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Department of the Classics Harvard University

Aristotle and Presocratic CosmogonyAuthor(s): Friedrich SolmsenSource: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 63 (1958), pp. 265-282Published by: Department of the Classics, Harvard UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/310860 .

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ARISTOTLE AND

PRESOCRATIC

COSMOGONY

BY

FRIEDRICH

OLMSEN

ARISTOTLE'S

Cosmos is

eternal.

Its

essential

structure,

its

-tlcharacteristic

movement,

the

relationship

between

its

major

parts

remainforever

unchanged. Becoming

and

passing-away,

while

powerful

in the

area

of

the

sublunary

elements,

do not extend

their

sway

to

the

fifthbodywhich fills the spacesfrom the outermostsphereto the region

of

the

Moon.

When

Aristotle

says

that Nature

has removed

this

body

from

the

grip

of

the

contraries

and

thereby

from

the

possibility

of

change'

he

asserts

by

implication

the

immortality

of the world

as

a

whole.

Implication,

however,

is not

the

same as

proof.

Aristotle

offered

proofs

for

the

eternity

of our

world

in the

dialogue

irepl

?cAoaortax,

showing

that

the

Cosmos is in a

condition

destined

to

endure

forever

and that

its

nature has

nothing

in

common

with

physical

entities

of

limited

lifetime.2

There

is no evidence

that the

cosmogonies

of

the

Presocratics'were

in

this

dialogue

made

the

subject

of a

close

and

detailed

criticism.

To do

so

may

have seemed

unnecessary.

Turning

from

the

remnants

of this

dialogue

to the

"

esoteric

"

treatises,

we

notice

that

while

specific

hypotheses

connected

with

cosmogony

are

often

severely

criticized

there is

no

passage

where

cosmogony

as

such,

the

genetic

or

"evolutionary"

approach

o the world

as

a

whole,

is

exposed

as

radically

erroneous.

Aristotle,

it

would

seem,

saw little

need of

strengthening

his

own

conviction

by

a

refutationof

the

opposite point

of

view

which

had

so

long

dominated

physical thought.

To

be

sure,

the last

question

taken

up

in Book I of decaelois "whether or not

(the

Cosmos)

has

come

into

being

and

whether

or not

it

will

come to an

end".3

Yet

what

the

chapters

at

the

end

of this

Book

actually

show

is

that it

is

impossible

to think

of

the

Cosmos

-

or indeed

of

anything

-

as

having

come

into

being

yet

lasting

forever

or

as

being

capable

of

destruction

yet

having

no

origin.4

The

target

of

this

disquisition

is

obviously

the

Timaeus.

Besides

pointing

out the

contradictions

in-

herent

in

such

opinions

the

chapters

give

us

acute

analyses

of

the

concepts

yE7-rTO,

&ye'vT-ov,

gcap-r6ov,

and

d68aprov, yet

they

do not

providean answerto the questionwhich they promisedto treat.5Still,

given

the

status

of

cosmological

thought

in

the

Academy,

we

may







absolve

Aristotle from

the

charge

of

negligence

or

forgetfulness.

For

if

the

q(6aprov

of

the

world was

generally

admitted it

sufficed

to

show

at

the cost of what illogicalities Plato, while sharing this view, had yet

asserted

the

Korajov

yE'cEas-.

By

discrediting

this last

essay

in

cosmogony

the whole

approach

was

ruled

out

of

court.

During

the

twenty years

which Aristotle

spent

in

the

Academy strong

currents

were

moving

in the direction

of

the new and

"static"

cosmo-

logy.

The

Timaews

gives weighty

reasons for

putting

the

Cosmos

in the

class

of

yevo'fLva,

but,

like other

dialogues

of Plato's

last

period,

also

contains

many

thoughts

that

go

far

to counterbalance

these

reasons.6

Matters were

evidently

still

in

flux. In the

end,

however,

the

arguments

in favor of an eternal Cosmos carried the day, and at the time when

Aristotle

composed

the

First

Book

of de

caelo,

other

pupils

of

Plato

had

even

"reinterpreted"

the

Cosmogony

of

the

Timaeus,

bringing

it into

line

with the

new

orthodoxy.7

We

do not know

at

how

early

a date

Aristotle became converted

to

the

belief

in

an

eternal

Cosmos.

One

refuses to think that he

was

simply

carried

along

by

the force of

the

current,

and the

arguments

preserved

from

-rept'

<fiXocro<cs

may

give

us an idea of what he himself

did to

strengthen

it

and

make it

irresis-

tible.

When he

began

to work

out his

physical

u4o$SooL,

cosmogony

in

the form in which it

had flourished

among

the Presocratics

was

dead,

while

the

new

version

which

the Timaeus

presented

called for one more

painstaking

examination

of

its

presuppositions.

Though

Aristotle

never

says

this

in

so

many

words,

all

cosmological

theories

that were bound

up

with the

genetic

approach

must

have

seemed to

him vitiated

by

a

fundamental

misconception. Large

ques-

tions which

in the

past

had been

vigorously

debated

have

lost

their

meaning

and

are

without

further

ado omitted from

consideration.

The

cosmologist

has no

longer

to decide how

the celestial

region

was

separated

from

the

heavier

world stuff

gathered

in

the

centre,

how

the

Cosmos received its spherical shape or how the Sun, the Moon, and

the

other

heavenly

bodies

came into existence

and

settled

in

their

respective spheres.

Other

questions,

however,

are

as live

issues

for

the

new

cosmology

as

they

had been

for the old.

They may

have

been

mis-

understood

in the

past,

or

the

way

to

a

correct

answer

may

have been

blocked

a limine

by

a

faulty

general

orientation.

The more

important

then to formulate

them more

precisely

and to

attempt

a

new

solution,

starting

from

valid

premises

where the

precursors

had

been

led

astray

by

invalid

assumptions.

On

the

following

pages

we shall deal with a

number of questions which survive the fundamental change of outlook.

Re-examined

and

re-defined,

they

help

to round

off

the new

system.

266

Friedrich Solmsen







Aristotleand Presocratic

Cosmogony

For

obvious reasons

we shall

find our best

examples

in the

physical

treatises;

yet

before

we turn to them

we

may briefly

record

a

solitary

instance n the degeneratione nimalium.8 he notionthat at a particular

juncture

of cosmic

history

rudimentary

forms

of the

living beings

emerged

from

the

Earthis for Aristotle

part

and

parcel

of

the

discarded

approach.

It deserves neither

elaborate

scrutiny

nor

explicit rejection.

Yet where Aristotle

deals

with

spontaneous

generation

he

remembers

the views of his

predecessors

and

in a short

digression

graciously

sets

them

right

as to the details

of their

theories. If

the idea

that life

origi-

nated in

the

Earth were

correct,

one

could

think

of

two

ways

in

which

this

might

come

to

pass.

The

first

beings

could either

have

been

larvae

or havedevelopedfrom eggs. The latterview would as a matterof fact

accord

even better

with the

biological

facts

as

known to

Aristotle;

yet

the

point

is that

while

neither

theory

has

any

chance of

being

true

evolution

from

eggs

would

not

have

incurred the

additional

disgrace

of

assuming

something

patently impossible.

I

In

its

typical

form

Presocratic

Cosmology

includes

a

fundamental

dichotomy.

There are

powers,

"forms",

or

elements

which,

when our

worldcameinto

being,

found their

place

in the outer

regions

at,

or

near,

the

circumference.

Others,

being

less

mobile,

remain

"below"

or

in

the

centre,

"where

Earth now is ".

The

two main

divisions of the

cosmic

stuff

are

not

always

described

in

the

same terms. We

may

read,

e.g.,

that the

cold, dark,

dense,

and

moist

separated

itself

from its

oppo-

sites or that

fire and

air

broke

away,

leaving

earth

and

sea

behind.9

Again

the

modus

and

the

agents

of

this

separation,

ts

causes

and cir-

cumstances

vary

on

the

whole from

system

to

system.

However,

these

details,

while

highly

interesting

in

themselves,

are

secondary

in

impor-

tance to the idea of a

separation

as such. Even Parmenides n his

"Way

of

Opinion"

knows the

two

contrary

sets

of

"forms",

and

Plato in

the

Timaeus

escribes

the

"

swaying

"

motion

of

the

Receptacle

as

separating

the

powers

that

inform it

and

"carrying"

them

"in

different

direc-

tions".10

This

swaying

and

separating

seems

to

go

far

towards

taking

the

four

main

substantial

parts

of

the

Cosmos

-

the

elements

-

to the

specific

spaces

which

they

occupy

in

our

world. And

as

the

Receptacle

is

presumably

as

eternal

as the

Forms

(with

which it

co-operates)

we

might

here

discern

the

outlines

of

an

eternal

Cosmos. Yet it

was

not

Plato'sintention to followup such possibilities;he assuresus that these

mechanical

processes

took

place

"before

the Heaven

(i.e.

the

Cosmos)

267







came

into

being".1i

Very

essential

characteristics

of

the Cosmos

are

still

missing,

ElS3

and

apt/olt,

which

in the scheme

of

the

Timaeus

only

the conscious and purposeful action of a planning Mind, like the Demi-

urge,

can introduce.

Whatever we

choose

to make

of

their introduction

and however we

interpret

-

or

interpret

away

-

the

Demiurge,

it is

clear

that what causes

the transition

from the

precosmic

to

the cosmic

condition

is

not

an

evolutionary

or

a

mechanical

process.

This

is the

essential

point

where Plato breaks

away

from

the Presocratic

tradition.

His

cosmogony

is

teleological,

not

mechanical;

there

is

genesis

but not

evolution.

And

indeed,

Plato's

conception

of

cosmic

genesis

differs

so

radically

from his

precursors'

that one

may sympathize

with

the

troubles which many interpreters have

taken to

controvert

his own

clear

and

emphatic

statement

that the Cosmos

has

come

into

being.12

One

may

sympathize

but

not

agree.

In Aristotle's

cosmology

(as

embodied

primarily

in

-rep; ovpavov)

there is

no

Receptacle,

no

shaking,

swaying,

or

winnowing.

The

parts

of

the cosmic

stuff

again

move

apart,

yet

they

do

so

by

their

own

impulse.

The

opjnu13

is

in the

elements

themselves;

it is

the

nature,

or

part

of

the

nature,

of fire

to

move

upwards,

to

the

circumference,

of

air

to

do

likewise

and to

settle

below

the

fire,

and of

water

and earth

to

sink below

them

(vioCraOact.)

and

remain

in the centre of

the Cosmos.14

No

divine

being

and no mechanical

agency,

neither Strife nor whirl,

not

even

Mind,

is

needed

to take

each

of

the four

elements

to its

proper

place.

Their

specific

movement

and

their cosmic

place

are

equally

"natural"

to them

-

so

natural,

indeed,

that Aristotle

by

one

more

application

of this

idea,

as

simple

as

only

genius

may

conceive

it,

could

postulate

for the

one

remaining simple

movement

(scil.

the

circular)

an

element

to which

this

movement

should

be

as "natural"

as

downward

motion

to earth

and

upward

motion

to

fire.15

Now

if the

elements

are in their

cosmic

places

by

"nature",

it

may

be

presumed

that they have always been in them. There is no reason

for

supposing

that

the

condition

of

things

should

ever

have

been

different.

To

picture

the

elements

as

being

for

a

long

time

in a

pre-

cosmic

condition

means

to

deprive

them

of their

"nature".

Yet

precisely

this is

what the

Presocratics

have done.

Aristotle's

polemic

against

them

in

Book

III

of

de

caelo leads

us

to the

roots of

his

opposition

to

them.

Plato

may

easily

have been

the

only

one

in

whom

Aristotle

found

a

statement

to the

effect

that

before

the

Cosmos

came

into

being

things

were moving in a disorderly fashion,

arcKrcTWs.'6

But Aristotle considers

himself

justified

in

applying

the

concept

of

an

(aCr7KTOS

K;vjats

also

to

268

Friedrich

Solmsen







Aristotle

and

Presocratic

Cosmogony

other

physical

systems, especially

to

the behavior

of

Empedocles'

elements and

to the atoms

of

Leucippus

and Democritus.17

Examining

theirviews, he urges againstthe formerthat he expects results (to wit,

the formation

of

composite

substances)

which an

ra=cros

KLiTaLS

cannot

produce18;

against

the atomists

and Plato

he

uses

arguments

which we shall

now consider

more

closely.

Taking

up

Plato's contention

that before

the Cosmos

was

fashioned

the

material in the

Receptacle

moved

&'draKcrws,'9

ristotle

at

once

offers for

this two alternative

possibilities.

The

movement

must

have

been either natural

or

contrary

to

nature.

The latter

possibility

is

not

explicitly

rejected

or

disproved

becauseAristotle

has even before

this

insisted that whoever posits movements contraryto nature must also

posit

some that are in accordance

with

it.20 Thus

he

immediately

thinks

of

the

movements

in the

Receptacle

as

being

KCa7r&

tov

-

and

finds that

in

this

case

the

Cosmos

is in

existence. For if

the

entities

of

the

world

stuff in

the

Receptacle

move

in

accordance

with their

nature

they

must come to rest

in

their

proper

places.

The

heavy

elements

would

gather

in the

centre,

the

light

move

away

from

it

towards

the

circumference,

and

so

they

create

the

order

(KcoaLros )

hich

we

now

have.21 Thus Plato

erred when

he

spoke

of

the

movements

and

separations

in the

Receptacle

as

happening

a&rcKrcos

or &Aod'yw).

With

the

assumptions

that he made he had in fact the Cosmos.

This

implies

that

the

further

developments

which Plato

considers essential

for the

creation of

a

Cosmos

-

the

god

bringing

E3r77

nd

apLOt6oi

o

bear

on

the

Receptacle

-

are

unnecessary

and

misconceived.22

Are

we

here

after

all

given

a

proof

for the

eternity

of

Aristotle's

own

Cosmos?

It is

certainly

true that

the

arguments

here

used need

only

receive

a

slightly

different

turn

to

establish this

thesis.23

The

polemic

against

the

atomists

includes

one

argument

which is

especially

relevant

to our

purpose.24

The

atoms,

as

Aristotle

finds

them described by their proponents, move most of the time

through

infinite

space

in a

haphazard

and

disorderly

fashion

(&ocrKTws-);

he

time

during

which

they

are

settled

in

a

Cosmos and

contribute to

its

TacLS

is

comparatively

short.

If

this

were the

case,

Aristotle

reasons,

they

would

be for a

far

longer

time in a

state of

d&raeetc

han

in

one of

ra'els.

Yet a&=rata

is

contrary

to

nature,

at

least

for

Aristotle.

For

the

atomists

the

reverse

would

be true.

Disorder

would

be

in

harmony

with

nature,

order

contrary

to

it.

For

"the

nature

of

things

is

that in

which

most

of

thmos

tf

ost

of the

time

".25

That

raea:cc

hould

be in

accord-

ancewith nature is, of course,thoroughlypreposterous.It runscounter

to

one

of

Aristotle's

most

deeply

rooted

convictions;

yet

one

may

269







wonder whether

he ever

again

has an

occasion to

express

this conviction

as

tersely

and

incisively

as here:

'7

yap

arcis

77

OLKdCa

Tcv

atclOrwv

ivarct dcaiv.26

The identification is so absolute that the translators seem

to

be

in doubt

which of

the

nouns is

the

subject

and

which

the

predicate

(no

philosopher

of

identity

could

hope

for

more).

Aristotle himself

is

hardly

to be blamed

for

this;

as the

subject

is

normally

put

first

we

should

translate: "the order which

belongs

to

them is

the nature

of

sense-perceived

things".27

Confidence in

fa)rt

could not

be carried

further. What

Aristotle

in

effect

says

is

this: let

the

elements follow

their own

inherent tendencies and the

result will

be order

and

this

Cosmos. This

in fact

is

the first

premise

of

his

entire

cosmological

system.

It is

intriguing

to see that the

issue

as

Aristotle

puts

it

hinges

on

~dacr

and

-rdaLs.

All Presocratics

were

believers

in

order,

as

opposed

to the

haphazard

(even

if

they

did

not

employ

the

word

radts),

and all

may

have had a

concept

of

uvats

(even

if

they

said

vJtcs

ovSevos

7TTv.

.

6vrr7cv

and

declared

that

they

used

the

term

in deference

to

conven-

tion).28

Yet

they

would not

bring

the

concepts

together

in

this fashion.

Order

may

for

them be the

-rats

(=bidding)

of

Time

which

regulates

Becoming

and

Passing-away;

even

the

formation

and

destruction

of

entire

worlds,

and the alternation

between non-cosmic and

cosmic

phases

may

be thus "ordered".29 For

Plato,

on the other

hand,

raicts

is

definitely

realized

in

our

Cosmos;

yet

the

v'erns

f the elements

left

to itself

could neither build

it

up

nor

keep

it

going.

The

Timaeus and

Book

X of the

Laws,

though

differing

on other

points,

agree

in

this,

and

both

intimate

that

something

better,

in

fact

something

nonphysical,

be

it

vovs

or

uvx,,

must

come into

operation.30

II

Obviously the arguments which settle the questions as to the move-

ment

and

place

of

all elements would

also

apply

to

each

individual

element. The Presocratics had

suggested

reasons

why

water,

air,

and

fire are

in their

specific

cosmic

regions

and

had shown how

they

had

been

"separated

off"

and

first

come to

occupy

these

regions.3l

On

the

whole

Aristotle

saw no

need to

discuss

and refute

these reasons. In

the

case of

Earth the

situation was different.

So

many

opinions

had been

advanced

with

regard

to its

shape,

its condition

of

rest or

movement,

and

its

place

in the

Cosmos

that

even in

a

Book devoted

primarily

to

problems of the heavenly vault and the planetary spheres Aristotle did

not

think

it

right

to

ignore

these

questions

or to decide

them

by

a

brief

Friedrich

Solmsen

70







AristotleandPresocratic

Cosmogony

dogmatic

statement. In Book

II of de caelo

he reviews

the

pertinent

doctrines of his

predecessors

at considerable

ength, pointing

out

their

individual errors or fallacies.32As long as Pythagorean heories,which

remove the

Earth

from the

centre,

are

under

scrutiny,

cosmogony

is

hardly

in the

picture,

and even when

the

discussion moves

on

from

the

position

of

the Earth

to

the

question

whether it is

at

rest and

why,

Thales,

Anaxagoras,

and some others

can

be

refuted

without

making

reference to

the

genetic

scheme

of which their

doctrines

formed

a

part.

Yet

there

comes

a

point

where

Aristotle

loses

patience

with such

piece-

meal

criticism. It is after

all

not

a

controversy

over matters

of

detail:

rrpos

rovs-

oVrct

XAyovraC

. .

0. O1

7rept(

.optY

ov

Eav

t

a9L7t- ar7sa',

aAAa

7rEpc

AXov

tvos

Ka.

rravros-."From the very beginning one must

make

up

one's mind

whether

physical

bodies

are to have

natural

motion"

or whether

they

can

only

move under constraint.33

If

the

latter

view

is

true,

Earth

may

have

come

to its

present

place

in

the

centre

through

the

agency

of

some

outside

force,

Igtq,

and

must

also

remain

there

for some

special

reason. The force which

brought

it

to

the

centre

is

generally

identified as

a

whirl

by

those

oao

-ro'v

oupavov

yewJuatv

( )34;

let us

grant

this,

says

Aristotle in

effect,

it

yet

remains

to

decide

what

place

the Earth

would

occupy

if it were

left to

its

own

inclinations

and

not

subject

to the

operation

of

an

outside

force.

Aris-

totle's own theories

begin

to shine

through

his criticalstrictures.The

same

hypothesis

should

explain

motion

to

a

place

and rest in

it.

The

Presocratic

physicists

were

unwilling

to

make

the

assumption

of

natural

movements;

once it is

made

it

can

with

telling

effect be

played

off

against

every

argument

by

which

they

have

tried

to show

why

the

Earth

must

remain at rest

and in its

present

position.

Anaximander's-

elegant

suggestion

that

the

Earth

has

no

reasonto

move

in

any

direction

because it

is

equidistant

from all

parts

of the circumference s

left

for

the

finish.35

f

this were

the

reason,

Aristotle

says,

it

ought

to

hold

good

for fire as much as for earth,

yet

it does not

(since

fire still moves

"upwards").

Also,

inverting

the direction in

which he

previously

argued,

he

blames

Anaximanderfor

not

explaining

at

the same time

why

particles

of

earth move

toward the centre.36

And

finally

the

reasoning

is

not even

correct;

although

equidistant,

Earth

might

still

move

off

into

space,

and if

it

is not

likely

to do so as

a

whole

it

would

split

up

into

parts,

each

of which

would

depart

in

a

different

direction.37

Having

disposed

of all

earlier

theories Aristotle

in

the

next

chapter

advances his own: yet before he begins to develop them he finds it

necessary

to

make

one

more

stand

against

doctrines

which credit

the

27I







Friedrich

Solmsen

Earth

with an

enforced motion

(including

Plato's

famous

"oscilla-

tion").

This

would not

be

Earth's

"own

motion",

nor could

it

be

eternal since it is contrary to nature.38 This point, which is here

made as

briefly

as

I

report

it,

recalls

the

arguments

by

which

Aristotle

in

Book III of our

treatise discredits

the

idea

of

(irregular) precosmic

motions.39

And

here,

for the

first time in

this

extended

discussion,

does

Aristotle come into the

open

with

the

basic

conviction which sets

him

apart

from

nearly

all

of

his

predecessors:

"The

motion,

tliereforc,

being

enforced

and

unnatural,

could not

be

eternal;

but the order

of the

world is

eternal.

"40

He leaves

it at

that,

but

it

is

easy

to realize

that

the

eternity

of

the world which

enforced

motion

could never

safeguard

rests securely on the foundations established by his own theory of

natural

motions.

The

correct doctrine

about

the

motion of

Earth for

which

we have

waited so

long

can

now

be

announced

in

a

few short

sentences.

Like

all its

parts,

Earth

as

a

whole

has

a

natural

motion towards

the

centre;

and

this

is at the same

time the

reason

why

it is

now

lying

at the

centre.41

This statement

would almost

suffice to

explain

at

once

why

Earth is

at

rest,

but

for this

question

Aristotle

still

has

a

few

specific

arguments

in store.

Their

gist

is

that

if

Earth is now in

the

place

to

which

it moves

"by

nature",

only

force could cause it

to

leave this

place.

It

would

have

to

be

a

"stronger

force"

- and

as

long

as

we do

not

know

anything

of this

description

we

need not

worry.42

Still,

the

question

as to the

shape

of

Earth

has

not

yet

been

answered.

When

Aristotle

goes

into

it the

genetic

or

"evolutionary" approach

suddenly

acquires

a

rather

surprising

interest

for

him,

and for

once

Aristotle

even finds

it

expedient

to

operate along

the lines

of

the

y7VVewC(Vr.43

To

be

sure,

it is

the lines

which

they

would

have

followed,

had

they

been

consistent;

and

if

it

pleases

Aristotle here

to

take a leaf

out of

their

book,

he

is far from

forgetting

the

gulf

which lies between

his own approach and that of the past. The reasons which lead him to

this unusual

procedure

may

perhaps

be

called

expository,

or indeed

pedagogical..

By

proceeding

on the

assumptions

of

the

evolutionary

schools

it

becomes

easier to

give

a

cogent

proof

for

the

spherical

shape

of

the

Earth.

Suppose

the

Earth formed because

its

constituent

parts,

all

portions

and

particles

of

it,

were

moved

by

the

operation

of

a

force

towards

the centre

(say,

towards

the

centre of

a

whirl;

for this is

obviously

the

picture

in Aristotle's

mind).

How

would

the

particles

arrange

themselves?

Each

would

try

to

be

as near to

the

centre of the

Cosmos as possible, and they would continue to push and press on one

another

until

this

is

achieved.

When

none

is farther from the

centre

272







Aristotle

and Presocratic

Cosmogony

than

necessary

no

bulge

is left

anywhere

but

a

perfect

sphere

has come

into

being.

The result at which we have thus arrived

represents

Aris-

totle's own view concerningthe shape of the Earth.Being anxious to

make

its

sphericity

as evident as he

could,

he realized that

the

evolu-

tionary

schools

were at an

advantage

n the matter

(even

if

they

had

not

availedthemselves

of

it),

and

he

was

both shrewd and

unprejudiced

enough

to

exploit

it.

Still,

as if he wished to

dispell

every

possibility

of

a

misunderstanding

and not to

let

the fundamental

antagonism

become

obscured,

he

enters a word of caution

precisely

when

on the

point

of

starting

on

this

little

venture in

cosmogony:

"However,

they

(scil.

some of

the

physicists)

make

compulsion

the

cause

of the

downward

movement; it is better

to

speak

the truth and to

say

that

it is in

the

nature

of

heavy

bodies

to move towards

the

centre."44

III

The word

y7

which

Aristotle

uses

throughout

these

sections means

not

only

Earth

(or

earth)

but also

land.

When Aristotle

makes

the

natural

movements of earth account

for

the

position

of

Earth,

he

seems

to

forget

that

a

large part

of

the

Earth

actually

is

sea.

However,

as

water too

has the natural

tendency

to move

towards

the

centre,

the

arguments employed

for earth would also be

applicable

to water.

Speaking

of

the

Sea

in

his

Meteorology

Aristotle

says

that

what

is com-

monly

called its

place

is

in truth

the

(natural) place

of water.45

The

reason

why

this is not

readily

seen is that

the

water

here collected

has

a

peculiar

quality

of saltiness.

In

the

section

of the

Meteorology

where

Aristotle clears

up

these

matters

we

find

him once

more locked

in

battle with the

cosmogonies.

Their authors

have

used

the

fact

that

water has

its natural cosmic

place

as

starting

point

for

erroneous

nferences,

and

their

explanations

for the saltiness of the sea areoff the mark.46Yet in the presentcontext

these

inferences and

explanations

are

of

no more

than

peripheral

interest.

Once

again

the

controversy

is

rrep'

OAov

7tvwO

KCL

xrrco'av;

here

too Aristotle

attacks the

genetic

approach

as

such.

Does the

sea

have an

origin,

a

history,

and a

limited

period

of

exis-

tence?

Some

of

Aristotle's

predecessors

have

maintained

that

at

first

the

entire

Earth was

moist,

and

that

through

the

action of

the

Sun

a

part

of

it

dried

up.47

On this

account

the sea

would

be

what is

left of

the

original

moisture.

We

know

from

Alexander's

commentary48

that

these doctrines go back to Anaximander and may believe Aristotle when

he

says

that

according

to

this

theory

the

drying up

is

a

continuing

273







Friedrich

Solmsen

process

which

in

the

end

will lead

to the

total

evaporation

and

dis-

appearance

of the

sea.

Aristotle

himself mentions

elsewhere

in these

chapters Democritus as holding that the sea is gradually decreasing and

will

some

day

disappear.49

We need

not hunt

for

further

names

of

physicists

associated

with similar doctrines

concerning

an

origin

or

an

end of

the

sea;

for

we have Aristotle's

own

words:

"All seem

to

be

agreed

that

the

sea

had

a

beginning

if

the Universe

had."

Admitting

a

certain

logic

in

this

coupling

of

the

two doctrines

Aristotle

forthwith

defies

both

by

presenting

their

opposites

similarly

interlocked:

"It

is

clear that if

the

Universe

is eternal

the

sea

is too."50

Actually

the

fundamental

issue is for

Aristotle

decided,

the

eternity

of

the Cosmos

no longer open for debate. Yet the notion that the water of the sea

gradually

evaporates

touches

a

vulnerable

point

in

Aristotle's

own

armory.

For

evaporations

from

land and water are

the

basic

assumptions

(the

pcpxat)

f

his

own

Meteorology.51

Throughout

this work

atmospheric

phenomena

are with

great

persistence

traced back

to their

origin

in

this

principle.

Moreover,

for

Aristotle, too,

the Sun is

the

"moving

cause" of

evaporation.

All

this

puts

him

dangerously

close

to

the

doctrines

with which

he

is

so

thoroughly

out of

sympathy.

Fortunately

evaporation,

even

if

a

continuous

or recurrent

process,

may yet

leave

the

bulk

of

the

sea

unimpaired.

Aristotle

has earlier

in

the

treatise shown

that

there

is

an

eternal

"cycle".

When

the Sun

is

close

to the

Earth

the moisture

which it

draws from

the sea

rises

up

as

evaporation;

yet

when

the

Sun recedes

the same

amount of

moisture

returns

in

the

form of

rain

or other

precipitation.

Here

is

again

an

instance

of

ra?ct,52

of the

cosmic order

which

safeguards

the balance

between

the

elements,

keeping

their

mutual

relations

and

proportions

over the

years

and indeed

forever

unchanged.

Still,

there

is definite

evidence of

a

different

type

that

the

area

covered

by

the sea is

gradually

reduced. Aristotle

and

his

contempo-

raries knew that rivers,

by

a

steady depositing

of earthy material

around

their

estuaries,

create

new

land,

forcing

the sea into

a con-

tinuous,

if

very

slow,

withdrawal. Lower

Egypt

with

the

Delta

was

the

classic

example

of

a

country

which

could

be

regarded

as

the

"gift

of

the

river".53

It

appears

that

observations

of the

kind were

used

in

the

cosmogonies

to bolster

the case

for

a

drying

up

of

the

sea,54

and

although

Aristotle's

own

system

allows

for

changes

in the

sublunary

world,

every

argument

for the

destruction

of one of

its

parts

is

potentially

an

argu-

ment

against

the

eternity

of the Cosmos.

Aristotle

has no choice

but

to

admit the action of the rivers; but against the far-reaching conclusions

he asserts

that such

increases

of

land

are counterbalanced

by huge

rain-

274







Aristotle

and

Presocratic

Cosmogony

storms

and

floods

which

occur,

or

rather

recur,

"in

determined

(edfap^Evwv)

periods",

putting large

areas

under

water

and

changing

the distribution of land and sea violently in the opposite direction.55

Thus

in

the

long

run the

proportion

between water

and

earth

remains

the

same and

the

changes

themselves

are

again

governed

by

a

cycle.

The

flood

motif

which serves

Aristotle's

interest

so well

goes

back

to

the

Academic

theory

of

periodic

catastrophes

which

is familiar

from

Plato's latest

dialogues.""

Yet

when Plato

speaks

of these

catastrophes

he is

not

primarily

concerned

with

cosmic

raLtsL.

The idea

of an

inner

balance

within the

one

Cosmos,

of

an

equilibrium

between

the

changes

of

"the

way

up"

and

"the

way

down",

carries

other

credentials.

It

would

be

tempting to examine these credentials, for there can be little

doubt that in the

lMeteorology

sometimes

in

effect

one

set of

Presocratic

doctrines is

played

off

against

another. Yet

a

study

of

this

question

would

be,

in

Aristotle's

words,

oA

s

Aoyos

and

-re'paS

'pyov

aXoAhs.

IV

In

the

instances

so

far

examined

the

continuity

of the

problem

and

with

it

the

points

of contact

or

conflict

were

easy

to

recognize.

Our

last

topic presents

a

somewhat

different

picture.

For

although

Aristotle

himself

brings

out the

continuity

at

the

beginning

of the

discussion,

he

soon

transfers

the

problem

to

a

plane

where

Presocratic antecedents

are

no

longer

relevant.

Book

VIII

of the

Physics,

which

leads

us

step

by

step

to the

concept

of

the

Unmoved

Mover,

opens

appropriately

with the

question

whether

or

not

Movement

must

be

eternal and

unceasing.

It

is

stated at

once57

that.

the

physicists,

inasmuch as

they

concern

themselves

with Cosmo-

gony

and

similar

matters,

logically

assume

the

reality

of

IKcatrs.

Yet

while

unanimous on

this

point,

they

differ

as

to the eternal

and

uninter-

rupted existence of Movement. Some believe in it; others assume that

before

the

formation of

our

Cosmos or

between the

disintegration

of

one

Cosmos

and

the

origin

of

another

there is

a

time

of

complete

rest

in

which

movement

and

change

have

passed

out

of existence.58

To

Aristotle

himself,

the

idea

that

Movement

may

not

always

have

existed

or

that

it

may

periodically

die

down seems

utterly

erroneous

and

he

proceeds

forthwith to

refute

it.

One

of

his

arguments

against

it

runs as

follows59:

If

there

is at

times

rest,

and then

again

movement,

this

change

must

be

accounted

for;

it

must

be

assumed

that

while

at

rest things were not in the right condition for movement (or the mover

not

in

the

right

condition

to

operate),

and

that before

they

move the

275







Friedrich

Solmsen

right

condition

has somehow come

about. There is

more

than

one

way

in which

this

might

happen

but each

of

them

would

involve

change,

which comes to the same as saying that there is even then Movement.

This

argument

may

be

developed

into

something

like an

infinite

regress,

and Aristotle on

one

occasion

comes

near

to

giving

it

this

turn.60

Yet

the

alternation between rest

and movement

is to his

mind

sufficiently

disproved

if movement

as

understood

in

this scheme

is

preceded

(not

by

rest

but)

by

another

change

or

movement.

As

we

have

seen,

Aristotle at

the

beginning

of this

disquisition

lays

his

finger

on

the

point

in the Presocratic scheme where

the

question

as

to

eternity

or

noneternity

of Movement

becomes

acute

and

where

the

various thinkers actually diverge. The divergence occurs in the assump-

tions

on

which

they

base

their

cosmogony.61

Some make

the Cosmos

arise

from

a

condition

in

which

everything

was

at

a

standstill;

others

hold

that Movement

persists

while some worlds

are

forming,

some

dis-

integrating.

Although

recent studies62

have

taught

us to

approach

such

historical

accounts

in Aristotle

with

a

large

dose

of

scepticism,

I

believe

that in

this

instance

he is

fundamentally

correct

and that he

here

brings

a

real

and

major

division

among

his

precursors

into focus.

Whether

more

recent historians

of

early

Greek

philosophy

have

made

the

best

possible

use of

his

insight may

be

another

question;

it

must

as

a

matter

of

fact be

admitted

that we cannot

accept

all matters

of

detail

as

he

presents

them.

If

we

find that

Plato

knows

of the same

division

among

the

Pre-

socratics,

we

may

not

have settled

the

question

of historical

accuracy

but

begin

to realize

that

Aristotle's

familiarity

with the

issue has

roots

in his

academic

period.

While

settling

accounts,

in the

Laws,

with

the

materialistic

cosmologies

of

the

past,

Plato asks:

El crrcTLr

ros

rac

avra

OLtOV

yEVOdMevC,

KciXa7Trep

L

TrAXelcrrot

wv

rotovt;rv

TroA

'at

Aeyelr,

-rV'

capo

v

vY

o7

roS

avyKT7 rrpcorTv

Klv7crt

yevEcroaL;63

(his

answer

is

of

course the motion of a self-mover like his World-Soul). The conditional

clause

is

clearly

aimed

at

Anaxagoras,

whose

oiuov

vrarvra

Plato

quotes.64

He

is here

made

to

represent

the

"majority",

but

the

word

TrrAerarol

should

perhaps

not

be

taken

quite

literally.

Or is

it

the

fault

of

our

defective

information

if

ol

nrAXei-rot

eem

to be

on

the

other

side?

The

atomists

certainly

believed

in

unceasing

motion.

Heraclitus

(to

mention

him

here,

although

he

has no

cosmogony) specifies

the

changes

of

the

"ever-Iiving"

Fire.65

Anaximenes'

and

Diogenes'

principle,

the

Air,

is

so mobile

by

nature

that

we

cannot

think of

it as

ever

being

arrested.

Finally, there is evidence - not entirely above doubt, yet not easy to

dismiss either

-

that

Anaximander's

Infinite

was

eternally

in

motion.*6

276







Aristotle and Presocratic

Cosmogony

Who,

then,

are

otl TAcElroL

of our

passage?

Besides

Anaxagoras

himself and

Archelaus,

who

appears

to

have shared

his initial

assump-

tions,67 Empedocles is perhaps the only one to answer the description.

Aristotle,

in

Physics

VIII,

classes him

with

Anaxagoras

and

quotes

five

lines from

his

poem

as

proof

that there were

intervals of Rest

between

the

activity

of Love

and

of

Strife.68

Actually,

the lines

prove

nothing

of

the

kind,

but

describe the

eternally

unchanging

behavior

of

the

elements.

We

are,

however,

in

a

position

to substitute

another

passage

for

that

so

cruelly

mishandled

by

Aristotle.

Jaeger

has shown

that in

the

charac-

terization

of the

Sphairos

as

KuKAo-rep-S

MovI7

TepLrJyet

yaCIw,

the

word

tLovlr)

an

hardly,

as

formerly

understood,

mean "solitude"

but

must

denote the condition of rest.69 In Empedocles' cycle the Sphairos

exists before

the formation

of

a new

Cosmos

by

the action

of

Strife.

Thus Aristotle

is,

in

spite

of

his

howler,

not

entirely wrong,

and

we

have

one other

great

thinker

in the

camp

of Plato's

"majority".

Actually,

Jaeger's

new

interpretation

may

help

us still

a

step

further.

As he

reminds

us,

/LOVv

s an

attribute

of

Parmenides'

One,

and

Empe-

docles was anxious to

begin

his world

cycle

with

a

condition

of

things

that

resembled,

or

corresponded

to,

the

One. The

cycle

starts

from the

One and

from

Rest

and

returns

to

it.

It

may

well

have

been

the

impact

of

Parmenides'

thought

which

prompted

some later Presocratics

to

abandon the

idea of

eternal

motion.

Empedocles

and

Anaxagoras70

still'have at

the

outset

of

the

cosmic

evolutions the undifferentiated

homogeneous

condition

of

things

which

had characterized Anaxi-

mander's

apeiron;

but instead of

being

in

motion,

everything

is

now at

rest.71

From

the

tone

in

which

the

Laws

refer

to

this

cosmological hypo-

thesis72

one

may

gather

which side Plato

himself

would

join.

The idea

that all

things-

i.e.,

all

physical

objects

-

should

ever

be

at

rest

is,

in

his

eyes,

not

merely

an

error

but

something

close

to

blasphemy,

a

form of hybris

(note

-roA,LcuL ).

To him it is as much in the nature of

physical

things

to

change

as it

is in

the

nature of the Forms to

be

forever

unchanging.

In

point

of

fact,

his

own

cosmic

system

makes

ample

provision

for

a

never-failing presence

of Movement.

Even

"before

this

ordered

whole

came into

being",

there is the

so-called

disorderly

motion in

the

Receptacle

due to

the

appearance

in

it

of

different

and

unevenly

balanced

powers.73

This

motion

is one of

the

features

which

distinguish

Plato's

scheme from

that

of

Anaxagoras,

whom

he

follows in

regarding

the divine Nous

as the

agent

effecting

the change from this condition to that of a Cosmos. After the Cosmos

has

come

into

being

there

is

the

World-Soul

with its

"never-ceasing

277







Friedrich

Solmsen

motion"

and,

closely

allied

to

it,

on

a

more

physical

plane,

"the

revolution

of

the whole"

which

keeps

the

elements

of

the

world con-

stantly moving through and past one another, ensuring eternal trans-

formation

as well as

exchange

of

places.'7

We

are not

surprised

to

find

Aristotle

arriving

in

principle

at

the

same

decision. His

conviction that Movement

is

eternal

and that there

can

be

no

physical

world without

it must

go

back

to his

Academic

period.

As we

have

seen,

he

begins

his

discussion

of the

question

by

referring

to the

place

which Movement

-

whether held

to be

eternal

or not

-

had had

in the

Presocratic

cosmogonies;

yet

while he

criticizes

both

the

fundamental

error

and also

the more

specific

assumptions

of

Empedocles and Anaxagoras, for both of whom Movement is not

eternal,

he

says

little about the

others

with whom

he would be

in

agreement

on

this cardinal

point.

And

yet

it is clear

that

eternal

move-

ment as he

conceives

of

it

has

little

in

common with

the

theories

embodied

in

the

cosmogonies.

For

him,

Movement

did not

exist

before

our

world

came

into

existence;

still

less

does

it

encompass

the

formation

and

destruction

of innumerable

simultaneous

or successive

Cosmoi.

In

his

system

eternal movement

is forever

tied to

one

and

the

same

Cosmos.

Movement, Cosmos,

and

Time

are

coeternal,

and

the

never-broken

movement

that

he himself

has

in mind is the

rotation

which

is

performed

by

the

heavenly

sphere

and

inspired

by

the

perfection

of the Unmoved

Mover.

Yet

Aristotle

does

not

trouble

to

indicate

where

he

leaves

the

Pre-

socratic

schools

behind.

Having

refuted

those

who

thought

of

Move-

ment

as

suffering

interruptions

or

starting

from

a

state of

rest,

he

has

no

desire

for

further

discussion

with

the

authors

of

cosmogonies.

The

correct

identification

of the

perpetual

movement75

does

not

emerge

from

an

examination

of

their

mistaken

views.

He

has in

a

later

section

of

Book

VIII

once

more

to

argue

for the

existence of

Movement,

this

time

against

the

(Eleatic)

acrr&t7es

whom he in

good

Academic fashion

pits

against

the

(Heraclitean)

KLvorvrEs76;

yet

this

argument

can

be

won

without

resort

to

cosmology

or

cosmogony.

And

when he

reaches

the

point

where

he

has to

specify

the

nature

of

his eternal

movement,77

he

proceeds

by

examining

all forms

or

species

of

change

and

deciding

that

only

circular

motion

can

continue forever.

Thus

the

question

whose

roots

he

had traced

to

Presocratic

cosmogony

is settled

in

an

atmosphere

totally

indifferent

to

the

original

issue

and

impervious

to

its

repercussions.

That

the

first

chapter

of Book

VIII

is closer

to

this

issue need not astonish us after we have seen how acute it was for Plato

in the

Tinmaeus

nd

even

in the Laws. We

may suppose

that

Aristotle's

278







Aristotle and Presocratic

Cosmogony

own

acquaintance

with

it

goes

back

to a

time

when

the

alternative

assumptions

of

Presocratic

cosmogonies

had

not

yet

passed

into

the

limbo of discardedproblems.78

NOTES

i.

de caelo

1,3.27oa2off.

2.

See

esp.

frgg.

I8

and

9ga-c

Ross.

Cf.

Jaeger's

reconstruction

Aristotle.

Fundamentals

of

a

History of

his

Development

(2nd

Engl.

ed.),

I39ff.

Of

the

num-

erous later

studies

only

two

can here be

mentioned:

E.

Bignone,

L'Aristotele

Perduto e

la

formazione

filos.

di

Epicuro

(Florence,

I936), 2.335ff.,

and

A.

J.

Festugiere,

La revdlation

d'Hermes

Trismegiste 3

(Paris,

1949),

2I9ff.

3. de caelo I,Io.279b4f.

4.

See

esp.

o1.279gb7-31;

I2.

5.

0o.28oai

-25

can

hardly

be

considered an

answer.

6. Tim.

28b4ff.

A

strong

reason

against

yvearso

would

be the

presence

of

a

Soul,

for Plato

elsewhere

an

&pX-

and

ayerivrov

(Plhaedr.

245dI).

And to

think of

the Cosmos

as

ycyovo's

yet

presumably existing

forever

(33a, 4ib)

is

indeed

an

unsatisfactory

halfway position.

7.

de

caelo

I,Io.279b32ff.

Cf.

Simplicius

ad

loc.

and

also the

scholion

of

Simplicius

in Paul

Lang,

De

Speutsippi

Academici

scriptis

(Diss.

Bonn,

1911),

79

(frg.

54b).

Further

material for the

Academic

interpretation

or

reinterpreta-

tion will be

found in

Harold

Cherniss,

Aristotle's Criticism

of

Plato and

the

Academy I (Baltimore, 1944), 432 n. 356.

8.

III,i

.762b28-763a23.

9.

See

for

these

examples

H.

Diels and W.

Kranz,

Die

Fragmente

der

Vorsokratiker

(8th

ed.,

Berlin,

1954-6,

henceforth

cited

as

Vorsokr.),

59BI5

(Anaxagoras); 3IA30,

49

(Empedocles).

Cf.

also the

coroKpLass

-rcv

vavrZvwv

n

Anaximander,

ibid.

I2A9

(and Io).

io.

Ibid.

28B53ff

.;

Plato,

Tim.

52eff.

I.

Tim.

53a7;

cf.

52d4.

I2. Tim.

28b4ff.

13.

Cf.

Arist.

Physics II,I.Igz2b8.

14.

See

esp.

de

caelo

III,2;

IV,3-5.

15.

de caelo

I,2f.;

see

esp.

2.269azff.

16. Tim.

30a3-6;

cf.

53a7f.,

69b3.

I7.

For

what

follows,

cf.

de caelo

III,2.3oob8-30Iaio.

18.

Ibid.

3oob25ff.

19.

Ibid.

i6ff.

20.

Ibid.

300a2o-b8.

21.

Ibid.

300bI9-25.

22. Cf.

above,

p.

268

23.

Cf.

rrcp;

Aoao0oaaS,

rg.

i9b

Ross

(p.

88.1-24).

24.

For

what

follows

see de

caelo

30oa4--

I.

25.

Ibid.

7ff.

What

is

it

that

Aristotle

considers

"absurd and

impossible"

in

the

atomist

system?

ro

drriepov

eraKrov

;XetV

KL'raYLv

(a7).

Here

creLpov could

either mean "the Infinite" or could modify

KLv-7o0v.

ut we can hardly find in

it

the

time factor

which

is so

essential

for

Aristotle's

retort. If

we look at

Io+

c.P.

279







Simplicius' commentary

we

begin

to wonder

whether

he

did

not read

ro

a-irepov

iv

&retip? Xpo6vu

aCraCfrov

xCv

KtYaQvL.

This

at

least is

the form

in

which he

pre-

sents

Aristotle's

sentence and that

iv

awerpp

Xpodvp

is

part

of the

quotationis

proved

(pace

Heiberg)

by

his

cxegesis

which

presupposes

and in the end

repeats

these

words.

It

might

seem more

elegant

to write

ro

<aTretpov povov

jro>

7rErtpov

,raKov

Xev

Ktl7arv,

but

1

should

prefer

to

accept

Simplicius'

words.

26.

30Ia5f.

27.

It

is

instructive

to

compare

the

renderings

of

J.

L.

Stocks

in

the

Oxford

Translation and of

W.

K.

C. Guthrie

in

the

Loeb

Library. Simplicius

takes

ra4cs

as

the

subject

but

is silent on

the

more

difficult

question

how

to

construe

the words

in

the

genitive.

28. Cf.

Empedocles

in

Vorsokr.

3iB8.

On the

meaning

of

-rads

before

the

4th century,

cf.

Hermann

Frankel,

Wege

und

Formen

frihgriech.

Denkens

(Munich,

1955),

i88 and

n.

3.

29. Cf. Empedocles B31.2f. On raers in Anaximander B i cf. Jaeger, Paideia

(Engl.

transl.)

I2, i59,

and

the

Theology

of

the

Early

Greek

Philosophers,

35f.

For

Heraclitus see

below,

p.

275.

30.

Tim.

3oaff.;

52eff.

(see

above,

p.

268);

Legg.

889a-899b.

31.

See,

e.g.,

Vorsokr.

i2Aio,

27

(Anaximander); 3IA49

(Empedocles);

59AI.8,

42,

BI5

(Anaxagoras).

The

Epicurean

doctrine

as

presented

by

Lucretius

5,432-508

reflects

the

Presocratic

pattern.

32.

Ch.

13.293aI7-296a23.

For a

closer

study

of

these sections

cf.

Harold

Cherniss,

Aristotle's Criticism

of

Presocratic

Philosophy

(Baltimore, i935),

200ff.

33. 294b30ff.

34. 295a9f., 2Iff.

35. 295b Iff.

36.

296aiff.

(cf.

295bI9ff.).

37.

296a3ff.;

I9ff.

38.

II,I4.296a25ff.

39.

See

above,

p.

269.

40.

296a32ff.

4I.

296b6ff.

42.

Ibid.

26ff.;

34ff.

43.

For

what

follows,

cf.

especially

297a8-25

and

also

a25-bi7.

44. 297aI5-7;

cf. also

bi4-7.

45. Mleteor. II,2.355a34ff. (cf. 354b5ff.).

46.

Ibid.

2.354b 5ff.;

3.357a4-b23.

47. II,I.353b6ff.;

see also

for

Democritus'

theory

3.356b

off.,

and

for

Empe-

docles'

entirely

different views

regarding

the

genesis

of the

sea

I.353bI2f.

48.

See Vorsokr.

12A27.

49.

See Note

47.

50.

Meteor.

II,3.356b7ff.

5

I.

Ibid.

I,4.34ib7ff.

52. I,9.346b2I-32; b36-347a8;

II,2.354b24-34; 355.2zff.

(25ff.).

For

the

rc6cS

motif see

347a5f.

53.

I,I4.35iai9ff.;

b28ff.

(for

Egypt

in

particular

cf.

Herodotus

2.5,

ioff.).

54.

Ibid.

352a17ff.

55. Ibid. 28ff. (cf. 35Iai9ff.). The flood which recurs

7-repdt8ouTcvoSlEyacA7

is

a

ieycar

Xetrtuvcorresponding

to

the winter in

the seasons

of

the

year

(3I).

280

Friedrich

Solmse7n







Aristotle

and

Presocratic

Cosmogony

Here one

may

find a

suggestion

of the annus

magnus

or

rgAeoS

evavtro'

(P1.,

Tim.

39d4)

but Aristotle

shows

no inclination

to

develop

this

idea.

On

the

periodic

floods

cf.

Jaeger,

Aristotle

I37.

56.

Plato,

Crit.

io8c,

rI2aff.,

Tim.

220,

250,

Legg.

3,677aff.

57. Phys.

VIII,I.250ob5.

58.

Ibid.

i8ff.

Sir

David

Ross

in

his

edition

(Aristotle's Physics, Oxford,

1936)

has

improved

the text in b22

but

it

still

is

not

entirely

clear what

cosmo-

logical

convictions Aristotle here

ascribes

to

Empedocles.

Is

he here

rcpre-

sented as

believing

in one

Cosmos,

alternating

between

stages

of

integration

and

disintegration (cf.

de caelo

I,Io.28oai2-23)?

59.

25ia8-bIo.

60.

252axff.

61.

See

again 25obI8ff.

62.

Most

notably

Harold

Chemiss'

book

(see

above,

Note

32).

63. Legg. Io,895a6ff.

64.

Vorsokr.

59BI

(also B4;

2.34.17).

Diels-Kranz

(see

Note

9)

have

not

incorporated

P1.

Legg.

Io,895a6f.

in

their collection

of testimonia

for

Anaxa-

goras.

Some

passages

in

59A

(scil.

A45,

48,

50, 59,

64)

attest that

his

Cosmos

evolved out

of

Eorcrcra

and

oKtiyrCr

but this

important

idea would be

more

adequately represented

if

Arist.

Phys.

VIII,I.25ob24

and

de caelo

III,2.3oIaI2f.

were

quoted

and

the

statements

of Eudemus

(A59)

and

Simplicius

(A45;

2.I8.27ff.

and

A.64;

2.21.37ff.)

treated

as

developments

of,

or

comments

on,

the

passage

in

the

Physics.

65.

See ibid.

67Ai6, i8ff.;

22B30f.

66.

Ibid.

I2A9,

II

(2),

I2. For some

recent comments see

Cherniss,

op.

cit.

173, n. I28; J. B. McDiarmid H.S.C.Ph.6I (I953), 142, n. 62; Gregory Vlastos

Gnomon

27

(I955),

74,

n.

I.

67.

Ibid.

6oA4,

5.

68.

25ob26-25ia5

(cf.

Vorsokr.

3IB17.9ff.

or

26.8ff.).

69.

Vorsokr.

3

B28;

Jaeger,

The

Theology

(see

Note

29) I4If.

A similar

view

is

taken

in L.

&

S.

s.v.

ojov(?.

70.

See

esp.

Vorsokr.

59BI.

7I.

If

this

is

so,

a

certain

difficulty

or

illogicality

which

results

from

the

new

apPXj

ay

also

be

traced

to the

influence of Parmenides. How can

Empedocles'

cycle

be

interrupted by

a

phase

of

rest?

The

state of

complete

submergence

of

all

individuality

in

the

One

would

logically

be

what

Aristotle

calls

a

"now",

a

mere

instant

and

in no sense a division of time. How then can there be "rest" ?

In

Anaxagoras

the

difficulty

takes

another form. If what

Aristotle

(252aI4ff.)

says

is

true and

the

Rest

lasted "an

infinite

time", why

should

Novs

all

of

a

sudden

become

active

(cf.

Aristotle's own

criticism,

loc.

cit.)?

One

wonders

whether

the

new

motif

which

has

invaded

the

cosmogonies

has not

disturbed

their

original

time

scheme and

evolutionary

pattern.

If Timaeus

48e-53c

were

not

to

be

interpreted

as

showing

a

pre-cosmic

phase

but as

written

8&acraKaA2ra

^vEKa

and

presenting

things

as

they

would be in

the absence

of a

teleological

principle,

the

same

interpretation

might

with

equal

justice

be

applied

to

Anaxagoras'

initial

condition of

things

(cf.

Vorsokr.

59A64).

Yet

both

have

-

at

some

cost

-

retained

the

pattern

of

cosmology

and we had better

respect

this.

72.

See

above,

p.

276.

73. Tim. 52cff.

74.

Ibid.

36c4ff.,

e3ff.,

58a4ff.

28t







282

Friedrich Solmsen

75.

Phys.

VIII,

7-9.

76.

Ibid.

3.253a24ff., esp. 32-254a1;

cf.,

e.g.,

Plato,

Theaet.

i8ocff.

(also

I

52dff.).

77.

See

again

Phys.

VIII,

7-9,

esp.

26Ia28-262b8;

264bg-265bi6.

78.

Gregory

Vlastos

has

kindly

given

me

the

benefit

of his

advice

and

criticism.

Documents

Aristotle and Presocratic cosmogony.pdf