ a lo d iq a e io s , o v S e ovjiTrXoK-q

So^ rjs K cd a lo d f jo e c o s (fxxvracrla a v e ir ¡, S ea r e

r a v r a tea l [S-^Aov]1 o n o v k aX X ov n v o s ¿ o t i v r¡

S o £ a , dXX’ ¿ K e l v o v eo n v o v K a l a ’lo d r jo is X ׳ e y w

S , ¿ K r f j s r o v X e v K o v So tjrjs K a l a lo d rjo eu > s T]

so avjirrXoKT¡ c fia v r a o la e o r lv o v y a p Srj ¿k rf js So^rjs

428 b [xev r f j s r o v a y a d o v , a lo d iq o e io s Se r f j s rov XevKov. to o v v <f>alveo9ai i o n to S o £ a £ e iv oVep a lo d d v e r a i

¡ ir¡ K a r a a v f jL p e p r jK O S . <f>aiverai Se K a l tfievSfj,

7r e p l cSv d f i a VTroXrjtfiiv aXr]8fj e % ei, o lo v (¡>alverai

¡lev o r jX ios TroSiaios, 7 r e m o r e v r a i S’ etvai jxel^ o jv

5 rf js OLKOV[Mevr]S' o v f i j ia iv e i o v v y jr o i dTTofiefiXr¡- K e v a i rrjv e a v r o v dX t]dfj So £ a v , y v et%e, oa)£ o p iev o v

rov T T p a y fia r o s , p¿} e m X a d ip ie v o v pirjSe [lerairei-

o d i v r a , r¡ e l e n e^et, d v a y K r¡ rr jv a v r r jv aXr\dfj

e t v a i K a l xftevSfj. aX X d ifsevSfjs e y e v e r o , o r e X a d o i

f ie r a n e o o v r o T rp a y fia . o v r a p a ev n r o v r c o v

!0 e o r l v o v r ’ e/c r o v r c o v r¡ cf> a vraola .

’AAA’ ¿ n eiS r ¡ e o n K i v r j d e v r o s r o v S l K i v e i o O a i

e r e p o v vtto r o v r o v , r¡ S e < f > a v r a o la k Iv t jo Is n s

So/cei e t v a i K a l o v k a v e v a l o d f j o e c o s y l y v e o S a i aAA’ a l o d a v o p - e v o i s K a l c o v a i o d r j o i s e o r l v , e o n . S e

y l v e o d a i k Iv y j g iv vtto r f j s e v e p y e l a s r f j s a l o d r ¡ -

o e a > s , K a l r a v r r j v o / x o l a v a v d y K r¡ e t v a i r f j a l o O f j o e i ,

15 slt] a v a v r r ¡ r¡ k Iv t j o is o v r e a v e v a l o O r j o e c o s e v S e -

X o p - iv r ¡ o v r e p ,r¡ a l o d a v o p - e v o i s v r r d p ^ i v , K a l rroXXd

K a r a v r r j v K a l r r o i e i v K a l T r a o ^ e iv r o e% ov , K a l

e t v a i K a l aX rjdfj K a l tp ev S fj. r o v r o S e crvfj,j3alvei

1 Shorey.

ARISTOTLE428 E

160

ON THE SOUL, III. in .—iv.

for this last fact is as follows. The perception of proper objects is true, or is only capable of error to the least possible degree. Next comes perception that they are attributes, and here a possibility of error at once arises ; for perception does not err in perceiving that an object is white, but only as to whether the white object is one thing or another.Thirdly comes perception of the common attributes which accompany the concomitants to which the proper sensibles belong (I mean, e.g., motion and magnitude) ; it is about these that error is most likely to occur. But the movement produced by the sense- activity will differ from the actual sensation in each of these three modes of perception. The first is true whenever the sensation is present, but the others may be false both when it is present and when it is absent, and especially when the sensible object is at a distance. If, then, imagination involves nothing else than we have stated, and is as we have described it, then imagination must be a movement produced by sensation actively operating. Since sight is the chief sense, the name <jxivro.cria (imagination) is de­rived from <£<xos (light), because without light it is impossible to see. Again, because imaginations per­sist in us and resemble sensations, living creatures frequently act in accordance with them, some, viz., the brutes, because they have no mind, and some, viz., men, because the mind is temporarily clouded over by emotion, or disease, or sleep. Let this suffice about the nature and cause of imagination.

IV. Concerning that part of the soul (whether it Feeims and is separable in extended space, or only in thought) ar^not8

Ig g analogous.

428 b ^S ià ráS e. f j a l o d r j o í s r œ v ¡ x e v Iö io j v à X r ¡ 6 r ¡ s ¿ g t l v

r¡ o t i- ô X iy u G T O v e ^ o v a a t o i f je v S o s ■ S e v T e p o v Sè 20 t o v G V f x ß e ß r jK e v a i raû ra• K a l i v T a v O a r¡hr¡ ¿ v 8 é -

% €T aL B ia iJ je v S e o O a i.■ o t i ¡ x è v y à p X s v k o v , o v i f i e v -

S era i, eî Sè t o v t o t o X s v k o v f j aÀAo r i , i f i e v S e T a i .

TpLTO V Sè TÜJV KOIVÔIV K a l ¿TTOlxévCOV T0Zç G VfX-

ßeßrjKocnv, ots vrrâpxei Ta iS ta • Xéyœ S ’ olov KLvrjcns Kal fiéyedos, à ovfxßeßrjKe toZs ala97]T0îs,

25 7T€pl à ¡xáXiGra f¡87) ’¿ g t l v ¿.irarr¡dfjvai Karà t t¡ v

aïadrjGiv. r¡ S è k l v t jg l ç r¡ v tto t t j s ¿vepyelas yivo- ¡jl¿ v 7¡ S l o l g sl T f j s aiod'r/Geojç rrjs â-rro t o v t c o v t c ü v

rpicüv aladr¡creü)v. Kal r¡ fièv ■npcoTr¡ ttapovorjs rrjs alodijaecos àXrjdrjs, a i S ’ I r e p a t K a l •7rapovcrr¡s Kal onrovcrrjs ¿lev àv tpev8eZç, Kal ¡láXiOTa OTav

30 TToppca t o aïcrdrjTov fj. e i ovv fxrjdèv fJ.£V aXXo429 a e^oi f¡ T a e i p r j f x é v a f¡ c f i a v T a o i a ,1 t o v t o S5 ¿orí

t 6 A e x O é v , f j < f> a v ra o L a à v e ïr ¡ k l v t j g l ç v t t o r r j s

a l o 6 r ¡ o e c o s T r j s K a T è v é p y e i a v y i y v o f x é v r j s . € 17i l

י8 e v / / \ tr / ) r י \ \ >/7] OlfJCÇ f l d A i G T a CLLGUrjGlS € G T l , KCLI TO OVO fJLCL

¿770 to v ( f> á o v s eíX r¡<f)€v , o ti â v e v <f>a>T0s ovk ¿g tlv 6 I S e Z v . K a l Sià t o ¿1x¡jL¿ve1v Kal ¿ [ x o ic o s etvai rat?

a l o d r j G e a i . , 7 ro X X à /car’ a v r à s v p a T T e i r à Ç c ô a , r à

f i è v Stà r¿ fif¡ e^eti׳ v o v v , o ï o v T a Or¡p í a , r à Sè Stà to ¿TTLKaXvTTTZodai to v v o v v è v i ot€ r r à û e i f! v Ó a O lS fj VTTVCp, o l o v 01 avOpCÜTTOl. Trepl f i è v o v v

(ftavTaalas, t I ¿ o ti Kal Sià t i ¿ g tlv , e l p r j o d œ ¿■ni

T OGOVTOV.

1a IV . H e p l Sè t o v ¡x o p ío v t o v t t ¡s if iv x fjs <3 y iv œ -

G K e i T e f¡ 1/rvxfj K a l <f>poveZ, eîre ) p io r o v o v t o s

1 * Xo1 V • • • V <j>avraaia E s f^es ־ , . f ¡à¡ 0a.:"aaic# Bekker : alii aliter.162

ARISTOTLE

with which the soul knows and thinks, we have to consider what is its distinguishing characteristic, and how thinking comes about. If it is analogous to per­ceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is thinkable, or something else of a similar kind. This part, then, must (although impassive) be receptive of the form of an object, i.e., must be potentially the same as its object, although not identical with i t : as the sensitive is to the sen­sible, so must mind be to the thinkable. I t is necessary then that mind, since it thinks all things, should be uncontaminated, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may be in control, that is, that it may know ; for the intrusion of anything foreign hinders and obstructs it. Hence the mind, too, can have no characteristic except its capacity to receive. That part of the soul, then, which we call mind (by mind I mean that part by which the soul thinks and forms judgements) has no actual existence until it thinks. So it is unreason­able to suppose that it is mixed with the body ; for in that case it would become somehow qualitative, e.g., hot or cold, or would even have some organ, as the sensitive faculty has ; but in fact it has none. I t has been well said that the soul is the place of forms, except that this does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only in its thinking capcity, and the forms occupy it not actually but only potentially. But that the perceptive and thinking faculties are not alike in their impassivity is obvious if we consider the sense organs and sensation. For the sense loses sensation under the stimulus of a too violent sensible object; e.g., of sound immediately after loud sounds, and

ON THE SOUL, III. iv.

165

e tre Kal fir¡ xojpio-rov K a r a fieyedos aAAa KaraAo y o v , G K €7TT€OV TL v‘ 6 ^ 6 1 8ia<f>Opdv, K a l 77(2)? 770T6

y l v e r a t t o voeZv. e l hr¡ ecrrt t o v o e « a ׳ jc n r e p to a i a d d v e a d a i , f j ■ n d o x e i v t l a v e ’lr¡ vtto to v vorjTov

!5 f j t l to io v to v e r e p o v . ¿ T r a d e s apa Set e t v a i , Se/CTt- kov Se to v eiSovs Kal Svvdjiei to io v to v aAAa f ir ¡

to v to , K a l o f i o u u s ^ X e i v > to o T r e p to a la d r jT L K o v

•n p o g ra a l a d r j r a , ovtu) to v vovv • n p o s ra vorjrd. a v a y K r ¡ a p a , e״־et v a v r a v o e l , d f i i y r j e t v a i , w a n e p

<f>r]arlv , A v a ^ a y S p a s , I v a Kparfj, to v to S’ ¿gtIv I v a

20 yvaipiQr¡• r r a p e f i< f > a iv o f i e v o v y a p KCoXvei to aAAo- Tpiov K a l a v T K f jp a T T e i , ¿ ¡ a r e f i y ] $ ’ a v r o v e t v a i

< j> vo iv f i r j S e f i l a v aAA’ 77 ravrrjv , o n S v v a to v . o

apa K a X o v f i e v o s rrjs *ll v X ’}S v o v s (Aeya> Se vovv &>

SiavoeZrac K a l vvoXafifidvei f¡ * f r v x v ) ° v 8 e v e a n v e v e p y e i q tu>v ovtojv n p l v voeZv. Sto ouSe fiefiZxQai

25 e v X o y o v a v r o v t o ) a c o f i a n • ttoios n s yap av y l y v o n o , i f i v x p o s f¡ O e p f i o s , f¡ K a v o p y a v o v t l e l r ¡ ,

i o a i r e p r e p a l d d r j n K C p • v v v S’ o v d e v e a r tv . /cat ey Si] o t X e y o v r e s t t ) v i p v x j j v e t v a i . to tto v e l S c o v , t t X t j vCf 3f a\ C / */ 5 \ / S\\ \or¿ oure 0A77 aAA ?) votjtlk tj , ovre evTeAe^et^ aAAa

80 S w a p te t t ¿ e tS ij . o t i S ’ o i> x o f i o i a f¡ d i r d d e i a t o v

a i a d r j T t K o v K a l t o v v o t j t l k o v , < j> a ve p o v e n l t c o v

a i o d r j r r j p i c o v K a l ■rrjs a l o O r j o e c o s . r¡ ¡ l e v y a p

429 b a ’i o d r j e n s o v S v v a r a i a io O d v e o Q a t . ¿ k t o v a < j> oh pa

a l a d r j r o v , o l o v <p6(j>ov ¿ k t c o v ¡ i e y a X a > v ¡¡¡¿cfxov , o v S ’

ARISTOTLE429a

164

ON THE SOUL, III. iv.

neither seeing nor smelling is possible just after strong colours and scents ; but when mind thinks the highly intelligible, it is not less able to think of slighter things, but even more able ; for the faculty of sense is not apart from the body, whereas the mind is separable. But when the mind has become the several groups of its objects, as the learned man when active is said to do (and this happens, when he can exercise his function by himself), even then the mind is in a sense potential, though not quite in the same way as before it learned and discovered ; moreover the mind is then capable of thinking itself.

Since magnitude is not the same as the essence of magnitude, nor water the same as the essence of water (and so too in many other cases, but not in all, because in some cases there is no difference), we judge flesh and the essence of flesh either by different faculties, or by the same faculty in different relations ; for flesh cannot exist without its matter, but like “ snub-nosed ” implies a definite form in a definite matter. Now it is by the sensitive faculty that we judge hot and cold, and all qualities whose due pro­portion constitutes flesh ; but it is by a different sense, either quite distinct, or related to it in the same way as a bent line to itself when pulled out straight, that we judge the essence of flesh. Again, among abstract objects “ straight ” is like “ snub-nosed,” for it is always combined with extension ; but its essence, if “ straight ” and “ straightness ” are not the same, is something different; let us call it duality. There­fore we judge it by another faculty, or by the same faculty in a different relation. And speaking gener-

167

efe t c ú v 1a)(ypâ>v ypojjj rœ v 1<al oop.œv ovre opâv

ovre ¿0fj.â06a 1■ aAA’ ó vovs o t o v t l vo’qorj acbôbpa

vorjTov, oi>x fjTTOv voeZ r à viroheéarepa , aAAà Kalן 5 lâÀÀov • t o p,èv y à p a lo O -q r iK o v o v k àvev aoj¡xaros,

¿ Sè x a i p i o r ó s . o ra v § ’ o v t c o s ê/cacrra yévqT a i (I)S im o r q p iC D V A eyera t ó K ar’ èvépyeiav ( t o v t o Sè

orvfj.ßaiv€1, o ra v Svvrjra i ivepyeZv 8 t’ a v r o û ) , e a r t

/xèv1 Kal r a r e 8vváfxei ttcüç, o v ¡1 r¡v ¿¡m olo jç 1<al

v p lv fiaOeZv r¡ evpeZv Kal avT 0s Sè a v ro v ro re

10 S v v a ra i voeZv.’E tte t 8’ aAAo €<7Tt r o ¡J,éye90ç K a l t o p,ey¿9e1

eîvai. K a l xlScop K a l v S a n eîva i (ovtcü Sè K a l ¿(¡S

érépœ v ttoXXow, ¿AA’ o v k è m T ràvrœ v €7r־ ¿vícov

y à p r a v T O V ecm ) t o oapKi eîva i K a l oàpK a r¡ aAAa>

f¡ aXXcos ’¿ x o v T L K p i v e i • r¡ y à p oà p £ o v k àvev rrjs vXrjs, aAA’ worrep t o ot.fj.ov ToSe ¿v rw S e . tco

15 1lèv o v v aloÔrjTLKœ t o 6íp¡x6v K a l t o i f s v x p o v Kpivei,

K a l w v Aoyo s t i ç r¡ oàpt;• àXXcp Sè t¡ to i x œ P1aTV w ף■ s 1J K€KÁa0fj.évr¡ e^et 77־pos avTr¡v o to v ¿KTadfj, t o oapKL eîva i K p t v e t . irdXiv S ’ è m tGsv ¿v à<f>-

a ipéoei 0VTC0V t o ev9v ojs t o o i f io v ¡jæto. o vvexo vs

so yàp■ t o 8è Tt rjv e îva i, e l eoTiv êrepov r ¿ evdeZ

eîva i K a l t o ev9v , aAA o 2• eo rw y à p S v á s . ¿Tepco

à p a ף• ¿Tepcos ’¿x o v t i K p í v e i . K a l oXcos a p a w s1 een [tèv ¿!xoiœs Bc.kkcr״

2 cEAAo TVX, Bonitz : a\\u>.

ARISTOTLE429 b

1 6 6

ON THE SOUL, III. iv.

ally, as objects are separable from their matter so also are the corresponding faculties of the mind.

One might raise the question : if the mind is a Two simple thing, and not liable to be acted upon, and lias prob! nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras says, how will it think, if thinking is a form of being (i) b acted upon ? For it is when two things have some- ^0¿“d thing in common that we regard one as acting and the other as acted upon. And our second problem is (2) I whether the mind itself can be an object of thought.° For either mind will be present in all other objects (if, that is, mind is an object of thought in itself and not in virtue of something else, and what is thought is always identical in form), or else it will contain some common element, which makes it an object of thought like other things. Or there is the explana­tion which we have given before of the phrase “ being acted upon in virtue of some common element,” that mind is potentially identical with the objects of thought but is actually nothing, until it thinks. What the mind thinks must be in it in the same sense as letters are on a tablet which bears no actual writing; this is just what happens in the case of the mind. It is also itself thinkable, just like other objects of thought.6 For in the case of things without matter that which thinks and that which is thought are the same ; for speculative knowledge is the same as its object. (We must consider why mind does not always think.) In things which have matter, each of the objects of thought is only potentially present. Hence while material objects will not have mind in them (for it is apart from their m atter that mind is potentially identical with them) mind will still have the capacity of being thought.

169

429 bX w p u j T a t o . v p d y f i a T a r f js v X rjs , o v t c j K a l r a ir e p l

r o v v o v v .

,ATropfjaeie S’ av n s , el o vovs ¿ttXovv earl Kal ¿.Trades Kal fxrjdevl fj,r]9ev e%ei kolvSv , coottep (f>r]olv

25 ,A va ^a yo p a s , ttcos voijcret, el to voeZv ■naa-^eiv r I ea rlp. f¡ yap n kouvov dfj.(f>olv VTrdpxei, to ¡lev TTOieiv So/cet to Se ■naa^eiv. e n S’ el vorjros Kal a vros. r¡ ya p rots' aXXocs o vovs viraptjeL (el ¡jlt¡ fcar’ aAAo avros vorjros, ev Se n to vorjrov etSet), f¡ ¡xep.iy/xevov t i e£ei, o TroieZ votjtov avrov tZarrep

so raXXa. •ij ro ¡xev Trdaxeiv Kara kolv6v t i Strjp-qrai ■nporepov, o n Svvdfiei ttd)s ¿ a n r a vorjrd o vovs,

5 \ \ J » \ / 9 0 * / \ ^ a 0 5 aAA evreAe^eLa ovoev, 7Tptv av vorj. dec 0״ ovrcos430 a d ja n e p ev y p a f i f ia r e i ip (S f ir jd ev v n a p x e i e v r e X e ^ e ia

y e y p a f J .p , e v o v . o r r e p a v f j - f i a i v e i e m r o v v o v . K a l

a v r o s Se v o r j r o s e a n v Sia-nep r a v o r j r a . e m p .e v

y a p r c b v a v e v v X r j s t o a v r o ¿ a n t o v o o v v K a l t o

5 v o o v f i e v o v r j y a p ¿TTi.aTrjfj.rf r j d e w p r jr iK T ] K a l t o

o v t i o s ¿ m a r r j r o v t o a i r ¿ ¿ a n v r o v Se fir ¡ d e l

v o e T v t o a t n o v ¿ m a K e i r r e o v . e v Se r o c s e ^ o v a u v

v X r jv h v v d j i e t , e K a a r o v e o n . t c o v v o r j r a > v l o o t ’

¿ K t l v o i s f j .e v o i> x v i r d p t j e i v o v s ( a v e v y a p v X r js

S v v a f j . i s o v o v s r a > v r o i o v r c j v ) , ¿ K e i v a ) Se t o v o t jt o v

v - n d p ^ e : . .

“ This and the succeeding sentence are not very satis­factory ; but A. is apparently arguing that if mind is sui generis it cannot be an object of thought, for this would put it in the same class as other objects of thought.

6 Cf. Met. xi. 7 and 9.168

ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL, III. v.—vi.

Mind and p

Indivi(andcombirconcep

V. Since in every class of objects, just as in the whole of nature, there is something which is their matter, i.e., which is potentially all the individuals, and something else which is their cause or agent in that it makes them all—the two being related as an art to its material—these distinct elements must be present in the soul also. Mind in the passive sense is such because it becomes all things, but mind has another aspect in that it makes all things ; this is a kind of positive state like lig h t; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colours. Mind in this sense is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is essentially an activity ; for the agent is always superior to the patient, and the originating cause to the matter. Actual knowledge is identical with its object. Potential is prior in time to actual knowledge in the individual, but in general it is not prior in time. Mind does not think intermittently. When isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting (we do not remember ° because, while mind in this sense cannot be acted upon, mind in the passive sense is perishable), and without this nothing thinks.

VI. The thinking of indivisible objects of thought occurs among things concerning which there can be no falsehood ; where truth and falsehood are possible there is implied a compounding of thoughts into a fresh unity, as Empedocles said,6 “ where without necks the heads of many grew,” and then were joined together by Love—, so also these separate entities are combined, as for instance “ incommensurable ” and “ diagonal.” But if the thinking is concerned with things past or future, then we take into account

4 F r. 57.171

10 V. , E ttsI S־ (¿)OTrep e v a T r d a r ¡ r f j <f>vaei e a r l t l

t o [ l e v vX r¡ eK a c jT O i y e v e i (t o v t o S e o r r d v T a

S v v a fx e L e t c e Z v a ) , '¿ T e p o v S e t o oXt l o v K a l ttoit]t l k o v ,

t w TTOueiv n d v r a , o l o v r¡ Tey^v'q i r p o s t t jv v X r jv

■neTTO vdev, a v a y K r ] K a l e v r f j t f j v x f j v n a p x e i v T a v r a s

T a s S i a c b o p a s . K a l e o T iV o ¡ x e v t o l o v t o s v o v s t w

15 i r a v T a y i v e o O a i , o Se ra> r r d v T a T r o ie lv , c o s e £ i s

t l s , o l o v t o ( j)c o s ׳ T p o n o v y a p T i v a K a l t o (¡)Co s

rroLeZ t o . S v v d / x e i o v r a x p a > f j .a T a e v e p y e i a x p c o f x a r a .

K a l o S r o s o v o v s x ° Jp l< Jr° S K a 'L a r r a d r ^ s K a l d f n y r j s

T j j o v o i a w v e v e p y e i a . d e l y a p T i f u a i T e p o v t o

t to lo v v t o v T r d a x o v r o s K a l r¡ d p -v r ] t f j s v X r j s . t o S’ 20 a v r ¿ e o T i v r¡ K a T ’ e v e p y e L a v ¿TTLOTraxr¡ r a j v p a y -

fiaT L ■ r¡ Se K a r a S w a [X L V x p o v c p ■ n p o r e p a e v t w e v i ,

o X w s S e o v x p d v c p • aAA’ o v v ¿ r e ¡ x e v v o e l ¿ T e S’ o v

v o e Z . ^copto^ets■ S’ e a r l ¡ x o v o v t o v 6 ’ o v e p e a t I , K a l

t o v t o ¡ x o v o v a d d v a r o v K a l a t S i o v ( o v ¡ L v i jf x o v e v o [x e v

S e , o t l t o v t o ¡ x e v a T r a d e s , o Se v a d r jT L K O S v o v s

25 ( ¡ d a p T O s ) , K a l a v e v t o v t o v o v d e v v o e Z .

VI. 'H ¡xev ovv t w v aStatperaiv vorjois ev t o v t o l s ,

TrepL a o v k eoTi t o tftevSos׳ ev o ls Se K a l t o ipevSos K a l t o dXrjOes, avvdeo is t l s rjSr] vor)fxaTWv wo-irep ev o v tc o v , KaOdnep ,^¡nreSoKXrjs e(/>r¡ “ f / woXXwv

so ¡xev KopcraL a va vxeves ej3X aorqaav,” eVetra o vv - T id e o 'd a L t rj (¡>iXia— , o v t w K a l r a v r a KexwpLO[xeva a v v r i d e r a L , olov t o dovfxfxeTpov K a l r¡ SLa[xeTpos,

430 b av s¿ yevofxevw v1 r¡ ¿crojxevcov, t o v xP °vov T tp o o -

1 yivojj.di’ojv VWX, Bekker, Trendelenburg.

ARISTOTLE430 a

a Sc., its previous activity.170

and include the notion of time. For falsehood always lies in the process of combination, for if a man calls white not-white, he has combined the notion not- white. I t is equally possible to say that all these cases involve division. At any rate it is not merely true or false to say that Cleon is white, but also that he was or will be. The principle which unifies is in every case the mind.

Since the term indivisible has two senses—potential indi or actual—there is nothing to prevent the mind from ^ a■ thinking of the indivisible when it thinks of length (which is in actuality undivided), and that in indivi­sible time. Time is also both divisible and indivisible in the same sense as length. So it is impossible to say what it was thinking in each half of the time ; for the half has no existence, except potentially, unless the whole is divided. But by thinking each half separately, mind divides the time as w ell; in which case the halves are treated as separate units of length.But if the line is thought of as the sum of two halves, it is also thought of in a time which covers both half periods.

But when the object of thought is not quanti­tatively but qualitatively indivisible, the mind thinks of it in indivisible time, and by an indivisible activity of the soul; but incidentally this whole is divisible, not in the sense in which the activity and the time are divisible, but in the sense in which they are in­divisible ; for there is an indivisible element even in these, though perhaps incapable of separate existence, which makes the time and the length one. And this is equally true of every continuous thing whether time or length. Points and all divisions and everything indivisible in this sense are apprehended in the same

ON THE SOUL, III. vi.

173

4S0 bevvow v Kai avvrid e iç . ro y à p ifievSos ev cmv-

déoei ¿et־ Kal y à p àv ro XevKov p,r¡ XevKov, to [irj XevKov crvvédrjKev. e v S e ^ e r a t S è Kal S ia lpsa iv

cf>âvat, ■navra. ¿ A A ’ ovv e a n y e ov ¡lôvov ro ifjevSos6 r¡ àXrjôés, otl XevKog K A e a iv è a r iv , dXXà Kal o t î

■r\v r/ c o r a t . t o S è êv ttolovv, t o v t o o vovs '¿Kacrrov.r־p ' 0 5 3 0 / 5 ' O ־׳* •rt O ' "l o 0 aOL(XLp€TOV €77€i Ot^COS“, ?) OVVajJL€l Tj

è v e p y e i a , o v d è v K to X v e t v o e l v t o a S l a i p e r o v , o r a v

v o f j r o f i f j K o ç ( â 8 i a i p e r o v y à p è v e p y e i a ) , K a l ¿ v

X p ô v c p ¿ S ia tp é r a r ¿¡jlolojs y à p ô \ p é v o s S ta i p e r o s

10 K a l a è i a i p e r o s r w ¡j,rjKei. o v k o v v e o n v e h r e l v è i

t ô > r / f iL o e i r l è v o e i 1 ¿ K a r é p a ) ■ o v y à p è a r i v , â v\ o n j .־׳ % n j ■rt o / ' 0 9 e /firj ocaipeorj, aAA rj oura/xet. XœPLS ° ^Karepoi

v o ô w t o j v r j[x i( je a > v S i a i p e l K a l t o v v p o v o v a/xa־/ 0 > * ' / > O ? t 9 / « \ »to t6 o oiovei fjbrjKrj. €i à eus €ç ajjLfpoiv, Kai ev

TÜJ X pO V O ) TCO €7r’ ¿ p ,(f> o lv .

15 T o Sè [Lr¡ K a r à rro o o v â S ia ip e r o v aAAà r<3 etSet

v o e l èv aStatpéra; x p o v c p K a l aStatpera) r f j s i f iv x f j s ׳

K a r à 0Vfj./3eprjK0s 8 4 , K a l oi>x f j ¿ K e lv a Sta i p e r â ,

S v o e l K a l èv th x p o v c p , aAA’ f j aStaipera• e v e a rn

y à p K a v t o v t o l s n aSta ip e r o v , ¿AA’ ïcrœ s o v

ya>pi(STOv, ô Trot e t ë v a t o v x p ô v o v K a l t o [x fjK o s.

20 K a l r o v d ’ ¿¡zolcos èv a T r a v r l è a n tco a v v e x ^ l K a l

X p o v to K a l fir jK e t. r¡ Sè a riy p -r¡ K a l ,?âcra Statpeat־״׳ K a l t o ovtcoç aStatp e r o v , B rjX o v ra i o jo n e p r¡

1 ¿voei L , Torstrik : èwoeî.

ARISTOTLE

172

ON THE SOUL, III. vi.—vn.

The ;cal ii in op tion.

way as privations. And the same explanation applies in all other cases ; e.g., how the mind cognizes evil or black ; for it recognizes them, in a sense, by their contraries. The cognizing agent must be potentially one contrary, and contain the other. But if there is anything which has no contrary, it is self-cognizant, actual and separately existent. Assertion, like affirmation, states an attribute of a subject, and is always either true or false ; but this is not always so with the mind : the thinking of the definition in the sense of the essence is always true and is not an instance of predication ; but just as while the seeing of a proper object is always true, the judgement whether the white object is a man or not is not always true, so it is with every object abstracted from its matter.

VII. Knowledge when actively operative is identi­cal with its object. In the individual potential know­ledge has priority in time, but generally it is not prior even in time ; for everything comes out of that which actually is. And clearly the sensible object makes the sense-faculty actually operative from being only potential; it is not acted upon, nor does it undergo change of state ; and so, if it is motion, it is motion of a distinct kind ; for motion, as we saw,® is an activity of the imperfect, but activity in the absolute sense, that is activity of the perfected, is different. Sensation, then, is like mere assertion and thinking ; when an object is pleasant or unpleasant, the soul pursues or avoids it, thereby making a sort of assertion or negation. To feel pleasure or pain is to adopt an attitude with the sensitive mean towards good or bad as such. This is what avoidance or appetite, when actual, really means, and the faculties

175

O T e p r jc n s . /cat o / x o t o s o Aoyo? ¿ tt'l t Gj v a X X o jv ,

o l o v tto js t o k u l k o v y v o jp l ' Q e i f j t o ¡ x e X a v • r a j e v a v T L tp y a p tto js y v o j p i t , e i . Set Se Sw a/xet e l v a i

t o y v c o p i ^ o v /cat i v e Z v a i e v a v T t o . e l Se t i v l ¡xfj

25 effTtv ¿ v a v r l o v , 1 a v r o e a v T ¿ ytvc6cr/cet /cat e v e p y e l a

e(7Tt /cat ^ajptCTTOv. eoTt S’ f¡ ¡ x e v tfx x c n s Tt K ara T ivost t o o n e p f j Kard<f>aais, ׳cat a X r jd f j s f j i f i e v S f j s

T r d a a ׳ o Se v o v s o v v a s , aAA’ o to u Tt e o r t /c a ra t 1 / ( / \ < ? i ׳ * / 5 \ \ 5

t o T t e tv a t a A r j v r j s , /ca t o u Tt /caT a t i v o s ' a A A

so o jO T ie p t o o p a v t o v 18¿ ou a X r j d e s , e l S ’ a v d p o j i r o s

t o X e v K O V r¡ [j.r¡ , o v k a X r j d e s d e l , o v t o j s e^et ocra

a v e v v X r / s .

43la V II . T o S’ a v r o ecTtv f j /car’ e v e p y e L a v eTTLcrrfjfjLr]

r e p 7 - p d y jx a T L . f¡ Se K a r a S v v a p . i v x p d v c p tt p o r e p a? ~ c t tt\ <>\ > o \ / yf ^

e v r c o e v i , o A o j s o e o v o e x p o v c o ’ e o n y a p e£ e v -

TeAeveta o v t o s r r d v r a Ta y i y v o f i e v a . ( ¡ ¡a lv e T a L Se 5 t o p ,e v a i a O ' q r o v e/c Sw a/xet oVtos■ t o v a lo d r jT L K o v

e v e p y e l a t t o l o v v o v y a p ■ n a a ^ e 0 .S’ aAAotourat'¿׳■ Sto aAAo etSos t o v t o K L v f j o e t o s f ׳ j y a p K i v r j o i s t o v

a r e X o v s e v e p y e ta ׳>] S’ ¿.ttX o j s e v e p y e L a e r e p a

f j t o v T e T e X e v f x e v o v . t o ¡ x e v o v v a l a d d v e o d a L

o jx o i o v Tip <f>avat ¡ x 6 v o v /cat v o e Z v o r a v Se f j S v

10 f j X v T T ijp o v , o l o v K a r a t f t d a a f j a T r o i d a a , Stoj/cet f j <f>evyei■ K a l eort t o f j h e o B a i /cat X w r r e Z o d a i t o e v -

e p y e l v t t¡ a l o d r jT iK r ¡ f x e a d r T ]Tt r r p o s t o a y a O o v

f j K a K o v , f j t o u x v t o . . K a l f j c j iv y f ] Se /cat f¡

o p e ^ L S t o v t o f j /car’ e v e p y e tav, /cat o v x e T e p o v t o

1 ¿vavTcov t c o v alruov Bekker.

ARISTOTLE430 b

« 4X7 b 2 sqq.

of appetite or avoidance are not really different from each other, or from the sensitive faculty, though their actual essence is different. Now for the thinking soul images take the place of direct perceptions ; and when it asserts or denies that they are good or bad, it avoids or pursues them. Hence the soul never thinks without a mental image. The process is just like that in which air affects the eye in a particular way, and the eye again affects something else ; and similarly with hearing. The last thing to be affected is a single entity and a single mean, although it has more than one aspect.

We have explained before ® what part of the soul distinguishes between sweet and hot, but some far­ther details must now be added. I t is a unity, but in the sense just described, i.e., as a point of connexion. The faculties which it connects, being analogically and numerically one, are related to one another just as their sensible objects are. I t makes no differ­ence whether we ask how the soul distinguishes things which are not of the same class, or contraries lik.e white and black. Suppose that as A (white) is to B (black), so is C to D. Then alternando C is to A as D is to B. If then C and D belong to one subject, they will stand in the same relation as A and B ; A and B are one and the same, though their being has different aspects, and so it is with C and D. The same also holds good if we take A as sweet and B as white.

So the thinking faculty thinks the forms in mental images, and just as in the sphere of sense what is to be pursued and avoided is defined for it, so also out­side sensation, when it is occupied with mental ima­ges, is moved.6 For instance in perceiving a beacon

ON THE SOUL, III. vii.

177

opeKTiKov K a l < f> evK Tt,K ov, ovr aXXyXcov ovre rod alaOrjrtKov״ aXka ro etvai aAAo. rfj Se Siavor/TiKrj

15 >pvxfi 4>avraafiara olov alodrjfiara inrapxei. or av Se ayadov rj K a K o v (f>rjorj r¡ avocfrrior], <f>evyei 7) SicuKei. Sio ovSe r r o r e voeZ avev (¡}avrdajxaros rj i/jvxr¡, coarrep Se o ar/p r r j v Koprjv roiavSl erroirjaev, avrr¡ S’ erepov, K a l r¡ ¿ K o r ] cbaavrcos״ ro Se OTvaTOi׳ ev, K a l ¡lia ¡leaorrjs׳ ro 8’ etvai avrr¡

20 TrXeico.Tt'vt S’ ¿TTLKpiveL tL Sia<f>epei yXvKii Kal 9epfiov,

eXpr¡ra t ¡xev Kal •nporepov, AeKreov Se ׳cat cSSe. eon yap ev Tt, ovrco Se Kal cos opog. Kal ravra ev rep avaXoyov Kal rep api9[icp ov1 e^et rrpos ¿Karepov cos ¿KeZva rrpos aXXrjXa■ Tt yap Sia<f>epei

25 t o arropeZv ttcos ra f i r ¡2 ¿¡loyevfj K p L v e i r¡ ravavria, olov XevKov K a l [leXav ; eorco Sr¡ cos ro A t o

XevKov 7rpos ro B t o fieXav, ro F rrpos t o A [a>?

¿KeZva rrpos aAAijAa]5• ware K a l evaXXa¿;. e l Sr¡ ra T A evl e’ir¡ inrdpxovra, ovrcos e^et coarrep Kal

' A T ) ' ’ \ , ■־5 < Jira AJd t o avro [juev /cat ev t o o etvai ov t o

43! b avro, KaKeZva* ¿¡loicos. o S’ avros Xoyos K a l el to /¿ev A to yXvKi) e’ir], ro Se B to XevKov.

T a ¡ l e v odv e tS r ¡ ro v o t j t i k o v e v roZs <j>avrdofiaai voeZ, K a l c o s ev ¿ K e i v o i s c b p i o r a i a v r c p r o S l c o k t o v

/cat ( f > e v K r o v , K a l ¿ k t o s rrjs a l o O r j o e c o s , o r a v ¿ •n l

5 rcov (f>avrao[idTCOv fj, KiveZrai, olov aladavo/ievos1 oi׳ Freudenthal: ov. 2 !j,t¡ om. TVW, Bekker.

3 seel. Biehl. 1 K',iKciv!i Pacius : KaKeZvo.

ARISTOTLE

“ 426 b 12 sqq. 4 Sc., to pursuit or avoidance.176

ON THE SOUL, III. vn.—vm.

a man recognizes that it is fire ; then seeing it moving he knows that it signifies an enemy. But sometimes by means of the images or thoughts in the soul, just as if it were seeing, it calculates and plans for the future in view of the presen t; and when it makes a statement, as in sensation it asserts that an object is pleasant or unpleasant, in this case it avoids or pursues ; and so generally in action. What does not involve action, i.e., the true or false, belongs to the same sphere as what is good or evil; but they differ in having respectively a universal and a particular reference. Abstract objects, as they are called, the mind thinks as if it were thinking the snub-nosed ; qua snub-nosed, it would not be thought of apart from flesh, but qua hollow, if it were actually so conceived, it would be thought of apart from the flesh in which the hollowness resides. So when mind thinks the objects of mathematics, it thinks them as separable though actually they are not. In general, the mind when actively thinking is identical with its objects. Whether it is possible for the mind to think of un­extended objects when it is not itself unextended, must be considered later.

VIII. Now summing up what we have said about Summary, the soul, let us assert once more that in a sense the soul is all existing things. What exists is either sensible or intelligible ; and in a sense knowledge is the knowable and sensation the sensible. We must consider in what sense this is so. Both knowledge and sensation are divided to correspond to their objects, the potential to the potential, and the actual to the actual. The sensitive and cognitive faculties of the soul are potentially these objects, viz., the sensible and the knowable. These faculties, then, must be identical either with the objects themselves

179

bt o v (f>pvKrov o t l TTvp, r fj K o i v f j yvcoplÇei, OpCÜV KLVOV- ¡ j te v o v , o n TroXépttos. orè Sè t o l s èv t t ¡ tftuxfj cf>av- râapuiaLV r¡ v o r j p a a c v œavrep op¿ov Aoyi^erat ko ! [SovXeveTai r à ptéXXovra Trpos r à rrapovra• K a l ôrav elVrj œ s ¿ K e î t o rjSv r¡ Xvirrjpov, èvravOa <j>evyei r¡

10 h i w K e t , K a l oXœs eV rrpâÇei. K a l t o âvev Sè ttp a - £eœ s, t o àXrjdès K a l t o ifievSos èv rû> avrô j yévei ¿art tû > a yadâ) K a l /ca/câr àXXà tû > y e ¿ttXùjs Sta- (f>épei K a l t l v l . r à Sè èv à<f>aipécrei, Xeyopteva voeî a x j v e p 5 v et t o atptov, f¡ ptèv a tp o v , ov Ke%ot)pio-

15 fiévœ s, f ! Sè k o î X o v , et t l s èvàet èvepyeia , âvev T r j s

a a p K o s àv èvôet èv f¡ t o k o î X o v . o v t c j j t à ¡xadif]- [laTiKa ov Kexœpicrfiéva w s K e ^ a ip tc r /x e V a voeî, orav vofj e/ceîv a . ôXœs Sè o vovs èo r lv o /car’ èvépyetav T a T r p d y p - a T a v o œ v . a p a S ’ e v S e ^ e r a t t c ü v k s v ù j -

p i o p t é v i o v Tt v o e î v o v T a a v ro v p.r¡ K e x œ p t u p . é v o v

f j t e y é d o v s , r¡ o v , a K e i n é o v v G T e p o v .

20 VIII. N w Sè 7r e p l i j i v x 'f j s r à X e x d é v r a a v y K e < j> a -

X a i c l \ o a v T e s , e t n œ p t e v t t o X l v o t l r¡ * p v x r] r à o v r a t t c j s

è a T L i r â v T a . f¡ y à p a la Q - q r à r à o v r a r¡ v o r / r â , « fo r t

S’ r¡ è v L O T ru jtr ¡ p t e v r à è i r t c m j T a i r a i s , r¡ S’ a ï a O - q a t s

T a a l a d r j T a ' t t o j s Sè t o v t o , Set Ç r jT e îv . r é f i v e T a t

25 o v v 7] im a T r u J L r ¡ K a l r¡ a t a d r j a L S et? r à T r p i i y f x a T a ,

r¡ j j tè v S v v â f j t e t e l s T a S w a p t e L , r¡ S’ eVreÀe^eta e l s

r à è v T e X e x e t a . T r j s Sè t p v x r j s t o a l a d r jT L K o v K a l

t o è i r iO T r ) ¡ j lo v l k o v S v v a p e i T a v r â 1 è a r t , t o p t è v•) \ \ O■ \ > û f 09 ,A Î \ •»\

€7T L G rr]T ov t o d e a c o u r j r o v . a v a y K r j o r¡ a v r a r¡

1 r a v r a E 2, Sophonias et vêtus translatio : tolvtov.

ARISTOTLE

178

ON THE SOUL, III. vm.—ix.

or ,with their forms. Now they are not identical with the objects ; for the stone does not exist in the soul, but only the form of the stone. The soul, then, acts like a hand ; for the hand is an instrument which employs instruments, and in the same way the mind is a form which employs forms, and sense is a form which employs the forms of sensible objects. But Thought since apparently nothing has a separate existence, are rfot'ln8 except sensible magnitudes, the objects of thought —both the so-called abstractions of mathematics and dependent, all states and. affections of sensible things—reside in the sensible forms. And for this reason as no one could ever learn or understand anything without the exercise of perception, so even when we think specu- latively, we must have some mental picture of which to think ; for mental images are similar to objects perceived except that they are without matter. But imagination is not the same thing as assertion and denial; for truth and falsehood involve a combination of notions. How then will the simplest notions differ from mental pictures ? Surely neither these simple notions nor any others are mental pictures, but they cannot occur without such mental pictures.

IX. The soul in living creatures is distinguished The relation by two functions, the judging capacity which is a ^ move-Ul function of the intellect and of sensation combined, ment• and the capacity for exciting movement in space.We have completed our account of sense and mind, and must now consider what it is in the soul that ex­cites movement; whether it is a part separable from the soul itself, either in extension or only in defini-

181

431 b < ־ r d eiSyj e t v a i . a v r a [xev y a p Sr¡ o v • o v y a p o

432 a A id o s ev r j j ip v x fj, ¿AA a t o e t S o s w ״ a re r¡ >JrvX7l

coorrep r¡ x e ^P ¿ a n v • Kal y a p r¡ X €LP o p y a v ó v e a n v

o p y d v o o v , /cat o v o v s e tS o s e lS co v Kal r¡ aicrdrjcns

e tS o s a lad rjrcH v. ¿•nei S é o v S é v p a y p -a o v d é v ¿ a n

rra p d r a ¡x ey é d r¡, w s So/cet, r a a la d r jr a K€)(a>pia-

5 ¡ íé v o v , ¿v r o t s e t S e a i Tots a la d r jr o ls r a v o r ¡r d ¿ a n ,

r á r e ¿ v a (j> aip éoei Ae y ó p ie v a , Kal o a a rtov a la d r jr w v

e t je is Kal irá d r¡. Kal S ta ro v r o o v re p.r¡ a ladavo -

[ le v o s [xrjdev o v d é v a v pcd d oi o v S é ¿;w eir)• o ra v re

O eo jp fj, aváyKt] d p ia <f>dvraap,d n d e o jp e iv r a y a p

10 <¡>avrdap.ara ojOTrep a ia d r jfia rd ¿ a n , t t a t ¡ v avev

v\t]S■ e o n S’ r¡ (f> avraaía e r e p o v cf>daecos Kal

á n 0 (f)á a e(0 s׳ av jn rX o K r¡ y a p vor¡p¡,dra>v e a r l t o

aX rjd és r¡ tfiev S o s. r a S é ttpeora v o r¡p ,a ra r i v i

S i o l o e i / r o v ¡j,r¡ (f> a vrd a p ,ara e t v a i; r/ o v Se raAAa

(jja vr d a f i a r a , aAA’ o v k a v e v <j>avraa[idr(x)v.

15 IX. ’ E7ret S é r j i / jv x r ¡ K a r a Sv o ¿ o p i o r a i S w d f i e i s

r¡ t c ü v £ ,á>cüv, r e p r e K p i n K c p , o S i a v o i a s e p y o v e a r l

K a l a l a d i j a e c u s , K a l e n r e v K i v e i v r r ¡ v K a r a t o t t o v

KLv r j o i v , r r e p l ¡ i é v a t a d r j o e a t s K a l v o v S i c o p i a d o y

r o a a v r a , r r e p l S é r o d K i v o v v r o s , Tt r r o r é ¿ a n r f j s

20 >pv X V s > O K e -r r r é o v , ■ n ó r e p o v e v n ¡ l ó p i o v a v r r j s

X w p i o r o v o v r¡ p i e y é O e i r¡ \ 6 y q > , r¡ r r a a a r¡ *¡rv^r¡,

180

ARISTOTLE

tion, or whether it is the whole soul; and if it is a part, whether it is a special part beyond those usually described, and of which we have given an account, or whether it is one of them. A problem at once arises : in what sense should we speak of parts of the soul, and how many are there ? For in one sense Part they seem to be infinite, and not confined to those es which some thinkers describe, when they attempt analysis, as calculative, emotional, and desiderative, or, as others have it, rational and irrational. When we consider the distinctions according to which they classify, we shall find other parts exhibiting greater differences than those of which we have already spoken ; for instance the nutritive part, which be­longs both to plants and to all living creatures, and the sensitive part, which one could not easily assign either to the rational or irrational p a r t ; and also the imaginative part, which appears to be different in essence from them all, but which is extremely difficult to identify with, or to distinguish from any one of them, if we are to suppose that the parts of the soul are separate. Beyond these again is the appetitive part, which in both definition and capacity would seem to be different from them all. And it is surely unreasonable to split this up ; for there is will in the calculative, and desire and passion in the irrational p a r t ; and if the soul is divided into three, appetite will be found in each.

Moreover, to come to the point with which our Mov< inquiry is now concerned, what is it that makes the living creature move in space ? The generative with and nutritive faculties, which all share, would seem the s responsible for movement in the sense of growth and

ON THE SOUL, III. ix.

183

Kav el fjtopLov t i , ■nórepov ihióv ri 77apà rà etajöora

Xéyeadai K a l rà eiprjfiéva, r¡ t o v t c o v ev t i . e^et Sè â r r o p i a v e v Ô v ç ttojs re Set [¿opta Xéyeiv rrjs 1pv־xf¡s K a l 7Toara, rpéirov yàp r ira a7Teipa (¡)aiverai,

25 /cat où ¡lóvov a rives Xéyovoi SiopiCovres, Xoyi- 0T1K0V K a l 6 v [ j l i k o v K a l èmÔv/irjTiKov, oí Sè t o

Aoyov eyov K a l t o âXoyov K a r a yàp ràs Siacftopàs 8 1 âs ravra yojpi^ovai, K a l aAAa <j>aveîrai ¡!¿pía [¿eiÇœ Siàaraaiv eyovra t o v t c o v , T r e p l &v K a l vvv eïprjrai, t o re OpeirriKÖv, o K a l roZs (¡ )V to Z s

30 vrrápyei K a l nácri t o Z s ^ w o i s , K a l ro a l a 6 r j r 1K Ó v ,

o ovre dis aAoyov ovre eos Xóyov ’¿Xov Seír¡ av ris 4326 pabíajs■ €T1 Sé ro ( f> a v r a o r 1K Ó v , ô reo piev elvai

■návTCOV êrepov, rivi Sè r o v r c u v r a v r o v r¡ erepov, e)s€1 iroÁXrjv airopíav, e'í n s B r \a e 1 K e y 0) p 10 \1 é v a

¡ j i ó p i a rrjs ipvxfjs. vpos Sé t o v t o is r o o p e K r i K Ó v ,

o K a l Xóyq) K a l Svváfiei erepov ä v S ó t j e i e v eívai 5 i r á v r o j v . K a l arovov Sr¡ t o v t o Siacnráv e v r e r<2>

XoyiGTiKto yàp r¡ ßovXrjais y lv e r a i, K a l ¿v reoנ \ / c •> ¿\ / ' י £ ' ' eaAoyco rj eTTiUv/jua /cat o Uvfjios€1 ״ oe rpia rj

ijjvxrj, ¿v iKacrrip earai opeáis.Kat Sr¡ Kal irepl ov v v v ó Aóyos é v é a r r ¡ K e , rí

r o k i v o v v Kara t o t t o v r o £ < S ó v i a n v ; t t j v ¡ x e v

yàp K a r ' a v ^ r j a i v Kal <f>9í a 1v K Í v r ¡ a 1 v , a n a a i v ¿77-

10 ápxovcrav, r o i r â a i v virápxov hó^eiev à v K iv e Z v ro 182

ARISTOTLE482 a

ON THE SOUL, III. ix.

decay, as this movement belongs to them a ll ; later on we shall have to consider inspiration and expira­tion, and sleep and waking ; for these also present considerable difficulty. But now, about movement in space, we must consider what it is that causes the living animal to exhibit a travelling movement. Obviously it is not the nutritive faculty ; for this movement always has an object in view, and is com­bined with imagination or appetite ; for nothing moves except under compulsion, unless it is seeking or avoiding something. Besides, plants would be capable of locomotion, and would have some part instrumental towards this movement. Nor is it the sensitive faculty ; for there are many living creatures which have feeling, but are stationary, and do not move throughout their existence. Then seeing that nature does nothing in vain, and omits nothing essential, except in maimed or imperfect animals (and the sort of animal under consideration is perfect and not maimed ; this is proved by the fact that they propagate their species and have a prime and decline), they would also have parts instrumental to progres­sion.“ Nor is the calculative faculty, which is called mind, the motive principle, for the speculative mind thinks of nothing practical, and tells us nothing about what is to be avoided or pursued ; but movement is characteristic of one who is either avoiding or pur­suing something. Even when the mind contemplates such an object, it does not directly suggest avoidance or pursuit; e.g., it often thinks of something fearful or pleasant without suggesting fear. I t is the heart which is moved,—or if the object is pleasant, some other part. Further, even when the mind orders and

185

y e w T jT L K O V K a l 6 p e - r tT i .K o v •nep i Se à v a 7r v o r j s K a l

¿K TT V orjs K a l v t t v o v K a l è y p r j y à p u e c o s v a r e p o v i m -

o k € t t t € o v e ^ e t y à p K a l T a v r a TToXXrjv à n o p i a v .

a X X à r r e p l r r j s K a r a t o t t o v K L v q a r e œ s , r i t o k l v o v v

TO Z,ipOV TTjV TTOpeVnKTjV K l v q o i v , GK€TTTeOV. OTlIS pkv ovv ovx 17 0p€7TTLK7j Svvap is, SrjXov a e i re

y à p êv€K¿. t o v r¡ KÎvrjois avrrj, K a l r¡ fierà <f!av- ra a la s f¡ opened)¡ èo T iv ovdèv yà p pur¡ opeyôfievov rj <f>evyov Kivelrai aA A ’ r¡ jSt a . e r t Kav r à (j>vrà KcvrjTLKa rjv, Kav e t ^ e T t fiopiov opyaviKov vpos TTjV K iv r ja iv TavTTjv. ofioiœ s S è ovêè t o alodr¡-

20 t l k o v rroXXà ya p ¿ O T l t c j v Çüjoji׳ a aioOrjoiv pkv eXei> / x o v tja a S ’ e c r r t K a l ¿ K Î v r j r a S t à réXovs. el ovv r¡ (f>vois ¡jLrjTe rroieî parrjv firjOev firjTe ¿tto- À et7T€t r t tcüv àvayKaiœv, irXrjV èv r o t y mjpa>fiacri K a l èv ro ts ¿TeXéaiv ( r à S è roiavTa t c ü v £a>a>v

r e À e t a K a l ov irrjpcbfiaTa èomv■ aijpeîov S’ o n 25 è c r r t y e w r jT L K à K a l ¿ K f ir jv ê ^ e i K a l (fidlcnv)— œ a r

elxev àv K a l r à opyaviKà fiépr¡ Trjs vopelas. aA A à

fir/v ovSè r o XoyiGTiKov K a l o KaXovp-evoç vovs è a n v o K ivœ v ô fiev yà p decoprjTiKos ovdèv voel jr p a K T O v , ovSè Xéyei T rep l (ftevK T O v K a l S i c d k t o v

ovdév, r¡ S è K Îv r jc n s rj <f>evyovr6s Tt r¡ S u o k o v t o s

80 Tt èciTiv. aA A ’ o v S ’ orav decoprj t i toiovtov, rjSr) KeXevei (f>evyeiv r¡ SiœKeiv, olov ttoXXolkis SiavoeÎTai (pofiepôv Tt f j r j h v , ov KeXevei S è <j>ofieLodai, rj S è

®S3 a KapSia KiveÎTai, àv S’ rjSv, erepov Tt pSpiov. e n

ARISTOTLE

° i .e . i f m o v e m e n t in s p a c e w e re d u e to th e s e n s it iv e fa c u lty . 184

thought urges avoidance or pursuit, there is no move­ment, but action is prompted by desire, e.g., in the absence of self-control. Speaking generally, we see that the man possessing knowledge of the healing art is not always healing, so that there is some other factor which causes action in accordance with know­ledge, and not knowledge itself. Finally, it is not appetite which is responsible for movement; for the self-controlled, though they may crave and desire, do not do these things for which they have an appetite, but follow their reason.

X. These two then, appetite and mind, are clearly Cause capable of causing movement if, that is, one regards move imagination as some sort of thinking process ; for men often follow their imaginations contrary to knowledge, and in living creatures other than man there is neither thinking nor calculation, but only imagination. Both of these, then, mind and appetite, are productive of movement in space. But the mind in question is that which makes its calculations with an end in view, that is, the practical mind : it differs from the speculative mind in the end that it pursues.And every appetite is directed towards an end ; for the thing at which appetite aims is the starting- point of the practical mind, and the last step of the practical mind is the beginning of the action. So these two, appetite and practical thought, seem reasonably considered as the producers of movement; for the object of appetite produces movement, and therefore thought produces movement, because the object of appetite is its beginning. Imagination, too, when it starts movement, never does so without appetite. That which moves, then, is a single faculty, that of appetite. If there were two movers, mind as

ON THE SOUL, III. ix.—x.

187

a ׳K a l é m r á T T o v T o s t o v v o v K a l X e y o v o r j s r f j s 8 l a v ó l a s

c j> e v y e lv t l f j S k L k s i v o v K i v e i T a i , aAAá /c a ra r f ¡ v

é i n 9v f j , l a v i r p á r T e i , o l o v o a K p a T r j s . K a l o X c u s S e

OpüjfJL€V O T l O e x ^ o v TTjV la T p lK r jV O VK lÓ LTai¡ CUS

5 ¿ T ¿ p o v t i v o s K v p í o v o v t o s t o v T T O ieiv K a r a TTjV

é m o T r j[ jL r jV , aAA’ o v Trjs ¿tt i o t f ¡ p ,r ¡ s . aAA a / j .f¡v

o v 8 ’ f j o p e é i s r a v T t j s K v p í a r f j s K L v r jo e c o s o ׳ l y a p

¿ y K p a T e Z s ¿ p e y ó / i e v o i K a l é m d v p L O v v T e s o v T r p á r -

t o v o l v o jv '¿x o v o l t t ¡v o p e £ i v , aAA’ olkoX o v 9 o v <7i

TU ) v í p .

10 X . O a iV era t Se y e Svo TavTa K i v o v v T a , fj o p e í j i s

fj vo vs, e l t í s t j]v <f>avrao¿av T id e l r ] eos vórjoív r i v a •

TroXXa y a p Trapa t f ¡ v ¿TTiorfjfirjv aK oÁovdovoi Ta is (¡)avTaolais, K a l ¿v t o l s aAA o ís £cóois ov vór¡ois ovSk Xoyicrfiós ¿ c t t l v , ¿AAá </>avTaoía. a/x^co apa r a ín a K iv r j T i K a K ara to-ttov, vovs K a l o p e á i s ,

vovs Sé 6 e v e K ¿ t o v Xoyi^ópievos Kal o ttp a K T i K o s ' 15 Sia(f>épei Se t o v 9ecopr¡TiKov t c o réX ei. Kal f j

opeáis e v e K a t o v Traoa■ ov y a p f] opeá is, avTr¡ áp x fj t o v i r p a K T i K o v vov• t ó 8 ’ é c r x a T O V apxfj Trjs Trpá^ecos. oioTe evXóycos r a v r a 8vo <f>aíveTai r a K i v o v v T a , opeáis K a l S iávo ia ttp a K T iK r ¡ r ׳ ó o p e K T o v

y a p Kivei, K a l Sia t o v t o f¡ S iávo ia K i v e i , o t i ¿PXV 20 airrrjs éoTi t ó o p e K T Ó v . K a l f j (¡¡avraoía Se o r a v

K i v f j , o v K i v e i a v e v ó p é £ e a > s . e v 8fj t í t o k i v o v v

t o o p e K T Ó v . e l y a p 8v o , v o v s K a l o p e á i s , ék l v o v v ¡

ARISTOTLE

1 8 6

ON THE SOUL, III. x.

well as appetite, they would produce movement in virtue of a common characteristic. But, as things are, mind is never seen to produce movement without appetite (for will is a form of appetite, and when move­ment accords with calculation, it accords also with choice), but appetite produces movement contrary to calculation ; for desire is a form of appetite. Now mind is always right ; but appetite and imagination may be right or wrong. Thus the object of appetite always produces movement, but this may be either the real or the apparent good ; and not every good can excite movement, but only practical good. Practical good is that which is capable of being other­wise.

It is clear, then, that movement is caused by such Appetit a faculty of the soul as we have described, viz., that movem which is called appetite. But those who divide up the parts of the soul, if they divide and distinguish them by their functions, get a great many parts : nutritive, sensitive, intelligent, deliberate and appetitive as w ell; for these differ from one another more than the desiderative does from the emotional. Now appetites may conflict, and this happens wherever reason and desire are opposed, and this occurs in creatures which have a sense of time (for the mind advises us to resist with a view to the future, while desire only looks to the present ; for what is momentarily pleasant seems to be absolutely pleasant and absolutely good, because desire cannot look to the future). Thus while that which causes movement is specifically one, viz., the faculty of appetite qua appetitive, or ultimately the object of appetite (for this, though unmoved, causes

189

K a r a , k o l v o v á v t i ¿ k l v o v v e T S o s . v v v Sé o f i e v

v o v s o v < f> a ív€ T a i K i v œ v à v e v o p é f j e œ s { v y à p

^ o v X r ja L S o p e á i s ׳ orav S è /cara t o v X o y i c r f io v

25 K i v r j r c u , K a l K a r a f ío v A r ¡ < j iv K í v e í r a i ) r¡ S ’ o p e á i s

K í v e i 7rapa t o v X o y i u p í ó v r¡ y à p ¿ m O v f z í a o p e á i s

t l s Í g t í v . v o v s f i e v o v v T r a s o p d ó s o ׳ p e á i s S é K a l

< j> a vT a < jía K a l o p d r ¡ K a l o v k o p d r ¡ . S lo ¿ e l K iv e Z

[ l e v t o ô p e K T O v , aAAá t o v t Í o t Iv r¡ t o a y a d ó v r¡

t o ( f > a iv ó f ie v o v a y a d ó v . o v n á v Sé, aAAá t o

so T r p a K T o v a y a d ó v . T rpaK T O V S ’ ¿ o r í t o i v S e x ó p - e v o v

K a l aAAa)? é ^ e i v .

“O r t fiev ovv r¡ roiavTr¡ Svvapus Kiveî Trjs r¡ KaÁovjJíévr] opeáis, <¡>avepóv. to ís S è SiaLpovai r á

433 b ¡xépr) T r js i f i v x r j s èàv / c a r a T a? Svváfieis S tatp túox

Kal xcüptÇœm, Tiá/MToXXa y lvera i, dpevTiKÓv, a l-a d r¡T I .K Ó v , VOYJTIk Óv , f¡O v X eV T L K Ó v , l n O p S K T lK O V

r a v T a y à p i r X é o v S ia < f> ¿p€ t a X X r¡X co v r¡ t o ¿ m O v p .r ] -

5 t l k o v K a l d v / ju K Ó v . ¿TTel S’ ô p é Ç e L s y l v o v r a i ¿ v a v -

T i a i ¿ X A r ¡ X a is , t o v t o Sé o v f i f i a í v e i , orav o Aóyo? K a l r¡ ¿ m d v f i í a é v a v r l a i ¿5 cri, ytVerat 8 ’ ¿ v t o í s

X p ó v o v a ’¿ o 9r¡GLV ’¿ v o v a i v (ó f i è v y à p v o v s Stá t o

f j-é X X o v â v d é X K e i v K e X e v e L , r¡ S’ ¿ m d v [ x .¿ a Stá t o>/<> ; / \ \ >r<z e o \ \ c \ ~ f£\ *

r j o r j • ( p a i v e r a i y a p t o 77077 r j o v K a i a r r A c j s r j o v K a i

10 a y a d o v a T rX cú s , S tá t o p ,r j ¿ p á v t o f .lé X A o v ) , e ’í S e i

f i é v ev a v e ’ír¡ t o k l v o v v t o o p e K T L K Ó v , f j o p e K T L K Ó v ,

i r p c ü T o v S é T r á v r c a v t o ô p e K T o v {t o v t o y à p K i v e î o v

ARISTOTLE433 a

188

movement by being thought of or imagined), the things which cause movement are numerically many.

But movement involves three factors : first the Howmov moving cause, secondly the means by which it pro- !ace.tali< duces movement, and thirdly the thing moved. The moving cause is of two kinds ; one is unmoved and the other both moves and is moved. The former is the practical good, while that which both moves and is moved is the appetite (for that which is moved is moved qua influenced by appetite, and appetite qua actual is a kind of movement), and the thing moved is the animal. The instrument by which appetite causes movement belongs already to the physical sphere ; so it must be considered among the functions common to body and soul. But for the present we may say briefly that the motive instrument is found where a beginning and end coincide, as in a ball-and- socket joint. For there the convex surface (the ball) and the concave surface (the socket) are respectively the end and the beginning of the movement; con­sequently the latter is at rest while the former moves.They are distinct in definition, but spatially insepar­able ; for all movement consists of pushing and pulling ; so that, as in a wheel, one point must remain fixed, and from it the movement must be initiated. Speaking generally then, as has been said, in so far as the living creature is capable of appetite, it is also capable of self-movement; but it is not capable of appetite without imagination, and all imagination involves either calculation or sensation. This latter all other living creatures share besides man.

XI. We must now consider what the moving prin- How is ciple is in the case of those imperfect animals, whose ^ 0ssfb?e ii only sensation is that of touch, and whether it is or the lower

ON THE SOUL, III. x.—xi.

191

KLVovjxevov tu> vor¡9f¡vai 7] <j>avTa<j6׳fjvai,), LipíOílo;

Sé ttXsÍoj r á KivovvTa.’ E -T reiS i) 8 ’ eCTTi T p í a , e v f i é v t o k l v o v v , S e v r e p o v

8’ <3 K i v e l , T p ír o v t o K i v o v p L e v o v t o Se k l v o v v

15 S l t t o v , t o ¡J .ev a ,K L v r ¡ r o v , t o Se k l v o v v K a l k l v o v -

¡ j le v o v - € O t l Se t o ¡u é v a K iv r ¡ T 0 v t o T TpaK TO V á y a d ó v ,

t o Se k l v o v v K a l K L v o v / j - e v o v t o o p e K T C K Ó v ( K i v e i r a L

y a p t o k l v o v / j l s v o v f¡ o p é y e r a i , K a l r¡ o p e á i s k l v t j o l s 1

t l s ¿ o t l v f! e v é p y e i a ) , t o Se K L V o v p ie v o v t o £á>ov <3 Se k l v s l ó p y á v c p r¡ o p e á i s , 7¡Sr¡ t o v t o o c o f i a r i K o v

20 e c r T iv S i o e v t o l s k o l v o l s o c ó p L a T o s K a l i p v x r j s e p y o i s

d ea > p 7] T € o v r r e p l avTod. v v v Se ¿>s e v Ke<f>aXaíco

e l i r e l v t o k l v o v v ¿ p y a v L K Ó ü s o t t o v a p X V K a 'L T e X e v r r ¡

r o a v T ¿ , o l o v o y L y y X v f jL Ó s ’ é v T a v d a y a p t o K v p r o v

K a l k o l X o v t o ¡ l e v r e X e v T r ¡ t o S ’ a p x ~ q 8 ׳ l o t o ¡ l e v

25 r j p e j i e l t o Se K L v e i T a t , X ¿ y a ) f i é v e r e p a o v r a , p i e y e O e i

S־ a x c ó p i o r a - • n á v T a y a p ajcret K a l eA^et K L v e L T a i.

Sió S e l a io T r e p e v k v k X o j f i é v e L v t i , K a l i v T e v d e v

a p x z o d a i t t ¡ v k l v 7] o l v . o X o j s p - e v o v v , w o i r e p

e i p r j r a i , f j o p e K T i K o v t o t ,¿ h o v , T a V T T j a i lT O V KLVT¡-

t l k o v o p e K T i K o v S é o v k d v e v < f> a v ra o ía s■ ( f> a v T a o ía

so Se i r d o a r¡ X oyL O T L K r¡ r¡ a l o 8 r]TLK q׳ . r a v r j j s p -é v

o v v K a l t o . a X X a £<3a /xere^et.X I . 'E tK eTT Teov Sé K a l i r e p l t c ü v a T e X w v , t l t o

434 a k l v o v v ¿ o t l v , o l s dcf)׳?¡ f i ó v o v v v á p x e L a l o d r ¡ a i s ,

1 opegis KívrjoLs] KÍinjms opeáis EL, Bekker.

ARISTOTLE

190

ON THE SOUL, III. xi.

is not possible for them to have imagination and forms of, , , , animalE¡desire, r or it is evident that they are liable to pam

and pleasure. If they have these they must also have desire. But in what sense could they have imagination ? Perhaps, just as their movements are indeterminate, so they also have imagination and desire, but only indeterminately. Imagination in the form of sense is found, as we have said, in all animals, but deliberative imagination only in the calculative ; for to decide whether one shall do this or that calls at once for calculation, and one must measure by a single standard ; for one pursues the greater good. This implies the ability to combine several images into one. This is why imagination is thought not to involve opinion, because it does not involve opinion which is based on inference, whereas opinion involves imagination. Hence appetite does not imply capacity for deliberation. Sometimes it overcomes the will and sways it, as one sphere moves Movemen another ; or appetite influences appetite, when the compficat subject lacks self-control (but in nature the upper o f i m p u l s f

sphere always controls and moves the lower) ; thus we now have three modes of movement. The cog­nitive faculty is not moved but remains still. Since one premiss or statement is universal and the other particular (for the one asserts that a man in such a position should do such a thing, but the other asserts that this present act is such a thing and that I am a

193

484 a■ n o T e p o v ¿ v 8é ^ e r a t (f>avra<jlav v i r á p x e L V t o v t o i s , r¡

ov, K a l ¿7r 1. d v f j . l a v . <f>alv€Ta1 y à p X v t t t ¡ K a l ■fjSovr¡

èvovua. e l Sé r a v r a , K a l ¿ T T 1 .dvp .lav a v á y K r ן .

( f > a v r a a l a 8 6 7r œ s a v ¿ v e l r ¡ ; r j œ o r r e p K a l /c tv etra t

5 â o p lo T C ü s , K a l ravT ë v e c m , ¡ 1 é v , à o p i a r œ s S’ ê v e o T i v . r¡ ¡ x é v o v v a l a d r j r i K r ¡ <f>avraala, t o a i r e p

e i p r p - a t . , K a l ¿ v r ó l s aÁ A ots ÇaSots V T rápxe¡■ , r¡ Sé ß o v X e v T iK r ¡ ¿ v t o Î s Á oyt& T i/cots ■ n ó r e p o v y a p i r p á -

g e t r ó 8 e r j r ¿ 8e , X o y u 7p . o v r¡8r¡ ¿ c r r l v e p y o v • K a l

a v á y K r j ¿ v i [ l e r p e i v t o ¡ x e l l ,o v y a p Stcó/cet. íS a r e

10 Svvarai e v ¿ k nXeLovoiv < b a v T a u ¡1á ~ o j v n o i e î v . K a l

aiTiov t o v t o t o v Só^av p.r¡ d o x e l v ¿ x €LV> ° rL T h vי \ \ ^ ר >/ tr ה י \ / o ז

€K CT V A A oyiG flO V OVK € €6, CLVT7) 0 € €K€lVr)V . ÖLO

t o ß o v X e v r i K o v o v K e ^ e t V ô p e t j i s . vt-KÖ. 8 ’ ¿ v l o r e

K a l K i v e i T 7¡v ß o v X r j c n v â t è 8 ’ ¿ K e lv r ¡ T a v r r ¡ v ,

tüO TTep o < f> a îp a , r¡ o p e á i s r r j v o p e ^ i v , o r a v a K p a u l a

15 y é v T j r a i . cf>v0e 1 8 1 ¿et r¡ a v c o apx<-KC0T ¿ p a /cat K iv e Z , œ o T e rpeî? c b o p à s 17817 K i v e î o O a i . t o 8 s

¿TTKJTTJfXOVLKOV OV KLVeLTai., ¿AAá j l€ V € L . ¿TTsl S’ TJ

[ i è v K a d á X o v v i r ó X r j i / j i s K a l X óyos, r j 8 è t o v K a f f

IK a o T a (r¡ j x e v y à p X é y e i o n Set t o v t o l o v t o v t o

r o i o v S e i r p á r r e i v , r¡ Se o n -roSe t o v v v rotovSe,

ARISTOTLE

192

ON THE SOUL, III. xi.—xn.

T h e s o u a n d l ife .

man in such a position), it is surely this latter opinion which causes movement, not the universal. Or per­haps it is both, but the universal tends to remain at rest, and the other does not.

XII. Every living thing, then, must have the nutri­tive soul, and in fact has a soul from its birth until its death ; for what has been born must have growth, a highest point of development, and decay, and these things are impossible without food. The nutritive faculty must then exist in all things which grow and decay. But sensation is not necessarily present in all living things. Those whose bodies are uncompounded cannot have a sense of touch, nor can those which are incapable of receiving forms without their matter. But an animal must have sensation, if it is a fact that nature does nothing in vain. For all provisions of nature are means to an end, or must be regarded as coincidental to such means. Any body capable of moving from place to place, if it had no sensation, would be destroyed, and would not reach the end which is its natural function ; for how could it be nourished ? Stationary living things can draw their food from the source from which they were born, but it is not possible for a body to possess a soul and a mind capable of judgement with­out also having sensation, if that body is not stationary but produced by generation ; nor even if it is un­generated. For why should it not have sensation ? Either for the good of the soul or for that of the body, but in fact neither alternative is true ; for the soul will not think any better, and the body will be no

1 ovre . . . lu>ov seel. Torstrik.2 ovx om. LSX, Bekker.

195

êS 4 a20 Kay¿) Sè roioaSe) -57Sr¡ avrr¡ Kiveî r¡ S6£a, ov% r¡

KadâXov. rj a¡¿([)(*), <xÀA’ r¡ p,kv rjpep,ovaa fiâXXov,e v*î) O ou.

XII. ¡ikv OVV 6p€7TTLK7jV ljw )(T jV ¿ v d y K T f] 7T&V

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25 '¿X€LV K a l o -K jxrjV K a l <j>9Laiv, ravra S’ âvev rpocfrjs àSvva toi׳• avdyKT] apa èveîvai rr¡ v dpenriKTjp i>vvo.jiiv èv rrâai t o î s <f>vop.évois K a l <f>8Lvovoiv. aïaOrjaiv S’ o v k à v a y K a î o v èv â i r a c n t o î s Ç â x n v

ovre yàp oawv t o aœp-a ¿ t t X o v v , è v o e y ^ r a i ¿<f>r)V

ë x e i v , [ovre âvev ravrrjs o î o v Te ovdèv e i v a i £<ûov]1 go ovre ocra ¡xr¡ Sefcrt/cà t c ü v ecSâiv âvev Trjs vXrjs.

TO Sè £<Sov à v a y K a î o v aïadrjaiv £Xelv> ^ ^ 7)Sèv [ i c Î t t j v 7Toteî r¡ (/)vais. ê v e K a t o v yàp •navra vn- âpXet 1־o- <j>voei, r¡ G V /X T i r c o f ia r a ¿ o r ai rœv ê v e K a .

t o v . el ovv ttôv a c ô f i a vopevriKov f i r ¡ ê^ov $3 4 1, aiodrjoiv, <j>9elpono àv K a l els réXos o v k àv ëXdoi,

o è o r i cfivaeœs ëpyov rrcos yàp 9pétfierai; roîs [ièv yàp piovifjiois VTrdpxei ro o9ev irecfivKaaiv• oï>x oîov re Sè aoj/xa è^etv p iè v i f i v x t y K a l vovv K p n i K à v ,

a’icr9r!oiv Sè fir¡ l^etv, pur¡ p,6vip.ov ov, yewiqrov hé■ 5 aÀÀa fjbrjv ovoe ayevvrjrov' à ta Tt yap ovx €çet ; 37־

yàp rf¡ tpvxfj fSéXnov rj rœ ad) pian. vvv S’ ovSere- pov r¡ ¡xèv yàp ov piaXXov vorjoei, ro S’ ovdèv ear ai

ARISTOTLE

194

ON THE SOUL, III. xn.

better, for not having sensation. No, body, then, which is not stationary possesses a soul without sensation.

Further, if it does possess sensation, the body must be either simple or compound. But it cannot be simple ; for in that case it will have no sense of touch, and this is indispensable to it. This is obvious from the following considerations. For since the living animal'is a body possessing soul, and every body is tangible, and tangible means perceptible by touch, it follows that the body of the animal must have the faculty of touch if the animal is to survive. For the other senses, such as smell, vision and hearing, per­ceive through the medium of something else ; but the animal when it touches, if it has no sensation, will not be able to avoid some things and seize others. In that case it will be impossible for the animal to survive. This is why taste is a kind of touch ; for it relates to food, and food is a tangible body. Sound, colour and smell supply no food, nor do they produce growth and decay. Hence taste must be some kind of touch, because it is the perception of what is tangible and nutritive. These two senses then, are essential to the animal, and it is obvious that an animal cannot exist without a sense of touch.

The other senses are means to well-being ; they do not belong to any class of living creatures taken at random, but only to certain ones, e.g., they are essential to the animal which is capable of locomotion; for if it is to survive, not only must it perceive when in contact, but also from a distance. And this will occur only if it can perceive through a medium, the

197

lb¡xáXkov Si’ ¿Keîvo. ovdèv apa ¡pv^vv awfia¡ir¡ ¡xóvi¡.iov avev alc7dr¡aecos.

5AAAà ¡Jirjv eiye alodijoiv eyei, áváyicr¡ ro acáfxa 10 elvai r¡ anXovv 7} ¡xiKróv. o v \ olóv re §6 ¿ttXovv

á<f>r¡v yáp oi>x eí;e1, eon Sé áváy/cr) ravnjv e^eiv. r 0VT0 Sé ¿k rcüvSe SfjAov. èvel yàp rà Çojov ato ¡xa ep,1pv■)(•óv éa n , acopia Se arrav áirróv, anrov Se ro aladrjrov áváyKrj K a l ro rov £ a >ova<jj¡xa á/nriKov eivai, el ¡xéXXei oœÇeadai ro Çcpov.

ss a i yàp aAAat alodr¡ae1s Si êrépœv aladávovrai, olov 0acf>pr¡a1s oifiis o-Kor¡■ âvrófxevov Se, el ¡xr¡ i£e1 aiodijoiv, ov Svvrjaerai rà ¡xev cjjevyeiv rà Sè XaßeZv. el Sè rovro, áSvvarov ëarai acocead ai ro Çcpov. S10 Kal r¡ yevals èanv wcrvep à<f>r¡ ris ° rpo<f>7js yáp èanv, r¡ Sè rpocfrr¡ ro aœfxa ro àirrôv.

201f16<f>os Sè K a l ypôjjxa K a l Ôc7[x7] ov rpècf>e1, ovSè noiei ovr’ av^rjaiv ovre cf>9ia1v. ware K a l rr¡v y e v a i v à v à y i c r ¡ âcfrrjv e ï v a l riva, Sià ro rov àvrov K a l O p e i r r i K o v a 109r¡01v eîvai. a v r a i ¡ x è v ovv a v a y K a î a i rw Ç cpco , K a l < f> a vep o v o n o v % o l ó v r e

avev â<j)rjs eîvai £â>o v .

25 A l Sè aAAat r o v re ev ë v e K a K a l yèvei Ç œ c o v

7jS r¡ ov rôt rvxpvr 1, aAAà naiv, o l o v rœ v o p e v n K c p

a v á y K T ] {mápxeiv el y à p fxéXXei oco^eadai, ov ¡ x ó v o v Seî à i r r ô j x e v o v a l o d á v e a d a i aAAà K a l a u o d e v .

r o v r o S’ à v eir], el S i à r o v ¡ x e r a i j v a l a d r j r i K o v eîr¡

ARISTOTLE

196

medium being affected and set in motion by the sensible object, and the animal itself by the medium.For just as that which produces movement in space causes change up to a certain point, and that which has given an impulse causes something else to give one also, and the movement takes place through a medium ; and as the first mover impels without being impelled, while the last in the series is impelled without impelling, but the medium both impels and is impelled, and there may be many media : so it is in the case of alteration, except that the subject suffers alteration without changing place. If one were to dip something into wax, the movement would occur in the wax just so far as one dipped i t ; stone would not be moved at all, but water would be to a great distance. But it is air that is moved, acting and being acted upon to the greatest extent, so long as it remains a constant unity. This is why in the case of reflection it is better to suppose, not that sight proceeds from the eye and is reflected, but rather that the air, so long as it remains a unity, is affected by the shape and colour. Now on a smooth surface it is a unity ; and so it in its turn sets the sight in motion, just as if the impression on the wax extended right through to the other side.

XIII. I t is obvious that the body of an animal Touch is cannot consist of a single element such as fire or air. ™ement: For without a sense of touch it is impossible to have anaindi any other sensation ; for every body possessing soul K saMi has the faculty of touch, as has been said.“ Now faculty• except for earth, all the other elements would be come sense organs, but they all produce sensation by means of something else, that is through media.

ON THE SOUL, III. xn.—xm.

• 434 b 10 sqq.199

A R IS T O T L E4 8 4 b י י י

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yrjs aludrjrr¡p1a fièv àv yévo iro , •návra Sé r& St’

érépov alodávecrdai 770tet t t ¡ v a'ladrjaiv Kal S tá rcov 198

But touch occurs by direct contact with its objects, and that is why it has its name. The other sense organs perceive by contact too, but through a medium; touch alone seems to perceive immediately. Thus no one of these elements could compose the animal body. Nor could earth. For touch is a kind of mean between all tangible qualities, and its organ is re­ceptive not only of all the different qualities of earth, but also of hot, cold, and all other tangible qualities. This is why we do not perceive by our bones and hair, and such parts of the body, because they are composed of earth. And for this reason plants have no sensation, because they are composed of earth. Without touch there can be no other sense, and the organ of touch is composed neither of earth nor of any other single element. I t is obvious, then, that de­prived of this one sense alone, animals must die ; for it is impossible for anything but an animal to possess this, nor need an animal possess any sense but this. And this explains another fact. Other sensibles, such as colour, sound and smell, do not destroy the animal by excess, but only the sense organs ; except incidentally, as for instance when a thrust or blow is delivered at the same time as the sound, or when by the objects of sight or smell other things are set in motion, which destroy by contact. Flavour, again, destroys only in so far as it is a t the same time tactile. But the excess of tangible qualities, such as heat, cold, and hardness, destroys the animal. For excess in any sensible quality destroys the organ ; and so the tangible also destroys touch. But this is the dis­tinguishing characteristic of life, for it has been shown

ON THE SOUL, III. x i i i .

201

ARISTOTLE

¡ x e r a £ v • r¡ S’ a <j>r¡ ru > a v r o j v d i T r e a d a t e a n v , 8 to K a l r o v v o f i a t o v t o e ^ e t. K a i r o i K a l r a aAAa a l a d r j r r i p i a atf>f¡ a l a 9d v e r a t , , aAAa 8 c e r e p o v a v r r ¡

20 8e Sofcet ¡xovr¡ 8 1 a v r f j s , w a r e r G w [x e v t o i o v t o i v

a T O i \ e L a i v o v 9e v a v e ’ir¡ ac t> p .a r o v ^ o j o v . o v 8e 8r¡

y r f i v o v . 7r d v r c o v y a p r¡ acjyr¡ r o w ¿ t t t c o v i a r i v

c j a r r e p f i e a o r r j s , K a l S e K T i K o v t o a lo O r jT r jp i o v o v

¡ j lo v o v o o m 8 ia c f> o p a l y f j s e l a i v , aAAa K a l 9e p p ,o v

K a l t j j v x p o v K a l r w v d X X c o v a v T o i j v a -r ra v T O W . K a l

25 S ia t o v t o r o t s o a r o Z s K a l r a Z s d p i t j l K a l t o Z s

435 l> t o l o v t o l s p o p i o c s o v k a l a 9a v 6p ,e 9a , o n y f j s i a r i v .

K a l r a . <f> vra 8 t a t o v t o o v 8e p , i a v e % e i a i a d r j a u v , o n

y f j s i a r i v a v e v 8e a<f>fjs o v 8e p , i a v o l d v r e a X k q v

V T T a p x e w , t o v t o S e t o a l a 9t ] r q׳ p i o v o v k e a n v o v r e

y f j s o v r e a X k o v r c o v a r o L x e i c o v oi>8e v 6s . < f> a vep o v

5 r o i v v v o n a v d y K r ¡ ¡ x d v r js r a v r r j s a r e p i a K o p L e v a r f j s

a i o d f j a e a j s r a C u sa a.TTo8v f j G K € i v o v r e y a p r a v r r j v

e % £ iv o l d v r e fir¡ £ ,a > o v , o v r e ( , w o v o v aXXrjv e%etv a v d y K r ¡ t tX y jv ravrrjs. K a l Sta t o v t o r a / x e v aAAa aia9rjrd r a Z s v r r e p f io A a Z s o v 8 ia < b9e i p e i t o f<£ov, o l o v x P & f x a K a l if!6(f>os K a l o a p r j , aAAa ¡ x d v o v r a

10 a i a d r j r y p i a , a v ¡xr¡ K a r a a v p .^ e ^ r jK O S , o l o v a v ap.a r e p ifio<f>a> t L o i s yevrjrai K a l •nArjyr¡, K a l v t t o o p a -

p d r o j v K a l o a p , f j s e r e p a K i v e Z r a i , a r f j a f i f j <f>9e i p e i .

K a l o x vlJ׳os Se fj d p , a a v f x f i a i v e i ¿ t t t l k o v e t v a i ,

r a v r r ¡ <f>9e i p e i . r¡ Se r o w d i r r c o v imepfSoAr¡, o l o v

9e p p .6w K a l i f i v x p & v K a l aKXrjpu>v, a v a i p e Z t o ^aiov 15 t t o v t o s ¡ x e v y a p a l a d - q r o v v r r e p f io A f ¡ a v a i p e Z r o

ala8’qrfjpLov, w a r e K a l r o d i r r o v rrjv d< frr\v , ravrr¡ Se w p i a r a t , t o t , f j v ׳ avev y a p a<j>fjs S e S e i K r a i o n

200

that without touch an animal cannot exist. Hence excess in tangible qualities destroys not only the sense organ, but also the animal, because touch is the one sense which the animal must possess. The animal possesses the other senses, as has been said,“ not for mere existence but for well-being ; for in­stance the animal has sight in order that it may see, because it lives in air or water, or generally in a trans­parent medium ; and it has taste because of what is sweet and bitter, in order that it may perceive these qualities in food, and may feel desire and be set in motion ; and hearing that it may have signi­ficant sounds made to it, and a tongue that it may make significant sounds to another animal.

° 434 b 24.

ON THE SOUL, III. xni.

20S

ARISTOTLEj b ^

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t o v e î v a i . ë v e K a ¿XXà t o v ev, o t o v o i / j i v , ¿ i t e l ¿v¿ é p i K a l v § a n , o r r œ s o p â , ôAo)? S’ e i r e i e v S i a f i a v e i ,

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25 Sè 0770)? or/fzaLvr¡ t i avrq j,1 yXojrrav Sè ottojs

o .jLaivr¡ Ti érépio][!׳

1 aurai Torstrik : aurai.

202